Category: The Conversation

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U.S. actions in Iran are politically motivated, not the result of intelligence failures

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

Intelligence agencies are often blamed when the use of military force has an unexpected or negative outcome. Pundits often argue leaders end up in difficult situations because they are not fully informed, or intelligence agencies got it wrong.

Of course, analysis is sometimes wrong. Intelligence failures do happen and can lead to bad decisions and disastrous outcomes. When intelligence agencies fail, as they did before 9/11, the price is steep. But, more often than not, intelligence analysis is very good.

Perceived failures are far more likely when political leaders manipulate, ignore or even revise intelligence findings for their own purposes.

The Donald Trump administration appears to be playing politics with intelligence regarding the ongoing United States-Israel war in Iran. Tulsi Gabbard, the current director of national intelligence, told U.S. congress last week that the judgment of whether Iran posed an imminent threat belonged to the president.

This statement exposes how intelligence was politicized and various agencies ignored in the lead-up to the conflict.

Intelligence agencies

Modern intelligence agencies resulted from difficult experiences; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, was only established in 1947, six years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. had sufficient information to foresee the attack, but the institutions of the time and the interpretations of political leaders failed to put a complete picture together.

Dramatized spycraft makes for great entertainment. But the more important work of intelligence agencies is painstakingly collecting and assessing bits and pieces of information of various kinds.

Experiences like Pearl Harbor resulted in practices that guard against individual interpretation, force analysts to consider alternatives and subject assumptions to the critical eye of experts. It’s a massive undertaking: between 100,000 and 120,000 people now work in the U.S. intelligence community.

The importance of autonomy

Intelligence agencies, by the nature of what they examine, often have incomplete data. They must work carefully to avoid bias.

These biases range from internal biases, such as the concept of mirror imaging, to external ones, such as political interference. Recent history is replete with examples of political interference in intelligence assessment to their own country’s detriment.

Most European analysts did not believe Russia would invade Ukraine in the lead-up to the full-scale Russian assault in 2022. The reason for their incredulity was that given Russia’s stated strategic goals, a direct invasion would compromise the country.

Vladimir Putin, however, had isolated himself from objective analysis and continues to do so. Instead, the structure of the Russian state encouraged people who agreed with him rather than those who provided analysis based on expertise.

The result is a war entering its fifth year, with a heavy toll on the Russian people and Putin’s dream of a stronger Russia floundering.

But the U.S. doesn’t need to look abroad for similar examples. The greatest American strategic folly of the 21st century, the invasion of Iraq, was abetted by the George W. Bush administration’s misrepresentation of CIA assessments that did not further the goal of invading Iraq.

In the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, Bush and his inner circle reportedly “cherry-picked” intelligence assessments to justify their case for war, leading them to fall victim to a form of bias known as groupthink.

The Iraq invasion has had long-lasting consequences — it still compromises America’s geostrategic position in the Middle East and globally. The invasion, in fact, helped bolster the regional strength of the current U.S. adversary, Iran.

A grey-haired man stands a podium with the U.S. presidential insignia. Behind him a sign reads Mission Accomplished.
In this May 2003 photo, U.S. President George W. Bush declares the end of major combat in Iraq as he speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast. The war dragged on for many years after that.
(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)

Failure to learn from the past

It seems the Trump administration has learned no lessons from the Iraq debacle.

In her congressional testimony, Gabbard avoided the topic of whether intelligence agencies agreed that Iran posed an imminent threat to the U.S. Given that Gabbard was under oath, her evasion suggests the White House interpreted information differently or dismissed intelligence reports.

Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, recently resigned in protest over the decision to attack Iran.

Kent, regardless of his own problematic past, noted in his resignation letter that Trump chose to ignore intelligence briefings that Iran did not pose an imminent threat and instead relied on an inner circle of supporters to justify his decision to wage war.

Fallout

The problems emerging from Trump’s attack on Iran are both grave and predictable. Not only has the U.S. failed to bring about regime change — ostensibly one of the reasons to attack — but the government now in charge in Iran is even more radical than the one it’s replaced.



Read more:
U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran may succeed on a military basis, but at what cost?

Furthermore, the world is now facing an energy crisis, which, according to the head of the International Energy Agency, is worse than the oil spikes of the 1970s. This directly stems from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

While Trump is trying to frame his decision to attack Iran as a victory, it is likely to be anything but — not only America’s strategic position in the Middle East, but for the intelligence community and global security.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. U.S. actions in Iran are politically motivated, not the result of intelligence failures – https://theconversation.com/u-s-actions-in-iran-are-politically-motivated-not-the-result-of-intelligence-failures-278971

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If using ChatGPT is cheating, what about ghostwriting? The old debate behind a new panic

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Emily Hodgson Anderson, Professor of English and Dean of Undergraduate Education, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Ghostwriting sits at the nexus of collaboration and deception. EThamPhoto/The Image Bank via Getty Images

In February 2023, a little more than a year after the launch of ChatGPT, Vanderbilt University sent an email to its student body in the wake of a fatal campus shooting at Michigan State.

“The recent Michigan shootings are a tragic reminder of the importance of taking care of each other,” the email read in part. In tiny type at the bottom of the message, a disclaimer appeared: “paraphrased from OpenAI’s ChatGPT.”

Students immediately objected.

“There is a sick and twisted irony to making a computer write your message about community and togetherness because you can’t be bothered to reflect on it yourself,” one senior wrote.

A Vanderbilt apology email quickly followed. The university launched a professionalism and ethics investigation. One associate dean couched the misstep as a result of learning pains tied to the adoption of new technology.

Chatbots have spawned a host of ethical questions about writing assistance for teachers, students and authors.

But similar debates about ghostwriting have been taking place for over a century, revealing a persistent discomfort with the idea that the words we read might not belong to the person whose name is attached to them.

Outsourcing authorship

Ghostwriting, a paid arrangement in which one person writes under another’s name, has existed for over a century.

The term seems to have first appeared in the English language in a 1908 newspaper article, which I encountered while researching my forthcoming book, “Ghostwriting: A Secret History, from God to A.I.” The story appeared in the Daily Star, in Lincoln, Nebraska, and describes an anonymous writer who earned US$5,000 to help a high-society woman write a book.

Today, ghostwriting usually involves collaborations between professional writers and celebrities or professionals who otherwise wouldn’t have the time, skill or connections to write a book.

On publication of the manuscript, the ghostwriter is typically named, albeit obliquely – perhaps identified as a friend or consultant in the acknowledgments section. In some instances, the ghostwriter’s name appears alongside the credited author’s on the cover. Either way, the client assumes ownership of the ghostwriter’s work.

An ethical gray area

And yet when I type “the practice of one person writing in another person’s name” into Google, the search engine doesn’t spit out “ghostwriting.”

My first hit is “pseudonym” or “alias.” “Plagiarism,” “libel” and “slander” aren’t far behind. A 1953 article titled “Ghost Writing and History” that appeared in The American Scholar also points out that in the mid-20th century, “forgery” – falsely imitating another’s work with the intent to deceive – and “ghostwriting” could be used interchangeably by scholars.

