CAN 2025 de football : les réussites et les ratés de l’édition marocaine

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Chuka Onwumechili, Professor of Communications, Howard University

La 35e édition de la Coupe d’Afrique des nations (CAN) 2025, organisée par le Maroc, a été riche en frissons et en rebondissements avec du bon et du moins bon. Elle s’est terminée par une victoire du Sénégal, qui remporte ainsi son deuxième titre de champion d’Afrique. Si la victoire 1-0 contre le Maroc était méritée, la finale s’est terminée sur une note amère. Les supporters ont envahi le terrain et l’équipe victorieuse a quitté le terrain pendant 16 minutes.

Je suis chercheur en communication sportive et auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur le football en Afrique.

Les quatre points positifs du tournoi ont été les suivants :

  • des matchs de qualité disputés sur des terrains impeccables

  • une couverture médiatique élargie

  • un intérêt mondial accru

  • une augmentation du nombre de supporters.

En revanche, nous avons assisté à l’abandon de l’équipe sénégalaise lors de la finale, à de mauvaises décisions arbitrales, en particulier dans les matchs impliquant le Maroc, et à des problèmes de billetterie.

Cette CAN 2025 a offert des exemples à suivre comme la qualité des terrains et le marketing réussi, dont les futurs pays organisateurs devraient s’inspirer. Cependant, la Confédération africaine de football (CAF) doit tirer les leçons de ce tournoi en matière de sécurité autour du terrain et de formation des arbitres.

Ce qui a bien fonctionné

Les infrastructures de la CAN ont démontré que le Maroc était prêt à accueillir la Coupe du monde plus tard dans l’année. Rien que pour les six stades, le pays a dépensé 1,4 milliard de dollars américains. Pas moins de 10 milliards de dollars américains ont été dépensés pour les infrastructures publiques connexes dans le domaine des transports. Les matchs ont été de grande qualité et se sont déroulés sur d’excellentes pelouses.

Les supporters qui ont assisté à ce spectacle de football ont été transportés par un système ferroviaire à grande vitesse et d’autres moyens de transport fluides.

La qualité des surfaces a peut-être contribué au fait qu’il y ait eu moins de surprises ou de bouleversements. Les quatre équipes qui ont atteint les demi-finales – l’Égypte, le Maroc, le Nigeria et le Sénégal – étaient toutes en tête de leur groupe.

Finalement, la finale a opposé les deux équipes africaines les mieux classées. Le match a été exceptionnel, les grands noms ayant produit un football mémorable tout au long du tournoi.




Read more:
CAN 2025 de football : quand l’image du sport influence le business et l’économie


Couverture médiatique élargie

La décision de s’étendre à d’autres marchés a conduit à une couverture médiatique élargie en Chine, au Brésil et sur les principaux marchés européens. La participation de plusieurs joueurs de renom issus de clubs européens a permis d’assurer une audience mondiale au tournoi. Des équipes telles que le Real Madrid, le PSG, le Bayern Munich, Manchester United et Liverpool ont vu certains de leurs joueurs participer à la compétition.

À ceux-ci s’ajoutaient des joueurs de renommée mondiale tels que Sadio Mané, Riyad Mahrez et Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang. Ces noms étaient assurés d’attirer l’attention des médias du monde entier.

L’audience a globalement augmenté, avec des hausses remarquables en Europe. La France a enregistré 3,4 millions de téléspectateurs et le Royaume-Uni 1,7 million de téléspectateurs.

Intérêt mondial accru

La CAF a annoncé une augmentation de 90 % de ses revenus. Le chiffre d’affaires s’est élevé à 192,6 millions de dollars (114 millions de dollars américains de bénéfices), contre 105,6 millions de dollars dont 72 millions de bénéfices lors de la précédente CAN. Cela montre une augmentation constante, avec le nombre de partenaires qui passe de 9 à 17 entre 2021 et 2023. Une plus grande couverture médiatique a suscité l’intérêt commercial autour du tournoi.

L’affluence dans les stades a aussi nettement progressé. Les chiffres annoncés à la fin de la compétition ont montré que 1,34 million de personnes ont assisté aux matchs. En 2023, en Côte d’Ivoire, le nombre de spectateurs était de 1,1 million.

Cela montre clairement l’intérêt croissant pour le tournoi. La proximité du Maroc avec l’Europe a également été un facteur déterminant. Davantage de spectateurs ont fait le déplacement depuis le continent et d’ailleurs.

Les primes remises aux équipes lors du tournoi ont également battu des records, le Sénégal remportant 11,6 millions de dollars. Les équipes éliminées lors de la phase de groupes ont reçu chacune 1,3 million de dollars américains.




Read more:
Le football africain a remporté la 34e édition de la CAN, suivi de près par la Côte d’Ivoire


Erreurs

Scènes de colère : La finale a été gâchée par un retrait du terrain des Sénégalais, qui protestaient contre un penalty accordé au Maroc pendant les arrêts de jeu. Le match a été suspendu pendant 16 minutes. Les Sénégalais étaient furieux suite à l’annulation de leur but dans les dernières minutes du temps réglementaire. Les protestations contre le penalty accordé au Maroc ont duré jusqu’à ce que l’une des figures emblématiques de l’équipe, Sadio Mané, demande à ses coéquipiers de poursuivre le match.

À ce moment-là, les supporters sénégalais en colère avaient arraché des sièges dans les tribunes et de nombreuses bagarres ont éclaté. Finalement, le Maroc n’a pas réussi à convertir le penalty et le Sénégal a marqué un but mémorable pour remporter la victoire.

Questions relatives à l’arbitrage : Tout au long du tournoi, le Maroc a semblé être favorisé par plusieurs décisions et absences de décision arbitrales. La CAF devrait envisager des programmes d’échange d’arbitres avec d’autres confédérations afin d’améliorer l’arbitrage. Cela aiderait non seulement la CAN, mais permettrait également aux arbitres de découvrir d’autres événements continentaux.

Il est également préoccupant que des ramasseurs de balles marocains aient été vus en train d’arracher les serviettes des gardiens de but des équipes adverses lors des matchs Nigeria-Maroc et Sénégal-Maroc.

