Religions en Afrique : déchiffrer un paysage en constante transformation

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, directeur de recherches, Institut de recherche pour le développement (IRD)

Le continent africain est marqué par la grande diversité de ses expressions religieuses. Cependant, dans le débat international, il est souvent réduit à un affrontement simpliste entre islam et christianisme. Dans l’ouvrage l’Afrique des religions, à l’épreuve des chiffres et des catégorisations , qui vient de paraître aux éditions Maisonneuve & Larose-Hémisphères, et qu’il a co-dirigé avec Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, juriste et directrice de recherche à l’Institut de recherche pour le développement, et Aurélien Dasré, démographe et maître de conférences à l’Université Paris Nanterre, Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, politiste et directeur de recherche à l’Institut de recherche pour le développement, revient sur les histoires locales et les pratiques sociales qui ont forgé la pluralité religieuse du continent, en croisant anthropologie, démographie, droit et sciences politiques. Extrait de l’introduction.


Terre de mission par excellence, l’Afrique intéresse le religieux à bien des égards. Du fait de sa vitalité démographique, d’abord, elle fait l’objet de vifs débats sur l’ampleur, la nature et la profondeur de son islamisation et de son évangélisation, alors que les communautés de croyances des deux plus grosses religions abrahamiques sont elles-mêmes travaillées de l’intérieur par des contestations salafistes et pentecôtistes. L’Afrique subsaharienne, qui plus est, a toujours été une aire d’étude privilégiée pour les anthropologues des religions dites « traditionnelles », « fétichistes », « naturistes » ou « endogènes ». Historiquement, enfin, le continent a joué un rôle important dans le développement de l’islam et de la chrétienté.

Avant même l’hégire vers Médine du prophète Mohammed, l’Abyssinie copte a ainsi accueilli des musulmans persécutés par l’aristocratie mecquoise. Sur la péninsule arabique, le premier muezzin de l’islam, Bilal ben Rabah, était quant à lui un esclave noir éthiopien.

De leur côté, les pères fondateurs de l’Église comprenaient d’illustres figures comme saint Cyprien de Carthage, le théologien tunisien Quintus Tertullien ou bien encore Augustin d’Hippone, évêque de Numidie, dans l’actuelle Algérie. Pendant plusieurs siècles, le patriarcat d’Alexandrie a par ailleurs compté le plus grand nombre de chrétiens de l’Empire byzantin avant d’être officiellement détrôné par la « nouvelle Rome », Constantinople, au concile de Chalcédoine qui, en 451, le relégua au troisième rang dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique.

De l’Abyssinie copte jusqu’au royaume du Kongo, n’oublions pas non plus que des christianismes africains ont pu se développer avant l’occupation coloniale, qui fut bien plus tardive qu’en Amérique du Sud ou en Asie.

L’arrivée des Européens a alors eu pour particularité de transposer les questionnements sur le religieux dans le registre d’un projet civilisationnel. Bien que leurs relations avec les autorités coloniales aient parfois été tendues, les missionnaires chrétiens ont ainsi précédé puis accompagné la conquête de territoires perçus comme « sauvages » et « arriérés ». Une fois passé le temps des résistances et des révoltes, les clercs musulmans ont, de leur côté, collaboré avec des puissances impérialistes qui, en dépit de craintes fort anciennes sur l’islam, ont fini par adopter des positions pragmatiques en vue de se concilier les bonnes grâces d’alliés de circonstances, notamment au Sahel. Parallèlement, le développement d’administrations étatiques et d’économies marchandes a bouleversé les cultes dits traditionnels ou agraires. L’ère coloniale a en effet consacré le grand basculement des populations d’Afrique subsaharienne dans le monothéisme en favorisant des conversions massives à l’islam ou à la chrétienté.

La période des indépendances a ensuite renouvelé les enjeux sociaux et politiques du religieux. Les catholiques et les anglicans, notamment, ont perdu leur position d’autorité face à la prolifération d’églises « indépendantes » puis « pentecôtistes » qui, pour certaines d’entre elles, existaient déjà depuis plusieurs décennies. En pleine guerre froide ont par ailleurs émergé de nouveaux acteurs du réveil islamique qui ont été qualifiés, tantôt de fondamentalistes, tantôt de réformistes.

Dans un premier temps, les salafistes se sont surtout opposés aux traditionalistes soufis et n’ont guère inquiété les pays occidentaux du fait de leur profonde hostilité au bloc communiste et à l’athéisme marxiste. Mais la guerre « globale » contre le terrorisme et le djihadisme a bientôt remis en cause certains des paradigmes qui avaient jusqu’alors dominé les analyses du religieux en Afrique. À l’orée du XXIe siècle, on a en effet assisté à une floraison d’études sur le salafisme et la « radicalisation de l’islam ».

Dans le même temps, les recherches sur l’Église catholique ou les protestants « orthodoxes » sont tombées en désuétude au profit d’un intérêt renouvelé pour des mouvements évangéliques, pentecôtistes et prophétiques parfois qualifiés de syncrétiques. Les termes du débat n’en ont pas moins continué d’être encadrés par des catégories d’analyse juridiques, démographiques et sociologiques qui dataient en grande partie de la période coloniale.

Un débat scientifique en plein renouvellement

Ce livre a pour ambition de revisiter les questions religieuses à l’épreuve des chiffres et des catégorisations, entendues ici comme des typologies dans les recensements et des listes de cultes reconnus sur le plan juridique. Dans le cadre d’une approche empirique et sans prétentions théoriques, l’objectif est notamment de confronter les catégories officielles des autorités étatiques avec les réalités du terrain et les diverses interprétations locales ou nationales des phénomènes qualifiés de religieux.

Les chapitres constitutifs de l’ouvrage portent non seulement sur les musulmans et les chrétiens, mais aussi sur des ensembles hybrides et difficilement définissables au regard des récits dominants sur les appartenances confessionnelles à une échelle globale. C’est donc dans le rapport aux autres communautés de croyances et dans les contours de chacune d’entre elles que les études qui suivent visent à comprendre les transformations religieuses en Afrique.

Résolument pluridisciplinaire et innovante, la démarche mobilise des spécialistes du droit, de la démographie, des sciences politiques, de l’anthropologie, de l’histoire et de la science des religions. Elle fait le pari qu’on peut effectivement comparer des systèmes de croyances. Dans le même temps, les auteurs de ce volume reconnaissent pleinement les spécificités des communautés qu’ils analysent. Ils ne cherchent nullement à soutenir que certains concepts d’ordre théologique seraient transposables d’une religion à l’autre. Ils n’ont pas non plus la prétention de produire une synthèse de nos connaissances à partir d’une littérature académique déjà très riche et fort abondante sur la définition des religions, des systèmes de croyances et des communautés de foi en Afrique et, d’une manière générale, dans le monde.

Plus modestement, les objectifs sont triples sur le plan heuristique. En premier lieu, l’idée est de combiner des méthodologies quantitatives et qualitatives pour identifier et mieux cerner les contours de communautés de croyances qui ne sont pas aussi clairement définies qu’on pourrait l’imaginer de prime abord. Pour cela sont exploitées des données statistiques tirées de recensements, d’enquêtes démographiques, de sondages et de sources utilisées par le Pew Research Center aux États-Unis. Sont également évoquées les normes et les modalités de quantification, de codification, de qualification juridique et de reconnaissance des ensembles confessionnels, légalisés ou non. Une telle approche permet de « déchiffrer » autrement les notions de laïcité, d’incroyance, d’islamisation, d’évangélisation et de conversion au prisme de statistiques qui obligent à questionner des définitions pour le moins polysémiques.

En second lieu, l’objectif est de confronter les données démographiques et juridiques disponibles avec les perceptions de l’évolution des appartenances confessionnelles en Afrique. De fait, il existe d’importants écarts entre les réalités objectivables et les représentations véhiculées par les médias, les décideurs politiques et les croyants eux-mêmes.

Un troisième objectif de ce livre est en conséquence de s’affranchir des approches purement quantitatives pour appréhender en finesse la complexité des dynamiques religieuses du continent par le biais d’entretiens semi-directifs et d’observations participantes. À partir de cas d’étude très localisés, l’analyse de l’hybridité et de la fluidité des communautés de croyances questionne en effet les frontières habituellement établies entre l’islam, la chrétienté et les religions dites traditionnelles. Elle interroge également le rapport du religieux au profane, au politique, aux conflits et, d’une manière générale, à l’insécurité spirituelle et matérielle.

