Comment La Réunion est devenue invisible en Afrique du Sud

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Christophe Rocheland, chercheur, Université Paris 8 – Vincennes Saint-Denis

Il y a plus de quarante ans, des leaders réunionnais finançaient clandestinement le Congrès national africain (ANC) de Nelson Mandela. Parmi eux, Paul Vergès, fondateur du Parti communiste réunionnais, arrachait au Parlement européen les premières sanctions internationales contre Pretoria. Aujourd’hui, l’Afrique du Sud, puissance régionale africaine, est statistiquement absente du commerce extérieur de La Réunion.

Entre les deux territoires, les proclamations sur les liens forgés dans la lutte anti-apartheid n’ont pas été suffisants pour susciter la signature par Pretoria du programme Interreg Océan Indien. Il s’agit d’un dispositif européen finançant des projets de coopération régionale dans l’Océan Indien.

De la complicité active à l’indifférence mutuelle : comment deux territoires liés par deux siècles d’histoire commune ont-ils “réussi” à se rendre invisibles l’un à l’autre, et que coûte cette régression aux Réunionnais ?

En 1851, un planteur britannique plante les premières boutures de canne à sucre jamais cultivées au Natal, en Afrique du Sud, venues de La Réunion, par le jeu des relations entre les sucriers colons réunionnais et anglais. C’est sur cette même terre du KwaZulu-Natal que s’enracine la trajectoire du géant sucrier Tongaat Hulett, aujourd’hui l’un des premiers producteurs du continent africain.

Le lieu porte une charge symbolique inversée : l’île qui exporta son savoir-faire agricole vers le continent se retrouve, un siècle et demi plus tard, économiquement marginalisée face à l’industrie qu’elle contribua à faire naître. Cent soixante-quinze ans plus tard, les deux territoires n’ont toujours pas signé le moindre accord de coopération institutionnel durable.

Mes recherches théorisent sur la posture géopolitique structurellement ambivalente de La Réunion, territoire ancré dans l’espace africain et indiaocéanique et une diplomatie territoriale du “faire semblant”. Ce paradoxe a un nom : la géopolitique du sanblan.

Le sanblan, ou l’art de faire semblant de coopérer

Le concept de sanblan (contraction créole de semblant et de sang blanc) désigne une posture géopolitique caractéristique des élites politiques réunionnaises : on en parle sans trop en dire, on en fait sans trop en faire, laissant à l’État le soin de décider sans prendre en main les outils de coopération internationale dont elles disposent.

Dans le cas d’espèce des relations sudafricano-réunionnaises, il décrit trente ans de rendez-vous manqués entre les décideurs des deux territoires : poignées de mains, communiqués sur les « nouvelles perspectives », délégations qui rentrent sans suite opérationnelle, sans lien politique nourri.

Paris conservant le monopole des relations extérieures sans produire de résultat concret pour l’île avec Pretoria. Les collectivités réunionnaises, divisées, peinent à se présenter comme un interlocuteur cohérent. Le programme Interreg Océan Indien (62,2 millions d’euros pour 2021–2027) géré par la région Réunion, présidée par Huguette Bello, une des leaders du combat anti-apartheid, en est le symptôme : l’Afrique du Sud reste le seul pays de la zone à ne pas l’avoir signé depuis deux cycles consécutifs.

Le verrou est politique : Pretoria pose la question de Mayotte comme condition préalable, Paris est embarrassé et c’est l’intégration économique régionale de La Réunion qui trinque.

Les chiffres du commerce extérieur donnent la mesure concrète de cet échec. En 2023, La Réunion importe pour 7,1 milliards d’euros de biens et exporte pour 400 millions d’euros, soit un déficit commercial de 94 %. Les importations depuis la France hexagonale représente à elle seule 59 %, soit près de 4,2 milliards d’euros (acheminés principalement depuis des centrales d’achat situées à 9 400 kilomètres). L’Afrique du Sud, à 2 900 kilomètres, n’apparaît dans aucune rubrique notable des exportations réunionnaises : elle en est statistiquement absente.

Côté importations, sa seule contribution recensée est du charbon, en voie d’extinction : les livraisons de houille sud-africaine ont chuté de 52 % en 2023 avec la conversion des centrales à la biomasse (wood pellets). D’ici deux ou trois ans, ce dernier flux disparaîtra à son tour.

L’île Maurice, voisine, apporte la démonstration contraire : l’Afrique du Sud est son premier client (12,7 % de ses exportations) et son quatrième fournisseur (7,3 % des importations), pour un commerce bilatéral dépassant 800 millions de dollars en 2023. Port-Louis est pourtant à la même distance de Johannesburg que Saint-Denis. L’écart n’est pas géographique, il est politique.

La trajectoire régressive est lisible sur cinquante ans. Dans les années 1980, La Réunion figurait au 7è rang des marchés d’exportation du régime d’apartheid et absorbait près de la moitié de ses exportations fruitières vers l’océan Indien.

Depuis 1994, cette relation s’est effondrée. En 2019, l’ensemble des échanges avec l’Afrique et les îles voisines combinés représentaient moins de 50 millions d’euros. Le charbon a succédé aux fruits, avant de s’effondrer à son tour. Il ne reste que les fruits frais, soit 52 % des volumes importés à La Réunion (agrumes, pommes, poires et raisins).

Une île utilisée, puis ignorée

Entre 1975 et 1990, Pretoria installe son unique consulat général dans le sud-ouest de l’océan Indien à Saint-Denis. La France maintient discrètement des relations économiques incluant une coopération nucléaire, pendant que La Réunion sert à faire transiter des marchandises « sensibles » vers le régime d’apartheid. Selon les statistiques douanières sud-africaines de 1990, l’île figure alors au septième rang des marchés d’exportation du régime, distinctement séparée de la « France » dans leurs propres tableaux.

En face, le Parti communiste réunionnais et ses alliés mènent une résistance qui dépasse le registre symbolique. Son ancien trésorier, Raymond Lauret, a témoigné qu’à la fin des années 1980, Paul Vergès, son Président fondateur, lui demande de retirer discrètement plusieurs centaines de milliers de francs en liquide pour les remettre à l’ANC, alors classée « organisation terroriste » par les Etats-Unis.

En 1979, Vergès dirige une mission du Parlement européen dans les pays de la ligne de front (États africains qui soutenaient la lutte contre l’apartheid : Tanzanie, Zambie, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe…).

Le rapport qui en résulte débouche sur les premières sanctions de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) contre le régime de Pretoria. En novembre 2025, le président français Emmanuel Macron s’est rendu au mémorial de Freedom Park : le nom de Paul Vergès est gravé sur le Mur des Héros de la lutte anti-apartheid le faisant entrer dans le Panthéon sud-africain.

Le sanblan a un coût réel, mesurable, quotidien : des prix à la consommation artificiellement élevée, une dépendance à l’hexagone française que rien ne justifie géographiquement, des retards d’investissements et de développement dans plusieurs secteurs économiques comme l’aérien, le tourisme, les services financiers ou encore la diversification d’une économie trop dépendante des transferts publics de l’Hexagone français.

Pendant que La Réunion invoque la mémoire de la lutte contre l’apartheid, Maurice signe des accords et exporte. Cesser le sanblan, ce n’est pas trahir Paris : c’est enfin assumer, collectivement, que La Réunion est une île africaine dotée d’un passeport français et que cette identité double est une force, non une contradiction. Il ne manque qu’une chose : la volonté d’agir au-delà des discours.

The Conversation

Christophe Rocheland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Comment La Réunion est devenue invisible en Afrique du Sud – https://theconversation.com/comment-la-reunion-est-devenue-invisible-en-afrique-du-sud-282077

Why has the US indicted former Cuban President Raúl Castro?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By James Trapani, Associate Lecturer of History and International Relations, Western Sydney University

After a week of speculation, the US Department of Justice has officially indicted Raúl Castro, the 94-year-old ex-president of Cuba.