Problèmes de billetterie : Il y a également eu des problèmes de billetterie. Alors que les billets étaient tous vendus, plusieurs stades étaient déserts pendant les matchs de groupe. Cela peut s’expliquer par des problèmes liés au fait que les revendeurs secondaires ont peut-être acheté plus de billets qu’ils ne pouvaient en revendre. Néanmoins, chaque match a attiré en moyenne 21 167 spectateurs. La présence des médias a également augmenté pendant le tournoi. Selon certaines informations, plus de 3 800 journalistes ont couvert l’événement depuis le Maroc.

Perspectives

La compétition a démontré que le Maroc était prêt à accueillir les matchs de la Coupe du monde en 2030. Le Maroc, ainsi que l’Espagne et le Portugal, accueilleront les matchs, auxquels participeront 48 équipes. Les six villes utilisées pour la CAN 2025 accueilleront le monde entier en 2030. Le Portugal n’aura que deux villes hôtes et l’Espagne fournira neuf sites.




Read more:
Coupe d’Afrique des nations : les diasporas, une aubaine pour le football africain ?


Il sera difficile pour les pays hôtes de la CAN 2027 d’égaler la réussite du Maroc.

Les trois pays hôtes de la CAN 2027 – le Kenya, la Tanzanie et l’Ouganda – devraient au moins atteindre le niveau de la Côte d’Ivoire qui avait accueilli l’édition de 2023.

Ils peuvent au moins s’inspirer de la Côte d’Ivoire en cherchant à améliorer le système de billetterie, la sécurité autour des stades et former les ramasseurs de balles afin de protéger les équipes en déplacement.

Mais les perturbations sur le terrain ne doivent occulter ni les nombreuses réalisations de ce tournoi ni les infrastructures déployées.

The Conversation

Chuka Onwumechili does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. CAN 2025 de football : les réussites et les ratés de l’édition marocaine – https://theconversation.com/can-2025-de-football-les-reussites-et-les-rates-de-ledition-marocaine-274558

African migration: focusing on Europe misses the point – most people move within the continent

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nadine Biehler, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Images of rubber dinghies overcrowded with refugees heading for Europe and narratives about mistreatment and exploitation of migrants on unsafe migration routes have come to dominate how African migration is perceived in European public and policy debates.

They suggest a continent on the move, driven mainly by conflict and heading to the global north. These narratives are deeply misleading. Nevertheless, they shape public opinion and political decision-making.

Fears of large-scale migration from Africa to Europe are exaggerated. Data shows migration from Africa has been growing, but more slowly compared to growth rates of migration worldwide – and largely takes place on the continent.

Because migration from Africa is seen primarily as a looming crisis for Europe, policy responses tend to focus on border control and deterrence, rather than on cooperation, the development potential of migration or protection.

We are researchers working on migration, forced displacement and data analysis. We combined our expertise in a new working paper to analyse the latest data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) on global migration. We also looked at current data on forced displacement.

We found that:

  • most African migration happens within Africa

  • the majority of African migrants moving across borders are not fleeing violence

  • the vast majority of those forced to flee never leave their own country or region, let alone the continent.

Understanding these mobility patterns is essential for more realistic and effective European migration policies.

The data

The UN DESA migration estimates that our paper is based on are the most comprehensive global data source available on migration. The estimates measure how many migrants live in a country at a given point in time (stock data). However, they don’t capture when they moved (flow data) or why. In addition, UN DESA figures exclude movements within countries.

Our paper complements these estimates with data provided by the UN Refugee Agency and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre on forced displacement. This includes internal displacement, which is particularly widespread in Africa.

This research found that most African migration takes place within Africa.

Globally, there were about 304 million international migrants in 2024. Africans made up around 15% of that total.

In other words, the majority of the world’s migrants are not from Africa.

Even more striking is where African migrants actually go.

In 2024, around 25 million Africans were living in an African country outside the one they were born in or held citizenship of. This exceeded the number of Africans living outside the continent (20.7 million) by around 21%.

This means that African migration is predominantly intracontinental, a long-standing trend that has become even more pronounced over time.

Several factors help explain this.

Travel within Africa is often cheaper and safer than journeys to other continents. Regional free movement agreements, such as those in west and east Africa, enable cross-border mobility. At the same time, legal pathways to Europe, North America or Asia remain limited and costly for most Africans, with high visa rejection rates and few opportunities for regular migration.

African migration is also gendered. Men are more likely to migrate than women, especially when moving beyond the continent. This gap is smaller for migration within Africa. This suggests that more accessible legal routes and less dangerous journeys help with overcoming migration barriers for women.

Forced displacement

War and conflict are forcing more people to leave their homes worldwide, and Africa is no exception.

By the end of 2024, more than 120 million people globally were forcibly displaced by war and violence. However, the majority of them (73.5 million, or 60% of the forcibly displaced globally) never left their own country to seek asylum elsewhere. They remained internally displaced in their countries of origin.

This is particularly true for the African continent, where almost half of all internally displaced people worldwide lived.

Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo account for almost 80% of internal displacement in Africa.

Even when Africans do cross borders to seek protection, they usually stay close to home.

In 2024, almost 87% of the 12.2 million African refugees and asylum seekers worldwide lived on the African continent. Only a small minority sought protection outside Africa.

This challenges the widespread idea that forced displacement in Africa automatically translates into large-scale migration to Europe.

In reality, neighbouring countries – often themselves affected by poverty or instability, and sometimes both countries of origin and destination for forcibly displaced people – carry most of the responsibility for hosting displaced populations.

Even when taking into account future displacement scenarios driven by the climate crisis, the World Bank estimates that affected people will remain within their regional neighbourhoods.

Still, globally, as well as in Africa, voluntary migration dominates: out of 45.8 million African migrants globally, refugees and asylum seekers make up 12.2 million.

This is also true for African migration to countries of the European Union, where residence permits for work, education or family reasons (2024: about 670,000) significantly exceed first-time asylum applications (2024: about 240,000).