In other words, even when consensual and compensated, ghostwriting has some relatives that are ethically suspect. And maybe that’s why many clients obscure the fact that they’ve used a ghostwriter, and why responses to ghostwritten works often reflect uneasiness with the practice.

“You should be ashamed,” read one social media post, written in response to Millie Bobby Brown’s 2023 debut novel, which she co-wrote with a ghostwriter. “[The ghostwriter’s] name should be on the cover. She was the one who actually wrote the book.”

The discomfort goes both ways: “I feel so guilty and ashamed whenever I use a ghostwriter now because I feel people will think I’m lying,” an anonymous poster on Reddit admitted.

Both the criticism and self-flagellation imply that the act of claiming another person’s words can render these words deceitful, even if the words have been paid for and the content is true.

Ghostwriting agencies rush to defuse these worries. Ghostwriting has been around forever, the Association of Ghostwriters reassures its clients. Ghostwriting is consensual and collaborative – not lazy, deceptive or a form of “selling out,” an author who’d recently used ghostwriting services explained.

And yet, in the last chapter of her ghostwritten book, Whoopi Goldberg acknowledges some misgivings about using a ghostwriter.

“I meant to try (to write the book myself),” Goldberg writes. “And when it turned out I couldn’t quite pull it off … I looked for help.”

Goldberg frames the assistance of ghostwriting as something she deserved after overcoming obstacles as a Black woman. But Goldberg also has financial resources available that others looking for writing assistance usually don’t. High-end ghostwriters collect in the mid-six figures for their services; Prince Harry’s ghostwriter, J.R. Moehringer, supposedly scored a $1 million advance.

Cue chatbots. Generative AI promises to be the ghostwriter for the masses, so much so that ghostwriter Josh Lisec explained to me how, in the future, ghostwriting will need to be marketed as a boutique service for elites if it is to survive.

Naming names

Whether you’re paying for a ghostwriter or using a free chatbot, “assistance” or “collaboration” on intellectual and artistic work is not automatically unethical.

Editors have long made a career out of helping authors shape their writing. Visual artists have long employed studio assistants. Television shows only get written collaboratively in writers’ rooms.

And yet, accepting assistance on intellectual or artistic work can raise legitimate questions, particularly with regards to how that assistance is acknowledged and how much assistance can be accepted while still calling a project “ours.”

In the late 19th century, for example, one sculptor went to court to rebut a claim that his assistant – whom the press referred to as a “ghost” – had completed sculptures for which the sculptor took credit. The judge announced that an artist could accept, with integrity, a certain amount of mechanical assistance. But he added that there was a threshold when artistic assistance became “dishonest.” The judge made the accused sculptor craft a bust in real time to prove his skill.

Black and white photo of bearded man wearing suit watching two men work on white sculptures.
French sculptor Auguste Rodin observes his assistants as they make plaster casts of his works.
Corbis/Getty Images

Similarly, most educators find it more ethical when their students turn to ChatGPT for editing assistance but much less so when they use it to generate a document from scratch.

Many universities now allow AI as a tool but require users to verify its accuracy and disclose its use – rules that echo long-standing ghostwriting contracts.

Yet even verified, A.I.-generated text, if claimed solely as an individual’s work, can pose policy violations at my institution, the University of Southern California: “You should never attempt to present … content created by others, including generative AI, as your own.”

The same policies that govern appropriate A.I. use also come up in ghostwriting contracts. The ghostwriter signs a “warranty of originality” that promises the author that the ghostwriter has – via platforms such as iThenticate – fact-checked and plagiarism-checked their work.

When inaccuracies do crop up, ghostwriters often take the fall.

Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem blamed her ghostwriter for indicating in her memoir that she had met North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Physician David Agus, who teaches at the University of Southern California Keck School of Medicine, held his ghostwriter responsible for the many instances of plagiarism that were identified in his popular science books.

Ghostwriters willingly provide assistance and accept responsibility for the originality of what they write. Scholars have permission to use generative AI, provided they properly cite its use.

And yet when Vanderbilt administrators advertised that their email had been written with the assistance of ChatGPT, students and faculty pushed back.

University policies and book contracts may offer veils of legitimacy and shields from legal liability. But in the end, readers still seem to want the words they’re reading to come from the mind of the person whose name is on the byline.

The Conversation

Emily Hodgson Anderson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. If using ChatGPT is cheating, what about ghostwriting? The old debate behind a new panic – https://theconversation.com/if-using-chatgpt-is-cheating-what-about-ghostwriting-the-old-debate-behind-a-new-panic-278754

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French local elections: political scientist on what’s next for the hard right and radical left

Source: The Conversation – France – By Frédéric Sawicki, professeur de science politique, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

In the wake of the final round of France’s local elections, we asked political pundit Frédéric Sawicki what the mayoral vote tells us about the political future of the two main contenders – Rassemblement National (RN) and La France Insoumise (LFI)?

The Conversation: What was the outcome of France’s 2026 mayoral elections?

Frédéric Sawicki: Let’s start by recalling that, in 9 out of 10 municipalities, the elections were conclusive right from the first round. The second round mainly concerned urban France. In one in two cities, at least three lists were running against each other, confirming the tripolarisation of the political arena. Overall, political stability dominates because, unlike in 2008 or 2014, these mayoral elections were not an opportunity to sanction a majority or a government, due to a massive lack of lists of candidates representing the “presidential majority.”

Consequently, the few shifts from one camp to another are often explained by local concerns. If the Parti Socialiste (PS), France’s centre-left establishment, wins Saint-Étienne, it may well have something to do with the sex tape scandal surrounding the outgoing mayor. And vice versa in Brest in Brittany where the PS lost, which the ailing reputation of the outgoing mayor who had been in office since 2001, no doubt had a hand in. There are multiple cases of this.

We also note a certain number of “sociological constants.” France’s largest cities always vote massively to the left. In cities with tourist economies, a strong presence of independent professions, small employers, retailers, military-related populations (in Toulon, for example), or well-off retirees (Nice, Menton or Cagnes-sur-Mer), the vote is strongly right or far-right leaning.

On the whole, we noticed as many swings from the right to the left and vice versa, as movements within each camp: socialist or communist cities became LFI territory (Saint-Denis, Vénissieux), “green party” cities shifted towards the centre left (Strasbourg or Poitiers). On the other end of the spectrum, some right-wing or centre right cities shifted to the far right or to its allies, for example, as was the case in Nice with Eric Ciotti.

The slides from left to right were few and far between and were balanced with slides in the opposite direction. Over the municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the left and the ecologists lost Bordeaux, Clermont-Ferrand, Brest, Avignon, Besançon, Poitiers, Cherbourg, but won Saint-Étienne, Nîmes, Amiens, Roubaix, Aubervilliers and Pau.

RN’s wins in smaller towns were quite a result…

F.S.: One of the new phenomena to come out of the vote is the solid bolstering of far right party Rassemblement National’s “mayoral anchorage”. In 2020, the RN claimed only 17 cities, including seven with more than 20,000 inhabitants. This time, it won 60. Toulon or Nîmes were, without doubt, huge losses for RN, but they managed to win over many medium-sized cities, such as Carpentras, La Seyne-sur-Mer, La Flèche, Vierzon, Montargis, Liévin… RN strongholds are primarily located in the former mining Pas-de-Calais area, the Côte d’Azur, and also in Occitania (Agde, Castres, Carcassonne, Montauban).

