How Australia’s anti-immigration rallies were amplified online by the global far right

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Callum Jones, Associate research fellow, Deakin University

Over the weekend, rallies were staged across various Australian cities under the branding “March for Australia”. The rallies, which were attended by avowed neo-Nazis and elected politicians alike, called for an end to mass migration.

These protests are not unique to Australia. Recently, the United Kingdom has seen its own wave of anti-migrant demonstrations in cities such as London, Bristol and Birmingham.

Despite claims by some that the Australian rallies were “hijacked” by the neo-Nazi National Socialist Network (NSN), they were deeply rooted in the far-right, white nationalist ideas of “remigration” and the Great Replacement theory.

An ABC investigation in the lead-up to the rallies found that “remigration” was listed on the organisers’ website as a key reason for marching, before later being deleted.

Significantly, the March for Australia rallies also received high-profile, online support from far-right figures overseas, including Alex Jones, Tommy Robinson, Jack Posobiec and Elon Musk.

Musk retweeted a post erroneously claiming 150,000 people took part in the rallies, while Jones retweeted a post claiming a crowd size of half a million.

For the rally organisers, public support from figures such as these greatly expands the reach of their message, and repositions them from isolated fringe events to vital parts of a global anti-immigration movement.

This is not the first time Musk has inserted himself in the domestic politics of a foreign country to bolster the far right. The tech billionaire notably gave his support to Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany party in recent elections, describing it as the “best hope”“ for the country.

In recent days, he also posted the phrase ”remigration is the only way“ in response to a post about foreigners in the UK.

Remigration refers to the mass deportation of non-white immigrants to their so-called countries of origin.

It is an ideological cornerstone of ”identitarianism“, a European far-right movement centred on preserving white European identities. These are perceived to be under attack by immigration, globalisation and multiculturalism.

Global growth of the far right

This online support for March for Australia underscores the growing transnational links among far-right movements.

These movements increasingly see themselves as united by shared concerns over the defence of so-called “Western Civilisation”, opposition to mass immigration, the preservation of white identity, and beliefs in conspiratorial narratives such as the Great Replacement theory.

And this transnational growth wouldn’t be possible without the proliferation of social media in recent years.

In Australia, for example, research shows how “indispensable” mainstream social media platforms have been in the development of anti-Islamic far-right movements such as the United Patriots Front, going back to the 2010s.

The far right also capitalises on virality and humour to extend the dissemination of their ideology online. In particular, this is done through memes.

Research has found, for example, that one particularly prominent transnational far-right meme, Pepe the Frog, has been localised for an Australian audience through the addition of a Ned Kelly mask.

Research also shows how international slogans travel across borders. US President Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” mantra, for instance, has been adapted into a distinctly local form for Australians: “Make Australia Grouse Again”.

The online space makes it easier for extreme views and rhetoric to permeate into mainstream political discourse, as well.

When elements of the far right get removed from mainstream social media platforms— a process known as “deplatforming” — they often find a new home on alternative platforms such as Telegram. Research shows they now host a range of Australian neo-Nazi groups.

It’s noteworthy that many of the key figures lending support for March for Australia, including Robinson and Jones, were previously deplatformed from Twitter before Musk acquired the company and reinstated them.

Social media has also allowed neo-Nazis such as Tom Sewell, who is essentially persona non grata in Australian mainstream media, to build a large and highly influential profile among international far-right audiences.

With Musk’s vows to defend “free speech” on X, and Mark Zuckerberg’s dramatic shift in Meta’s approach to content moderation, the mainstream social media environment is becoming even more hospitable to far-right movements. This is a worrying trend.

For the Australian far right, the support of figures such as Musk and Robinson signals an opportunity to increase their mobilising potential. It could also lead to the transnational exchange of information, resources and tactical support.

As the far right becomes increasingly emboldened, mainstreamed and normalised, we should expect to see more public and increasingly violent demonstrations across Australian cities – and support for these among a global audience online.

The Conversation

Kurt Sengul has received funding from the NSW Government’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Social Cohesion Research Program.

Callum Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How Australia’s anti-immigration rallies were amplified online by the global far right – https://theconversation.com/how-australias-anti-immigration-rallies-were-amplified-online-by-the-global-far-right-264269

Russia’s GPS interference: do I need to worry when flying?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lucia McCallum, Senior Scientist in Geodesy, University of Tasmania

Gints Ivuskans / AFP via Getty Images

On Sunday, a plane carrying European Union chief Ursula von der Leyen was reportedly forced to land in Bulgaria using paper maps after its GPS navigation systems were jammed. Bulgarian authorities claim the jamming was deliberate Russian interference, though a Kremlin spokesperson told the Financial Times this was “incorrect”.

GPS interference is on the rise, so you might be wondering how it works. And can anything be done about it? And – perhaps most importantly – do you need to worry?

How does GPS jamming work?

The Global Positioning System (GPS) and other satellite navigation systems use radio signals from satellites to calculate position. To determine position, a GPS needs a direct line of sight to at least four satellites.

There are two ways to disrupt satellite navigation.

The first is jamming. This works by simply broadcasting high-intensity radio noise in the same frequency band used by the navigation satellites.

Jamming drowns out the satellite signal, like a person shouting loudly in your ear stops you hearing what someone is saying on the other side of the room. This appears to be what happened in Bulgaria.

The second way to interfere with satellite navigation is called spoofing, and it’s a little more elegant. Spoofing involves sending radio signals that pretend to be coming from the navigation satellites.

Where jamming stops the satellite navigation system from producing any location, spoofing tricks it into giving a false location – with potentially catastrophic results.

Are jamming and spoofing becoming more common?

Jamming and spoofing do appear to be growing more common, especially in conflict zones in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

A clandestine Russian base near the Polish border is reportedly responsible for satnav interference in the Baltic region.

Ships in the Red Sea report frequent interference, likely from Houthi rebels in Yemen.

These increasingly common incidents highlight how vulnerable our reliance on satellite navigation makes us.

What can be done about interference?

The best response to interference is to have backup navigation options in place. The US-run GPS is the best known and most commonly used satellite navigation system, but there are others.

The EU runs a parallel system called Galileo, while Russia has one called GLONASS and China operates its own BeiDou satellites.

Each of these systems operates using slightly different radio frequencies. Some navigation systems can tune in to more than one set of satellites – so even if one is jammed, others may be available.

Galileo also has a “safety of life” feature, which allows users to detect spoofing. Australia’s in-development SouthPAN system will also offer a similar feature.

Another common feature of navigation systems is inertial sensing. This relies on sensors such as gyroscopes and barometers to directly detect movement and calculate position.

Most car navigation systems use inertial sensors to track location in cities or tunnels where there is no direct line of sight to satellites. Inertial sensing works well for short periods of time, but quickly becomes inaccurate and needs to be recalibrated by checking in with satellite systems.