Why these findings matter

First, the data shows clearly that African migration is not primarily about Europe. It is, above all, about Africa itself. For European and other global north policymakers, our findings suggest a need to rethink priorities. Supporting refugee-hosting countries in Africa, expanding legal migration pathways and investing in reliable migration data may ensure more effective migration management. Focusing narrowly on deterrence is misplaced.

Second, our findings highlight the importance of African countries and regions as migration destinations and refugee hosting states. Countries such as Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa or Nigeria host millions of migrants and refugees, often with far fewer resources for integration and protection than wealthier states. For African governments, this means continuing to strengthen regional and continental mobility frameworks. These would allow people to move safely and legally for work, education or family reasons. Intra-regional migration is already the backbone of African mobility. It is likely to remain so.

Third, the analysis demonstrates that UN DESA data is indispensable but incomplete. It excludes domestic migration, undocumented migration and many forms of temporary or circular mobility common in Africa. Funding cuts to international data-collection institutions risk further weakening evidence-based policymaking.

Understanding how people actually move – and why – is essential for designing fair and realistic migration policies.

The Conversation

Nadine Biehler works at SWP for the research project “Strategic Refugee and Migration Policy”, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Emma Landmesser works at SWP for the research project “Strategic Refugee and Migration Policy”, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Rebecca Majewski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. African migration: focusing on Europe misses the point – most people move within the continent – https://theconversation.com/african-migration-focusing-on-europe-misses-the-point-most-people-move-within-the-continent-273679

Inside the challenges faced by journalists covering Iran’s protests

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sanam Mahoozi, Research Associate, City St George’s, University of London

Iran is enduring one of the darkest periods in its modern history. Protests that erupted in late December initially over economic hardship have clearly transformed into a nationwide rejection of the Islamic Republic and a call for regime change.

Thousands of people have been killed by Iranian security forces, with human rights organisations saying many more are injured, detained or missing. In moments like these, journalism plays a critical role in informing the Iranian public and the international community about what is happening inside the country.

Yet Iran is not like most other countries. Reporting on it comes with extraordinary personal and professional risks and obstacles, particularly for journalists who are Iranian themselves with personal ties to the country and family and friends still living there.

This is something I am acutely aware of as a journalist and media researcher who has been covering Iran’s anti-government protests for years.

One of the most significant obstacles is the Iranian government’s repeated shutdown of the internet and communications networks during periods of unrest. On January 8, more than a week after the protests began, the authorities imposed one of the most severe and prolonged internet shutdowns in the country’s history.

More than 90 million people have effectively been cut off from the outside world since then, with limited access to the internet only possible through circumvention tools like virtual private networks (VPNs). Some “vetted” individuals, who are largely government loyalists or regime officials, are able to access the unfiltered global internet.

For journalists outside Iran, this makes reporting difficult. Access to local news outlets and on-the-ground sources vanished almost overnight. Information has had to be pieced together through a handful of people who have access to satellite internet services, such as Starlink and are willing to speak, alongside activist networks operating from outside the country.

The only media currently able to operate openly inside Iran are state and conservative outlets such as Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and Tasnim, often through Telegram channels. These platforms offer a highly controlled narrative aligned with the government’s position. Senior Iranian officials, including foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, have described the protests as “riots” and have labelled protesters as “terrorists”.

For journalists trying to counter this narrative, human rights organisations such as the Human Rights Activists News Agency and Hengaw have become crucial sources. Their daily reports on deaths, arrests and injuries have helped document the scale of the crackdown. Diaspora media outlets such as BBC Persian and IranWire have also played a vital role, as videos and eyewitness accounts slowly emerge despite the blackout.

The information vacuum created by the shutdown has, at the same time, also enabled disinformation. Regime supporters have actively created fake accounts on social media to sow division among opposition groups, while AI-generated videos purportedly depicting the protests have flooded the web. This has impeded the ability of journalists to trust social media as a source of news gathering and information.

Deeply polarised opposition

Another defining feature of the current protest movement has been the emergence of calls for an alternative leadership. Unlike previous protests – including those in 2021 over water shortages and the 2022 nationwide Woman, Life, Freedom movement – this wave has included chants calling for the return of Iran’s former crown prince, Reza Pahlavi. Slogans such as “long live the king” and “Pahlavi will return” have been heard across most provinces.

But Iran’s opposition landscape is deeply polarised, and this presents a further challenge for journalists. Feelings on all sides are intense. Iranian journalists and their families face harassment, threats and coordinated attacks not only from the authorities, but also from opposition supporters.

This dynamic is particularly difficult to navigate. Quoting government officials in a news article, or interviewing them, can prompt accusations of “platforming the regime”. Yet accurate journalism requires reporting on those still in power as well as on opposition figures and possible successors. If I had to identify the single most exhausting challenge of reporting on Iran, this would be it.

The hatred towards the regime is entirely warranted. But it has created an environment in which any coverage of state officials – even when critical or contextual – is treated by Iranian opposition supporters as betrayal. For Iranian journalists, this pressure is constant. Many argue with friends and family, lose relationships and, in some cases, miss out on professional opportunities simply for doing their jobs.

There also seems to be a broader misunderstanding about how journalism works. Critics often expect a single article to address all of Iran’s problems at once and on a 24/7 rotation. But news has limits and each country has a dedicated space in international news cycles.

A short article cannot fully explore Iran’s economic collapse, environmental crises, human rights abuses, regional conflicts and internal repression simultaneously. Journalists must make difficult decisions about focus and framing.

Recognising these points does not mean lowering expectations of the media, particularly in turbulent times when news is a vital source of information. But it can help provide a small window into the challenges journalists face while covering Iran.

The Conversation

Sanam Mahoozi is a freelance reporter for The New York Times focused on Iran.

ref. Inside the challenges faced by journalists covering Iran’s protests – https://theconversation.com/inside-the-challenges-faced-by-journalists-covering-irans-protests-274130

Did the US ever ‘give back’ Greenland to Denmark, as Trump claims?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rikke Lie Halberg, PhD Candidate in History, Lund University

American servicemen in Greenland during the second world war. Signal Corps Archive / Wikimedia Commons

When Nazi Germany began its occupation of Denmark in April 1940, Greenland suddenly found itself cut off from its colonial power and thrust into the centre of North Atlantic wartime strategy. The US took control of Greenland temporarily, establishing bases and defence perimeters there to prevent Germany from using the island.

