We associate New Year with deep mid-winter and the tidy date of January 1, but for 600 years between 1155 until 1752 in England and Wales the new year began on 25 March. This day was one of the quarter days that divided the year historically and on which rents and debts were settled. March 25 became the quarter day where annual accounts were finalised. So, around about now, we’d have been preparing to welcome in a new year alongside the warmer weather and spring blooms.
Celebrations were double as the legal and ecclesiastical calendar worked in harmony as March 25 is also Lady Day or the Feast of the Annunciation. Falling exactly nine months before Christmas Day, for Christians it marks when the archangel Gabriel informed Mary that she was shortly to bear a son.
Feast days are normally days of indulgence and merrymaking, but Lady Day normally falls in Lent, a time of abstinence. This meant, for some, Lady Day was a temporary lightening of Lenten restrictions.
Also known as Annunciation Day, Lady Day has sometimes fallen on Good Friday, as it did in 1608. This day is the opposite of a feast day, marking the crucifixion and death of Christ, which is observed through fasting and abstinence. The poet John Donne reflected on this crossover in 1608 in Upon the Annunciation where he saw it as an opportunity to be extra pious:
“Tamely, frail body, abstain today;
today My soul eats twice,
Christ hither and away”
So for Donne, this was a day of fasting and reflection to commemorate both the coming of Christ and his death.
Superstitions
Lady Day has many associated superstitions. An anonymous pamphlet printed in 1721 called When my Lord Falls in my Lady’s Lap, England Beware of a Great Mishap takes its title from an old saying that means that it is unlucky when Lady Day falls on or near Easter Sunday. The author proceeds to run through the many calamities that have happened on such inauspicious occasions.
For instance, it tells of how in 1117 the heir to Henry I, William Adelin was drowned in the sinking of the White Ship along with 300 other souls. The author hasn’t got their facts quite straight here as this disaster happened in November 1120. By Victorian times, this superstition about Lady’s day falling near Easter Sunday was considered old fashioned with The Hampshire Advertiser describing it as a “former ill omen” in its 21 March 1846 edition.
Customs
Lady’s Day is still celebrated in some parts of the UK. In Hampshire, The Tichborne Dole on Lady’s Day dates back to around 1150. Mabella (or Isabella), Lady de Tichborne of Alresford, made a deathbed request that an annual donation of bread, baked with grains from her lands, be made in her memory to the parish poor.
Her rather less charitably minded husband, Sir Roger, agreed on condition that his benevolence was limited to crops from just the land that she could walk around while carrying a single burning log from the fire. According to the legend, the dying Mabella crawled her way around some 23 acres before the flame went out. This area is still known as “The Crawls”.
The Tichborne Dole (1671) by Gillis van Tilborgh. Wikimedia
It’s said Mabella left a curse on the house that if ever the dole was stopped the family line would die out. Specifically, she vowed that a generation of seven sons would be followed by a generation of seven daughters. The dole continued uninterrupted until 1794 and it would seem that Mabella’s curse came to pass when the last male Tichborne had a family of seven daughters. And so, the custom was reinstated.
A film, The Tichborne Curse, was released in 1947. The reinstated Dole is still taking place today. Adults from the parishes of Tichborne and Cheriton are entitled to claim one gallon (2kg) of flour, and children half a gallon each.
Always in April
The dating system in the US, Britain and Ireland changed in 1752 when these countries adopted the Gregorian calendar. Then the legal New Year in these countries became the same as it had been in Scotland for the last century and a half: January 1.
However, it wasn’t just the year start that needed adjusting, as the new calendar was now out by several days. This meant that in England, 11 days were “lost” as Wednesday September 2 1752 was followed by Thursday September 14 1752 in order to right things. The jump must have been very disconcerting if we consider how much the clocks going forward an hour throws us out for a while.
In Britain, the legacy of the old-style dating system lives on in our tax system. Where the new tax year was March 25 (the old New Year) it was moved to April 5, and later to April 6, due to the leapfrog in dates 1752.
This day became Old Lady Day. April 6 day now stood in for the financial aspects of the quarter day, which meant this was the date in which new leases on farms and land began and often farm labouring families moved into new tied housing on that day as they signed new year long contracts. Author Thomas Hardy includes this in his 1891 novel Tess of the d’Urbervilles. Tess is hired on a farm upon “her agreeing to remain till Old Lady-Day”.
So March 25 may be a day that for most goes by with little notice now but it was once a major holiday that marked the beginning of the new year.
Sara Read does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Imagine a man wants to buy a new shirt for work that he plans to wear once a week for at least the next five years. When browsing for options, he finds one shirt from a lower-quality brand priced at £20 and one shirt from a high-quality brand for £50. Which one should he buy?
From his previous experience with the two brands, he knows that if he plans to wear the shirt once a week (so roughly 50 times per year) the lower-quality shirt will last him about a year. After that, he will need to replace it. The high-quality shirt will be good for at least four years. But clearly, the high-quality shirt is also more expensive.
Our theoretical shopper would probably conclude that the high-quality shirt makes more economic sense. Taking into account the purchase price relative to how many times he can wear the shirt, it would cost him only 25 pence for each time he would wear it, compared to the lower-quality shirt at 40 pence.
This is the logic of “cost per wear”. Some fashion blogs and small businesses have started using this concept to make the case for high-quality clothing. The rationale is simple – higher-quality clothing should last longer, making a higher purchase price worthwhile in the long run. Cost per wear is calculated by dividing the garment price by the number of times the consumer expects to wear it.
Essentially, cost per wear works much like unit pricing in supermarkets. These measures already help consumers compare things like the price of a product per 100g, per chocolate bar in a multipack, or per laundry load. But this same logic isn’t yet applied to clothes in a retail setting.
The fashion industry is one of the largest contributors to environmental harm, accounting for up to 8% of the world’s carbon emissions, causing immense water pollution due to textile treatments such as dyeing, and producing millions of tonnes of textile waste annually.
Using cost per wear in shops or online retail spaces could reduce the environmental impact of fashion – the more frequently a garment can be worn, the more efficiently the consumed resources are used. And of course the longer that garment remains in use, the less often it needs to be replaced.
The problem is that most shoppers don’t know how long a garment will last. Without a prompt in stores or online, many consumers do not even consider clothing longevity when buying.
But standardised fabric-testing methods exist already. These methods assess the durability of fabric according to the number of abrasion cycles (that is, the number of rubs against an abrasive surface) it can tolerate before showing signs of wear. This could easily be applied to clothing, allowing retailers to include cost per wear labels alongside the purchase price.
In research I carried out with Lucia Reisch from Cambridge Judge Business School, we tested this idea. In a number of experiments, we showed participants from online panels a lower-quality, cheaper garment (a sweater, for example) and a higher-quality, more expensive version. We then asked which they would prefer.
Fast fashion suddenly wasn’t so affordable
When we included information on the cost per wear for both options – or even just the high-quality option (showing a lower cost per wear compared to a poorer-quality option, or a reference value), participants were more likely to choose the more expensive, high-quality option.
The effect was stronger when participants were shopping for everyday wear over occasion wear, when they could compare the cost per wear between options, and when the cost per wear information was said to be certified by an independent third party. Participants then trusted the information more, and we found that this could outperform a general durability claim made by a brand.
Our studies showed that cost per wear can make cheap fashion suddenly appear more expensive to shoppers – the high-quality options were viewed as better financial investments. And by choosing the more economical, high-quality option, participants were also choosing the greener option.
Cost per wear can increase the perception of affordability for more expensive, high‐quality clothing. But of course many shoppers will still not be able to afford the higher purchase price even though they know it would make more long-term economic sense.