The RN has particularly anchored its presence in the cities it conquered in 2014 and 2020; strengthening its credibility is essential for the RN ahead of the 2027 presidential elections.

Did LFI – the radical left party come out of these local elections any stronger?

F.S: LFI’s breakthrough became apparent as it won over several cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants – Saint-Denis, Roubaix, Saint-Paul and Le Tampon (France’s overseas territory – Island of La Réunion), Vénissieux, Vaux-en-Velin, La Courneuve, Creil, which is far from insignificant considering they started from scratch. However, this breakthrough must be put into context.

France’s radical left suffered losses in situations where they had taken the lead from the left (in Toulouse or Limoges). The party led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon failed to reclaim towns from the right, with the exception of Roubaix.

LFI specifically poised itself as an essential partner, with the threat of bringing down the centre-left PS if no alliance was formed. However, when the socialists and allies refused the merger, they were rarely defeated. LFI therefore failed to demonstrate its ability to hit hard – the example of Paris was emblematic, but Rennes and Montpellier are other fine examples.

Finally, in the context of alliances with the environmentalists, in particular, we note LFI losses in cities such as Strasbourg, Poitiers, Besançon. When the alliances made it possible to win (Grenoble, Lyon, Tours), LFI will not be represented at executive level because the mergers were only a “technicality.” The LFI representatives therefore remain confined to the role of opponent, which doesn’t give the party the ability to govern and appearing as a party “purely of the opposition” poses a real problem for obtaining supreme (presidential) power in 2027.

We noticed that the centre and the right strengthened their alliance during the mayoral runoffs…

F.S.: There were a lot of lists where the centre right, Horizons, MoDem and Renaissance, joint forces with conservative candidates, Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI) or Les Républicains (LR), from the first round. In the second round, many alliances were formed. This municipal election is therefore part of the continuity of the parliamentary alliance between the central block and the right since 2022 and especially since 2024, and foreshadows what could happen in the presidential election. After the second round, we heard calls for LR, Horizons and the Macronists to have a common arrangement and one candidate. With his win in Le Havre, Édouard Philippe delivered a speech aimed at federating these forces – even though the battle remains very open.

There has been a lot of talk about “infighting within the left-wing,” with a clear divide between part of the socialists and LFI. What are the stakes for 2027?

F.S.: The fracture between those who refuse any alliance with LFI and the others has been reinforced with this vote. But what we notice is that the autonomous centre hardly exists any more, the central block is now clearly uniting with the right. So what is the alliance strategy of those who, like Raphaël Glucksmann or François Hollande, advocate a rapprochement with the centralists? If the Socialist Party comes out stronger after this election, it’s because it joined forces from the first round, with the ecologists, the communists, Place publique and former LFI supporters. The only path that seems to be emerging for the left is to work on this foundation by making it stronger – without LFI – while showing LFI voters that they are not “inaudible” and that their aspirations are heard.

Some observers feared a “fusion” between the right and the far right. While this didn’t happen at party level, we have, on the other hand, witnessed moderate right-wing and far right-wing voters becoming closer…

F.S.: Local initiatives to bring the RN closer to conservative candidates were immediately condemned by LR. The fact that Bruno Retailleau did not call for Christian Estrosi to vote against Éric Ciotti in Nice caused outrage. On the other hand, voters’ choices at the ballot showed substantial porosity between the right and the far right. The presence of LFI candidates acting as a foil, RN voters voted LR to block the left, and LR voters voted RN for the same reason. It’s clear in Brest, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, Besançon, and Marseille that conservative LR Martine Vassal’s electorate (LR) was halved between the first and second rounds, in favour of Franck Allisio (RN).

Finally, who came out as the winner? Does this mean RN might be heading for success in 2027?

F.S.: The RN enjoyed a positive dynamic, strengthening its local presence is an important step in the right direction ahead of the senatorial elections, but also presidential and next legislative elections. That said, the FN remains on the outside looking in with regards to France’s largest cities, which is a major weakness for setting its sights on the Élysée palace. How could a party claim power at the national level while being absent in the cities where most of France’s intellectual and economic activity is concentrated? The RN represents around 30% of voters: it can win in 2027 against an isolated Jean-Luc Mélenchon, or if the left (excluding LFI) and the right remain divided. The potential success of the RN in 2027 is therefore not inevitable provided that the left or the right come together. This is what François Mitterrand managed to do in 1981 and 1988. That’s what Jacques Chirac did in 1995, like Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. It is now up to the political forces to play… their cards right.

Interview by David Bornstein, Political Editor at The Conversation France.

A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!

The Conversation

Frédéric Sawicki ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. French local elections: political scientist on what’s next for the hard right and radical left – https://theconversation.com/french-local-elections-political-scientist-on-whats-next-for-the-hard-right-and-radical-left-279129

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Cocoa farmers cut down trees for short-term gain, but keeping them is important – here’s why

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Olly Owen, Research Affiliate, Anthropology, University of Oxford

Some cocoa farmers are cutting down trees on their farms. Narong Khueankaew/Shutterstock

The price of most chocolate bars has gone up worldwide in the past year, after cocoa bean prices rose dramatically in 2024.

As cocoa prices shot up, many farmers in tropical cocoa-producing countries including Nigeria saw profits rise.

With new cocoa farms opening up on the edges of the forested areas, trees are often cut down to plant more shrubs. However, this could increase deforestation in the biodiverse tropical rainforest regions where most cocoa is farmed.

But research shows that cutting down trees may actually result in fewer beans being produced in the long term because trees can protect the crop from pests and provide much needed shade.

Our research in the state of Ekiti, south-west Nigeria, has explored how, when and why trees are retained on cocoa farms, and what their potential is both for the farmer, and for the environment.

As the world’s fourth-largest cocoa producer, Nigeria plays a significant role in global supply.

Although Nigeria has seen more plantation-style farms with cocoa shrubs and without trees, its cocoa sector has, to some extent, bucked the deforestation trend seen in other cocoa-producing countries. This is partly because for many years the country’s economic policy focused on the oil sector, while not much was invested in cocoa “modernisation” policies that have caused so much damage and deforestation in other cocoa-producing countries, such as Ghana.

In Ekiti state in south-west Nigeria, an estimated 57% of cocoa is still grown on small farms with significant tree cover. However, Ekiti has lost significant forest cover over the past two decades, with one-third of deforestation driven by agriculture. As part of our research we wanted to understand why some farmers choose to retain trees and how existing production systems might be supported, despite producers around the world trying to meet new levels of demand.

How cocoa, timber, and fruit/spice trees contribute to farm revenue

Chart showing income from cocoa farms in Nigeria.

Author’s own research, CC BY-NC-ND

We visited 15 farms and found high levels of biodiversity. We recorded 42 different tree species, many recently planted by farmers. The trees creating the greatest shade across farms were all indigenous rainforest species, including increasingly rare tropical hardwoods such as Iroko (Milicia excelsa), Oganwo (Khaya senegalensis), Eku (Brachystegia eurycoma), and Obeche (Triplochiton scleroxylon). Some of these species are so rare in Nigeria that cocoa farms are now being used as a source for seed collection. There were also up to 26 bird species recorded on a single site.

