West Bank violence is soaring, fueled by a capitulation of Israeli institutions to settlers’ interests

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Arie Perliger, Director of Security Studies and Professor of Criminology and Justice Studies, UMass Lowell

Israeli settlers gather near the Kiryat Arba settlement in Hebron on Dec. 10, 2025. Mosab Shawer/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images, CC BY

Owais Hammam was walking near his home in Khirbet Bani Harith in the West Bank on Dec. 3, 2025, when, according to media reports, he was kidnapped by Jewish settlers. Over several hours at a nearby settlement, the 18-year-old Palestinian is alleged to have endured repeated beatings, humiliation and harassment.

Israel military soldiers were reportedly involved in the incident, before they eventually released him the next morning. Hamman was hospitalized with multiple injuries and severe psychological trauma.

The alleged attack is far from isolated. The post-Oct. 7, 2023, environment has seen an escalation in settler violence, which has gone from primarily involving vandalism and property destruction to now being marked by kidnapping, prolonged abuse and apparent military complicity. In the two years to October 2025, more than 3,200 Palestinians were “forcibly displaced by settler violence and movement restrictions,” according to United Nations figures.

Violence has increased to an extent that the U.N. said October 2025 was the worst month for West Bank settler violence since it started recording incidents in 2006.

As a scholar who has studied Israeli extremist groups for over two decades, I contend that the dramatic escalation of settler violence in the West Bank reveals a profound transformation within Israel’s state institutions. Rather than serving as purported neutral enforcers of law and order, the military, Israeli police and the broader governmental apparatus have become increasingly aligned with — and at times directly complicit in — violent settler actions against Palestinians.

This institutional reluctance to address settler violence is not merely a failure of enforcement, I would argue, but a deliberate outcome of deep social, political and cultural changes that have reshaped Israeli society since at least the mid-1990s.

Settlers’ dream government

The most visible manifestation of this transformation is the composition of Israel’s current government, formed in December 2022.

For the first time, key ministerial positions are held by individuals with explicit pro-settler ideologies and personal ties to some of the most violent streams of the settlement movement. Hence, it is not surprising that prominent figures such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir — both settlers with what has been described as extremist ideologies — have actively implemented policies that facilitate and legitimize settler violence.

For instance, Ben-Gvir has significantly eased firearm regulations, issuing over 100,000 new gun licenses since October 2023, with settlers receiving preferential access.

Smotrich, meanwhile, has publicly distributed security equipment to illegal outposts and allocated substantial budgets for settler militias. This political backing fosters a climate in which settlers feel emboldened to act with impunity.

Men in suits gesticulate with their hands.
Itamar Ben-Gvir, left, and Bezalel Smotrich, center, talk to reporters as they visit the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem on May 10, 2021.
Gil Cohen-Magen/AFP via Getty Images

Beyond individual ministers, the Israeli government has pursued structural reforms that systematically undermine institutional checks on settler violence.

The transfer of the main Israeli governing body in the West Bank — the Civil Administration authority — from military central command to Smotrich’s Finance Ministry represents a fundamental shift in governance. For decades, the Civil Administration coordinated the provision of West Bank services such as health and education. It also served as an instrument for coordinating with the Palestinian Authority, the body entrusted per the Oslo Accords with limited self-rule over parts of the occupied West Bank.

By placing the Civil Administration under political control rather than independent military command, the government has weakened one of the few mechanisms capable of restraining settler expansion.

Similarly, plans to subordinate the West Bank Border Police to Ben-Gvir’s Ministry of National Security threaten to dismantle the unified command structure that has been instrumental in managing tensions in the occupied West Bank since 1967.

Capitulation to settlers

Concurrent to these developments has been a blurring of lines between civilian settlers and uniformed security personnel. After Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli authorities distributed 8,000 army rifles to so-called civilian settlement defense squads and regional defense battalions.

These armed settler groups now operate alongside — and are increasingly indistinguishable from — official security forces. Settlers frequently wear official uniforms and carry army-issued weapons during attacks on Palestinians.

Security infrastructure such as police stations is often physically located within settlements, fostering close relationships between law enforcement and settler communities.

I would suggest that this geographic and institutional proximity makes neutral policing nearly impossible.

The cultural and social dimensions of this phenomenon run even deeper. Many settlers serve as army reservists, creating overlapping identities between civilian and military personnel.

Civilian security coordinators, who are responsible for coordination between the military and the settlements’ own “defense squads,” actively shape military operational policy. They help define settlement boundaries, determine areas prohibited to Palestinians and occasionally command soldiers.

Soldiers typically interpret clashes as friction between civilians rather than crimes requiring intervention. When violence intensifies, they often declare an “emergency situation” and defend settlers rather than protecting Palestinian victims.

Societal shifts

The transformation of Israeli institutions reflects broader societal changes where the settler movement has evolved from one of many societal factions to a dominant political force.

Settlers hold key positions in government and military leadership and exercise considerable political influence.

As a result, settler violence has become increasingly embedded in the operational logic of state institutions, turning law enforcement bodies from ostensibly neutral arbiters into what international observers increasingly describe as enablers or participants in systematic violence against Palestinians.

It represents, I would argue, a fundamental reorientation of state power in explicit service of settler expansionism.

Moreover, the failure to hold perpetrators of settler violence to account reveals the extent of the institutional capture. Between 2005 and 2023, more than 93% of police investigations into settler violence were closed without indictment – and only 3% resulted in convictions.

In 2021, the last year for which I was able to obtain data, Israeli authorities opened just 87 investigations for “ideologically motivated offenses,” while U.N. monitors documented 585 incidents.

The Israeli police chief in the West Bank has gone so far as to claim that reports of settler violence are fabricated by “radical left-wing anarchists.”

The erosion of judicial scrutiny

The Israeli Supreme Court has formally acknowledged that the West Bank constitutes occupied territory under international law.

Nonetheless, the judicial architecture historically accommodates settlement expansion. Settlers are subject to Israeli civilian law, including the ability to vote in Israeli elections while Palestinians face military law, producing vastly asymmetrical outcomes in cases involving violence and property rights.

The country’s Supreme Court, while occasionally striking down discriminatory measures against Palestinians, has bowed to security rationales that permit the broader settlement enterprise to proceed. For example, in 2022, the court rejected a petition to return Palestinian land in the city of Hebron, ruling that an
Israeli presence is part of the military’s “regional security doctrine.”

Three soldiers stand in front of a mechanical digger
Israeli soldiers stand by as Israeli construction vehicles destroy agricultural lands and uproot centuries-old olive trees in the village of Karyut, West Bank, on Dec. 8, 2025.
Issam Rimawi/Anadolu via Getty Images

Similarly, in many petitions against military policy of house demolitions, the Supreme Court has adopted a deferential stance toward security authorities.

Impact on the peace process

The implications of this institutional capitulation to settlers’ interests extend far beyond the West Bank itself. Settlers have explicitly viewed the war in the Gaza Strip as an opportunity to accelerate their agenda, forcing over 1,000 Palestinians from at least 18 communities since Oct. 7, 2023.

In addition to the humanitarian concerns, this pattern of violence-driven displacement undermines the viability of a two-state solution, which has returned to international discourse as the centerpiece of “day after” planning for Gaza. It also undermines any claim Israel might make that in lieu of a two-state solution, it can enforce the rule of law equally across people living in territories under its control.

So while international actors focus on ceasefire negotiations and reconstruction, the violence in the West Bank undermines the territorial and demographic foundations necessary for Palestinian statehood and makes the prospect of a lasting ceasefire more distant. The implications of that for a just future are indeed dire.