More than 80 years later, Donald Trump invoked that moment at the World Economic Forum in Davos. In his speech on January 21, the US president claimed his country “gave Greenland back” to Denmark after the second world war. This history, Trump implied, still gives the US a claim to Greenland today.

Trump’s claim rests on a selective reading of wartime history. It also reflects a colonial and imperial way of thinking about territory, sovereignty and ownership. To understand why his claim is misleading, it helps to follow the sequence of agreements that governed Greenland before, during and after the war.

In 1916, Denmark sold its Caribbean colony, the Danish West Indies, to the US (which then changed its name to the US Virgin Islands). That same convention included an explicit American declaration that the US would not object to Denmark extending its “political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland”. As one colony was transferred, sovereignty over another was reaffirmed.

But during the second world war, wartime circumstances and US strategic needs drove another agreement between Denmark and the US that allowed the Americans to assume responsibility for Greenland’s defence. That arrangement was formalised in the 1941 Greenland Defense Agreement, drawn up by the American state department and signed by Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish envoy in Washington.

The agreement explicitly stated that the US government “fully recognizes the sovereignty” of Denmark over Greenland. It added that the US is “animated by sentiments of the completest friendliness for Denmark and believes that by taking these steps, it is safeguarding the eventual re-establishment of the normal relationship between Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark”.

In practice, the US did defend Greenland during the war. It built airstrips and military installations there, while also running patrols and integrating the island into wider allied logistics.

A rusting vehicle surrounded by mountains in Greenland.
An abandoned US military vehicle in Ikateq, eastern Greenland.
Michelle van Dijk / Shutterstock

In 1945, after the end of the war, Kauffmann wrote a diplomatic note to the US. He declared that it had “been a source of great satisfaction to the Danish people” that Denmark had an “opportunity to contribute to the war effort through the placing of Danish territory at the disposal of the United States in the fight against the common enemy”.

Kauffmann added that Denmark did not wish “to receive any payment” for the US military’s use of Greenland during the war. The note framed Denmark’s wartime cooperation as a voluntary contribution, again affirming Danish sovereignty over Greenland.

The wartime arrangement was later translated into a post-war security relationship. In 1951, with Denmark and the US now formal allies within the UN and Nato, the two countries concluded a new defence agreement. This granted the US extensive and permanent military rights in Greenland, now within the framework of peacetime alliance politics.

The post-war period represented a legal consolidation of a US presence in Greenland that had begun under wartime exception. This included the construction of installations such as the Thule Air Base (now Pituffik Space Base) on Greenland’s north-west coast. The base became a cornerstone of US strategic operations in the Arctic, and remains the only active American base in Greenland today.

The construction and expansion of Thule entailed the forced relocation of the local Inuit population in 1953. This move was later recognised as unjust by the Danish court system, leading to compensation awarded by the Danish state in 1999.

Colonial entanglements

These arrangements stabilised Danish sovereignty over Greenland and bolstered the island’s security. But they left the colonial relationship itself largely unexamined. In 1953, in the context of emerging UN norms on decolonisation, Greenland’s colonial status was formally lifted, and the territory was integrated into the Danish state.

This administrative transformation allowed Denmark to present its relationship with Greenland as post-colonial, without engaging in a broader reckoning with the political, cultural and economic legacies of colonial rule. Subsequent reforms can be understood as belated attempts to address this unresolved colonial relationship.

These include home rule in 1979, which transferred responsibility for most domestic affairs from Denmark to a Greenlandic parliament. Self-government in 2009 further expanded Greenland’s political autonomy and recognised Greenlanders as a people under international law.

Recent developments underline just how new the participation of Greenlanders in their own affairs is. The inclusion of Greenland’s foreign minister, Vivian Motzfeldt, in high-level January talks in Washington marks a clear break with earlier practice, where Greenland’s strategic future was negotiated without Greenlandic representatives at the table.

Trump’s attempt to revive imperial language of ownership sharpens the contrast between older colonial ways of thinking and emerging efforts to include Greenlandic political voices in discussions over their future. On this terrain, the contest is no longer only about the past, but also which parties will be part of the discussion about the future.

The Conversation

Rikke Lie Halberg receives funding from Lund University for her PhD research on the Fireburn revolt in the Danish West Indies.

ref. Did the US ever ‘give back’ Greenland to Denmark, as Trump claims? – https://theconversation.com/did-the-us-ever-give-back-greenland-to-denmark-as-trump-claims-274335

How Iran shut down the internet and built a sophisticated system of digital control

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Gemma Ware, Host, The Conversation Weekly Podcast, The Conversation

On January 8, as thousands of Iranians took to the streets in nationwide protests, the government cut off the internet.

Under cover of digital darkness, the Iranian regime launched a brutal and deadly crackdown against anti-government protesters. What information has got out, including testimony from morgues, graveyards and doctors who treated the injured, suggests thousands of people have been killed.

 Iran has shutdown the global internet before, but never for this long.  Without the internet, trading has slumped.  Many entrepreneurs who rely on Instagram to do business can’t post. Lorry drivers are struggling to cross borders because they can’t access digital documents. By some estimates, internet shutdown can cost more than US$37 million a day.




Read more:
Iran’s latest internet blackout extends to phones and Starlink


After three weeks of internet blackout, reports from web traffic monitor Netblocks suggest that the internet is slowly coming back online but the connection is predominantly for government-approved users.

Yet for most of the shutdown, banks and some local government websites and apps still worked. And that’s because Iran is developing its own, national internet, cut off from the rest of the world.

In this episode of The Conversation Weekly podcast, we speak to Amin Naeni, a PhD candidate researching digital authoritarianism at Deakin University in Australia, about how Iran built one of the world’s most sophisticated systems of digital control.


This episode of The Conversation Weekly was written and produced by Mend Mariwany and Gemma Ware. Mixing by Michelle Macklem and theme music by Neeta Sarl. Gemma Ware is the executive producer.

