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March 2, 2026

Why we shouldn’t abandon handwriting at school

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Atheena Johnson, Docteure en linguistique appliquée, Université Paris Nanterre

Over the decades, technological devices have been gradually integrated into language learning, as is recently the case with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

Does the sophistication of these tools eventually render pencils and pens obsolete? Or can digital uses be combined with manual writing? How does writing keep its value for the human being?

Pen or keyboard: an impact on memorisation

Handwriting has long been associated with memory and learning. It was in 1829 that the keystroke first appeared. It, thereafter, became common in 1867 thanks to the first manual typewriter. While students of the past learned to write exclusively by hand, today’s students alternate between screens and paper. However, research shows that these modalities do not have the same effects on memorisation and retention, and essentially, the acquisition of knowledge.

In a 2014 study, students were better able to answer analytical questions if they took their notes by hand. A 2017 study found that 20-25-year-old students retained the information they wrote by hand longer than the information that they typed on a keyboard.

In addition, it was discovered that students who used artificial intelligence from the stage of their
first draft remembered very little of what was actually written when they were tested for their ability to cite a text, unlike those who had composed their own texts from the draft stage. Finding a balance between written and digital production is, therefore, very important.

Less lexical richness in digitally produced written work

In an experiment conducted in 2019, before the generative AI boom that we know, we compared the handwritten and typewritten productions of students in English. We found a lesser lexical richness in typed productions, which confirmed the trends mentioned above.

There were 58 university participants in the study, each producing a typewritten text and a handwritten text at an interval of one week. The experiment took place as part of the preparation for a final evaluation. Participants could not use resources during the production: no dictionary or self-correction tools.

The objective of the study was to determine whether there were linguistic differences according to the mode of production. We were interested in the stylistic aspects, such as the informational value of the texts and the way they were arranged, as well as lexical aspects.

The majority of the texts showed a statistically similar informational value and textual organisation. This suggested that the mode of production did not influence the stylistic approaches used.

Regarding lexical diversity, however, the observation was not the same. Lexical richness was much greater in most handwritten productions. The typed productions had lexical weaknesses that were not present in the handwritten productions of the same participants.

These results may have implications for teaching English and how students are encouraged to produce their written texts.

Writing on screen is a learned competence

Since the digital transition has been condoning the pen to the closet, several countries have looked at the impact of digital uses on written skills: Spain, the United States and France.

However, recent studies highlight the importance of specific writing strategies for student progression, such as planning or proofreading. If handwritten production develops capabilities that the keyboard does not develop, keyboard mastery remains an essential but demanding skill.

The difficulties in writing today are primarily due to the place that it is given, receiving less priority in school curricula in Europe, the United States or China. What is of fundamental consideration is that the production methods are different at three levels.

Firstly, typewriting and handwriting take place in distinct spatial frameworks. Writing occurs in a unified space while typing takes place in two separate spaces: on the screen and on the keyboard.

Secondly, the way in which the individual composes with the spatial differences when planning, transcribing and revising a text is also very different. Finally, the perception and uses of students vary according to the production methods.

This is why it is important to continue to emphasise the cognitive benefits of handwriting at school and elsewhere, while becoming aware of the formal training that digital writing implies so that students reach the same level of fluidity on screen as on paper. In class, it is a matter of thinking about the options offered in terms of writing tools. It remains to be seen what the impact of the increasing use of AI will be on written production, where writing mastery is equally essential and demanding.

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Atheena Johnson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Why we shouldn’t abandon handwriting at school – https://theconversation.com/why-we-shouldnt-abandon-handwriting-at-school-276210

March 2, 2026

Suplemento cultural: el cine español de 2025

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Claudia Lorenzo Rubiera, Editora de Cultura, The Conversation

Bruno Núñez y Sergi López en una fotografía promocional de _Sirât_. BTeam Producciones

Una versión de este texto se publicó por primera vez en nuestro boletín Suplemento cultural, un resumen quincenal de la actualidad cultural y una selección de los mejores artículos de historia, literatura, cine, arte o música. Si quiere recibirlo, puede suscribirse aquí.

La del título es una expresión manida, lo sé, pero también cierta. Y probablemente este año más que ninguno. Aunque, como todas las quinielas pronosticaban, hubo dos películas que coparon muchos de los Premios Goya que se entregaron el sábado (con Los domingos llevándose el de Mejor Película), el 2025 ha sido un año excelente para la, y perdonen otra vez el cliché, cosecha.

Déjenme resumirles los hitos de este año: se consiguió el premio Panorama del público en el Festival de Cine de Berlín con una ópera prima; se enviaron dos películas a la sección oficial del Festival de Cannes –una de las cuales salió premiada y ahora tiene dos nominaciones a los Óscar–; un equipo de sonido compuesto por mujeres conquistó una de esas nominaciones, la primera hecha íntegramente a mujeres; una película española consiguió la Concha de Oro en el Festival de San Sebastián; el público acudió en masa a las salas a ver películas no precisamente “fáciles” pero que han atraído audiencias y presentado debates y, entre otras cosas, se habló (con éxito) de historias de seres humanos que no siempre salen en la gran pantalla.

En el 40 aniversario de los Goya celebremos que en los últimos meses hayamos podido ver filmes como Sorda, Sirāt, Romería, Los domingos, Ciudad sin sueño, La cena, Maspalomas, Tardes de soledad, La furia, Muy lejos, Una quinta portuguesa, Un fantasma en la batalla o La buena letra, entre otros muchos.

Y para brindar por ello tenemos dos artículos nuevos (además de otros que se han ido publicando a lo largo del año) que explican, por un lado, la espiritualidad en Sirāt, la película de Oliver Laxe, y, por otro, el diseño sonoro de este filme y de Sorda, de Eva Libertad. Son dos análisis estupendos que ayudan a entender las profundidades de sus historias y también el hecho de que, en el cine, la técnica siempre funciona cuando está al servicio de aquello que se quiere contar al espectador.

Por cierto, aprovecho este hueco para mirar al pasado. El Goya de Honor recayó en el cineasta, escritor, artista y hombre que lo hace todo Gonzalo Suárez. Hace un tiempo publicamos un artículo que repasaba su carrera y que, sobre todo, destacaba su tremenda libertad a la hora de abordarla. Su discurso de la gala es, como todo lo de Suárez, imprescindible: “El cine es el último reducto en el que podemos soñar despiertos”.

También me gustaría recuperar un tema atemporal que lanzamos en 2024 por estas mismas fechas y que utilizaba siete títulos españoles para explicar en qué consiste eso que muchas veces llamamos “lenguaje cinematográfico”. Porque no hay nada como los ejemplos con obras maestras para hacernos entender algunos conceptos.

La otra cara de Estados Unidos

Las recientes protestas contra la detención de migrantes en Minneapolis y la despiadada reacción del gobierno estadounidense provocaron que muchos de los que seguíamos el desarrollo de la acción desde la distancia buscásemos refugio en la cultura.

Por un lado, se multiplicaron las referencias a la película Civil War, dirigida por Alex Garland y estrenada hace casi dos años, en la que un Estados Unidos distópico vive un conflicto civil bajo el mandato de un presidente autoritario que ostenta un (ilegal) tercer mandato.

Por otro, el sector musical, que se ha mostrado más combativo que Hollywood, dio la cara una vez más. Si la semana pasada los irlandeses U2 lanzaban por sorpresa un EP que analizaba los diferentes conflictos mundiales, incluidos los asesinatos de dos norteamericanos en las calles de esa ciudad, hace casi un mes era el jefe de todo esto, el mismo Springsteen, quien ponía música a la ira que le consumía.

Un crimen limpio

Recuerdo la época en leí las novelas de Henning Mankell como una de las más disfrutonas y, a la vez, sórdidas de mi vida lectora. Mankell desarrollaba asesinatos y truculencias mientras desnudaba la sociedad sueca y yo vivía enganchada a los casos del inspector Wallander. Al final tuve que desintoxicarme porque el mundo que él presentaba parecía tan real como cruel.