The Conversation

Arie Perliger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. West Bank violence is soaring, fueled by a capitulation of Israeli institutions to settlers’ interests – https://theconversation.com/west-bank-violence-is-soaring-fueled-by-a-capitulation-of-israeli-institutions-to-settlers-interests-269162

Sénégal : pourquoi et comment le tandem Diomaye-Sonko a déraillé

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Bamba Ndiaye, Assistant Professor, Emory University

Lors de la célébration de la Journée des martyrs et des victimes le 7 décembre 2025, à Dakar, le Premier ministre sénégalais, Ousmane Sonko, a admis sans équivoque ses divergences avec le président Bassirou Diomaye Faye. Ceci fait suite à plusieurs semaines de débat passionné au cours desquels s’est dessinée une dynamique pro-Sonko vs. pro-Diomaye, faisant craindre le risque d’un divorce politique entre les deux personnalités.

Quelques semaines auparavant, Sonko avait annoncé sur les réseaux sociaux un rassemblement “historique” prévu le 8 septembre pour ses partisans, avec pour thème : “l’État, la politique et le Pastef”, son parti.

Ce rassemblement même qu’il qualifie de “tera meeting” fut la résultante des rumeurs d’une crise au sommet de l’État. Certains parlaient même d’une possible démission ou révocation du Premier ministre. Ainsi, l’appel de Sonko a suscité de l’excitation, mais aussi de l’inquiétude. Il a en effet laissé entendre que ce rassemblement marquerait un tournant dans la vie politique du pays.

En tant que spécialistes ayant étudié [les mouvements politiques et sociaux en Afrique de l’Ouest et au Sénégal], nous analysons ici les tenants et les aboutissants de cette divergence politique naissante. Une crise qui, si elle persiste, pourrait menacer la stabilité politique du pays dans un contexte économique et financier précaire.

Une démonstration de force

Le rassemblement du 25 octobre a été une véritable démonstration de force. Sonko a saisi cette occasion pour évoquer la lourde dette cachée du Sénégal, tout en détaillant les conséquences négatives sur l’économie. Il a aussi parlé des négociations difficiles avec le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour résoudre la crise en insistant sur le refus d’une restructuration.




Read more:
Sénégal : la politique étrangère du tandem Faye-Sonko, rupture ou continuité ?


Devant une foule enthousiaste, il a accusé l’ancien président Macky Sall et son parti, l’APR (Alliance pour la République), de mauvaise gestion financière.

Le Premier ministre a enfin dénoncé des manœuvres en cours pour écarter l’ancienne ministre de la Famille et des Solidarités, Aïda Mbodj, comme coordinatrice de la coalition “Diomaye Président”. C’est cette coalition qui avait porté la candidature du président Faye à la présidentielle de 2024. Sonko a insinué qu’on voulait la remplacer par Aminata Touré, ancienne Première ministre de Macky Sall. Il a aussi fait allusion au fait que Mme Touré, citée dans un rapport public pour mauvaise gestion, ne dirigerait pas une coalition dominée par le Pastef.

La réaction du président

L’euphorie du meeting s’est rapidement transformée en inquiétude et indignation. Deux jours plus tard, le président Faye a signé un document. Il a limogé Aïda Mbodj et a nommé unilatéralement Aminata Touré à la tête de la coalition, avec pour mission de la restructurer et de la consolider.

Pour de nombreux partisans de Sonko et du Pastef, cette décision du président Faye est un “acte hostile”. Elle a été perçue comme un désaveu et une provocation envers le Premier ministre. Pourtant, c’est Sonko qui avait soutenu Faye comme son successeur, lui permettant d’accéder au pouvoir.

En l’espace d’une semaine, les actions contradictoires des deux hommes ont révélé une crise politique plus profonde. Une crise qui menace de créer une fracture au sein du Pastef et de briser ce duo historique, nous rappelant ainsi une crise politique similaire qui avait opposé, soixante-trois ans plus tôt, le président Léopold Sédar Senghor à son Premier ministre, Mamadou Dia.

“Diomaye n’est pas Sonko”

Depuis que ce conflit est devenu public, beaucoup parlent de “déloyauté”. Ils détournent le slogan de la campagne présidentielle de 2024, “Diomaye moy Sonko” (Diomaye est Sonko, en wolof), en “Diomaye du Sonko” (Diomaye n’est pas Sonko). Cela marque une différence fondamentale entre les deux hommes.

Sonko et le président Faye partagent pourtant un programme politique “anti-système”. Ils sont pour la transparence, la justice et de nouveaux partenariats économiques gagnant-gagnant. Mais des divergences claires sont apparues sur la méthode et les priorités.

Le président Faye semble privilégier le dialogue et la préservation de l’unité nationale. Il agit avec lenteur pour lancer des enquêtes et des poursuites contre les dignitaires de l’ancien régime. Pourtant, il s’était engagé à mener des réformes judiciaires profondes et à rendre justice aux victimes du régime de Macky Sall.




Read more:
Sénégal : les ressorts de l’ascension fulgurante du Pastef, le parti au pouvoir


Cette lenteur dans les réformes frustre l’opinion publique. Les Sénégalais voient d’anciens responsables se soustraire à la justice en se réfugiant à l’étranger ou ne pas être inquiétés pour leurs actes.

De son côté, Sonko incarne le “projet” de changement et bénéficie d’une grande popularité. Il semble amer face à une justice qui stagne et qui semble marquer le pas face aux dossiers impliquant d’anciens dignitaires du régime sortant. Il veut voir un système hérité de la colonisation entièrement démantelé et remplacé. Cela répond aux attentes de nombreux Sénégalais qui réclament des comptes et des changements concrets dans la justice, l’économie et le système politique.

Ainsi, le Premier ministre a ouvertement critiqué la crise d’autorité et la lenteur dans la reddition des comptes.

Une stratégie politique ?

Beaucoup pensent que le limogeage d’Aïda Mbodj par le président Faye est une affirmation de son autorité. Il s’agirait de se positionner face à un Premier ministre qui reste très populaire. Mais cette nomination d’Aminata Touré signifie aussi qu’il intègre des figures du système qu’il promettait de démanteler.

Faye cherche-t-il à prendre ses distances avec Sonko et le Pastef ? Le but serait-il de se présenter à la présidentielle de 2029 sous une autre bannière politique ? Une chose est claire : le Pastef reste la formation politique dominante au Sénégal. S’opposer à une version renouvelée de la coalition “Diomaye Président” sans le Pastef et Sonko pourrait être une mauvaise tactique pour assurer une longévité politique.

Aujourd’hui, la coalition “Diomaye Président” est clairement divisée. Une dynamique “Pro-Sonko” s’oppose à une dynamique “Pro-Diomaye”, ce qui aggrave la crise. Le Bureau politique du Pastef a d’ailleurs publié un communiqué réaffirmant sa volonté de restructurer “Diomaye Président” en plaçant le Pastef au centre. Il refuse de reconstruire une coalition avec des dignitaires recyclés de l’ancien régime ou des partis sans légitimité populaire.

Pour l’instant, des médiations sont toujours en cours. Mais les deux camps appellent chacun à renforcer leurs positions, ce qui creuse davantage le fossé entre Sonko et Faye. D’ailleurs, lors de la rencontre du 7 décembre, Ousmane Sonko a appelé son parti à se réinventer pour mieux faire face à la réalité politique et aux menaces internes. Dans la foulée, il a annoncé le congrés de son parti prévu au mois d’avril 2026.

Les conséquences d’une possible séparation

Après la fin du régime de Macky Sall (2012-2024), le Pastef avait clairement annoncé son intention de rester au pouvoir pendant au moins un demi-siècle. Mais l’histoire politique montre que la cohabitation de longue durée entre des figures fortes, ayant des ambitions présidentielles, est souvent irréaliste et de courte durée. Le tandem Sonko-Faye ne fait pas exception.

Si Faye décidait de se séparer du noyau dur du Pastef, sa nouvelle coalition “Diomaye Président” pourrait rencontrer d’énormes difficultés. Malgré le contrôle du pouvoir exécutif, elle aurait alors du mal à rivaliser avec la légitimité populaire d’Ousmane Sonko, au Sénégal et dans la diaspora.

