Le Liban n’arrive toujours pas à résorber le trou abyssal de son système bancaire

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Nizar Atrissi, Professeur associé, IAE Paris – Sorbonne Business School; Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

La singularité de la « Gap Law » : la garantie de l’argent placé sur un compte en banque ne s’effectue pas par établissement mais par déposant, à l’échelle du système bancaire. TexBr/Shutterstock

Le Liban traverse une crise bancaire sans précédent avec des dépôts bloqués, une baisse de 98 % de la valeur de la livre libanaise et un trou financier de 70 milliards de dollars états-uniens, soit plus de 59,4 milliards d’euros. Un projet de loi « Gap Law » vise à établir un nouveau cadre pour organiser la répartition entre l’État, la banque centrale, les banques commerciales et les déposants. Avec quels perdants ? Au cœur des débats : la confiance dans l’avenir du pays.


Le Liban traverse l’une des crises financières les plus graves observées au niveau mondial depuis plusieurs décennies. Avec l’effondrement de son système financier en 2019, les dépôts (dont les fonds peuvent être retirés partiellement ou totalement à tout instant) sont largement bloqués, la monnaie nationale a perdu l’essentiel de sa valeur et l’économie fonctionne sous un régime de restrictions informelles en l’absence de cadre légal.

Dans ce contexte, l’adoption par le gouvernement d’un projet de loi « Gap Law » visant à organiser la répartition des pertes bancaires le 26 décembre 2025, constitue une étape longtemps attendue, mais soulève de profondes questions quant à sa capacité à restaurer la confiance.

Alors comment le Liban peut restaurer cette confiance dans son système bancaire ?

Trou financier équivalent à trois fois le PIB du Liban

La crise financière libanaise est le résultat de déséquilibres économiques profonds accumulés pendant plusieurs décennies.

Le modèle économique reposait sur un endettement massif de l’État auprès des banques, elles-mêmes fortement exposées à la banque centrale, ou Banque du Liban. Ce système dépendait d’entrées continues de capitaux, notamment de la diaspora, facilitées par un régime de change maintenu « artificiellement » fixe entre la livre libanaise et le dollar – 1 507 livres libanaises pour un dollar états-unien de 1997 à octobre 2019.

Il favorisait de facto la circulation des flux de capitaux. Lorsque ces flux se sont taris, l’insolvabilité conjointe de l’État, de la Banque du Liban et du secteur bancaire est apparue, conduisant au défaut souverain de mars 2020.

Taux de change de la livre libanaise avec le dollar états-unien de 1960 à 2024. En 2024, 1 dollar états-unien = 89 500 livres libanaises.
Université de Sherbrooke

Depuis, la crise est gérée sans cadre légal de résolution bancaire ni contrôle des capitaux. Des restrictions sur les dépôts ont été imposées par des circulaires de la Banque du Liban. Parallèlement, la livre s’est effondrée sur le marché parallèle, perdant plus de 98 % de sa valeur, détruisant le pouvoir d’achat des Libanais et des Libanaises. Selon le FMI et d’autres organismes internationaux, le « trou financier » actuel du système bancaire dépasse 70 milliards de dollars, soit plus de trois fois le PIB annuel du pays.

« Gap Law » sur le « trou financier »

Le projet de loi « Gap Law » de la régularité financière et de la restitution des dépôts vise à établir un cadre légal pour traiter les pertes financières accumulées en devises. Il organise leur répartition entre l’État, la Banque du Liban, les banques commerciales et les déposants.

Il prévoit la protection des dépôts jusqu’à 100 000 dollars états-unien par déposant, avec remboursement sur quatre années. Ce plafond s’applique de manière consolidée à l’ensemble des comptes détenus par un même déposant dans le système bancaire, indépendamment du nombre d’établissements concernés.

Les dépôts consolidés excédant ce seuil seraient convertis en instruments financiers de long terme, essentiellement des obligations zéro-coupon (pas d’intérêts jusqu’à la fin de durée de l’obligation), émises par la Banque du Liban, avec des maturités de dix à vingt ans selon le montant.




À lire aussi :
La crise économique au Liban en 1966 a-t-elle été provoquée par les États-Unis ?


Le Conseil central de la Banque du Liban aurait un pouvoir étendu pour déterminer les modalités de remboursement, y compris la possibilité d’accélérer les échéances, sans critères prédéfinis, alors que le Conseil des ministres pourrait les rééchelonner en fonction de l’évolution de la situation économique.

Le texte évoque une restructuration du secteur bancaire, sans préciser les critères de viabilité des établissements, les modalités de recapitalisation, ni la séquence de mise en œuvre, renvoyés à des textes d’application ultérieurs.

Les déposants en première ligne

L’un des aspects les plus singuliers du dispositif réside dans la manière dont les pertes sont consolidées. Contrairement aux pratiques généralement observées, la garantie des dépôts et la répartition des pertes ne s’effectuent pas par établissement, mais par déposant, à l’échelle du système bancaire. Lors de la crise chypriote ou en Islande, les pertes ont été rapidement reconnues, explicitement chiffrées et appliquées dans un cadre institutionnel clair visant à restaurer la confiance.

Les mécanismes de résolution bancaire reposent principalement sur une hiérarchie claire des pertes, où les actionnaires et créanciers absorbent les chocs avant toute atteinte aux dépôts, et ce banque par banque.

En agrégeant les pertes, le projet ne procède à aucune différenciation entre banques, indépendamment de leur contribution à l’effondrement financier. Celui-ci a été largement alimenté par des opérations d’ingénierie financière complexes ayant encouragé une prise de risque démesurée. Sans critères économiques conditionnant la répartition des pertes, le dispositif privilégie une stabilisation globale du système sans traitement préalable de l’aléa moral issu de ces pratiques.

Un engagement au présent sans fondement

L’enjeu ne réside pas seulement dans la manière dont les pertes sont réparties ou différées. La crédibilité des engagements repose sur la capacité future de l’économie à générer des ressources suffisantes pour les honorer, largement incertaine. En l’absence de sources de financement identifiées ou de trajectoire macroéconomique crédible, les promesses de remboursement s’apparentent davantage à des engagements conditionnels qu’à des obligations fermes.

Produit intérieur brut (PIB) du Liban, de 1989 à 2023.
Banque Mondiale

L’expérience internationale montre que ce type de dispositifs – obligations issues de restructurations ou instruments indexés sur la croissance – ne peut fonctionner que s’il est adossé à des règles claires, une gouvernance crédible et une visibilité minimale sur les flux futurs. En Grèce, Argentine ou Chypre, la valeur réelle de ces instruments dépendait moins de leur valeur faciale que de la confiance dans les institutions et le cadre macroéconomique sous-jacent.

Les instruments de la loi risquent donc d’incarner une forme de dette différée, dont la soutenabilité dépend d’une reprise hypothétique et de décisions politiques incertaines.

Faire reposer sur l’épargne privée

Sans mécanismes clairs de responsabilisation, de hiérarchisation des pertes, de recapitalisation bancaire substantielle et de collatéraux définis, le projet fait reposer une part majeure de l’ajustement sur l’épargne privée.

Cette socialisation ex post des pertes érode la richesse des ménages, réduit leur capacité d’épargne future et contribue peu à restaurer la confiance. Or, la confiance est au cœur du fonctionnement bancaire et de l’intermédiation, indispensable à la reprise de l’investissement et de l’activité économique.