Como no todo van a ser tragedias, aprovechamos dos aniversarios (el centenario de la publicación de la novela El asesinato de Roger Ackroyd y los cincuenta años del fallecimiento de su autora, Agatha Christie) para rebuscar en lo que ahora se llama el cozy crime, que no es otra cosa que la investigación de crímenes en un entorno protegido.

En una época en la que el true crime parece ocuparlo todo, los seguidores (entre los que me incluyo) de series como Solo asesinatos en el edificio estamos de enhorabuena.

Todas esas palabras que soltamos

¿Alguna vez se ha apuntado a un gimnasio que le ofrecía un functional traininig? Está de enhorabuena. Está de enhorabuena. En The Conversation no podemos decirle cómo mejorar la técnica de las dominadas o conseguir meter más burpees en un minuto, pero podemos ayudarle a desmenuzar, lingüísticamente, aquello por lo que ha pagado una suscripción.

Nuestros expertos tan pronto analizan el “functional” como el “training”. Y para todo tienen reflexiones y respuestas.

– ref. Suplemento cultural: el cine español de 2025 – https://theconversation.com/suplemento-cultural-el-cine-espanol-de-2025-277029

March 2, 2026

Syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette : les patients atteints de « tics tabous » subissent une forte stigmatisation sociale

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Rena Zito, Associate Professor of Sociology, Elon University

Les tics de langage obscènes dont sont atteints certains patients touchés par le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette les poussent à dire ou à faire ce qu’ils souhaitent le plus éviter. Dominic Lipinski/Stringer via Getty Images

Le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette est encore très mal compris du public, et fait l’objet d’une importante stigmatisation. Le réduire à une « maladie des jurons » ne reflète pas la réalité complexe de ce trouble du neurodéveloppement, puisque seule une minorité de patients est concernée par ces symptômes.

Le 22 février 2026, durant la cérémonie de la British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA), à Londres, John Davidson, dont l’existence a inspiré le biopic primé I Swear, a involontairement proféré une insulte à caractère racial lors du discours de Michael B. Jordan et Delroy Lindo. La séquence est devenue virale, et le tollé qui s’est ensuivi a ravivé le débat public sur le syndrome de Gilles de la Tourette et son symptôme le plus frappant, les tics de langage obscènes, désignés sous le terme de « coprolalie ».

M. Davidson est une figure familière du public britannique depuis son adolescence, époque à laquelle il a figuré pour la première fois dans un documentaire de la BBC consacré au syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette, dont il est atteint. Depuis lors, il a consacré des décennies à sensibiliser le public à cette pathologie, un engagement qui lui a valu une distinction honorifique en 2019, remise par la reine Elizabeth II.

Les réactions suscitées par les tics de Davidson lors de la soirée de la BAFTA révèlent que le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette demeure une pathologie profondément méconnue. En tant que sociologue, je consacre mes recherches aux dimensions sociales de cette affection (avec lequel je vis moi-même), notamment à la stigmatisation liée à la coprolalie. Si la majorité des personnes atteintes par le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette ne présentent jamais ces tics tabous, celles qui en souffrent doivent supporter le poids du jugement social.

Qu’est-ce que le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette ?

Le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette est un trouble du neurodéveloppement qui affecte environ 0,5 % à 0,7 % de la population. Il se caractérise par des mouvements et des sons involontaires, appelés tics, qui débutent généralement dans l’enfance et, pour certains individus, persistent à l’âge adulte.

Les tics peuvent être moteurs, tels que des clignements d’yeux ou des haussements d’épaules, ou vocaux, comme le raclement de gorge ou l’émission de sons brefs. Certains se limitent à un geste ou un son unique, tandis que d’autres combinent plusieurs mouvements ou impliquent des verbalisations plus longues – par exemple, un claquement de doigts suivi d’un mouvement brusque de la tête, ou la répétition de mots ou de phrases.

La coprolalie, soit l’émission involontaire de propos obscènes ou offensants, constitue l’un des aspects les plus mal compris de la pathologie. Environ 10 % à 20 % des personnes atteintes du syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette présentent ce type de tic.

Moins d’une personne sur cinq atteinte du syndrome Gilles de La Tourette présente des tics tabous, comme la coprolalie, mais leur impact sur la vie sociale est disproportionné.

L’intensité, la fréquence et la forme des tics évoluent souvent avec le temps, des périodes de calme relatif alternant avec des phases d’exacerbation des symptômes. De nombreux patients ressentent une sensation de tension désagréable avant l’apparition d’un tic, appelée besoin prémonitoire, comparable à une démangeaison qu’il faut impérativement soulager. Pour d’autres, les tics surviennent de manière plus subite, à l’instar d’un éternuement imprévisible. Certains parviennent à réprimer temporairement leurs tics, souvent au prix d’un inconfort ultérieurement accru, tandis que d’autres en sont incapables.

Les tics peuvent être physiquement éprouvants, entraînant des douleurs et des blessures aiguës ou chroniques. En outre, les personnes atteintes sont fréquemment confrontées à la stigmatisation et à la discrimination. Elles vivent sous la pression constante de devoir contrôler ou dissimuler leurs symptômes, ce qui engendre une lourde charge psychologique. Ces patients présentent un risque accru d’automutilation et de suicide.

Bien que l’étiologie du syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette ne soit pas encore totalement élucidée, une forte composante génétique est vraisemblablement en cause. Cependant, s’il s’agit souvent d’une pathologie familiale, ce syndrome peut également résulter de complications périnatales ou d’infections.

Comprendre les tics tabous tels que la coprolalie

Bien que seule une minorité de patients souffre de coprolalie, les représentations médiatiques du syndrome de Gilles de la Tourette se focalisent de manière disproportionnée sur les accès de vulgarité. Ces tics tabous, choquants et inattendus, marquent en effet davantage l’imaginaire collectif que des tics plus fréquents, mais moins spectaculaires. Ce stéréotype de la « maladie des jurons » dénature la réalité vécue par la plupart des malades.

Par ailleurs, la coprolalie n’est en effet qu’une forme de tic tabou parmi d’autres. On dénombre également la copropraxie (gestes obscènes) et les tics non obscènes, mais socialement inappropriés, tels que des bruits de baisers, des crachats ou le fait de toucher autrui.

Baylen Dupree, star de l’émission « Baylen Out Loud » de la chaîne états-unienne TLC — Baylen Dupree, vedette de l’émission « Baylen Out Loud » (TLC), souffre d’une forme sévère de syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette incluant la coprolalie.
Slaven Vlasic/Stringer via Getty Images

L’un des aspects les plus déroutants des tics tabous réside dans leur capacité à être contextuellement pertinents, tout en demeurant involontaires. Un patient pourrait par exemple hurler « J’ai une arme ! », lors d’un contrôle de police. Les tics peuvent être déclenchés par certains stimuli de l’environnement social, en particulier lors de moments de stress intense.

Pourquoi la vulgarité prédomine-t-elle dans certains cas ? Les tics résultent d’un dysfonctionnement des circuits neuronaux impliqués dans le mouvement et le contrôle des impulsions. Or, les termes tabous possèdent une forte charge émotionnelle et sociale ; ils tendent donc à être plus solidement ancrés dans les réseaux langagiers et émotionnels du cerveau que les mots neutres.

Cela explique pourquoi la coprolalie peut également survenir, bien que plus rarement, chez des individus souffrant de lésions cérébrales, de maladies neurodégénératives ou de troubles épileptiques.

Les défis du quotidien avec la coprolalie

Les symptômes de tics tabous sont souvent associés à une gravité clinique accrue du trouble, à une plus grande fréquence de comorbidités ainsi qu’à des difficultés relationnelles majeures. L’insertion sociale des personnes touchées par le syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette qui en sont atteintes peut s’avérer précaire. Mes recherches sur la stigmatisation de la coprolalie mettent par ailleurs en lumière la profondeur de la détresse qu’engendrent les idées reçues.