De plus, sans majorité au parlement, la coalition “Diomaye Président” aurait sans doute du mal à faire voter des lois et à mettre en œuvre des réformes importantes avant la prochaine présidentielle prévue en 2029. Lors des dernières élections législatives, le Pastef, sous la direction de Sonko, a remporté 130 des 165 sièges. Beaucoup de ces députés ont affirmé leur loyauté envers le Premier ministre.

En outre, des partisans appellent déjà à l’élection de Sonko en 2029. Ce dernier a lui-même rappelé que sa potentielle candidature en 2029, ne souffre d’aucun obstacle légal. Ses partisans estiment que le président Faye est en train de s’éloigner du “projet”. Étant donné la popularité actuelle du Pastef, l’affronter pour le reste du mandat serait très difficile pour le président Faye. D’autant qu’il peine déjà à mettre en œuvre des réformes politiques, sociales ou économiques significatives.

Face à cette situation, les citoyens sénégalais sont inquiets. Ils sont pris en étau entre une grave crise économique et financière et des années d’instabilité politique, après des décennies d’efforts.

Ces prévisions inquiétantes pourraient être évitées. Il faudrait pour cela de la sagesse politique et une ambition collective pour préserver l’intérêt public en apaisant les différends.

En définitive, le Sénégal, nation jeune et démocratique, n’est pas à l’abri des crises politiques. Elles menacent souvent la stabilité du pays. L’élection présidentielle de 2024 devait marquer la fin d’un régime et annoncer la disparition de “l’État néo-colonialiste”.

Le président Faye et son Premier ministre Ousmane Sonko incarnent l’espoir d’une grande partie du peuple pour des réformes radicales. Mais leurs divergences politiques pourraient compromettre la stabilité du pays et la mise en œuvre du “projet”, dans un contexte de crise de la dette très préoccupant.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Sénégal : pourquoi et comment le tandem Diomaye-Sonko a déraillé – https://theconversation.com/senegal-pourquoi-et-comment-le-tandem-diomaye-sonko-a-deraille-270822

Did Donald Trump order piracy on the high seas?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor, The Conversation

This newsletter was first published in The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email. Sign up to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.


Venezuelan Nobel peace laureate, María Corina Machado, plans to return home with her accolade “at the correct moment”. You have to presume the correct moment will be at such a time as her bitter political foe Nicolás Maduro is on holiday or otherwise unavoidably detained, or she certainly risks arrest as soon as she sets foot in her home country.

She told the Times of reports from a local NGO that young people were being detained for simply having the news of the Nobel prize in their phone. So she’d be well aware that the crime of being one of the most prominent opposition figureheads might place her in considerable legal jeopardy.

Perhaps that’s the point. It’s not up to us to speculate, but it’s not hard to imagine news of her arrest going down extremely badly in Washington right now. Having conducted 22 strikes on boats in the Caribbean alleged to be carrying what the US president has designed as “narcoterrorists” with the deaths of at least 87 people, closed the airspace above the country and, on December 10, intercepted and boarded an oil tanker off the coast (more of which anon), one wonders what the Trump administration’s next step might be.

Will there be a “Gulf of Tonkin incident?” The equivalent of the now-infamous confrontation between North Vietnamese and US naval forces which precipitated the Vietnam War – an episode which turned out to be wholly cooked-up by the Americans. Announcing the seizure of the oil tanker, Donald Trump told reporters, cryptically: “Other things are happening.” He did not go into details, but we’ll be watching closely as this develops.

Understandably the Venezuelans are not amused by the incident, which a government spokesman said was “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy”. We asked Mark Chadwick, an expert in international law at Nottingham Trent University, who has written a book on piracy, for his opinion on the matter.




Read more:
What does international law tell us about the US seizure of an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela?


Let’s avoid, for now at least, the irony of Trump’s decision to pardon a man convicted in a US court for “flooding the US with cocaine”, while instructing his military to target boats piloted by people he has designated as “narcoterrorists”.

It has been interesting to follow the coverage of these attacks and their legality, or lack of it. For the record, and in case you have missed our expert analysis, these attacks appear very risky, legally.

But it’s not as if the US – and her allies, including the UK – have’t sailed pretty close to the legal wind with “targeted killings” across the Middle East and elsewhere over past decades. Elisabeth Schweiger is an expert on international law and the use of force at the University of Stirling. She writes that the fact that there has not been more of an international outcry at these killings has created a situation where these extrajudicial killings have been almost normalised. Indeed the discussion is “beginning to shift from whether such strikes should occur to how they should be conducted, focusing on issues like target identification”.




Read more:
Donald Trump’s strikes against narcoterrorists are new but the logic behind them isn’t


One country where they will be watching what’s going on in Venezuela with close interest is China, writes Tom Harper. Harper, an expert in Chinese foreign policy at the University of East London, says that Beijing reacted to news of the closure by the US of Venezuelan airspace with an admonitory message that China “opposes external interference in Venezuela’s domestic affairs under any pretext”.

As Harper notes, Beijing has worked hard over decades to develop relations and influence with a range of Latin American countries, partly for trade reasons, partly as a counterweight to US influence. China is also one of the largest buyers of its oil. In turn, Venezuela buys Chinese arms.

But now, in its new national security strategy, the Trump administration has invoked the Monroe doctrine. This policy originating from the 19th century essentially claimed that Latin America was America’s backyard to mess around in and that any outside interference in the region would be seen as a hostile act towards US interests. It was discontinued in 2013 by the Obama administration, as the then secretary of state John Kerry declared that “the era of the Monroe doctrine is over”.

Now it’s back, in what the White House is calling the “Trump corollary”, which states that “the American people – not foreign nations nor globalist institutions – will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere”. How Beijing reacts to this remains to be seen.




Read more:
Why China is watching Trump’s Venezuela campaign closely


National security strategy

The Chinese aren’t the only people who will have read Trump’s 2025 national security statement with interest, although in the case of most of us in Europe, it’s more a case of bemusement and horror. While barely mentioning Russia and not mentioning North Korea at all, the 33-page document describes Europe’s shortcomings in lavish detail.

Europe, we read, has become weakened by allowing immigration to get out of control to the extent that it now risks “civilizational erasure”. Meanwhile Europe’s politicians have undermined free speech and suppressed democratic opposition. Ominously, the national security strategy talks of “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”. He doubled down on that theme in an interview with the US, hinting that he might consider endorsing candidates who align better with his geopolitical vision.

Reading between the lines of the document, David Dunn and Stefan Wolff, experts in international security at the University of Birmingham, conclude that “the transatlantic alliance that was the cornerstone of European security and underpinned the liberal international order has ceased to exist”.

It’s a worrying time for Nato’s European members, they believe. Trump and some of his most senior officials have signalled that the US is no longer prepared to act as the security backstop – the principle around which the alliance was originally built. If any silver lining to this is to be found it’s that the US president’s insistence that all Nato members must increase their defence spending has already got them scrambling to adjust their budgets. And Trump’s perceived unreliability around the Ukraine war has led them to form a Europe-oriented “coalition of the willing”.

As our authors conclude: “If Nato founders, which is not now inconceivable, [this coalition] may be Europe’s best hope of surviving in a world where it is no longer one of, or aligned with, the dominant great powers of the day. But for that to become a reality, the coalition of the willing needs to become a coalition of the able. And this is a test it has yet to pass.”




Read more:
Donald Trump’s national security strategy puts America first and leaves its allies to fend for themselves


That Washington has often viewed the unwillingness of some European powers to join in with America’s foreign policy adventures as a sign of weakness is well known. When France and Germany declined to join George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq, there were quips about “Euroweenies” and “EU-nuchs”. So it’s not surprising that the new US national security strategy focuses on this perceived shortcoming.