Many researchers around the world are trying to develop new alternatives to satellite navigation using extremely precise sensors. One recent development uses tiny fluctuations in Earth’s magnetic field to detect position, for example.




Read more:
Quantum navigation could transform how we travel. So what is it, and how does it work?


Should you be worried about flying?

Everyday air passengers have no need to worry about jamming or spoofing. For one thing, it’s very rare – especially outside conflict zones.

For another, the aviation industry is highly regulated and extremely safe. Even where satellite navigation doesn’t work, there are backup options.

What all of us can take away from this latest incident is how dependent we have become on satellite navigation. What matters is that we have a diverse range of systems so we are not dependent on just one.

The Conversation

Lucia McCallum does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Russia’s GPS interference: do I need to worry when flying? – https://theconversation.com/russias-gps-interference-do-i-need-to-worry-when-flying-264334

What’s behind the rioting in Indonesia? And will the much-loathed political elite back down?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tim Lindsey, Malcolm Smith Professor of Asian Law and Director of the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, The University of Melbourne

For many Indonesians, the violent riots currently wracking Jakarta and other cities across the archipelago are eerily reminiscent of the riots of 1998 that accompanied the fall of former dictator Soeharto and his New Order regime after three decades in power.

As in 1998, demonstrators have targeted the legislative complex and “fat cat” politicians they see as neglecting and even impoverishing them. Rioters are also vandalising the homes of politicians and stripping them of luxury goods.

Also striking is the behaviour of the security forces. While there are widespread reports of violence by police, some members of the military are said to have been standing by and not stopping the looting. In one case, they even handed out drinks and cash to rioters.

Again, this reminds many of the involvement of the military in the 1998 riots, when soldiers harshly cracked down on protesters, but were also accused of facilitating rioting and looting. Current President Prabowo Subianto, then a senior army general, was dismissed after being allegedly implicated in these events, particularly in the forced disappearances of democracy activists.

The situation in Jakarta is not yet as serious as it was in 1998, but the presence of thousands of violent rioters targeting the rich and powerful is still a nightmare for Indonesia’s oligarchic elite. Mass protests are one of the few things that give them pause – and sometimes even force them to back down.

This is why those protests can also be vulnerable to manipulation by members of that same elite: they hope to weaponise public fury against each other.

But there is much more to these events than just elite rivalry.

Political perks and public pain

In recent years, huge protests calling on legislators to abandon plans to pass a repressive new criminal code or gut the once-respected Anti-Corruption Commission have failed. But this has only added to a backlog of grievances against politicians. On Independence Day on August 17, some protesters even flew pirate flags below the national flag. Officials called this act “treason”.

The current street protests began spontaneously a week later on August 25, with people calling for the dissolution of the national legislature (known by the acronym DPR). Protesters were enraged that legislators had granted themselves lavish new monthly housing allowances of approximately A$4,700, which the deputy speaker claimed was still not enough, even though many politicians already earn more than $9,000 per month (and some more than $21,000), tax free.

The angry public response was understandable, given the minimum wage in Jakarta is just $500 per month. There is deep resentment in Indonesia of politicians, who are seen as corrupt, lazy and out of touch.

The growing budget hole created by Prabowo’s costly signature projects means many basic social services have been slashed since he was sworn in last October, including health, education and local government funding. The ranks of the poor are growing and the middle class is shrinking. Both segments of society are hurting.

Unsurprisingly, the demonstrators demanded the legislators’ new housing allowances be cancelled, along with other perks such as overseas junkets. Lawmakers responded arrogantly, with one even calling the protesters “the dumbest people in the world”.

The demonstrations were relatively calm at first. Then, on August 28, a 21-year-old motorcycle taxi driver, Affan Kurniawan, who happened to be making a delivery near the protests, was run over and killed by a police vehicle.

The symbolism could hardly be starker. A precarious gig economy worker struggling to support his parents on a pittance crushed by an armoured vehicle driven by the police, popularly seen as corrupt and oppressive agents of the political elite. It seemed to encapsulate the issue at the heart of the demonstrations – elite greed and lack of concern for the “little people”.

Motorbike taxi associations and many other community groups quickly organised, demanding police be held accountable. The protests then grew outside Jakarta police headquarters and spread rapidly across Indonesia. Rioters targeted police stations, government buildings, and bus and train stations.

Looting and even arson attacks followed, resulting in numerous regional legislatures being destroyed. There have been at least seven deaths so far.

Prabowo now says he is listening to protesters’ grievances and the DPR will cancel the legislator allowances. It remains to be seen if that ever happens and whether it will last, given it’s in Prabowo’s interests to keep lawmakers’ pockets full.

Reflecting his military past and “strongman” self-image, the president has also said the protesters are committing treason and terrorism. He has called on police to act against them with “determination”.

Conspiracy theories running wild

These events are clearly a threat to some members of the elite, but there is no doubt they offer opportunities to others.

Some protesters believe the different responses of the police and the army – longstanding rivals for status, funds and influence – reflect their competing political allegiances.

Prabowo, a former Special Forces commander, is said to be backed by the army, while the police chief, Listyo Sigit Prabowo (no relation), is loyal to former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who appointed him. Jokowi also presided over huge growth in police budgets and numbers while in office.

While Prabowo won last year’s presidential election thanks to an alliance he formed with Jokowi, the two now seem locked in a struggle for power.

Some critics suggest it would suit Prabowo for the police to be the villains in the current protests, as that would weaken Jokowi. Army inaction (or even provocation or support for the rioting) helps achieve that. The ultimate aim, they suggest, might even be to disband the national police and make it a subordinate branch of the military, as it was under Soeharto.

In 1998, Prabowo was allegedly involved in manipulating the rioting in Jakarta in a failed effort to win power. Many Indonesians believe a similar high-stakes scheme today is not beyond him.

Whether or not this is true, conspiracy theories are running wild. It’s certainly possible the elite would try to meddle in events in the streets, even if details are likely to remain murky.

But it’s equally apparent the protests are a genuine outburst of long-simmering grievances against the political elite, guided by grassroots civil society organisations. Unfortunately, these groups have not yet been able to articulate the clear set of political demands that could create a more unified movement out of the street protests, as happened in 1998.

How will Prabowo respond?

Will the elite back down? They did in 1998. Then, the rioting forced the New Order elite to purge themselves of their more toxic members (such as Soeharto and, for a while, his then son-in-law, Prabowo) and reconfigure as nominal Reformasi democrats.

But that does not look likely this time – at least not yet. Although Indonesia has been a constitutional democracy since 1999, real political authority is still firmly in the hands of a relatively small, entrenched, oligarchic elite.

They have learned to win elections and control the political process so effectively there is no meaningful political party opposition at all. This has created an increasingly undemocratic ruling coalition that has its own savage internal fights (such as those between Jokowi and Prabowo), but has proved extraordinarily resilient and resistant to external pressure.