Un préjugé courant veut que les tics révèlent le fond de la pensée de l’individu. En réalité, les tics contraignent souvent les personnes à dire ou à faire précisément ce qu’elles souhaitent le plus éviter.

La lutte contre les préjugés est un enjeu crucial, d’autant plus lorsque les tics prennent la forme d’insultes ou de calomnies.

Comme me l’a confié une des personnes que j’ai interrogées durant mes travaux : « C’est comme si mon cerveau transformait mes intentions les plus polies en armes cruelles. Sortir devient terrifiant… Savoir que j’ai en moi ce mécanisme de confrontation qui peut se manifester subitement, alors que je ne le souhaite absolument pas. »

Ces tics socialement inappropriés peuvent attirer une attention malvenue sur les patients et les conduire à l’exclusion, au harcèlement, à des altercations et constituer un obstacle à l’accès à l’emploi. Un autre participant l’a résumé ainsi : « Il n’existe aucun travail où l’on accepterait un aménagement spécifique m’autorisant à injurier mon patron. »

Anticipant ces réactions, de nombreux patients souffrant d’une coprolalie marquée se retirent de la vie publique ou vivent avec le fardeau de devoir sans cesse s’expliquer et sensibiliser leur entourage.

Une autre idée reçue est que la coprolalie se manifeste systématiquement par le fait de hurler des obscénités en public. Si tel est le cas pour certains patients, comme John Davidson à la remise des prix de la BAFTA, d’autres parviennent à réprimer, masquer ou minutieusement contrôler leurs tics en société. Toutefois, ces deux réalités sont tout aussi éprouvantes l’une que l’autre. En outre, comme tout tic, l’atteinte coprolalique peut fluctuer avec le temps.

Enfin, soulignons que le stress lié aux tics tabous s’étend au-delà de l’individu. Les membres de la famille des patients affirment fréquemment ressentir un sentiment d’impuissance face à la détresse de leur enfant. Ils se sentent également peu soutenus par les institutions scolaires, et expérimentent le poids du jugement d’autrui lorsque ces tics se manifestent.

Afin de pouvoir participer pleinement et sereinement à la vie de la cité, les personnes atteintes du syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette, et plus particulièrement celles souffrant de tics tabous, ont donc besoin de toute la compréhension et le soutien possible.

Rena Zito ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Syndrome de Gilles de La Tourette : les patients atteints de « tics tabous » subissent une forte stigmatisation sociale – https://theconversation.com/syndrome-de-gilles-de-la-tourette-les-patients-atteints-de-tics-tabous-subissent-une-forte-stigmatisation-sociale-277116

March 2, 2026

What Bad Bunny meant when he said ‘Canadá’ — and why we’re still talking about it

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Rodrigo Narro Pérez, Assistant Professor, School of Earth, Environment and Society, Faculty of Science, McMaster University

Weeks later, a single word from the Super Bowl half-time show continues to reverberate across social media: “Canadá.”

As Puerto Rican artist Bad Bunny named countries across the Americas at the end of the show, he included Canada as an unexpected reference. This timely invocation made visible what is so often overlooked.

More than one million Latin American people live in Canada, according to Statistics Canada, and for those communities, “Canadá” does not register as novelty. It names a known reality in a country where Spanish is now the most spoken non-official language.

Against this backdrop, Bad Bunny’s halftime performance has lingered as a deliberate cultural and historical intervention that centred Puerto Rico with intention while also gesturing toward a wider hemispheric story of the Americas and their entangled histories. What unfolded was not merely entertainment but an anticolonial re-mapping of the Americas.

From the transformation of the football field into sugarcane fields to Bad Bunny’s unapologetic insistence of performing only in Spanish, the performance centred Black, Latin American and Caribbean cultures in a space often framed as the apex of popular culture in the United States.

But this was not just Spanish in the abstract. It was the distinct Puerto Rican Creolized Spanish that is legible across much of the Latin American Caribbean and its diasporas.

And, given the criticism the performance has drawn both before and after the event, it’s worth underscoring that this took place within a space long shaped by uneven representation.

Latin America lives in Canada

As Latin American scholars working and living within diasporas in Canada, that moment reflected questions our students bring and the histories they carry with them.

At McMaster University, our work in Latin American and Latinx studies begins from the premise that Canada is part of the Americas. Through interdisciplinary teaching and research, we bring together students from across the university — some with personal ties to Latin America and the Caribbean, others encountering these histories for the first time — to think hemispherically, with particular attention to Blackness, Indigeneity, migration and the ongoing, persistent and evolving impacts of colonial rule.

And despite the rapid growth of Latin American and Latinx communities in cities like Toronto, Vancouver and Hamilton, scholarship examining their experiences remains limited, with tangible consequences. Latinx students in Toronto, for example, face some of the lowest high-school graduation rates among major demographic groups.

Our research underscores that these lives are not peripheral to the hemisphere, but central to it.

Celebration as a practice against erasure

When Bad Bunny said “Canadá,” he reminded Canadians that they exist within a story they so often imagine unfolding somewhere else.

For many Latin American, Latinx and Caribbean communities in Canada, that moment affirmed a lived experience. For others, it offered an invitation: to recognize that joy can function as resistance, that culture carries memory and that music can be a way of sharing history.

Scholars of popular culture have long noted that Bad Bunny’s work consistently centres Puerto Rico, not only as a place but as a political reality. This melding of lineage and geopolitics is significant, situating the half-time show as a continuation of a tradition in which culture becomes a vehicle for collective hope.

Music historian and multimedia artist Katelina Eccleston, also known as La Gata, argues that music and dance in Black Latin American and Afro-diasporic traditions are never merely esthetic. On an episode of Reggaetón con la Gata, she framed movement as a site of reclamation of the body, space and autonomy.

When dance is stripped of its histories and recast as apolitical entertainment, the social and material conditions that produced those rhythms are rendered invisible.

Consumption without reckoning

At the same time Canadians enthusiastically consume Latin American culture. Music fills playlists, restaurants flourish and millions travel annually to destinations like Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.

What is often missing, however, is a deeper engagement with the histories of colonialism, displacement, racialization and resistance that shaped these cultures and the lives of the people who carry them.

Bad Bunny’s naming of “Canadá” highlights that Canada is not adjacent to the Americas — it is part of it. It also serves as a reminder that Latin American and Latinx people are not newcomers to be acknowledged only through immigration statistics. They are already active participants in shaping the cultural, linguistic and political lives of this country.

As educators, we see this dissonance daily. Students are eager to learn about the region in ways that move beyond stereotypes and surface-level, performative multiculturalism. They want to see how histories of empire and extraction connect to contemporary migration, climate vulnerability and racial inequities, and they want language, culture and politics to be taught together, not siloed.

In a moment when Canada’s relationship with the U.S. is uncertain, it’s important to remember that Latin America is not only a place Canadians visit for some sunshine. It’s a region with which Canada shares economic ties, political responsibilities and a future.

The Super Bowl half-time show may seem to have been an unlikely site for this reckoning. But culture often arrives where policy lags behind.

In naming “Canadá,” Bad Bunny reminded Canadians that Latin American and Latinx lives are already here, already shaping the country, already demanding to be seen as people with history, presence and possibility.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What Bad Bunny meant when he said ‘Canadá’ — and why we’re still talking about it – https://theconversation.com/what-bad-bunny-meant-when-he-said-canada-and-why-were-still-talking-about-it-277148

March 2, 2026

Good-quality child care? What parents should consider, and how it can be assessed

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michal Perlman, Professor of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto

Children’s experiences during early years form the foundation for their development.

For many children in Canada and across the globe, these early experiences include substantial exposure to early learning and child care. And government investments in early learning and care in Canada and elsewhere has increased dramatically.

Research has shown that exposure to high-quality early learning and care is associated with positive outcomes for children — and these associations are strongest for children from families with fewer resources, including lower incomes.