The Conversation

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos a reçu des financements de l’Université Paris Cité, Atrium Humanités et Sciences Sociales France 2030.

ref. Religions en Afrique : déchiffrer un paysage en constante transformation – https://theconversation.com/religions-en-afrique-dechiffrer-un-paysage-en-constante-transformation-278834

Démocratie et science : les deux piliers de la résilience européenne

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Dominic Rohner, Professor of Economics and André Hoffman Chair in Political Economics and Governance, Geneva Graduate Institute, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

Dans un monde bouleversé par les tensions géopolitiques et l’essor de l’intelligence artificielle, l’avenir de l’Europe repose sur deux piliers : le renforcement de ses institutions démocratiques et un investissement massif dans la recherche scientifique. Seule une Union européenne devenue superpuissance scientifique pourra relever les défis du XXIᵉ siècle.


Les événements récents révèlent l’accélération du passage d’un ordre multilatéral fondé sur des règles à un monde où prévaut la loi du plus fort. Au nom d’une approche que certains qualifient déjà de nouvelle doctrine « Don-roe » (contraction du prénom du locataire actuel de la Maison-Blanche et de doctrine Monroe, du nom de son lointain prédécesseur des années 1820), l’administration américaine a attaqué l’Iran, arrêté et incarcéré le président du Venezuela, adressé des avertissements à la Colombie et à Cuba, et menacé ouvertement d’annexer le Groenland – menace certes atténuée depuis, mais dont la simple formulation a suffi à ébranler les certitudes européennes.

Si les interventions états-uniennes en Amérique latine sont abondamment documentées, l’évocation d’une annexion du Groenland a constitué la première menace explicite de Washington contre le territoire d’un pays européen – le Danemark – depuis 1945. Pour un continent dont les libertés démocratiques doivent tant à l’intervention de l’US Army il y a quatre-vingts ans, ce franchissement d’un tabou par un allié centenaire marque un bouleversement géopolitique majeur.

Dans un monde où les grandes puissances se partagent les zones d’influence, les petits États situés aux marges des blocs de pouvoir voient leur avenir devenir particulièrement incertain. Un scénario dans lequel la Chine et la Russie accepteraient tacitement une suprématie américaine exclusive sur l’hémisphère occidental, tandis que Pékin revendiquerait une domination équivalente sur Taïwan et d’autres territoires asiatiques, et Moscou sur l’Europe de l’Est, apparaît désormais possible. L’intervention américaine à Caracas et en Iran pourrait non seulement encourager de nouvelles actions contre Cuba, mais aussi inciter la Russie et la Chine à agir dans les régions qu’elles considèrent comme relevant de leur propre sphère d’influence. Pour l’Europe, une telle évolution relèverait de la menace existentielle.

Les faits empiriques démontrent que le multilatéralisme appuyé sur un rôle important attribué aux institutions internationales favorise la paix et la prospérité tout en protégeant la souveraineté des petites démocraties. L’érosion de l’ordre multilatéral est donc de mauvais augure pour l’Europe. Pourtant, des raisons d’espérer subsistent : le continent dispose d’atouts stratégiques considérables qui, utilisés avec discernement, pourraient lui permettre de prospérer même dans un environnement hostile.

Le pluralisme démocratique, une force insoupçonnée

Si le pluralisme politique des pays européens est souvent présenté comme une faiblesse sur le plan militaire, la richesse des cultures démocratiques du continent constitue au contraire un rempart contre toute dérive autoritaire. La décentralisation du pouvoir entre de multiples centres de décision pourrait rendre la démocratie plus résiliente en Europe qu’ailleurs. Ce pluralisme démocratique profondément ancré pourrait également s’avérer décisif pour attirer les talents du monde entier.

L’histoire fournit un précédent éclairant : l’exode des meilleurs chercheurs allemands fuyant le fascisme dans les années 1930 a largement contribué à l’essor des États-Unis comme superpuissance académique. Or, depuis quelques années, le monde académique est redevenu, dans de nombreux pays un terrain de plus en plus politisé. Au-delà d’anecdotes particulières, des données rigoureuses démontrent que la liberté académique décline dans de nombreux pays. L’Indice de la liberté académique 2025 révèle que, ces dix dernières années, les libertés académiques ont nettement diminué dans 34 pays – y compris des poids lourds comme les États-Unis, l’Inde et la Russie – tandis qu’elles n’ont progressé que dans huit pays, bien plus petits.

Si dans les prochaines années et décennies, l’Europe se positionne comme un phare de liberté et de démocratie, elle pourrait à son tour attirer les esprits les plus brillants. Le monde académique fuit les environnements où circulent des listes noires de sujets de recherche bannis et où critiquer le gouvernement peut conduire au licenciement, voire à l’incarcération. À l’inverse, les scientifiques attachent une grande valeur à la liberté intellectuelle. La science doit rester suffisamment ouverte pour accueillir une pluralité de perspectives et de méthodes. Le progrès scientifique repose sur la confrontation d’idées diverses soumises à l’épreuve des faits. Un tel environnement, propice aux découvertes majeures et à la prospérité qui en découle, s’épanouit dans des sociétés profondément attachées à la démocratie et aux libertés civiles.

Attirer les talents : un défi crucial

Le « vieux continent » a déjà compris que le moment était propice pour attirer des vedettes désirant quitter les États-Unis. L’Université de Zurich a récemment réussi un coup d’éclat en engageant deux Prix Nobel d’économie, Esther Duflo et Abhijit Banerjee, en provenance du MIT. Au niveau du European Research Council (ERC), l’institution européenne qui finance des projets scientifiques de pointe, il existe un effort concerté pour créer des « super-subsides » sous le label « Sélectionne l’Europe pour la recherche », doublant de 2 à 4 millions d’euros le financement attribué aux nouveaux arrivants extra-européens désirant créer un laboratoire.

Recruter des « stars » venues d’autres horizons peut s’avérer important en termes de visibilité, mais il faut veiller à ne pas oublier la relève. Souvent, les prix Nobel récompensent des recherches menées plusieurs décennies auparavant. Concentrer notre manne financière sur quelques sommités ayant dépassé leur pic de productivité risque d’avoir moins d’impact à long terme qu’investir dans les prix Nobel du futur.

N’oublions pas qu’une grande partie des innovations sont actuellement réalisées par de brillants cerveaux européens ayant tenté leur chance aux États-Unis. Parmi les vingt-trois économistes ayant reçu le prix Nobel ces dix dernières années, presque 40 % sont d’origine européenne, mais tous étaient affiliés à une université d’élite américaine au moment de recevoir ce prix prestigieux.

Pendant des décennies, l’excellent système scolaire public européen a formé des cerveaux qui sont ensuite partis contribuer à la prospérité américaine. Plutôt que viser quelques vedettes vieillissantes, nous devrions améliorer les conditions-cadres pour que nos jeunes talents aient envie de rester en Europe. Cela implique non seulement une défense vigoureuse de la liberté académique, mais également un système de recrutement ouvert et méritocratique, ainsi que des conditions d’engagement attractives dans nos hautes écoles.

L’urgence d’une autonomie stratégique

Nous vivons une période charnière de l’histoire, caractérisée non seulement par des incertitudes géopolitiques, mais également par des transformations radicales causées par l’intelligence artificielle. Celle-ci pourrait remodeler nos économies à l’échelle de l’industrialisation ou de l’essor des ordinateurs, créant de nouvelles inégalités entre pays et au sein des pays. Les bouleversements du marché du travail et une perte de vitesse de la classe moyenne pourraient mettre davantage de pression sur nos institutions démocratiques et favoriser la montée de populismes de tout bord. Dans cette période, notre continent ne peut se permettre de perdre du terrain : nous devons être en tête du peloton.

Comme de nombreuses études le démontrent de manière convaincante, la démocratie favorise la prospérité à long terme, laquelle se traduit généralement par une puissance politique et militaire accrue. Pour promouvoir ce qu’Emmanuel Macron appelle une « Renaissance » européenne, le continent doit atteindre une véritable autonomie stratégique : être suffisamment solide sur les plans économique, politique et militaire pour faire face à n’importe quelle superpuissance sans accepter des « accords » déséquilibrés imposés sous la contrainte.