While many rich and powerful oligarchs fear Prabowo’s innate authoritarianism, the current crisis is probably not enough to force a split with him.

Indeed, Prabowo may even be able to use his response to the riots to further consolidate his power. Some suggest he may even impose martial law if they continue.

And this means that once the current unrest dies down (and that may take a while), and Prabowo and his inner circle feel sufficiently in control again, a harsh crackdown on civil society critics and protest leaders is a very real possibility.

The Conversation

Tim Lindsey receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

ref. What’s behind the rioting in Indonesia? And will the much-loathed political elite back down? – https://theconversation.com/whats-behind-the-rioting-in-indonesia-and-will-the-much-loathed-political-elite-back-down-264470

El cautiverio de Miguel de Cervantes en Argel: muchos mitos y pocas realidades

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By José Manuel Lucía Megías, Catedrático de Filología Románica, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Julio Peña interpreta a Miguel de Cervantes en la última pelicula de Alejandro Amenábar, ‘El cautivo’, que narra los años que el autor pasó en Argel. FilmAffinity

Miguel de Cervantes fue un desconocido para sus contemporáneos, como la mayoría de los escritores de lo que conocemos como Siglo de Oro –en realidad, los siglos XVI y XVII, en los que la Monarquía Hispánica marcó el ritmo de su tiempo en la política, la economía, la ciencia y el arte–.

Cervantes no contó con un discípulo que al año siguiente de su muerte glosara de manera entusiasta su vida y su obra (como Lope de Vega y Pérez de Montalbán). Ni tampoco con un académico italiano que decidiera recordar los hechos gracias a un sobrino (como Quevedo y Pablo Antonio de Tarsia). Hubo que esperar más de un siglo después de su muerte para tener una primera biografía, la de Gregorio Mayans y Siscar al inicio de la edición inglesa del Quijote, publicada en Londres en 1738.

Y esos más de cien años que pasaron entre el fallecimiento del escritor y el relato de Mayans y Siscar, escrito sin conocer ningunos de los cientos de documentos de la época que han llegado hasta nosotros, explican muchos de los tópicos que aún hoy perduran en nuestro imaginario sobre la vida de Cervantes.

Si a esto le sumamos la visión romántica de los siglos XVIII y XIX, que ha impuesto la imagen de un Cervantes heroico y ejemplar, autor de la más grande obra literaria en lengua española, encabezada y casi limitada al Quijote, tenemos los ingredientes necesarios para aderezar el banquete de las ficciones alrededor de uno de los autores (y humanos) más complejos e interesantes del Siglo de Oro.

Y sin duda, los cinco años en que estuvo cautivo en Argel son uno de los episodios que han dado lugar a más mitos. ¿Por qué razón? Antes de adentrarnos en ellos –aprovechando el estreno de El cautivo, el último filme de Alejandro Amenábar–, es necesario conocer un poco más el Argel del siglo XVI, muy alejado de la imagen de la cárcel de alta seguridad que muchos se imaginan.

Tráiler de El cautivo, la nueva película de Alejandro Amenábar basada en los cinco años que Cervantes pasó en Argel.

Un error habitual: confundir los corsarios con los piratas

Miguel de Cervantes estuvo cautivo (es decir, raptado hasta se pagara su rescate) en Argel un lustro. Con 28 años se embarcó en Nápoles, en septiembre de 1575, y días después de hacerlo su nave fue capturada por corsarios argelinos delante de las costas catalanas. Como tantos otros miles y miles de cautivos por estos años, a partir de entonces su vida dependió del dinero y de su capacidad de conseguirlo.

Cuando hablamos de corsarios argelinos tenemos que olvidarnos de la imagen romántica del pirata, con su parche en un ojo, el loro en el hombro o una pata de palo, que ha terminado por triunfar gracias a las películas de Hollywood. Frente al pirata, cuya única ley es su deseo, el corso es un sistema económico cuidado hasta en sus más pequeños detalles. Los corsarios más famosos (y los que ahora nos interesan) son los argelinos.

El corso fue habitual en todo el Mediterráneo de la época –incluso en las costas cristianas–. Se basaba en el secuestro de personas por las que se pedía un rescate. En este sistema todo estaba reglamentado, desde los porcentajes de las ganancias (una parte para el rey de Argel, otra para el capitán, otras para los marineros, etc.) hasta el precio del rescate de los raptados, que pasaban a ser cautivos.

Pintura de Miguel de Cervantes frente a un hombre poderoso de Argel.
Cervantes en Argel, cuadro original de Antonio Muñoz Degrain, que se conserva en la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid.
Hemeroteca Digital/Revista ‘La Esfera’

Y ese rescate marcaba su futuro: el de los más pobres (cautivos de almacén, que se ocupaban de las tareas necesarias para mantener Argel, desde ser galeotes a jardineros, albañiles o criados) y el de los “hombres graves”, por los que se pedían entre 300 y 500 escudos de oro, una pequeña fortuna para la época. Los primeros eran tratados como esclavos por sus amos; los segundos, como “objetos de lujo”, a los que había que preservar con vida, pues el rescate era la ganancia.

Miguel de Cervantes y su hermano Rodrigo, ambos soldados de los tercios italianos, consiguieron ser considerados “hombres graves”. Su precio fue de 500 y 300 ducados respectivamente.

Argel en el siglo XVI: una visión falsa en el tiempo

Para muchos, Argel, la ciudad en la que estuvo Cervantes con otros miles de cautivos, es lo más parecido a una cárcel de alta seguridad en el Mediterráneo.

Nada más lejos de la realidad. En el siglo XVI, Argel era una de las ciudades más cosmopolitas de todo el Mediterráneo. Su gobierno dependía de Estambul, siendo uno de los más codiciados por las cuantiosas ganancias que podían conseguir sus gobernadores.

Era asimismo una de las urbes más pobladas y, sobre todo, una de las más ricas, necesitada de productos de lujo y primera supervivencia. A su puerto no solo llegaban los barcos de los corsarios argelinos, sino también los de cientos de mercaderes de toda Europa y Estambul para ofrecer sus productos y poder hacer negocio. El dinero de los rescates terminaba siendo una fuente esencial para mantener la economía de la Europa cristiana.

Grabado de Argel realizado por Georg Braun en 1576.
Grabado de Argel realizado por Georg Braun en 1576.
Biblioteca Digital Hispánica, CC BY

¿De dónde procede esa imagen negativa, carcelaria, de sadismo de sus reyes y de atropello a los cristianos, que se ha convertido en un mito de mármol a lo largo de los siglos?

La fuente fundamental para conocer el trato recibido por los cristianos cautivos en Argel es la que conocemos como “literatura de cautivos”. En ella sobresale la obra de Antonio de Sosa, compañero del cautiverio de Miguel de Cervantes, Topografía e historia general de Argel, publicada en 1612.