Newsclips in this episode from The Guardian, Al Jazeera English, DW News, CNA, CBS News, CNN, CBC News and BBC News.

Listen to The Conversation Weekly via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here. A transcript of this episode is available via the Apple Podcasts or Spotify apps.

The Conversation

Amin Naeni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How Iran shut down the internet and built a sophisticated system of digital control – https://theconversation.com/how-iran-shut-down-the-internet-and-built-a-sophisticated-system-of-digital-control-274570

Student well-being comes from care, but is caring enough? Academics reflect on 3 stumbling blocks

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Martina van Heerden, Senior Lecturer in English for Educational Development, University of the Western Cape

Christina @ wocintechchat.com via Unsplash, CC BY

Students’ well-being in higher education has been a growing concern globally since the coronavirus pandemic, which disrupted learning and lives generally.

Well-being has been described as “the combination of feeling good and functioning well; experiencing positive emotions such as happiness and contentment as well as the development of one’s potential, having some control over one’s life, having a sense of purpose, and experiencing positive relationships”.

Well-being is important for student engagement, achievement and belonging, which all make for a more positive learning and teaching experience.

We teach in an academic literacy module at a historically disadvantaged university in South Africa. Since the pandemic, we’ve continued to see that students’ well-being is often neglected, especially by students themselves. This neglect could potentially lead to lack of motivation, lack of interest and burnout.

In South Africa, first-year students’ well-being is often precariously placed, as they have to navigate socioeconomic and familial stresses, while adjusting to the demands of higher education. One of the many hurdles that students face is due to the “digital divide”, and it includes having to learn how to use unfamiliar technological resources. There are high dropout rates for first-year students.

That’s despite the efforts of universities to support them.

As academic literacy practitioners, we aim to help students to understand what’s required of them academically. In the last five years, since the pandemic, we’ve revised our module to foster a more caring, responsive and engaging environment. The idea is to smooth the way into university studies and to enhance student well-being.

We recently published a paper on what we’ve learnt so far. Our main finding is that creating a “care-full” environment for learning is not as simple as it sounds. Care has to be offered at various levels – and also received. Universities, lecturers and students still need to overcome some barriers to receiving care.

Getting to know students

Our academic literacy module is offered to first-year undergraduate students and runs for both semesters, with a different group of students each semester. In line with the university’s mandate, the module is concerned with student flourishing and success.

During the pandemic (2021-2022), we became aware of our students being in emotional distress, and so, to focus more deliberately on student well-being, we adopted a more “care-full” approach to learning and teaching. We embedded “care” into our module, by considering how we might equip students better to deal with the demands of higher education. We listened to our students’ experiences and needs and made the necessary adjustments to provide a more supportive, holistic, care-full classroom. This continued in our post-pandemic classroom.




Read more:
During lockdown, South African students wrote a book about ‘a world gone mad’


The changes included adding assignment-specific guides, more resources, more focused discussions on time management and organisation, regular reminders of due dates, and links to work apps.

We also had regular conversations with the students as our way of getting to know them and finding out how they were coping. We wanted them to know that we were there to care for them, not just to impart knowledge.




Read more:
Lecturers reflect on their efforts to ensure no student gets left behind


But we came to realise that by 2023 students were still struggling with the same issues as before, despite the changes we had made. This became clear from student questionnaires, end-of-semester feedback forms, and the informal conversations we had with them.

An analysis of our data showed that certain challenges acted as impediments to care and negatively affected students’ well-being. The three main impediments were:

  • resources

  • time management

  • anxiety.

In other words, these problems prevented students from “receiving” and benefiting from the care we offered.

Resources

Resources present a dual impediment to students’ well-being. Firstly, students might not have access to resources like laptops and a stable internet connection. Secondly, they might not know how to use the available resources efficiently.

For example, many of our students indicated that they struggled to find lecture content or to submit assignments on the university’s Learning Management System. This was even though we had made “how-to” guides for students showing step-by-step instructions and the university scheduled workshops on how to navigate it. Resources became another hurdle instead of helping as intended.

Organisation and time management skills

Many students struggle with meeting deadlines and balancing their social and university lives. During the pandemic, the online environment provided little structure to their days, so some of them struggled with managing their workload. This continued when classes were back on campus. It is not a problem that is unique to South Africa, but time management is important for well-being (and thus student success).

Feelings of inadequacy and anxiety

The last impediment we identified related to feelings of inadequacy and anxiety. These feelings may be a result of struggles with resources and time management skills, but they might also be related to students’ own perceived competence in their studies. Anxiety has become a challenge for many students in university, not just in South Africa, but globally. These feelings may stop students from reaching out for help.




Read more:
Mental health: almost half of Johannesburg students in new study screened positive for probable depression


Getting past the impediments

We’ve realised these challenges act as impediments to care. That is, despite the efforts educators may put into creating a “care-full” environment, certain challenges can hamper their effectiveness. In our context, we weren’t able to make all our students feel cared for. This realisation could negatively affect the well-being of students and educators alike. Academics are at risk of burnout too.

We still think academics have to be “care-full” with students, but they can’t do it alone, and their care has to be reciprocated if it’s to result in academic success and well-being. Care requires input from both the educators (the carers) and the cared-for (the students). When it works both ways, a “care-full” approach might improve students’ well-being.

Both parties need to take responsibility. Students must be willing to receive care by taking care (that is, asking for advice, accepting the advice and resources that have been made available, doing what they can).

We understand that they might feel uncomfortable or anxious; we are not blaming them. Educators must take care in interactions with students, in pedagogical choices, and in content. University structures and processes are also involved in care. And the issue extends beyond the confines of the university into the national health, welfare and safety landscape. Care requires buy-in from all parties. Otherwise there may be limits to how care is received.

The Conversation

Martina van Heerden is a member of the South African Association of Academic Literacy Practitioners.

Sharita Bharuthram does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Student well-being comes from care, but is caring enough? Academics reflect on 3 stumbling blocks – https://theconversation.com/student-well-being-comes-from-care-but-is-caring-enough-academics-reflect-on-3-stumbling-blocks-274066

Africa, rating agencies and the cost of debt

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Southey, Founding Editor, Africa, The Conversation

How much we pay for the debt that we incur determines a great deal in our lives. This is true of countries too. In the world of sovereign debt – money raised or borrowed by governments – the cost of debt is dependent on, among other factors, how rating agencies “grade” a country.