Si les investissements de défense à court terme sont indispensables, la voie la plus sûre vers une paix solide et une prospérité durable consiste à renforcer les fondements démocratiques – libertés civiles, liberté de la presse et indépendance de la justice – tout en investissant massivement dans les infrastructures de recherche : financement, liberté académique et reconnaissance par le mérite. Comme l’avait déjà compris Napoléon, « le sabre est toujours vaincu par l’esprit ». Pour assurer l’avenir de l’Europe, nous devons en faire une superpuissance scientifique — condition essentielle de sa force économique, politique et militaire.

The Conversation

Dominic Rohner a dans le passé reçu des financements de recherche du European Research Council (ERC) et du Fonds national suisse (FNS) dont il siège actuellement dans le Conseil national de recherche.

ref. Démocratie et science : les deux piliers de la résilience européenne – https://theconversation.com/democratie-et-science-les-deux-piliers-de-la-resilience-europeenne-277179

Bad rural roads in South Africa aren’t just a technical problem – they block people’s rights: report

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi, Senior Researcher, UNESCO ‘Oliver Tambo’ Chair of Human Rights, University of Fort Hare, University of Fort Hare

In many rural parts of South Africa, getting to a hospital, school or workplace depends on the condition of a gravel road. When that road collapses during rain or potholes make it impassable, the consequences are immediate: ambulances cannot reach patients, children miss school, workers lose income.

This is the reality for many communities in the Eastern Cape, one of South Africa’s poorest provinces. Here, four out of every five children live in households whose monthly income isn’t enough to meet their basic needs. In 2024, nearly 50% of children in the Eastern Cape lived in households without a single employed adult – the highest rate in the country.

A recent study in one Eastern Cape community documents that the roads are so degraded – from poorly maintained gravel to crumbling asphalt – that they actively cut residents off from healthcare, education and markets.

The problem is often described simply as a failure of service delivery. But this explanation is incomplete. My research as a sociologist with a particular interest in the transport sector suggests that the decay of rural roads reflects something deeper. It is not a breakdown, but a continuation. A regime of inequality continues to shape infrastructure development long after the end of apartheid.

The poor infrastructure is a direct legacy of apartheid’s spatial planning, which from 1948 to 1994 systematically underdeveloped rural “homelands” like the former Transkei (now in the Eastern Cape) to confine and control the Black majority.

Today’s neglected roads still physically isolate communities, restrict their access to markets and services, and demonstrate how the state, through inaction and underfunding, maintains the barriers established by its predecessor.

In my study, I drew on the 2023 inquiry conducted by the South African Human Rights Commission into the state of rural roads in the province. The inquiry was convened in response to a pattern of complaints received by the Commission from rural communities over several years. I served on the panel for this inquiry, which heard oral testimonies from affected community members and farmers, and received detailed written submissions from key stakeholders.

A key finding was that only 9% of the province’s roads are paved, compared to a national average of 25%. The inquiry found that poor road infrastructure limits people’s ability to access essential services enshrined as constitutional rights, such as healthcare, education and social support.

Roads as a system of power

Infrastructure is often seen as neutral – roads, bridges and railways that simply allow people and goods to move. But infrastructure also reflects political choices about who receives investment and who is left behind.

A snapshot of this is evident in the provincial budget for roads in the Eastern Cape. The human rights inquiry report reveals that the Eastern Cape Department of Transport receives an annual allocation of about R2.5 billion (almost US$150 million) for its road network. But the department itself estimates a capital backlog of R30.5 billion just to bring roads up to an acceptable standard.

While the annual budget allows for upgrading only about 42km of road per year (at an average cost per kilometre of R18 million, or over US$1 million), the province has over 36,000km of unpaved roads – a legacy of apartheid-era neglect.

This is not a technical failure. It is a political choice to perpetuate a system where the most vulnerable communities remain isolated.

Three decades after democracy, many of these patterns remain visible. And the effects continue to ripple through everyday life.

The everyday harm of infrastructure decay

For rural residents, road deterioration is not just an inconvenience. It produces what scholars call slow, everyday harm.

Ambulances struggle to reach remote villages, delaying medical care. School transport is disrupted when buses cannot travel on damaged roads. Farmers face difficulties transporting goods to markets. Public transport services often avoid areas where roads are impassable.

These impacts accumulate over time, affecting livelihoods, health and dignity.

In some cases, residents must walk long distances because vehicles cannot reach their communities. During heavy rains, entire villages can become temporarily isolated.

This situation highlights how infrastructure shapes social inequality. When roads deteriorate, the burden falls disproportionately on people who already face economic and geographic marginalisation.

Why the problem persists

Several factors contribute to the continued deterioration of rural roads.

The first is the massive historical backlog.

Second, the funding model is fundamentally inadequate. The inquiry report details that the Eastern Cape relies almost entirely on the Provincial Roads Maintenance Grant. Provincial Treasury itself argued that the national funding formula, based on population, fails to account for the province’s vast geography and historical infrastructure deficit.

Third, governance and capacity issues are rife. Submissions from the Auditor General highlighted repeated financial mismanagement within the Department of Transport, including fruitless and wasteful expenditure on contracts. Municipalities, tasked with maintaining local roads, often lack the resources and the technical capacity to effectively use management systems.

Fourth, the impact of climate change is accelerating decay. The inquiry heard from multiple municipalities about how increasingly severe weather events overwhelm their ability to respond.

Finally, a lack of coordination and accountability. The report notes that despite clear legal mandates, there is often poor planning between the provincial department, the national roads agency and municipalities, leading to misaligned priorities and slow project implementation.

Urban areas and major highways receive priority funding because they are economically strategic. This is not a uniquely South African phenomenon – it is a global pattern. The World Bank estimates that 80% of the world’s poorest people reside in rural areas.




Read more:
Land reform in South Africa is failing. Ignoring the realities of rural life plays a part


Rural roads tend to receive less consistent maintenance. When maintenance is consistently deferred, costs climb.

Meanwhile, funds that could be used for this upkeep are often tied up elsewhere. A recent Auditor-General’s report found that municipal infrastructure projects nationally face average delays of 17 to 26 months, and all South African municipalities combined spend only 4% of the total value of their assets on maintenance.

These numbers show that the deterioration of rural roads is not an accident, but the predictable outcome of political choices not to invest in marginalised communities.

Communities stepping in

Despite these challenges, rural residents are not passive victims of infrastructure neglect.

Across parts of the Eastern Cape, communities have organised to repair roads themselves. Residents fill potholes, clear drainage channels and use local materials to stabilise damaged sections of road.

These efforts are often informal and rely on collective labour rather than state support. They reflect what scholars sometimes call “insurgent infrastructure” – grassroots initiatives that emerge when the state fails to maintain essential services.

While such actions demonstrate community resilience, they also highlight the scale of the problem. Road infrastructure is expensive and technically complex to maintain. Community efforts cannot substitute for sustained public investment.

Rethinking infrastructure policy

Addressing rural road deterioration requires more than occasional repairs. It demands a broader rethinking of infrastructure governance.

First, rural infrastructure should be treated as a development priority, not a secondary concern. Reliable roads are essential for economic participation, access to services and social inclusion.

Second, government agencies need stronger coordination to ensure that road maintenance responsibilities are clearly defined and effectively implemented.

Finally, policymakers should recognise the knowledge and experience of rural communities themselves. Residents often understand the local terrain and infrastructure challenges better than distant administrators.

Beyond service delivery

If rural roads continue to deteriorate, the consequences will extend far beyond transport. They will reinforce social and economic exclusion for already marginalised communities.

Recognising infrastructure as part of a broader regime of inequality is an important step towards addressing these challenges.

The Conversation

Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Bad rural roads in South Africa aren’t just a technical problem – they block people’s rights: report – https://theconversation.com/bad-rural-roads-in-south-africa-arent-just-a-technical-problem-they-block-peoples-rights-report-278337

African cities are diverse and thriving, but face many challenges. How to make them healthier

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Elaine Nsoesie, Assistant Professor, Department of Global Health, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston University

A new book called Urban Health in Africa explores how rapid urbanisation across the continent shapes public health and wellbeing. Drawing on diverse research and case studies, the book reframes African cities not just as sites of challenge, but as places of innovation, resilience and opportunity.

