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April 10, 2026

Undertone: this creepy sound horror is utterly terrifying

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Laura O’Flanagan, PhD Candidate, School of English, Dublin City University

Undertone is the terrifying feature film debut from Canadian director Ian Tuason, which promises to be the “scariest movie you will ever hear”.

Evy (Nina Kiri) is a podcast host caring for her dying mother (Michèle Duquet) at home. Told only from Evy’s perspective, the film moves from initially creepy to utterly horrifying over a tense, tight 93-minute running time.

Evy’s Undertone podcast explores supernatural phenomena. Her co-host Justin (Adam DiMarco) is in another time zone, so they record online in the middle of the night, Evy’s time. This veers close to the “witching hour”, but as Evy is the podcast’s resident sceptic – the voice of reason opposing Justin’s belief in the paranormal – she is unbothered. Until she’s not.

For this week’s instalment, Evy and Justin react to a series of mysterious recordings involving a couple: Jessa (Keana Lyn Bastidas), who has begun talking in her sleep, and her husband Mike (Jeff Yung), who records her. These clips lend the story a naturally escalating structure, as the material grows increasingly distressing and the sense of dread intensifies.

As elements from the recordings seep into Evy’s world and her sense of reality begins to shift, Kiri proves superb in the role. Alone onscreen aside from her unconscious mother, she balances a raw fragility with intense emotional control. Kiri carries the film almost entirely, with supporting characters reduced to voices in her headphones or on her phone.

Undertone’s domestic setting has an uncanny familiarity to it, with soft furnishings, lamps and religious artwork bathed in cold, often unpredictably flickering light. Compounding the disquiet is the fact that Tuason used his childhood home in Toronto as his filming location, inspired by caring for his own ailing parents.

The result is an uneasy intimacy which blurs the line between personal memory and horror. This, combined with Evy’s mother’s impending death and the harrowing implications of the audio clips, makes the film a disturbing yet consistently absorbing experience.

At times, though, Tuason leans too heavily on religious iconography to generate unease, diluting some of the originality. The film also flirts with shock value using inherently distressing subject matter, rather than fully earning its impact.

Sound as terror

Sound design is Undertone’s real strength. As podcast host Justin says: “Don’t be afraid of the dark, be afraid of the silence.”

The film captures the sound of podcasting with close, warm, immaculately clear voices and achieves an intimate, studio-polished quality. Building the sense of unease, there are authentic-sounding sleep-talking recordings, nursery rhymes played backwards, exaggerated household noises such as taps and whistling kettles, and prolonged silences.

Other horror films such as Berberian Sound Studio, The Black Phone and Keeper have harnessed the unsettling potential of sound in recent years, exploring the eerie power of disembodied voices.

This is a lineage Undertone joins while carving out a more intimate horror. Tuason’s film also makes narrative use of the podcast hosts’ editing skills to great effect, as they speed up, slow down, reverse and replay the recordings over and over, trying to glean some sense from them. In doing so, sound becomes Undertone’s primary source of terror, placing its audience in the same position as Evy.

Undertone is a confident debut from Tuason, who understands exactly where the film’s power lies. By grounding its horror in voice and sound, the film becomes an experience that feels immediate and inescapable.

In placing us so firmly within Evy’s singular perspective, Undertone crosses the boundary between listener and participant, resulting in a work which fulfils its promise of terror. It is not for the faint of heart.

Laura O’Flanagan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Undertone: this creepy sound horror is utterly terrifying – https://theconversation.com/undertone-this-creepy-sound-horror-is-utterly-terrifying-279915

April 10, 2026

Embryo fossil found in South Africa is world’s oldest proof that mammal ancestors laid eggs

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Julien Benoit, Associate professor in Vertebrate Palaeontology, University of the Witwatersrand

Artist’s impression of _Lystrosaurus_ embryo. Artist: Sophie Vrard, CC BY

Between 280 and 200 million years ago, a group of animals evolved which would eventually give rise to mammals, including humans: the therapsids. They were first described more than 150 years ago, based on fossils from South Africa. Since then, many more fossils have been discovered.

James Kitching, one of the most talented South African fossil hunters of the 20th century, excavated many thousands of therapsids from the rocks of the Karoo (a semi-arid region of the country’s interior). He also found fossilised dinosaur eggs, but neither he nor any palaeontologist after him ever found therapsid eggs.

They should exist, because some mammals (platypus and echidnas) do lay eggs. But Kitching began to doubt that therapsids laid eggs: perhaps, he thought, they were, like most of their mammalian descendants, already viviparous (giving live birth)?

We are scientists who study extinct animals and the environments they lived in millions of years ago to understand more about the evolution of life. In our new paper we describe, for the first time, the embryo-containing fossilised egg of a 250 million-year-old mammalian ancestor.

It finally shows that therapsids were indeed egg-laying (oviparous). This discovery sheds new light on the reproduction and survival strategy of that group of animals.

Hand holding what looks like a stone egg — The egg about to be synchrotron scanned at the ESRF.
Author provided, CC BY

A 20-year-old mystery

The fossil egg and embryo we described was discovered near Oviston, in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa, by John Nyaphuli, a palaeontologist from Bloemfontein, in 2008. It’s been kept in the National Museum in Bloemfontein. We knew that it belonged to a species that lived 252 million to 250 million years ago called Lystrosaurus, but we didn’t know whether the species was an egg-layer. The adult looked like a pig, with naked skin, a beak like a turtle, and two tusks sticking out and pointing down.

The reason it took 20 years to prove that it had been in an egg is that this fossil preserves no shell. Only a curled-up embryo is visible. If there was a shell, it was likely leathery or had dissolved. Only the most advanced dinosaurs laid hard-shelled eggs.

So how could we find out whether this young creature had once been inside an egg?

The answer to this question lay in the advanced technology of the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility at Grenoble, France. There, we used a powerful X-ray source to image the inside of the bones of the embryo. Under this treatment, the fossil unveiled all its long-kept secrets – most crucially, its stage of development.

3D reconstruction of the embryo based on synchrotron scan performed at the ESRF.
Author supplied, CC BY

We discovered that the lower jaws of its beak were not completely fused. This developmental trait is only found in modern turtles and birds in which jaw bones fuse long before they are born so that their beak is strong enough for the hatchling to catch and crush its food.

This meant that our curled up Lystrosaurus embryo had died in ovo (in an egg), tightly nestled in its soft, leathery eggshell. This was the evidence palaeontologists had been looking for.

Thanks to the synchrotron-assisted examination of its lower jaw, we could finally demonstrate that this embryo was indeed that of an unhatched Lystrosaurus baby.

Famous survivor

What does it unravel about the survival strategy of Lystrosaurus?

Lystrosaurus is a herbivorous (plant-eating) therapsid famous for surviving the “Great Dying”, which was a major mass extinction of species 252 million years ago. During this event, 90% of all living things on Earth died. Life almost ceased to exist, which makes this the second most important event in the history of life on Earth after the origin of life itself.

How Lystrosaurus survived this is still an intriguing mystery, but the egg gives a possible clue. The fossil we describe shows that the animal laid arguably large eggs for its body size. Large eggs are produced by species that feed their embryos with yolk rather than milk. The young develop to an advanced stage in the egg and then they hatch. In contrast, monotremes (the platypus and echidnas), which feed milk to their young, lay small eggs because the baby is fed after hatching. The large size of its egg implies that Lystrosaurus did not feed milk to its young.

More relevant to its survival strategy, this further indicates two things. Firstly, it means that the egg was less prone to desiccation (drying out). The larger the egg, the smaller its surface area (comparatively speaking), so Lystrosaurus eggs would lose less water through their leathery shell than those of other species of that time. Given the dry environment during and in the immediate aftermath of the extinction, this was a significant advantage, especially since hard-shelled eggs would not evolve for another 50 million years, at least.