Tree cover also plays an economic role in production. Many of the 15 farmers we surveyed valued shade trees for keeping plants cool. Cocoa doesn’t produce well if it gets too hot, and as climate change is now threatening the future suitability of many growing regions, regulating temperature is going to be increasingly important. And the trees are a harvestable resource in themselves: 11 of the 15 farmers valued trees as direct financial security, because harvesting tree fruits and spices contributed between 2% and 43% of their annual income, while timber accounted for anywhere from zero to 57%.

Cocoa bean prices rose swiftly a year ago.

Income from trees made up at least 20% of total household income for a majority of farmers, and in some cases up to nearly 60% of total income. So trees are used as a safety net whenever cash is tight from cocoa income.

Growing trees is not without its challenges for these farmers. However, indigenous rainforest trees tend to host fewer pests such as mirids. And they also tend to form higher canopies than cultivated fruit trees, meaning less fungal diseases too.

Despite the range of challenges, the majority of farmers in Ekiti retain non-cocoa trees because of their value. These decisions reflect a balancing act – the advantages of shade and pest control, income from fruit and timber and climate regulation – can offset any short-term loss of cocoa production.

Efforts to limit deforestation and support sustainable cocoa farming need to acknowledge the trade-offs farmers experience. This is particularly important as Nigeria’s forests are highly biodiverse and the nation is highly vulnerable to climate change.

Sustainability certification, such as the one run by the Rainforest Alliance, could be extended to more specifically highlight cocoa beans from farmers who produce fruit using sustainable methods which protect the climate including retaining trees on their farms. This could help safeguard biodiverse rainforests and help cocoa farmers make a living.

Given the global demand for cocoa, this is crucial for a sustainable future.

The Conversation

Olly Owen has received funding from Oxford University John Fell Fund, and provides pro bono technical advice to Ekiti State Forestry Commission.

Zoe Brown receives funding from the Tropical Agriculture Asssociation Fund.

– ref. Cocoa farmers cut down trees for short-term gain, but keeping them is important – here’s why – https://theconversation.com/cocoa-farmers-cut-down-trees-for-short-term-gain-but-keeping-them-is-important-heres-why-277816

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Les voitures électriques pourraient rattraper l’essence en Afrique, si les obstacles au financement disparaissent

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Christian Moretti, Senior Researcher, Paul Scherrer Institute PSI, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

Le coût des véhicules électriques a longtemps semblé constituer un obstacle à leur adoption en Afrique. La plupart des chercheurs ne s’attendaient pas à ce que l’énergie des batteries devienne suffisamment abordable pour remplacer l’essence ou le diesel sur le continent avant 2040.

Mais la baisse du coût des batteries, l’essor de la production mondiale de véhicules électriques et l’abondance des ressources solaires sont en train de changer cette vision.

Notre nouvelle étude montre que les véhicules électriques, en particulier lorsqu’ils sont associés à une recharge solaire hors réseau, pourraient être moins chers que les voitures à essence ou diesel dans de nombreux pays africains dans un avenir pas si lointain. Cependant, plusieurs facteurs continuent de freiner leur adoption. Nous estimons que l’accès au financement est l’obstacle principal.

Nous sommes des chercheurs travaillant sur la politique énergétique, l’analyse du cycle de vie et les technologies à faible émission de carbone à l’ETH Zurich et à l’Institut Paul Scherrer (PSI). En collaboration avec des universités africaines partenaires, nous avons passé les deux dernières années à examiner si les pays africains peuvent passer directement à la mobilité électrique, en contournant les technologies plus anciennes.

Cette étude est née du besoin de données contextuelles pour évaluer si les véhicules électriques peuvent jouer un rôle significatif dans l’avenir des transports de la région. Cela pourrait améliorer la qualité de l’air local et transformer la trajectoire des émissions de l’un des secteurs des transports qui connaît la croissance la plus rapide au monde.

Le principal défi n’est pas de savoir si la mobilité électrique est techniquement viable dans le contexte africain – elle l’est –, mais plutôt de déterminer comment mettre en place un financement à grande échelle.

Les taux d’intérêt élevés, les primes de risque et l’accès limité au crédit à long terme rendent encore les véhicules électriques inabordables pour la plupart des Africains. Mais dans des pays à faible risque tels que le Botswana, Maurice et l’Afrique du Sud, les conditions de financement actuelles sont déjà proches de l’équilibre entre les coûts des voitures électriques et ceux des voitures à carburant fossile.

Nos recherches montrent que si un véhicule électrique est acheté comptant, hors taxes, il serait déjà compétitif en termes de coûts dans certains scénarios.

Il est nécessaire de mener des recherches ciblées sur des solutions de financement évolutives afin de débloquer une croissance accélérée des véhicules électriques en Afrique. Nous présentons quatre points potentiellement pertinents pour les chercheurs, les décideurs politiques africains et les institutions financières internationales.

Réduction des risques financiers parallèlement aux subventions publiques indirectes

Le marché africain des véhicules électriques connaît une croissance rapide, atteignant 17,4 milliards de dollars en 2025 et devant atteindre 28 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030, bien qu’il représente actuellement moins de 1 % du parc automobile total.

Notre étude examine la compétitivité du coût total de possession des véhicules électriques dans 52 pays africains, sur six segments de véhicules particuliers : les deux-roues de petite et moyenne taille ; les quatre-roues de petite, moyenne et grande taille ; et le segment des minibus. Nous avons également examiné trois horizons temporels : 2025, 2030 et 2040.

Nous avons constaté que, pour plus de la moitié des pays examinés, les coûts de financement devraient baisser de 7 à 15 points de pourcentage pour que les véhicules électriques atteignent la parité des coûts avec les véhicules conventionnels d’ici 2030. Cette baisse peut réduire les dépenses de financement sur la durée de vie de plusieurs milliers de dollars, ce qui suffit souvent à faire passer un véhicule de la catégorie « inabordable » à celle de « tout à fait accessible ».

Le risque technologique n’est plus le problème : les véhicules électriques ont désormais atteint leur maturité commerciale et sont largement utilisés à travers le monde, et de plus en plus en Afrique.

Le problème réside davantage dans les risques spécifiques à chaque pays. Ceux-ci reflètent plusieurs risques d’investissement, perçus ou réels, tels que l’instabilité macroéconomique ou institutionnelle, la volatilité monétaire ou la méconnaissance des modèles économiques des véhicules électriques chez les prêteurs, ce qui se traduit par des prix d’achat élevés.

Les subventions indirectes, telles que les exonérations fiscales ou les exemptions de droits d’importation pour les véhicules électriques, sont utiles et populaires dans de nombreux pays africains.

Mais pour accélérer et pérenniser l’adoption des véhicules électriques, les pays pourraient également avoir besoin d’outils permettant de transférer le risque financier des prêteurs privés vers les acteurs publics. Cela pourrait réduire le coût global du véhicule.

Parmi ces outils pourraient figurer des garanties de crédit, des prêts concessionnels et des structures de financement mixte. Concrètement, cela signifie que les gouvernements ou d’autres institutions financières publiques absorberaient une partie du risque associé aux prêts pour véhicules électriques. Les prêteurs se sentiraient ainsi plus à l’aise pour financer ces véhicules.