We spoke to global health researcher Elaine Nsoesie and urbanisation and wellbeing sociologist Blessing Mberu, co-editors of the book, to explore why the stories of African cities matter, and what it will take to build inclusive, healthy urban futures.

What’s one thing about urban life in Africa that you think more people should appreciate?

African cities work, but not always like cities in other regions. In the book, we quote the following text by AbdouMaliq Simone, who works on issues of spatial composition in urban regions:

In city after city, one can witness an incessant throbbing produced by the intense proximity of hundreds of activities: cooking, reciting, selling, loading and unloading, fighting, praying, relaxing, pounding, and buying, all side by side on stages too cramped, too deteriorated, too clogged with waste, history, and disparate energy, and sweat to sustain all of them. And yet they persist.

That persistence matters. Too often, discussions about African cities focus only on their problems. These include inadequate infrastructure, rapid urbanisation and informal settlements. What gets lost is their remarkable functionality and their diversity. No single city can represent the entire continent. Lagos is not Nairobi; Accra is not Dakar. Each has its own history, governance structures and contemporary challenges. Treating them all the same flattens this complexity.

Yes, these cities face serious challenges. But they’re also home to innovative urban experts, effective policy solutions and technological breakthroughs designed for their specific contexts. The question isn’t whether African cities work. It is whether we’re paying attention to how they work, documenting how they are addressing challenges related to health and learning from their solutions.

Was there a story or example that really stayed with you?

When we set out to write this book, we knew we had to start with history. You can’t understand health in African cities today without understanding how colonialism shaped the built environment and urban citizenship. We wanted readers to see how historical forces combined with rural-urban migration, population growth and policies created the urban landscapes affecting millions of lives today.




Read more:
Harare’s street traders create their own system to survive in the city


Our second goal was to map the social determinants of health – the conditions of the environments in which people are born, live, play, work and learn – shaping African cities. We focused on informal settlements and slums because they’ve become defining features of urban Africa. We examined how residents navigate daily struggles: inadequate housing, water and sanitation; air pollution; transportation; food insecurity. We didn’t want to present these as isolated problems. We wanted to show how they’re interconnected challenges that affect many communities.

One of our favourite chapters is in this section. The chapter explores how transport affects health in African cities – both the risks and the benefits. For example, the availability of transportation increases access to hospitals and schools, while vehicles also cause traffic injuries and air pollution. The authors also discuss distinctive forms of public transport that African cities share that you won’t find in most other parts of the world.

Motorcycle taxis, for example, have different names. They are called boda bodas in Kampala, okadas in Lagos. Commuter minibuses are referred to as poda-poda in Freetown, trotro in Accra, daladala in Dar es Salaam, matatu in Kenya, car rapides in Dakar, kamuny in Kampala, gbaka in Abidjan, esprit de mort in Kinshasa, candongueiros in Luanda, sotrama in Bamako, songa kidogo in Kigali.

The chapter captures a major theme in the book; while these cities are different, policies that have been effective in one city can be adopted to address the needs of residents in another city.




Read more:
South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this


In addition to the social determinants of health, we had another section that addressed Africa’s unique demographic reality: these cities are young. We dedicated sections to how urban environments shape young lives, particularly around sexual and reproductive health. We also highlighted the growing epidemic of chronic diseases like obesity, diabetes and hypertension. Studies have shown an association between the rate of urbanisation in Africa and an increase in chronic diseases because of issues such as adoption of unhealthy western diets, lack of spaces to exercise, and sedentary behaviours.

To showcase how some cities are addressing the challenges related to the social determinants of health, we included case studies on air quality in Kampala, new mental health initiatives in Yaoundé, an approach to reducing school dropouts in Arusha, integrated planning transforming informal settlements in Nairobi, and digital health innovations. The case studies demonstrate that effective solutions incorporate community voices and the local context.

Your book outlines a future for urban health in Africa. What do you see?

Our final chapters make explicit what we believe must happen next. We need public health professionals, urban planners, physicians, nurses, community health workers, policy advocates and water and waste managers working together. We need educational programmes focused specifically on urban health. Most critically, we need strong local, national and regional governance to turn plans into reality.




Read more:
Youth workers are spreading health messages on social media: how to support what they do in South Africa


But we also need to elevate youth voices, ideas and innovations across the continent. According to United Nations estimates, about 40% of Africans were under 15 in 2020, and nearly 60% were under 25 – the largest proportion of young people of any region worldwide.

Young people are shaping African cities and they will live with the consequences of whatever decisions are made today.

What motivated the publication of this book, and why now?

When we started this project there weren’t any books on urban health in Africa written by Africans working to address the various challenges faced by urban residents. An estimated 46% of Africa’s 1.3 billion people live in urban areas. Africa is also the continent with the fastest urbanisation rate, with 50% to 65% of the population projected to live in urban areas by 2050. Despite having urban challenges similar to those in other regions, some of the issues that cities in Africa face are unique.

We wanted to bring together researchers and practitioners with diverse expertise and deep knowledge of the challenges people face in cities. We wanted to look at these challenges, the policies that have been effective and recommendations about what must be done to improve the health of residents.

The Conversation

Elaine Nsoesie receives funding from the Gates Foundation to support a fellowship program for early career researchers in Africa.

Blessing Mberu works for the APHRC, an organization that previously received funding for urbanization research, but not for the specific book on urban health in Africa, nor this submission to The Conversation Africa.

ref. African cities are diverse and thriving, but face many challenges. How to make them healthier – https://theconversation.com/african-cities-are-diverse-and-thriving-but-face-many-challenges-how-to-make-them-healthier-274647

Why ‘deaths of despair’ are higher in former coal mining communities

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christopher Saville, Clinical Senior Lecturer, School of Psychology and Sport Science, Bangor University

Life expectancy in the UK has risen dramatically since the Industrial Revolution. For more than a century, people lived increasingly long and healthy lives. But around the turn of the millennium, that progress began to slow.

In 2015, economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton published a landmark study showing something unexpected. From the late 1990s onwards, death rates among middle-aged white Americans without university degrees had started to rise. Three causes of death were driving the trend: suicide, drug overdoses and alcohol-related disease. Case and Deaton called these “deaths of despair” and they have been a topic of research in public health ever since.

Although deaths of despair were originally thought to be a specifically American problem, researchers have been concerned that similar patterns exist elsewhere. New research from my colleague Eurwen Williams and myself suggests they do. And in England and Wales, they are particularly common in one type of place: former coal mining communities.

Coal once powered the UK’s economy. At its peak in 1920, the industry employed more than 5% of the entire UK workforce. Mining shaped towns and villages across England, Wales and Scotland. Work was hard, but it provided stable employment and strong communities. That began to change in the late 20th century.

Competition from imported coal, the shift to oil and gas, and political conflict between miners and government accelerated the industry’s decline. The confrontation reached its peak during the 1984 to 1985 miners’ strike against the government of Margaret Thatcher.

Within a generation, most mines had closed. For many coalfield communities, the economic shock was profound. Jobs disappeared. Local economies struggled to recover. And many areas have never fully recovered. We wanted to understand whether this long economic transition has left a lasting mark on public health.

For our study we examined whether deaths of despair are more common in former coal mining areas than elsewhere. To do this, we linked death registration data from the Office for National Statistics with historical records of coal mines and the dates they closed. This allowed us to compare mortality rates between areas with a history of coal mining and those without.

We analysed deaths between 2015 and 2023 and looked specifically at three causes – suicide, alcohol-related deaths and drug poisoning. What we found was striking.

Across England and Wales, deaths of despair were consistently higher in communities that once relied on coal mining. Alcohol-related deaths were particularly elevated. In some coalfield areas, they were between 27% and 52% higher than in places without a mining history.

Drug poisoning deaths were also much more common, running 23% to 53% higher than elsewhere. While suicide rates were higher too, the difference was smaller, roughly 7% to 19% higher. Perhaps most striking was the fact that these patterns appeared even in places where coal mining ended more than 50 years ago.

More than just poverty

At first glance, it may seem obvious why this happens. Former coalfield areas tend to be poorer than other parts of the country. Poverty is closely linked to poorer health.