Secondly, a large egg implies that Lystrosaurus was likely precocial, meaning that the babies likely hatched at an advanced stage of their development. Lystrosaurus hatchlings were big enough to feed by themselves and run away from predators, and would reach maturity faster so they could reproduce early.

Growing up fast, reproducing young and proliferating were the secrets of Lystrosaurus survival.

Our ability to identify the fossil egg adds to our understanding of the origin of mammalian reproductive biology and lactation, and the survival strategy of Lystrosaurus in the most devastating biological crisis. This is significant to better grasp how modern species might cope with the current sixth mass extinction of species.

Julien Benoit receives funding from the DSTI-NRF African Origins Platform and GENUS Centre of Excellence in Palaeosciences.

Vincent Fernandez works for the ESRF synchrotron and was awarded beamtime at the ESRF for this experiment.

Jennifer Botha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Embryo fossil found in South Africa is world’s oldest proof that mammal ancestors laid eggs – https://theconversation.com/embryo-fossil-found-in-south-africa-is-worlds-oldest-proof-that-mammal-ancestors-laid-eggs-277673

April 10, 2026

After ceasefire, negotiating a lasting deal with Iran would require overcoming regional rivalries and strategic incoherence

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ioana Emy Matesan, Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan University

A man walks in the rubble of a damaged Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, Iran, following U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Shadati/Xinhua via Getty Images

President Donald Trump’s rapid and dramatic turn from threatening to kill “an entire civilization” in Iran on the morning of April 7, 2026, to announcing a two-week ceasefire later that day left many observers with a sense of whiplash.

While it is difficult to predict whether the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran will hold or how events will unfold, the dynamics of the conflict so far reveal multiple vulnerabilities in the short term and numerous detrimental effects on the region in the medium to long term.

Already, the truce has shown signs of strain. Iran and the U.S. almost immediately offered dueling narratives about the agreement, including whether it would cover the war in Lebanon. Iran and Pakistan, the primary mediator, asserted that it would, while the U.S. and Israel, which pledged to honor the U.S. agreement, said it would not. Indeed, a day after the ceasefire came into force, Israel conducted some of its most intense bombing in Lebanon to date.

As an expert in Middle East politics, I believe that the involvement of so many governments and militant groups – in both the negotiation process and in terms of the regional effects of the conflict – make it more difficult to uphold a ceasefire.

Over the past decade, there has been a shift in regional alliances in the Middle East, leading to increasingly assertive foreign policies by many countries and a deepening rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The current war only fuels these dynamics, incentivizing competition and offering governments and militant groups new opportunities to exert leverage over opponents.

The current reality also underlines the idea that external intervention and privileging war over diplomacy has made conflict resolution ever more difficult in a region with a long history of imperial expansion, great power competition and bitter political divides.

A man stands in a destroyed building as smoke rises around him. — A Lebanese man gathers his belongings from his home, which was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike a day after the ceasefire with Iran went into effect.
AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti

Regional fault lines

One of the more remarkable aspects of the war in Iran that began on Feb. 28 was how quickly it escalated in terms of geographic scope and the actors pulled into it.

The three key countries involved – Israel, the U.S and Iran – are all facing internal political tensions, polarization and legitimacy crises.

Outside countries such as China, Russia and Pakistan have deployed their own strategic interests and diplomatic tools in the conflict in indirectly getting involved.

The conflict has also drawn in a variety of regional governments and other groups, from [Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states] to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

All of that is bound to deepen the fault lines that make regional tensions and sectarian conflict more likely in the long run.

Meanwhile, public opinion in the Arab world shows profound damage to the United States’ reputation in the region and a loss of credibility in the international legal and humanitarian system.

I think these developments are also deeply troubling for the long term.

Events since the war began have been bad enough. The war has led to over 1,200 Iranian civilian deaths, over 3.2 million Iranians temporarily displaced and significant damage to Iranian infrastructure. Thirteen American soldiers have also died in the course of the conflict, as have more than two dozen in Israel and the Gulf states.

That’s to say nothing of the toll in Lebanon, where more than 1,500 people have died and more than 1 million displaced since the beginning of March.

The Houthis and the politics of regional instability

The Houthis in Yemen, one of the conflict participants that remained surprisingly silent at the outbreak of the war, are instructive for understanding the region’s complicated and fractured dynamics.

As a religious rebel movement that follows the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, the Houthis, who took over Yemen’s capital in 2014, have been the target of sustained military operations by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since 2015. This has only pushed them closer to Tehran.

Protesters burn flags at a demonstration. — Houthi supporters burn American and Israeli flags during a rally against the war on Iran in Sanaa, Yemen, on April 3, 2026.
AP Photo/Osamah Abdulrahman

Avowed opponents of Israel, the Houthis declared war against the country following the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2024, the Houthis attacked maritime shipping in the Red Sea near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a key maritime choke point. That prefigured, in a much smaller and less consequential way, Iran’s own actions in blocking the Strait of Hormuz during the current crisis.

That Houthi campaign to block maritime shipping resulted in a U.S.-led international coalition and significant military strikes against the insurgent group, their redesignation as a foreign terrorist organization, and ultimately a ceasefire deal between the U.S. and the Houthi movement in May 2025.

Yet the underlying regional disputes and domestic fractures that the Houthis were part of were never resolved.

Eventually, the Houthis reentered the fight against Israel amid the latest war in Iran, attacking Israel on March 28.

They refrained from attacks in the Red Sea and currently are observing the ceasefire. But entering the war enabled a weakened Houthi movement to signal resolve, military capacity and commitment to its alliance with Iran, just as Yemen continues to face an economic and severe humanitarian crisis. The Houthis now also have added leverage to play the role of spoiler amid ongoing diplomacy.

The costs of diplomacy avoidance

Of course, the Houthis are not the only movement that will perceive the war on Iran as an opportunity to exert regional influence.

Just as the Houthis and their enemies are using regional conflicts to boost their domestic legitimacy and strategic advantages, so too are the more salient participants − Iran, Israel and the U.S. − relitigating their own past conflicts on the battlefield.

Amid all of these current regional trends of crises and contestation, the United States’ own strategic goals have remained remarkably unclear. The Trump administration has vacillated from a focus on regime change to preventing Iran from developing nuclear capabilities.

A man in a suit walks away from a lectern. — President Donald Trump departs a news conference on April 6, the day before threatening to destroy Iran’s civilization − and then agreeing to a ceasefire.
AP Photo/Julia Demaree Nikhinson

So far, there are no indications that talks with Iran to extend the ceasefire into a full diplomatic agreement will successfully prevent Iran from pursuing uranium enrichment. Indeed, one of the contested points of the framework for talks with Iran is the apparent acceptance of Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment.

In 2018, Trump abandoned the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or so-called Iran deal. In it, Iran agreed to terms, including limiting uranium enrichment, that would block its path to a nuclear weapon, should it have desired one.

Under the Iran deal, Tehran had also complied with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It was not until much after American withdrawal from the agreement that Iran once again started stockpiling uranium and pursuing enrichment.

In her 2020 book on the tenuous 22-month diplomatic process leading to the Iran deal, aptly titled “Not for the Faint of Heart,” Ambassador Wendy Sherman wrote how complex, challenging and delicate such multiparty negotiations can be.

But the recent war on Iran suggests that the current machine-gun politics approach toward Tehran and the Middle East favored by the U.S. and Israel comes with serious costs and risks.

In the course of a war with unclear targets, vague strategic objectives and high human costs, the region is far less stable than it was when the conflict began. That has made the path to long-term durable peace all the more difficult now that diplomacy is back on the table.