And cost per wear only reflects the durability of an item as one dimension of sustainability. It does not reflect ethical considerations, such as the conditions workers face in the production process, or ecological aspects such as the use of natural or synthetic fibres.
Brands and retailers must also be willing to display cost per wear labels without regulation. High-quality brands may arguably have a greater incentive to do so than fast fashion brands.
However, the concept of cost per wear is still worth pursuing. It can prompt shoppers at the point of purchase to consider a garment’s durability and how often they might wear it. And ideally, it would motivate them to ditch fast fashion and choose greener options – even if just to save money in the long run.
Lisa Eckmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Even before the US-Israel war on Iran, people in the UK were unusually vulnerable to sudden swings in the cost of energy. Depending how you count it, either 11% or 30% of households are officially energy poor, and already struggled to afford basic needs in times of relative peace.
The government’s fuel poverty strategy for England, published in January 2026, focuses on long-term measures such as home insulation upgrades. But it says little about how to protect vulnerable households quickly in this crisis or in future price shocks.
To reduce the immediate harm, ministers need tools that can be deployed now, not just reforms that may take years to deliver.
Here are three measures that could be deployed right now.
A social tariff
The most effective step would be to discount energy bills for lower-income or vulnerable households – a so-called “social tariff”.
This is often seen as difficult or politically risky. But energy remains one of the few essential services without targeted affordability support. Water and telecoms already enjoy it, and energy should be no different.
In a policy brief we published late last year, we showed that the UK electricity system hits lower-income households hardest and produces “uneven bills”. This means that two households using the same amount of electricity can face differences in bills of up to 15% depending on where they live, and another 22% depending on payment method or contract type.
Laundry costs more – or less – depending on where you live. Carlos G. Lopez / shutterstock
A social tariff would be fairer. Through a lower unit rate or a bill discount it would protect households with the least room to cut energy use – such as older people, low-income households, those with medical-related electricity needs and renters in inefficient homes.
These policies can also encourage energy efficiency. For instance, in California, the state’s Care programme discounts electricity and gas bills for low-income households up to a set level of use. Beyond that point, rates revert to normal.
This is not unrealistic administratively. Portugal introduced automatic eligibility for its social energy tariff in 2016. This used existing tax and social security data to expand the number of households receiving support by 400%.
The UK already has the data infrastructure to do something similar through its benefits and tax system – energy companies wouldn’t have to find out household incomes themselves; they could just ask the government. The near-term step here is straightforward – ministers could ask the industry regulator Ofgem and energy companies to design an automatic, income-linked tariff for winter 2026, instead of waiting for another crisis response.
Emergency support
The second priority is to reduce immediate exposure to the most volatile and expensive fuels.
Government has traditionally responded to shocks like the Ukraine war with emergency bill support. However, these ill-targeted policies are impractical and do not reduce reliance on volatile fossil fuels. Unlike a social tariff, which is a continuous means-tested support payment, emergency support is often a one-off payment. Traditionally, emergency support is a flat payment to all households, meaning those on lower incomes benefit less in relative terms, though it can also be targeted at vulnerable households.
Transport is one immediate opportunity. Rather than (yet again) freezing fuel duty, the government could redirect this money into cheaper public transport for low-income and car-dependent households.
Germany’s €9 (£8) public transport ticket, introduced in 2022 during the energy and cost-of-living crisis, shows that governments really can act quickly when necessary.
Subsidised public transport could help out people struggling with expensive energy. PintoArt / shutterstock
Households that are off the gas grid and reliant on heating oil are especially exposed when global prices rise. Alongside short-term support, like the welcome £50 million announced last week, the government should consider targeted support to switch from oil to heat pumps. The economic case for heat pumps is especially strong for households relying on heating oil. This switch would immediately reduce their exposure to oil prices.
Help households access existing savings
The third priority is to ensure vulnerable households can benefit from money-saving features that are already available in the electricity system.
The near-term priority is not new schemes, but making existing ones usable. The government could require suppliers, local authorities and landlords to prioritise smart meters and other low-carbon technologies in social housing and private rentals, where people face the greatest barriers to accessing these savings. It could also fund trusted community organisations to help households choose suitable tariffs, avoid poor deals and access support if they fall into arrears.
This may sound less dramatic than a new subsidy scheme, but clarity matters in a price shock. Households cannot benefit from cheaper tariffs or smart systems they do not know about or cannot use, so financial support often flows most to those already best placed to respond.
The UK cannot prevent global energy price shocks, but it can choose who bears its greatest burden. What is missing is political will. If the government is serious about protecting vulnerable households, it needs a strategic short-term response that matches the scale of urgency.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tony Kushner, James Parkes Professor of Jewish/non-Jewish Relations, University of Southampton
The arson attack on four ambulances in Golders Green early on March 23 has been called “a horrific antisemitic attack” by the prime minister, Keir Starmer.
These ambulances were run for the benefit of both the local Jewish and non-Jewish communities in this district of north London by a charity called Hatzola – meaning “rescue” in Hebrew. As these ambulances played a key supportive role in enabling access to health provisions for the good of all, it is especially shocking – and has further heightened the anxieties of British Jews.
This is a community still reeling after the attack on the Heaton Park Synagogue in Manchester in October 2025 on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish religious calendar, which killed two people. And the arson attack is part of a wider international wave of antisemitism, which has included Norway, the US and the Netherlands in the past few weeks. This is not an easy time to be a diaspora Jew.
Those who have carried out the attacks have come from different backgrounds. Many have been influenced by online hate emanating from Isis, and potentially individuals or groups supportive of the hardline Iranian regime. Counter-terror police are investigating whether an Iran-linked group is responsible for the arson. The terror group Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (The Islamic Movement of the People of the Right Hand) has claimed responsibility for the attack, as well as others in Europe.
These attacks reflect the complex pattern of hostility towards Jews in the UK, which has been through a mixture of domestic and foreign-inspired hatred. In terms of the latter, there are several examples going back a century which can be highlighted.
The most well-known is the Jew hatred spread by Oswald Mosley and his British Union of Fascists (BUF), formed in 1932, which was at least partly stimulated by German Nazism.
Overall, however, there are deep domestic roots of antisemitism since the readmission of the Jews in the 17th century after a 300-year expulsion. But it has rarely resulted in violent attacks – even if it has made life uncomfortable for the Jewish minority in moments of crisis.
Golders Green’s rich history
These roots can be seen in relation to Golders Green which started to develop as a place of Jewish settlement from the first world war onward. While there were some Jews in this then small suburb in the 19th century, there was not much in the way of a formal community.
Pam Fox, the social historian of Golders Green’s Jewish community, states that “Before 1910 there was just a handful of Jews living in the community, but by 1915 … there were 300 households”. Growth continued after the first world war, and in 1922 the first synagogue, Dunstan Road, was opened. Today, the Jewish population is around 8,000 and represents some 40% of the suburb’s population.
Such crude statistics do not reflect the diversity of the Jewish population both past and present. As early as the 1930s, more orthodox Jews, some of them refugees from Nazism, were establishing different forms of worship from Dunstan Road, which was more in the form of mainstream orthodox religiosity. By the second world war, there were at least 14,000 Jewish refugees in north-west London (including Golders Green), who varied from the totally secular, to reform, to the very orthodox.
After the war, there were more influxes of Jewish refugees, including from Egypt, Hungary and later South Africa, as well as second- and third-generation Jews whose origins were from eastern Europe and then the East End of London. While the very orthodox are currently the growing group in Golders Green, it still has an incredibly heterogeneous Jewish population.
For most Jews, the vibrant cultural, social and religious life of Golders Green has made it a very comfortable place to call home. Even so, there has been antisemitism – organised in the form of the BUF and more commonly in the form of more casual prejudice.