But when we adjusted our analysis to account for differences in deprivation, something interesting happened. The gaps became smaller but they didn’t disappear.

Former coal mining communities still had significantly higher rates of alcohol-related deaths and drug poisoning. Suicide rates also remained elevated in areas where mines closed more recently. In other words, poverty alone cannot explain the pattern. Something deeper appears to be at work.

The legacy of industrial decline can shape communities in ways that standard economic measures struggle to capture. The loss of stable employment, the weakening of social institutions and long-term uncertainty about the future can all leave lasting effects. These pressures may contribute to the kinds of distress that lead to deaths of despair.

A wider pattern of health inquality

Our findings fit with a growing body of research on health in former coalfield communities. Previous studies have found higher rates of mental health problems in these areas. Others have identified other public health issues, including greater use of anabolic steroids and lower uptake of COVID-19 vaccines.

Taken together, these studies suggest the effects of deindustrialisation can persist for decades. Coal may be gone, but the consequences remain.

The decline of coal is one of the clearest examples in modern Britain of how economic transitions can reshape communities. It shows how the effects of industrial change can outlive the industries themselves.

Many economists believe the world may be entering another major economic shift. Advances in artificial intelligence are already beginning to reshape parts of the labour market.

History suggests these transitions need to be managed carefully. For decades, the UK has often relied on markets to absorb economic shocks, with limited industrial strategy to support the places most affected. But our findings highlight what can happen when communities face large economic changes without timely support.

The story of Britain’s coalfields is not just about the past. It is a reminder that economic transitions leave deep marks on people and places. And if we want to avoid repeating those mistakes, we need to learn from them.

The Conversation

Christopher Saville has received funding from the British Academy, for work on coalfield health.

ref. Why ‘deaths of despair’ are higher in former coal mining communities – https://theconversation.com/why-deaths-of-despair-are-higher-in-former-coal-mining-communities-278173

Dusking is a trend aimed at helping people switch off at the end of the day. How does it work?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jenny Hall, Associate Professor in Tourism and Events, York St John University

Ramon Martinez/Shutterstock

At the end of the day, as the sky begins to darken, many people instinctively retreat indoors, turn on the lights and miss the arrival of dusk.

A small but growing movement suggests people can benefit from doing the opposite: stepping outside and observing the slow transition from day to night. This practice, often described as “dusking”, involves watching the light start to disappear, noticing the changing colours of the sky, the emergence of evening sounds, and the quiet rhythms that mark the close of the day.

This practice is rooted in historical traditions found in places as diverse as the Netherlands and parts of Africa. The idea has recently been revived by artist Lucy Wright and by Dutch poet Marjolijn van Heemstra among others.

Wright performs a style of Morris dance that encourages participants “to dance the old sun down”, drawing attention to the moment when daylight fades.

Van Heemstra describes dusking as taking time to simply watch the sunset and the gradual fading of light as a way of reconnecting with natural rhythms. In a world dominated by relentless digital stimulation, she believes that taking time to look at the sky can help restore awareness of our surroundings. She now organises regular dusking events across the Netherlands. “All you need is a chair and a view,” she said.

Across cultures, dusk marks the shift from activity to rest, from work to home, and from light to darkness; a boundary where social rhythms change. These in-between moments can invite reflection on the environment.

Across many cultures, dusk has also been associated with uncertainty and imagination. The fading of light has long been linked to folklore, ghost stories and childhood fears of the dark, moments when the familiar landscape becomes slightly unfamiliar.

When the sun goes down

Dusk also marks a particular point in the daily rhythm of the natural world. Many species become active during this transitional period, including bats leaving their roosts to hunt, while moths and other nocturnal insects begin to fly, and mammals such as deer, foxes, and hedgehogs emerge to forage. Biologists often study dawn and dusk because animal behaviour shifts notably during these times of the day.

The idea behind dusking aligns with studies indicating that briefly focusing on natural surroundings can enhance wellbeing and relaxation. Simply observing changes in light, sound, and atmosphere may also encourage a shift from the constant hustle of the work day to winding down, potentially moving people towards sleep.

Music inspired by the dusking movement.

Sounds of twilight

In our research, carried out in the North York Moors National Park, participants said that while walking at twilight, or in darkness, they became more aware of natural smells and sounds. The group noticed the transitions from daytime birdsong, with the robin last to tweet, to nighttime animal sounds and the hoot of an owl. These moments frequently produced quiet reflection.

In the last century, the places where people can experience darkness have reduced dramatically because of increasing artificial light glow from homes and office buildings. Now only 10% of the people living in the western hemisphere experience places with dark skies, where there is no, or little, artificial light. And the number of people who can see the Milky Way is reducing all the time.

Previous generations were more accustomed to navigating in low light, using their senses to move through landscapes after sunset. Today, this sensory knowledge has become increasingly rare in our artificially illuminated world.

Artificial lighting frequently masks the subtle environmental cues that once dictated the rhythm of everyday life. Noticing dusk, even briefly, can bring those rhythms back into focus.

The sky darkens, the air cools, birds shift their calls, and the world moves quietly toward night.

To quote the 18th-century poet Thomas Gray: “Now fades the glimmering landscape on the sight. And all the air a solemn stillness holds.”

Of course, watching the sunset is hardly a new idea as Gray’s poem shows, but one it seems we may have forgotten to value to our detriment.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Dusking is a trend aimed at helping people switch off at the end of the day. How does it work? – https://theconversation.com/dusking-is-a-trend-aimed-at-helping-people-switch-off-at-the-end-of-the-day-how-does-it-work-277814

Voici pourquoi il faut valoriser les vendeurs ambulants et les récupérateurs de déchets dans les villes

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Gisèle Yasmeen, JW McConnell Professor of Practice, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University

Les villes abritent aujourd’hui près de la moitié (45 %) des 8,2 milliards d’habitants de la planète, et ce chiffre devrait atteindre 68 % d’ici 2050. Avec leur croissance, les villes deviennent des acteurs clés pour bâtir un avenir durable. Partout dans le monde, l’urbanisation influence la production, la distribution et la consommation alimentaires, et les villes sont des moteurs essentiels de l’évolution des systèmes alimentaires.

Le Pacte de Milan pour une politique alimentaire urbaine a récemment renouvelé les engagements mondiaux en faveur de systèmes alimentaires urbains durables et équitables. Signé par 330 villes à travers le monde, le plan d’action de ce pacte vise à améliorer la production et la distribution alimentaires et à réduire le gaspillage.


Cet article fait partie de notre série Nos villes d’hier à demain. Le tissu urbain connait de multiples mutations, avec chacune ses implications culturelles, économiques, sociales et politiques. Pour éclairer ces divers enjeux, La Conversation invite les chercheuses et chercheurs à aborder l’actualité de nos villes.

Comme le Comité de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale a affirmé en octobre 2025, sans politique intentionnelle, cette croissance ne permettra pas d’alimenter la transformation nécessaire pour assurer la durabilité des systèmes alimentaires.

La restauration de rue et ses vendeurs sont un élément essentiel du paysage alimentaire urbain, offrant une alimentation abordable et un revenu vital à de nombreux citadins. Cependant, ces vendeurs se heurtent fréquemment à l’hostilité des autorités municipales qui invoquent des problèmes de circulation et de santé publique.

De plus, au moins un tiers des aliments produits dans le monde se perdent, finissant dans les décharges et entraînant un gaspillage de ressources précieuses, d’énergie et de main-d’œuvre. Les récupérateurs de déchets urbains peuvent jouer un rôle essentiel dans la réduction de ces déchets.

Pour remédier à ces problèmes, il faut une volonté politique et des investissements afin d’améliorer nos systèmes alimentaires et de les rendre plus durables à l’avenir.

Vendeurs ambulants et les kiosques de nourriture

De nombreuses villes à travers le monde proposent une scène culinaire de rue dynamique qui assure des moyens de subsistance aux vendeurs et offre à leurs clients une cuisine variée, savoureuse et de grande qualité. Des chercheurs et des défenseurs de la cuisine de rue affirment qu’elle constitue un élément essentiel du système alimentaire urbain et souvent une alternative plus saine aux aliments ultra-transformés de type fast-food.