Le projet de loi rompt avec des années d’inaction, mais l’enjeu dépasse la simple répartition comptable des pertes, profondément arbitraire et opaque : il touche au cœur du contrat de confiance entre l’État, le système bancaire et les citoyens, condition indispensable à toute reprise économique durable.

The Conversation

Nizar Atrissi ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Le Liban n’arrive toujours pas à résorber le trou abyssal de son système bancaire – https://theconversation.com/le-liban-narrive-toujours-pas-a-resorber-le-trou-abyssal-de-son-systeme-bancaire-273401

Cloud tech outages: how the EU plans to bolster its digital infrastructure

Source: The Conversation – France – By Christine Abdalla Mikhaeil, Assistant professor in information systems, IÉSEG School of Management

When Amazon Web Services (AWS) went down globally in October 2025, millions of users were abruptly reminded how invisible yet indispensable cloud technology has become.

From banks and hospitals to airlines and retail platforms, entire sectors slowed or came to a standstill. The disruption followed a separate catastrophe earlier in July 2024, when CrowdStrike’s software update grounded operations around the world.

Different companies. Different causes. Yet both events exposed the same uncomfortable truth: the world’s digital infrastructure, the networks, servers and software that underpin nearly every modern service, is far more fragile than we like to believe.

Technically, these were very different failures, but the similarity lies in how quickly they cascaded. A single error in a single company rippled across global systems that had no direct relationship to that company at all.

The illusion of resilience

For years, cloud providers have marketed themselves as the answer to such fragility. Distributed computing, automated backup, and redundant systems are supposed to keep data and services online even when local components fail. However, the cloud model depends heavily on network connectivity and can introduce latency and other vulnerabilities, that mitigates certain failures, but does not eliminate fragility entirely.

As both the AWS and CrowdStrike incidents show, redundancy on paper doesn’t always mean resilience in practice. Many organisations that rely on AWS for critical services also use AWS for their backup, monitoring or authentication. When a core network fails, so do the fail-over mechanisms designed to prevent downtime. In other words, “diversification” often exists only within the same provider’s ecosystem, a classic case of putting all eggs in one digital basket.

At the heart of the issue is cloud concentration. A small number of companies, primarily AWS, Microsoft and Google, now host the majority of the world’s digital infrastructure. Even more when, cloud computing has become the backbone of modern AI by relying on large, centralized data centers that offer substantial processing power and scalability.

Governments, universities, hospitals and even competitors run their critical services on these same platforms. The convenience and cost efficiency are undeniable. But this consolidation has created a structural vulnerability. A single misconfiguration or software flaw in one of these providers can have global consequences, similar to how a major bank failure can destabilise the financial system.

The situation is further complicated by opacity: cloud providers rarely disclose full details of their interdependencies or internal resilience practices. Customers often have no clear map of how their services are distributed, where their data resides, or which other systems they rely on indirectly. When outages happen, even identifying who’s responsible can be a challenge.

Europe’s dependence and ‘digital sovereignty’

What makes these incidents particularly concerning is that they involve private companies running public infrastructure. AWS and CrowdStrike aren’t just serving commercial clients, they underpin hospitals, airports, energy grids and government systems. When they fail, entire ecosystems fail, not just their direct customers. Yet oversight of these critical dependencies remains minimal.

For Europe, these outages turned an abstract “digital sovereignty” debate into a very concrete dependency problem.

Digital sovereignty is about the capacity to ensure that critical data, infrastructure, and AI systems operate under EU rules and remain controllable in crises. This sovereignty framing ties outages to broader issues of jurisdiction (US access to data), trade power, and strategic autonomy for critical sectors, like finance, health, and public administration.

Politically, it responds to dependence on a handful of US hyperscalers who hold over 70% of the European cloud market and are also subject to US laws like the CLOUD Act. On the CLOUD Act side, explanations by EU‑focused providers and analysts emphasise that US‑headquartered cloud firms (including AWS, Microsoft, Google) are subject to the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, which can compel disclosure of data stored in European data centers.

Cloud and AI sovereignty frameworks address where and under which law sensitive data and workloads run, and how easily European users can exit, port, or reconfigure in the face of outages or geopolitical shocks.

Recent European initiatives explicitly treat hyperscalers and major Information and Communication Technology (ICT) providers as systemic infrastructure, not just vendors.

Under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), in force since 2025, EU financial regulators can designate “critical third party ICT service providers” and subject them to direct oversight to reduce systemic risk.

EU debates on cloud now emphasise exit, portability, and multi‑cloud architectures, arguing that resilience depends less on “more providers” and more on avoiding structural lock‑in that makes switching or redundancy impossible in practice. DORA addresses who runs critical digital infrastructure for finance and how the European Union can oversee and stress test them as systemic actors.

Guaranteeing cybersecurity across Europe

The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), in force since December 2024, is the EU’s way of hard wiring “resilience by design” into the entire stack of connected hardware and software that underpins Europe’s digital infrastructure.

CRA addresses what characteristics all networked digital products must have so they do not import unmanageable cyber risk or opaque vulnerability handling into the EU.

The NIS2 (Directive (EU) 2022/2555 came into effect in January 2023 and required transposition into national law by October 2024, expanding from NIS1’s narrow scope to cover medium/large entities in energy, transport, health, finance, digital infrastructure (including cloud), public administration, manufacturing, and more. NIS2 operationalises sovereignty at the entity level: critical operators must align their practices with EU standards, even when relying on non-EU providers, creating a harmonised resilience baseline across the single market. It integrates with CRA, DORA, and cloud initiatives by requiring entities to demand equivalent resilience from suppliers, closing gaps in the dependency chain.

Beyond regulations, the Commission is building practical sovereignty tools around cloud and AI.

A “Cloud Sovereignty Framework” tender (up to €180 million for 6 years), launched in 2025 and awarded in April 2026 to Luxembourg’s Post Telecom, Germany’s StackIT, French Iliad’s data centre unit Scaleway and Belgium’s Proximus, sets concrete sovereignty criteria, strategic, legal, operational, environmental, supply chain transparency, openness, security, and EU law compliance, for cloud services procured by EU institutions.


A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!


The Conversation

Christine Abdalla Mikhaeil est membre de l’Association for Information Systems (AIS).

ref. Cloud tech outages: how the EU plans to bolster its digital infrastructure – https://theconversation.com/cloud-tech-outages-how-the-eu-plans-to-bolster-its-digital-infrastructure-280928

Les femmes, les oubliées de la science sur l’accouchement et l’allaitement

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Thomas Delawarde-SaÏas, Professeur de psychologie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

La médecine reproductive connait très bien la qualité du lait maternel, les indicateurs néonataux et les courbes de risque. Pourtant, lorsque 20 % des femmes québécoises décrivent des pressions coercitives, des gestes non consentis ou une douleur ignorée lors de l’allaitement ou de l’accouchement, ces savoirs-là – sur leur vécu, leur anxiété, leur autonomie décisionnelle – ne comptent presque pas dans la décision médicale. Il est peut-être temps que la médecine intègre pleinement leur vécu comme critère scientifique à part entière.


Professeur à l’UQAM et chercheur en psychologie communautaire, mes travaux portent sur la réduction des inégalités sociales de santé, les politiques publiques en périnatalité, et la transformation des institutions au service du bien-être des familles et des professionnels. Avec mes collègues universitaires et travaillant en obstétrique, nous avons récemment mené deux recherches empiriques qui étudient le vécu des femmes. Nos résultats montrent que les pratiques médicales en périnatalité, bien que visant la sécurité des mères et des enfants, peuvent parfois se faire au détriment de leur autonomie décisionnelle et de leur santé mentale.