In late 1945, the Hampstead Petition Movement aimed to remove all foreign Jews from the wider area, and it had some local support. In the Nazi era, local newspapers, including the Golders Green Times, objected to the alleged bad behaviour of the Jewish refugees who were falsely accused of being unpatriotic and selfish.
Today, the idea of Golders Green being a Jewish suburb ignores the reality that most of its population is not of that background. It also forgets the many types of Jewishness that are articulated there. Such nuances are lost on those carrying out the attack on the ambulances, with their universal usage.
It says much about the times that such distinctions are not made – many people hold all Jews responsible for the actions of a particular Israeli government. Yet in Golders Green as elsewhere, Jews for both political, cultural and religious reasons hold a range of attitudes towards the problems of the Middle East. Ultimately, such attacks are, as local Jewish resident Sam Adler put it, “cynical and cowardly”. If nothing else, as with Manchester, they have also brought communities together in solidarity and resistance to the ugliness of antisemitism.
Tony Kushner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Denim is present in practically every country in the world and is widely adopted as one of the most common forms of everyday attire. Its appeal spans generations and social groups: jeans are worn worldwide by those who follow fashion and those who do not, by people seeking to stand out and by those who prefer to blend in. However, many of us have never found the perfect pair.
Although denim has been produced since the 16th century, its association with American culture and durable workwear emerged during the Californian gold rush of the 1850s. It was during this time that Levi’s – now arguably the most recognisable denim brand – was established.
Levi Strauss, an immigrant entrepreneur who arrived in California from Bavaria in the 1850s, opened a dry goods business catering to miners. One of his customers, the tailor Jacob Davis, developed the innovative use of metal rivets to reinforce stress points in work trousers, making them more durable. Strauss and Davis jointly patented this technique, and the Levi’s brand was born.
Blue jeans were originally a seen as symbol of labourers (like the miners) and they also gained a strong association with cowboys. In the decades that followed, denim jeans evolved from practical workwear into one of the most iconic and enduring symbols of global fashion and culture. Film stars such as Marlon Brando and James Dean popularised the jeans and t-shirt look to a young generation in the 1950s. These films personified motorcycle-loving nonconformists, and 1950s Hollywood embraced denim as the garment of rebellion.
Today, the cultural significance of denim jeans has moved beyond early associations with workwear, the cowboy and the teenage rebel, to become a staple worn by people of all ages and backgrounds.
Finding the perfect pair
Denim jeans are often seen as a problematic fashion product in terms of sustainability, because their production leaves a considerable environmental footprint.
Cheap prices on the high street can encourage consumers to treat denim products as short-term items, reducing their lifespan. Cotton, which is commonly the main fabric for denim, is incredibly water intensive; the production of one pair of jeans uses approximately 7,500 litres of water.
Different components involved in the making of a single pair of jeans, such as denim, thread, cotton and buttons, can originate from different countries all over the world. This raises questions regarding the environmental costs involved in the production process. Further issues include that jeans are often not made from single fibre materials and therefore cannot be recycled.
Adding to sustainability concerns, at the consumer level, the perfect pair of jeans remains an elusive concept. But in a recently published book chapter, I explain that the perfect pair of jeans is elusive for a reason. Jeans have to be correct for the individual wearer in terms of comfort, social and personal identity, and also the complexity of fit.
Previous reports have focused on women’s struggle to find jeans that fit and are flattering. The inability to find the perfect pair of jeans may encourage overconsumption, due to repeated purchasing based on poor fit.
My research shows that this is an issue which applies to all genders. The men I spoke to noted how they resented paying a higher price for brands like Levi’s, so spent less by purchasing cheap, high street alternatives. This attitude can lead to overconsumption, as low price points achieved through low-quality production often compromise product longevity.
This demonstrates the perpetuating cycle of fast fashion, driven by cheap, low-quality production, and contradicts the original purpose of jeans of being highly durable and having longevity. The combination of highly environmentally damaging production processes with overconsumption results in even greater environmental harm.
Retailers can make efforts to reduce the trend of overconsumption with better fitting garments. However, fit is a complex issue for retailers as well as consumers. For the retailer, producing jeans in a wide range of sizes and styles is often not cost effective, and complex sizing systems can also confuse the consumer.
Technology could provide future solutions to improving the accuracy of fit. Personalised virtual fitting, made possible through improvements in 3D human shape recognition, could ensure improved fit for the consumer. This would benefit online shoppers, although the technology does remain in its infancy, and is yet to be adopted by major online fashion retailers. Virtual fitting rooms also cannot replicate the feeling of denim next to the skin, so although the fit may be perfect, comfort could be compromised.
Ultimately, the enduring challenge of finding the “perfect pair” of jeans highlights not only the garment’s cultural significance but also the opportunity for the fashion industry – and consumers – to move toward more sustainable, better-fitting and more thoughtfully designed denim for the future.
Rose Marroncelli does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Approximately one month into the Iran war, public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic is decidedly opposed to this conflict. A recent CBS/YouGov poll shows that 60% of the public oppose military action against Iran, as do a similar percentage in the UK: 59%.
As a political scientist who studies public attitudes about foreign policy and the use of force, my research addresses an important question: under what conditions do people support military action? Based on this research, the widespread opposition to American military action against Iran is completely understandable, as the action lacks the usual foundations for support from domestic as well as international audiences.
Decades of research in political science show that broad support for use of the military rests on three key pillars: purpose, likelihood of success and legitimacy. When these elements are present, support can be high. It can even be maintained in the face of significant costs, both financial and in terms of lives lost. When they are absent, support tends to be weak, polarised and prone to erosion.
At present, these key ingredients are missing.
What’s the objective?
First and foremost, the Trump administration’s strategic rationale remains poorly articulated. Public support for military action is strongly tied to policy goals. When citizens believe force is being used to prevent a clear and immediate danger, they are far more likely to support it. But the US has not made the case that Iran was close to achieving a nuclear weapon – or posed other imminent threats for that matter. The CBS/YouGov poll confirmed that the public does not believe the rationale for war has been convincingly articulated – by a count of 68% to 32%.
In the first few days of the bombing, US president Donald Trump strongly advocated regime change as a reason for the war. But among voters there is little appetite to change another country’s domestic politics. A majority thinks this is not important, although now it has started, a small majority of respondents (53%) felt it would be a mistake to leave the regime in power. It’s a big political risk though – American voters don’t have to cast their memories back far to think of unsuccessful regime change missions.
What does winning look like?
The ambiguity surrounding mission goals complicates the second key element: what constitutes success? Airstrikes can damage nuclear facilities or disrupt Iran’s ballistic weapons programme. But they can’t eliminate the scientific knowledge or technical know-how which will enable to regime to rebuild. And, clearly, if previous strikes were as decisive as the US president, Donald Trump, has claimed, the current action would be unnecessary. The rest of the world knows that too.
The same question about what qualifies as success also applies to regime change. Killing the leadership is one thing, but creating a stable government that breaks from the Islamic revolution and protects American interests is quite another. The essential nature of politics is that there are competing factions, which will want to build or maintain governmental structures that advantage those interests. The the type of government Iran might adopt under a regime change scenario – and which faction(s) will control the levers of domestic power – are two dramatic unknowns.
Any plan to completely disempower the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would risk a re-run of the disastrous de-Baathification strategy after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Leaving the IRGC even partially in power leaves the civilian population at continued risk and would hardly make it easier to achieve American aims – whatever they may be. As we’re still seeing in Libya, a power struggle between factions is unlikely to produce the sort of result the region – and the wider world – want to see.