Cependant, les tensions avec les autorités municipales peuvent perturber ce paysage alimentaire. Par exemple, à Bangkok, des dizaines de milliers de vendeurs ont été déplacés en raison d’une campagne municipale décongestionner des trottoirs.

De plus, il y a une récente initiative controversée visant à créer des centres de restauration ambulante à la manière de Singapour afin de créer une apparence d’ordre et d’améliorer l’hygiène.

À New York, une organisation appelée le Street Vendor Project vise à équilibrer la sécurité de la circulation et des piétons avec la nécessité de maintenir ces services urbains et moyens de subsistance essentiels. Le groupe a joué un rôle déterminant dans la campagne menée par le Conseil municipal de New York pour l’abrogation des sanctions pénales pour délits mineurs en faveur des vendeurs ambulants de nourriture en septembre 2025. Une politique et une planification équitables impliquent de soutenir les vendeurs de nourriture plutôt que de les marginaliser davantage.

Récupérateurs de déchets urbains

Dans de nombreuses villes, des récupérateurs de déchets collectent, trient et vendent des matériaux mis au rebut comme le plastique, le métal et le papier en vue de leur recyclage ou de leur réutilisation. Si les récupérateurs de déchets sont plus fréquents dans les villes des pays à revenu faible ou intermédiaire, on les retrouve également dans les zones urbaines des pays riches.

Les pertes et le gaspillage alimentaires sont responsables de 8 à 10 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ce gaspillage est largement dû à de mauvaises pratiques de stockage, à des chaînes d’approvisionnement défaillantes, à la logistique du dernier kilomètre, à des réglementations trop restrictives et aux pratiques de consommation excessives des ménages aisés. Une étude de 2020 a estimé que près de 60 % du plastique collecté pour le recyclage l’était par des récupérateurs de déchets informels.

Une grande partie de ce plastique provient d’emballages alimentaires et de boissons jetés dans les zones urbaines. Le Programme des Nations unies pour l’environnement recommande que les quelque 20 millions de récupérateurs de déchets dans le monde soient pleinement intégrés à la gestion des déchets municipaux.

L’amélioration de la gestion des déchets, notamment dans les villes des pays du Sud, exige des investissements importants dans les infrastructures. Toutefois, les systèmes de gestion des déchets ne doivent pas se contenter de copier les modèles des pays du Nord.

Une analyse des approches et des résultats menée à travers le monde en vue de l’intégration des récupérateurs de déchets dans les systèmes municipaux de gestion des déchets a formulé plusieurs recommandations. Toutefois, la stigmatisation de ces moyens de subsistance demeure un obstacle.


Déjà des milliers d’abonnés à l’infolettre de La Conversation. Et vous ? Abonnez-vous gratuitement à notre infolettre pour mieux comprendre les grands enjeux contemporains.


Néanmoins, un nombre croissant d’organisations de récupérateurs de déchets — ainsi qu’une coalition mondiale — offre une lueur d’espoir quant à la reconnaissance de ces héros méconnus du recyclage urbain. Parmi ces initiatives, on peut citer les partenariats entre les récupérateurs de déchets et les collectivités locales brésiliennes, le Binners Project à Vancouver, qui s’appuie sur le dépôt United We Can, Les Valoristes à Montréal, la National Street Vendor Association of India et l’initiative Linis-Ganda à Manille, qui collabore avec des établissements d’enseignement et des entreprises. Ces exemples illustrent comment l’intégration des recycleurs informels peut contribuer à la gestion des déchets et à la création d’une économie alimentaire plus circulaire.

Face à l’urbanisation croissante, nous serons de plus en plus nombreux à dépendre du rôle essentiel des vendeurs ambulants et des récupérateurs de déchets. Des politiques et une planification inclusives, reconnaissant la contribution de ces deux moyens de subsistance, sont indispensables pour garantir un avenir alimentaire urbain durable pour tous.

La Conversation Canada

Cet article est basé en partie sur des documents de breffage que Gisèle Yasmeen a préparé pour une étude par la Banque Mondiale.

Julian Tayarah et Umme Salma ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur poste universitaire.

ref. Voici pourquoi il faut valoriser les vendeurs ambulants et les récupérateurs de déchets dans les villes – https://theconversation.com/voici-pourquoi-il-faut-valoriser-les-vendeurs-ambulants-et-les-recuperateurs-de-dechets-dans-les-villes-274942

Spain-US rift: Pedro Sánchez’ defiance of Trump is dictated by domestic politics – but it’s also a litmus test for Europe

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Waya Quiviger, Professor of Practice of Gobal Governance and Development, IE University

A protester’s sign reading ‘For peace and justice. No to war’ in Spanish, at a demonstration in Logroño on March 12, 2026. Www.mariomartija.es/Shutterstock

The war in Iran has yet again exposed the tensions between Spain’s Pedro Sánchez and Donald Trump. The two leaders have clashed repeatedly over the last year, including over Spain’s ongoing opposition to Israel’s conduct in Gaza, its refusal to raise Nato spending above 2% of GDP, and now its refusal to support the US war in Iran.

In late February, Spain barred the US from using its joint military bases in Rota and Morón for operations linked to the Iran war. As a result, an incensed Trump stated “We’re going to cut off all trade with Spain. We don’t want anything to do with Spain.”




Leer más:
Could the US cut off trade with Spain? Here’s what international law says


Sánchez has since doubled down on his opposition in a nationally televised address, where he emphatically stated the Spanish government’s position: “No a la guerra”, no to war. On social media he also asserted: “NO to violations of international law” and “NO to the illusion that we can solve the world’s problems with bombs.”

Such pointed defiance of the Trump administration could carry political risks for Sánchez. Indeed, reactions to the war from other European states have been a lot more muted. Why, then, has Sánchez adopted such an unusually confrontational stance?

The clash is being presented as a question of geopolitics or international law, but it is better understood as domestic politics shaping foreign policy. Spain’s historical anti-war political culture, the dynamics of Sánchez’s left-leaning governing coalition, and electoral incentives at home all help account for Madrid’s unusually firm position.

The shadow of Iraq

In his recent address, Sánchez made a specific reference to the 2003 war in Iraq: “Twenty-three years ago, another US Administration dragged us into a war in the Middle East,” he said. “A war which, in theory, was said at the time to be waged to eliminate Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, to bring democracy, and to guarantee global security but… it unleashed the greatest wave of insecurity that our continent had suffered since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”

In 2003, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar joined the US-led coalition to topple Saddam Hussein. The decision triggered massive protests across the country and partly led to Aznar’s defeat in the 2004 elections. His opponent, the Socialist Party’s José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, campaigned on a promise to withdraw troops from Iraq, which he fulfilled immediately after taking office.

The Iraq war fundamentally shaped Spanish public attitudes toward military intervention in the Middle East, and its legacy explains Sánchez’s instinct to distance Spain from the Iran war. His stance is not only ideological – it reflects the memory of how politically damaging it can be for a Spanish government to align itself with US interventions.

Coalition politics and early electoral signals

Sánchez’ position on the war in Iran can also be analysed in the light of current political developments at home. Sánchez governs with support from left-wing parties strongly opposed to US military intervention. Backing Washington, or even facilitating the war through US bases, could risk destabilising that coalition. But the political calculation may go even further.

Sánchez has earned a reputation for repeatedly surviving political crises. Despite declining poll numbers and ongoing scandals within his party and inner circle, he appears to be betting that Trump’s deep unpopularity in Spain will ultimately work to his advantage, particularly among his left-leaning base.

Recent electoral results suggest the strategy may be resonating with voters. In much anticipated regional elections in Castilla y León held on Sunday, Sánchez’ Socialist Party (PSOE) increased its representation, gaining two additional seats despite polls suggesting the party might lose significant ground.

While one election cannot determine national trends, the result offers an early indication that a firm anti-war stance may not carry the domestic political costs critics predicted. If anything, it may have reinforced Sánchez’s appeal across party lines among voters sceptical of military escalation, critical of Donald Trump, and supportive of a more independent European foreign policy.

If Sánchez is proven right, it would also vindicate the Spanish government’s stance on Nato. In June 2025, Spain refused to raise defence spending toward Trump’s proposed 5% Nato target, prompting harsh criticism from the US president. The dispute reflects a broader political reality: higher defence spending is unpopular among the Spanish electorate.