But, the document’s focus on the risk of “civilizational erasure” in Europe came as a surprise to many. It feels for all the world like a reheated version of the “great replacement theory” – namely the idea that indigenous Europeans are being outbred by immigrants, to the extent that “will be unrecognizable in 20 years or
less”.

The fact is, writes Roman Birke, an expert in modern European history at Dublin City University, that this has become something of an obsession for some thinkers in the US and parts of Europe. Leaders that Trump admires, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, have promoted policies to get women having more children. “We Hungarians have a different way of thinking,” Orban is quoted as saying. “Instead of just numbers, we want Hungarian children. Migration for us is surrender.”

Birke believes that Trump and his Maga movement’s suspicion of Europe focuses on these issues which to them mean the Europe has become weak and decadent.




Read more:
America’s anti-European attitudes are centred on perceptions of military weakness and the decline of native populations


But you’d be mistaken if you believe Trump’s national security strategy to reveal him as an isolationist, writes Andrew Gawthorpe. Far from it. Gawthorpe, whose research has focused on the changing views of civilisation inherent in Trump’s foreign policy when contrasted with that of the great liberal US president Woodrow Wilson, thinks that Trump sees himself as “the protector of a racially and culturally defined civilisation that covers both the US and Europe”.

Gawthorpe picks out three broad themes from the national security strategy which illustrate how the US president and his top aides see the world and America’s place astride it.




Read more:
What the US national security strategy tells us about how Trump views the world



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The Conversation

ref. Did Donald Trump order piracy on the high seas? – https://theconversation.com/did-donald-trump-order-piracy-on-the-high-seas-271881

Polar bears are adapting to climate change at a genetic level – and it could help them avoid extinction

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alice Godden, Senior Research Associate, School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia

Polar bears that have moved to the south-east of Greenland where there it is warmer are showing different genetic data. Tony Campbell/Shutterstock

The Arctic Ocean current is at its warmest in the last 125,000 years, and temperatures continue to rise. Due to these warming temperatures more than two-thirds of polar bears are expected to be extinct by 2050 with total extinction predicted by the end of this century.

But in our new study my colleagues and I found that the changing climate was driving changes in the polar bear genome, potentially allowing them to more readily adapt to warmer habitats. Provided these polar bears can source enough food and breeding partners, this suggests they may potentially survive these new challenging climates.

We discovered a strong link between rising temperatures in south-east Greenland and changes in polar bear DNA. DNA is the instruction book inside every cell, guiding how an organism grows and develops. In processes called transcription and translation, DNA is copied to generate RNA (molecules that reflect gene activity) and can lead to the production of proteins, and copies of transposons (TEs), also known as “jumping genes”, which are mobile pieces of the genome that can move around and influence how other genes work.

In carrying out our recent research we found that there were big differences in the temperatures observed in the north-east, compared with the south-east regions of Greenland. Our team used publicly available polar bear genetic data from a research group at the University of Washington, US, to support our study. This dataset was generated from blood samples collected from polar bears in both northern and south-eastern Greenland.

Our work built on the Washington University study which discovered that this south-eastern population of Greenland polar bears was genetically different to the north-eastern population. South-east bears had migrated from the north and became isolated and separate approximately 200 years ago, it found.

Researchers from Washington had extracted RNA from polar bear blood samples and sequenced it. We used this RNA sequencing to look at RNA expression — the molecules that act like messengers, showing which genes are active, in relation to the climate. This gave us a detailed picture of gene activity, including the behaviour of TEs. Temperatures in Greenland have been closely monitored and recorded by the Danish Meteorological Institute. So we linked this climate data with the RNA data to explore how environmental changes may be influencing polar bear biology.

Does temperature change anything?

From our analysis we found that temperatures in the north-east of Greenland were colder and less variable, while south-east temperatures fluctuated and were significantly warmer. The figure below shows our data as well as how temperature varies across Greenland, with warmer and more volatile conditions in the south-east. This creates many challenges and changes to the habitats for the polar bears living in these regions.

In the south-east of Greenland, the ice-sheet margin, which is the edge of the ice sheet and spans 80% of Greenland, is rapidly receding, causing vast ice and habitat loss.

The loss of ice is a substantial problem for the polar bears, as this reduces the availability of hunting platforms to catch seals, leading to isolation and food scarcity. The north-east of Greenland is a vast, flat Arctic tundra, while south-east Greenland is covered by forest tundra (the transitional zone between coniferous forest and Arctic tundra). The south-east climate has high levels of rain, wind, and steep coastal mountains.

Temperature across Greenland and bear locations

A map of Greenland indicating the location of the polar bears sampled in the north and south-east of Greenland, coupled with the temperature of those locations. The temperatures were more varied and overall much warmer in the south-east
Author data visualisation using temperature data from the Danish Meteorological Institute. Locations of bears in south-east (red icons) and north-east (blue icons).
CC BY-NC-ND

How climate is changing polar bear DNA

Over time the DNA sequence can slowly change and evolve, but environmental stress, such as warmer climate, can accelerate this process.

TEs are like puzzle pieces that can rearrange themselves, sometimes helping animals adapt to new environments. In the polar bear genome approximately 38.1% of the genome is made up of TEs. TEs come in many different families and have slightly different behaviours, but in essence they all are mobile fragments that can reinsert randomly anywhere in the genome.

In the human genome, 45% is comprised of TEs and in plants it can be over 70%. There are small protective molecules called piwi-interacting RNAs (piRNAs) that can silence the activity of TEs.

Despite this, when an environmental stress is too strong, these protective piRNAs cannot keep up with the invasive actions of TEs. In our work we found that the warmer south-east climate led to a mass mobilisation from these TEs across the polar bear genome, changing its sequence. We also found that these TE sequences appeared younger and more abundant in the south-east bears, with over 1,500 of them “upregulated”, which suggests recent genetic changes that may help bears adapt to rising temperatures.

Some of these elements overlap with genes linked to stress responses and metabolism, hinting at a possible role in coping with climate change. By studying these jumping genes, we uncovered how the polar bear genome adapts and responds, in the shorter term, to environmental stress and warmer climates.

Our research found that some genes linked to heat-stress, ageing and metabolism are behaving differently in the south-east population of polar bears. This suggests they might be adjusting to their warmer conditions. Additionally, we found active jumping genes in parts of the genome that are involved in areas tied to fat processing – important when food is scarce. This could mean that polar bears in the south-east are slowly adapting to eating the rougher plant-based diets that can be found in the warmer regions. Northern populations of bears eat mainly fatty seals.

Overall, climate change is reshaping polar bear habitats, leading to genetic changes, with south-eastern bears evolving to survive these new terrains and diets. Future research could include other polar bear populations living in challenging climates. Understanding these genetic changes help researchers see how polar bears might survive in a warming world – and which populations are most at risk.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 47,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

The Conversation

This study was funded by grants from the Natural Environment Research Council (NE/S011188/1) and the European Research Council (SELECTHAPLOID – 101001341)

ref. Polar bears are adapting to climate change at a genetic level – and it could help them avoid extinction – https://theconversation.com/polar-bears-are-adapting-to-climate-change-at-a-genetic-level-and-it-could-help-them-avoid-extinction-269852

Black-market oil buyers will push Venezuela for bigger discounts following US seizure – starving Maduro of much-needed revenue

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Francisco J. Monaldi, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Latin American Energy Policy, Rice University

A video posted on Attorney General Pam Bondi’s X account shows the moment an oil tanker was seized by U.S. forces off the coast of Venezuela. U.S. Attorney General’s Office/X via AP

The U.S. seizure of an oil tanker off the Venezuelan coast looks designed to further squeeze the economy of President Nicolás Maduro’s country.

The Dec. 10, 2025, operation – in which American forces descended from helicopters onto the vessel – follows months of U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean and was immediately condemned by the Venezuelan government as “barefaced robbery and an act of international piracy.”