Ioana Emy Matesan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. After ceasefire, negotiating a lasting deal with Iran would require overcoming regional rivalries and strategic incoherence – https://theconversation.com/after-ceasefire-negotiating-a-lasting-deal-with-iran-would-require-overcoming-regional-rivalries-and-strategic-incoherence-280243

April 10, 2026

What will it take to get ships going through the Strait of Hormuz again?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jennifer Parker, Adjunct Professor, Defence and Security Institute, The University of Western Australia; UNSW Sydney

Wednesday’s ceasefire announcement by President Donald Trump, linked to Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, prompted immediate optimism shipping would quickly resume. It didn’t.

The following morning, traffic remained minimal. A handful of vessels, largely linked to Iran, made the transit. But most of the ships waiting in the Gulf stayed put. Iran announced shortly afterwards that it would effectively close the strait because of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon.

The reality is the strait was never closed. Framing the issue as “open” or “closed” misses the point.

Ships are not being physically blocked. They are being deterred.

Over recent weeks, Iran has demonstrated both the capability and intent to target commercial shipping. Attacks and credible threats against vessels have driven daily transits down from around 130 to just a handful. Until that risk changes, ships will not return in meaningful numbers.

So what can be done to turn this around?

Both walking and talking

The ceasefire declarations have added to the uncertainty rather than resolved it.

Washington has asserted that the strait is open.

Tehran’s messaging has been more ambiguous, including references to requiring vessels to inform Iranian authorities before transiting.

Some interpret this as a precursor to attempts to exert control over the waterway through a toll.

This ambiguity matters. Shipping is a commercial activity driven by risk calculations. Operators and crews will not move on the basis of political statements, particularly when recent experience suggests those statements may not hold.

The importance of reassurance

In practice, restoring traffic through the strait will likely occur in two phases.

The first is reducing the threat. That can occur through military means, diplomacy, or a combination of both, but it must materially degrade Iran’s ability and willingness to target shipping.

The second is reassurance.

Even if Iran’s attacks on civilian shipping stop as a result of the ceasefire, shipping will not immediately return. Confidence has been shaken and will take time to rebuild.

A credible reassurance effort would include limited naval escorts, at least initially. It’s notable the US did not move immediately to demonstrate confidence in the ceasefire by escorting US flagged and crewed commercial vessels out of the Gulf.

That would have sent a clear signal to industry, helped restore confidence in transits and undercut subsequent Iranian claims that ships require approval from its armed forces.

Given Iran’s interest in maintaining the ceasefire, it would have been unlikely to challenge ships under US naval protection. The US hesitation has instead created space for Iran to entrench its position, pushing vessels closer to its coastline and reinforcing its ability to shape how the strait is used.

An effective reassurance campaign would also involve a broader international presence to provide surveillance, information-sharing and rapid response capability. The international community should move quickly to establish this. Its very establishment would help restore confidence in transits.

We have seen this model before. The International Maritime Security Construct, established in 2019 following Iranian attacks in the Gulf of Oman, focused on transparency, coordination and reassurance rather than large-scale convoy operations.

I served as the construct’s Director of Plans in 2020. A similar, but more effective, approach is likely to be required again. It is not a silver bullet, but reassurance is layered, and this would at least provide the clarity and communication shippers need.

Diplomacy will also matter. Clear, coordinated messaging from the international community, backed by explicit economic consequences for any renewed attacks on merchant shipping, will be essential to rebuilding confidence.

The question of tolls

There has also been speculation about whether Iran might seek to impose a toll on vessels transiting the strait.

The legal position here is clear. The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Ships enjoy the right of transit passage through the strait. Charging vessels for passage would cut directly against that principle and set a dangerous precedent for other strategic waterways.

There are early signs Iran is testing the boundaries. Reports of radio calls warning vessels they require approval to transit, and suggestions that ships should notify Iranian authorities before transiting, point to an attempt to exert greater control over the strait.

That should be resisted.

Allowing a toll, or even limited restrictions, to take hold in the Strait of Hormuz would have far-reaching consequences, undermining the central principle of maritime trade: freedom of navigation. Regardless of Donald Trump’s flippant comments, the international community is unlikely to accept any enduring Iranian toll system.

If Iran attempts to pursue one, it should face clear economic consequences, including sanctions.

Questions remain about whether mines have been laid in or near the strait. Even the suggestion adds to uncertainty and reinforces the need for a coordinated international response, including transparent assessments of the threat environment.

A clear, public assessment from the international community on whether the strait has in fact been mined would go a long way. It should be an early priority for any coalition effort.

The bottom line

Ultimately, shipping will return to the Strait of Hormuz not when it is declared open, but when it is assessed to be safe enough.

That will require a sustained period without attacks, a visible international effort to secure the waterway, and clear signalling that the rules governing international straits will be upheld.

Until then, the ships will wait.

Jennifer Parker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What will it take to get ships going through the Strait of Hormuz again? – https://theconversation.com/what-will-it-take-to-get-ships-going-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-again-280275

April 10, 2026

May elections: what five politics experts are looking out for

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool

On May 7 2026, voters in England, Scotland and Wales will head to the polls. Parliamentary elections are taking place in the devolved Welsh Senedd Cymru and Scottish Parliament, and local elections for over 4,850 councillor roles could have huge implications for local governments throughout England. With all to play for, we asked five experts to tell us what they will be keeping their eye on.

Can Reform compete across the UK?

Jonathan Tonge, Professor of Politics, University of Liverpool

The 2026 elections will reveal whether Reform UK will peak as an English nationalist party, or if they can compete as a genuine nationwide force. Last year’s local elections confirmed that Reform can seriously harm the Conservatives. This year, contests are across councils held mainly by Labour, making the English elections about Reform’s threat to Keir Starmer’s party.

Nigel Farage’s party, which currently has eight MPs, has led opinion polls in England since May 2025, when it won the highest vote in English local elections. Reform took control of ten councils (from a starting point of zero), and gained nearly 700 new councillors. Of these, eight were county council gains from the Conservatives, with another taken from a Liberal Democrat-led coalition. The tenth gain was from Labour in the only metropolitan borough contested, Doncaster.

Reform’s likely gains in English councils aren’t guaranteed elsewhere in the UK however. The party’s polling in Scotland is around ten percentage points behind what it is in England. It may be that Reform is battling Labour for second place, while the Scottish National Party (SNP) continues to dominate.

Reform’s polling in Wales is higher (in the mid-to-high-20% range) but again, the real battle is with Labour for runner-up, as Plaid Cymru seems set to top the poll.

Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru, Birmingham Council dome — Elections in the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru, and local councils across England will drastically reshape the UK’s political landscape this May.
Wangkun Jia/shutterstock, trabantos/shutterstock, Juan Garcia Hinojosa/Shutterstock

Local results could force tricky coalitions

Alex Nurse, Reader in Urban Planning, University of Liverpool

Local elections are often concerned with local issues – think potholes and bin collections. Councils are also obliged by law to spend a lot of their time and budget on initiatives like adult social care, but these issues are often lost in the broad brush strokes of election campaigns.

It will be interesting to see how the ascendant Greens and Reform present their vision for local government, and what compromises they make to win over local voters. In the recent Gorton and Denton byelection, Green candidate Hannah Spencer made scarce mention of the environment and instead focused heavily on the cost of living and the broader social contract. Similarly, Reform’s promise to mimic the US Department of Government Efficiency (Doge) following the 2025 elections came up short after its newly elected councillors found local authorities already cut to the bone from years of austerity.