Seen in this context, the Iran war confrontation is part of a longer pattern in which domestic political considerations shape Spain’s position within the transatlantic alliance.




Leer más:
NATO has deep divisions – but why is Spain its most openly critical member?


Domestic pressures across Europe

Spain’s stance may appear unusually confrontational, but Europe’s response to the Iran war has been far from unified. Much of the variation reflects different domestic political pressures facing European leaders.

In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz initially avoided direct criticism of the US strikes and has generally emphasised transatlantic unity. Nevertheless, he has warned against a prolonged conflict and stressed that Germany “is not a party to this war” and does not want to become one, highlighting concerns about economic disruption and regional instability.

The UK has taken a similarly careful stance. Prime Minister Keir Starmer insisted on clarity about US objectives and legal justification before committing military support, emphasising diplomacy and maritime security rather than direct involvement in the conflict.

Italy’s Giorgia Meloni has raised concerns about the legality of the war, but avoided outright condemnation of Washington. Her government has emphasised respect for existing agreements governing US military bases rather than blocking their use outright, reflecting both Italy’s strong security ties with the United States and Meloni’s own political alignment with transatlantic conservatives.

The overall picture is of a fragmented European response. Across the continent, governments are balancing their own domestic political constraints against broader international strategic calculations.

A litmus test for Europe

Spain’s response to the Iran war may offer the clearest example yet of how domestic politics is shaping Europe’s reaction to the conflict. Time will tell whether Sánchez’s stance proves politically sustainable at home, and whether it makes Spain the champion of a more assertive European approach toward Washington or just an outlier.

If the strategy proves successful, it could encourage other European leaders to push back against Washington. If it backfires, however, Europe’s cautious response will likely become more entrenched.

Either way, the episode illustrates a broader reality of international relations. Foreign policy decisions may be presented as matters of international law or principle, but in democratic systems they are often shaped first and foremost by the pressures of politics at home.


A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!


The Conversation

Waya Quiviger no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Spain-US rift: Pedro Sánchez’ defiance of Trump is dictated by domestic politics – but it’s also a litmus test for Europe – https://theconversation.com/spain-us-rift-pedro-sanchez-defiance-of-trump-is-dictated-by-domestic-politics-but-its-also-a-litmus-test-for-europe-278557

Trump’s ‘Venezuela solution’ to Cuba would see the island nation returned to a client state

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joseph J. Gonzalez, Associate Professor of Global Studies, Appalachian State University

The U.S. and Cuban governments have been at odds since the conclusion of the Cuban Revolution 67 years ago. Yet despite pressure, embargoes and various CIA plots, the communist government in Havana has resisted the wishes of its very powerful neighbor separated by just 90 miles (145 kilometers) of water.

From my perspective as an expert on Havana-Washington ties, however, this moment seems different.

For the first time since 1959, an American president, Donald Trump, appears on the verge of doing what so many of his predecessors have longed to do: depose a Cuban president and compel the Cuban government to align itself with American economic and strategic interests.

If Trump succeeds – either through military might or negotiation – then Cuba looks set to become something less than a sovereign nation and more akin to an American client state.

A partnership of unequals?

At first glance, the possibility of such a change looks epic, even monumental: an end to the Cuban Revolution as we have known it.

But deep in the annals of U.S.-Cuban history, there are echoes of Trump’s demands.

From 1898 to 1959, the American government essentially ran Cuba as a colony within its empire.

Americans repeatedly decided who would occupy the presidential palace, while Cuban politicians protected U.S. investments and supported U.S. supremacy in the Caribbean. American gangsters ran the hotels and the gambling.

That relationship ended with the revolution and Fidel Castro’s assumption of power. But if Trump has his way, the future of the U.S. and Cuba will look very much like it did in the pre-Castro era: a partnership of unequals.

Heightened tensions

During his first term, Trump turned away from President Barack Obama’s “Cuban Thaw,” which had established diplomatic relations, eased travel restrictions and raised hopes of an end to the decades-old U.S. embargo.

In place of engagement with the Cuban government, Trump strengthened the embargo, all but closed the U.S. Embassy in Havana and further restricted travel by American citizens to the island.

Trump also returned Cuba to the State Department’s list of nations that support terrorism, where it resides today.

Now, one year into his second term, Trump is using coercion backed with a tacit military threat to increase pressure on the Cuban government.

On Jan. 3, 2026, U.S. forces, seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, bringing them to New York to stand trial.

During the raid, U.S. forces killed between 75 and 100 Venezuelans and a coterie of Cubans providing security to Maduro.

Venezuela was Cuba’s closest ally, providing the island with oil at vastly reduced prices in exchange for doctors and advisers for Venezuela’s security and intelligence services.

Following Maduro’s arrest, Trump made it clear that the U.S. would no longer permit any country to supply Cuba with oil.

Without oil, Trump predicted that the Cuban government would soon collapse and suggested that Marco Rubio, his Cuban American Secretary of State, could become president of Cuba.

Secret negotiations

Cuba was in severe distress long before Maduro’s arrest.

In the years since the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has found it almost impossible to maintain adequate electricity, water, public health health what? care? and public transport.

Then came the Trump administration’s oil embargo, which may push Cuba into the worst economic crisis in its history, prompting longer, deeper blackouts and further reductions in public services.

Hunger is now a widespread concern, garbage is piling up and mosquito-borne illnesses are skyrocketing. Dissent is also becoming more public – and more violent.

A man stands in a street with only car headlights lighting the scene.
Blackouts have become common in Cuba.
Yamil Lage/AFP via Getty Images

Publicly, the communist government responded defiantly to the Trump administration’s aggressive actions, pledging to resist American pressure just as it had for the better part of 60 years.

Privately, however, the Cuban government agreed to talks with the Trump administration, hoping to find a way to ease American pressure.

The White House reportedly no longer considers the collapse of the Cuban government desirable, as it would precipitate a migration crisis that threatens the stability of the Caribbean, including to a South Florida that is home to the world’s largest Cuban diaspora community.

The ‘Venezuelan Solution’

Cuba’s president, Miguel Díaz-Canel, has publicly acknowledged talks with the U.S. But the particulars remain obscure.

The U.S. government reportedly wants Díaz-Canel to leave the country and permit American investment in Cuba, particularly from Cuban Americans, which has long been prohibited.

The Cuban government has already reportedly acceded to this latter demand.

The Trump administration also wants more political prisoners released and a purge of officials who were close to Fidel and Raúl Castro, his successor as president, and remained powerful after the Cuban revolutionary leader’s death in 2016. According to Amnesty International, Cuba has at least 1,000 prisoners of conscience.

In exchange, the White House would be willing to permit members of the Castro family to remain in Cuba and allow for the importation of oil. The rest of the Cuban government would also remain intact.

Cubans I know are calling this deal the “Venezuela Solution.” Much like Maduro’s successors, Cuba’s leaders would remain rulers of Cuba – provided they accept diminished political sovereignty and respect U.S. policy priorities.

Back to the future

Such a deal, if it happens, would return Cuba to the status of an American client state, the status it held long before Castro seized power and allied himself with the Soviet Union.

In 1898, the U.S. intervened in the Cuban War of Independence, the last in a series of wars fought by Cubans against their onetime Spanish colonizers.

The United States kicked out the Spanish, occupied Cuba and proclaimed its desire to turn Cuba into an independent, sovereign nation-state.

But that never happened.

Distrusting the Cubans’ ability to govern themselves, the U.S. retained the legal right to intervene in Cuban politics.

Between 1898 and 1959, the U.S. government, through its ambassador in Havana, determined who would be president of Cuba whenever a dispute arose.

Cuban politicians, eager to preserve their positions, guarded American property, despite Cuban resentments, and supported U.S. foreign policy throughout Latin America and the world.

On the eve of the revolution, Americans owned more than US$800 million in property in Cuba — the equivalent of at least $9 billion today.

Americans dominated not only the sugar industry but also public utilities, mining and tourism, which American organized crime came to control.

What’s next?

For more than 60 years, pre-revolutionary Cuba endured independence without sovereignty as an American client state.

Could such a relationship reemerge? For now, the situation between the U.S. and Cuba remains fluid, and the terms of discussions are shrouded in secrecy.

Trump, publicly, promotes a “friendly takeover of Cuba,” insisting that he could do with Cuba “anything I want.”