It’s a sensitive issue. Three agencies dominate the rating business. A criticism often meted out is that they judge African countries more harshly than others, which pushes up borrowing rates. These tensions lie behind the acrimonious fall-out between one of the big three – Fitch – and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

On 28 January 2026 Fitch announced it had downgraded the bank’s credit rating to junk status, and that it was ending its relationship with the bank.

Fitch’s decision was preceded by Afreximbank announcing that it was severing all ties with the rating agency. A few days later the African Union weighed in, issuing a statement from its watchdog, the African Peer Review Mechanism, backing the bank’s decision, and warning Fitch not to issue any credit assessments of the bank. The rating agency clearly chose to ignore the warning.

Below you can find articles from our archives that examine various dimensions of Africa’s debt challenges.


Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

African countries need strong development banks: how they can push back against narratives to weaken them

Africa’s new credit rating agency could change the rules of the game. Here’s how

Eurobonds issued by African countries are popular with investors: why this isn’t good news

African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Senegal’s rating downgrade: credit agencies are punishing countries that don’t check their numbers

South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it

The Conversation

ref. Africa, rating agencies and the cost of debt – https://theconversation.com/africa-rating-agencies-and-the-cost-of-debt-274676

Weakening the soy moratorium in Brazil: a political choice that ignores the science

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Aline Soterroni, Pesquisadora associada do Departamento de Biologia, University of Oxford

In the first days of 2026, the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE), which represents the largest soybean traders in Brazil, announced its withdrawal from the Amazon soy moratorium.

Created in 2006, the moratorium is a voluntary commitment between companies, governments and civil society, establishing that signatory traders and industries will not purchase soy produced from areas deforested in the Amazon biome after July 2008.

The moratorium is widely recognised as one of the world’s most effective voluntary multisectoral agreements for decoupling direct deforestation from soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.

ABIOVE’s member companies account for a substantial share of Brazil’s soybean processing capacity and exports. As such, they play a central role both in the soy expansion and in the implementation of environmental commitments across the country.

Although the moratorium has not been formally terminated, its weakening by an actor as influential as ABIOVE may mark the beginning of the end of the most successful zero-deforestation agreement in history.

Fewer state tax benefits

A large body of research demonstrates unequivocally that the moratorium has not constrained soybean production in the Amazon biome. On the contrary, between 2009 and 2022, the area planted with soy increased by more than 300%, while deforestation fell by 69% in the municipalities monitored under the moratorium.

In addition, the agreement was responsible for establishing a sophisticated system for monitoring, traceability and independent auditing of the soybean supply chain in the Brazilian Amazon.

Despite all this evidence, some argue that the soy moratorium is no longer necessary. This view has recently gained political traction through manoeuvres by the government of the state of Mato Grosso, including the Decree 1,795, which seeks to regulate part of a state law (Law 12,709/2024) whose constitutionality is still being examined by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court.

In practice, the Mato Grosso government aims to restrict state tax benefits for companies that adopt environmental criteria beyond those required by law, as is the case with the Amazon soy moratorium.

The core argument is that Brazil’s Forest Code – the country’s main environmental law regulating land use on private properties – alone is sufficient to ensure high socio-environmental standards in agricultural production. But is this really the case?

Full implementation of Brazil’s Forest Code

There is a scientific tool capable of addressing this question: mathematical and economic land-use modelling. According to a study I led, published in Global Change Biology, even the rigorous implementation of the Forest Code would prevent only about half of the deforestation projected to accommodate the expansion of agriculture and livestock production in Brazil up to 2050.

These findings indicate that, while full implementation of the Code is essential and urgent, it is not sufficient to guarantee deforestation-free agricultural production that is truly sustainable and aligned with increasingly demanding markets, such as that of the European Union.

It is also worthwhile to remember that achieving zero deforestation is central to Brazil fulfilling the commitments it has voluntarily undertaken, including the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Leader’s Declaration on Forests and Land Use.

Better futures are possible

One of the most motivating aspects of my research area is the opportunity to explore better futures. What if the Amazon Soy moratorium were expanded from the Amazon to the Cerrado? Around a decade ago, in 2017, this was precisely the debate.

That year, the Cerrado Working Group was created with the aim of discussing an agreement that would eliminate the direct conversion of native vegetation for soybean production in the most biodiverse and threatened tropical savanna on Earth.

In another modelling study that I led, published in Science Advances, we simulated this plausible future, in which the Soy moratorium is adopted simultaneously in the Amazon and the Cerrado biomes.

The results show that even with a moratorium of this scale, Brazilian soybean production would continue to grow in order to meet domestic and international demand. By 2050, the reduction in planted area would be only about 2% compared with a scenario without an expanded moratorium.

With strategic land-use planning, the impact on production would therefore be minimal, while the environmental and social benefits would be immense. This scenario highlights Brazil’s potential for environmental leadership, demonstrating that large-scale commodity production can be reconciled with the conservation of natural resources.

Brazil is one the most megadiverse nations in the world, home to around 20% of all known species. This extraordinary biodiversity – together with ecosystem services such as pollination, climate regulation and rainfall patterns – underpins the country’s position as a major global producer and exporter of food.

Yet prolonged droughts, intense rainfall events and more frequent heatwaves are already affecting agricultural productivity, confirming scientific warnings about the vulnerability of Brazilian agriculture in an increasingly warming planet.

In the face of the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises, the debate should focus on policies and initiatives that complement Brazil’s Forest Code, such as expanding the Amazon Soy moratorium to the Cerrado, rather than on dismantling it.

Protecting native vegetation is an essential condition for the long-term viability of Brazilian agriculture and the most effective insurance against the impacts of climate change.

Approving legislation that trades standing forests, irreplaceable biodiversity, water security and climate regulation – while also jeopardising the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities – for soybeans largely used as animal feed is not just short-sighted land-use governance. It is, quite literally, casting pearls before swine. Not to mention the unnecessary reputational risk generated for the Brazilian agricultural sector.