I’ll also be watching to see how the fragmented opinion polls translate into council seats. While we might be expecting a wipeout for Labour and the Conservatives, it remains to be seen how many councils the other parties will win wholesale, and where there will be situations of no overall control, requiring tricky coalition building. This might involve attempts to form a coalition of like-minded councillors, as seen in Bristol. However, the reality is often that parties attempt to go it alone, by entering minority government and living vote by vote, as seen in places like Sheffield or Wirral.

Challenges to inclusive Scottish identity

Murray Leith, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Migration, Diaspora, Citizenship and Identity, University of the West of Scotland

The SNP has long predicated its sense of national identity on a civic and inclusive
Scottishness. Its message throughout the past 19 years has been that anyone who believes in Scotland can be Scottish. While other parliamentary parties have challenged and attacked myriad SNP platforms and policies in the last two decades, none disagree with this political elite consensus.

However, this agreement has not been as duly accepted by people in Scotland who
are less accepting of incomers and migrants (from the rest of the UK and beyond) claiming Scottish identity. Scotland has shifted from an emigrant nation to an immigrant nation in recent years. Without immigration, Scotland’s population would have shrunk. While migration policy remains reserved to Westminster, it looms large in the minds of voters – so much so, that the SNP has made devolving immigration power to Scotland one of its 14 key manifesto pledges.

Reform UK is openly challenging this inclusive and welcoming political consensus. In his first speech, Malcolm Offord, Reform’s Scottish leader spoke of strangers and uncontrolled immigration destabilising communities. Given recent polling and the possibility that Reform may be the official opposition in the next Scottish parliament, the SNP may soon be facing an opposition that proposes a less inclusive vision of Scottishness.

A potentially huge turnover on councils

Hannah Bunting, Senior Lecturer in Quantitative British Politics and Co-director of The Elections Centre, University of Exeter

In the English local elections, I’m keeping an eye out for how many incumbents lose their seats. We know that voters are disillusioned with the two main parties and looking for alternatives. Last year in the 2025 locals, and in many council byelections since, less than 40% of Labour and Conservative incumbents were re-elected. According to our data at The Elections Centre, this figure hasn’t dropped below 70% since 1973.

There are also many more vacancies this year compared to 2025, with Labour defending half of the nearly 5,000 up for grabs, and the Conservatives defending another quarter of them. If this rate of losses continues, we are going to see thousands of new councillors elected, with huge implications for local governments.

Two Labour strongholds, Sunderland and Barnsley, are currently polling in favour of Reform, as is Walsall, which has been held by the Conservatives since 2004. The Greens are making headway in the inner boroughs of London, and councils with “no overall control” may be more common than ever in the capital after these contests. Labour has the furthest to fall, and all eyes will be on how many gains Reform and the Greens make, alongside how many areas turn to the Liberal Democrats as an alternative.

A proportional system in the Senedd

Anwen Elias, Reader in Politics, Aberystwyth University

Changes to the way Welsh voters elect the Senedd – a proportional system where one vote is cast for a political party’s list of candidates across 16 new constituencies – will require parties to campaign very differently compared to previous elections. The extent to which they can adapt will affect how they perform.

Under the previous electoral system, most Senedd members (40 out of 60) were elected under first-past-the-post, with the rest elected through proportional regional lists. There was an incentive to focus attention and resources on key seats where a political party had the best chances of winning. Under the new system parties will need to gain support from across Wales if they want to ensure a strong presence in the Senedd.

This requires a different kind of campaign strategy and organisation, which is likely to be especially challenging for parties with fewer resources. Within constituencies – some of which are huge – political parties will have to mobilise activists in areas where historically they might not have had a much presence or electoral support. Parties with the available resources for a coordinated national campaign and a strong media, and social media, presence will have a clear advantage under this new system.

Alex Nurse receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

Anwen Elias receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

Hannah Bunting receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

Murray Leith has previously received funding from the European Union and the Scottish Government. He is a member of the Electoral Reform Society.

Jonathan Tonge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. May elections: what five politics experts are looking out for – https://theconversation.com/may-elections-what-five-politics-experts-are-looking-out-for-279260

April 10, 2026

Five warning signs that rivers are polluted – even when they look clean

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jess Neumann, Associate Professor of Hydrology, University of Reading

After months of relentlessly miserable weather for most of the UK, spring brings renewed enthusiasm for spending time outdoors hiking, wild swimming, paddling or on walks.

Millions of people visit lakes and riversides every year. Yet with constant, and sadly necessary, reminders about sewage and water pollution, it’s not surprising that people are increasingly worried about whether the water they see is safe.

Cocktails of contaminants created by sewage systems, agricultural pollutants and urban runoff are currently at the forefront of public, scientific and regulatory focus.

Not one UK river was free from chemical contamination, and only 14% were classified as having “good ecological status” at the last assessment.

In 2024 alone, raw and partially treated sewage was discharged in to watercourses for more than 3.6 million hours. With around 15,000 sites regularly discharging effluent, in addition to ongoing inputs from agriculture, transport and other industries, the 2025 results due to be published this year are not expected to show significant improvement.

Given this, many people who spend time around rivers want to know how to identify pollution.

A sewage pipe pours water into a river. — diegorayaces/Shutterstock

It’s worth remembering that pollution isn’t always visible.

River contaminants take many forms. Some, like oil sheens, excrement, sanitary products and fly-tipping are visible and often odorous. Others such as nutrients including phosphates and nitrates, heavy metals, microplastics, and chemicals like ammonia and Pfas “forever chemicals” are invisible to the naked eye.

Pollutants may enter rivers from points such as discharge pipes, but also from farmland or roads, making them difficult to trace. Assuming you’re not armed with specialist pollution testing kit, identifying contamination often relies on observing indirect signs. Here are five indicators to look out for along with the conditions in which they are most likely to appear:

1. Sewage fungus

Look out for a pungent, gelatinous, fuzzy carpet along the river bed, often found downstream of sewage outfall pipes.

Although not technically a fungus, these slimy, brownish-grey growths of bacteria and microorganisms thrive in nutrient-rich waters. Sewage fungus reduces oxygen levels in water, suffocating and physically smothering aquatic life.

2. Algal blooms

Look out for thick green mats or scum on the surface of the water, often looking like pea soup or spilled paint in green, blue-green, or brownish-black colours. Odours may be musty, earthy or grassy.

Algae is a natural part of aquatic ecosystems. Warm and dry weather combined with overloads of nitrogen and phosphorus nutrients, can trigger excessive algal growth. Algal blooms block light and use up available oxygen during their decomposition in a process known as eutrophication. The effects of algal blooms, especially blue-green algae can be catastrophic to aquatic life, and toxic to humans and pets.

3. Murky water

Look out for colours that are different to what’s expected, and cannot be easily explained by what you know about the local landscape.

Sewage tends to present as grey, cloudy or milky, sometimes accompanied by bubbles, foam and a foul odour. Green or blue-green is indicative of algal blooms. Unusual colours like orange, red, yellow, or black may suggest industrial leaching or chemical dumping. Soil erosion can cause large quantities of suspended solids giving rivers a murky brown appearance that reduces light penetration and can suffocate organisms.

However, not all colours are a cause for concern. Heavy rain will naturally suspend particles and transport sediments giving rivers a temporary murky appearance. Local geology and soils may result in tea-coloured water caused by high iron content, or oily sheens caused by aerobic iron-fixing bacteria in boggy areas. You may even spot harmless dyes used by water companies and contractors to trace drainage leaks and misconnections.

4. White foam

Look out for bright white or milky-grey foam that doesn’t easily disperse. It is often accompanied by a perfume, soapy or detergent-like smell.