But what exactly is high-quality early learning and child care? As I have examined in my research with a number of colleagues, quality is multi-dimensional, encompassing both structural features (like educator/child ratios and the group size) and also what children experience.

The latter includes the quality of interactions between children and their educators. Robust evidence demonstrates that the quality of educator-child interactions is a stronger predictor of developmental and learning outcomes compared to other aspects of quality.

Yet despite decades of investment and reform, national and international evidence consistently indicates that, in many cases, the quality of these interactions in early learning and care settings is average at best.

Monitoring, improving child-care quality

An important mechanism for improving quality, increasing accountability and providing evidence for planning in early learning and child care: quality ratings and improvement systems (QRISs or quality ratings for short).

These ratings and improvement systems are structured around ongoing — commonly annual — measurements of program quality, including systematic assessments of educator-child interactions.

QRISs generally involve evaluations by external assessors that are conducted in early childhood education and child-care settings. Results from these assessments:

• Inform the development of targeted quality improvement plans for the learning and care setting and for individual educators.

• Can be publicly available to help parents decide where to send their children (although posting scores is not required).

• Can inform how quality improvement and system expansion dollars are allocated.

Young children seen in a garden with an adult speaking with them. — It’s important that planning in early learning and child care is informed by evidence.
(Allison Shelley/The Verbatim Agency/EDUimages), CC BY-NC

Important features

For quality ratings and improvement systems to work, they need to have a few important features. For starters, they need to capture key aspects of quality. This means measuring what matters most, not merely what is most readily captured.

Most states in the United States operate quality ratings and improvement systems that involve visiting assessors who observe environments, including hard-to-capture qualities of educator/child interactions.

In Canada, the City of Toronto has operated such a system for years, as have several other Ontario municipalities. Prince Edward Island is in the process of implementing one.

In the face of substantial government spending on early learning and child care and the potential impact on children served by these programs, the cost of implementing quality ratings and improvement systems and their related assessments is small.

Given the high-stakes nature of assessments, they must be:

Valid: This means they’ve been tested to ensure they capture what they are intended to.
Reliable: Different assessors can consistently apply the standards they set across contexts and time periods.

Using valid and reliable measures is needed for the assessments to be fair. But developing such measures requires specific methodological and statistical expertise. Fortunately, several existing and efficient measures are available to capture quality.

City of Toronto’s quality assessment

The City of Toronto developed the assessment for quality improvement (AQI) with help from my team and me at the University of Toronto.

The city’s quality ratings and improvement system is built around the AQI which includes a suite of measures designed to assess global classroom quality (including educator-child interaction) in infant, toddler and pre-school centre classrooms, as well as in-home child-care and outdoor environments.

Results track inequity in access to early learning and child-care programs as well as the quality of these programs, enabling evidence-informed quality improvement. For example, early learning and care practitioners might receive coaching or assistance working on goals that emerge from the assessment.

The City of Toronto also uses assessment for quality improvement scores to determine what organizations or services are eligible to provide care to children whose families receive a child-care subsidy. The scores are posted online so that parents and other stakeholders can use this information when choosing care for their children.

P.E.I. is conducting annual assessment of all early learning and child-care classrooms in the province, relying upon the same assessment for quality improvement tool.

Assessments of individual educators

Current quality ratings and improvement systems focus on observing aspects of caregiver-child interactions in classrooms, but don’t systematically consider individual educators’ work with children.

Research increasingly shows that educators in the same classroom interact with children differently. This raises concerns about inclusion, equity and whether all children in early learning and care settings experience high-quality interactions — and how these are guided and informed by relevant policy and professional education.

Findings about differences in how individual educators interact with children suggest policymakers should additionally use more specialized quality improvement measures that consider individual educators’ responsiveness. Use of such individualized assessment, when it comes with coaching and support, has been shown to improve the quality of educator interactions with children.

Ongoing quality assessments matter for knowing our public investments in early learning and child care are synonymous with stable high-quality experiences for children. They provide actionable, evidence-based information that can guide how resources are allocated.

Systems like these have been in place for decades in the U.S. There is growing momentum toward quality-assessment approaches in Canada that are both methodologically sound and capable of informing meaningful action. When these approaches are combined with tailored coaching and supports for improvement, they merit increasing attention and support.

Michal Perlman receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Lawson Foundation, McCain Foundation and others.

– ref. Good-quality child care? What parents should consider, and how it can be assessed – https://theconversation.com/good-quality-child-care-what-parents-should-consider-and-how-it-can-be-assessed-274370

March 2, 2026

Pourquoi l’Iran a-t-il bombardé plusieurs États du Golfe ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Détroit d’Ormuz, missiles balistiques, proxies régionaux : la République islamique joue l’extension du conflit pour survivre. Reste à savoir si cette stratégie de déstabilisation produira des effets politiques avant d’épuiser ses ressources.

Les frappes conjointes américano-israéliennes contre l’Iran au cours du week-end ont de nouveau plongé la région dans la guerre et ont entraîné la mort du guide suprême iranien. L’Iran a riposté par des salves de missiles balistiques et de drones visant Israël, mais aussi plusieurs de ses voisins du Golfe persique.

En lançant des centaines de missiles et de drones à travers le Golfe, Téhéran a ciblé des sites aux Émirats arabes unis (EAU), en Arabie saoudite, à Oman, au Bahreïn, au Koweït et au Qatar, clouant des avions au sol. Et ce, alors qu’aucun de ces pays n’avait officiellement pris part à des actions coordonnées avec les États-Unis et Israël lors des premières opérations.

Un voisin impopulaire

Malgré la taille relativement importante de l’Iran et sa puissance militaire dans la région, le gouvernement iranien est peu apprécié par ses voisins. Au mieux, le pays est perçu comme un rival ; au pire, comme un adversaire. L’Arabie saoudite et l’Iran se livrent ainsi depuis plus d’une décennie une guerre par procuration au Yémen. Et en décembre dernier, l’Iran a réaffirmé ses revendications historiques sur Bahreïn.

Les autres États du Golfe – à savoir les Émirats arabes unis, le Koweït, Oman et le Qatar – ont, pour leur part, entretenu des relations plus pragmatiques avec l’Iran, en maintenant des canaux diplomatiques réguliers et en proposant de jouer les médiateurs dans les différends au sein du Conseil de coopération du Golfe.

Malgré des tensions persistantes, l’Iran n’a jamais été engagé dans une confrontation militaire directe avec aucun de ces États.

Pourquoi bombarder ?

Presque tous les États du Golfe ont un point commun essentiel : ils bénéficient de garanties de sécurité américaines et accueillent des bases militaires américaines.

Pour l’Iran, frapper ces sites constitue l’un des moyens les plus efficaces de riposter, pour plusieurs raisons. D’abord, ces bases se trouvent clairement à portée de ses missiles balistiques les plus nombreux.

Les bases situées dans le Golfe revêtent également une importance stratégique majeure pour les États-Unis. Celle frappée à Bahreïn ce week-end abrite le quartier général de la Cinquième flotte de la marine américaine.

La base aérienne d’Al-Udeid, située à l’extérieur de Doha, la capitale du Qatar, a elle aussi été visée par des missiles balistiques iraniens. Al-Udeid accueille le commandement central américain (US-CENTCOM), chargé de coordonner les opérations militaires dans l’ensemble de la région. Elle abrite également 10 000 soldats américains – le contingent le plus important déployé dans la zone.

Téhéran est toutefois conscient du degré de sophistication des systèmes d’alerte américains et ne s’attend probablement pas à infliger des dommages significatifs aux infrastructures états-uniennes.

Quel est l’objectif, alors ?

La stratégie consiste plutôt à déstabiliser la région et à faire en sorte que tous ses voisins en ressentent les effets. En substance, Téhéran avertit que si les opérations se poursuivent, la relative paix et la prospérité dont le Golfe a bénéficié prendront fin.