The charges relate to a 1996 incident in which the Cuban military allegedly shot down two unarmed civilian planes operated by Brothers to the Rescue.

The news comes amid mounting US pressure on the ailing Cuban Republic to change its system of government after 67 years of revolutionary rule.

So why did the United States act now, and what will happen next?

Who is Raúl Castro?

Raúl Castro is the younger brother of Cuban revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. He joined Fidel’s movement to overthrow the authoritarian US ally, Fulgencio Batista, starting in 1952. He participated in the assault on the Moncada Barracks on July 26 1953, becoming a founding member of the M-26-7 guerrilla movement, the leading organisation in the Cuban revolution.

In 1958, he rose to the rank of comandante of the Second Eastern Front. He came to Washington’s attention in June when he kidnapped a group of 50 US Marines to prevent the continued aerial bombardment of his troops and local villagers.

This was a pivotal moment when Raúl become more than Fidel’s brother – he was now a key leader of the revolution.

By late 1958, Raúl Castro’s army had liberated much of eastern Cuba from the Batista regime and began marching on Havana to conclude the revolution.

From January 1959, Castro became the defence minister at a time when fighting was ongoing. For decades, he was the face of Cuba’s military and the island’s defence.

When, in April 1961, a group of 1,400 Cuban exiles, supported by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), attacked Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, Castro’s military secured a famous victory against the exiles, and the US.

He would also rise through the civilian and party ranks in Cuba. From 1976, he served as vice president and then succeeded his ageing brother as president from 2008, a position he would hold until 2019.

Raúl Castro remained atop the Communist Party until 2021 and is still viewed as influential in Cuba’s politics. Castro is a soldier, a politician and, above all, a revolutionary who toppled a pivotal US ally and resisted US pressure for decades.

However, Cuba is an authoritarian state that does not tolerate dissent. In 2003, Fidel Castro’s government, of which Raúl Castro was apart, detained dozens of pro-democracy advocates in an event dubbed the “black spring”. One of those detained, José Daniel Ferrer, founder of the Patriotic Union of Cuba, called on the US to stand with the opposition forces in 2025.

What is he accused of doing?

Cuba has been subject to a blockade by the US since 1960. It was also subject to an embargo by the members of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which includes almost all the countries in the Western Hemisphere, between 1964 and 2009.

The economic survival of Cuba has always been dependent on the support of a large nation willing to supply it with fuel.

During the Cold War, that was the Soviet Union, whose 1991 collapse was devastating for Cuba and its government. The “Special Period” following 1991 saw fuel shortages, declining food production, social unrest and large-scale emigration from Cuba.

Cuban exiles boarded unstable flotillas in their tens of thousands, hoping to join other exiles in Florida. The Clinton administration in the US eventually allowed for mass migration and the US Coast Guard was regularly helping to save stranded Cubans. Despite this, dozens of people drowned at sea.

A group of Cuban exiles, led by self-declared “Bay of Pigs veteran”, José Basulto, flew reconnaissance flights and reported the location of stranded Cubans to the Coast Guard.

But the flights had other motives. On several occasions, the planes flew into Cuban airspace, ignored warnings and dropped propaganda designed to trigger anti-government activity.

Records made public by William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, authors of a book on the topic, reveal the US knew of these operations and feared Cuba would eventually shoot down the planes, creating an international incident.

On February 24 1996, the Cuban military indeed shot down two planes, killing all four people on board.

Now, 30 years later, the US Department of Justice alleges that Castro, the then-defence minister, and six others are criminally responsible for the murders of the four men, three of whom were US citizens.

The US attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Jason A Reding Quiñones, said “this passage of time does not erase murder”.

Why is the US acting now?

Cuba is again suffering under a US blockade, this time initiated following the removal of its fuel guarantor, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January.

New Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez was pressured into ending oil shipments to the island, as were Mexico and other regional partners under the threat of crippling tariffs.

Cuba declared last Thursday it had no fuel or diesel remaining at all. Meanwhile, the humanitarian conditions worsen. Amnesty International reported in 2025 that most Cubans were struggling to find sufficient food and medicine.

In a historic visit in recent days, CIA Director John Ratcliffe spoke with members of the Cuban government in a sign of potential regime change.

President Donald Trump has also highlighted his motives on Cuba this week, saying “to a lot of people it’s going to be one of the most important things, they’ve been looking for this moment for 65 years”.

Cuban-Americans have indeed been pushing for the removal of the Castros since the 1960s.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, himself a Cuban-American, commemorated Cuba’s 1902 Independence Day by delivering the following message to the Cuban people, in Spanish:

and I want to tell you that we, in the US, are offering to help you not only to alleviate the current crisis but also to build a better future.

The message condemned the Cuban government, and Raúl Castro, as corrupt. He called for regime change, referring to the current Cuban president, Miguel Díaz-Canel.

The indictment of Castro is about more than justice for one man. It’s about Cuban-American politics in Florida, and it’s about the looming potential of regime change in Cuba, America’s primary regional foe for the past 67 years.

The Conversation

James Trapani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why has the US indicted former Cuban President Raúl Castro? – https://theconversation.com/why-has-the-us-indicted-former-cuban-president-raul-castro-283467

Taunting and degrading civilians in armed conflict is a clear violation of international law

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Bosch, Associate Professor (Law), Edith Cowan University

Ben Gvir/X

In a video posted by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir on Wednesday night, detained activists from dozens of countries are shown kneeling on the ground with their foreheads on the floor and hands zip-tied behind their backs.

Some of the activists, who had been intercepted by Israeli forces on a flotilla in the Mediterranean Sea, are then pushed and dragged by Israeli personnel. Ben-Gvir is seen waving an Israeli flag and taunting them.

The video on his X account had a simple message in English: “Welcome to Israel”.

The video sparked widespread international condemnation. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong called it “shocking and unacceptable”, while the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said the treatment of the detainees was “degrading and wrong”.

Even Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel and a stalwart supporter of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, called Ben-Gvir’s actions “despicable”, saying he had “betrayed the dignity of his nation”.

Netanyahu himself also publicly rebuked Ben-Gvir. He said Israel had the right to stop the flotilla, but the minister’s behaviour had damaged Israel’s image and did not reflect the country’s values.

Even though international lawyers like myself have expressed concern about this on multiple occasions, it bears repeating: international law matters in conflict zones.

So, what obligations does Israel have to treat those detained by its forces, and did the country violate the law?

Why were the activists detained?

Israeli forces began intercepting the Gaza-bound Global Sumud flotilla on Monday in international waters off the coast of Cyprus. Dozens of boats were stopped as they attempted to challenge Israel’s maritime blockade of Gaza.

The flotilla reportedly carried more than 400 activists from over 40 countries. Those on board included humanitarian volunteers, medical personnel, peace activists and civil society figures. Organisers said the vessels were carrying humanitarian relief supplies, including food, medicine and other aid intended for Palestinian civilians affected by the war and blockade of Gaza.

Israel disputed the flotilla’s aid-delivery purpose and described it as “a PR stunt at the service of Hamas”.

After those on board were arrested, they were reportedly subjected to violence, with some suffering suspected broken ribs and other injuries.

In a post on X, the Israeli Foreign Ministry claimed Israel was acting in full accordance with international law.

What does the law say?

Under international humanitarian law, those involved in the transport and distribution of relief supplies must be respected and protected during armed conflict. They are to be treated as civilians so long as they do not directly take part in hostilities.

Bringing aid to the civilians of Gaza does not amount to “direct participation in hostilities”. In fact, the International Court of Justice has ordered Israel to allow aid into Gaza given their obligations under the Genocide Convention.

International humanitarian law also says civilians may not be detained arbitrarily in conflict zones. If civilians are detained, however, they have certain rights under international law. They must:

Internment of civilians is only permitted when “absolutely necessary” for security reasons. It must end once those reasons no longer exist.

In addition, civilians detained during armed conflict must be treated humanely at all times.

They are to be protected from:

The phrase “public curiosity” has historically been understood to prohibit humiliating displays of detainees for propaganda, intimidation or public spectacle.