But what exactly is the Trump administraion’s aim in going after the tanker, and how could this impact the already beleaguered economy of Venezuela? The Conversation U.S. turned to Rice University’s Francisco J. Monaldi, an expert on Latin American energy policy, for answers.

What do we know about the tanker that was seized?

The seized tanker, which according to reports is a 20-year-old vessel called the Skipper, is a supertanker that can carry around 2 million barrels of oil.

According to the Trump administration, the vessel was heading to Cuba. But because of the size of the ship, I strongly suspect that the final destination was likely China – tankers the size of the seized one don’t tend to be used to take oil across the Caribbean to Cuba. The ones used for that task are far smaller.

This particular tanker was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2022 due to it carrying prohibited Iranian oil. At the time, it was claimed that the ship – then called Adisa – was controlled by Russian oil magnate Viktor Artemov and was engaged in an oil smuggling network.

Attorney General Pam Bondi released a video of the seizure on X.

So the latest U.S. seizure was, on the surface, unrelated to the sanctions placed on Venezuela by U.S. authorities in 2019 and expanded in 2020 to include secondary sanctions – that is, on countries that do business on the targeted nation or company.

As such, Venezuelan officials have said this is unprecedented. And they are largely right. While there have been a few occasions in which Iranian tankers have been seized due to sanctions busting, this is the first time that there has been a seizure of a vessel departing Venezuela and with a Venezuelan crew.

The Trump administration has signaled that it is not only seizing the cargo but the ship itself – which would represent a significant loss for the company owning the ship. The loss will be borne by the company, not Venezuela, as it was under a “Free on Board” contract, meaning that as soon as it left Venezuela the buyer takes responsibility for it.

Nonetheless, this is a significant escalation of the pressure campaign on Venezuela, which looks set to continue. Reuters has reported that around 30 other tankers near Venezuela have some kind of sanction against them. They form part of a large shadow fleet that try to skirt sanctions through hiding their identity while transporting oil from Russia, Venezuela and Iran.

The signal from U.S. officials is that they are prepared to go after more vessels and further squeeze Venezuela’s oil revenues through fresh sanctions.

How often they will seize vessels is not known, but the clear threat from the White House is that the U.S. will continue with this seizure campaign.

How important are oil exports to Venezuela?

Venezuela’s economy is tremendously dependent on oil production.

We do not have exact figures, as the Venezuela government has not published them in seven years, but most analysts believe oil constitutes north of 80% of all of the country’s exports – some even put this figure above 90%.

Most of that oil goes to the black market, and a majority ends up with independent refiners in China. State-owned enterprises in China tend not to buy this oil because they do not want to fall foul of the sanctions regime. But Beijing tends to turn a blind eye to tankers heading to non-state entities, especially if those tankers have hidden their true identity so it doesn’t look like they are coming from Venezuela.

Oil rigs are seen on a large body of water.
Oil production makes up a large chunk of Venezuela’s economy.
Federico Parra/AFP via Getty Images

Around 80% of Venezuelan oil goes to China in this way; around 17% goes to the U.S. through a license awarded by the U.S. Treasury to oil giant Chevron. And 3% goes to Cuba, which tends to be subsidized by the Venezuelan government.

Venezuela’s economy itself is also very dependent on oil, with the sector making up about 20% of total GDP, more than any other industry. And when it comes to government income, the oil sector makes up north of 50%.

How have US actions affected Venezuelan oil production?

It is important to know that even before U.S. sanctions began in 2019, Venezuela’s oil production was in severe decline.

In 1998, before Hugo Chávez, the leftist military officer who became a populist president, came to power, oil production peaked at around 3.4 million barrels a day. By the time Chávez died and Maduro succeeded him in 2013, it had fallen to 2.7 million barrels a day.

When U.S. sanctions targeting the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, were enacted in 2019, production was down to 1.3 million barrels a day – but that had already been affected by the other financial sanctions that came in two years earlier.

The oil sanctions of 2019 closed the U.S. market, taking away half a million barrels a day that at the time headed from Venezuela to the U.S. As a result, Venezuela had to increase oil sales to India and China.

But then the 2020 secondary sanctions, which apply to countries doing business with Venezuela, came in. As a result, Europe and India stopped buying Venezuelan oil, meaning that its only markets were Cuba and China. Of course, that year also saw the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a massive cooling of the oil market globally.

Venezuelan oil production collapsed to 400,000 barrels a day that year. Today it has recovered to around 1 million barrels a day. This has been helped by the U.S. allowing Chevron – which, after Petróleos de Venezuela, is the second-largest oil company operating in the country – to continue production.

How does Venezuela get around oil sanctions?

Venezuela relies on a shadow fleet to help it skirt U.S. sanctions. These vessels hide their identity by using false flags and false names.

Companies often take a tanker that is going to be retired and change the identity, put on a new coat of paint and make sure transponders – devices that transmit radio signals to give a map reading – are doctored so that it looks like the ship is in a different place altogether.

These ships arrive in Venezuela, pick up oil and then set sail. Sometimes they then transfer the cargo to another ship – which carries huge environmental risks. And then it arrives typically in Malaysia, where it takes on a Malaysian identity and on it goes to China.

What impact has this latest seizure had on the price of oil?

The seizure had little impact on global oil prices, because of exiting oversupply and due to the fact that Venezuela makes up only around 1% of the overall market. That could change, depending on how aggressive the U.S. gets. But the Trump administration will be mindful that it doesn’t want to see domestic prices rise as a result.

A man in white stands in the center of a large crowd.
Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro faces growing pressure over his country’s economic problems.
Pedro Rances Mattey/Anadolu via Getty Images

As to the price of Venezuelan oil, that could be more drastic. Venezuelan oil is already sold at a discount on the black market because of the existing risk relating to the sanctions. This latest action is likely to widen these discounts even further.

In addition, Venezuela has until now required companies to pay some of the payment for oil cargo upfront – and a lot will be unwilling to do so now, due to high costs involved in a U.S. seizure. For example, a tanker of 2 million barrels, even with the current discount, will be worth around US$100 millon – no one wants to risk that much money. So very few buyers will be willing to prepay. Instead they will expect Venezuela to share the risk.

The bottom line for Maduro is that the only way to get someone to buy Venezuelan oil amid the heightened risk of this moment is to offer higher discounts with fewer prepayments. Besides discounts, export volumes could also be affected and that in turn would lead to production cuts, which are costly to reverse.

And all this will further choke off the already limited revenue that Maduro is relying on to keep Venezuela’s government functioning.

The Conversation

Francisco J. Monaldi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Black-market oil buyers will push Venezuela for bigger discounts following US seizure – starving Maduro of much-needed revenue – https://theconversation.com/black-market-oil-buyers-will-push-venezuela-for-bigger-discounts-following-us-seizure-starving-maduro-of-much-needed-revenue-271896

Why tensions between China and Japan are unlikely to be resolved soon

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, International Relations, Contemporary Japanese Politics & Society, University of Tokyo

Though China and Japan are experienced in dealing with diplomatic crises, relations between the two neighbours appear to have reached a new low. And this time, their conflict may not be easily resolved.

What’s behind the latest crisis and what’s driving the escalation?

The current round of tensions was triggered by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks in the Diet (Japanese parliament) on November 7, suggesting a move by Beijing to use military force against Taiwan would trigger a Japanese military intervention.

Presented as a “worst-case scenario”, such a Chinese attempt would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, she said, justifying its right to collective self-defence to support its US security ally in restoring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Diplomatic crisis

Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. Later, it harboured Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists after their defeat by Mao Zedong’s communist troops in 1949.

Today, Beijing considers Taiwan a province of China, though it has never been under the Communists’ rule. Statements to the contrary are considered an intervention in China’s domestic affairs, crossing a red line for Beijing’s elite.

Demanding a swift retraction of Takaichi’s remarks and an apology, Beijing’s brigade of “wolf warrior diplomats” launched a war of words against her. With the Japanese prime minister not backing down, Beijing then retaliated with a mix of political, economic and military pressure.