L’Iran espère que ses voisins percevront le conflit comme une guerre d’initiative menée par les États-Unis et Israël, dans laquelle ils se retrouvent entraînés malgré eux. Les États du Golfe seront alors contraints soit de renforcer encore leur alliance avec Washington, soit d’œuvrer à une désescalade.

Il n’est pas certain que cette stratégie porte ses fruits. Elle pourrait au contraire entraîner une pression militaire accrue sur l’Iran si les États du Golfe s’impliquent davantage dans les opérations.

Dans le même temps, les relations de plus en plus tendues entre les États du Golfe et Israël au cours des deux dernières années pourraient inciter plusieurs d’entre eux à hésiter à s’engager davantage.

Il est également impossible pour l’Iran de soutenir indéfiniment une telle stratégie. Même s’il dispose de l’arsenal de missiles le plus vaste et le plus diversifié de la région, il finira par épuiser ses stocks de munitions. Les autres pays pourraient alors choisir d’attendre que la situation s’essouffle.

Ce type d’action est devenu la signature de la doctrine iranienne de « défense avancée » : frapper loin de ses frontières pour démontrer sa capacité de projection. En mobilisant son arsenal de drones et de missiles, Téhéran entend ainsi signaler à la région – et au reste du monde – que le régime ne s’effacera pas sans riposter.

Entraîner toute la région dans le chaos

Parallèlement, l’Iran dispose d’un réseau affaibli mais toujours étendu de proxies indépendants à travers la région. Des groupes au Yémen, en Irak et au Liban devraient rester loyaux à la République islamique et mettre en œuvre, en son nom, des stratégies insurrectionnelles de long terme.

Le groupe paramilitaire libanais Hezbollah a déjà tiré des projectiles vers Israël. Cela a ravivé les hostilités le long de la frontière libanaise, ouvrant un nouveau front pour Israël.

Le détroit d’Ormuz, par lequel transitent 20 % du pétrole mondial, constitue un autre levier que l’Iran peut instrumentaliser. Déjà, deux pétroliers ont été attaqués dans le détroit et le prix du baril de Brent a augmenté de 13 %.

Autrement dit, l’ampleur de ces attaques constitue un signal. Elles ne sont pas comparables aux frappes calibrées de désescalade que l’Iran avait menées en 2024 et 2025.

Cette guerre est existentielle pour la République islamique. Ses frappes à travers le Golfe visent à rappeler qu’elle fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour entraîner l’ensemble de la région dans le chaos, favoriser l’incertitude et l’instabilité, le tout afin d’assurer sa survie.

À tout le moins, l’Iran cherche à créer des conséquences politiques pour toutes les parties impliquées. Reste à savoir si le régime survivra suffisamment longtemps pour que ces conséquences produisent leurs effets.

Andrew Thomas ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Pourquoi l’Iran a-t-il bombardé plusieurs États du Golfe ? – https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-liran-a-t-il-bombarde-plusieurs-etats-du-golfe-277306

March 2, 2026

Pourquoi les frappes sur l’Iran nous rappellent qu’il est urgent d’abandonner le pétrole

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Hussein Dia, Professor of Transport Technology and Sustainability, Swinburne University of Technology

La sortie du pétrole est souvent présentée comme un impératif climatique. Mais les frappes américaines et israéliennes sur l’Iran, qui paralysent le détroit d’Ormuz, nous rappellent que c’est également un enjeu sécuritaire de premier ordre.

Alors qu’Israël et les États-Unis attaquent l’Iran, les marchés mondiaux du pétrole sont sur les nerfs.

Les prix du pétrole ont commencé à augmenter avant même toute perturbation de l’approvisionnement. Les négociants en pétrole envisagent la possibilité que le détroit d’Ormuz soit fermé.

Le détroit d'Ormuz permet d'exporter une importante partie du pétrole saoudien, iranien et émirati. — Le détroit d’Ormuz permet d’exporter une importante partie du pétrole saoudien, iranien et émirati.
Jacques Descloitres, MODIS Land Rapid Response Team, NASA/GSFC, CC BY

Environ 20 % du pétrole commercialisé dans le monde transite par cette voie navigable étroite entre l’Iran au nord et Oman et les Émirats arabes unis au sud. Un pétrolier a été bombardé et le trafic a pratiquement cessé. Or, sur les marchés mondiaux de l’énergie, la simple menace d’une interruption peut faire grimper les prix.

Car, le pétrole n’est pas comme la plupart des matières premières. Le contrôle de ce combustible à haute densité énergétique façonne la géopolitique. Les trois quarts de la population mondiale vivent dans des pays qui dépendent des importations de pétrole pour leurs voitures, leurs camions et d’autres usages. Ainsi, le contrôle des flux de pétrole et, de plus en plus, de gaz, a longtemps été utilisé comme moyen de pression, depuis les chocs pétroliers des années 1970 jusqu’à la réduction des approvisionnements en gaz de la Russie à l’Europe en 2022.

Toute perturbation grave du trafic des pétroliers dans le Golfe aura donc des répercussions sur les marchés mondiaux du pétrole et menacera la stabilité économique. De longues files d’attente ont déjà été signalées en Australie, les automobilistes se précipitant pour faire le plein avant une éventuelle flambée des prix.

Alors que les tensions internationales s’intensifient, des pays tels que Cuba ou l’Ukraine en passant par l’Éthiopie accélèrent déjà leurs plans visant à réduire leur dépendance au pétrole et à renforcer leur sécurité énergétique.

Un demi-siècle d’influence pétrolière

Le pouvoir du pétrole est devenu évident lors de l’embargo pétrolier de 1973, lorsque les principaux producteurs de pétrole du Moyen-Orient ont réduit leur offre afin de remodeler la politique étrangère américaine. Les prix ont quadruplé, les économies ont stagné et la sécurité énergétique est devenue un enjeu politique central presque du jour au lendemain. Depuis lors, l’Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole (Opep) coordonne l’approvisionnement afin de faire grimper les prix.

Aujourd’hui, les mécanismes de contrôle ont changé, mais le pouvoir créé par la dépendance au pétrole demeure.

Même avant l’intervention militaire américaine, les sanctions contre les principaux producteurs tels que l’Iran et le Venezuela ont réduit l’offre et remodelé les flux commerciaux.

Les tensions actuelles près des points d’étranglement tels que le détroit d’Ormuz introduisent des primes de risque dans les prix.

Car les marchés pétroliers sont prospectifs, ce qui signifie que les prix reflètent non seulement l’offre et la demande actuelles, mais aussi les anticipations quant à l’évolution future.

Les frappes sur l’Iran ont ainsi entraîné une hausse du prix du pétrole brut Brent – la référence mondiale – qui s’échange [à l’heure où nous publions cet article] autour de 79 dollars américains (67,50 euros) le baril, contre environ 68 dollars américains (58,10 euros) quelques semaines plus tôt. Les prix étant mondiaux, l’instabilité politique dans une région donnée peut avoir des conséquences économiques partout ailleurs.

Qu’est-ce qui réduit la dépendance au pétrole ?

En 2015, l’Inde a bloqué les importations de pétrole du Népal, provoquant le chaos. En réponse, les autorités ont encouragé la croissance très rapide des véhicules électriques. Les importations de pétrole ont, elles, commencé à baisser.

Plus récemment, la guerre entre la Russie et l’Ukraine et les frappes américaines contre le Venezuela et l’Iran ont remis au centre des préoccupations la réduction des importations de pétrole et le renforcement de la sécurité énergétique nationale.

À Cuba, pays dépendant du pétrole, la pression exercée par les États-Unis a réduit de manière drastique l’approvisionnement en pétrole. Les coupures d’électricité sont fréquentes et les voitures restent immobilisées. En réponse, les autorités et les entreprises importent 34 fois plus de panneaux solaires chinois qu’il y a un an.

Ce n’est pas l’idéologie qui motive ce changement, mais la nécessité. Les importations de véhicules électriques sont également en forte hausse. « Cuba pourrait connaître la transition énergétique la plus rapide au monde », a déclaré un économiste cubain au magazine The Economist.