Deux formes de savoirs

En santé reproductive, les décisions médicales s’appuient sur divers savoirs scientifiques, qui n’ont pas tous la même valeur. Ces savoirs décrivent notamment ce que le corps féminin devrait permettre, préserver ou optimiser : le développement de l’enfant, la continuité et la qualité de la reproduction, la gestion du risque obstétrical. Ces connaissances, abondamment étudiées, mesurées et financées, structurent l’essentiel des recommandations cliniques.

D’autres sources de connaissances portent pourtant sur les femmes elles-mêmes : leur santé mentale, leur capacité à décider, et leur vécu émotionnel. Ces travaux existent – mais ils sont moins nombreux, moins mobilisés dans les cadres décisionnels, et plus rarement érigés en priorité de santé publique. On sait ainsi beaucoup de choses sur la qualité du lait, les indicateurs néonataux ou les courbes de risque, mais on dispose de données nettement plus fragmentaires sur ce que vivent les femmes lorsqu’elles doivent composer avec ces recommandations.




À lire aussi :
De la dépression postnatale à la détresse relationnelle : repenser la santé mentale périnatale


Le problème apparaît lorsque ces deux formes de savoirs entrent en tension. Dans ces situations, ceux considérant le corps des femmes comme un moyen au service d’autres finalités tendent à s’imposer, reléguant au second plan ceux qui portent sur leur vécu et leur autonomie décisionnelle.

Quelle place pour les mères dans l’allaitement ?

Dans une étude menée en 2024 au Québec auprès de 944 femmes, nous avons voulu comprendre comment les politiques d’incitation à l’allaitement interagissaient avec les choix des femmes. Les résultats ont montré que, sans égard pour le choix d’allaiter et l’attitude des femmes par rapport à l’allaitement, 20 % des personnes rapportaient avoir reçu des messages jugeants, coercitifs, intrusifs ou en décalage avec leurs besoins.

Certaines expriment une absence totale de prise en compte de leur santé mentale : « Le message ne prend jamais en compte les besoins de la mère, physiques ou psychologiques ». D’autres décrivent des gestes non consentis, des pressions répétées pour continuer malgré la douleur, ou l’absence d’information sur les alternatives : « Ils me faisaient mal et je n’étais pas en état de refuser ».

L’étude montre aussi que les difficultés vécues – douleur, stress, anxiété, sentiment d’échec – sont souvent minimisées ou renvoyées à « un manque d’efforts ». Et lorsque les femmes choisissent de ne pas allaiter exclusivement, un nombre important rapportent n’avoir reçu aucun soutien, ou même avoir subi des jugements négatifs de la part du corps médical.

Dans le champ de l’allaitement, institutionnellement structuré par l’Initiative « Hôpitaux amis des bébés » (je souligne), les considérations sur les bénéfices pour l’enfant – immunité, prévention des infections, effets à long terme – occupent une place centrale et orientent largement les recommandations internationales.

En comparaison, les recherches portant sur les conséquences psychologiques et sociales des politiques d’incitation à l’allaitement pour les femmes sont beaucoup moins visibles dans les cadres décisionnels. Pourtant, ces travaux existent et documentent des liens entre pression normative, culpabilisation, défaut de consentement et détresse émotionnelle, incluant anxiété, perte de confiance et sentiment d’échec maternel.

Les deux corpus proviennent des mêmes espaces scientifiques. Mais dans la pratique clinique, les connaissances centrées sur les besoins de l’enfant s’imposent, tandis que celles portant sur la santé mentale, les limites et la capacité d’agir des mères (choisir d’allaiter ou ne pas allaiter) demeurent périphériques.


Déjà des milliers d’abonnés à l’infolettre de La Conversation. Et vous ? Abonnez-vous gratuitement à notre infolettre pour mieux comprendre les grands enjeux contemporains.


En marge de son propre accouchement

Les travaux sur les violences obstétricales offrent un autre terrain particulièrement éclairant pour observer ces tensions entre savoirs. Dans une recherche récente menée au Québec auprès de 271 personnes ayant accouché dans les deux dernières années, nous avons documenté les formes que peuvent prendre ces violences ainsi que leurs conséquences émotionnelles.

Trois grands types d’expériences ressortent : des interactions non-soutenantes avec les professionnels, l’absence de consentement à certains actes médicaux et des défaillances organisationnelles des services. Plus largement, 78 % des participantes rapportent avoir vécu au moins une expérience désagréable lors de leur accouchement, souvent liée à la manière dont les soins étaient réalisés ou imposés.

Ces pratiques sont rarement nommées comme des violences. Elles s’inscrivent plutôt dans une logique de protocolisation et de sécurité : accélérer le travail, prévenir les complications, optimiser les issues périnatales. Autrement dit, elles s’appuient sur un corpus de connaissances biomédicales centré sur la gestion du risque obstétrical et la protection du fœtus.




À lire aussi :
Voici comment reconnaître et prévenir la violence obstétricale et gynécologique


Mais lorsque l’on examine leurs effets du point de vue des femmes, un autre savoir émerge. Les participantes décrivent un sentiment d’impuissance, d’humiliation, de dépossession de leur accouchement, certaines allant jusqu’à dire s’être senties « comme une expérience de laboratoire ». La douleur minimisée, les gestes pratiqués sans consentement ou les plans de naissance ignorés illustrent une disqualification récurrente de leur propre expertise corporelle.

Ici encore, deux registres de connaissances coexistent : l’un centré sur la sécurité obstétricale, l’autre sur l’intégrité psychique et l’autonomie décisionnelle des femmes. Et lorsque ces registres entrent en tension, ce sont le plus souvent les impératifs biomédicaux qui structurent la décision, reléguant au second plan les conséquences émotionnelles et subjectives des pratiques.

Concilier les enjeux biomédicaux et l’expérience vécue

Ces deux recherches montrent que les personnes dont le corps est objectifié ne manquent ni d’informations ni de capacité réflexive. C’est la valeur accordée à leur savoir qui manque. Quand les connaissances issues de leur vécu, de leur santé mentale ou de leur trajectoire de vie entrent en tension avec des savoirs biomédicaux centrés sur la fonction du corps (porter, accoucher, nourrir, conserver la possibilité de procréer), ce sont presque toujours ces derniers qui l’emportent.

Il est essentiel à cet égard de reconnaître que les preuves scientifiques sont toujours produites, sélectionnées et interprétées dans un cadre normatif. Lorsque le corps est principalement envisagé à travers ses fonctions reproductives, les connaissances qui s’y accordent tendent à structurer les décisions.

Interroger cette hiérarchie revient à élargir le cadre dans lequel elle est mobilisée. Cela suppose de considérer les effets des pratiques médicales non seulement en termes d’issues biomédicales, mais aussi en termes d’expérience vécue, de santé mentale et de capacité à décider.


L’auteur rapporte ici des résultats produits dans le cadre d’une programmation de recherche collaborative avec Cécile Delawarde-Saïas, Coralie Mercerat, Julie Poissant et Eloïse St-Denis.

L’auteur remercie Eloïse Lara Desrochers et Julie Zaky pour leur relecture de cet article et leurs commentaires critiques qui en ont augmenté la qualité.