China’s Communist leadership warned its citizens against travelling to Japan, and students were told to reconsider their plans there, apparently because of safety concerns. Imports of Japanese seafood were reduced or put on hold, while concerts and movie screenings featuring Japanese artists were cancelled.

China’s Coast Guard and Navy vessels also passed through the waters of the Senkaku islands, a territory administered by Japan but claimed by China as the Diaoyu islands.

Amid all this, an international campaign to blame Japan for the current crisis was rolled out to isolate Tokyo. A formal protest was issued to the UN, and in talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, global leaders were pressured to align with his Communist government against Japan.

The diplomatic turmoil reached a climax in early December with Chinese military planes directing their radars at Japanese fighter jets.

Tension spills into trade

China and Japan are key trading partners. This year alone, a fifth of Japan’s inbound tourism came from China. Beijing’s tightening the screws on Japan will therefore have a measurable impact on the Japanese economy. Some estimate the economic fallout could reach ¥2.2 trillion (A$14.2 billion).

Nevertheless, Beijing’s measures still fall short of past episodes of conflict between the two.

In the early 2000s, Japanese prime ministers’ pilgrimages to the Yasukuni war shrine and revisions of Japanese history textbooks triggered massive anti-Japanese protests across China.

In 2010, Beijing stopped exporting rare earth minerals to Japan in retaliation for Japanese authorities arresting a Chinese captain and his crew after they rammed their ship into a Japanese Coast Guard vessel.

Japan’s “nationalisation” of the disputed Senkaku islands in 2012, buying the isles from their private owner, triggered a significant increase in China’s military presence in the East China Sea.

In light of Japan’s wartime past and China’s economic and military rise, diplomatic disputes have been a default in Sino-Japanese relations since both countries normalised their ties in 1972.

Beijing and Tokyo, however, established a path that has skilfully avoided this from spilling over into trade and business. Japanese investments and economic aid were instrumental in driving China’s industrial modernisation, and both countries have developed close trade relations.

So, when relations hit a low in the 2000s, then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a point by choosing Beijing as his first visit abroad in 2006, declaring a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”.

Ever since, this wording has served as the broader framework for manoeuvring tensions in Sino-Japanese relations.

No off-ramp in sight

This time, however, de-escalation and a return to the status quo may not be as easily achieved.

Takaichi has portrayed herself as an arch-conservative who has inherited her mentor Abe’s policy agenda. She has pledged to restore a “strong Japan” by beefing up Tokyo’s defence capabilities and further strengthening the alliance with the United States.

The current dispute should not come as a surprise. Takaichi has established herself as a China hawk. She has repeatedly visited Taiwan, and in April this year called for a “quasi-security alliance” with Taipei. This reflects concerns in Tokyo that have linked the security of Taiwan directly to that of Japan, and put security across the Taiwan Strait at the centre of the US-Japan alliance.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio declared “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow,” explicitly putting Taiwan at the core of international security.

Already, Takaichi has announced plans to increase Japan’s defence budget to 2% of its GDP by the end of March 2026, two years ahead of schedule. To secure the financial resources, tax hikes are part of the discussion. A nation on alert against foreign threats will help temper opposition.

Supported by Taiwan’s leadership and large portions of the island’s public, Takaichi has used the standoff with Beijing to present herself as a resolute leader. She has also redirected the public’s focus away from her party’s past scandals to the current security crisis. Two months into office, her cabinet enjoys high support.

A quick end to the crisis is not in sight. Xi’s China is more powerful than it was a decade ago, leaving it with plenty of options to escalate tensions. The weaponisation of trade and increased military exercises are the tools Beijing will likely employ.

Yet, Japan has learned from past crises. Its supply chains have become more resilient. De-risking its investments and production away from China is an established strategy.

Takaichi’s current governing coalition also does not include the Komeito party, which has strong ties to Beijing. Within her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), members of the old guard, such as Toshihiro Nikai, who maintained channels to Beijing’s elite, have lost their influence. Figures sceptical of China’s rise, such as Taro Aso, remain at the centre of the party.

With diplomatic channels in short supply and domestic political agendas paramount, an off-ramp for the current dispute is not in sight.

Most importantly, however, geopolitical transitions have created a new context for Sino-Japanese tensions to play out. A confident China has backed Russia in its war in Ukraine and claims leadership of the Global South. The Trump administration has undermined confidence in established US alliances, accelerating polarisation in the international system. Deterring China will become an increasingly difficult task.

The Conversation

Sebastian Maslow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why tensions between China and Japan are unlikely to be resolved soon – https://theconversation.com/why-tensions-between-china-and-japan-are-unlikely-to-be-resolved-soon-271527

Hundreds of iceberg earthquakes detected at the crumbling end of Antarctica’s Doomsday Glacier

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Thanh-Son Pham, ARC DECRA Fellow in Geophysics, Australian National University

Copernicus / ESA, CC BY

Glacial earthquakes are a special type of earthquake generated in cold, icy regions. First discovered in the northern hemisphere more than 20 years ago, these quakes occur when huge chunks of ice fall from glaciers into the sea.

Until now, only a very few have been found in the Antarctic. In a new study soon to be published in Geophysical Research Letters, I present evidence for hundreds of these quakes in Antarctica between 2010 and 2023, mostly at the ocean end of the Thwaites Glacier – the so-called Doomsday Glacier that could send sea levels rising rapidly if it were to collapse.

A recent discovery

A glacial earthquake is created when tall, thin icebergs fall off the end of a glacier into the ocean.

When these icebergs capsize, they clash violently with the “mother” glacier. The clash generates strong mechanical ground vibrations, or seismic waves, that propagate thousands of kilometres from the origin.

What makes glacial earthquakes unique is that they do not generate any high-frequency seismic waves. These waves play a vital role in the detection and location of typical seismic sources, such as earthquakes, volcanoes and nuclear explosions.

Due to this difference, glacial earthquakes were only discovered relatively recently, despite other seismic sources having been documented routinely for several decades.

Varying with the seasons

Most glacial earthquakes detected so far have been located near the ends of glaciers in Greenland, the largest ice cap in the northern hemisphere.

The Greenland glacial earthquakes are relatively large in magnitude. The largest ones are similar in size to those caused by nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in the past two decades. As such, they have been detected by a high-quality, continuously operating seismic monitoring network worldwide.

The Greenland events vary with the seasons, occurring more often in late summer. They have also become more common in recent decades. The signs may be associated with a faster rate of global warming in the polar regions.

Elusive evidence

Although Antarctica is the largest ice sheet on Earth, direct evidence of glacial earthquakes caused by capsizing icebergs there has been elusive. Most previous attempts to detect Antarctic glacial earthquakes used the worldwide network of seismic detectors.

However, if Antarctic glacial earthquakes are of much lower magnitude than those in Greenland, the global network may not detect them.

In my new study, I used seismic stations in Antarctica itself to look for signs of these quakes. My search turned up more than 360 glacier seismic events, most of which are not yet included in any earthquake catalogue.

The events I detected were in two clusters, near Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers. These glaciers have been the largest sources of sea-level rise from Antarctica.

Earthquakes at the Doomsday Glacier

Thwaites Glacier is sometimes known as the Doomsday Glacier. If it were to collapse completely it would raise global sea levels by 3 metres, and it also has the potential to fall apart rapidly.

About two-thirds of the events I detected – 245 out of 362 – were located near the marine end of Thwaites. Most of these events are likely glacial earthquakes due to capsizing icebergs.

The strongest driver of such events does not appear to be the annual oscillation of warm air temperatures that drives the seasonal behaviour of Greenland glacier earthquakes.

Instead, the most prolific period of glacial earthquakes at Thwaites, between 2018 and 2020, coincides with a period of accelerated flow of the glacier’s ice tongue towards the sea. The ice-tongue speed-up period was independently confirmed by satellite observations.