Pourquoi les énergies renouvelables changent la donne

Contrairement au pétrole, les panneaux solaires et les éoliennes peuvent éviter d’être transportés via des points d’étranglement maritimes tels que le détroit d’Ormuz. Les énergies renouvelables ne sont pas commercialisées de la même manière centralisée à l’échelle mondiale. L’électricité est produite localement et de plus en plus sur de nombreux sites de petite taille.

La Russie cible depuis longtemps les infrastructures énergétiques et les centrales électriques ukrainiennes pendant la guerre. En réponse, l’Ukraine développe les énergies renouvelables aussi rapidement que possible, car la production d’électricité décentralisée est beaucoup plus difficile à détruire. Comme l’a déclaré un expert ukrainien en énergie à Yale360, un seul missile « peut détruire » une centrale à charbon, alors qu’il faudrait 40 missiles pour détruire un parc éolien.

L’énergie décentralisée est plus résiliente, ce qui signifie que les dommages causés à une ferme ne provoqueront pas l’effondrement du réseau.

La résilience grâce au transport électrique

L’électrification des transports est un autre élément clé de ces nouvelles approches en matière de sécurité énergétique.

Les véhicules électriques alimentés par de l’électricité produite localement réduisent la dépendance vis-à-vis des marchés mondiaux du pétrole. Cette réflexion transparaît dans la décision prise par l’Éthiopie d’interdire les nouvelles voitures à moteur à combustion interne.

De son côté, la Chine importe encore la majeure partie de son pétrole, dont une grande partie provient d’Iran. Mais Pékin accélère en parallèle sa transition rapide vers les véhicules électriques. L’année dernière, les véhicules électriques représentaient 50 % des voitures neuves en Chine et 12 % du parc automobile total. La Chine utilise de plus en plus le pétrole pour fabriquer des plastiques et non pour le transport. La hausse des importations enregistrée l’année dernière s’explique par la constitution de stocks considérables dans un contexte d’incertitude mondiale.

La vulnérabilité de nombreux pays

L’Australie importe la grande majorité de ses carburants raffinés. Le pays disposerait d’environ un mois d’approvisionnement d’essence avant d’être à court.

[En France, en 2024, les autorités assuraient que les réserves de pétroles bruts représentaient un peu plus de deux mois de consommation nationale, ndlr]

Si les guerres font grimper les prix du pétrole, la hausse des prix à la pompe se répercutera sur les coûts de transport, les prix des denrées alimentaires et l’inflation.

Alors que la transition vers les véhicules électriques s’accélère, l’Australie est à la traîne par rapport aux normes mondiales. Même si l’électricité se verdit rapidement, les transports restent massivement dépendants du pétrole étranger. Cela expose l’Australie à des risques.

[La France est dans une situation similaire avec des véhicules électriques et hybrides qui ne représentaient que 5 % environ du parc automobile français en 2025, ndlr]

La politique énergétique est une politique de sécurité

Les énergies renouvelables n’éliminent pas les risques géopolitiques. Les réseaux électriques sont exposés à des cybermenaces. Les chaînes d’approvisionnement en minéraux critiques introduisent de nouvelles dépendances, et une grande partie de la fabrication actuelle de panneaux solaires, de batteries et de véhicules électriques est concentrée en Chine.

Mais il existe une différence structurelle évidente. Les systèmes décentralisés sont plus difficiles à manipuler par le biais des goulets d’étranglement de l’approvisionnement. Une fois installés, les panneaux solaires produisent de l’énergie localement. La vulnérabilité passe alors des importations continues de combustibles à la dépendance initiale vis-à-vis de la fabrication.

Le pétrole façonne la politique mondiale depuis des décennies, car il est transportable, négocié à l’échelle mondiale et seuls quelques pays disposent d’importantes réserves.

La réduction de la dépendance au pétrole est souvent présentée comme une mesure de politique climatique. Mais elle est également essentielle pour la sécurité énergétique et la sécurité nationale. La réduction de la consommation de pétrole renforce la résilience face aux chocs et réduit l’influence d’autres nations.

La crise iranienne pourrait ne pas entraîner de hausse durable des prix. L’offre pourrait s’ajuster. Les marchés pourraient se stabiliser. Mais les dirigeants vont repenser l’opportunité de s’exposer au pétrole négocié à l’échelle mondiale dans un monde instable.

Hussein Dia a reçu des financements du Australian Research Council, du centre coopératif de recherche iMOVE Australia, de Transport for New South Wales, du Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, du Victorian Department of Transport and Planning, ainsi que du Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts.

– ref. Pourquoi les frappes sur l’Iran nous rappellent qu’il est urgent d’abandonner le pétrole – https://theconversation.com/pourquoi-les-frappes-sur-liran-nous-rappellent-quil-est-urgent-dabandonner-le-petrole-277304

March 2, 2026

South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi, Senior Researcher, UNESCO ‘Oliver Tambo’ Chair of Human Rights, University of Fort Hare, University of Fort Hare

South Africa’s minibus taxi industry is the backbone of the country’s public transport system. Every day, millions of commuters rely on it. In many low-income and peri-urban communities, there is no real alternative. They account for roughly 70% of daily public transport trips in the country.

Yet despite its scale and significance, the industry remains largely informal. It is governed less by formal contracts and clear regulatory systems than by relationships, trust and unwritten rules.

This makes the sector an important subject for industrial and economic sociology scholars like myself, who are concerned with how regulation, labour and economic life unfold in practice rather than merely on paper. Particularly in contexts marked by informality, inequality and contested regulatory environments.

In a recent study, my co-author and I explore how “social capital” – the networks, shared norms and trust that connect people – shapes the governance, labour relations and everyday functioning of the minibus taxi sector.

We conducted a structured search of academic databases and South African institutional repositories, and analysed 62 peer-reviewed articles, theses and policy reports to identify themes.

Our central finding is that social capital within South Africa’s minibus taxi industry operates as a double-edged sword. The same dense networks of trust, shared norms and reciprocal obligations that enable the industry to function also entrench inequality, exclusion and, at times, violence. Social capital is a source of both resilience and instability.

This matters because policy debates have too often treated the industry’s informality either as a problem to be eradicated or as a reality to be tolerated. Our research suggests that sustainable reform requires a hybrid approach: one that works with social capital rather than against it. Efforts to formalise or regulate the sector are unlikely to succeed if they ignore the networks and authority structures that already govern it.

It is therefore essential to engage with taxi associations, drivers and commuters, recognising their lived realities and institutional knowledge. It is possible to make the industry safer, fairer and more efficient without undermining the social foundations on which it depends.

An industry born of exclusion

The modern minibus taxi industry took shape during apartheid (1948-1990), when black South Africans were systematically excluded from formal urban planning and public transport provision. Commuters faced long journeys between racially segregated townships and economic centres, so entrepreneurs began operating minibuses to meet demand. The sector grew rapidly because it was responsive, decentralised and embedded in communities.

In the new democratic era after 1994, the industry continued to expand – but without being fully integrated into formal transport planning. Today, it comprises hundreds of thousands of vehicles organised into roughly 1,500 taxi associations nationwide. These associations regulate routes, manage disputes and coordinate operations. Alongside them are individual taxi owners, who own vehicles and lease them out, and drivers.

Part of the reason for this limited integration is that the state has lacked the institutional capacity and the political leverage to impose coherent oversight on the sector.

In the absence of consistent and effective state oversight, informal systems of governance have developed. These systems are rooted in social relationships.

Understanding social capital

The concept of social capital is often associated with political scientist Robert Putnam, who defined it as the networks and norms that enable collective action. According to this view, trust and civic engagement help communities solve shared problems.

But sociologist Pierre Bourdieu offered a more critical perspective. For him, social capital was not simply about cooperation. It was also a resource that groups could use to consolidate power and exclude others.

Drawing on these traditions, we distinguish between three forms of social capital in the taxi industry:

bonding: tight-knit networks within taxi associations and owner groups
bridging: connections across different associations or stakeholder groups
linking: vertical ties between the industry and formal institutions such as government departments, banks and law enforcement agencies.