Man-made foam from sewage, detergents, fire-fighting activities, pesticide runoff and industrial processes causes oxygen depletion in water. They can contain noxious forever chemicals known to cause serious health conditions in humans and wildlife.

Understanding river foam requires a discerning eye – not all foam is bad. Natural foam, while aesthetically unpleasant, can be formed by decaying leaves and plants. White-to-brown in colour, natural foam smells earthy or slightly fishy. It can collect in large clumps and is common on windy days, following heavy rain and in turbulent and nutrient-rich waters. In the absence of other environmental impacts like dead fish, algal blooms, or obviously stagnant water, natural foam is rarely problematic.

5. Aquatic life

Look out signs of distress including fish gasping at the surface, dead fish, or unusual behaviour from animals that live in and around the river.

Pollution causes a decrease in dissolved oxygen, which alongside drought and temperature extremes are leading causes of fish deaths and wildlife distress.

The presence of species such as kingfishers, water voles, frogs and riverflies indicate a cleaner river environment. A prolonged and noticeable absence of wildlife using the river is a concerning sign.

Interpreting the signs and taking action

Even with these indicators, identifying pollution is not always clear-cut. Many of these signs can overlap or have natural explanations, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions based on appearance alone.

To build a clearer picture, it’s important to consider additional information. For example:

Are there unusual smells?
Is there a visible discharge point nearby?
Have there been reports of people or animals becoming ill after contact with the water?
Has there been recent sewage discharge in the area?
In England, water companies provide near real-time data on sewage discharges through monitoring systems. However, these show how long spills occur, not the volume or concentration of pollutants, so they offer only part of the picture.

If you suspect serious pollution, it should be reported immediately to the relevant environmental authority.

While the current state of our waterways is concerning, understanding the signs of pollution and taking action are important steps toward improvement. Being well informed could help avoid turning your day out on the water into an unpleasant and potentially unhealthy experience for you and your friends and family.

Jess Neumann works at the University of Reading as an Associate Professor of Hydrology. She is a trustee of River Mole River Watch, a water quality charity who work with, advise, and receive funding from environmental and conservation organisations and agencies, water companies, commercial services, local authorities and community groups. She is a Director of the UK Chapter for the International Association for Landscape Ecology.

– ref. Five warning signs that rivers are polluted – even when they look clean – https://theconversation.com/five-warning-signs-that-rivers-are-polluted-even-when-they-look-clean-279881

April 10, 2026

Children going through family courts face increased risk of self-harm, new research finds

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amanda Marchant, Research Assistant & PhD Candidate in Mental Health, Swansea University

Family courts step in at some of the hardest moments in a child’s life, when parents separate or when there are concerns about their safety.

We already know that children involved in care proceedings are more likely to self-harm. But most children who come into contact with family courts are there because of disputes between parents, not safeguarding concerns. Until now we have known comparatively little about these children or what happens to them after court proceedings end.

For the first time, our research tracked self-harm over time in these children. We found that children who go through the family courts, whether because of parental separation or welfare concerns, are more likely to self-harm than those who do not.

This doesn’t mean the courts themselves are causing harm. This increased risk is more likely linked to the circumstances that lead families to court in the first place. Family courts are an often-missed opportunity to offer help.

We analysed anonymised family court records alongside routinely collected health data for more than 700,000 children between 2011 and 2018. Around 17,000 had been involved in private cases – usually disputes over finances or living arrangements after separation. Another 5,500 were involved in public cases, where local authorities step in over concerns about a child’s welfare.

The risk of self-harm was about twice as high after private cases and more than three times as high after public ones.

Exterior of a building with the sign Family and Youth Court — Children involved in family court were more likely to self-harm than those with no court contact.
Diana Parkhouse/Shutterstock

Previous research shows that families in contact with courts often face challenges beyond the courtroom. They are more likely to live in deprived areas and to experience mental or physical health problems, in both caregivers and children. These factors are already known to increase the risk of self-harm in young people.

Historically, people designing services for families have not always had enough data to guide the decisions made in family courts. Evidence now shows elevated risks not just of self-harm but for a range of adverse outcomes, including depression, anxiety and poorer educational attainment. Yet family courts receive far less public attention than many other issues affecting young people.

A warning sign we shouldn’t ignore

Self-harm is relatively common in adolescents. Most young people who self-harm do not go on to die by suicide. However, it is one of the clearest signals of distress and one of the strongest risk factors for suicide. This makes early identification and support especially important.

Children who come into contact with family courts should be a priority for support.

Parental separations are common. Many children experience them and their effects can be underestimated and downplayed because of that. Around one in ten separating families turn to family courts to resolve disputes, often as a last resort because of the financial and emotional costs. It may also reflect high levels of conflict between parents.

The decisions made during these proceedings can be life changing for children. Where families reach the point of involving family courts, we should ensure that support is available for the whole family, especially for children.

Family courts are in a unique position. They come into contact with children and families, with complex and intersecting needs, at important moments that have the potential to shape the rest of their lives.

We believe that contact with the courts should be seen as an opportunity to identify the needs of these families and offer practical, timely support to children and their families. This might include wider networks such as schools, community services and primary care or to provide clearer pathways to specialist mental health support where needed.

Decisions made in family courts have the potential to shape children’s lives at critical moments. These moments should be seen as signals of need, not just legal milestones. If we act on them, we have a real chance to support children at the point they need it most.

Amanda Marchant receives funding from Health and Care Research Wales (HCRW).

Ann John receives funding from MRC, Health and Care Research Wales and NIHR.

– ref. Children going through family courts face increased risk of self-harm, new research finds – https://theconversation.com/children-going-through-family-courts-face-increased-risk-of-self-harm-new-research-finds-278263

April 10, 2026

I was in Georgia in the late 1980s: I observed how tradition survived harsh Sovietisation and rapid transformation

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Karina Vamling, Professor emerita of Caucasus Studies, Malmö University

Begos’ Friends by Georgian painter Niko Pirosmani, painted in the 1910s. At a keipi or festive supra, the tamada holds a kantsi (horn) and introduces a toast.
Wikiuka/Wikimedia

When Soviet president and Communist party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policies of perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (openness) in the mid-1980s, it marked the beginning of cautious reforms of the Soviet Union. Georgia, or the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, to give it its full name at the time, was on the periphery of the union.

Far from Moscow, it lay hidden on the other side of the Caucasus mountain range on the edge of the Black Sea. As a doctoral candidate in linguistics on a research grant to Tbilisi University, I spent one year living there, between 1987 and 1988. I was conducting research on the Georgian language.

Travel at the time was very difficult, and could only happen via Moscow. I did not return to Sweden for the duration of my stay. In the recent publication, We Witnessed the Soviet Break-Up: Five Scandinavian Researchers on the Final Years of the USSR, Seen From the Caucasus, I detail how this gave me a front-row seat from which to observe the speed at which society was shifting – and how language was key to that transformation. I also observed how old cultural traditions had endured despite decades of Communist propaganda and harsh Sovietisation.

Rapid transformation

The May Day parade was long one of the key moments in the Soviet calender. I witnessed the last time it was held in central Tbilisi, in 1987. People were carrying red flags. Banners declaiming “Glory to the Communist party” and “Glory to our multinational Soviet Fatherland” were draped on the main buildings.

Next year, however, the national movement across the republic was pushing for a free Georgia. In November 1988, many took part in a hunger strike in front of the Georgian parliament against changes in the constitution that would reduce the rights of the Georgian republic. Protesters wanted what they termed the “Russification of Georgia” to come to an end.