Rather than hastily weakening one of the most successful environmental agreements ever implemented, companies and trade associations should strengthen safeguards, resist legislation that undermines environmental protection, and work alongside governments and civil society to build supply chains that are genuinely sustainable and free from deforestation. The science is clear. The choice, however, is political.

The Conversation

Aline Soterroni não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

ref. Weakening the soy moratorium in Brazil: a political choice that ignores the science – https://theconversation.com/weakening-the-soy-moratorium-in-brazil-a-political-choice-that-ignores-the-science-274677

Weakening the soy moratorium: a political choice that ignores the science

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Aline Soterroni, Pesquisadora associada do Departamento de Biologia, University of Oxford

In the first days of 2026, the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (ABIOVE), which represents the largest soybean traders in Brazil, announced its withdrawal from the Amazon soy moratorium.

Created in 2006, the moratorium is a voluntary commitment between companies, governments and civil society, establishing that signatory traders and industries will not purchase soy produced from areas deforested in the Amazon biome after July 2008.

The moratorium is widely recognised as one of the world’s most effective voluntary multisectoral agreements for decoupling direct deforestation from soy expansion in the Brazilian Amazon.

ABIOVE’s member companies account for a substantial share of Brazil’s soybean processing capacity and exports. As such, they play a central role both in the soy expansion and in the implementation of environmental commitments across the country.

Although the moratorium has not been formally terminated, its weakening by an actor as influential as ABIOVE may mark the beginning of the end of the most successful zero-deforestation agreement in history.

Fewer state tax benefits

A large body of research demonstrates unequivocally that the moratorium has not constrained soybean production in the Amazon biome. On the contrary, between 2009 and 2022, the area planted with soy increased by more than 300%, while deforestation fell by 69% in the municipalities monitored under the moratorium.

In addition, the agreement was responsible for establishing a sophisticated system for monitoring, traceability and independent auditing of the soybean supply chain in the Brazilian Amazon.

Despite all this evidence, some argue that the soy moratorium is no longer necessary. This view has recently gained political traction through manoeuvres by the government of the state of Mato Grosso, including the Decree 1,795, which seeks to regulate part of a state law (Law 12,709/2024) whose constitutionality is still being examined by Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court.

In practice, the Mato Grosso government aims to restrict state tax benefits for companies that adopt environmental criteria beyond those required by law, as is the case with the Amazon soy moratorium.

The core argument is that Brazil’s Forest Code – the country’s main environmental law regulating land use on private properties – alone is sufficient to ensure high socio-environmental standards in agricultural production. But is this really the case?

Full implementation of Brazil’s Forest Code

There is a scientific tool capable of addressing this question: mathematical and economic land-use modelling. According to a study I led, published in Global Change Biology, even the rigorous implementation of the Forest Code would prevent only about half of the deforestation projected to accommodate the expansion of agriculture and livestock production in Brazil up to 2050.

These findings indicate that, while full implementation of the Code is essential and urgent, it is not sufficient to guarantee deforestation-free agricultural production that is truly sustainable and aligned with increasingly demanding markets, such as that of the European Union.

It is also worthwhile to remember that achieving zero deforestation is central to Brazil fulfilling the commitments it has voluntarily undertaken, including the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Leader’s Declaration on Forests and Land Use.

Better futures are possible

One of the most motivating aspects of my research area is the opportunity to explore better futures. What if the Amazon Soy moratorium were expanded from the Amazon to the Cerrado? Around a decade ago, in 2017, this was precisely the debate.

That year, the Cerrado Working Group was created with the aim of discussing an agreement that would eliminate the direct conversion of native vegetation for soybean production in the most biodiverse and threatened tropical savanna on Earth.

In another modelling study that I led, published in Science Advances, we simulated this plausible future, in which the Soy moratorium is adopted simultaneously in the Amazon and the Cerrado biomes.

The results show that even with a moratorium of this scale, Brazilian soybean production would continue to grow in order to meet domestic and international demand. By 2050, the reduction in planted area would be only about 2% compared with a scenario without an expanded moratorium.

With strategic land-use planning, the impact on production would therefore be minimal, while the environmental and social benefits would be immense. This scenario highlights Brazil’s potential for environmental leadership, demonstrating that large-scale commodity production can be reconciled with the conservation of natural resources.

Brazil is one the most megadiverse nations in the world, home to around 20% of all known species. This extraordinary biodiversity – together with ecosystem services such as pollination, climate regulation and rainfall patterns – underpins the country’s position as a major global producer and exporter of food.

Yet prolonged droughts, intense rainfall events and more frequent heatwaves are already affecting agricultural productivity, confirming scientific warnings about the vulnerability of Brazilian agriculture in an increasingly warming planet.

In the face of the intertwined climate and biodiversity crises, the debate should focus on policies and initiatives that complement Brazil’s Forest Code, such as expanding the Amazon Soy moratorium to the Cerrado, rather than on dismantling it.

Protecting native vegetation is an essential condition for the long-term viability of Brazilian agriculture and the most effective insurance against the impacts of climate change.

Approving legislation that trades standing forests, irreplaceable biodiversity, water security and climate regulation – while also jeopardising the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities – for soybeans largely used as animal feed is not just short-sighted land-use governance. It is, quite literally, casting pearls before swine. Not to mention the unnecessary reputational risk generated for the Brazilian agricultural sector.

Rather than hastily weakening one of the most successful environmental agreements ever implemented, companies and trade associations should strengthen safeguards, resist legislation that undermines environmental protection, and work alongside governments and civil society to build supply chains that are genuinely sustainable and free from deforestation. The science is clear. The choice, however, is political.