La finalidad de estas historias era conmover al lector europeo para que ayudase con limosnas para la redención de los cautivos. Por ello ofrecen un relato desgarrador de sus vidas en tierras argelinas, teniendo que luchar contra dos grandes peligros: el reniego y la sodomía. Es decir, con la posibilidad de participar de la vida social otomana, en la que un esclavo podía llegar a convertirse en rey (así le sucedió a Hazán Bajá el veneciano, rey de Argel desde 1577 a 1580), y en la que las costumbres y posibilidades sexuales, en especial el amor entre hombres, podían disfrutarse a la luz del día.

Portada del libro Cervantes íntimo, con un dibujo de un hombre con barba, bigote, lechuguilla y pecho descubierto.
Portada de Cervantes íntimo, biografía del autor escrita por José Manuel Lucía, que se adentra en los mitos sobre los años del cautiverio de Cervantes en Argel.
Penguin Libros

Es en este contexto de movilidad social, de libertad sexual, de oportunidades económicas –siempre que uno renegara de la religión católica–, en una de las ciudades más cosmopolitas del Mediterráneo, donde hemos de situar los cinco años como cautivo de Miguel de Cervantes.

Cinco años en los que convivió con otra cultura, otra religión, otras costumbres… Y en los que demostró, una vez más, su capacidad para inventarse, para sobrevivir, para convertir sus experiencias biográficas en una particular visión del mundo, que luego supo plasmar en sus obras literarias, más allá y más acá del Quijote.

El Argel del cautiverio de Cervantes es un universo por desentrañar y por descubrir. Y lo es más allá de los brochazos míticos que se han impuesto en los últimos siglos, alentados por un mojigato siglo XIX y por una dictadura franquista de corte nacional-católica.


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The Conversation

José Manuel Lucía Megías no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. El cautiverio de Miguel de Cervantes en Argel: muchos mitos y pocas realidades – https://theconversation.com/el-cautiverio-de-miguel-de-cervantes-en-argel-muchos-mitos-y-pocas-realidades-261913

Voces ucranianas (I): testimonios desde exilio

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Léna Georgeault, Directora del Grado en Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Villanueva

Refugiados ucranianos esperan el tren en la ciudad polaca de Przemysl en junio de 2022, en los primeros meses de la guerra. rospoint/Shutterstock

“Crucé la frontera legalmente”, me dice Theodor* nada más sentarse, con las manos firmes sobre la mesa. No lo sabía todavía, pero todas mis entrevistas con hombres ucranianos en Polonia empezarían así: con una justificación.

Theodor llegó a Breslavia (Polonia) para estudiar apenas unos días antes de la invasión rusa, en febrero de 2022. Me explica que quizás no hubiese sido posible unos meses después. Al principio de la guerra, los estudiantes internacionales aún podían salir del país. Luego se endurecieron las normas, al comprobarse un uso masivo –y a menudo fraudulento– de esa vía para evitar el servicio militar obligatorio. “Quizás te salvó Dios”, le dijo su padre.

Fue Oksana* quien nos puso en contacto. Trabaja en la sede polaca de la Universidad Católica de Ucrania, que me había invitado a participar en un evento sobre su experiencia de la docencia en tiempos de guerra: un testimonio de compromiso y resiliencia.

Oksana abandonó Ucrania hace unos meses con su hija para reunirse con su marido. Insinúa que su presencia en Polonia no es del todo legal, pero no piensan volver. Le parece inasumible: dos semanas de entrenamiento y al frente, sin salida, salvo en un ataúd. Algunos de sus amigos se ofrecieron voluntarios al comienzo de la guerra, convencidos de que sería cuestión de meses. Ninguno volvió.

Como Oksana y su familia, muchos ucranianos eligieron el exilio. En mayo de 2025, la ONU estimaba en un millón el número de refugiados ucranianos en Polonia, un país de 37 millones de habitantes. Pero esa cifra podría estar muy por debajo de la realidad: no todos los desplazados se registran oficialmente al llegar. Y, desde luego, no todos comparten la misma experiencia del exilio.

Natalia*, estudiante ucraniana, reconoce que su experiencia fue muy distinta a la de muchos de sus compatriotas. Siempre había soñado con estudiar en el extranjero, y llegó a Breslavia con una beca, el apoyo de su universidad y alojamiento asegurado desde el primer día. Pero sabe que su caso no es representativo: “Para otros es mucho más difícil. Han perdido su casa, cambian de país, tienen que aprender un idioma desde cero… y ellos no lo han elegido.”

Kinga y Oleg dan comida y refugio

Los migrantes más vulnerables son atendidos por Kinga y Oleg, de la asociación Nomada. Al principio de la guerra, interrumpieron su labor principal para atender la emergencia humanitaria, proporcionando comida, ropa y refugio. Desde mayo de 2022, retomaron sus actividades habituales: además de brindar asesoramiento legal, operan un espacio comunitario donde las personas migrantes se reúnen, reciben educación sobre violencia motivada por prejuicio y talleres formativos. “Cubrir tantos aspectos hace difícil explicar exactamente a qué nos dedicamos”, comenta Kinga, las manos envueltas alrededor de una taza estampada con el lema de Nomada: No human is illegal (“Ningún ser humano es ilegal”).

Una de las dificultades más inmediatas es encontrar alojamiento. En las ciudades, los escasos pisos disponibles suelen estar saturados: varias familias comparten un mismo espacio hacinado, sin intimidad. En las zonas rurales, los retos son distintos: faltan guarderías y acceso a atención médica, un problema especialmente grave para las madres solteras y los ancianos que huyen de la guerra.

Pero el mayor problema es la incertidumbre, que lo enreda todo. Oleg desliza con voz queda un comentario sobre la laxitud con que Polonia aplica la Directiva de Protección Temporal (2001/55/CE), activada por la Unión Europea en marzo de 2022 tras la invasión rusa. El estatuto de refugiado se concede por períodos breves, sin garantías de renovación.

Si Varsovia declara segura una región de Ucrania, quienes provienen de ella pueden perder su protección, aunque ya no tengan casa ni familia a la que regresar. Esta inseguridad jurídica se suma a la incógnita sobre la duración de la guerra, y deja a muchos en suspenso. Sin saber si lo provisional se volverá permanente, los refugiados ucranianos oscilan entre el deseo de volver y la necesidad de reconstruir una vida estable donde están.

Ante ese limbo identitario, Artem, fundador de la Fundación Ucrania, se declara abiertamente antiasimilación y antiguetos. Ni convertirse en polaco, ni quedarse al margen de la sociedad. Artem me confía que se crió en una familia “muy soviética”, una experiencia que le dejó una aversión persistente por la uniformidad forzada. “Antes tenía esa visión infantil, ingenua, de ciudadano del mundo”, dice con una sonrisa irónica.

Sentirse ucraniano en Polonia

Pero fue al mudarse a Polonia cuando empezó a sentirse profundamente ucraniano. Por eso se dedica desde hace once años, con su fundación, a cultivar esa identidad dentro de la comunidad, organizando en Breslavia eventos con figuras destacadas de la escena artística y cómica ucraniana.