La Conversation Canada

Thomas Delawarde-SaÏas ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Les femmes, les oubliées de la science sur l’accouchement et l’allaitement – https://theconversation.com/les-femmes-les-oubliees-de-la-science-sur-laccouchement-et-lallaitement-270337

Ghana’s mining law aims to stop speculation but leaves communities in limbo – insights from a lithium case study

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Clement Sefa-Nyarko, Lecturer in Security, Development and Leadership in Africa, King’s College London

Ghana’s parliament ratified the country’s first lithium mining agreement in March 2026. This came three years after lithium mining was confirmed as commercially viable in September 2023.

The Ewoyaa Lithium Project, in the Central Region of Ghana, covers an area where farming communities have lived for generations. It spans several communities.

The agreement is between the government and Barari DV Ghana Limited, the local subsidiary of Australia-based Atlantic Lithium. Lithium is a mineral used in batteries that power electric vehicles, renewable energy storage systems and everyday electronics. It’s at the heart of global minerals supply chains to decarbonise energy and transport.

With the deal in place, formal discussions will begin with mining communities about relocation, compensation and restoring livelihoods. Compensation could include payment for land, crops, construction work and other assets that will be affected by mining operations, as required under Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act.

The ratification of the deal also marks the end of a legal moratorium set out in Ghanaian law. This comes into force once minerals of commercial value are discovered.

The moratorium, which lasted three years in the case of the Ewoyaa Lithium Project, was designed to protect both the state and mining firms from complications such as speculative construction, sudden land claims, and inflated compensation demands that may arise from new developments.

Under Ghana’s mining law, once minerals of commercial value are confirmed, temporary restrictions are placed on new permanent structures, farm expansion and other major land use changes in the affected area. It lasts until there is a mineral agreement and compensation arrangements are clear. The intention is to stabilise land use and ensure fair valuation.

It has profound social consequences.

For people already living in these areas, the moratorium can mean extended periods of uncertainty. During this time, everyday decisions about livelihoods, housing and the future are placed on hold.

Its practical impact is that residents living on or near the mining area can’t build, expand their farms, or make other major decisions about land use.

The affected communities live in a state of suspended time during the moratorium. Farmers are unable to plan their next season confidently. Families delay home improvements. Young people postpone major life decisions because their future access to land remains unclear.

The mining agreement doesn’t end the waiting. Instead, it opens a new phase of negotiations, compensation assessments and administrative back and forth. It could stretch on for months or even years.

This prolonged uncertainty causes real social and economic harm. Yet its effects are often overlooked.

My academic work examines governance, natural resources, politics, and energy transitions. In a recent paper, based on extensive fieldwork in the lithium-rich communities of Ewoyaa, Krampa Krom and Krofu, I investigated how these delays and uncertainty shaped everyday life. I gathered firsthand accounts of how people navigated this period of waiting. All are affected by the project.

The effects were unmistakable. People described the moratorium as a form of “frozen time”, when life could not move forward.

The economic setbacks and emotional strain from long periods of uncertainty often go unrecognised in public policy discussions.

Time on hold

My research identified a number of negative effects of the delays in getting mining operations off the ground.

Firstly, households described how it eroded local opportunities and contributed to young people leaving the area. Young people expressed frustration as their job prospects remained frozen, and they lacked clarity on whether future employment at the mine would be accessible or meaningful.

Many young adults, already frustrated by years of stalled prospects, had left in search of work elsewhere.

The few lower-paid jobs associated with early stage mining activities were not yet available.

Secondly, farmers reported clear losses: they could not expand or invest.

Thirdly, women traders, many of whom sell farm produce and foodstuffs, reported disruptions in household income patterns because farming activities were stalled.

Fourth, community elders, reflecting on years of limited communication, described a growing distrust towards government institutions and the processes governing the mineral agreement.

Across these accounts, what united residents was the feeling that their lives had been interrupted by forces far beyond their control. The moratorium did more than pause development, it suspended decision making, aspirations and the ability to plan even the simplest aspects of the future.

“Time on hold” shaped economic choices, social relationships and the very rhythm of community life.

In my study, I argue that these prolonged delays are a form of “temporal injustice”. This concept emerged directly from listening to residents describe how their aspirations, livelihoods and sense of security were reshaped by bureaucratic time.

Temporal injustice occurs when certain groups bear unfair burdens of waiting, uncertainty and delayed decision-making. These disruptions may seem minor when viewed from the outside. But they have broader implications. They affect project timelines, investor confidence, and the long-term reliability of the supply chains that power the global clean energy transition.

Looking forward

As Ghana and the mining company move into the compensation and community engagement phase, they have an opportunity to address not only material losses but the temporal burdens that communities have endured.

First, compensation frameworks should recognise that the moratorium itself caused harm. Beyond land, crops and structures, policymakers must account for the economic and social costs of years spent waiting.

Second, community engagement must be timely, transparent and genuinely participatory.

Information should flow consistently, especially when people’s livelihoods depend on it.

Third, Ghana should incorporate temporal justice principles into mining governance, including clearer timelines, regular updates and support for communities facing prolonged delays.

Finally, as Ghana deepens its role in the global critical minerals supply chains, local communities should share the benefits rather than being left to carry hidden costs. A just energy transition demands fair distribution not only of mineral wealth, but of time, certainty and opportunity.

The Conversation

Clement Sefa-Nyarko receives funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) for a Future Leaders Fellowship that is researching justice in critical minerals governance and energy transitions. Clement also does occasional consultancy for Participatory Development Associates for research and evaluation in Africa, but not directly related to mining.

ref. Ghana’s mining law aims to stop speculation but leaves communities in limbo – insights from a lithium case study – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-mining-law-aims-to-stop-speculation-but-leaves-communities-in-limbo-insights-from-a-lithium-case-study-279594

East African Community’s expansion has triggered financial troubles: why solutions come with risks

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, United States International University

The East African Community is one of Africa’s oldest regional economic organisations. Its birth in 1967 was the culmination of decades of economic ties forged in the colonial era between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It’s no surprise that the EAC is also the most deeply integrated regional entity.

In its heyday between 1967 and 1977, the bloc shared a common currency, jointly operated a development bank and administered its transport infrastructure as one. There was a common education policy with a single syllabus and examining body as well as the University of East Africa with specialised colleges in the three countries.

Political friction and conflicting priorities, among other factors, led to its collapse in 1977 but it was revived in 1999. Citizens within the bloc currently benefit from free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, along with the rights of establishment and residence. Unmet objectives include the return of a common currency and a political federation.

Meanwhile, the bloc has grown from three to eight – Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007; South Sudan in 2016, the DR Congo in 2022 and Somalia in 2023. The territory covers stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic and brings together over 331 million people and a combined GDP of US$313 billion as of 2025.

However, this rapid expansion has triggered financial difficulties, putting the economic integration agenda at risk. While partner states are expected to contribute to fund the bloc’s operations, only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda regularly meet their quota. The budget shortfall has led to massive staff layoffs and a freeze on new recruitment.

So serious is the crisis that it was top of the agenda at the annual summit of the heads of state in March 2026. The leaders stepped up to reform the funding model and signalled that the bloc was ready to sanction or sideline countries that compromise funding.

I have studied regionalism and integration in eastern Africa, conducted research on the EAC and published on Tanzanian citizens’ sovereignty, popular participation, and the EAC integration and democratisation.

It is my view that the radical proposals will compel non-paying partner states to either shape up or ship out. These reforms will salvage the East African Community but could potentially trigger mistrust and perception of unequal benefits in the long run.