This speed-up could have been caused by ocean conditions, the effect of which is not yet well understood.

The findings suggest the short-term scale impact of ocean states on the stability of marine-terminating glaciers. This is worth further exploration to assess the potential contribution of the glacier to future sea-level rise.

The second largest cluster of detections occurred near the Pine Island Glacier. However, these were consistently located 60–80 kilometres from the waterfront, so they are not likely to have been caused by capsizing icebergs.

These events remain puzzling and require follow-up research.

What’s next for Antarctic glacial earthquake research

The detection of glacial earthquakes associated with iceberg calving at Thwaites Glacier could help answer several important research questions. These include a fundamental question about the potential instability of the Thwaites Glacier due to the interaction of the ocean, ice and solid ground near where it meets the sea.

Better understanding may hold the key to resolving the current large uncertainty in the projected sea-level rise over the next couple of centuries.

The Conversation

Thanh-Son Pham receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

ref. Hundreds of iceberg earthquakes detected at the crumbling end of Antarctica’s Doomsday Glacier – https://theconversation.com/hundreds-of-iceberg-earthquakes-detected-at-the-crumbling-end-of-antarcticas-doomsday-glacier-268893

Why do we wake up shortly before our alarm goes off? It’s not by chance

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Yaqoot Fatima, Professor of Sleep Health, University of the Sunshine Coast

Malvestida/Unsplash

You’ve probably experienced it – your alarm is set for 6:30am, yet somehow your eyes snap open a few minutes before it goes off. There’s no sound, no external cue, just the body somehow knowing it’s time.

It might seem strange, but you didn’t wake up by chance. It’s your body clock at work – an amazingly precise internal timing system that regulates when you sleep and wake.

But how exactly does this built-in alarm clock work?

A hormonal wake-up call

Deep in the brain is a small group of neurons called the suprachiasmatic nucleus, often referred to as the body’s “master clock”. These neurons keep track of time by coordinating internal rhythms such as circadian rhythm (aligned with the 24-hour day) to regulate things like sleep, body temperature, hunger and digestion.

The circadian rhythm influences when we feel sleepy and alert each day. Our bodies set the master clock naturally, and it is completely normal to see variation in the timing of when people prefer to sleep and be awake.

Have you ever wondered why some people are “morning people”, preferring to catch the sunrise and hit the pillow early at night, and others are “night owls”, staying up late and sleeping till mid-morning? This is because of differences in their circadian rhythm.

Regular sleep and wake, meal and exercise routines program our master clock so it starts to predict when these behaviours will happen each day and begin releasing related hormones accordingly.

For example, when we wake up in the morning, we experience a phenomenon known as the “cortisol awakening response”. This is a significant spike in cortisol – a hormone thought to help us prepare for the day and feel energised.

For people who have very consistent rise times and morning light exposure, the master clock learns when they usually get up. Well before their alarm sounds, it gently prepares the body: the temperature rises, melatonin (a sleepiness hormone) levels fall, and cortisol levels start to climb.

By the time their alarm is due, the body is already transitioning into wakefulness. Think of it as a sort of hormonal wake-up call.

A well-synced rhythm or poor sleep quality?

If you often wake a few minutes before your alarm and feel alert and rested, it’s a sign your circadian rhythm is finely tuned. Your body clock has learned to anticipate your routine and help you transition smoothly from sleep to wakefulness.

However, if you wake before your alarm but feel groggy or restless, it might signal poor sleep quality rather than a well-synced rhythm.

Having a regular bedtime and awakening schedule helps train the body’s internal clock, especially when it stays aligned with natural cues in your environment, such as changes in light and temperature throughout the day.

This will make it easier to fall asleep and wake up feeling refreshed. A regular sleep-wake schedule will help your body “keep track of time” and can teach the body to predict when it’s time to wake up.

On the other hand, an irregular sleep schedule can confuse these internal bodily rhythms, leading to drowsiness and difficulty concentrating and performing mental tasks.

Without a consistent sleep pattern, the body will rely on an alarm to wake up, potentially waking you in deeper stages of sleep and leaving you with that groggy feeling (known as sleep inertia).

In that case, reviewing your sleep hygiene and making small changes to your habits can realign your body’s internal clock, helping you wake naturally and feel truly rested.

Why is it hard to switch off?

Stress and anxiety can increase levels of cortisol – the same hormone that naturally increases in the morning to help you wake up – making it harder to stay asleep or triggering early awakening.

Anticipation of exciting events can also make it difficult to sleep, as a high state of arousal makes your brain stay alert, leading to lighter sleep and premature awakenings. These situations are common and are normal from time to time; however, they may cause longer-term sleep problems if they happen too often.

In the pre-industrial era, people followed environmental cues from the sun and the moon to guide their sleep patterns.

In modern times, waking naturally without an alarm can be hard. But when it happens, it’s a strong sign that you’ve had enough rest and that your body clock is healthy and well-aligned.

Training your body to wake up without an alarm is possible by adopting the following strategies: prioritising a consistent sleep schedule with 7–8 hours of sleep (including on weekends); avoiding sleep disruptions due to caffeine, alcohol or heavy meals; creating a dark sleep environment and avoiding screens before bed; and ensuring exposure to natural sunlight in the morning.

The Conversation

Yaqoot Fatima receives funding from MRFF, NHMRC and Beyond Blue.

Alexandra Metse has received funding from the Australian Prevention Partnership Centre, MRFF, the Waterloo Foundation, and the NSW Department of Education. She is a member of the Australasian Sleep Association.

Danielle Wilson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why do we wake up shortly before our alarm goes off? It’s not by chance – https://theconversation.com/why-do-we-wake-up-shortly-before-our-alarm-goes-off-its-not-by-chance-268992

Netflix is buying Warner Brothers. Is this the end of the cinema?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Liam Burke, Associate Professor and Cinema and Screen Studies Discipline Leader, Swinburne University of Technology

Jametlene Reskp/Unsplash

The world’s dominant streaming service, Netflix, has announced its planned acquisition of Warner Bros with a deal valued at US$82.7 billion (A$124.5 billion).

The acquisition has provoked criticism from film fans, the creative community and the United States government, including concerns for the future of filmgoing. News of the acquisition was also followed by a hostile bid (a bid that goes directly to shareholders, not the board), from Paramount Skydance.

Jane Fonda described the Netflix deal as “catastrophic”, saying it “threatens the entire entertainment industry”.

Since emerging as the global leader in streaming, Netflix has avoided acquisitions while its competitors have bought up legacy assets, like Amazon’s purchase of MGM in 2022. Rather than buy existing intellectual property, Netflix sought to build new brands such as Stranger Things and Squid Game.

However, it is rare that a 100-year archive like Warner Bros – which ranges from Looney Tunes cartoons to Emmy-magnet The White Lotus – would come up for sale. The deal would bolster Netflix’s library and save expensive licensing costs. There’s no need to pay for ten seasons of Friends if you own the company.

The acquisition raises questions on the consolidation of streaming services. But one of the most immediate concerns is the impact on filmgoing.

Do we still go to the cinema?

Cinema attendance has been falling since the rise of global streaming. This decline was exacerbated by the pandemic: 2025’s global box office will be down 13% from pre-COVID times.

Netflix occasionally releases films in a handful of theatres for extremely limited runs to qualify for awards such as the Oscars, which require a cinematic release. But Netflix co-CEO Ted Sarandos has repeatedly stated Netflix’s priority is at home rather than theatres.

While blockbusters from the Warner Bros studio like Batman and Minecraft are likely to still be released in cinemas under the new super-company, original and mid-budget films may not get the same opportunity.

Ironically, the proposed deal is coming at a time when Warner Bros is having a very successful run of auteur-led films in theatres, such as Ryan Coogler’s Sinners and Paul Thomas Anderson’s One Battle After Another.