Para Kinga, ese tipo de encuentros son esenciales: “Ves a varios miles de personas que son de tu país y te das cuenta de que realmente viven en la misma ciudad que tú, que podéis cantar las mismas canciones, divertiros juntos… y entonces ya no te sientes tan solo, ni tan desconectado”.

Para algunos, esa comunidad sirve para recrear un microcosmos ucraniano mientras esperan el regreso, como en el caso de Natalia. “Todo el tiempo quiero volver a Ucrania… Como en casa, en ningún sitio”, afirma con entusiasmo.

Para otros, es sólo el eco persistente de una vida que saben que no retomarán. Esa certeza parece ir calando poco a poco en Ivan*, cuya hija estudia en la Universidad de Breslavia. “Mi sueño es que quiera volver a Ucrania. Pero cuanto más tiempo pasa… menos posible me parece.”

Se hace el silencio en el semisótano, donde se nos ha hecho de noche mientras conversábamos. Un silencio largo y espeso en la oscuridad que habla de un legado que se disuelve, de la desconexión entre un padre y una hija que ya no hablan el mismo idioma. La distancia entre generaciones, esta vez, no se mide en años, sino en fronteras que ya no se cruzan.


Los nombres marcados con asterisco han sido modificados para proteger la identidad de las personas entrevistadas.


The Conversation

Léna Georgeault no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Voces ucranianas (I): testimonios desde exilio – https://theconversation.com/voces-ucranianas-i-testimonios-desde-exilio-259344

Qué nos dicen las coquinas del Guadiana y el Guadalquivir sobre los microplásticos

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Íñigo Donázar Aramendía, Investigador postdoctoral biología marina, Universidad de Cádiz

_Scrobicularia plana_ o coquina de fango. Saxifraga/ Fitis Sytske Dijksen, CC BY-NC-SA

La almeja Scrobicularia plana, conocida comúnmente como coquina de fango, es un molusco bivalvo de concha ovalada y frágil, de color grisáceo, y largos sifones, con los que se alimenta filtrando partículas del agua y del sedimento. Esta especie, muy apreciada en nuestra gastronomía, vive enterrada en los sedimentos blandos de marismas y estuarios –zonas de transición entre ríos y océanos, donde tienden a acumularse diversos contaminantes, incluidos los microplásticos–.

En un estudio colaborativo entre la Estación Biológica de Doñana, la Universidad de Sevilla y la Universidad de Roma III, nos propusimos investigar la presencia de microplásticos en esta especie, en los estuarios de los ríos Guadiana y Guadalquivir.

Coquina al microscopio

Primero, recogimos ejemplares en distintos puntos de ambos estuarios, desde la desembocadura hasta zonas más interiores. En el laboratorio, los tejidos blandos de las almejas fueron digeridos con una solución de peróxido de hidrógeno, que permite eliminar la materia orgánica sin dañar las partículas de plástico. El material resultante se filtró y se examinó al microscopio para identificar las partículas en función de su forma, color y tamaño.

Posteriormente, una parte de estas partículas se analizó mediante espectroscopía infrarroja (micro-FTIR), una técnica que permite confirmar con precisión su composición química y distinguir entre plásticos sintéticos, fibras de celulosa tratada u otros materiales.

Para garantizar la fiabilidad del análisis, se aplicaron protocolos de control de calidad que minimizaron posibles contaminaciones durante el procesamiento de las muestras.

Los resultados revelaron que, pese a las diferencias en la presión humana entre los estuarios del Guadiana y del Guadalquivir, las concentraciones de microplásticos en los bivalvos fueron similares.

Contaminación de largo alcance

Nuestro hallazgo sugiere que factores naturales, como la dinámica del agua por mareas o corrientes (hidrodinamismo) y las variaciones estacionales, podrían influir en el transporte y la acumulación de estos contaminantes, más allá de las fuentes locales.

Además, no se observó un gradiente claro en la contaminación de microplásticos a lo largo del curso de los estuarios, lo que indica que la proximidad a focos puntuales de contaminación no basta para explicar su distribución; es esencial considerar también los procesos naturales de dispersión y sedimentación.

Fallos en el tratamiento de aguas residuales

La mayoría de los microplásticos encontrados en ambos estuarios eran fibras oscuras, probablemente derivadas del lavado de ropa y de una deficiente filtración en las plantas de tratamiento de aguas residuales. Este tipo de microplásticos es especialmente abundante en ambientes acuáticos, ya que, por su forma y composición, tienden a flotar con mayor facilidad que otras partículas.

No obstante, los análisis sí revelaron diferencias en la composición de polímeros de microplásticos entre estuarios, siendo el tereftalato de polietileno (PET) y la celulosa pigmentada –presente en papeles y cartones, especialmente para embalajes y productos de higiene– más frecuentes en el Guadiana.

A pesar de estas diferencias, ambos estuarios presentaban contaminantes comunes como PET, celulosa, celofán, PVC, poliamidas y acrílicos, lo que refuerza la idea de una contaminación generalizada por estos materiales.

Almejas más grandes, menos contaminadas

Otro hallazgo relevante del estudio es que los individuos de menor tamaño contenían, en promedio, más partículas de microplásticos que los ejemplares más grandes. Esto sugiere que, a medida que crecen, las almejas podrían desarrollar mecanismos más eficaces para expulsar o evitar la acumulación de estas partículas.

El estudio demuestra que Scrobicularia plana, además de ser un reconocido bioindicador de contaminación por metales pesados, también podría desempeñar un papel clave en la detección de microplásticos en estos entornos. Debido a sus hábitos alimenticios y de vida, esta almeja podría reflejar condiciones ambientales tanto de la columna de agua como del sedimento, lo que la convierte en una herramienta especialmente útil para evaluar la contaminación.

Evaluar el riesgo para la salud

Es fundamental evaluar la acumulación de microplásticos en esta y en otras especies de bivalvos a largo plazo, no solo por su valor como bioindicadores, sino también por su posible papel como vectores de contaminantes hacia otros niveles tróficos, incluido el ser humano.

La coquina se recolecta habitualmente para el consumo. Por ello, resulta crucial investigar en mayor profundidad hasta qué punto los microplásticos pueden transferirse a lo largo de la cadena alimentaria y, con ellos, los contaminantes que pueden estar asociados. Más allá de los efectos directos sobre los organismos, la presencia de estos materiales podría alterar el equilibrio de las redes tróficas y favorecer procesos de biomagnificación, con potenciales consecuencias para la salud ambiental y humana.