The Conversation

Aline Soterroni não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

ref. Weakening the soy moratorium: a political choice that ignores the science – https://theconversation.com/weakening-the-soy-moratorium-a-political-choice-that-ignores-the-science-274677

Dans l’océan, comment les écosystèmes marins s’organisent sans chef

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Céline Barrier, Chercheuse, Université de Corse Pascal-Paoli

Et si on élargissait l’idée qu’on se fait de l’intelligence ? Exemple appliqué au milieu marin. Céline Barrier, Fourni par l’auteur

À la différence de l’intelligence humaine, régie par un centre de décision (le cerveau), celle du monde marin s’organise sans chef d’orchestre. Elle repose sur une multitude d’interactions où chaque processus physique contribue à un fonctionnement global. Que penser de cette analogie ? Peut-on encore parler d’intelligence ? Étudier ces formes d’organisation non humaines invite à repenser notre définition de l’intelligence.


Docteure en sciences marines, spécialisée dans la modélisation des processus écologiques, je travaille principalement sur la dispersion larvaire et la connectivité entre habitats marins, en particulier dans les écosystèmes côtiers de la Méditerranée.

Mes recherches consistent notamment à « suivre des larves marines », afin de comprendre comment l’information circule dans un système naturel complexe, à travers l’espace, le temps et de fortes contraintes physiques. Les « propagules » marines, larves de poissons ou d’invertébrés, ne sont en effet pas seulement de la matière vivante transportée passivement par les courants.

Elles sont aussi des vecteurs d’information écologique. En effet, elles transportent un patrimoine génétique, des traits d’histoire de vie, une mémoire évolutive et surtout un potentiel fondamental : celui de permettre, ou non, le maintien d’une population dans un habitat donné.

Leur évolution dans l’espace est un exemple intéressant de la façon dont les écosystèmes marins s’organisent. Cette organisation fait intervenir une forme d’intelligence bien différente de celle que nous connaissons en tant qu’humains.




À lire aussi :
La Fête de la science 2025 met toutes les intelligences à l’honneur


Une intelligence sans chef d’orchestre

Les écosystèmes marins peuvent être décrits comme des systèmes distribués : il n’y existe ni centre de décision, ni contrôle centralisé.

L’organisation globale émerge de l’interaction continue entre des processus physiques (courants, stratification de la colonne d’eau), biologiques (développement larvaire, mortalité, parfois comportement) et écologiques (disponibilité et qualité des habitats).

Comprendre cette organisation revient à comprendre comment des systèmes complexes peuvent fonctionner efficacement sans intelligence centrale. Dans ce cadre, l’« intelligence » du monde marin n’est ni neuronale ni intentionnelle. Elle est collective, spatiale et émergente.

Chaque processus physique y joue un rôle spécifique. Par exemple :

  • les courants marins forment une infrastructure invisible, comparable à un réseau de communication ;

  • les habitats fonctionnels, zones de reproduction, de nourricerie ou habitats adultes, constituent des nœuds ;

  • enfin, les larves assurent la circulation entre ces nœuds, rendant possible la connectivité du système.




À lire aussi :
Podcast : Intelligence animale… Quand la seiche sèche le poulpe !


Modéliser des réseaux invisibles

Dans mon travail, je cherche à modéliser cette connectivité, c’est-à-dire le réseau d’échanges dont la structure conditionne la résilience, l’adaptabilité et la persistance des populations marines face aux perturbations environnementales.

Pour explorer ces réseaux invisibles, j’utilise des modèles biophysiques dits lagrangiens, qui combinent des données océaniques (courants, température, salinité) avec des paramètres biologiques propres aux espèces étudiées, tels que la durée de vie larvaire ou la période de reproduction.

L’objectif n’est pas de prédire le trajet exact de chaque larve, mais de faire émerger des structures globales : corridors de dispersion, zones sources, régions isolées ou carrefours d’échanges.

C’est précisément ce que j’ai montré dans un travail récent consacré à la grande araignée de mer Maja squinado en Méditerranée nord-occidentale. En simulant plus de dix années de dispersion larvaire à l’échelle régionale, j’ai mis en évidence l’existence de véritables carrefours de connectivité. Ils relient certaines zones côtières éloignées, tandis que d’autres, pourtant proches géographiquement, restent faiblement connectées.

Une intelligence fondée sur les relations

Cette organisation ne résulte d’aucune stratégie consciente. Elle émerge de l’interaction entre la circulation océanique, la biologie des espèces et la distribution spatiale des habitats favorables.

Les résultats obtenus illustrent une forme d’intelligence collective du système, dans laquelle l’organisation globale dépasse largement la somme des trajectoires individuelles.

On retrouve ici des propriétés communes à de nombreux systèmes complexes – colonies d’insectes, réseaux trophiques ou dynamiques sociales humaines. Dans tous les cas, ce sont les relations entre les éléments, bien plus que les éléments eux-mêmes, qui structurent le fonctionnement de l’ensemble.

Élargir notre définition de l’intelligence

Un parallèle peut enfin être établi avec l’intelligence artificielle, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de forcer l’analogie. Les modèles que je développe agissent, avant tout, comme des outils de traduction : ils transforment un monde continu, chaotique et tridimensionnel en représentations intelligibles – cartes, matrices de connectivité, probabilités.

Comme en intelligence artificielle, l’enjeu n’est pas de tout contrôler ni de tout prédire, mais d’identifier les échelles pertinentes et les relations clés à partir desquelles le sens peut émerger.

Étudier ces formes d’organisation non humaines nous invite ainsi à repenser notre définition de l’intelligence. Dans un monde marin sans cerveau, sans mémoire explicite et sans intention, des systèmes entiers parviennent pourtant à se maintenir, à se réorganiser et parfois à résister aux perturbations environnementales.

Reconnaître cette intelligence diffuse, incarnée dans des flux et des réseaux, ne revient pas à humaniser la nature, mais à élargir notre regard sur ce que signifie « être intelligent » dans un monde complexe et interconnecté.


Cet article est publié dans le cadre de la Fête de la science (qui a eu lieu du 3 au 13 octobre 2025), dont The Conversation France est partenaire. Cette nouvelle édition porte sur la thématique « Intelligence(s) ». Retrouvez tous les événements de votre région sur le site Fetedelascience.fr.

The Conversation

Céline Barrier ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Dans l’océan, comment les écosystèmes marins s’organisent sans chef – https://theconversation.com/dans-locean-comment-les-ecosystemes-marins-sorganisent-sans-chef-273541