Is this a legitimate war?
Finally, there are severe concerns regarding the legitimacy of the war. Citizens rely on cues from their political leaders and institutions to inform their view about the use of force. The Trump administration had not made a sustained case for the need for military action before the war, nor has it secured Congressional authorisation or bipartisan support. There is no clear domestic consensus supporting the use of force.
Not only is there no clear signal of legitimacy domestically, the same is true internationally. Multilateral backing — especially through institutions such as the United Nations security council — has historically played an important legitimising role (especially to reassure domestic audiences who want a second opinion). This is is absent here – in fact, key US allies have expressed their opposition. The UK’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, has declared military action against Iran is “not our war”, language remarkably similar to that of Germany’s defence minister, Boris Pistorius. Having foregone building international support prior to the use of force, the US is now struggling for support from allies — particularly when it comes to protecting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
None of this means the operation will be uniformly unpopular. Partisan attachment is also important: those who back the administration are likely to view the operation more favourably. Accordingly, a majority of Republicans (84%) support the action, though there is a strong divide between Maga (92%) and non-Maga (70%) Republicans.
Meanwhile, Democrats (92%) and independents (69%) overwhelmingly disapprove of the conflict, so domestic support for the conflict is extremely narrow. The factors that sustain backing beyond a president’s core supporters — perceived necessity with clear strategic goals, confidence in eventual success of the mission, and legitimacy conferred by domestic or international institutions — are conspicuously absent.
Over time, events on the ground may change how the public views the conflict. Iranian efforts to expand the scope of conflict – particularly when directed at US allies – could swing support towards the American action. Or, a unified Iranian opposition could quickly coalesce on who and what replaces the Islamic Republic government. These are just two possibilities seen through rose-tinted spectacles – frankly, developments that complicate America’s position seem just as likely.
Without significant changes in clarity of goal, verifiable indicators of success, or signals of legitimacy from persuasive actors outside the administration, support will diminish. But the consequences are graver than the domestic popularity of an American military operation. Sidelining institutional constraints – such as Congressional authorisation and international institutions – erodes limits on the use of force.
When the US ignores these constraints, it invites other countries to do the same, resulting in a more unstable and insecure world.
Jason Reifler has received funding for research examining public opinion about foreign policy and the use of military force from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK), Volkswagen Stiftung, and National Science Foundation (US).
*Furor teutonicus* représente la bataille de Teutobourg, en l’an 9 de notre ère. Dans une forêt de l’Allemagne actuelle, trois légions romaines tombent dans une embuscade mise en place par une coalition de tribus germaniques et sont massacrées. Paja Jovanović, 1888
La guerre asymétrique, formule devenue omniprésente depuis quelques décennies dans les analyses des conflits contemporains, est en réalité un phénomène aussi ancien que la guerre elle-même. Partout, toujours, des belligérants moins puissants que leurs adversaires ont cherché à employer les moyens les plus variés pour venir à bout de leurs ennemis plus nombreux et mieux équipés.
L’asymétrie fait désormais partie du vocabulaire des états-majors et des autorités politiques engagées sur des théâtres extérieurs. Les publications sur le sujet se sont également fortement multipliées depuis quelques années, et la guerre menée par les États-Unis et Israël contre l’Iran a confirmé, depuis février 2026, l’importance de ce phénomène.
Le terme est désormais tellement utilisé qu’on en oublierait presque qu’il était, il y a encore quelques années, totalement inconnu du grand public, et à peine mentionné dans les cercles d’experts. La situation a fortement changé avec ce que de nombreux observateurs qualifient de période post-guerre froide, née sur les ruines du World Trade Center en septembre 2001, et en marge de la guerre contre le terrorisme et des conflits de basse intensité opposant des puissances à des acteurs beaucoup plus faibles, qu’ils soient étatiques ou non.
Pourtant, ce type de conflit est bien plus ancien que les interventions des forces des États-Unis et de leurs alliés en Afghanistan en 2001 et en Irak en 2003.
Définition de la guerre asymétrique
Étymologiquement inscrite dans la négation, l’asymétrie est indissociable de la symétrie, mais aussi de la dissymétrie, moins souvent évoquée, dont elle se distingue cependant assez nettement. La symétrie caractérise la « juste proportion », notamment en matière d’architecture. Ainsi, la symétrie suppose au moins deux éléments pouvant être comparés. L’asymétrie est l’absence volontaire de symétrie, et la dissymétrie est un défaut de symétrie – généralement par erreur, mais cela peut être volontaire dans certains cas. Dans ces conditions, l’asymétrie semble plus catégorique que la dissymétrie, car la « juste proportion » y est absente et ne peut pas être corrigée.
Au niveau stratégique, la symétrie est perçue comme le combat à armes égales ; la dissymétrie est la recherche par l’un des combattants d’une supériorité qualitative et/ou quantitative (on parle ici de « stratégie du fort au faible ») ; et l’asymétrie correspond à la démarche inverse, qui consiste à exploiter toutes les faiblesses de l’adversaire pour être le plus nuisible possible.
En s’appuyant sur le constat d’un déséquilibre capacitaire, l’asymétrie est donc une stratégie du faible au fort qui consiste à refuser les règles du combat imposées par l’adversaire et à contourner ses forces, rendant ainsi toutes les opérations totalement imprévisibles.
Cela suppose à la fois l’utilisation de forces non prévues à cet effet et surtout insoupçonnables (comme les civils) ; d’armes contre lesquelles les moyens de défense ne sont pas toujours adaptés (dernièrement, les drones) ; de méthodes situées hors du cadre de la guerre conventionnelle (guérilla, terrorisme) ; de lieux d’affrontement imprévisibles (centres-villes, lieux publics) ; et de l’effet de surprise, cette dernière caractéristique étant sans doute la plus importante, car elle permet de réduire le déséquilibre entre les belligérants.
Employant des moyens techniquement simples, l’asymétrie peut ainsi être assimilée à l’« arme du pauvre », dans la mesure où elle permet à de multiples acteurs ne disposant que de moyens très limités d’avoir une capacité de nuisance totalement disproportionnée.
Il est également possible que des acteurs puissants optent délibérément pour une stratégie de guerre asymétrique, confondant même ce concept avec celui de « génie militaire », comme si celui-ci supposait finalement le triomphe au-delà de toutes les espérances, le niveau des forces engagées étant très faible en comparaison aux résultats obtenus. Dès lors qu’elle peut être privilégiée par le faible comme par le fort, la guerre asymétrique est ainsi une ruse déployée à une échelle pouvant varier.
Alternative par défaut ou par choix à une confrontation frontale dite traditionnelle, et réponse à la recherche de dissymétrie par les puissants, la guerre asymétrique se généralise. Compte tenu de l’improbabilité de guerres entre les grandes puissances et de l’implication quasi systématique de ces dernières dans des confrontations entre des acteurs plus faibles, la question de savoir si tous les conflits contemporains sont par nature des guerres asymétriques mérite a minima d’être posée.
La stratégie du faible au fort
La notion de guerre asymétrique trouve dans l’histoire de multiples exemples de sa mise en application, tant au niveau stratégique que tactique.
Sur tous les continents, de nombreux cas nous permettent de vérifier en grandeur nature les résultats obtenus par le choix de l’asymétrie dans des conflits armés. Détail important, il convient de noter que les moyens asymétriques ont été utilisés à la fois par des États et par des groupes non étatiques, quelle que soit leur importance. Mais une chose est certaine : l’asymétrie n’est pas un fait nouveau.