Georgian society was multiethnic and multilingual, counting Russians and Georgians alongside Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Abkhaz, Ossetians, Greeks and many others. Georgian was the main language within the Georgian education system as well as in broadcasting and the press and, technically, according to Article 6 of the Constitution of Soviet Georgia recognised as the republic’s official language. However, during the Soviet period, Russian speakers could easily live and work in Georgia without knowing Georgian: Russian was the lingua franca for inter-ethnic communication within the republic and the Soviet Union at large.

As a non-Indo-European language, Georgian boasts its own script and a written history that dates back to the 5th century AD. It is a cornerstone of the Georgian identity. Within the wider push for greater political freedom, Georgians now fought for the implementation of the constitutional status of Georgian. This included increased demands for knowledge of Georgian in workplaces and administration, while also investing in teaching Georgian as a second language.

Efforts were made to develop Georgian terminology in technology, science and other fields where Russian had been dominant. Citizens who had little or no knowledge of Georgian were under pressure to learn.

Enduring traditions

Despite decades of Sovietization, social and family life remained underpinned by old patriarchal traditions.

During my time in the country, I was welcomed with more openness and engagement, and less suspicion, than during the three years I had spent in Moscow. I experienced the extent to which hospitality was an ancient Georgian virtue. “A guest is a gift from God,” local people would say.

Georgians were proud of their cuisine and ancient wine production. When a guest entered a home, the dinner table would quickly transform into a feast, what is know as a “supra”. This came with its own specific structure and rules. The man of the house would assume the role of toastmaster (tamada), and the wife and female members of the family would prepare and serve the food. They would be called in from the kitchen for a toast in honour of the women. In some traditional families, the men would sit at one end of the table, and the women and children at the other.

These traditions were discernible across the different cultural communities within Georgia. Tensions at the time were growing between Tbilisi and the central Soviet authorities in Moscow, and within Georgia itself, with minorities in the autonomous entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In the summer of 1989, the first violent Abkhaz-Georgian clashes took place. I was on a day trip, travelling from Sokhumi, the capital of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, to a wedding in a small town called Zugdidi in the Megrelia region when violence broke out. Unable to return to Sokhumi as planned, I ended up spending one week with a family on the outskirts of the town.

Being there was like stepping back in time. The household was run by a young woman called Tsira, who, as a widow, dressed all in black. According to tradition, she would remain in black for the rest of her life. Her eldest son, who was 12-13 years old at the time, appeared to be seen as the man of the house.

Tsira’s neighbours came round and my friends from Sokhumi sat with them, discussing the conflict in Megrelian, the local language. Tsira prepared food, chicken and maize porridge over an open fire in a small wooden hut in the yard. Smoked cheese hung from the ceiling.

At one point, we visited the cemetery. Tsira sat on a stone bench by a black marble bust of her husband while relatives and guests sat around the grave. The women brought out Soviet champagne and food. I observed how toasting and eating bread dipped in wine were important in a ritual of honour and remembrance.

These religious practices showed how, within the official atheism of Soviet society, Georgian Orthodox traditions persisted – as they still do today. Another such religious practice common in Georgia during Soviet times was to hold a commemorative supra 40 days after a person had passed away. During this period, the men were not supposed to shave. The 40 days are considered the time it takes for the soul to reach heaven and God.

In 1990, I heard the crowd shouting “occupiers, occupiers” in front of the general staff of the Caucasian Military District in Tbilisi. The newly adopted Soviet law, dubbed the “law of non-secession” made the idea that the Soviet Union might break up feel a utopian dream. And yet it did, merely a year later. Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union on April 9 1991 and the split was finalised on December 26 with the dissolution of the USSR.

In the intervening decades, the ethnopolitical conflicts that were fomenting during this early post-Soviet period have only deepened, not least following the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Today, they remain largely unresolved and the situation in Georgia, highly volatile.

The Georgian language, however, has reclaimed the media, education and the streets. Russian has been replaced by English among the young generation of Georgians who do not carry this Soviet heritage.

Karina Vamling received funding from the Swedish Institute, Åke Wiberg Foundation, Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science and the Längman Cultural Foundation. She is affiliated to the research group Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus Regional Research (RUCARR), Malmö University, Sweden.

– ref. I was in Georgia in the late 1980s: I observed how tradition survived harsh Sovietisation and rapid transformation – https://theconversation.com/i-was-in-georgia-in-the-late-1980s-i-observed-how-tradition-survived-harsh-sovietisation-and-rapid-transformation-276911

April 10, 2026

Élection à Djibouti : le président vieillissant s’apprête à prolonger son mandat après avoir modifié la Constitution

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

Le président de Djibouti, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, a fait adopter en octobre 2025 des modifications constitutionnelles supprimant la limite d’âge pour les candidats à l’élection présidentielle. Ces réformes lui permettent de rester éligible et de briguer un nouveau mandat au-delà de 2026. Ces modifications lui permettent de rester au pouvoir au-delà de 2026.

Guelleh est déjà au pouvoir depuis 27 ans et est assuré de remporter l’élection du 10 avril 2026, qui a été boycottée par l’opposition. Guelleh dirige un pays de la Corne de l’Afrique où la mer Rouge rencontre l’océan Indien — l’un des emplacements les plus stratégiques au monde. Federico Donelli, qui a étudié le paysage politique djiboutien, décrypte les dynamiques qui lui ont permis de se maintenir au pouvoir.

Qui est Ismaïl Omar Guelleh et quel est son style de gouvernance ?

Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, plus connu sous le nom d’IOG, est président de Djibouti depuis 1999. Il a succédé au premier président du pays, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, dont il a été le chef de cabinet pendant plus de deux décennies.

Aujourd’hui âgé de 78 ans, Guelleh est l’un des dirigeants les plus anciens d’Afrique de l’Est.

Il appartient au groupe ethnique majoritaire des Issa-Somalis, qui monopolise le pouvoir depuis que le pays a obtenu son indépendance de la France en 1977. La population de Djibouti se compose en grande partie de deux groupes principaux : les Issa-Somalis et les Afars. Cette composition démographique reflète la situation dans l’État régional d’Afar, en Éthiopie voisine. Elle se reflète encore plus fidèlement dans l’État de facto du Somaliland en raison des liens claniques et familiaux.

Par conséquent, la dynamique politique à Djibouti s’entremêle fréquemment avec les développements dans ces États voisins. Cela est particulièrement vrai en matière de sécurité, de mobilité transfrontalière et de réseaux claniques.

En théorie, Djibouti est une république présidentielle dotée d’un système multipartite. Dans la pratique, cependant, le pouvoir politique reste fortement centralisé, laissant peu de place à une véritable concurrence politique.

Le parti au pouvoir, le Rassemblement populaire pour le progrès (RPP), domine le parlement, détenant 45 des 65 sièges. La coalition pro-présidentielle au sens large, l’Union pour la majorité présidentielle (UPM), contrôle 58 sièges au total, consolidant ainsi l’influence de l’exécutif sur la sphère législative.

Les coalitions d’opposition telles que l’Union pour l’alternance démocratique (UAD) et l’Union des mouvements démocratiques (UMD) sont confrontées à des contraintes importantes. Elles ont parfois boycotté les élections. Cinq élections présidentielles et cinq élections législatives ont eu lieu depuis 1999.

Les organisations internationales soulignent fréquemment les restrictions imposées aux médias et à la dissidence publique, la majorité des médias étant contrôlés par l’État.

Guelleh doit également sa longévité à un réseau très soudé de fonctionnaires, de membres de sa famille et d’alliés politiques occupant des postes clés au sein du gouvernement et du monde des affaires. La coalition qui l’entoure n’est pas toujours totalement unifiée. Des rivalités subtiles ont émergé de temps à autre entre certaines personnalités politiques et des membres de son cercle restreint. Mais ces dynamiques ne constituent pas une menace politique.

Qu’est-ce qui explique sa longévité ?