The Conversation

Íñigo Donázar Aramendía no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Qué nos dicen las coquinas del Guadiana y el Guadalquivir sobre los microplásticos – https://theconversation.com/que-nos-dicen-las-coquinas-del-guadiana-y-el-guadalquivir-sobre-los-microplasticos-262483

El rey Lear y la sucesión en los negocios familiares

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Santiago Iñiguez de Onzoño, Presidente IE University, IE University

Rawpixel.com/Shutterstock

Un patriarca anciano y dispuesto a retirarse reúne a sus hijos para anunciarles la distribución de su legado, fruto de años de trabajo y sacrificio. Después de una vida de esfuerzos planea transferir sus negocios a sus descendientes, convencido de que no solo mantendrán su legado, sino que también lo llevarán a nuevas alturas.

En su mente, esta decisión es una extensión natural de sus propios valores: respeto por la tradición, equidad y un sentido de deber hacia su familia. Sin embargo, comete una suposición crucial: cree que sus hijos comparten su visión y que aceptarán gustosamente lo que él ha dispuesto para ellos.

Para su sorpresa y consternación, una de sus hijas rechaza la herencia y, en lugar de aceptar la transferencia de los negocios, decide quedarse a cuidar de su padre enfermo. Atónito por su rechazo, el patriarca reacciona con furia y, en un ataque de despecho, le arrebata todo y la expulsa de la finca familiar.

Sucesiones: una tragedia shakesperiana

Así comienza “El rey Lear”, una de las tragedias más grandes de William Shakespeare. Sin embargo, este escenario dramático no se limita al teatro. De hecho, dinámicas similares ocurren con más frecuencia de lo que uno podría imaginar durante la planificación de la sucesión en muchas empresas familiares.

Cuando leí por primera vez me pareció desconcertante la reacción del rey Lear ante el rechazo de su hija Cordelia a recibir su parte del legado. ¿Cómo un padre podía malinterpretar tan completamente las intenciones de su hija? La generosidad desinteresada de Cordelia es confundida con ingratitud, un error que pone en marcha una cadena de eventos trágicos que llevan a la desesperación y caída de Lear.

Sus otras dos hijas, que simulaban mostrarle amor y respeto, lo abandonan cuando las necesita, dejándolo en la miseria y la soledad. Curiosamente, este tipo de malentendido no es infrecuente en el mundo de los negocios familiares. Un fundador puede ver el rechazo de un hijo de incorporarse al negocio familiar como una ofensa, un signo de deslealtad o de ingratitud.

Comprensión y respeto

Recuerdo a un joven que, tras concluir su posgrado en administración de empresas, decidió seguir una carrera en consultoría en lugar de unirse a la empresa familiar. Su padre no solo se opuso ferozmente a su elección sino que también trató de sabotearla disuadiendo a sus posibles empleadores.

En ese momento, no pude evitar pensar en cuánto reflejaba ese comportamiento el trágico error de Lear. El padre creía que actuaba en el mejor interés de su hijo, tal como Lear pensaba que dividir su reino era una sabia decisión. En ambos casos, la falta de conocimiento y comprensión de los deseos y aspiraciones de la siguiente generación condujo a un conflicto amargo y provocó daños a largo plazo.

La cuestión central en estas historias es que la sucesión no es solo una transacción de propiedad o de poder. Es más bien una transición profunda que requiere una comprensión y respeto profundos de las necesidades y aspiraciones de los miembros de la familia involucrados.

Las nociones de propiedad y gestión se confunden con demasiada frecuencia en los negocios familiares. Si bien traspasar el patrimonio familiar puede parecer una acción lógica, la verdadera pregunta es si la siguiente generación está lista –o incluso dispuesta– para asumir las responsabilidades que esto conlleva.

Idealmente, los herederos deben tener la autonomía suficiente para decidir si quieren combinar la propiedad con un rol activo en la gestión, o si prefieren dejar que dirijan el negocio otras personas, más competentes o interesadas. De manera similar, puede ser invaluable para la segunda y tercera generación de la familia ganar experiencia fuera del negocio familiar antes de tomar las riendas del mismo.

El bufón, consejero del rey

En “El rey Lear”, una de las figuras más llamativas es la del bufón, que se atreve a decir las verdades que nadie más osa decir. No se anda con rodeos y no le importa ofender al rey. Él es el único que ve las acciones equivocadas de Lear y señala la necedad de sus decisiones. Y aunque Lear escucha al bufón, está demasiado cegado por su propio orgullo y rabia como para hacerle caso.

De muchas maneras, el bufón funciona como el tipo de consejero que los grandes líderes –ya sean reyes o directores generales– deberían tener a su lado y que harían bien en escuchar. En la época de Lear, solo un bufón podía hablar a un rey con franqueza y sin miedo a represalias.

Afortunadamente, las organizaciones se han vuelto más abiertas y democráticas. Ya no es necesario que los consejeros finjan ser tontos para expresar lo que piensan. Aunque se podría argumentar que sigue siendo igual de raro tener el coraje necesario para decir a los poderosos las verdades incómodas.

Diálogo abierto y escucha activa

En la sucesión de las empresas familiares –como en la historia del rey Lear– es crucial evitar el error de suponer que la siguiente generación comparte automáticamente los mismos objetivos, valores y visión propios.

Así como la mala interpretación de Lear de las intenciones de Cordelia llevó a un desenlace catastrófico, no entablar un diálogo abierto y honesto con los herederos también puede conducir a relaciones rotas y al eventual colapso de un negocio familiar.

La lección aquí es simple pero poderosa: la planificación de la sucesión requiere más que simples documentos legales o transacciones financieras: se necesita inteligencia emocional, empatía y humildad para comprender los deseos y las aspiraciones de la siguiente generación.

Se sea un rey o un fundador de negocios, es vital recordar que el futuro del legado no va a depender solo de los deseos propios sino también de la disposición de los sucesores a llevarlo adelante, a su manera.


Una versión de este artículo se publicó en LinkedIn.

The Conversation

Santiago Iñiguez de Onzoño no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. El rey Lear y la sucesión en los negocios familiares – https://theconversation.com/el-rey-lear-y-la-sucesion-en-los-negocios-familiares-264240

New gun law protections target domestic violence, but real prevention must start earlier

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Eden Hoffer, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Information and Media Studies & Faculty of Health Sciences, Western University

In Canada, having a gun in the home is one of the strongest predictors that intimate partner violence (IPV) will turn fatal.

Among intimate partner homicides, 62 per cent of cases involved shotguns and rifles, many of which were legally owned.

It’s clear that reforms to Canadian firearm laws are much needed. Victims of IPV are five times more likely to be killed in cases where a violent partner has access to a gun. Those numbers are even higher when the victim is a racialized woman or lives in a rural area.




Read more:
The latest mass shooting in Sault Ste. Marie highlights Ontario’s epidemic of gender-based violence


Bill C-21

Recognizing the lethal role firearms can play in IPV cases, the Canadian government has included specific measures in Bill C-21, its 2023 overhaul of firearm legislation, to expand restrictions and prohibitions related to IPV, family violence, gender-based violence and domestic violence.