Les empires ne purent s’y soustraire – les barbares qui pillèrent Rome et les révoltés à plusieurs époques dans l’histoire de Chine disposaient de moyens nettement inférieurs à ceux de leurs adversaires – et certaines grandes batailles offrirent même l’occasion aux faibles de vaincre les forts là où les rapports de force ne leur laissaient a priori pas la moindre chance – la victoire écrasante des Anglais sur la chevalerie française à Azincourt en 1415 est sans doute l’exemple le plus significatif, mais il n’est pas isolé.
De manière répétitive et sur des théâtres très différents, on relève la même équation : là où les empires, les royaumes les plus riches et les plus puissants ont voulu exploiter leur supériorité pour s’imposer durablement, leurs adversaires ont développé par défaut des stratagèmes leur permettant de contourner les moyens de cette puissance. C’est ainsi que, tout au long de l’histoire, se sont mises en place des guerres asymétriques, les adversaires étant au final rarement au même niveau.
Seules les batailles du XIXᵉ siècle, inaugurées lors des campagnes napoléoniennes et organisées sur les bases définies par Carl von Clausewitz (introduisant le concept de victoire écrasante en opposition aux « guerres en dentelle » des XVIIᵉ et XVIIIᵉ siècles), et plus encore la Première Guerre mondiale ont été l’occasion d’assister à des guerres réellement symétriques, dans lesquelles les belligérants étaient de force presque égale et ne devaient leur victoire qu’à des circonstances particulières et/ou au génie tactique de leurs généraux. Parfois, ces batailles s’éternisaient, aucun des combattants n’étant en mesure de prendre le dessus, les tactiques et les moyens utilisés étant, approximativement, les mêmes de part et d’autre.
Les déséquilibres capacitaires hérités de la révolution industrielle, des guerres de colonisation et de la décolonisation marquèrent le retour de l’opposition du fort au faible (guerre dissymétrique), et l’utilisation par ce dernier de stratégies de contournement avec des résultats parfois surprenants pour y répondre (guerre asymétrique).
Les guerres d’Algérie et du Vietnam, la résistance à l’occupation soviétique de l’Afghanistan, l’opération en Somalie, la guerre de Tchétchénie ou encore la campagne menée au Kosovo – ou plus exactement les tactiques de camouflage et de leurres observées sur le terrain dans les rangs des forces serbes – sont des exemples plus récents de guerre asymétrique. Cette manière de faire la guerre est contraire aux règles chevaleresques au Moyen Âge, au respect des conventions sociales pendant les siècles modernes, et à une certaine idée de l’éthique et du droit de la guerre dans les périodes plus récentes. En clair, la guerre asymétrique fut longtemps diabolisée et assimilée en Occident à des pratiques indignes des États.
De la Bible aux Mongols, en passant par Sun Tzu
Dans la tradition occidentale, l’origine mythologique de l’asymétrie est cependant plus glorifiante, et peut être attribuée à l’épisode biblique du jeune David, triomphant du Philistin Goliath aux abords de Jérusalem. Face à un géant, disposant par ailleurs d’armes puissantes, le jeune berger s’est servi de son génie pour éviter le combat, utilisant une simple fronde et frappant mortellement son adversaire à la tête. Le rapport de force était totalement déséquilibré, et c’est pourtant le plus faible qui a triomphé. La Bible mentionne que, « ainsi, avec une fronde et une pierre, David fut plus fort que le Philistin ; il le terrassa et lui ôta la vie, sans avoir d’épée à la main ».
Ce combat symbolise la victoire de la bravoure face aux moyens, et de l’intelligence face à la force physique. Dès lors, les fidèles comprennent que, si la cause qu’ils défendent est juste, peu importe les moyens dont ils disposent, ils pourront parvenir à leurs fins pour vaincre leurs adversaires. Pour devenir roi, plus besoin d’être puissant, du moins au vu des critères traditionnels. Seuls comptent le génie et l’aptitude à vaincre n’importe quel type d’adversaire. L’asymétrie est ainsi perçue comme un moyen de récompenser les mérites quand la force brute ne le permet pas, mais elle n’est pas considérée comme un choix stratégique.
Tandis que l’asymétrie correspondait, dans la civilisation occidentale, à une intervention divine offrant la ruse au jeune David, s’est développée en Asie orientale une véritable pensée stratégique proposant l’asymétrie comme moyen de guerre. Au VIᵉ siècle avant notre ère, une époque où la Chine traversait la période chaotique dite des « royaumes combattants », Sun Tzu s’est penché sur les meilleurs stratagèmes permettant de limiter ses propres dégâts, tout en multipliant ceux de l’adversaire, même si celui-ci est plus fort. Sa pensée – dont l’objectif est de faire croire à l’adversaire qu’il maîtrise la situation de manière à pouvoir le duper plus facilement – s’est répandue en Asie orientale, puis progressivement dans le reste du monde.
Après l’œuvre de Sun Tzu, de nombreux autres théoriciens chinois se lancèrent dans la rédaction d’études sur la guerre. Shang Yang, contemporain de Sun Tzu, et sa guerre défensive, ou Sima Qian (fin du IIᵉ siècle avant notre ère) et ses biographies des généraux marquèrent ainsi l’histoire de la guerre dans la civilisation chinoise, avec la nécessité de miser sur les stratégies de contournement quand les conditions de la victoire ne sont pas remplies.
Pour les théoriciens chinois de la guerre, si la victoire reste l’objectif ultime, comme en Occident, les moyens pour y parvenir sont multiples, et passent notamment par la patience et l’analyse rigoureuse des forces et des faiblesses de l’adversaire. Dès lors, même le faible a ses chances contre le fort, à condition de savoir refuser le combat quand celui-ci est perdu d’avance, et de porter ses attaques au bon moment et au bon endroit.
Sun Tzu fut également l’un des premiers stratèges à s’interroger sur « ce qu’il faut avoir prévu avant le combat », faisant des préparatifs et du renseignement l’une des clés de la victoire. Pour lui, un général doit savoir cinq choses avant de s’engager dans la bataille : 1) savoir s’il peut combattre et quand il faut cesser ; 2) savoir s’il faut engager peu ou beaucoup ; 3) savoir gré aux simples soldats autant qu’aux officiers ; 4) savoir mettre à profit toutes les circonstances ; 5) savoir que le souverain approuve tout ce qui est fait pour son service et sa gloire.
Ces différentes recommandations sont particulièrement entendues des acteurs asymétriques, qui comprennent qu’elles doivent impérativement être remplies, d’abord dans un but de survie, et le cas échéant afin de remporter le combat.
L’islam des premiers temps fut de son côté également caractérisé par la stratégie indirecte d’un peuple disposant de moyens rudimentaires, mais parvenant rapidement à vaincre ses adversaires et à étendre son influence. Les Mongols, face à un empire chinois infiniment plus peuplé et nettement plus avancé, mais aussi les Ottomans et les peuples d’Afrique, notamment face aux conquérants occidentaux, développèrent également des stratégies asymétriques avec des résultats spectaculaires.
De la guérilla aux conflits contemporains
C’est avec la guérilla et les théories qui y sont associées puis, plus récemment, avec le terrorisme transnational dont les puissances firent les frais que la guerre asymétrique est progressivement revenue en vogue en Occident.
De l’Espagne dominée par l’empire napoléonien à Che Guevara, en passant par Lawrence d’Arabie ou Mao Zedong, les moyens de guerre proposés dans le cadre de la guérilla sont totalement asymétriques. C’est en s’infiltrant au sein même des territoires adverses qu’ils obtiennent des succès, pas en s’attaquant frontalement à des forces armées supérieures en nombre et en matériel.