The cost of rapid expansion

Each of the eight partner states is expected to contribute approximately US$7 million to fund the bloc’s operations. In addition, the bloc relies on development partners to fund some activities.

In recent years, six of the eight member states have missed their budget contributions. This resulted in a US$90 million budget shortfall. Regional institutions affected by these include:

  • the East African Legislative Assembly, the regional parliament

  • the East African Court of Justice, responsible for the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty.

The two have failed to perform their core functions due to resource constraints. The regional assembly, on occasion, has been forced to skip sittings. This has an effect on critical debates and enactment of new laws to foster economic integration. The regional court grapples with case backlogs.

In November 2023, the EAC Summit adopted a new financing model. It shared 65% of the budget equally among partner states and the rest based on each country’s financial capacity. This capacity is assessed using the World Bank’s average nominal GDP per capita metric for the previous five years.

But only Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – and occasionally Rwanda – have remitted their contributions on time. Domestic conflicts in South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia may have played a role in the slow contributions of these newer EAC members. In the 2024-2025 financial year, Burundi paid only 19% of its expected contribution, the DRC paid 14%, Somalia paid around half, and South Sudan paid a mere 7%.

Overall compliance stood at roughly 58%, leaving the bloc with arrears exceeding US$55 million. In the 2025-2026 cycle, the picture was even bleaker: compliance slipped to just 36.6%, while outstanding obligations climbed to about US$90 million.

The pattern also hints at something deeper: political ambivalence among non-paying members, and uneasiness among some partner states about the benefits of belonging to the bloc. Despite the funding challenges, inter-regional trade in the EAC has been on the rise due to increased trade facilitation under the customs union and common markets protocols. The EAC has also made advances in peace and security. In 2022 for example, through the Nairobi Process, the EAC facilitated peace talks and deployed the East African Community Regional Force in DRC.

Beyond funding, personal and political differences between the DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame have contributed to tensions within the bloc.

What did the leaders decide at the March summit?

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, in a rather surprising but decisive move, pushed for a new financing formula, replacing the model adopted in 2023.

The highlights of the new financing formula include:

  • 50% of the budget will be shared equally among all partner states, while the remaining 50% will be based on each country’s economic strength. The formula will take effect from 1 July 2026. By factoring in differences in economic capacity, the reform aims to reduce the burden on smaller economies and make the bloc’s funding more sustainable.

  • members of the legislative assembly should be paid by their respective national assemblies with effect from December 2027

  • the council of ministers should finalise the schedule of sanctions considering the new financing formula. The EAC aims to deal with mounting arrears and non-payment through a sanction regime.

A quorum for the meeting of all organs and institutions of the community will be two-thirds of all partner states. Previously, all states had to participate in passing crucial resolutions, and this was frustrated by absenteeism, especially by non-paying countries.

Nominations for the key institutional positions will depend on the sponsor state’s ratification of all community legal instruments, domestication of the treaty, and full implementation of the roadmap for the partner state’s integration.

What’s next

These are radical proposals, with consequences. Take the example of the decision to appoint Stephen Mbundi of Tanzania as the new secretary general. Based on the rotational principles of the EAC, South Sudan was poised to take over the position from Kenya’s Veronica Nduva. But South Sudan is a defaulter.

This decision signalled the bloc’s commitment to financial compliance and commitment to the spirit of regional integration. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, also took over the chairman’s position, bypassing Somalia and the DRC, which were poised to lead the community for a year. Somalia and the DRC have been behind in their annual payments.

The proposals, which appear to have been orchestrated by the founding members, suggest a pragmatic move to salvage the EAC.

The Conversation

Nicodemus Minde does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. East African Community’s expansion has triggered financial troubles: why solutions come with risks – https://theconversation.com/east-african-communitys-expansion-has-triggered-financial-troubles-why-solutions-come-with-risks-280632

Who is calling the shots in Iran?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Following the last round of talks between the United States and Iran in Islamabad, Iran’s foreign minister and negotiator Abbas Araghchi declared in a post on X on April 17 that the Strait of Hormuz was “completely open”. This came after he also signalled that his government could be flexible over the issue of nuclear enrichment as well as Iran’s support for its proxies in the region.

Then came an abrupt correction. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) who was recently appointed as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, is understood to have complained to the IRGC, submitting a report that criticised Araghchi for “deviation from the delegation’s mandate”.

The negotiating team was called back to Tehran. Araghchi was attacked by state-run media which said his post had “provided the best opportunity for Trump to go beyond reality, declare himself the winner of the war and celebrate victory.” And the Strait of Hormuz was declared closed.

This episode demonstrates the new reality in the Islamic Republic, where the IRGC increasingly calls the shots in all matters of statecraft and government. The rest of the state is a façade at most.

Over the six weeks of war, Iran’s former leadership has been decimated: the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in a US strike on the first day of US and Israeli attacks. Many of his senior colleagues have also been killed. Iran is no longer best understood as a state with a powerful militia. It has become, more precisely, a powerful militia with a state – a political order with the IRGC at its core.

The other traditional centres of power – the government and the clergy – have effectively been relegated to mere front organisations. Amid the fog of war, even the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, appears merely as a legitimising ornament. In any case, Khamenei is reported to have been severely injured in the attack that killed his father and is apparently taking no part in government.

So who is running the country? The answer points unmistakably to the IRGC and its leader, Ahmad Vahidi.

Guardians of the revolution

The IRGC was created after the 1979 revolution, precisely because Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his allies did not trust the conventional state apparatus to defend the revolution. Over time it grew beyond its role as guardians of the revolution into an all-encompassing, all-channel network. It became a military, an intelligence service, an economic conglomerate and a regional expeditionary network. Its internal security force, the Basij, gave it an arm of mass social control inside Iran. The Quds force was set up to export the revolution across Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond.

Far from destroying this architecture, sanctions deepened it. They led to the creation of front companies linked to the IRGC doing illicit deals and operating circuits of patronage that enriched those closest to the centre of power. What emerged was a parallel state that gradually outgrew the formal one.

The IRGC is organised as a network with a core and a periphery. Its central hub decides strategy. This is surrounded by a network of decentralised cells capable of operating with a high degree of autonomy. This is called Iran’s “mosaic defence doctrine”. And it was built to operate precisely the way it is now: to keep fighting amid attempts at decapitation and disruption.

A new leader emerges

After IRGC chief Mohammad Pakpour was killed on the opening day of the conflict, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior minister and a founding member of the IRGC, has emerged to take his place. After being appointed in an emergency capacity after his predecessor was killed, he has consolidated effective control as the civilian presidency has been hollowed out.

With the new supreme leader apparently incapacitated and the clergy sidelined, Vahidi and his group of allies – IRGC commanders and security council hardliners such as Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr – have set the mandate and red lines for the ceasefire talks.

The IRGC’s red lines are clear: it will not surrender uranium enrichment altogether; it wants to preserve its missile program and the axis of resistance; it wants sanctions to lifted and access to Iranian assets overseas that are presently frozen. Room for negotiation only exists on technical details about enrichment levels, timelines for lifting sanctions or the language of any deals that are agreed.

In times of war, states tend to centralise as civilian institutions shrink. Hard men tend to rise, especially after many of the influential political pragmatists, such as Ali Larijani, the former secretary of the security council, were deliberately taken out by Israel.