En absorbant une partie du risque, ces instruments pourraient faire baisser les taux d’intérêt à des niveaux rendant les véhicules électriques plus abordables, ce qui accélérerait leur adoption et réduirait la période pendant laquelle des subventions publiques sont nécessaires.

Les véhicules électriques en tant qu’actifs financiers

Les véhicules électriques se prêtent bien à la réduction des risques. Les voitures et les systèmes de recharge sont des actifs standardisés générant des flux de trésorerie prévisibles. Les prêts peuvent être regroupés et titrisés, ce qui signifie que les prêts individuels pour l’achat de véhicules sont mis en commun et convertis en produits financiers négociables. Un processus similaire s’applique aux prêts hypothécaires, mais pas à la plupart des projets d’infrastructure. En ce sens, le financement des véhicules électriques pourrait être plus simple et plus évolutif que le financement traditionnel du développement.

Le regroupement de milliers de petits prêts pour véhicules électriques en produits susceptibles de servir d’investissements pourrait attirer les fonds de pension, les assureurs et les investisseurs d’impact – des pools de capitaux bien plus importants que l’aide au développement traditionnelle.

Les banques multilatérales de développement jouent ici un rôle essentiel, non pas en tant que prêteurs principaux, mais en tant que créateurs de marché. En aidant à structurer les produits financiers, en établissant des normes et en offrant des garanties partielles, elles peuvent attirer des capitaux privés à grande échelle.

Le financement public pour renforcer la dynamique du secteur privé

Les entreprises privées démontrent déjà que la mobilité électrique peut fonctionner sur les marchés africains à faible risque.

Au Kenya et au Rwanda, les entreprises proposant des modèles de remplacement de batterie, de location et de paiement à l’utilisation pour les deux- et trois-roues électriques connaissent une expansion rapide. Ces modèles commerciaux réduisent les coûts initiaux pour les consommateurs et génèrent des données d’exploitation qui renforcent la confiance des investisseurs.

L’opportunité consiste désormais à obtenir des financements publics pour tirer parti de ces premiers succès. Les entreprises privées peuvent regrouper les prêts automobiles et les actifs de recharge dans des portefeuilles régionaux, répartissant ainsi le risque entre les pays et les segments de clientèle.

Une fois ces portefeuilles établis, les acteurs publics, tels que les banques de développement ou les fonds pour le climat, pourraient les développer à plus grande échelle, en particulier sur les marchés à haut risque. Ils pourraient par exemple contribuer à la mise en place de plateformes panafricaines de financement des véhicules électriques qui canalisent intelligemment les capitaux entre les environnements à haut et à faible risque.

Politiques en matière de véhicules éléctriques et conditions de financement spécifiques à chaque pays

Les efforts visant à réduire les risques financiers liés aux véhicules électriques en Afrique doivent s’accompagner d’une politique plus large en la matière. Des cadres politiques nationaux clairs et prévisibles peuvent réduire l’incertitude liée aux investissements et diminuer directement les coûts de financement.

La Politique nationale de mobilité électrique du Kenya en est un excellent exemple. Outre les incitations visant à accroître l’adoption des véhicules électriques, cette politique renforce les cadres réglementaires et soutient le développement des infrastructures de recharge. Elle encourage également la fabrication et l’assemblage locaux de véhicules électriques, ce qui pourrait contribuer à créer des opportunités de croissance économique verte.

Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que tous les pays doivent adopter dès demain des obligations strictes en matière de véhicules électriques. Au sein du continent, il existe de fortes disparités entre les pays, tant en termes de besoins de financement que d’environnements politiques pour la mobilité électrique. Certains pays peuvent nécessiter davantage d’intervention publique que d’autres.

Des mesures politiques efficaces pourraient inclure :

  • des exonérations temporaires des droits d’importation

  • des incitations à l’achat ciblées pour les acheteurs à faibles revenus

  • des réformes de la taxe sur les carburants

  • des stratégies claires pour éliminer progressivement les véhicules d’occasion très polluants.

Les politiques devraient être limitées dans le temps et régulièrement réévaluées, afin d’éviter des charges budgétaires à long terme alors que les prix des véhicules électriques baissent naturellement.

Cibler les incitations sur les véhicules plus petits et grand public peut également améliorer l’équité. Cela garantirait que le soutien public profite qu’aux nouveaux acheteurs plutôt qu’aux ménages les plus aisés.

Les faits sont clairs : l’Afrique n’a pas besoin d’une percée technologique pour électrifier le transport de passagers. Ce dont elle a besoin, c’est de capitaux moins chers et d’un environnement politique favorable pour accélérer l’adoption des véhicules électriques.

The Conversation

Christian Moretti bénéficie d’un soutienfinancier de l’ETH Mobility Initiative.

Bessie Noll remercie bénéficie d’un soutien financier de l’Initiative Mobilité de l’ETH.

– ref. Les voitures électriques pourraient rattraper l’essence en Afrique, si les obstacles au financement disparaissent – https://theconversation.com/les-voitures-electriques-pourraient-rattraper-lessence-en-afrique-si-les-obstacles-au-financement-disparaissent-278674

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Scotland’s smoking ban turns 20 – it cut secondhand smoke exposure by 96%, but the job isn’t finished yet

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sean Semple, Professor Institute for Social Marketing, University of Stirling

At 6am on a quiet Sunday morning 20 years ago today, Scotland became the first UK nation to ban smoking in enclosed public spaces. It was a landmark moment in public health policy, and new research shows just how much has changed since.

Exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke has fallen by 96% in Scotland since the legislation came into force on March 26 2006. But our new study, published in the journal Tobacco Induced Diseases, reveals that nearly one in four people are still being exposed to tobacco smoke in settings the law does not fully cover. This raises the question of what it will take to finish what the ban started.

The Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 made it illegal to smoke inside bars, restaurants, public transport and almost all workplaces. While there had been much lobbying for exemptions for bars on the basis of size, existing ventilation, or whether or not they also sold food, the law, when it was finally introduced, was comprehensive and simple.

Despite the scale of the change, adoption was rapid and without much dispute. It is now inconceivable that we could ever return to a time when people had to breathe high concentrations of a known carcinogen as they chatted in bars, ate dinner or sat at their workplace desk.

We should take time today to celebrate the impact of the smoking ban. Scotland led the way in the UK and showed it could be done. It also generated extensive evidence through a seven-study evaluation programme that covered everything from hospital admissions for heart attack (reduced by 17% after legislation), to air quality in bars (improved by 86%), to qualitative work examining changes in behaviour, attitudes and social norms.

That detailed and extensive evidence would go on to influence tobacco control policy decisions around the globe for years to come.

Our new analysis examines how Scotland’s exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke has changed in the 20 years since the smoking ban. We used the annual Scottish Health Survey, which gathers data from about 6,000 people across the country, and includes a group of participants who provide a sample of saliva. From this saliva, it is possible to determine the amount of nicotine that someone has inhaled in the past couple of days.