Intentional attacks against humanitarian personnel can amount to war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Why does this matter?

The public humiliation and degrading treatment of the activists shown in the footage must be scrutinised and investigated. And Israeli officials must comply with their obligations under the law.

These protections exist precisely to preserve a minimum standard of humanity during conflict, and to ensure civilians and humanitarian actors are not stripped of their dignity for political theatre, intimidation or punishment.

When such conduct is normalised or left unchallenged, it risks undermining the broader international legal framework designed to protect all civilians caught up in armed conflict.

The Conversation

Shannon Bosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Taunting and degrading civilians in armed conflict is a clear violation of international law – https://theconversation.com/taunting-and-degrading-civilians-in-armed-conflict-is-a-clear-violation-of-international-law-283472

Le « verrouillage carbone », ou pourquoi les majors pétrolières comme Shell renoncent à leurs projets de décarbonation

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Fernanda Arreola, Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship, ESSCA School of Management

Les grands groupes pétroliers tels que Shell peuvent-ils réellement accomplir leur transition énergétique ? Derrière les difficultés, on retrouve la notion centrale de « verrouillage carbone ». Celui-ci est d’abord lié à la durée de vie des infrastructures pétrolières, mais un second type de verrou s’y superpose, lié aux attentes des marchés et des actionnaires.


Pourquoi la transition énergétique progresse-t-elle si lentement, alors même que les technologies bas carbone existent, sont de moins en moins onéreuses et gagnent peu à peu des parts de marché ? Cette question d’actualité trouve une réponse dans les travaux fondateurs de Gregory C. Unruh, qui a introduit dès les années 2000 le concept de carbon lock-in, ou verrouillage carbone en français.

Selon lui, nos économies sont enfermées dans une trajectoire fossile, non pas du fait de l’absence d’alternatives, mais parce que les technologies, institutions et comportements permettant les conditions de cette trajectoire se renforcent mutuellement, créant une inertie systémique. Autrement dit, le carbon lock-in, c’est quand un système continue à fonctionner, non pas parce qu’il est optimal, mais parce qu’il est déjà en place.

Ce cadre théorique a depuis été enrichi par de nombreux travaux, notamment ceux de Steven J. Davis, qui montre comment les infrastructures existantes conditionnent les émissions futures et rendent toute bifurcation coûteuse et incertaine. Dans cette perspective, transformer le système énergétique ne consiste pas simplement à innover, mais à défaire un ensemble de dépendances accumulées dans le temps. Cette perspective prend une résonance particulière dans le cas de Shell, que nous avons analysée dans notre étude récente.

Au début des années 2020, l’entreprise fait face à une pression croissante. Régulations climatiques renforcées, attentes sociétales accrues, et décisions judiciaires inédites, notamment aux Pays-Bas. Ces éléments correspondent à ce que la littérature identifie comme des chocs exogènes, des situations externes capables de déstabiliser un système.

La transition de Shell se présente alors a priori comme conforme à la théorie, mais il apparaît rapidement qu’il existe un verrouillage carbone de second ordre, lié aux marchés et aux orientations stratégiques, en particulier les attentes des actionnaires. Explications.




À lire aussi :
Aujourd’hui, le droit protège les combustibles fossiles : une première conférence internationale veut briser ce verrouillage


Shell : une transition qui se heurte à deux verrous

De 2015 à 2024, Shell engage des investissements significatifs dans des technologies bas carbone comme l’hydrogène, les biocarburants et le captage du carbone. C’est en particulier le cas pour sa raffinerie de Rotterdam (Pays-Bas), connue sous le nom de raffinerie Shell Pernis. À première vue, l’entreprise semble amorcer une sortie du carbon lock-in.

Shell semble commencer à franchir un cap. Les activités bas carbone gagnent en importance, la stratégie de l’entreprise évolue, et une réduction de la dépendance aux hydrocarbures paraît envisageable. Notre article montre que cette phase correspond à un désenclavement de premier ordre. Les contraintes technologiques et infrastructurelles, qui définissent le carbon lock-in, commencent alors à s’atténuer. C’est ici que, pour la première fois, les conditions matérielles d’une transition deviennent réellement plausibles.

Cadre théorique permettant de comprendre comment on peut lever le premier verrouillage carbone, appliqué au cas de Shell Pernis.
G. Unruh et coll., 2026, Fourni par l’auteur

Mais cette dynamique ne se stabilise pas. Très rapidement, une autre forme de contrainte émerge : celle des marchés financiers. Les attentes de rentabilité des investisseurs, les logiques de valorisation boursière et les modèles de gouvernance exercent une pression forte sur les choix stratégiques.

Du point de vue des investisseurs, les activités fossiles restent souvent les plus rentables à court terme. Les investissements bas carbone, plus incertains et plus longs à rentabiliser, peinent à rivaliser. Progressivement, la stratégie de Shell se rééquilibre. Les ambitions climatiques sont ajustées, et les activités traditionnelles retrouvent un rôle central.

Ce constat rappelle que le succès de la transition dépend pour beaucoup des organisations, des institutions et des pratiques existantes. Or, les nouvelles activités reposent ici sur les infrastructures, les compétences et les chaînes de valeur héritées du pétrole. Dans le cas présent, la transformation ne remplace pas le système existant, elle s’y superpose.

Cette observation confirme un point clé de notre recherche : les transitions industrielles sont rarement des ruptures, mais plutôt des reconfigurations progressives.

La véritable difficulté ? Sortir du second verrouillage carbone

C’est dans cette tension que réside la contribution principale de notre recherche. Nous montrons en effet que sortir du verrouillage carbone ne suffit pas. Même lorsque les contraintes technologiques s’affaiblissent, un nouveau verrouillage peut émerger, d’ordre financier et stratégique. Nous l’avons appelé « verrouillage carbone de second ordre » (second-order carbon lock-in).

Ce deuxième verrouillage ne repose plus sur seulement sur les infrastructures en place, mais également sur des logiques économiques telles que les attentes des actionnaires, les exigences de rentabilité et les structures de gouvernance. Autrement dit, même lorsque la transition devient techniquement possible, elle peut rester économiquement difficile.

Comment le second verrou carbone conduit finalement à reculer sur les engagements de transition.
G. Unruh et coll., 2026, Fourni par l’auteur

Cette distinction entre les deux formes de verrouillage carbone suggère que les politiques climatiques ne peuvent pas se limiter à soutenir l’innovation ou à adapter les régulations qui s’appliquent aux infrastructures. Elles doivent aussi transformer les incitations économiques et financières qui orientent les décisions des entreprises. Sans cela, les efforts de transition risquent de rester partiels, instables, voire réversibles.




À lire aussi :
Comment échapper à la malédiction de la rente fossile ?


Comment sortir du piège carbone… sans y retomber ?

L’histoire de Shell n’est pas une exception. Elle révèle une dynamique plus générale, celle d’une transition énergétique qui progresse, mais qui reste contrainte par les logiques profondes du système juridique et économique. Sortir du piège carbone ne consiste donc pas seulement à changer de technologie. Il faut aussi changer les règles du jeu.

Le cas de la raffinerie Shell Pernis met en évidence à la fois l’efficacité et les limites des interventions classiques de décarbonation. Les interventions de premier ordre visent d’abord à réduire les inerties internes aux complexes techno-institutionnels (c’est-à-dire les systèmes regroupant aussi bien des acteurs publics que privés qui participent à la diffusion des nouvelles normes technologiques). Elles sont essentielles pour amorcer la transition, mais demeurent insuffisantes lorsque les entreprises sont insérées dans des systèmes transnationaux, notamment les marchés financiers globaux et la concurrence internationale, qui peuvent réintroduire de nouvelles contraintes.