The IRGC was not suddenly conjured by this war, but prepared by decades of institutional entrenchment, economic capture and delegated coercion. The IRGC’s military dictatorship in the making needed this war to consolidate its influence over competing nodes in the network – most importantly the clergy.

This has profound consequences for the negotiations. Instead of being straightforward bargaining between statesmen, Washington’s real estate moguls turned negotiators are speaking to Iranian counterparts who are on a short lead held by the IRGC. Progress in negotiations should not be judged by what Iran’s diplomats say in public, but by what the guard allows to be implemented in practice.

Trump and Israel’s failed decapitation strategy leaves a potent system in place that feels emboldened by the desperation in the White House to find a diplomatic off-ramp. To think that this war-hardened system of hardliners will capitulate is wishful thinking.

The past few days have made it clear that the IRGC is now a militia with a state using the civic and military institutions of the Islamic Republic as its outer skin. While there is room for negotiation to build a mutually acceptable deal, the US administration needs to be realistic about where the IRGC’s red lines are and what card it actually has to play against a resilient network with a very high threshold for pain.

The Conversation

Andreas Krieg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Who is calling the shots in Iran? – https://theconversation.com/who-is-calling-the-shots-in-iran-281066

Our Freedom: Then and Now explores what freedom means to Brits, 80 years after the second world war

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Rawlinson, Associate Professor History of Art, University of Nottingham

Marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war, Our Freedom: Then and Now is a nationwide photography project exploring how communities understand freedom.

The show opened at London’s Southbank Centre in April and is now touring the UK. This exhibition offers an alternative perspective to the idea that this is currently a nation divided. From the Highlands of Scotland to libraries in southwest England, it asks a simple yet powerful question: what did freedom mean in 1945, and what does it mean now?

The Socially Engaged Photography Network sent 22 photographers to work closely with community projects, ensuring the photographs were created in collaboration with participants. This approach is distinct from traditional photojournalism, which often speaks about rather than with the people photographed.

By spending time in places such as Maesteg Town Hall and libraries in Stornoway, artists including Johannah Churchill, Sam Ivin and Leticia Valverdes have focused on making photographs that portray the viewpoints of the people involved.

Projects marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war can easily lapse into cliche, but Our Freedom: Then and Now avoids sentimentality. In fact, part of its power lies in engaging with the complexities of contemporary society and culture. It avoids simple slogans and instead the photographs foreground thoughtful reflections on conflict and the ongoing importance of finding common ground and sustaining connection.

As Stephanie Peacock, the UK’s minister for sport, tourism, civil society and youth, said at the launch, the project comes at an important time. With fewer people having direct memories of the war, sharing their reminiscences alongside the voices of schoolchildren and young artists creates a conversation between those who remember 1945 and those who will shape 2045.

This exchange fosters two forms of understanding: participants learn about themselves, and viewers learn about others. According to Simon Mellor, Arts Council England’s deputy chief-executive, these works bring local experiences into national conversations, offering a valuable space for dialogue in difficult times.

This was certainly my experience. I left the gallery surprised by the many ways freedom is experienced and understood across the UK. Whether it’s a veteran in Wolverhampton or a student in Hartlepool, the cumulative effect of individuals’ thoughts about freedom and community was fascinating and thought-provoking.

The exhibition is grounded by poet laureate Simon Armitage’s specially commissioned poem, Freedom Road. Echoing the participant photographs, the poem shifts its focus from grand images of liberation to the simple, everyday actions that make up real freedom. He writes:

You can’t dig up freedom like a potato

from the verges of Freedom Way, or pan it

from Freedom Beck like inklings of gold;

it won’t be delivered to Freedom Avenue

gift-wrapped in silver string.

Armitage suggests that freedom is most real when it goes unnoticed, such as the ability to disagree with a neighbour, walk where we want, and live as we choose. This idea aligns with the exhibition’s main goal: to show that freedom is something we live every day – not just a piece of history to remember now and then, but something current and vital.

The exhibition on tour

The exhibition’s tour is as ambitious as the work itself. After starting at the Southbank Centre, it travels to places like Eden Court in Inverness, the McKechnie Institute in South Ayrshire and the Strand Arts Centre in Belfast, bringing the art back to the communities that helped create it.

This return is important because it shows that art doesn’t just happen in big cities; it grows from local libraries and community centres and derives its power from these regional identities. In 2025, more than 530,000 people took part in the events and performances leading up to this exhibition.

By steering clear of easy sentimentality, Our Freedom: Then and Now does something more meaningful. It offers an honest look at how we live together. The exhibition recognises the difficult parts of our shared histories while reminding us of our shared humanity.

In a nation that can feel divided, Our Freedom: Then and Now uses photography to highlight what people have in common and where we might work harder to find those commonalities. It’s a reminder that, even though freedom requires work, it is not only worth it but necessary.

The Conversation

Mark Rawlinson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Our Freedom: Then and Now explores what freedom means to Brits, 80 years after the second world war – https://theconversation.com/our-freedom-then-and-now-explores-what-freedom-means-to-brits-80-years-after-the-second-world-war-280955

Dan Dare is blasting off again: why, as a scientist, I’m excited for the comics’ return

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Elizabeth Stanway, Reader in Astronomy and Astrophysics, University of Warwick

Dan Dare: Pilot of the Future was a groundbreaking science fiction comic serial, first appearing in the UK comic The Eagle in 1950. Now, more than 75 years later, a reinvention of the series is underway, with the first new graphic novel written by Alex de Campi (Bad Girls and Madi) with art by Marc Laming (Marvel’s Star Wars). set for later this year.

As science fiction enthusiast and a scientist, I am excited to see what it will be like. I’m sure I’m not alone, as a number of scientists – including the late astrophysicist and cosmologist
Stephen Hawking and planetary scientist Colin Pillinger – cited Dan Dare’s exciting vision of the future as instrumental in their decision to pursue science.

Daniel McGregor Dare is an officer in the Britain-based Interplanet Space Force (ISF). Faced with overpopulation and starvation on Earth, the ISF is tasked with exploring the possibility of crop production or trade on Venus. After initial problems, Dan Dare and a small group of colleagues are able to reach the surface of the planet. Once there, they find a habitable world with two native species: the friendly Therons, and the inimical Treens, with the latter led by their “super-scientist” the Mekon. Defeating the Mekon, and making arrangements for food supply with the Therons, Dare opens up the solar system, and ultimately the wider galaxy, to humanity.

While the concept of Dan Dare originated with a clergyman, Marcus Morris, its formative years and storylines were shaped by a very different man. Writer and artist Frank Hampson was known for the attention he paid to the science, working from detailed models and reference photographs. He gave thought to plausible design and stayed abreast of developing vehicle technologies and concepts, while also working with a scientific advisor.

In an early story, “The Red Moon Mystery” (serialised in The Eagle in 1952), for instance, he had the character Professor Peabody explain planetary orbits, magnetic fields and spectroscopic biosignatures to a young audience. He also drew a sequence with accurate representations of the Royal Observatory at Herstmonceux in Sussex, and a character closely based on the astronomer royal of the time, Sir Harold Spencer Jones.

This level of precision both added to the verisimilitude of his stories and appealed to an enthusiastic audience that saw a bright future in space exploration, an audience that included budding scientists Hawking and Pillinger.

Sadly, the level of scientific accuracy in the series declined after Hampson’s departure, with writers introducing more bizarre aliens and unexplained interstellar travel. But its engagement, from the very beginning, with technical accuracy and scientific plausibility, continues in many ways and is also part of the reason for its longevity and why it remains relevant.