La guérilla s’est immédiatement imposée comme l’arme du faible, voire de l’inculte en matière militaire, face au soldat professionnel bien armé, bien entraîné et mené par un général instruit. La guérilla fut aussi et surtout théorisée, sur la base des expériences et des testaments de ces acteurs. Le plus célèbre de ces « nouveaux testaments » de l’asymétrie est incontestablement la Guerre de guérilla, écrit par Che Guevara en 1959, dans lequel est démontré qu’une armée populaire peut battre une armée régulière, quels que soient les moyens dont les « combattants de la liberté » disposent. Guevara considérait qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de s’appuyer sur une large base, mais qu’un petit foyer ou un petit groupe d’idéalistes en armes, établi loin des villes, peut entraîner l’adhésion de tous les mécontents et des révolutionnaires.
Le terrorisme peut-il de son côté être considéré comme une manifestation de guerre asymétrique ? Indiscutablement, l’invisibilité et le caractère imprévisible des attaques terroristes sont asymétriques, car ils se caractérisent par la faiblesse des moyens engagés. Le terrorisme transnational apparaît ainsi comme le degré ultime de la guerre asymétrique, car il s’intègre à l’intérieur même des sociétés qu’il combat, ce qui le rend d’autant plus difficile à détecter et à prévenir.
Le terrorisme transnational et le risque qu’il fait peser sur la sécurité dans les sociétés contemporaines fut à l’origine du regain d’intérêt pour les guerres asymétriques, et c’est sans surprise que, après 2001, ce concept a fait une entrée fracassante dans les réflexions des états-majors, au point d’inspirer des innovations stratégiques, comme la contre-insurrection déployée en Irak, avec des résultats mitigés mais qui confirment une nécessaire adaptation du fort aux pratiques du faible.
Un type de guerre qui n’est pas près de disparaître
La fin de la bipolarité a ouvert le champ à des formes de conflits restées relativement silencieuses tout au long du XXᵉ siècle, dans sa deuxième partie surtout, opposant des adversaires aux moyens limités, soit des États faibles, soit des acteurs non étatiques, et consacrant ainsi ce que certains analystes qualifièrent de « retournement du monde ». Ce regain de violence a poussé Washington, seule superpuissance rescapée de la guerre froide, à s’interroger sur les menaces dont les États-Unis (et par extension le « monde » dans son ensemble) pourraient désormais faire l’objet.
Dans un contexte marqué par une remise en cause de plus en plus prononcée de la puissance américaine, tant dans ses aspects politico-diplomatiques que militaires (les expériences de l’Irak et de l’Afghanistan ont renforcé ce phénomène), la guerre asymétrique semble avoir de beaux jours devant elle et impacte ainsi considérablement les conflits contemporains. Le cas de l’opération menée par Israël et les États-Unis en Iran vient le confirmer.
Barthélémy Courmont ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
You’re scheduled for surgery next week. You’ve likely looked up your surgeon’s credentials, years of experience and perhaps even patient reviews. You want reassurance that your surgeon has steady hands, deep expertise and a thorough command of the procedure. Technical skills feels like the thing that matters most.
But there’s another question most patients never think to ask: How well does your surgeon lead a team?
It might sound like an odd thing to consider, but in the operating room, surgery is rarely a solo act. Surgeons work alongside anesthesiologists, nurses and medical residents who must co-ordinate closely, often under intense pressure, to deliver care.
When something unexpected happens and the team needs to pivot quickly, how a surgeon leads matters in ways most patients rarely see or even think about.
Despite decades of evidence showing the benefits of inspiring, people-focused leadership, those qualities alone were not enough in complex, high-stakes operations where conditions can change rapidly.
Two different leadership styles
Leadership researchers have long distinguished between two main approaches to leading teams: transformational and directive leadership.
Transformational leadership is people-focused, meaning it emphasizes inspiration, building trust, encouraging open communication and helping people feel valued and motivated.
Directive leadership is task-focused. It involves giving clear instructions, co-ordinating actions, enforcing procedures and ensuring everyone knows their role in real time.
Transformational leadership has been widely studied and positively linked with better team performance, stronger morale and improved outcomes across many workplace settings. As a result, it is often examined on its own as a driver of effective leadership.
But our research suggests the picture is more complicated in environments where the stakes are high.
Complexity changes everything
Not all surgeries are alike.
Some procedures are relatively routine and predictable. An appendectomy, for example, typically follows established protocols with predictable demands and roles. In these situations, everyone on the team knows what to do and when to do it.
But surgeries don’t always go according to plan.
A routine surgery can suddenly become complicated if a patient becomes unstable, while more complex procedures may involve unexpected challenges from the start.
In these moments, the usual script may no longer be enough to guide the team. This is when leadership becomes far more important.
Situational leadership
To make sense of this, we drew on a concept from psychology called situational strength — how much a situation provides information about appropriate or desirable behaviour.
Routine surgeries are considered “strong situations.” Protocols, prior training, roles and expectations are so clear that the situation itself largely guides behaviour with little-to-no leadership required.
More complex or unpredictable surgeries can create “weak situations.” Protocols may not fully cover what’s unfolding. Roles become ambiguous and prior training no longer suffices. The team needs real-time guidance on what to prioritize, who should act and how to co-ordinate under pressure.
In these moments, leadership becomes critical precisely because the situation no longer provides all the answers.
Our research found that during these high-complexity moments, the benefits of transformational leadership only emerged when it was combined with directive leadership.
When surgeons paired people-focused leadership with task-focused leadership, their teams reported feeling significantly safer about speaking up, raising concerns and flagging problems as they arose, otherwise known as psychological safety.
More reported errors can signal better care
One of the more counter-intuitive findings involved surgical errors. Teams that reported higher psychological safety actually had more observed errors during surgery, not fewer.
At first glance, that sounds like worse performance. In reality, it may signal the opposite.
And our data support this interpretation: teams with higher psychological safety had fewer severe complications after patients were discharged. More errors caught earlier and corrected in the operating room meant better outcomes beyond it.
But a closer look reveals that many programs focus on developing a single leadership style or approach rather than helping surgeons learn how to flexibly combine different leadership behaviours as situations change.
Our findings suggest this flexibility matters.
This has implications well beyond the operating room. Financial trading floors, emergency response teams, military units and any environment where conditions shift rapidly and errors carry serious consequences all share the same basic challenge for leaders.
The leaders who perform best in these environments don’t master one leadership style. Rather, they learn to combine and adapt approaches when it matters most.
Steve Granger receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Julian Barling receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Borden Chair of Leader at the Smith School of Business.
Michaela Scanlon receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Nick Turner receives research funding from Cenovus Energy Inc., Haskayne School of Business’s Future Fund, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).
Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre, head of Canada’s official opposition, recently became the first Canadian political leader to appear on the controversial Joe Rogan Experience podcast.
Poilievre had been asked to sit for an interview with Rogan amid the federal election campaign in April 2025, but was reportedly advised by his team to pass since Rogan was, and remains, a polarizing and contentious figure. Nonetheless, Rogan’s podcast is one of the world’s longest running, averaging 11 million listeners per episode and ranked No. 1 globally on Spotify in 2025.
Whether his efforts worked remains to be seen, but could there be unintended consequences to Poilievre’s appearance on the podcast? Did he spread any harmful disinformation about Canada and North America to a massive audience that, while possibly popular among his base, could be detrimental to Canadians in general?
Our findings show that manosphere influencers spread toxic content about marginalized populations, including dangerous misinformation about health, politics, immigration and the environment. The Joe Rogan Experience is part of this ecosystem.
While recent coverage of the podcast episode in news media has focused on tariffs, Canada-U.S. relations and a shared love of fitness, we found misinformation on immigration, the health and environmental consequences of Alberta’s oilsands, seed oils, safer drug supply measures and the causes of inflation.