Ceci a deux conséquences très concrètes :

  • Pour les décideurs publics, cela implique de dépasser les cadres nationaux et d’articuler les politiques climatiques à l’évolution de la gouvernance financière. Une meilleure coordination avec des institutions, telles que la Banque centrale européenne (BCE), l’Autorité européenne des marchés financiers (AEMF) ou l’Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs (IOSCO), apparaît nécessaire afin de limiter les désalignements entre objectifs climatiques et logiques de marché. Des instruments complémentaires, comme des cadres contractuels de long terme ou des protections contre certaines pressions financières, pourraient également soutenir les entreprises en transition.

  • Pour les entreprises, la transition ne saurait être réduite à un enjeu technologique ou réglementaire local. Et cela d’autant plus pour les firmes multinationales, qui opèrent dans plusieurs cadres nationaux à la fois et doivent gérer des attentes multiples et souvent divergentes, notamment de la part de leurs investisseurs. Les investissements de transition nécessitent des stratégies spécifiques, capables de valoriser leur rentabilité à long terme tout en limitant les pressions à court terme.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

– ref. Le « verrouillage carbone », ou pourquoi les majors pétrolières comme Shell renoncent à leurs projets de décarbonation – https://theconversation.com/le-verrouillage-carbone-ou-pourquoi-les-majors-petrolieres-comme-shell-renoncent-a-leurs-projets-de-decarbonation-283288

TotalEnergies face à l’administration Trump : quand l’abandon de l’éolien offshore devient une monnaie d’échange

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Wissem Ajili Ben Youssef, Professeur associé en Finance, EM Normandie

En mars 2026, le groupe TotalEnergies a annoncé renoncer à deux concessions d’éolien offshore sur la côte Est américaine. En échange, l’administration Trump, ouvertement hostile au développement des énergies renouvelables, a promis des investissements de plus de 801 millions d’euros. Cet accord, qualifié de « gagnant-gagnant » par les deux parties, constitue un précédent juridique inédit. Il intervient au pire moment pour les États-Unis, qui doivent faire face à une augmentation massive de la demande d’électricité et fragilise la crédibilité des engagements ESG de la major pétrolière.


L’annonce est intervenue discrètement et l’actualité chargée des deux derniers mois aura eu tôt fait de la chasser des radars. Elle marque pourtant un précédent questionnable. Le 23 mars 2026, lors de la conférence CERAWeek à Houston (Texas), Patrick Pouyanné, PDG de TotalEnergies, a annoncé un accord d’environ 930 millions de dollars (plus de 801 millions d’euros) avec l’administration Trump.

Cet accord prévoit l’abandon par le groupe français de ses deux concessions d’éolien offshore sur la côte Est américaine, Carolina Long Bay et New York Bight, ainsi qu’un redéploiement des investissements vers les hydrocarbures, en particulier le gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL). Le dirigeant a qualifié cet accord de « gagnant-gagnant », une formule qui mérite d’être décortiquée.

L’administration Trump et le groupe TotalEnergies ont signé, en mars 2026, un accord de remboursement d’un peu moins d’un milliard de dollars au géant français, compensant l’abandon de ses projets d’éolien en mer aux États-Unis, remplacés par des investissements dans le gaz et le pétrole.

Présenté comme une sortie pragmatique d’investissements devenus « politiquement hostiles », cet accord renvoie en réalité à des enjeux plus profonds. D’abord, parce qu’il constitue un précédent juridique inédit qui marque un recentrage stratégique aux implications significatives pour ce qui est des critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG). Ensuite, parce que l’accord envoie également un signal négatif aux marchés financiers, dans un contexte où la demande américaine d’électricité s’apprête à battre des records, notamment dans le contexte de la montée en puissance de l’intelligence artificielle.

En définitive, l’accord fragilise simultanément la crédibilité des engagements climatiques de l’entreprise et la sécurité juridique des investissements verts, tout en interrogeant la gouvernance de la transition énergétique.

Un deal énergétique à 930 millions de dollars

Les deux concessions abandonnées par TotalEnergies représentaient une capacité cumulée d’environ 4 gigawatts (GW), soit l’équivalent de quatre réacteurs nucléaires, ou encore de quoi alimenter près de 1,5 million de foyers en électricité décarbonée.

L’entreprise avait acquis ces droits au terme de procédures d’appel d’offres longues et coûteuses. Pour celles-ci, elle avait engagé des centaines de millions de dollars en études environnementales ainsi qu’en ingénierie préliminaire. Les deux projets avaient en outre déjà obtenu les autorisations fédérales nécessaires, ce qui les plaçait dans une phase avancée de développement.

Les raisons de ce rétropédalage tiennent au contexte politique. Dès janvier 2025, le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche s’est accompagné d’une offensive réglementaire contre l’éolien offshore, avec le gel de permis, la remise en cause de cadres contractuels existants et une pression accrue sur les États côtiers.

Interview de Patrick Pouyanné, PDG de TotalEnergies, sur la chaîne états-unienne CNBC.

Dans cet environnement devenu incertain, les opérateurs ont réagi différemment. Ørsted et Equinor, par exemple, ont choisi la voie judiciaire. TotalEnergies a fait un autre choix, en acceptant un deal négocié avec l’administration fédérale, fondé sur l’abandon de ses actifs éoliens offshore, en échange d’une compensation financière présentée comme définitive.




À lire aussi :
Aux États-Unis, les vents du « backlash » climatique redoublent d’intensité


Pragmatisme ou revirement stratégique ?

La contrepartie du deal est explicite. Il permet à TotalEnergies de confirmer son statut de premier exportateur privé de gaz naturel liquéfié américain, avec 19 millions de tonnes par an de capacité contractualisée, soit environ 18 % de la production nationale des États-Unis.

Pour l’administration Trump, qui a fait de l’expansion du GNL un instrument central de sa politique industrielle et diplomatique, le groupe français apparaît comme un partenaire de premier plan. L’accord s’inscrit ainsi dans une logique assumée de donnant-donnant, fondée sur l’abandon d’actifs éoliens offshore en échange de la pérennité des positions du groupe dans l’exportation gazière.

Cette convergence stratégique crée toutefois une tension directe avec les engagements climatiques affichés par TotalEnergies. Le groupe dit viser la neutralité carbone en Europe à l’horizon de 2030 et au niveau mondial d’ici à 2050, en cohérence affichée avec les scénarios de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie.

Or, plusieurs travaux académiques soulignent que les émissions fugitives de méthane sur l’ensemble du cycle de vie du GNL peuvent, sur un horizon de vingt ans, annuler le léger avantage du gaz par rapport aux autres énergies fossiles et le rendre comparable au charbon en matière d’impact climatique.

Cette contradiction n’est pas seulement environnementale, elle est aussi financière. Le « greenium », défini comme la prime de valorisation ou la décote de rendement associées aux titres de dette d’un émetteur jugé crédible sur le plan environnemental, repose fondamentalement sur la cohérence perçue entre sa stratégie industrielle, son allocation d’actifs et sa trajectoire climatique.

La littérature montre que toute divergence entre engagements climatiques affichés et décisions d’investissement effectives tend à éroder, voire à inverser, cette prime de crédibilité. Ce lien entre crédibilité ESG et comportement des investisseurs rejoint nos travaux récents montrant que l’adoption des standards ESG dépend étroitement de la cohérence entre stratégie, gouvernance et environnement réglementaire.

Dans un tel contexte, un déclassement du groupe dans les portefeuilles de grands investisseurs institutionnels, ou une remise en cause de sa crédibilité environnementale, entraînerait des conséquences très concrètes. Lorsque des investisseurs se retirent ou deviennent plus prudents, se financer devient plus coûteux. Cette hausse durable du coût du capital pèserait alors bien davantage, à moyen terme, que le gain financier immédiat tiré du deal américain.

Un contournement inédit du droit à l’expropriation réglementaire

L’aspect le plus singulier de cet accord tient à sa nature juridique. L’administration Trump avait d’abord tenté de bloquer des projets éoliens pourtant déjà autorisés. Ces initiatives ont été invalidées par les tribunaux fédéraux, qui ont rappelé que les permis délivrés créaient des droits protégés et ne pouvaient être suspendus ou retirés unilatéralement par l’exécutif.