All three forms are present in the minibus taxi sector. But they operate unevenly, and their effects are not always positive.

The strengths of dense networks

Bonding social capital is particularly strong within taxi associations. These organisations function as powerful, if informal, regulatory bodies. They control routes, set fare guidelines and enforce industry norms. Membership provides access to shared resources and a measure of protection in a competitive market.

These dense networks allow for rapid coordination. If disputes arise, they can often be resolved internally without recourse to the courts. If demand shifts or new residential areas develop, associations can adjust routes quickly. In communities where formal institutions are perceived as distant or ineffective, such embedded systems can appear more responsive and legitimate.

Trust is also central to financial arrangements. Many taxi owners rely on rotating credit schemes and informal savings groups to finance vehicle purchases and maintenance. Formal financial institutions frequently regard the sector as high risk, making credit expensive or out of reach. Social networks therefore take the place of formal banking relationships.

The driver-owner relationship also depends heavily on trust. In many cases, drivers lease vehicles for a fixed daily fee, with no written contracts. Instead, expectations are governed by personal relationships and informal understandings.

In short, social capital fills gaps left by weak or uneven formal regulation enabling coordination, resilience and continuity.

When networks entrench power

However, the same bonding social capital that enables coordination can also reinforce hierarchy and exclusion.

Taxi associations control access to routes, which are the primary source of income. Because associations regulate who may operate on which routes, they wield considerable power. Dense networks of members can create barriers to entry for outsiders.

Disputes over routes are a feature of the industry. In some cases, they escalate into violence. Such conflicts arise in a system where economic survival depends on territorial control and where formal mediation mechanisms are weak.

Social capital here functions as a resource of dominance. Associations mobilise networks to maintain authority and legitimacy. Their links to communities can confer symbolic power, even in the absence of formal legal recognition.

Most drivers, by contrast, occupy a precarious position. Many are not members of associations in their own right. They lease vehicles from owners and have to meet fixed daily payment targets. To do so, they frequently work shifts exceeding 12 hours. If they fall short, they may absorb the loss themselves.

Without formal employment contracts, drivers typically lack access to medical benefits, unemployment insurance or retirement savings. Trust-based arrangements limit recourse in cases of exploitation or unfair treatment.

In this context, social capital benefits some actors more than others.

The missing links to formal institutions

While bonding social capital within associations is strong, linking social capital between the industry and formal institutions remains comparatively weak.

Government has attempted to formalise and regulate the sector, most notably through the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. The aim was to replace older vehicles, improve safety and integrate the industry more fully into national transport policy. Yet implementation has been uneven, and many reforms have met resistance.

One reason is that policy interventions don’t “talk to” existing informal governance structures. Top-down regulation can be perceived as a threat to association autonomy. Where there is limited trust between the state and industry actors, compliance is likely to be partial.

Towards hybrid governance

The research suggests that industry reforms would have to recognise and work with social capital.

Formalisation should not simply impose external control. It should build on existing structures while introducing safeguards.

Legal recognition of taxi associations as cooperatives is one potential pathway. This could enhance access to subsidies, training and financial services. It could also clarify governance and accountability.

Standardised employment contracts for drivers are another step. They could provide greater security, define working hours and clarify dispute resolution processes.

Digital technologies may also help. Mobile payment systems could reduce reliance on cash, improve transparency and minimise disputes over fares. Digital platforms for route management could support fairer allocation processes and clearer record-keeping.

Drivers and commuters would have to take part in creating these solutions.

A delicate balance

The future of South Africa’s minibus taxi industry depends on striking a careful balance. Reform must recognise that the sector’s social capital is both its foundation and its fault line.

Strengthening bridging and linking social capital – across associations and between the industry and the state – can reduce conflict and foster shared accountability.

The challenge is not to dismantle the social fabric of the minibus taxi industry, but to reshape it, so that trust, cooperation and collective action serve all who depend on it.

Although our study focuses on South Africa, its implications extend more broadly. Across the global south, informal transport systems play a central role in urban mobility. They are often more adaptable than formal systems but also more vulnerable to conflict and labour exploitation.

Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi previously received funding from the National Research Foundation for his Master of Arts in Industrial and Economic Sociology Degree at Rhodes University and PhD in Industrial Sociology at the University of Johannesburg.

– ref. South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-minibus-taxi-industry-runs-on-social-bonds-reform-must-accept-this-276771

March 2, 2026

Biometric IDs are being rolled out in Africa. Study reveals the risks and pitfalls

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Tony Roberts, Digital Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Across Africa, governments are introducing digital systems that use individuals’ unique physical measurements to identify them. These systems collect citizens’ biometric and personal data and use it to give people access to essential public services like voting, healthcare, education and social protection. Biometric digital identification systems are often promoted as tools to improve efficiency, inclusion and service delivery.

But a new report by the African Digital Rights Network, published by the Institute of Development Studies, highlights serious concerns about exclusion, rights violations, data protection and accountability. Drawing on evidence from ten African countries, the report shows how millions of people are struggling to enrol in or safely use these systems, or are choosing not to participate due to fear and mistrust.

The report draws on the expertise of researchers based in each of the ten countries studied. Tony Roberts, co-editor of the report, takes us through what they found.

What are biometric digital IDs and why are they both useful and problematic?

Digital-ID is a form of identification that can hold large amounts of sensitive personal data. This includes biographic data like name, date of birth and address, as well as biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition. What makes digital-ID distinct from paper-based IDs is that it is machine readable. And, when it’s connected to the internet, millions of people can be identified and verified, instantly and remotely.

Biometric digital-ID includes facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scans and voice patterns that are unique to individuals. It can verify that an individual is who they claim to be.

Increasingly, biometric digital-ID systems are being imposed across Africa and used to determine who gets services or entitlements. For example, fingerprint or iris scans are used during elections to confirm that a person is entitled to vote. In Botswana and in Malawi there are examples of ID chaos threatening voter registration.

But these systems are leaving millions of citizens in Africa unable to obtain essential services. Some people struggle to register for biometric digital-ID due to disability or illiteracy. There are costs to use online systems, including phone access, mobile data, or electric power for phone charging. This is deepening existing inequalities.

How is uptake happening in Africa?

Our report includes ten country studies. The research was coordinated by the African Digital Rights Network, bringing together 75 digital rights researchers from 30 African countries, in collaboration with Paradigm Initiative, a non-profit organisation.

We found that pressure to adopt biometric systems often comes from foreign funders and creates dependencies on foreign technology providers.

The World Bank claims that the motivation for spending billions of dollars on digital-ID is to meet the Sustainable Development Goal of “identity for all”. But the role of private vendors, international funders and even state actors may also reflect interests in profit generation, data control, or surveillance of populations.

The introduction of biometric digital IDs varies between countries. Between 2017 and 2025, Ghana registered 19 million people (around 95% of the adult population) to a system called GhanaCard. In Ethiopia, 28 million people (around 35%) have enrolled in the Fayda-ID scheme. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there is still no digital-ID system despite repeated announcements and legislation introduced to enable it since 2011.

In Senegal, biometric digital-ID, with fingerprint data, was introduced in law in 2016. Citizens need it to obtain a phone number, bank account and public services, such as electricity and water. Based on 2025 data, it’s estimated that around 10 million citizens hold a biometric national ID card, just over 90% of the population aged 15 and over.

But this suggests that around 10% of the population over 15 – over 1 million people – lack ID and therefore lack access to essential services and entitlements.

What are the challenges of rolling them out?

One of the challenges is that universal human rights which should be unconditional become conditional on enrolment in a biometric digital-ID scheme. These include access to education, healthcare, social security and voting. Withholding access is a violation of fundamental human rights.

The report includes the case of Ethiopia, where registration in the Fayda digital-ID system is a condition of access to government services, banking and mobile telecoms.