These measures include “red flag” emergency prohibition orders, which allow courts to immediately remove firearms from anyone who may be a danger to themselves or others. Initial orders last up to 30 days, though courts can extend them if needed.

Additionally, since March 2025, officials known as chief firearms officers have been authorized to issue temporary licence suspensions for up to 30 days if an individual is considered a potential risk of harm, including in cases of domestic violence. During this suspension, they can keep their firearms, but cannot use, buy or import them.

While these amendments are a step in the right direction, they must be part of a broader, systemic shift in policy, practice and societal attitudes. Without comprehensive legislative and societal reforms to address IPV, the measures in Bill C-21 risk being little more than a bandage on a gaping wound.

Here are three reasons why Bill C-21’s firearm measures are necessary but will not be sufficient in ending the scourge of IPV:

1. IPV is already a crime

In Canada, IPV has long been criminalized under existing Criminal Code provisions, such as assault and assault with a weapon. Since the mid- to late 1980s, these offences have been primarily addressed through mandatory charging and “no-drop” prosecution policies, which aim to ensure IPV cases are pushed through the legal system — from charging to prosecution — so that perpetrators are brought to justice.

Nevertheless, IPV remains widespread in Canada, with police-reported incidents rising slightly in recent years and evidence indicating that criminalization alone has limited effectiveness in preventing abuse.

This suggests that simply adding new criminal consequences for IPV may have a little impact, because criminalization alone does not address the underlying causes or contributors to violence.

To truly tackle IPV, it must be recognized not only as a crime, but as a human rights violation, public health issue and deeply embedded societal problem.

2. IPV is significantly under-reported

It’s estimated about 80 per cent of spousal violence incidents in Canada are never reported to police.

This is often due to survivors’ fears of increased abuse from their partners if they report it, concerns about not being believed, awareness of the stigma IPV survivors often face, feelings of shame or a lack of trust in police.

As a result, many instances of IPV may never come to the attention of authorities, meaning the legal safeguards provided by Bill C-21 wouldn’t be triggered.

3. Other weapons will likely be used

Without broader reforms and supports, removing a perpetrator’s firearm or restricting access may not prevent fatal violence.

Proactive, systemic interventions that help survivors safely escape abuse before it escalates. Otherwise, even with firearm restrictions in place, perpetrators may obtain firearms illegally or resort to other lethal methods, such as strangulation, using blunt force or stabbing.

What to do?

Proactive policy and practice responses to IPV must reflect its severity and systemic nature, including the cyclical and escalating patterns that often characterize relationships marked by patterns of violence and control.

These reforms should include recognizing femicide as a distinct offence under the Criminal Code rather than treating it as murder or manslaughter.

Canada’s response should also be strengthened by formally acknowledging IPV as a national crisis, reflecting the urgency of the issue. Some provinces, such as Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, along with dozens of municipalities in Ontario, have taken the additional necessary step of declaring IPV an epidemic.

Additionally, survivors require trauma- and violence-informed supports, along with increased public awareness and sustained funding for critical services.

These include assistance navigating the legal system, access to safe and affordable housing, and financial support that enables survivors to leave abusive relationships before the violence escalates to a fatal level.

Crucially, policy reform and the creation of new policies in response to IPV must also address the heightened risk period following separation when women who have experienced IPV are especially vulnerable.

Research shows that women face a 75 per cent increase in violence when attempting to leave an abusive relationship — and remain at elevated risk for up to two years afterward.

This underscores the urgent need for long-term, adequately resourced social support systems that consistently prioritize survivor safety and well-being — not only at the point where violence may claim lives.

The Conversation

Eden Hoffer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. New gun law protections target domestic violence, but real prevention must start earlier – https://theconversation.com/new-gun-law-protections-target-domestic-violence-but-real-prevention-must-start-earlier-263390

Reluctance to reach out to old friends is a common experience, but reconnecting can pay off

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Kristina K. Castaneto, Ph.D. Candidate in Social Psychology, Simon Fraser University

Picture this: One day while drinking your morning coffee, you are reminded of a friend from your past. You have not spoken to this person in some time, but you remember them fondly and wonder how they are doing. You pick up your phone and start typing a message to say “hello!” only to delete the message before hitting send. Has something like this ever happened to you? If so, you are not alone.

Past research in our lab found that up to 90 per cent of people report having an “old friend” — a friend they care about but with whom they have lost touch. And while most people say they would like to reconnect with an old friend, only about 30 per cent are willing to send a message, even with favourable circumstances, such as when the relationship did not end on bad terms, people think their friend wants to hear from them or people have their old friend’s contact information.

This reluctance to reach out to old friends is puzzling because a large body of research demonstrates that social relationships are a strong predictor of health and happiness. Indeed, having a larger and more diverse social network is associated with greater well-being.

Writing notes

So what makes it more likely for someone to reach out to an old friend?

In our new research, we investigated this question in two ways. First, we examined what people express in a “reaching out” note to an old friend, and whether some content can predict which notes are sent. For instance, are people more likely to send a note with a greater focus on the past, present or future?

To find out, we analyzed more than 850 reaching-out notes that we had collected in prior studies. Importantly, all participants wrote their note with a specific old friend in mind and were given the opportunity to send their note, but participants could choose to opt out. This allowed us to investigate whether notes that were sent included different types of content compared to the notes that were not sent.

Each note was coded on over 20 theoretically relevant dimensions such as the length of the note, emotion and the presence or absence of personal memories. Specifically, 12 of these dimensions were analyzed by a computer software called Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) that can easily and objectively capture information like word count, time-orientation (past, present or future) and the amount of positive and negative emotion.

In addition, a team of trained human coders evaluated each note. The human coding team focused on 13 more subjective and complex topics which can sometimes be hard for computers to grasp, including whether the author shared specific memories involving their old friend or whether the author took responsibility for the fading friendship.

a man looks at his smartphone
Reaching out to an old friend may help strengthen social networks.
(Sarah Brown/Unsplash), CC BY

Revealing information

After all of this, we still weren’t able to predict which notes were more likely to be sent. But our substantial coding efforts revealed many interesting things about the content of reaching out notes. For instance, messages to old friends were often positive and focused on the present.

We used statistical regression analyses to look at the relationships between the various note features and reaching out behaviour — only six were statistically significant. However, these significant relationships were were small and inconsistent across our two participant samples.

This suggests that the content of a reaching-out note may not predict who chooses to send their message and who does not.

Who reaches out

With little insight gleaned from the content of the reaching-out notes, we pivoted our focus to ask: Who is most likely to reach out to an old friend?

To explore this question, we recruited 312 participants on campus and in public spaces around the city to complete a survey. The questionnaire began by asking participants to identify an old friend. This old friend was someone who the participants cared about but had not spoken to for a long time, who they believed would want to hear from them and someone for whom they had contact information.

Then, participants answered a number of questions about themselves, including items about their happiness, loneliness, personality, friendship satisfaction and friendship beliefs.