Face à cette limite, l’administration a changé de levier. Bloquée juridiquement, l’administration a trouvé avec TotalEnergies un moyen plus efficace : substituer à la contrainte réglementaire une transaction financière conduisant à l’abandon volontaire des projets.

Ce mécanisme s’inscrit dans une tension bien connue du droit économique états-unien, celle de l’« expropriation réglementaire indirecte », ou regulatory taking. Le cinquième amendement de la Constitution interdit notamment, en effet, à l’État de priver un investisseur de la valeur économique de son actif sans compensation, y compris en l’absence de nationalisation formelle. Lorsqu’une réglementation devient si contraignante qu’elle rend un investissement non viable, elle peut être assimilée à une expropriation déguisée. C’est précisément sur ce fondement que les tribunaux fédéraux ont bloqué les tentatives de l’administration visant à neutraliser des projets éoliens déjà autorisés.

L’accord annoncé à CERAWeek permet ainsi de contourner la jurisprudence sans l’affronter directement. En recourant à une compensation financière négociée, l’administration évite toute qualification d’expropriation, tout en obtenant un résultat équivalent : l’abandon de projets pourtant légalement autorisés.

Ce précédent est lourd de conséquences. Il installe l’idée qu’un permis pour un projet d’énergie renouvelable peut devenir rachetable au gré d’une alternance politique, indépendamment de sa conformité au droit en vigueur. Or, les travaux de l’économiste Nicholas Bloom sur l’incertitude de politique économique montrent que ce type d’instabilité réglementaire pèse durablement sur les décisions d’investissement, bien au-delà des cycles politiques immédiats.

La prime de risque exigée par les investisseurs s’en trouve accrue. Et cela non seulement pour le projet concerné, mais aussi pour l’ensemble des investissements dans les énergies renouvelables aux États‑Unis. Ce mécanisme est cohérent avec nos travaux récents, qui montrent que l’incertitude politique accroît durablement la prime de risque exigée par les investisseurs et modifie les flux d’investissement, bien au‑delà des chocs politiques immédiats.

Quand l’abandon de l’éolien intervient au pire moment

L’ironie de cet accord tient avant tout à son calendrier. Selon les projections de l’Agence d’information américaine sur l’énergie, la demande d’électricité américaine devrait croître de plus de 15 % d’ici 2030, sous l’effet combiné du développement accéléré des centres de données liés à l’intelligence artificielle, de l’électrification des transports et de la réindustrialisation.

Dans ce contexte, les technologies les plus rapidement mobilisables restent l’éolien et le solaire, dont les coûts sont désormais compétitifs avec ceux des énergies fossiles. Renoncer à près de 4 gigawatts d’éolien offshore déjà autorisés au profit d’un combustible fossile revient ainsi à abandonner un projet dont les fondations sont déjà posées.

Les États côtiers concernés, en particulier la Caroline du Nord et l’État de New York, avaient intégré ces capacités dans leurs trajectoires officielles de transition, à la fois pour sécuriser l’approvisionnement électrique et pour atteindre leurs objectifs climatiques. Cette situation met en lumière une tension croissante entre la gouvernance énergétique fédérale et les stratégies des États, fragilisant la cohérence de la politique énergétique américaine au moment même où les besoins augmentent le plus rapidement.

Cet accord révèle aussi, de façon plus générale, les tensions structurelles au cœur de la gouvernance climatique mondiale. Il souligne l’écart persistant entre les engagements climatiques volontaires, la stabilité juridique de façade et, de fait, la volatilité des politiques publiques. Si ce type de mécanisme, fondé sur le rachat d’abandons de projets légalement autorisés, venait à se généraliser, la prime de risque associée aux investissements verts aux États‑Unis en serait durablement renforcée.

Pour TotalEnergies, l’accord peut apparaître économiquement rationnel à court terme. Le véritable test se jouera toutefois ailleurs : dans l’évolution de ses notations ESG, dans l’examen des prochains rapports de durabilité et dans la capacité des marchés à distinguer une transition effective d’un simple ajustement de stratégie sous contrainte politique.




À lire aussi :
Des États-Unis ébranlés par leur offensive de « domination énergétique » ?


The Conversation

Wissem Ajili Ben Youssef ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. TotalEnergies face à l’administration Trump : quand l’abandon de l’éolien offshore devient une monnaie d’échange – https://theconversation.com/totalenergies-face-a-ladministration-trump-quand-labandon-de-leolien-offshore-devient-une-monnaie-dechange-283217

When AI giants go public, will ordinary investors know if they are along for the ride?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sara Ali, Research Fellow and Academic Database Advisor, Auckland University of Technology

NurPhoto/Getty Images

We’ve heard a lot about the artificial intelligence (AI) boom and how enormous amounts of money are being poured into companies building ever more powerful technologies.

That boom is now taking a new turn as major AI players edge closer to becoming publicly-traded companies.

According to reports, OpenAI is preparing to file confidentially for a public listing that could value the ChatGPT maker at hundreds of billions of dollars.
Rivals including Anthropic (Claude) and Elon Musk’s SpaceX – which just absorbed xAI (Grok) – are also moving toward the stock market.

What many people may not realise, however, is that, through retirement funds, pensions and other managed investments, they could end up owning shares in these giants – whether they choose to or not.

And while people might have moral concerns with the AI companies they’re tied to, the greater issue at play is about money, risk and who ends up holding it.

Where AI’s billions go

Building a cutting-edge AI system requires vast numbers of specialised computer chips, running nonstop in data centres that consume enough electricity to power a small city.

OpenAI plans to spend around US$50 billion on computing power in 2026 alone. In 2017, that same company spent roughly US$30 million, a 1,600-fold increase in less than a decade. OpenAI is targeting roughly US$600 billion in compute spending – or that in areas such as processing power, data storage and cloud infrastructure – through to 2030.

It’s not just OpenAI. The big technology companies are collectively expected to invest around US$650 billion in AI infrastructure in 2026. That’s roughly one-third of Australia’s annual GDP – or two-and-a-half times New Zealand’s – being committed to one technology bet in a single year.

All these expenses must be covered before the companies earn consistent profits. This is why they keep raising money – and why the question of where that money will eventually come from is enormously important.

In 2025, total investment in AI companies reached US$217 billion. Then, in just the first three months of 2026, private AI companies raised a further US$226 billion, surpassing the entire 2025 total in a single quarter.

Much of this was concentrated in three transactions: US$122 billion for OpenAI, US$30 billion for Anthropic and US$7.5 billion for xAI.

Together, these three deals alone accounted for 71% of all AI funding that quarter. Mega-rounds above US$100 million now make up 94% of all AI investment by value.

The funding has mostly come from large institutions: venture capital firms, sovereign wealth funds, and technology giants that can afford to take the risk. The gains and the losses stay within a small, specialist group.

When the AI sector goes public

Once a company is publicly listed, anyone can buy its shares.

More importantly, large index-tracking funds – widely used in Australia’s Super system and New Zealand’s KiwiSaver funds – automatically gain exposure to companies once they become large enough to enter the indices those funds follow.

In other words, they don’t get to decide whether it looks like a good investment; the index simply decides for them.

That matters for ethical investors, too. The thought of AI raises concerns about privacy, labour, misinformation and security. But unlike tobacco or gambling, it may prove difficult to exclude because it is being increasingly woven into the world’s largest listed companies.

There is, therefore, a case for asking whether these companies should trigger an opt-out mechanism for fund managers and regulators before the listings arrive.

Neither OpenAI, Anthropic, nor xAI has formally announced a stock market listing, and timelines remain uncertain. When that shift comes, the risk also shifts. The investors who funded the early stages of this race knew what they were getting into.

The people who will end up holding the shares through their pension funds or index trackers may not.

Index providers are rewriting the rules

Here is where the picture becomes more complex. Major index providers are changing their rules so newly listed mega-cap AI companies can enter key benchmarks much faster.