1. Immigration
Poilievre, citing no evidence, told Rogan that Canada admits one million immigrants per year.
But information from the Canadian government website shows that targets for temporary residents — students and work visa holders — make up 385,000 people for 2026, while permanent resident targets are at 380,000 people. Combined, that’s significantly fewer than the number cited by Poilievre.
Inflating immigration numbers is a known rhetorical tactic in far-right online spaces, where it functions to fuel anxieties about demographic change. Repeating it on a platform with millions of listeners legitimizes a distortion that creates division and harms racialized communities.
Canada’s immigration system is not without criticism and immigrants often face challenges. (Unsplash)
2. Oilsands
Poilievre told Rogan that Alberta’s oilsands have very few health or environmental consequences, stating that it has “no impact to groundwater … no impact to the environment” and that people who live near the oilsands are “very healthy.”
But a 2024 report on the Athabasca oilsands released by scientists at the University of British Columbia suggest significant environmental and health impacts from the oilsands, meaning that, at best, Poilievre oversold the safety of oil development. His characterizations don’t reflect scientific research and they sideline those most affected.
One of Rogan’s favourite topics is health and diet, so it wasn’t surprising to hear him discuss seed oils with Poilievre. They talked about how beef tallow or butter is better for people’s health than foods made from seed oils.
Canada is also the largest exporter of canola oil in the world, so when Poilievre failed to push back against Rogan’s health misinformation, he tacitly supported an idea that harms the very trade he was purportedly aiming to bolster with his appearance on the podcast.
Poilievre told Rogan that inflation during and following the COVID-19 pandemic was a direct result of the previous Liberal government’s actions. He said:
“Like back during COVID when all these governments were printing money and all the politicians and bankers said ‘Oh, this is great. Well, look at all this money we get to spend.’ I’d walk around communities and I’d have like mechanics say, you know, we’re going to have inflation. And I would say, yeah, it makes sense to me… And sure enough, all that money filtered into the economy, bid up all the goods we buy, and everybody got smoked with higher prices.”
Does it matter if Poilievre is spreading misinformation about Canada on Rogan’s podcast? We believe it does.
Poilievre aspires to become prime minister and should aim to lead the country in ways that benefit all Canadians, including canola farmers, immigrants, people who use drugs and the communities that are currently polluted by oil development.
Making false accusations about drug-related crime or unmitigated drug trafficking reinforces the case for greater governmental oversight of citizens. It also justifies, to some extent, the false narratives cited by the U.S. in its retaliatory actions against Canada, including tariffs.
By promoting politically expedient misinformation on a show like Joe Rogan’s, Poilievre risks eroding Canadians’ shared understanding of public health, environmental challenges and social cohesion — all issues he should be working to address.
At a time when democratic communication is strained by misinformation and deepening polarization, Canadians should expect better from their political leaders, regardless of party.
Jaigris Hodson receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Brianna I. Wiens receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Nick Ruest receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Shana MacDonald receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Source: The Conversation – in French – By Octave Moreau, Doctorant au laboratoire Histoire Territoires Mémoires (Histémé), Université de Caen Normandie
En Ukraine, en Palestine ou dans le golfe Persique, la guerre aérienne est au centre des conflits contemporains. Expérimentée lors de la Grande Guerre et dans les colonies puis systématisée, sans succès, lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale afin d’y mettre rapidement fin en faisant chuter les régimes bombardés, l’arme aérienne a cependant toujours été pensée comme une arme de destruction contre les populations civiles.
Depuis le 28 février 2026 et le déclenchement de la guerre israélo-américaine contre l’Iran, les populations civiles sont les premières victimes du conflit. Le bilan s’élève déjà, a minima, à 2 000 personnes tuées, dont quelque 150 écolières de la ville de Minab, dans le sud du pays.
Cette situation n’est pas une exception. En effet, les conflits de ces dernières années – notamment en Ukraine et en Palestine – sont avant tout des guerres aériennes. À rebours de la rhétorique militariste qui affirme que les bombardements sont de plus en plus « précis », ces conflits s’inscrivent dans l’histoire de la guerre aérienne où ce sont, en premier lieu, les civils qui sont tués par les bombes.
Une arme de destruction massive pour la paix universelle ?
L’aéronef tel que dessiné et imaginé par Francesco Lana de Terzi. Wikimédia
L’imaginaire qui entoure l’arme aérienne est, historiquement, celui d’une arme de destruction massive, pouvant raser des villes et anéantir des populations entières. En 1670, par exemple, Francesco Lana de Terzi, un jésuite et naturaliste italien, alors qu’il proposait un projet d’aéronef sur le modèle d’un bateau volant, met en garde ses contemporains sur les capacités de destruction d’une telle machine.
La montgolfière de 1783 des frères Montgolfier. Wikimedia
Un siècle plus tard, l’invention des frères Montgolfier permet à l’être humain de s’élever dans le ciel. Dans la foule, Heyne, un lieutenant du génie prussien, est impressionné par les capacités militaires qu’offre la montgolfière, mais il est persuadé que, comme tous les pays belligérants seront soumis au même risque de destruction, « on va s’entendre rapidement sur des règles empêchant l’utilisation des aérostats comme instruments de terreur ».
Au XIXᵉ siècle, les progrès de l’aviation – la montgolfière s’avère finalement trop compliquée à diriger pour pouvoir bombarder – font naître l’espoir d’une paix universelle. En effet, certains intellectuels, comme Victor Hugo par exemple, croient que l’aviation permettra de mettre en relation les différents peuples de la planète et rendra obsolète la guerre, puisque tous les pays auront la capacité de détruire et pourront être détruits par l’arme aérienne. Cette doctrine s’apparente à la pax atomica qui allait régir la seconde moitié du XXᵉ siècle.
Cet imaginaire est renforcé, à la fin du XIXᵉ et au début du XXᵉ siècle, par la publication de nombreux ouvrages futuristes où la paix universelle n’est atteinte qu’après des guerres aériennes internationales contre des peuples considérés comme « inférieurs ». C’est par exemple le cas dans The Last War or the Triumph of the English Tongue (1898), de Samuel W. Odell, où les États-Unis bombardent, avec « un feu qui ne peut être éteint », les populations non anglophones afin de créer les États-Unis du monde et garantir « la paix éternelle ».
Les premiers bombardements et le tournant de la Grande Guerre
Loin de garantir une paix universelle, le premier bombardement de l’histoire apportera la démonstration que l’arme aérienne permet la pleine réalisation de la guerre totale.
Le 1er novembre 1911, Guilio Gavotti, chargé d’une mission de reconnaissance, décide de se munir d’une bombe et de la larguer sur l’oasis d’Aïn Zara, où, la veille, il avait repéré un attroupement de combattants. Toutefois, au-delà d’être un lieu de rassemblement potentiel pour insurgés, la petite oasis, située à une quinzaine de kilomètres de Tripoli, est surtout un système économique et social, un lieu de vie pour la population civile. Dès lors, en plus d’inscrire dans le réel une nouvelle arme pour faire la guerre, Gavotti instaure également un nouveau type de cible : une cible hybride où se mêlent indistinctement les objectifs militaires et la population civile.