A new Dan Dare

Despite its many reinventions over the decades, much of this premise has remained unchanged. Dare has always represented humanity’s best, and is typically shown as an optimistic exemplar of bravery, chivalry and honour. The Kickstarter page for the new Dan Dare: First Contact novel makes it clear that the current creative team respects the character’s origins. As the new reboot’s writer Alex de Campi says:

if you are already a Dan Dare fan, there’s a ton of references to the classic stories as well as a sincere respect for Frank Hampson’s legacy from our entire creative team.

But like the 1990s graphic novel written by Scottish comic writer Grant Morrison or the 2010s audio dramas made by B7 Productions, there will be some changes in the story. For instance, these iterations have given more agency to Dare’s female scientist colleague Professor Jocelyn Peabody. They have also typically been darker and more cynical regarding the political or commercial interests funding human spaceflight.

Cover of Dan Dare
Dan Dare is back!
Wikimedia

The new Dan Dare team also acknowledge Hampson would have expected changes in scientific and contextual representation:

In First Contact, the science is updated, making Dan’s world one we can understand from our current point of view: a world of bickering oligarchs, broken nations, and climate disaster. The stakes are immediate: humanity is only just getting faster-than-light travel.

As I’ve discussed in my own work on the relationship between science and science fiction, the stories have always reflected our changing understanding of solar system habitability. Already by 1950, scientific studies were making it clear that Venus was uninhabitable, although popular culture and even school textbooks often retained the older visions. As a result, more recent versions have tended to gloss over issues such as the origin of the Treens, sometimes relocating their civilisation to cloud cities high in the atmosphere of Venus.

The changing science shouldn’t be a surprise: the role of science fiction has always been to mirror and extrapolate as much from the sociopolitical concerns of a time as from its technology and science. Good science fiction has always balanced accurate science with fine storytelling and a critical eye towards social trends and their logical extremes. The new Dan Dare project will do so for a new audience, adding to a remarkable eight-decade long record of popular engagement with space science.

The Conversation

Elizabeth Stanway does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Dan Dare is blasting off again: why, as a scientist, I’m excited for the comics’ return – https://theconversation.com/dan-dare-is-blasting-off-again-why-as-a-scientist-im-excited-for-the-comics-return-281053

The way primates parent their young shows how strict labels like parenting styles miss the mark

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Libby Ware, PhD, Biological Anthropology, Université de Montréal

Whether you’ve sought them out or not, you’ve probably encountered parenting content creators on social media at some point in the last two decades.

In the comments section, you’ve undoubtedly seen parents being celebrated for their child-rearing methods. And you’ve probably also seen a lot of disagreements, “mom-shaming” or criticism of parenting styles.

“Gentle parenting” — an empathy-based approach focused on raising confident children through understanding and respect — has experienced a rise in popularity, for example. And then, predictably, it has been followed by sharp critiques.

More often than not, parenting is framed as a choice between fixed styles, but evidence from primate research suggests effective parenting is flexible and responsive to context.

Parenting is more complex than categories

According to Diana Baumrind, an influential American clinical and developmental psychologist, there are three parenting styles: authoritative, authoritarian and permissive.

The authoritative approach has high parental warmth and discipline, the authoritarian one has low parental warmth and high discipline and permissive parenting has high parental warmth and low discipline.

Humans, however, are far from the only animal to parent. Non-human primates have a variety of parenting approaches, and researchers have looked to our closest relatives to understand how caregiving adapts across environments.

Maternal primate care strategies vary from permissive to protective, much like human parenting styles.

Primate mothers invest more energy and time into feeding, being with and generally caring for their offspring, from infancy to independence, than males do. This mirrors traditional family roles under patriarchal standards in humans.

Similarities also appear in how human and non-human primate mothers sometimes adapt their parenting to best fit their offspring’s needs and environment.

Evolution supports responsive parenting

In a recent study by psychologists and primatologists comparing humans and captive bonobos, gibbons and siamangs, researchers found that, across all study species, mothers adjusted their behaviour to the potential risks facing their offspring.

They also changed their approaches based on age, typically decreasing protective behaviours and increasing some permissive ones as infants grew older. For example, imagine this scenario: your child becomes a teenager and has a later curfew (increased permissiveness) and is allowed sleepovers (decreased protectiveness). This would fit the authoritative approach.

Interestingly, protective care was higher in both humans and bonobos. This similarity may be explained by our shared genetics (about 99 per cent). There may be more risk in permissiveness, depending on the environment.

The flexibility in maternal care across primate species suggests that parenting is not be as simple as choosing one style or approach. Adjusting across the axes of permissiveness and protection, as well as levels of warmth and involvement, seems to be key to effective parenting with the best outcomes.

What works better appears to be the ability to shift based on context. This flexibility extends across caregivers as well, including fathers, whose role has often been underestimated.

What research says about fathers

Paternal care is present in primates but rare in other mammals. This is another reason non-human primates and humans are a more comparable model for parental care than other animals.

Fathers are important to the survival of offspring in marmosets, tamarins, titis and owl monkeys, as well as some lemurs and siamangs. This is often in the form of grooming, support during confrontations and protection from infanticide.

It is common for adults, specifically males, to be aggressive towards young members of the group. In many species, this is a form of socialization, teaching the juveniles their place within the social hierarchy. This is more common in stricter social hierarchies like chimpanzees and may shift male roles toward the authoritarian category.

It’s well documented that parenting styles and involvement have an influence on the social and health outcomes of children. While many mammal studies focus on the influence of the mother, a study on marmosets found that during the first 30 weeks of life, a present father can improve both survival and growth trajectories of offspring.

These results are also consistent for fathers with multiple offspring, and is among the first piece of evidence demonstrating this in wild marmosets. They form long-term pair bonds and are largely monogamous, making their social model additionally comparable to ours.

These results are consistent with studies in humans showing the value of fatherhood in child health outcomes. This is a parallel between primate care and human parenting styles that encourage paternal involvement, which has historically been overlooked.

Male involvement in rearing challenges assumptions about the importance of fathers in non-human animals. Fathers clearly have a role in the success of their offspring through adulthood.

So if parenting is fundamentally adaptive, then debates over what style is right may be less useful than we think. This has implications for parenting advice culture and how we design support systems.

The Conversation

Libby Ware does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The way primates parent their young shows how strict labels like parenting styles miss the mark – https://theconversation.com/the-way-primates-parent-their-young-shows-how-strict-labels-like-parenting-styles-miss-the-mark-276516

Hurricanes devastated Florida’s East Coast – then seagrass made an unexpected comeback

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Stephanie Insalaco-Wyner, Assistant Professor of Geographic Information Sciences, Southwestern University

Seagrass has made an unexpected return to Mosquito Lagoon. Captain William B. Wolfson, Grassroots Guide Service, New Smyrna Beach, FL

Florida’s Indian River Lagoon has been an ecosystem in decline going back to 2011, when harmful algal blooms led to a severe decline in seagrass, the foundational component of shallow coastal ecosystems.

Seagrass meadows stabilize sediments, improve water clarity and provide critical habitat and forage for species ranging from invertebrates to sea turtles and manatees. Seagrass also generates a significant amount of economic activity in the state of Florida.

The loss of seagrass in the Indian River Lagoon System undermined fisheries, tourism and wildlife, ultimately leading to the starvation of more than 1,200 manatees from 2020-25, peaking in 2021-22.