Nasdaq has already adopted a fast-track rule that allows a newly listed mega-cap company to join the Nasdaq-100 after just 15 trading days. S&P Dow Jones Indices is consulting on similar changes that would reduce the waiting period and waive profitability requirements for mega-caps.

These changes are reshaping the index system to funnel passive money into AI giants almost as soon as they list – and before most investors have had time to decide whether they belong in their portfolios at all.

So, what can ordinary investors do?

As they likely won’t be making the call themselves on whether to invest in an AI stock market float, they can put questions to the fund managers doing so on their behalf.

Those might be questions about whether the company is becoming more efficient, what their customer retention looks like, or how their leadership holds up under pressure.

OpenAI’s 2023 board crisis showed how unusual governance structures can create sudden instability.

There is no doubt the AI revolution is real and is changing economies in the same way it is changing our everyday lives.

But whether the AI boom will create lasting value for ordinary investors – or mainly provide an exit for early-stage insiders – is a question fund managers and regulators cannot afford to leave unanswered.

Before the listings arrive, they need to decide: should ordinary investors be automatically swept into the AI gamble, or should they have a choice?

The Conversation

Sara Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When AI giants go public, will ordinary investors know if they are along for the ride? – https://theconversation.com/when-ai-giants-go-public-will-ordinary-investors-know-if-they-are-along-for-the-ride-282963

We analysed the TikTok history of 142 men. Here’s what it taught us about the manosphere

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Krista Fisher, Research Fellow, Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne

Sarazh Izmailov/Pexels, The Conversation, CC BY-SA

Interest in the manosphere has recently surged yet again, with the recent Louis Theroux documentary catapulting the term “manosphere” back to the forefront of our cultural psyche.

The term has become a catchall for the most inflammatory content and communities in young men’s digital worlds. Alarm bells are ringing, but our understanding of what the manosphere actually is – where it begins and ends – has more questions than answers.

As concern grows, so does the ambiguity around how to define the manosphere and how young men actually experience it. Our policy responses, interventions and public discourse assume it’s one thing, one ideology, populated by one type of young man: a singular algorithmic journey from loneliness to radicalisation. It isn’t, and overlooking the complexity and nuance misses large parts of the problem.

So what is it instead? Our new research answers this question.

Simulations vs reality

Addressing ambiguity matters, whether you’re a researcher trying to measure the full spectrum of harm being experienced, or part of a community trying to talk about it with sons, brothers and friends. You cannot diagnose a problem without truly understanding it, and that means going into these online ecosystems to explore their bounds.

Previous research has included the use of dummy accounts to simulate internet use. These have been criticised by social media companies, who say the simulations don’t reflect the real experiences of users on their apps.

In response, our new research looked at the real TikTok viewing histories of 142 young men across Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. We watched what they watched, 2,000 videos over the past month, and built a framework to map the full spectrum of masculinity content that young men encounter online.

It’s the first time academic research has used real user data in this space. It means we can respond to what young men and boys are actually seeing, rather than simulations of user experiences and what we think they’re seeing.

Almost half of the videos we analysed (44%) contained masculinity-related themes. Masculinity content fell into three distinct categories. Understanding these categories, how they escalate and who’s watching it makes tailored intervention possible, from policymakers to support services, and even the platforms themselves.




Read more:
How boys get sucked into the manosphere


Beginning the journey

The journey can start somewhere ordinary. Three videos. Same young man. Same day. Same algorithm.

In the first video, a young, buff man located in a gym, demonstrating to his audience the correct technique when completing the “perfect lying tricep extension”.

We called this tier “cultural touchpoints”. It includes gym, sport, fashion and dating tips content. It made up 38% of what young men in our study watched, making it the most common type of content.

On the surface, none of it raises alarm. But it quietly sets a norm. One type of male body, one set of male interests, one way of moving through the world.

Travelling deeper

In the second video, a shirtless young man delivers a motivational-style speech about gym and discipline. He argues that physical commitment produces results in other areas of life, such as earning admiration from his girlfriend and becoming a “superhero” to his future children.

We called this tier “masculine status” content. It constituted 6% of the videos we analysed.

Outwardly, it looks like self-improvement, motivational and informative content with messages of discipline, ambition, levelling up as a man.

Underneath, the rigid moulds become clear: muscularity, emotional suppression, financial abundance, the “high-value” male archetype.

Women are framed as rewards to be earned. The content is ideologically hardened, but also easy to miss.

The destination

In the third video, a male creator sarcastically warns his audience against peptides. He then proceeds to list the side-effects of “getting leaner, shredded and getting more bitches”, while showing the vials to the audience.

We called this tier “degrading health” content. It made up less than 1% of content.

Most of it violates TikTok’s own community guidelines prohibiting the promotion of peptide hormones, testosterone boosters, and content that demeans, endangers or advocates for self-harm.

This category includes overt misogyny and graphic depictions of violence against women.

It’s infrequent, but not isolated. This content sits at the end of a journey that began with a tricep extension tutorial.

Three videos. Three very different messages about masculinity and health. This is how the manosphere finds young men: through platforms they’re already on, creators they already follow and in a cultural language they appreciate.

Cultural touchpoints lay the foundation that make messages of misogyny, risk-taking, violence and hate not just palatable, but reasonable. Ideological shifts happen because it feels like much of the same.

Exploiting insecurities

The manosphere doesn’t create these pressures – it finds genuine unmet needs and exploits them for profit and views. Often girls, women and other minority groups are at the receiving end of that harm, as well as the boys and men themselves.

Our broader framework, in which these classifications are a part, gives researchers, regulators, and platforms a tool to identify and intervene across the full spectrum of young men’s digital lives, not just at the extremes.

Current moderation and regulation approaches are reactive. Content is removed once platform guidelines are violated, but often that comes too late, after thousands if not millions of users have already seen it.

This research makes early and tailored intervention possible, disrupting the masculinity content pipeline at different points along the spectrum, before young men reach the most extreme end.

For example, tech companies could embed this classification framework into the design of recommender systems to ensure an age appropriate user experience. Cultural touchpoint content may be appropriate for a 16-year-old, but masculine status and degrading health videos may not be, and thus should not be recommended to them. Our work provides a defensible evidenced standard for appropriate moderation and digital platform design.

Lastly, it helps create a shared language and collective understanding of the manosphere. We can talk about masculinity content in a way that aligns with young men’s actual digital experiences, and to build solutions that fit the problem.

The manosphere has spent years speaking directly to young men’s fears and insecurities, building narratives that are fluent, persuasive and hard to counter. We need to be just as fluent, delivering effective responses and alternative narratives grounded in what young men actually see, watch and feel.

This research is the first attempt to do that. Now we need to use these insights to expand our evidence on the manosphere’s harm, develop tailored solutions, call for platform reform and develop community resources to help protect the men and boys exposed to this content online.

The Conversation

Krista Fisher is affiliated with the Movember Institute of Men’s Health. Krista Fisher had support from the Polarization & Extremism Research & Innovation Lab (PERIL) and Diverting Hate when conducting this research.

Emily Lewis is affiliated with the Movember Institute of Men’s Health.

Zac Seidler has been awarded an National Health and Medical Research Council Investigator Grant. He is also the Global Director of Research with the Movember Institute of Men’s Health. He advises government on men’s suicide, masculinities, violence prevention and social media policy.

Cynthia Miller-Idriss and Ruben Benakovic do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. We analysed the TikTok history of 142 men. Here’s what it taught us about the manosphere – https://theconversation.com/we-analysed-the-tiktok-history-of-142-men-heres-what-it-taught-us-about-the-manosphere-282156

Nearly everything we use online is owned by big tech. There’s a better way forward

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ashwin Nagappa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society, Queensland University of Technology

Pachon in Motion/Pexels

Globally, users of digital media are increasingly locked into a handful of operating systems, app stores, and communication platforms. Most of us must choose between Apple, Windows, or Android. All of these are owned by American tech giants.