Our analysis shows that adult non-smokers now inhale 96% less nicotine than they did before the ban. Scotland has switched from a nation where seven out of eight non-smokers inhaled other people’s smoke, to a country where three out of four breathe no measurable secondhand tobacco smoke today.

And the progress hasn’t been limited to the settings where the law applies. Our study also provides an analysis of a survey question included since 2012, when people were asked about whether they permit smoking inside their own home. The percentage of homes where smoking is allowed has more than halved in a little over a decade – from 25% to under 10% in 2024.

We’ve made fantastic progress in tackling secondhand smoke exposure in such a short space of time, and it is tempting to see this as a problem solved. But dig deeper and there is a sting in the tail.

The data we present shows that nearly one in four adult non-smokers still breathe secondhand tobacco smoke, and that this figure has been relatively static in the past decade. Workers in many sectors still report they are exposed to other people’s smoke – from those serving in outdoor hospitality settings, to the healthcare workers who provide assistance to people in their own homes.

And as our study reports, we still have about one in ten homes where smoking takes place indoors. While we’ve seen major progress and reductions in that figure, the change also masks a growing inequality. When we look at smoking in the home by deprivation, we see that more than a fifth of households in the most deprived postcodes allow smoking indoors compared with just 2% in the most affluent areas – that inequality gap has doubled since 2012.

One of the most important public health achievements.

Unfinished business

So where next? The tobacco and vapes bill is progressing through the parliament and will provide new powers to extend smoke-free spaces to other settings in the UK.

Consultation on how to use these powers has already started, with options to provide protection in a whole range of outdoor and indoor spaces including playgrounds, at school entrances and in outdoor hospitality settings.

Tackling secondhand smoke in the remaining workplaces and homes where exposure continues to take place is a priority.

As we celebrate 20 years of smoke-free enclosed public spaces in Scotland, it is worth reflecting that the benefits have been extensive. For you it may be that you avoided a hospital admission for a heart attack or stroke, or your child didn’t need that GP appointment for their asthma or glue ear (a common ear infection in children).

Or perhaps it was just the simple joy of not having to wash your hair to get rid of the stink of smoke when you come home from a night out. Whatever your reason, it is little wonder that smoke-free spaces are viewed as one of the most important public health achievements of the first part of the 21st century.

The Conversation

Sean Semple has received research funding from various UK government and EU funding sources (e.g. UKRI, The Chief Scientist Office Scotland, Horizon Europe) and from the Colt Foundation to carry out work on understanding exposure to second-hand smoke. None of this work has been funded by the tobacco industry.

Rachel O’Donnell has received funding from various UK government and EU funding sources (e.g. UKRI, The Chief Scientist Office Scotland) and from Cancer Research UK and the National Institute for Health and Care Research to carry out work on tobacco control and other public health topics. None of this work has been funded by the tobacco industry.

– ref. Scotland’s smoking ban turns 20 – it cut secondhand smoke exposure by 96%, but the job isn’t finished yet – https://theconversation.com/scotlands-smoking-ban-turns-20-it-cut-secondhand-smoke-exposure-by-96-but-the-job-isnt-finished-yet-278939

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Ejaculating more frequently may improve sperm quality – new study

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rebecca Dean, Research Fellow, Department of Biology, University of Oxford

When it comes to reproduction, female biology is often described in terms of a ticking clock. Women are born with most of their lifetime supply of eggs, meaning that a woman’s age is usually the same as the age of her eggs. Older women therefore produce older eggs.

But male reproduction works differently. Sperm are produced continuously from puberty onwards and can be stored in the reproductive tract before ejaculation. That means a man’s age is not necessarily the same as the age of his sperm. So what happens to sperm while they wait?

Men trying to conceive are often advised to remain sexually abstinent for several days to allow their sperm count to build up. It is true that abstinence increases sperm count. But the size of the ejaculate is not the only factor that determines fertility. Our new study shows that in men (and other male animals), sperm stored during sexual abstinence actually “ages” and deteriorates in quality.

We already know that male fertility declines with age. What has remained unclear is whether the time sperm spend in storage contributes to this decline.

Answering this question is particularly timely. Sexual activity appears to be declining, especially among young people. Combined with the global trend towards delayed parenthood, this may further exacerbate global fertility declines.

For our investigation, we collected semen data from 115 published studies involving nearly 55,000 men. We found that when men abstained from ejaculation, the health of their sperm dropped significantly. Sperm motility (their ability to swim) and viability decreased – and sperm DNA became more damaged.

We identified two likely causes. The first is oxidative stress – a form of biological “rust” that accumulates in sperm and can physically damage them. The second is energy depletion. Unlike most cells, sperm are highly active and have only a limited capacity to replenish their energy reserves. When stored for extended periods, they simply run out of fuel.

The World Health Organization advises against ejaculating two to seven days before providing a sperm sample for analysis, fertility treatments or procedures such as IVF. However, our findings suggest that even shorter periods may be better if sperm quality in the sample is to be improved.

This supports a recent discovery that ejaculating within 48 hours of providing a sample improves IVF treatment outcomes compared to longer durations of abstinence. It also aligns with a hypothesis in evolutionary biology.

We know that in primates, frequent ejaculation from masturbation improves the quality of ejaculates. Combined with our results, this suggests that male masturbation may have an adaptive benefit: it flushes out damaged, stored sperm.

Sperm does not just deteriorate inside males. It can also deteriorate after mating, when stored inside females. Human sperm only remains alive inside a woman for several days. However, in other animals such as queen ants, bees and female bats, sperm can be stored for several months or even years before eggs are fertilised.

A Colorado field ant queen.
Sperm can remain viable inside queen ants for months or even years.
Amelia Martin/Shutterstock.com

The birds and the bees

To test whether sperm deterioration during storage is a widespread biological pattern, we examined data from 56 studies across 30 different animal species, including birds and bees, reptiles and other mammals. Here too, we found that sperm quality declined during storage.

Fathers who stored sperm before ejaculation, or mothers who stored it before fertilisation, produced embryos with lower chances of survival. We suspect this is not just due to damaged DNA. It may also be that stored sperm have a different gene expression profile – that is, a different pattern of which genes are actively switched on and being used – compared to freshly produced sperm.

Interestingly, sperm deteriorated at a slower rate inside females than inside males. This may be because females in several species have evolved specialised organs that secrete antioxidants, substances that nourish and protect the sperm they are storing, effectively extending their functional lifespan.

Whether in mice or men, sperm, much like eggs, have a “use-by date” after being produced. When sperm are stored for too long before fertilisation, they deteriorate in quality.

Crucially, however, our findings also point to a simple and potentially powerful intervention. Many fertility problems are driven by factors outside our control, such as environmental toxins, stress and genetics. But the duration of sperm storage is something that can be modified. Using freshly ejaculated sperm for fertilisation could therefore provide a meaningful boost to fertility outcomes by improving sperm quality.

The Conversation

Rebecca Dean receives funding from a Daphne Jackson Fellowship funded by NERC.

Irem Sepil receives funding from BBSRC and the Royal Society.

Irem Sepil receives funding from the Royal Society.
Rebecca Dean receives funding from NERC (UKRI).

– ref. Ejaculating more frequently may improve sperm quality – new study – https://theconversation.com/ejaculating-more-frequently-may-improve-sperm-quality-new-study-275373

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Eco-anxiety: how do young people relate to the climate crisis?