Millions of citizens cannot enrol, particularly those with disabilities. For example, some people don’t have fingerprints due to amputation, diseases including leprosy, years of hard manual labour or old age. Some people cannot provide iris scans due to vision problems.

Millions of Africans are also denied legal ID because government officials dispute their citizenship. The project of digital-ID is sold as a solution. But research shows that it reproduces this form of discrimination and injustice.

For example, in Kenya, members of the Somali, Nubian and Pemba communities who have lived in the country for five or six generations and inter-married are discriminated against and rendered stateless. They are denied digital-ID and so cannot access education, healthcare, voting and social protection.

Some do not want to enrol for a biometric digital-ID because they have good reason not to trust their governments with their personal information. In countries like Sudan and Ethiopia the state is targeting people based on their ethnic group or on other identifiers such as surname, address or religion which are used as proxies for ethnicity.

Are there any dangers?

The use of biometric digital-ID introduces new challenges and risks. These include risks to privacy caused by data leakage or sharing and risks of exclusion due to poor data quality or mismatches.

There are also privacy risks involved because biometrics are permanent. People need to be aware and give informed consent. Data protection principles should be followed.

There is a lack of adequate legal frameworks and robust digital security to prevent unauthorised access to sensitive data. Countries also lack accountability mechanisms for when data entry errors, breaches or system failures occur.

The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Initiative has a framework of 18 core principles to ensure that digital-ID is secure, inclusive and rights-based.

Eight out of ten countries studied in the report have no law specifically governing digital-ID, and none include special protection. In some cases, where legal provisions exist, enforcement is weak or symbolic.

Independent oversight bodies are rare, as are judicial mechanisms to contain function creep – where ID systems expand beyond their original scope. Governments could secure consent by saying that digital-ID will only be used for a single purpose, such as voting. But then they could make it mandatory for accessing education, healthcare, employment and banking.

Without stronger legislation, clearer accountability and harmonised regional standards, digital-ID projects risk entrenching inequality and mistrust rather than delivering inclusion or security.

Tony Roberts receives funding from the Open Society Foundation.

– ref. Biometric IDs are being rolled out in Africa. Study reveals the risks and pitfalls – https://theconversation.com/biometric-ids-are-being-rolled-out-in-africa-study-reveals-the-risks-and-pitfalls-273510

March 2, 2026

South Sudan has never had an election to hand over presidential power: so what are the rules of succession?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jan Pospisil, Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs

South Sudan has not held an election since it gained independence 15 years ago, and progress towards a new constitution has stalled. Election dates have been set and postponed at least three times. A new date has been set for December 2026 but it’s unclear the poll will take place. If it does, it will be the first electoral test for President Salva Kiir, who has been in power since 2011. It raises the question of what legal guardrails exist for a smooth transition to new leadership outside an election. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the country’s politics and power-sharing agreements, explains what’s in place.

What legal frameworks govern presidential succession in South Sudan?

Two legal frameworks operate side by side to regulate the succession question in South Sudan: the 2011 transitional constitution and the 2018 peace agreement, which has a quasi-constitutional quality.

Read together, the logic in the 2011 and 2018 frameworks is straightforward. Upon vacancy, the first vice-president acts as president, but only until the party in power nominates a successor. The president’s party then has 48 hours to nominate a replacement. If a nomination is made within that period, however, the nominee is sworn in and replaces the acting first vice-president.

The peace agreement overlays the constitutional acting mechanism with a time-limited party entitlement. But it does not replace the constitutional fallback.

A more granular breakdown looks like this.

The 2018 agreement is based on a power-sharing deal between five major political parties and blocs. It is the primary framework governing the country’s transitional period from conflict to democracy.

The peace agreement created a collective presidency composed of a president, one first vice-president and four vice-presidents. The four vice-presidents are considered equal in rank.

The key provision on succession is clause 1.6.5. It states that if the post of the president falls vacant during the transitional period, the replacement shall be nominated by the respective party as constituted at the signing of the agreement. The process of choosing a successor must also be done within 48 hours of the post falling vacant.

The clause establishes two principles.

First, the presidency remains allocated to the party that originally held the position under the power-sharing arrangement. In this case, it’s the mainstream SPLM, now called SPLM-IG, for “in government”. This is to differentiate it from the main opposition that formed in December 2013 in the course of civil war, SPLM-IO, for “in opposition”.

Second, the party’s right to nominate a successor is time-bound. The 48-hour window is designed to preserve the elite settlement and guarantee executive continuity with minimal friction.

What the agreement doesn’t do is spell out in detail what happens during those 48 hours. It does not foresee the creation of a separate interim authority for this short period.

Instead, continuity is ensured through the 2011 transitional constitution.

In the constitution, article 102 defines five ways the president’s office can become vacant. These are expiration of the term of office, resignation, impeachment, mental infirmity or physical incapacity and death. It lays out the respective succession rules.

If the presidency falls vacant, the vice-president assumes office temporarily,

pending the filling of this position, within fourteen days from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy, by a nominee of the political party on whose ticket he or she was elected.

Under the post-2018 structure, this provision applies to the first vice-president.

There has been precedent for such structured succession. In 2005, Salva Kiir assumed regional leadership following the death of John Garang under the constitutional framework that was then in force. At the time, South Sudan was a semi-autonomous region led by Garang, with Kiir as his deputy.

What happens if the 48-hour deadline is missed?

This raises difficulties. The 2018 agreement sets a time limit but does not contain a separate sanction clause.

If nomination occurs on hour 72 or 96 rather than hour 48, the text does not specify whether the party’s entitlement automatically lapses.

Different interpretations are possible. One reading treats the deadline as mandatory: once expired, the first vice-president’s acting role becomes substantive, and he or she becomes the president.

Another reading is that a delayed nomination could still be recognised if political actors agreed. This would be in line with the transitional constitution, which allows a 14-day window for nominations that need to be accepted by the vice-president acting as president.

In practice, such a scenario would likely be resolved through political bargaining rather than judicial enforcement.

What about the issue of someone being detained or being on trial?

This is a further complexity as the current first vice-president, Riek Machar, is in detention and on trial.

Detention or trial, however, do not automatically create a vacancy under either the 2011 constitution or the 2018 peace agreement. Unless the office holder resigns or is formally removed, the position remains legally intact.

If the presidency were to fall vacant while the first vice-president was detained but not removed, the legal text would still designate the latter as the acting authority.

The 2018 agreement does not rank the other vice-presidents for automatic succession. All are explicitly of equal rank.

Any attempt to bypass the first vice-president without formal removal would therefore be politically and legally contested.

Where are the biggest risks in the current system?

Behind these legal provisions lie political realities.

The 48-hour clause requires rapid consensus within the president’s party, the mainstream SPLM. The 2018 agreement does not specify which internal organ of the party must nominate the successor. Instead, this process is guided by internal party leadership structures, rules and regulations. In practice, this is likely to be handled by the SPLM Political Bureau.

However, the decision-making would be shaped by more than formal party ranks. Other factors, especially the support of the security sector, ethnopolitical balances and existing patronage networks, would come into play.

The presidency has historically been embedded in military and security structures, which gives succession an importance that extends beyond procedural law.

The 48-hour provision is clear on paper, but its operation depends entirely on political cohesion. If consensus fails, the text alone cannot prevent contestation.

How would elections help?

The picture could change once elections become a realistic possibility and a nomination process is held. South Sudan has postponed elections previously due to delayed preparations, political resistance and lack of funding. Polls are now slated for December 2026.

A post-transition order would revert to a presidency-vice presidency model as per the transition reflected in the country’s National Election Act, with a vice-president elected on a ticket as running mate, and thus positioned as the undisputed successor. Elections would force parties to clarify leadership hierarchies in advance.

In this sense, an electoral framework does not merely choose a president – it simplifies succession.

Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

– ref. South Sudan has never had an election to hand over presidential power: so what are the rules of succession? – https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-has-never-had-an-election-to-hand-over-presidential-power-so-what-are-the-rules-of-succession-276640