Much of private and government IT infrastructure – websites, mobile banking, nearly anything online you can think of – uses cloud services, such as Amazon Web Services, Cloudflare or Microsoft Azure. They might have locations worldwide, but these are also US companies.

Mobile phones, laptops, smartwatches and more are mostly made by American or Chinese companies. And it’s getting worse as tech companies embed artificial intelligence (AI) assistants directly into everyday devices, such as Google’s Gemini or Microsoft’s Copilot. They’re doing this in ways designed to further entrench users within particular ecosystems.

When a single cyber security update brought down Windows computers the world over in 2024, it was a stark reminder nobody should put all their IT eggs in one basket.

But what might that actually look like? The “digital sovereignty” movement in the European Union (EU) can show us the way. European countries are gradually breaking up with American tech giants and pushing for local AI development, all in the name of achieving digital autonomy.

What exactly is ‘digital sovereignty’?

A state’s sovereignty means to be able to govern itself. Extend that to the digital era, and we arrive at a concept that’s difficult to pin down, but broadly means being in charge of your own digital infrastructure.

Let’s take the European digital sovereignty strategy. It provides a roadmap for creating, owning and governing computer hardware, AI, software, and social media within the EU. Any tech providers would have to comply with core EU values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

The ultimate goal here is digital autonomy. It means reducing reliance on systems vulnerable to growing geopolitical and economic risks. If you make your own devices and host your data locally, you’re not at the mercy of multinational corporations whose interests may not align with your own.

Several prominent EU institutions have already ditched the Microsoft Office suite for official communication. Instead, they use European software such as Office EU or free open-source alternatives.

The EU is also making progress on Gaia-X, a local alternative to global cloud providers.

But these efforts come with major challenges. Large tech companies such as Alphabet (Google), Microsoft and Amazon are not watching idly. By promising local governments and organisations greater control, they’re tapping into the digital sovereignty discussion.

Researchers call this “sovereignty-as-a-service”. Through it, big tech is shaping digital sovereignty on terms that are favourable to them.

Alternatives already exist

Europe’s digital sovereignty strategy is a long-term, multi-country initiative that involves major financial, industrial and policy changes. Outside of the EU, countries including India, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa are also pursuing digital sovereignty plans.

But for everyday users, much of it comes down to turning to viable alternatives to dominant tech platforms. Many already exist.

Decentralised social media ecosystems allow independently operated communities to communicate across shared protocols without being controlled by a single corporation. One such example is the Fediverse, which includes platforms like micro-blogging site Mastodon and video sharing site PeerTube.




Read more:
Decentralised social media offers an alternative to big tech platforms like X and Meta. How does it work? Podcast


Similarly, the AT protocol, which powers micro-blogging sites Bluesky and Eurosky, aims to separate social networking from platform ownership. It enables users to move identities, content and communities between services more freely.

Open-source office suites such as LibreOffice have provided alternatives to Microsoft Office for more than two decades.

It’s also increasingly possible to run AI systems locally on personal devices or private networks. This reduces reliance on cloud-based AI services controlled by big tech.

In other words, many of the technical foundations for greater digital autonomy already exist. The challenge lies with adoption and coordination. When Twitter was bought by Elon Musk, many users fragmented to other sites – from Mastodon and Threads to Bluesky and others. If your friends are all on different social media sites, which do you choose?




Read more:
Have you heard of the open source internet? The antidote to a capitalist web already exists


What can Australia learn from this?

Australia is in a similar position to the EU. We’re heavily reliant on foreign-owned digital infrastructure. We’re also increasingly exposed to the geopolitical tensions surrounding it.

Australia could take a leaf out of the EU’s book and develop its own roadmap for digital sovereignty. This would have to operate at both the policy and public levels.

Australia’s digital policy shouldn’t be dictated by large platforms or external geopolitical actors. There’s also a pressing need to promote local innovation for the future, such as investing in quantum computing.

Publicly funded organisations have already demonstrated Australia can invent globally significant technology. After all, Australia’s national science agency, the CSIRO, patented the technology that led to wifi. Universities and publicly funded institutions should be at the core of future tech innovation as well.

Most importantly, Australia is home to First Nations communities. Their governance systems have long operated through decentralised, relational, and autonomous forms of organisation.

Groups such as Maiam nayri Wingara and the HASS and Indigenous Research Data Commons have already developed internationally significant frameworks for Indigenous data sovereignty. These cover data governance, stewardship, collective benefit, and the rights of communities to control data about their peoples, lands and cultures.

We can learn from these. Respecting Indigenous sovereignty may also open a pathway for all Australians to rethink what our shared digital futures can look like.

The Conversation

Ashwin Nagappa receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is a recipient of the 2024 AXA Post-Doctoral Fellowship (for the theme ‘Navigating misinformation and trust erosion in the digital age’).

Daniel Angus receives funding from the Australian Research Council through Linkage Project LP190101051 ‘Young Australians and the Promotion of Alcohol on Social Media’. He is a Chief Investigator with the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision Making & Society.

– ref. Nearly everything we use online is owned by big tech. There’s a better way forward – https://theconversation.com/nearly-everything-we-use-online-is-owned-by-big-tech-theres-a-better-way-forward-282969

Health authorities are racing to contain Ebola in the DRC and Uganda. Here’s what’s making it so challenging

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By C Raina MacIntyre, Professor of Global Biosecurity, NHMRC L3 Research Fellow, Head, Biosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, UNSW Sydney

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is grappling with a rising Ebola epidemic, with almost 600 cases detected so far and more than 130 deaths.

Ebola is a rare virus that initially causes a fever, fatigue, muscle pain, then vomiting and diarrhoea. It can then progress to the hemorrhagic stage, with internal bleeding – which presents as blood in vomit and faeces – as well as bleeding as from parts of the body including the nose, gums, vagina and needle punctures.

Ebola primarily spreads through contact with bodily fluids such as blood, faeces and vomit. It can be contracted from contaminated surfaces or contact with bodies of those who have died, but can also spread by other routes including without contact.

This current outbreak, caused by the rare Bundibugyo strain, was first confirmed as Ebola on May 15. It was already estimated to have 246 cases at the time of this confirmation.

As surveillance efforts stepped up, it became clear the outbreak was more than double that size, with spread to Uganda.

So what are health authorities doing to get the virus under control and why is it such a challenge?

And what can health authorities in Africa, as well as the rest of the world, learn from previous outbreaks?

How did so many people get sick so quickly?

Ebola has a long incubation period of two to three weeks or longer. This means the number of infected people has likely been growing since at least March or April.

Our epidemic early warning system, Epiwatch, saw signals of unknown illness in the DRC on April 13, with reports of hemorrhagic fever noted even earlier on March 13.

The delay in diagnosing Ebola may have been due to initial testing targeting the more common Zaire strain of Ebola. Tests must be specific to Bundibugyo.

The DRC is also experiencing other serious outbreaks including mpox and measles, as well as malnutrition and chronic malaria.

These underlying factors can make epidemics more severe and harder to detect.




Read more:
WHO has declared mpox a global health emergency. What happens next?


How big did previous outbreaks get?

The worst Ebola epidemic in history was over 28,000 cases in the 2014 West African epidemic. More than 11,000 people died from this Zaire strain, as vaccines were not yet available at the peak of the epidemic.

In the DRC, the last epidemic of 64 cases was in late 2025. The largest epidemic in the DRC was in 2018-2019 with more than 3,000 cases. These were both the Zaire strain.

There have only been two other Bundibugyo outbreaks. The first, in 2007 with 149 cases, was in the Bundibugyo District of western Uganda, near the DRC border. The second, in 2012, was in the DRC, with 57 cases. The current Bundibugyo epidemic is already the largest in history.

While Bundibugyo is not as lethal as the Zaire strain, it can kill 30–50% of infected people. The fatality rate in this epidemic appears close to 30%, with 139 deaths reported from almost 600 cases.

Unlike the Zaire strain, for which there are treatments and vaccines, there are no approved drugs or vaccines for the Bundibugyo strain.