Source: The Conversation – France – By Daniella Watson, Research fellow, Imperial College London

“Eco-anxiety” and “climate-anxiety” are the most widely known terms describing what people feel in response to being aware of the climate crisis.

We conducted a review of published academic papers including original research articles and review papers, and found surprising results on how young people aged 10-29 years actually experience being aware of global warming and climate change and its effects.

While you might have experienced climate anxiety or know about it, you might not know what it is.

Researchers do not have agreed definitions. In the papers we examined as part of our study, eco-anxiety was defined 41 times and climate-anxiety defined 24 times.

The main inconsistency between definitions of eco-anxiety stems from the extent to which it is related to anxiety. Some definitions position eco-anxiety as an extension of generalised anxiety or as having characteristics of anxiety disorders. Whereas some do not actually mention anxiety at all in the definition and may instead use concepts like “concern or worry,” which muddies the conceptual waters.

Natural disasters versus human-made disasters

Another discrepancy is whether the definitions relate to just climate-related changes, or wider environmental changes, and whether or not the feelings relate to human-caused changes only.

Some definitions consider these terms to describe experiences coming from awareness of climate and ecological change, whereas others consider “eco” and climate-anxiety to be experienced in response to more direct climate events.

In reality, all of this is likely to be going on, and our previous research has shown that eco-anxiety levels are significantly higher in US youth aged 16-24 years who self-report exposure to climate change hazards.

Although eco-anxiety and climate-anxiety are the most commonly used terms, our review found a total of 173 experiences describing how young people think, feel and behave in response to being aware of the climate crisis. They include: Solastalgia, symptoms of depression, sleep disruptions, financial strain and hope, along with other experiences not documented in the academic literature.

A breakdown of key climate change awareness concepts

As there were so many experiences described, we organised them into six interrelated categories and sub-categories (see the chart below).

Map of the key concepts and developed 6 categories and subcategories of young people’s experiences of climate change awareness.
Courtesy of Daniella Watson, CC BY

It is important to address and be inclusive of the full spectrum of young people’s experiences beyond climate-anxiety, including the impacts on physical health such as sleep, physical activity and eating behaviours, social and cultural practices, and spiritual and community wellbeing.

Climate awareness: exploring the cultural and colonial factors

Researchers like us are working with lived experience experts around the world to co‑design research and support tools that genuinely reflect the diverse ways people understand and are affected by climate change. Because awareness of the climate crisis is shaped by history, identity, place, and power, it is essential that research is developed with people whose lives are directly touched by these dynamics.

One example of how lived experience expertise has expanded the field comes from a contributor who challenged and deepened existing definitions of eco‑anxiety. They explained:

“I think we perceived [climate-anxiety] as more of an embodied and intergenerational, deep wound that comes out of colonisation, colonial legacies and something that was a lot more personal.”

Our research uncovered no existing definitions of climate change or eco-anxiety that acknowledge the impact of colonial history on individuals’ experiences of environmental distress. By collaborating with experts in lived experience, we have deepened and sharpened our understanding in this area.

Another example of our work with lived experience experts to codesign a research evaluation of The Resilience Project’s youth‑led intervention prompted us to adopt a broader definition of resilience: not simply “bouncing back”, but balancing strength, softness and self‑care so young people can sustain climate‑care activities in ways that are genuinely protective and long‑term.

The way forward

Taken together, our findings show that young people’s experiences of being aware of the climate crisis are far more complex, varied, and culturally situated than the terms eco‑anxiety or climate‑anxiety can capture.

While these labels have become dominant in public and academic conversations, the evidence reveals a much broader landscape of emotional, social, cultural, and structural impacts: from intergenerational grief and disrupted sleep to financial strain, solastalgia, and profound reflections on justice and inequality.

The lack of consistent definitions not only limits scientific clarity but also risks narrowing how we understand and support young people living through a rapidly changing world.

If researchers, practitioners, and policymakers want to design meaningful interventions and supportive environments, they must move beyond narrow psychological framings and engage with the full spectrum of people’s lived realities.

This means codesigning research, measures, and policies with those most affected; recognising the structural and historical forces that shape climate anxiety; and ensuring that the language we use reflects the world as people actually experience it. We recognise that news outlets and social media play an important role in shaping public understanding, which is why we chose to write this article and others like it, and to share our messages with the BBC Climate Question and other media platforms.

Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund – now part of the Axa Foundation for Human Progress – has supported over 700 projects around the world with researchers from 38 countries on key environmental, health & socioeconomic risks. To learn more, visit the website of the AXA Research Fund or follow @ AXAResearchFund on LinkedIn.

The Conversation

Emma Lawrance received funding from AXA Research Fund. Emma was Director of the Climate Cares Centre at Imperial College London when this research was undertaken, and is now the Senior Research Fellow in climate change and mental health at the University of Oxford.

Daniella Watson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Eco-anxiety: how do young people relate to the climate crisis? – https://theconversation.com/eco-anxiety-how-do-young-people-relate-to-the-climate-crisis-277520

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A host nation at war with a participant: uncertainty and tension swirl around soccer’s World Cup

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Daryl Adair, Associate Professor of Sport Management, University of Technology Sydney

On March 11, Iranian Sports Minister Ahmad Donyamali announced he saw “no possibility” of the country’s men’s national soccer team taking part in the World Cup scheduled for North America in June and July this year.

That prognosis came in the wake of US and Israeli military attacks on Iran, which have triggered a crisis across the Middle East.

Never before has a World Cup host nation been at war with one of the countries participating in the tournament.

The failure to find a diplomatic solution to longstanding multilateral tensions has not only impacted the supply of oil and trade routes, it has complicated one of the world’s largest sporting events.



Read more:
Trump’s war language is aggressive and extreme. It also offers some insight into his thinking

Prizing peace, enacting war

In 2025, Gianni Infantino, president of soccer’s governing body – Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) – announced the inaugural “FIFA Peace Prize”.

FIFA, he said, intended to recognise:

the enormous efforts of those individuals who unite people, bringing hope for future generations.

In January 2026, US President Donald Trump was deemed the most worthy recipient of this accolade.

That is despite a litany of conduct at odds with the award, such as the US partnering Israel in the Gaza conflict, as well as the Trump administration’s “rapid authoritarian shift”, which has brought a substantial decline of civic freedoms at home.

Two months after Trump received his “peace prize”, the US partnered with Israel to provoke war against Iran.

Little wonder some critics have argued Trump’s award ought to be revoked.

Will Iran be welcome at the World Cup?

After meeting Infantino on March 10, Trump provided assurance the Iranian team would be “welcome to compete”.

Soon after, though, Trump wrote on his Truth Social media platform there would not be a welcome mat:

I really don’t believe it’s appropriate that they be there, for their own life and safety.

This veiled warning prompted a rebuke from the Iranian team, which insisted: “no individual could exclude a country from the World Cup”, and that it was the responsibility of a host nation to provide security guarantees for participants.

The players want to take part, even if their national sports minister feels it is a forlorn hope.

At this stage, scheduled friendly games against Nigeria and Costa Rica in Turkey, intended as preparation for the World Cup, are going ahead.