Commenting on the deal, Sarandos said Netflix would look to make the time between films being exclusively in cinemas and available at home more “consumer friendly” – meaning the company will look to have short cinema runs and a quick pivot to streaming services.

Theatrical windows have been shrinking. The original Top Gun is often credited with starting the home video revolution when it sold a then-record 2.9 million VHS cassettes in 1987, but that was ten months after it had been a hit in cinemas.

Even in 2010, when the Walt Disney Company sought to shorten the home video release window of Tim Burton’s Alice in Wonderland to 12 weeks, the British theatre chain Odeon threatened not to exhibit the film. Today, blockbusters like Wicked can fly to premium video on demand in a few weeks.

Many theatrical films earn the majority of their box office in the first two weeks of release, and so longer exclusive windows are arguably a case of diminishing returns. However, this doesn’t always hold true.

Earlier this year, Warner Bros’ vampire movie Sinners opened modestly in cinemas. But the film sustained its audience over several weeks on its way to becoming the highest grossing original film at the US box office in years, taking in over US$260 million (A$390 million).

Cinephiles argue original films like Sinners need time to find a cinema audience, and the film’s many musical and horror setpieces are amplified by the communal experience of the theatre.

Challenges ahead

Skydance is also looking to add the studio to its growing portfolio, after its recent purchase of Paramount.

Skydance owner David Ellison has demonstrated his commitment to cinemas by promising Paramount will release 30 films in theatres a year with “healthy traditional windows”.

The deal will also come under regulatory scrutiny due to antitrust concerns. It unites top streamers Netflix and HBO as well as the film studio, removing a significant buyer from the market. Such anti-competitive rationale was used under the Biden administration to successfully block the proposed merger of book publishers Penguin Random House and Simon & Schuster.

One note of optimism is that Netflix has recently demonstrated a willingness to deviate from its founding principles. When the streaming service first launched, it positioned itself in opposition to broadcast and cable television by dropping all episodes of a season at once, not streaming live content or sport, and shunning advertising. Netflix has rolled back these three tenets in recent years in response to the shifting marketplace.

Perhaps the service’s stubborn refusal to embrace filmgoing is another long-held principle it will abandon if audiences are eager.

New research shows young people are craving in-person entertainment, still a novelty for digital natives.

This appetite for experiences has fuelled the recent success in cinemas of A Minecraft Movie, Taylor Swift concert films, and KPop Demon Hunters sing-along – months after it was originally released on Netflix.

If cinema’s reassert themselves as a lively communal space, perhaps this is one experience the newly diversified Netflix will buy a ticket for.

The Conversation

Liam Burke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Netflix is buying Warner Brothers. Is this the end of the cinema? – https://theconversation.com/netflix-is-buying-warner-brothers-is-this-the-end-of-the-cinema-271518

With Nvidia’s second-best AI chips headed for China, the US shifts priorities from security to trade

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide

JIM WATSON/Getty

This week, US President Donald Trump approved previously banned exports of Nvidia’s powerful H200 artificial intelligence (AI) chips to China.

In return, the US government will receive 25% of the sales revenue, in what has become a hallmark of this administration to take a sales cut of a private company’s revenues.

The H200 is Nvidia’s second-most powerful AI processor. It’s roughly six times more capable than the H20 chips previously available to buyers in China.

These aren’t consumer gadgets powering the latest cat meme generator or helping you with the weekly pub quiz. They’re the computational engines behind advanced AI systems that increasingly drive autonomous weapons. This includes drone navigation systems, automatic gun emplacements and targeting algorithms in modern warfare.

Think less the futuristic world of the Terminator movies, more the very real AI-powered targeting systems already being deployed, including in Ukraine and Gaza.

At the end of a year that has seen the US and China locked in a bitter trade war in which Trump lifted tariffs on China as high as 145% at one point, the decision to allow these sensitive exports is stunning.

This policy reversal fundamentally challenges how export controls work. It also raises urgent questions for US allies such as Australia, caught between economic dependence on China and deepening defence alignment with an increasingly unpredictable United States.

How we got here

Having access to advanced semiconductor chips is crucial in the global race toward advanced artificial intelligence. In October 2022, the Biden administration put strict semiconductor export controls in place. These rules targeted advanced AI chips and chip-making equipment destined for China.

This was dubbed the “small yard, high fence” approach. The aim was to restrict (build a “high fence” around) a narrow range of sensitive technologies, while still allowing broader trade with China.

The Biden administration placed 140 Chinese entities on export blacklists. It also restricted 24 types of manufacturing equipment and banned US engineers from supporting advanced Chinese chip facilities.

These measures had real impact. Between 2022 and 2024, Chinese AI companies struggled to access needed computing power, forcing them to innovate with older hardware.

A different strategy

Trump’s approach is fundamentally different. In July, his administration allowed Nvidia to sell H20 chips to China in exchange for 15% of revenues. This was widely seen as a concession to China linked to negotiations over US access to rare earth minerals.

Trump’s latest move to approve the far more powerful H200 chips for export to China reflects his abandoning the rulebook on trade.

Strategic security decisions are being transformed into transactional “deals” where everything has a price.

AI warfare is already here

AI chips now power targeting systems, guide munitions and make split-second decisions on battlefields worldwide.

Ukraine’s forces use AI-equipped drones that autonomously navigate the final approach to targets, even in heavily jammed environments, reportedly improving strike accuracy from 30–50% to around 80%.

According to a Guardian report, Israel’s “Lavender” AI system identified 37,000 potential Hamas-linked targets, accelerating airstrikes but reportedly contributing to significant civilian casualties.

China’s People’s Liberation Army is reportedly deploying AI for drone swarm coordination, autonomous target recognition, and real-time battlefield decision-making.

The Pentagon’s Project Maven synthesises satellite and sensor data to suggest targets that US forces may subsequently destroy.

This isn’t science fiction; it is today’s battlefield reality.

A new kind of laundering

Modern semiconductors are “dual-use” technologies. The same chips training AI chatbots can guide cruise missiles. The same microcontrollers regulating washing machines can navigate attack drones.

British researchers have found a significant number of foreign components in Russian drones used in Ukraine have come from the US and Europe.

Some were literally harvested from household appliances. Russian procurement networks reportedly bought chips intended for repairing washing machines, erased the manufacturer’s name with acetone and inserted them into kamikaze drones.

These components travelled through third countries such as India and Kazakhstan before finding their way to Russian manufacturers.

You can’t ban washing machines without crippling consumer economies. But washing machines contain microcontrollers perfect for military drones. Export controls can become an elaborate game of whack-a-mole, where each restriction spawns new workarounds.

Australia’s dilemma

As a consequence of joining the AUKUS security partnership, Australia has restructured its export control regime to align with US priorities.

But Australia is in something of a bind. China accounts for about 30% of Australia’s total merchandise trade. Meanwhile, the US increasingly demands policy alignment as the price for accessing its defence technology.

What does US relaxation of export controls on advanced AI chips mean for Australia? Are we obligated to follow? Australia’s alignment with AUKUS was grounded on partners sharing similar views about threats, and adopting a consistent response.

However, the US’ recently released National Security Strategy identifies migration to Europe as a bigger “civilisational” threat than Russia’s military threat. Clearly, Australians see this very differently.

When security becomes a bargaining chip

Export controls work when they’re consistent, predictable, and clearly tied to national security. They fail when they become bargaining chips or revenue generators.

Trump’s H200 deal transforms the “high fence” around sensitive technologies into a turnstile for the right price.

There are pressing questions for Australia. Do US-aligned export controls serve Australian interests? Or are we outsourcing sovereignty to a partner whose decisions are increasingly arbitrary and transactional?

The Conversation

Nathan Howard Gray receives funding from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

Peter Draper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. With Nvidia’s second-best AI chips headed for China, the US shifts priorities from security to trade – https://theconversation.com/with-nvidias-second-best-ai-chips-headed-for-china-the-us-shifts-priorities-from-security-to-trade-271831