However, the World Health Organization has sponsored clinical trials of a monoclonal antibody and the antiviral remdesivir, a drug which is also used for COVID.

We may see higher fatality rates unless non-pharmaceutical measures ramp up.

How can it be stopped?

The epidemic can be stopped by coordinated surveillance and containment. This is by identifying cases, isolating them so they cannot infect others, tracing their contacts and quarantining them.

In 2014, these measures alone controlled the Ebola epidemic at a time when no treatments or vaccines were available. This means health system capacity is the key to epidemic control.

There were not enough beds for Ebola patients in the 2014 epidemic, so health authorities built tent hospitals to help bring the epidemic under control. This could be considered if hospitals are overwhelmed.

The DRC has limited capacity to diagnose Ebola, so it’s important to scale up surveillance and testing. A clinical case definition (such as “fever and bleeding means a probable case”) can be used if testing is not available.

Simple surveillance systems – such as open-source intelligence, where community chatter and local news reports can provide signals of epidemics – can help. So can providing incentives for communities to report suspected cases.

It’s also essential to communicate and work with communities and community leaders from the ground up. In the 2014 epidemic, locals murdered eight Ebola workers who provided health education, showing how important trust and community relationships are.

Health workers, close contacts and funeral attendants need extra precautions

Ebola is predominantly spread by contact with blood and bodily fluids. Those most at risk are close contacts of patients with Ebola, health workers and people attending funerals, which often involves touching the body.

At least four health workers have been infected, including one American missionary doctor.

Given the high fatality rate, health workers should be provided the highest level of personal protection.




Read more:
How are nurses becoming infected with Ebola?


What can other countries do?

Ebola is a concern for all of us, because travel can result in infections occurring in any country. During the 2014 West African epidemic, cases also occurred outside the main affected countries, the largest number in Nigeria.

Failure to initially diagnose a case in Texas resulted in four other people becoming infected, including health workers.

Whether facing hantavirus or Ebola, emergency departments need tools to improve their awareness of and ability to prevent hospital outbreaks.

Busy staff in emergency triage may send someone with a fever back to the waiting room for hours, not realising they have travelled recently and may have a serious infectious disease. In South Korea, a person with the deadly Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) virus was in the emergency department for many hours, and a huge outbreak resulted.

One useful tool for hospitals is a decision-support system used during triage that prompts staff to ask for a patient’s travel history and provides data on disease outbreaks in the country of travel. This means patients with deadly infections may be isolated before they can infect others.

Another concern is that if the outbreak becomes much larger, there may be survivors who still harbour the virus for many months or longer after recovery. They could continue to infect others after this epidemic is over if they come into contact with bodily fluids such as semen, amniotic fluid or breast milk, as well as fluids from the placenta or eye.

The WHO declaring a public health emergency of international concern helps, as it activates a range of additional measures and resources for outbreak control.




Read more:
Ebola survivors struggle to return to normal lives: what I found out in Sierra Leone and Liberia


The Conversation

C Raina MacIntyre is the founder of EPIWATCH Global Pty Ltd which tracks global epidemics. She receives funding from NHMRC Investigator Grant 2016907 and NHMRC Centre for Research Excellence GNT2006595.

Ashley Quigley, Mohana Priya Kunasekaran, and Noor Jahan Begum Bari do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Health authorities are racing to contain Ebola in the DRC and Uganda. Here’s what’s making it so challenging – https://theconversation.com/health-authorities-are-racing-to-contain-ebola-in-the-drc-and-uganda-heres-whats-making-it-so-challenging-283276

Playing host to Putin and Trump, China sends a message – it’s now in the driver’s seat

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Alexander Korolev, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, UNSW Sydney

It’s been quite a week for Beijing, with back-to-back visits by the leaders of the United States and Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has had his hands full with hosting duties, gun salutes, photo opportunities and high-level talks.

Each visit was important in its own way. US President Donald Trump’s state visit was his first to Beijing since 2017. It came at a moment of strained China-US relations, with the US at war in the Middle East and its foreign policy undergoing a massive transformation under Trump.

For Putin, it was his 25th official visit to China. The trip was intended to further consolidate the China–Russia strategic alignment amid global uncertainty. Putin was also keen to secure China’s continued economic lifeline and diplomatic cover as its war with Ukraine grinds on.

And while the timing of the back-to-back visits should not be over-interpreted – Moscow says there was “no connection” between the two – they do reveal a deeper structural shift in global politics.

Beijing’s rising confidence

First, the United States is clearly no longer the most important country in China’s strategic worldview – and Beijing is increasingly willing to show it.

This was visible in Xi’s posturing and negotiating style with Trump. From his rather distant handshake to his dominant body language throughout their meeting, Xi
sent a message: Washington has a limited ability to influence Beijing anymore.

The modest outcomes of their summit reinforced this dynamic. Trump left China without a formal deal, a press conference or a joint communiqué. Nor was there a breakthrough on either Iran or Taiwan.

Putin, meanwhile, met his “good and old friend” Xi and took home some 20 agreements ranging from trade to technology.

The most striking, if not unsettling, moment was Xi’s invocation of the “Thucydides Trap” during his meeting with Trump. This is the idea that a rising power inevitably threatens an established one, risking war.

Xi asked a pointed question:

Can China and the United States transcend the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’ and forge a new paradigm for major-power relations?

Xi has used this concept before, but his directness this time sent a warning: the US risks creating a major crisis if it continues to rely on a containment strategy to counter China’s rise.

In short, Beijing used the Trump visit to signal confidence, autonomy and the fact that Washington is not the only capital that matters to China.

Russia has new usefulness to Beijing

Second, the China–Russia alignment has become less equal, but it has gained greater strategic depth. And Beijing is now using it to put pressure on the US leadership.

During a private garden stroll through the highly secretive Zhongnanhai leadership compound last week, Trump asked whether Xi often brings other world leaders there. Xi replied that such visits are “extremely rare,” but added that “Putin has been here”.

The innocent reading of this exchange is that Xi was simply noting the depth of his personal rapport with Putin. But in the current geopolitical context, it also served as a subtle reminder to Trump that China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia is not rhetorical. Beijing was signalling Moscow remains a privileged strategic partner – and that China has options.

The deeper message is this: if Washington seeks to isolate China, Beijing can lean even more heavily on its relationship with Moscow.

China does not need to help Russia “win” in Ukraine to make this point. What matters is that Beijing has the ability – if it chooses – to bolster Russia’s war effort through economic, diplomatic and long-term technological and energy cooperation. Beijing’s influence now extends well beyond the Indo-Pacific and reaches into Europe in ways Washington cannot ignore.

Xi didn’t give Putin everything he sought during his meeting, though.

With the turmoil in the Middle East cutting off China’s access to Middle Eastern oil and gas, Moscow sensed an opportunity to push ahead on a new pipeline, called the Power of Siberia-2, to bring Russian gas to China.

While Putin and Xi came to a “general understanding on the parameters” of the project, however, no final deal was signed.

China is now in the driver’s seat

Third, China now sees itself as the central node of great-power politics.

For many decades, the United States sat at the apex of the “great triangle”, balancing between China and the Soviet Union and then Russia.

Today, the geometry has flipped. Both Trump and Putin felt compelled to come to Beijing – for stabilisation, reassurance and strategic signalling – even as they confront each other elsewhere.

China is not playing triangular diplomacy in the classic sense. It is not trying to pit Washington and Moscow against each other. Instead, it is positioning itself as the system’s centre: the place where major-power diplomacy must pass, even if the outcomes are uncertain.

China is not at the apex of this arrangement because it is the strongest militarily or economically, but because it has the confidence to engage the US and Russia on its own terms.

In this new geometry, great-power politics does not revolve around Washington. Increasingly, it runs through Beijing.

The Conversation

Alexander Korolev does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Playing host to Putin and Trump, China sends a message – it’s now in the driver’s seat – https://theconversation.com/playing-host-to-putin-and-trump-china-sends-a-message-its-now-in-the-drivers-seat-283375