Pitch perambulations

Iran is scheduled to play three group-stage games in California and Seattle at the World Cup.

Competing in the United States is a sticking point for the Iranian Football Federation (FFIRI), which is responsible for the team.

FFIRI head Mehdi Taj stated:

We will prepare for the World Cup. We will boycott the United States but not the World Cup.

The Iranian hope, therefore, is the team be permitted to play in either Canada or Mexico, which are co-hosting with the US.

Mexico appears willing to play ball: on March 17, President Claudia Sheinbaum stated: “the nation stands prepared to host Iran’s group-stage matches should circumstances require”.

FIFA though said it was unwilling to move Iran’s matches from the US.

For the Iranians, the ability to take part seems more important than chasing a trophy: teams that make the final will play at New Jersey’s MetLife Stadium and Iran does not wish to play in the US.

Meanwhile, FIFA is privately pondering contingency arrangements should Iran not take part.

This includes making Iran’s place in the tournament vacant – which would mean a walkover for opponents – or replacing it with a team from either Iraq or the United Arab Emirates, both of which narrowly missed qualifying via the Asian Football Confederation pathway.

That said, Iraq is already scheduled to play the winner of a match between Bolivia and Suriname for a spot in the World Cup.

The UAE lost to Iraq in the relevant Asian Confederation match, yet should Iraq win its intercontinental playoff match, the team from the Emirates might be given a FIFA free kick into the World Cup.

Political football

FIFA states it is a “politically neutral” body.

But this has not stopped it excluding Russia from qualifying matches for the 2026 World Cup.

FIFA insists it did so for operational reasons: many countries refused to play against Russia, and if games were scheduled there would be concerns about security.

Privately, Infantino might be relieved Israel did not qualify for the World Cup, as both of these considerations may have come to light in the wake of the Gaza war and more recent attacks against Lebanon and Iran.

The withdrawal (or banning) of a team from the World Cup or qualifying matches has happened on a few occasions:

In each of these cases there were no follow-up penalties by FIFA.

If Iran withdraws from the World Cup, will FIFA sanction the FFIRI and, by extension, the national men’s team? A yellow card is feasible – a financial penalty. A red card is also possible – such as exclusion from the 2030 World Cup.

However, FIFA has the discretion not to impose any penalty, especially as the circumstances go beyond sport and have no parallel in World Cup history.

The Conversation

Daryl Adair does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. A host nation at war with a participant: uncertainty and tension swirl around soccer’s World Cup – https://theconversation.com/a-host-nation-at-war-with-a-participant-uncertainty-and-tension-swirl-around-soccers-world-cup-278191

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Israel wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. But should it have nuclear weapons itself?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Marianne Hanson, Associate Professor of International Relations, The University of Queensland

Israel’s avowed goal in the Middle East war is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet, the double standard associated with this is hardly sustainable in the long run.

The worst-kept secret in the world of nuclear politics is that Israel possesses a formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons. It began developing these in the 1950s and reached a fully operational capability by the late 1960s.

Although Israel refuses to confirm or deny this fact, arms control organisations have assessed that the country has some 80–90 nuclear weapons.

In recent days, Iran targeted Israel’s nuclear facility in the southern town of Dimona, injuring more than 100 people. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called for restraint to avoid a “nuclear accident”.

A program shrouded in secrecy

There is much evidence to support the existence of Israel’s arsenal.

In 1963, then-Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres famously stated Israel would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons to the Middle East. What this actually meant was spelled out a few years later by the Israeli ambassador to the US. For a weapon to be “introduced”, he said, it needed to be tested and publicly declared. Merely possessing them did not constitute introducing them.

Several whistleblower accounts, intelligence reports and satellite imagery confirm the extent of the Israeli program and its capabilities.

More recently, Amichai Eliyahu, a far-right minister in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, alluded to using nuclear weapons in Gaza – a tacit acknowledgement of Israel’s capabilities. He was later reprimanded by Netanyahu.

And in 2024, Avigdor Lieberman, a former defence and foreign minister, threatened to “use all the means at our disposal” to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon. He added: “It should be clear at this stage it is not possible to prevent nuclear weapons from Iran by conventional means.”

It is important to remember that Israel not only developed its nuclear weapons in secret – employing subterfuge, misleading claims, and even the suspected theft of bomb-grade nuclear material from the United States – it has also rejected international inspections of its facilities and refused to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty has been signed by almost every state in the world.

Concerns over Iran’s program

Iran, meanwhile, has never had a nuclear weapon, though its program has been the source of international concern for more than a decade.

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (also known as the Iran nuclear deal) with the US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, which imposed restrictions on its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. This included inspections by IAEA monitors.

However, Trump scuppered the plan in 2018. Since then, Iran has enriched uranium to levels well above those needed for its energy program. And last year, the IAEA said Iran was non-compliant with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations for failing to provide full answers about its program.

But since the current war began, US and international officials have confirmed that Iran was not close to developing a nuclear weapon and did not pose an imminent nuclear threat to the US or Israel.

In short, there is no truth to the claim, made for almost 40 years by Israel, that Iran is “weeks away” from acquiring the bomb. The IAEA made clear two years ago that a nuclear weapon requires “many other things independently from the production of the fissile material”.

Getting close to nuclear threshold status, but stopping short of developing an actual bomb, likely provides a fall-back position for Iran. If Iran were to feel pushed or threatened, it could, in time, accelerate its energy program towards a weapons program. Or it could use this enriched uranium as leverage in negotiations with the US.

Nuclear powers need to show restraint

This brings us back to a major question: can double standards about who can and cannot develop a nuclear weapon be sustained indefinitely?

Israel’s nuclear arsenal has been tacitly accepted by the West, implying there are “right hands” and “wrong hands” for nuclear weapons. But this is a risky and ultimately unsustainable position.

As Australia’s Canberra Commission noted in 1996, as long as any one state has nuclear weapons, other states will want them, too.

This is precisely why many states voted in 2017 to adopt the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty’s purpose is to make the possession, threat and use of nuclear weapons illegitimate for all states, not just for some, on the basis of international humanitarian law.

Signed by 99 states so far, the treaty recognises that nuclear weapons promise massive destruction to civilians and combatants alike, and that even a “small” nuclear war will cause catastrophic damage.

At the end of the day, a consistent approach to nuclear weapons is more likely to prevent nuclear proliferation (by Iran or other states) than the current mess, where some states are tacitly permitted to have these weapons (and wage war on others), while other countries are not.

It is possible we are at a tipping point when it comes to nuclear proliferation, with some countries suspected of wanting to develop nuclear weapon capabilities. This includes US allies South Korea and Japan.

Are the nuclear weapons states ultimately willing to accept the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and disarm in the interest of global peace and security? If they don’t, then the current trajectory of keeping one’s own nuclear weapons and waging war against states that don’t have them will only weaken an already crumbling rules-based international order.

The Conversation

Marianne Hanson has previously received funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UK Foreign Office and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. She is currently co-chair of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) Australia.

– ref. Israel wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. But should it have nuclear weapons itself? – https://theconversation.com/israel-wants-to-destroy-irans-nuclear-program-but-should-it-have-nuclear-weapons-itself-278801