Le mandat de Guelleh peut être attribué à une combinaison de changements institutionnels, de facteurs géopolitiques et de dynamiques au sein de l’élite.

L’un de ces éléments est la réforme constitutionnelle. Au fil des ans, le parlement djiboutien a érodé les principales garanties démocratiques de la Constitution de 1992.

La première mesure a été la suppression de la limitation du nombre de mandats présidentiels en 2010. Ces changements ont permis à Guelleh de se représenter et ont réduit la durée du mandat présidentiel de six à cinq ans.

Le vote parlementaire de novembre 2025 visant à abolir la limite d’âge pour le président s’inscrit dans la même logique. Il a supprimé la dernière restriction formelle à son éligibilité à partir d’avril 2026.

Un deuxième facteur est l’importance stratégique de Djibouti. Situé à l’entrée du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb, une voie maritime vitale reliant la mer Rouge et l’océan Indien, le pays abrite plusieurs bases militaires étrangères. Les États-Unis, la France, la Chine, le Japon et l’Italie y sont représentés.

Pour de nombreux partenaires internationaux, la stabilité du gouvernement djiboutien est considérée comme une source de prévisibilité dans une région instable.

En conséquence, les pressions extérieures en faveur d’une réforme politique ont été limitées, ce qui a, à son tour, renforcé la stabilité du pouvoir en place.

Troisièmement, la cohésion de l’élite au pouvoir joue un rôle central dans la politique intérieure. Un réseau de personnalités influentes, comprenant des membres de la famille du président, des conseillers de longue date et des figures du monde économique, s’est formé autour du leadership de Guelleh. Ce groupe contrôle des institutions étatiques clés ainsi que des secteurs importants de l’économie, ce qui constitue une forte incitation à maintenir la continuité du pouvoir.

L’économie de Djibouti repose principalement sur les services portuaires et logistiques, en particulier son port international qui dessert le commerce régional, ainsi que sur les revenus générés par l’accueil de multiples bases militaires étrangères.

Dans le même temps, l’absence de successeur ouvertement désigné a déclenché une compétition silencieuse au sein de ce cercle. La perspective d’une ère post-Guelleh a, ces dernières années, encouragé diverses personnes à chercher à accroître leur influence. Cela va des membres de la famille aux conseillers de haut rang et aux personnalités politiques.

Les rivalités émergentes ne remettent pas ouvertement en cause l’autorité du président. Elles illustrent néanmoins les dynamiques internes complexes qui sous-tendent l’ordre politique actuel.

Quelles sont ses réalisations et ses promesses ?

Au cours de ses plus de deux décennies au pouvoir, Guelleh a assuré une période de relative stabilité à Djibouti. Alors que la Somalie et l’Éthiopie voisines ont connu une insécurité persistante et des conflits internes, Djibouti est resté relativement épargné.

Le gouvernement cite fréquemment cette stabilité comme l’une des caractéristiques marquantes de son mandat.

Djibouti a également renforcé sa position de plaque tournante stratégique. La présence de nombreuses bases militaires étrangères, ainsi que d’installations portuaires et logistiques, a généré d’importantes recettes pour l’État.

Depuis 2016, les investissements et la gestion chinois ont de plus en plus façonné les principales infrastructures portuaires du pays, intégrant davantage Djibouti dans les réseaux commerciaux mondiaux. Ces facteurs ont renforcé la visibilité du pays dans les accords internationaux en matière de commerce et de sécurité.

En outre, Djibouti a joué un rôle dans la diplomatie régionale. C’est un membre important de l’Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD). Il s’agit de l’organisation régionale chargée de traiter les conflits liés aux ressources, à la concurrence politique et à l’identité. L’engagement le plus récent de Djibouti comprend sa participation aux tentatives de médiation du conflit au Soudan.

Le gouvernement a également mis en avant certaines réformes institutionnelles comme des marqueurs de progrès. L’abolition de la peine de mort en 2010 en est un exemple.

Cependant, les défis structurels restent importants. Djibouti a une population très jeune. Des problèmes tels que le chômage, le coût élevé de la vie et la participation politique limitée persistent.

Que nous apprend le vote sur la limite d’âge sur la politique à Djibouti ?

La décision a été adoptée sans débat public et sans voix contre parmi les 65 législateurs présents. Cela reflète à quel point l’Assemblée nationale s’aligne sur l’exécutif.

Ce vote met également en évidence le rôle central du consensus des élites dans le système politique djiboutien. Des figures clés de la coalition au pouvoir, notamment des représentants des élites Issa et des élites Afar cooptées, ont soutenu la réforme. Pour ces groupes, le maintien de la continuité du pouvoir est souvent considéré comme un moyen de préserver l’accès aux ressources économiques et politiques. Cette option est préférée aux incertitudes liées à un changement de direction.

Le fait de contourner un vote populaire sur la disposition constitutionnelle limite la possibilité d’évaluer les véritables niveaux de soutien ou d’opposition. Cela a pour effet d’exclure en particulier les jeunes citoyens qui n’ont connu qu’un seul président.

Dans l’ensemble, ce vote montre que les dispositions constitutionnelles peuvent être modifiées lorsqu’elles font obstacle à la continuité du pouvoir. Cela renforce un modèle dans lequel les règles formelles s’adaptent aux besoins politiques plutôt que de les contraindre. Cela met également en évidence l’importance de la cohésion des élites pour le maintien de l’ordre politique actuel.

À l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2026, le discours dominant du gouvernement reste celui de la continuité, soutenu par ceux qui considèrent la stabilité comme essentielle à la protection des intérêts nationaux et régionaux.

Cependant, les pressions socio-économiques et les inquiétudes sous-jacentes concernant la succession inévitable continuent d’influencer les attentes du public, en particulier parmi les jeunes citoyens.

Cet article a été mis à jour en prévision de l’élection de Djibouti en avril 2026.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

– ref. Élection à Djibouti : le président vieillissant s’apprête à prolonger son mandat après avoir modifié la Constitution – https://theconversation.com/election-a-djibouti-le-president-vieillissant-sapprete-a-prolonger-son-mandat-apres-avoir-modifie-la-constitution-280306

April 10, 2026

La dengue est un problème de plus en plus préoccupant : pourquoi est-il si difficile de la combattre avec des vaccins

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Marielena Vogel Saivish, Research Fellow in Virology (Post-Doc position), The University of Texas Medical Branch

La dengue, une maladie transmise par les moustiques, touche chaque année des millions de personnes en Asie, en Afrique et en Amérique latine. Et elle se propage géographiquement, car le réchauffement climatique et l’urbanisation permettent aux populations de moustiques de prospérer dans de nouvelles régions.

À première vue, la dengue semble être une candidate évidente à la vaccination. Elle est causée par un virus. L’infection déclenche une réponse immunitaire. Des vaccins contre des virus similaires existent déjà.

Mais la dengue est complexe. Elle n’est pas causée par un seul virus, mais par quatre virus étroitement apparentés, appelés sérotypes. Lorsqu’une personne est infectée par l’un d’entre eux, le système immunitaire la protège généralement contre ce type spécifique, mais pas contre les trois autres. Dans certains cas, une infection antérieure peut en fait faciliter l’apparition d’une nouvelle infection.

Il n’est donc pas étonnant que la dengue soit l’une des maladies virales transmises par les moustiques les plus courantes au monde. Les scientifiques estiment qu’environ 390 millions d’infections surviennent chaque année, ce qui en fait un problème de santé publique majeur en Afrique.