But one thing remains certain. While Trump remains in the White House and Rubio heads the State Department, U.S. maximum pressure on Cuba will not cease.

The Trump administration is committed to ending the Cuban government’s resistance to American power and American investment, regardless of the direct humanitarian costs in the form of the oil embargo and other penalties.

Any deal with Trump will be a bitter pill for Cuba’s political elite to swallow.

But absent an oil-rich ally, like Russia or Venezuela, and faced with an implacable enemy, Cuban officials may have no choice but to bring Cuba back into the orbit of American power, at least for now.

The Conversation

Joseph J. Gonzalez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Trump’s ‘Venezuela solution’ to Cuba would see the island nation returned to a client state – https://theconversation.com/trumps-venezuela-solution-to-cuba-would-see-the-island-nation-returned-to-a-client-state-278710

How dolphins communicate – new discoveries from a long-term study in Sarasota, Florida

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Laela Sayigh, Senior Research Specialist, Cetacean Communication, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Bottlenose dolphins are social creatures that use whistles and clicks to communicate with each other. Brookfield Zoo Chicago’s Sarasota Dolphin Research Program, taken under NMFS MMPA Scientific Research Permit

Human fascination with bottlenose dolphins goes back thousands of years, at least as early as Greek mythology.

But it wasn’t until the 1960s that methodical research into dolphin communication began. Scientists like John Lilly and the husband-and-wife team of Melba and David Caldwell tried various experiments to decipher the sounds dolphins can make.

The Caldwells figured out a way to record isolated animals in human care. They discovered that each individual dolphin communicated mostly with one unique whistle, which they called the “signature whistle.” Researchers now know that these whistles convey identities much like human names do. Dolphins use them to stay in touch with each other in their murky habitat, where vision is limited. It’s like announcing “I’m over here!” when someone can’t see you.

This discovery is foundational to my own research. I’ve been studying communication in wild dolphins since the mid-1980s, when I joined my mentor Peter Tyack in documenting signature whistles in wild dolphins for the first time. Our team’s research focused on a resident community of free-ranging bottlenose dolphins in waters near Sarasota, Florida, where I continue to work today.

This collaborative study, led by Randall Wells of Brookfield Zoo Chicago’s Sarasota Dolphin Research Program, involves numerous researchers from a variety of institutions, who study different aspects of dolphin biology, health, ecology and behavior. Begun in 1970, this is the longest-running research project on a population of wild cetaceans – whales, dolphins and porpoises – in the world.

one dolphin surfaces next to another's dorsal fin, which has a jagged edge at the top
Each dolphin has distinctive markings on its dorsal fin. Experienced researchers can sometimes identify them by sight in the field, and they photograph them to confirm their identity in the lab.
Photo by Brookfield Zoo Chicago’s Sarasota Dolphin Research Program, taken under NMFS MMPA Scientific Research Permit

Recording and observing

Researchers know the age, sex and maternal relatedness of almost all of the approximately 170 dolphins in the Sarasota community. This depth of knowledge provides an unprecedented opportunity to study communication in a wild cetacean species.

The dolphins in the Sarasota project are periodically subject to brief catch-and-release health assessments, during which researchers, including me, briefly handle individual dolphins.

Our team attaches suction-cup hydrophones directly onto each dolphin’s melon – that is, its forehead. We then record the dolphins continuously throughout the health assessments, taking notes on who is being recorded when, and what is happening at the time.

This is how my colleagues and I were able to confirm that wild dolphins, like captive animals, produced large numbers of individually distinctive signature whistles when briefly isolated from other dolphins. Through observations and recordings of known free-swimming dolphins, we were further able to confirm that they produced these same signature whistles in undisturbed contexts.

We have organized these recordings into the Sarasota Dolphin Whistle Database, which now contains nearly 1,000 recording sessions of 324 individual dolphins. More than half of the dolphins in the database have been recorded more than once.

We identify each dolphin’s signature whistle based on its prevalence: In the catch-and-release context, about 85% of the whistles that dolphins produced are signature whistles. We can identify these visually, by viewing plots of frequency vs. time called spectrograms.

Spectrograms of signature whistles of 269 individual bottlenose dolphins recorded in Sarasota.
Figure created by Frants Jensen, with sound files from Laela Sayigh

Signature whistles and ‘motherese’

The Sarasota Dolphin Whistle Database has proved to be a rich resource for understanding dolphin communication. For instance, we have discovered that some calves develop signature whistles similar to those of their mothers, but many do not, raising questions about what factors influence signature whistle development.

We have also found that once developed, signature whistles are highly stable over an animal’s lifetime, especially for females. Males often form strong pair bonds with another adult male, and in some instances, their whistles become more similar to one another over time. We are still trying to understand when and why this occurs.

Dolphin mothers modify their signature whistles when communicating with their calves by increasing the maximum frequency, or pitch. This is similar to human caregivers using a higher-pitched voice when communicating with young children – a phenomenon known as “motherese.”

Slowed recording of a bottle-nosed dolphin without her calf, then with her calf.
Courtesy of Laela Sayigh of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, and Brookfield Zoo Chicago’s Sarasota Dolphin Research Program. These sounds were obtained under a federal scientific research permit issued to R. Wells of SDRP.72 KB (download)

Also similar to humans is how dolphins will initiate contact with another dolphin by imitating their signature whistle – what we call a signature whistle copy. This is similar to how you would use someone’s name to call out to them.

Our team is interested in finding out if dolphins also copy whistles of others who aren’t present, potentially talking about them. We have seen evidence of this in our recordings of dolphins during health assessments, which provide a rare context to document this phenomenon convincingly. But we still have more work to do to confirm that these are more than chance similarities in whistles.

Shared whistle types

Another exciting development has been our recent discovery of shared whistle types — ones that are used by multiple animals and that are not signature whistles. We call these non-signature whistles.

I could hardly believe my ears when I first discovered a repeated, shared non-signature whistle type being produced by multiple dolphins in response to sounds we play back to them through an underwater speaker. We had previously believed that these non-signature whistles were somewhat random, but now I was hearing many different dolphins making a similar whistle type.

Our team originally had been using the playbacks to try to determine whether dolphins use “voice cues” to recognize each other – similar to how you can recognize the voice of someone you know. Although we found that dolphins did not use voice cues, our discovery of shared non-signature whistle types has led to an entirely new research direction.

A woman on a boat wearing headphones and looking at a laptop
The author listens to dolphin whistles on a boat in Sarasota.
Jonathan Bird from the film ‘Call of the Dolphins’/Oceanic Research Group, Inc.

So far, I’ve identified at least 20 different shared non-signature whistle types, and I am continuing to build our catalog. We are hoping that artificial intelligence methods may help us categorize these whistle types in the future.

To understand how these shared non-signature whistle types function, we are carrying out more playback experiments, filming the dolphins’ responses with drones. We’ve found that one such whistle often leads to avoidance of the drones, suggesting a possible alarm-type function. We have also found that another type might be an expression of surprise, as we have seen animals produce it when they hear unexpected stimuli.

More difficult, more interesting

So far, the main takeaway from our experiments has been that dolphin communication is complex and that there are not going to be one-size-fits-all responses to any non-signature whistle type. This isn’t surprising, given that, like us, these animals have complicated social relationships that could affect how they respond to different sound types.

For instance, when you hear someone call your name, you may respond differently if you are with a group of people or alone, or if you recently had an argument with someone, or if you’re hungry and on your way to eat.

Our team has a lot more work ahead to sample as many dolphins in as many contexts as possible, such as different ages, sexes, group compositions and activities.

This makes my job more difficult – and far more interesting. I feel lucky every day I am able to spend working on the seemingly infinite number of fascinating research questions about dolphin communication that await answers.

Read more stories from The Conversation about Florida.

The Conversation

Laela Sayigh works for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. She receives funding from various government and philanthropic organizations. She is on the board of the non-profit Cetacean Communication Research, Inc. She closely collaborates with the Brookfield Zoo Chicago’s Sarasota Dolphin Research program.

ref. How dolphins communicate – new discoveries from a long-term study in Sarasota, Florida – https://theconversation.com/how-dolphins-communicate-new-discoveries-from-a-long-term-study-in-sarasota-florida-271276