Near the end of the survey, we asked participants if they were willing to reach out to their old friend, and then we gave them two minutes to draft a short note to the friend they previously identified. After the two minutes had ended, we asked participants if they sent their message to their old friend.

Similar to past research, 34.2 per cent of participants chose to reach out. And while some of the personality dimensions and other variables predicted how willing participants said they would be to reach out to an old friend, only one variable — “friendship resiliency” — predicted whether people sent their message to their old friend.

The concept of friendship resiliency refers to the belief that friendships can remain even after long periods of low interaction and is now something we are studying in our lab.

two older men hug
Friendship resiliency is the belief that friendships can remain, even after long periods of low interaction.
(Erika Giraud/Unsplash), CC BY

Take the leap

If the thought of an old friend crosses your mind again, don’t get too caught up on crafting the perfect message — just reach out!

For example, you could reach out when a cafe is playing a song that you both used to enjoy or you see a meme that reminds you of them, or just to say a simple “Hey, it’s been too long! How are you?”

Our findings illustrate that reluctance to reach out to old friends is not experienced by one type of person, nor do reaching-out notes that are sent follow one type of script.

Hesitancy to reach out to an old friend is a common experience, suggesting that most people may be capable of reaching out if they are willing to take the leap to do so. Realizing this could encourage people to feel like they are capable of making the first move to reconnect.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Reluctance to reach out to old friends is a common experience, but reconnecting can pay off – https://theconversation.com/reluctance-to-reach-out-to-old-friends-is-a-common-experience-but-reconnecting-can-pay-off-263079

Baltic states have torn down their Soviet past following Ukraine war – a photo essay

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kristina van Kuyck, PhD Candidate in the School of History and Geography, Dublin City University

As I was photographing Soviet-era monuments in the Lithuanian port city of Klaipėda in May 2022, I heard a woman shout at me: “You are a young Nazi who wants to remove and destroy everything”. She was triggered by my presence, taking notes around the monuments and carrying a couple of professional-looking cameras.

I was in the middle of a research trip to document Soviet monuments in the Baltic states. The past few years had seen some former Soviet bloc countries debate the future of these monuments, many of which were originally erected to mark the role of Soviet forces in the second world war.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began earlier in 2022, had accelerated these debates in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The debates were not new – questions about the presence of Soviet-era monuments had surfaced for decades. But concrete actions to remove them had been rare due to divided opinions over their meaning.

For many people in the Baltic states, Soviet-era monuments embodied occupation and served as reminders of repression imposed by a foreign regime. Yet for others, especially within ethnic Russian communities, they continued to represent Soviet wartime victories and functioned as sites of commemoration. Legal restrictions also prevented their removal, as many monuments were formally protected by law.

These monuments, once largely unquestioned features of the public space, were now being reevaluated against the backdrop of a new war and growing geopolitical tensions. And, as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine continued, the debates over the fate of these monuments intensified. This culminated in direct action.

The first actions often began with acts of vandalism. Monuments, including one in Ukmergė, Lithuania, which had been unveiled in 1982 to mark the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, were defaced. They were frequently covered in blue and yellow paint, reflecting the scale of public anger at the war and solidarity with Ukraine.

These spontaneous interventions were soon followed by more formal, centralised action. Local municipalities held meetings to discuss relocating monuments, while some took steps to remove them altogether.

Lithuania’s parliament passed a so-called desovietisation law in late 2022. This banned the commemoration or representation of people, symbols and information promoting totalitarian or authoritarian regimes and their ideologies. Latvia’s parliament also passed a law providing for the dismantling of sites glorifying Soviet and Nazi regimes.

Where decision-making stalled and legal restrictions prevented official action, local communities often took matters into their own hands. In some cases, such as in the Lituanian city of Telšiai, Soviet war memorials were covered with garbage bags. This deprived them of their symbolic presence without physically removing them.

Public opinion on the removal of monuments was far from uniform. A 2022 survey revealed that 50% of the Lithuanian population supported the removal of Soviet monuments (21% “fully support” and 29% “rather agree”), while 35% opposed it. Nevertheless, Soviet monuments rapidly disappeared from public spaces in the Baltic states following Russia’s invasion, leaving a visible mark on the urban landscape.

Documenting these monuments in 2022 proved challenging as removals were progressing at a rapid pace. In some cases, monuments were taken down without prior public notice to avoid disruption. Sometimes, I arrived at sites just too late. One of the first memorials to fall in Latvia was located in the south-eastern city of Jēkabpils, which I reached when dismantling was already underway.

In a few of the more high-profile cases, such as the monument in the Latvian capital Riga – to the Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga from German Fascist Invaders – sites were fenced off and monitored by police.

Three years on

Visiting the same sites in the summer of 2025, I observed several patterns in the changing urban landscape. Some former monument sites still bore traces of the Soviet legacy, leaving noticeable voids in the public space. In Ukmergė, for example, the monument itself had been removed, but the surrounding site remained largely untouched. In Narva, an Estonian border city, the obelisk topped with a five-pointed star had been taken down. This left only an empty plinth as a silent reminder of what once stood there.

Such cases are common in peripheral towns, where removals often occurred without follow-up plans or allocated funds for redevelopment.

Even after removal, some former sites continued to serve as places of memory for local Russian-speaking communities. In Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, a monument comprised of six granite statues of Soviet soldiers was taken down in late December 2022.

Yet the site still provides space for commemorations, with a lit candle and a wreath placed where the monument once stood. The statues have been relocated to Grūtas Park, a Soviet sculpture park in Lithuania, where they are placed in the parking lot with a lantern symbolising an eternal flame.

Other former Soviet-era monument sites reveal striking transformations. A park in Pärnu, south-western Estonia, and a public square in Daugavpils, south-eastern Latvia, now show no visible traces of the monuments that once occupied a space in the urban landscape there.

I had to return twice, circling the park in Pärnu, before I could recognise the spot where I had photographed the monument three years earlier. These monuments have slipped into a silent oblivion.

Many of the Soviet-era monuments were originally placed within military cemeteries where Soviet soldiers were buried. Usually, these cemeteries were maintained by Russian embassies. However, with the monuments gone – and their role as visual propaganda erased – many of the sites have been left neglected. Their upkeep is faltering alongside their symbolic power.

The war in Ukraine has triggered striking changes in the urban landscape across the Baltic states. These changes reveal not a uniform story of erasure but rather a fragmented landscape of memory.

My photographs show how some places are marked by absences, others are inscribed with different meanings, and many have fallen into neglect.

The Conversation

Kristina van Kuyck receives funding from the Irish Research Council Government of Ireland Postgraduate Scholarship
Project ID: GOIPG/2023/3686

ref. Baltic states have torn down their Soviet past following Ukraine war – a photo essay – https://theconversation.com/baltic-states-have-torn-down-their-soviet-past-following-ukraine-war-a-photo-essay-263468