À l’heure actuelle, un vaccin contre la dengue est autorisé à l’échelle mondiale. Le Dengvaxia ne doit être utilisé que si la personne a déjà été infectée. Un vaccin plus récent, le TAK-003, a été recommandé par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé pour une utilisation chez les enfants âgés de 6 à 16 ans dans les zones à forte transmission de la dengue, quel que soit leur statut d’infection antérieure. Il est administré en deux doses. De plus, des vaccins de nouvelle génération sont en cours de développement, notamment au Brésil.

Notre travail de chercheurs en immunologie virale et en maladies transmises par les moustiques vise à comprendre comment les réponses immunitaires façonnent la protection contre des virus tels que celui de la dengue.

Nos recherches récentes ont passé en revue des décennies d’études sur les vaccins contre la dengue, y compris des essais cliniques et des analyses immunologiques. Les données montrent que les vaccins contre la dengue doivent générer une réponse immunitaire soigneusement équilibrée contre les quatre sérotypes viraux. Si la protection est incomplète ou inégale, cela peut augmenter le risque de forme grave de la maladie chez certaines personnes.

La compréhension de ces mécanismes immunitaires est essentielle pour concevoir des vaccins plus sûrs et plus efficaces.

Dans l’ensemble, l’efficacité des vaccins varie encore en fonction de facteurs tels que les infections antérieures, l’âge et l’intensité de la transmission, ce qui signifie que les stratégies de vaccination doivent être soigneusement adaptées à chaque population.

La dengue en Afrique

Des épidémies de dengue et des preuves de transmission ont été documentées au Kenya, Tanzanie, Soudan, Sénégal et Côte d’Ivoire. Elle pourrait être encore plus répandue sur le continent qu’on ne le pensait auparavant, en partie parce que les systèmes de dépistage et de surveillance sont encore en cours de développement dans de nombreuses régions.

La maladie se propage par la piqûre de moustiques Aedes infectés, en particulier Aedes aegypti. Ces moustiques se reproduisent dans les eaux stagnantes, souvent situées à proximité des zones habitées. Les symptômes de la dengue comprennent une forte fièvre, des maux de tête, des douleurs derrière les yeux, des douleurs musculaires et articulaires, des nausées et des éruptions cutanées. La plupart des personnes se rétablissent en une semaine environ, mais dans certains cas, l’infection peut s’aggraver et entraîner des hémorragies, des lésions organiques ou un choc. La transmission a tendance à augmenter pendant la saison des pluies, lorsque les populations de moustiques se développent.

Au cours des dernières décennies, le nombre de cas a fortement augmenté, l’urbanisation, les voyages et le changement climatique ayant élargi l’habitat des moustiques.

La recherche d’un vaccin

L’infection par un sérotype de la dengue confère généralement une protection à long terme contre ce sérotype spécifique. Le problème survient lorsqu’une personne est ensuite infectée par un sérotype différent.

Au lieu d’offrir une protection, les anticorps issus de la première infection peuvent parfois aider le deuxième virus à pénétrer plus facilement dans les cellules.

Ce processus, connu sous le nom facilitation dépendante des anticorps, a été associé à des formes plus graves de la maladie, notamment la dengue hémorragique et le choc. En termes simples : la mémoire du système immunitaire peut parfois se retourner contre l’organisme. Cette caractéristique biologique rend le développement d’un vaccin particulièrement difficile.

Nos recherches ont révélé plusieurs schémas importants.

Tout d’abord, l’efficacité du vaccin dépend fortement du fait que la personne ait déjà contracté la dengue. Dans certains essais à grande échelle, les vaccins ont offert une bonne protection aux personnes qui avaient déjà été infectées. Mais pour les personnes qui n’avaient jamais été exposées au virus, la protection était plus faible et, dans certains cas, le risque d’hospitalisation augmentait après une infection ultérieure.

Deuxièmement, la qualité des anticorps importe autant que leur quantité. Il ne suffit pas de produire des taux élevés d’anticorps. Ces anticorps doivent être fortement neutralisants, c’est-à-dire capables de bloquer complètement le virus. Des anticorps faiblement neutralisants peuvent ne pas parvenir à stopper l’infection et contribuer à aggraver la maladie.

Troisièmement, l’âge et l’intensité de la transmission influencent les résultats. Dans les zones où la dengue circule largement et où de nombreuses personnes y sont exposées tôt dans leur vie, les schémas d’efficacité du vaccin diffèrent de ceux observés dans les régions où la première exposition survient plus tard.

Pourquoi c’est important

Des pays où l’activité de la dengue était auparavant limitée sont désormais confrontés à des épidémies. Les vaccins restent l’un des outils de santé publique les plus puissants.

Mais une compréhension incomplète peut saper la confiance du public. La confusion autour de la vaccination contre la dengue a, par le passé, contribué à la peur et à la désinformation dans certaines communautés.

Par exemple, l’introduction du vaccin Dengvaxia a suscité la controverse aux Philippines après que des études de suivi ont montré que les résultats du vaccin différaient selon que les personnes avaient déjà été infectées par la dengue ou non. Il est essentiel d’expliquer de tels résultats et leurs causes.

Des données issues de multiples essais cliniques, études épidémiologiques et groupes de recherche en immunologie à travers le monde montrent que les vaccins contre la dengue doivent être évalués non seulement pour leur efficacité globale, mais aussi pour leurs performances par rapport à différents groupes de populations. Il s’agit notamment des personnes ayant déjà été infectées ou non, différents groupes d’âge et des régions présentant des niveaux de transmission variables.

Nos recherches démontrent également que les réponses immunitaires doivent être soigneusement mesurées.
La protection ne consiste pas simplement à générer des anticorps. Il s’agit de générer le bon type d’anticorps.

Ces connaissances orientent déjà de nouvelles stratégies vaccinales. Certains candidats vaccins se concentrent sur l’amélioration d’une immunité équilibrée pour les quatre sérotypes. D’autres visent à affiner la manière dont les réponses immunitaires sont stimulées afin de réduire le risque d’amplification.

Se préparer aux épidémies

Plusieurs enseignements se dégagent pour les pays qui se préparent à des épidémies de dengue.

Premièrement, les stratégies de vaccination doivent être adaptées au contexte épidémiologique. Dans les régions où la plupart des adolescents ou des adultes ont déjà été infectés, certains vaccins peuvent être très bénéfiques. Dans les zones à faible transmission, un dépistage préalable à la vaccination pour déterminer l’exposition antérieure peut s’avérer nécessaire.

Deuxièmement, la surveillance à long terme de la sécurité est essentielle. Les effets du vaccin contre la dengue ne deviendront peut-être pleinement visibles que plusieurs années après son déploiement, une fois que les personnes vaccinées auront été exposées à l’infection naturelle. Les systèmes de surveillance doivent être suffisamment solides pour détecter les tendances à un stade précoce.

Troisièmement, la communication doit être transparente. La confiance du public repose sur des explications claires tant des avantages que des risques. Il n’est pas nécessaire de simplifier une science complexe pour en faire une certitude trompeuse. Elle peut être expliquée honnêtement et clairement.

Enfin, les investissements dans la recherche doivent se poursuivre. La dengue montre que tous les virus ne suivent pas de règles simples.

La leçon à en tirer va au-delà de la dengue. À mesure que les maladies transmises par les moustiques se propagent en raison des changements environnementaux, d’autres virus complexes pourraient poser des défis similaires. Il est de plus en plus important d’apprendre à concevoir des vaccins pour des agents pathogènes biologiquement complexes.

Marielena Vogel Saivish does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. La dengue est un problème de plus en plus préoccupant : pourquoi est-il si difficile de la combattre avec des vaccins – https://theconversation.com/la-dengue-est-un-probleme-de-plus-en-plus-preoccupant-pourquoi-est-il-si-difficile-de-la-combattre-avec-des-vaccins-279916