Mosquito Lagoon is part of the Indian River Lagoon system that spans 28 miles (45 kilometers), running from Cape Canaveral in the south up to Ponce Inlet in the north. As in the rest of the lagoon system, years of nutrient pollution and recurring algal blooms had diminished seagrass cover to nearly zero by the early 2020s. By most accounts, Mosquito Lagoon had crossed a critical ecological tipping point.

In the fall of 2022, hurricanes Ian and Nicole struck Florida’s east coast within six weeks of one another, bringing intense rainfall, storm surges and coastal erosion. In the immediate aftermath, seagrass declined even further.

But a few months later, in the spring of 2023, seagrass began to return. Satellite imagery revealed rapid and widespread regrowth.

We are geographers who study environmental change. Our research documents this unexpected recovery and examines what it may reveal about ecosystem resilience in heavily degraded coastal systems.

One of us, Hannah Herrero, is a Volusia County native who grew up around the lagoon. She returned to her hometown at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was there that some local guides and fishermen she’d known for years suggested that our team should use satellite imagery to look at the state of collapse in the lagoon.

The study we designed as a result used satellite imagery and machine learning, a type of artificial intelligence that uses advanced algorithms to learn and predict patterns, to track seagrass dynamics in Mosquito Lagoon before, during and after the storms. This approach allowed us to observe change at a scale and frequency that is difficult to achieve using only traditional field survey methods.

Tracking seagrass from space

Monitoring seagrass coverage “the old-fashioned way” involves going into the lagoon and laying out transects, straight lines that cut through a landscape, so standard observations could be recorded. We would then have to boat or wade all along those lines to measure seagrass extent and locations and create digital maps manually to show where it is present.

As you can imagine, this is a time-intensive process that’s limited by how far you can boat or swim in a day, and by financial resources.

So we decided to use satellite imagery instead. This method is not without its own challenges – water turbidity, or cloudiness, seasonal variability and the patchy nature of vegetation that grows on the bottom of the lagoon all make it difficult to observe seagrass growth directly on the imagery.

To address this challenge, our study used imagery from NASA’s Harmonized Landsat–Sentinel program, which combines data from multiple satellites into a consistent record of photos of the same areas taken frequently over time. We analyzed imagery collected between September 2022 and January 2024, focusing on periods before and immediately after the hurricanes and throughout the subsequent recovery.

We applied a type of machine learning model called Random Forest to classify each image into seagrass and nonseagrass categories.

The machine learning algorithm is informed by training samples collected in the field, but once the model has learned the signature of seagrass, it is able to then apply the classification model to the rest of the lagoon and across time with limited human input. We can then validate this classification.

two women wading in a body of water
The authors wade into Mosquito Lagoon to track seagrass growth as they train their AI model.
Captain William B. Wolfson, Grassroots Guide Service, New Smyrna Beach, FL

Heading into the field

First, we had to train the model using hundreds of GPS points collected in the field over multiple seasons. This step helps to ensure that satellite classifications align with on‑the‑ground conditions and are accurately interpreting the images.

Over several weeks during the summers of 2020 through 2023, our team spent many hours navigating Mosquito Lagoon in a small skiff designed for shallow depths, recording seagrass presence.

It wasn’t always easy – Florida summers are intensely hot and humid, and Mosquito Lagoon definitely lived up to its name. But we got to see a wide variety of wildlife, including manatees, dolphins, sea turtles and alligators. And occasionally, on lucky days, we even spotted a roseate spoonbill or reddish egret.

Our experience in the field highlighted why this system matters: Mosquito Lagoon is a remarkably vibrant place, teeming with wildlife. These long days on the lagoon, surrounded by its biodiversity and immersed in its unique sense of place, are what anchor the remote sensing data to on-the-ground ecological conditions and make the resulting models credible.

timelapse gif of Mosquito Lagoon seagrass coverage
This time-lapse of satellite images shows the three phases of seagrass coverage the authors observed in Mosquito Lagoon between September 2022 and January 2024.
Stephanie Insalaco-Wyner

What we found

Our analysis reveals three distinct phases of seagrass coverage.

First, seagrass declined sharply following hurricanes Ian and Nicole. By December 2022 and early 2023, satellite imagery showed virtually no detectable seagrass across the lagoon.

Then, in March 2023, we identified a statistically significant shift. Seagrass began to reappear, initially in small, scattered patches.

Finally, during late spring and summer 2023, seagrass expanded rapidly. By July 2023, it covered more than 20% of the lagoon – levels not observed in more than a decade. Coverage then declined again during the winter of 2023–24, as expected based on seasonal growth cycles. But even our last observation, completed in January 2024, showed seagrass covering 4.3% of the lagoon, substantially higher than pre-recovery levels during the winter season.

In spring 2026, seagrass in Mosquito Lagoon has remained at stable levels. Although it still experiences fluctuations due to algal blooms, seasonality and other changes in the ecosystem, we have not seen a complete loss of seagrass again like what was occurring for over a decade.

Importantly, this pattern was not random. Regrowth occurred primarily in the central and southern parts of the lagoon, areas historically known to support dense seagrass meadows. The timing also aligned with established seagrass seasonal growth patterns, which strengthens our confidence that the observed changes reflect true ecological recovery.

How storms may have contributed

We cannot prove that hurricanes directly caused the seagrass recovery that we document in our study. Further study beyond the scope of our work is needed to evaluate this possibility. However, we believe the sequence of events suggests that the storms may have altered environmental conditions in ways that enabled regrowth.

Hurricane Ian delivered large volumes of fresh water into the lagoon, potentially suppressing salt‑tolerant macroalgae that compete with seagrass for sunlight and nutrients.

Six weeks later, Hurricane Nicole breached coastal dunes and created several new inlets between the lagoon and the Atlantic Ocean. These openings allowed salt water into the lagoon, likely altering salinity and changing water circulation and conditions.

The hurricanes may also have redistributed seagrass fragments and mobilized dormant seed banks, accelerating regrowth once conditions stabilized. Ecologists have observed similar mechanisms in other coastal systems affected by tropical cyclones.

seagrass underwater in Mosquito Lagoon
The surprising comeback of seagrass in Mosquito Lagoon bodes well for local wildlife and for the people whose livelihood depends on it.
Hannah Herrero

Beyond Mosquito Lagoon

Mosquito Lagoon’s collapse and eventual tentative recovery illustrates both the vulnerability and resilience of coastal ecosystems. Even after years of decline, the Mosquito Lagoon coastal ecosystem demonstrated an ability to recover relatively rapidly when physical conditions shifted.

At the same time, resilience does not guarantee permanence, and we believe this recovery should be viewed cautiously.

From a practical standpoint, our study also highlights the value of satellite imagery and machine learning for ecosystem monitoring. These tools allow scientists, resource managers and local communities to detect change consistently and respond before losses spread.

The Conversation

Hannah V. Herrero is the Director of Science for the Lagoon Watermen Alliance, a Florida-based non-profit. The mission of Lagoon Watermen Alliance is to protect the entire Indian River Lagoon system by advocating for science-based solutions that will lead to improved water quality, protection of imperiled habitats and safeguarding of gamefish populations.

Stephanie Insalaco-Wyner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Hurricanes devastated Florida’s East Coast – then seagrass made an unexpected comeback – https://theconversation.com/hurricanes-devastated-floridas-east-coast-then-seagrass-made-an-unexpected-comeback-279177