Durant la Grande Guerre, l’aviation s’impose progressivement comme une arme indispensable. D’abord outil de reconnaissance, elle permet également d’attaquer des cibles au-delà du front : des infrastructures militaires, mais également les villes comme Paris, Rouen, Londres…
Le 1er avril 1918, au Royaume-Uni, est créée la première force aérienne indépendante : la Royal Air Force (RAF). Cependant, dès la fin de la « Der des ders », la RAF doit prouver son utilité, garante de son indépendance. C’est ainsi que, après le traumatisme de la guerre des tranchées, l’aviation se présente comme une arme capable de préserver la vie des soldats… au détriment de celles des civils. Elle doit donc permettre à la couronne britannique de maintenir l’ordre dans ses colonies sans avoir besoin d’envoyer des troupes au sol, grâce à des opérations de « police bombing ». C’est cette doctrine qui est encore en vigueur aujourd’hui lorsque des États (les États-Unis ou Israël, par exemple) veulent maintenir ou imposer leur ordre international sans risquer la vie de leurs soldats.
Durant l’entre-deux-guerres, les forces coloniales, ne pouvant atteindre directement les insurgés qui se dissimulaient facilement dans la nature, visent les espaces socio-économiques des populations colonisées pour annihiler la contestation. Le 18 octobre 1925, par exemple, en réponse à l’insurrection syrienne contre l’empire colonial, l’aviation française bombarde les quartiers musulmans de Damas. Ces différents éléments illustrent également la dimension structurellement raciste de l’arme aérienne qui est d’abord massivement utilisée contre les populations considérées comme « non civilisées » et pouvant donc être bombardées.
Depuis la première convention de La Haye de 1899, signée à l’issue de la première Conférence pour la paix, les populations civiles européennes sont effectivement, en théorie, protégées contre le risque de bombardements. Toutefois, les puissances coloniales refusent que l’arme aérienne soit définitivement interdite afin de ne pas entraver leur capacité d’innovation militaire. Les bombardements aériens sont ainsi considérés comme légitimes – y compris lorsqu’ils atteignent des civils – uniquement s’ils sont dirigés contre un objectif militaire.
En plus de préserver la vie des soldats au détriment de celles des civils, la puissance de l’arme aérienne repose sur un – supposé (car il n’est confirmé par aucune étude scientifique) – facteur psychologique. En effet, selon Hugh Trenchard, fondateur de la RAF et théoricien de la guerre aérienne, « l’effet moral d’un bombardement est vingt fois plus important que les effets matériels ». Il espère même que les bombardements pousseront les populations à se révolter et à renverser leur gouvernement. Dès lors, ce postulat – qui structure encore aujourd’hui la guerre aérienne – nécessite de bombarder les villes et donc les civils.
Cette certitude est renforcée par Giulo Douhet, théoricien de l’arme aérienne, qui affirme en 1921 dans la Guerre de l’air, que « par sa capacité de destruction quasiment illimitée, elle peut décider à elle seule de l’issue d’une guerre », reprenant l’imaginaire qui entoure l’arme aérienne depuis sa genèse. C’est ainsi que, afin de rester en adéquation avec le droit international, les forces aériennes élargissent progressivement la notion d’« objectif militaire » à des villes entières – et donc aux civils.
Le bilan de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et l’ère des missiles
À partir de la fin des années 1930, la guerre aérienne devient une réalité pour les Européens. Les bombardements se multiplient durant la guerre d’Espagne (Durango, Guernica, Barcelone), puis surtout pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.
Les stratèges aériens, aussi bien de la Luftwaffe que de la RAF ou de l’United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) – qui ont massivement investi dans des appareils lourds quadrimoteurs –, sont persuadés que les bombardements permettront de briser le moral de la population et de rapidement remporter la guerre. Ils attaquent ainsi directement les villes. Celles-ci deviennent, au cours du conflit, des objectifs militaires, ce qui permet aux militaires d’affirmer qu’ils effectuent des attaques de précision.
Les différentes campagnes de bombardements (Blitz sur le Royaume-Uni ou raids alliés sur l’Europe occupée) sont, cependant, un échec absolu. Le moral de la population n’a jamais été brisé par les attaques aériennes et les productions économiques n’ont jamais été ralenties, y compris au plus fort des bombardements. Ce sont pourtant plus de 600 000 civils qui sont tués par les bombes en Europe. À la fin de la guerre, il est rapidement fait le constat que les bombardements ont été « la plus grande erreur stratégique de la guerre ».
Lors du procès de Nuremberg, les Alliés retirent mêmes les condamnations concernant les bombardements nazis afin que le droit international ne restreigne pas l’utilisation de l’arme aérienne. Face au triste bilan de l’offensive aérienne, les militaires considèrent alors que les bombardements ont été un échec, car leur capacité de destruction n’était tout simplement pas assez élevée. Dès lors, les attaques atomiques, couplées aux vols des premiers missiles, font rentrer l’arme aérienne dans une nouvelle ère.
Toutefois, pour les civils, l’expérience de la violence de la guerre aérienne forme un continuum. Ainsi, les Normands, alors qu’ils ont été massivement bombardés entre l’été 1940 et septembre 1944 par les forces aériennes alliées, relient leur expérience aux différents bombardements des conflits contemporains.
C’est, par exemple, le cas d’Henri Bernard qui, en 1947, comparait le bombardement allié de Saint-Lô (Manche) dont il avait été témoin à celui de Guernica par la Luftwaffe. En 1994, lors du 50e anniversaire du Débarquement et de la Libération, Jean Quellien, éminent spécialiste du 6 juin 1944, introduisait les veillées du Mémorial de Caen en expliquant que les Caennais, qui avaient vécu les attaques aériennes de 1944, étaient particulièrement sensibles au sort des habitants plongés dans le siège de Sarajevo. Enfin, ces dernières années, dans le cadre de notre thèse, nous avons pu constater que les témoins des bombardements alliés en Normandie faisaient systématiquement le rapprochement de leur expérience avec celles des civils ukrainiens, palestiniens et aujourd’hui iraniens.
En effet, d’un point de vue matériel, l’expérience de la guerre aérienne – qu’elle soit orchestrée à base de bombardiers quadrimoteurs, de missiles de croisière ou de drones – est relativement similaire pour les civils. L’incertitude de l’attaque propre aux bombardements aériens ; le bruit de l’alarme, des appareils et des bombes ; l’expérience de l’abri dans les caves, les métros, les théâtres, les écoles ; la saturation des sens lors de l’explosion ; l’odeur du soufre et du brûlé ; les espaces de la quotidienneté qui deviennent des ruines ; et enfin, l’expérience de la mort est similaire face aux bombes de 1937 à Guernica ou celles de 2026 à Minab.
Définir des objectifs légitimes « après » les frappes aériennes
En somme, les pertes civiles ne sont jamais des « dommages collatéraux ». Au contraire, par définition, l’arme aérienne est une arme de destruction ayant vocation à détruire des cibles où des civils sont massivement présents.
Les militaires sont, de plus, persuadés – à tort – que l’arme aérienne peut briser le moral de la population et permettre de renverser des régimes. C’était l’espoir des dirigeants alliés contre le Troisième Reich ; c’est aujourd’hui l’espoir de Donald Trump en Iran. Or, les bombardements permettent surtout de préserver la vie des soldats en détruisant partiellement des objectifs, nécessitant toujours de nouvelles opérations, au détriment de la vie des civils.
Dès lors, si l’arme aérienne est aujourd’hui, d’un point de vue technique, beaucoup plus puissante qu’au début du XXᵉ siècle, la rhétorique militariste, afin de légitimer son utilisation en garantissant des bombardements de précision, redessine surtout les objectifs militaires après les frappes.
C’est ainsi que, à en croire les communiqués israéliens, les hôpitaux de la bande de Gaza abritaient des quartiers généraux du Hamas, et que l’école iranienne de Minab sera probablement présentée, à terme, comme un important centre de commandement des gardiens de la révolution. Quant aux populations civiles, elles demeurent structurellement les principales victimes de la guerre aérienne.
Octave Moreau ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
