Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nick Ilott, Senior Researcher and Lead Bioinformatician, The Oxford Centre for Microbiome Studies, University of Oxford
Microplastics are microscopic fragments of plastic that are smaller than 5mm long (and as small as 0.001mm) – and they’re everywhere. Some microplastics are created intentionally, glitter and confetti being obvious everyday examples. Others are created when larger plastic items are worn down (such as when plastic pollution in the ocean or environment is eroded).
Nevertheless, whether they’re shed from plastic chopping boards, in our drinking water or inadvertently added to processed food products, we could consequently be consuming up to 5g every week.
However, we don’t currently know the exact quantities of microplastics a single person may have in their body at any one time. Getting precise measurements of microplastics in human samples can be difficult. This is because other small fragments (such as some fats) in bodily samples can look like plastic to scientific instruments.
While scientists are sure that we’re eating microplastics, there’s also still some debate around their ability to enter our bloodstream and build up in body tissues.
Nevertheless, the fact that we consume them at all is enough for microplastics to meet our metabolic organ – the gut microbiome. Current research suggests that these encounters can reduce the good bacteria in our gut to contribute to IBD.
Microplastics and gut health
Our gut is home to trillions of microorganisms – known as the gut microbiome. Some 500 to 1,000 different microbial species work together in harmony to keep our gut healthy.
A major function of the microbiome is to take what we eat, chew it up and spit out breakdown products. These products are called metabolites and are critical for gut health.
A well-studied group of metabolites are short-chain fatty acids. Short-chain fatty acids garnered attention around a decade ago, when they were found to be produced by good gut bacteria and could help prevent IBD.
IBD is an increasingly common disease, affecting around one in every 123 people in the UK. It can cause severe abdominal pain, diarrhoea, weight loss and fatigue.
One of the gut’s key short-chain fatty acids is butyrate, which is produced by bacteria when they break down dietary fibre. Butyrate has been found to be crucial for gut health, helping to boost immunity and preserve the gut barrier. However, if the gut microbiome is disturbed, microbes that produce butyrate are reduced and gut health is jeopardised.
The gut microbiome faces many challenges that now includes plastic pollutants.
Evidence for how microplastics influence the microbiome and gut health in humans is presently scarce, largely due to the previously mentioned difficulty in measuring microplastics in human samples. But work in mouse models has been more revealing, allowing us to observe the consequences of various types of microplastics in the gut.
A recently published study in the Journal of Hazardous Materials, showed that giving mice a group of polystyrene microplastics of various sizes makes the gut vulnerable to IBD. This happens because key members of the microbiome are reduced, stopping the production of butyrate and increasing the severity of inflammation.
Clearly microplastics are capable of inducing poor gut health. However, whether animal studies accurately capture levels of microplastics found in human tissues remains to be completely understood – something that will hopefully become possible with technological advances. It’s also still not clear exactly how microplastics do this.
Even with bans on intentionally produced microplastics, we still have to fight against those that are produced through wear and tear of plastic-containing materials.
What if we could use our bacteria to help us in this battle? There is some tantalising evidence that some bacteria found in human guts are capable of breaking down some types of microplastics. Although we don’t yet know if this breakdown happens in the gut (or whether it’s a good thing), there is a real, albeit distant, possibility that in collaboration with our microbiome we might be able to fend off some of the ill effects of microplastics.
With ever-growing technological advances, it is plausible that we could, in the future, harness the power of the microbiome to dispose of plastics outside, and inside, our guts.
Nick Ilott receives funding from The Kennedy Trust for Rheumatology Research, The Wellcome Trust, Guts UK, PSC Support and has received funding from Roche for a PhD project jointly with funding from the BBSRC as part of an iCASE DTP.
Donald Trump’s deadline for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face a renewal of American bombardment was due to expire this week, but was extended at the last moment, this time with no defined time limit. But the risk of renewed escalation remains real, as both sides continue to block traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important – and contested – waterways..
Yet, despite hardline rhetoric on both sides, diplomacy has not collapsed. In fact, several plausible off‑ramps exist that could allow Washington and Tehran to cool tensions without either side appearing to capitulate.
Research in conflict resolution suggests that warring parties will be more likely to come to an agreement when both sides can take away what they consider a winning result. Often, this comes in trade-offs between what you are willing to give away in order to gain elsewhere. Nevertheless, it’s axiomatic in conflict resolution that it’s much easier to start a war than to stop it.
The most viable pathway to a settlement remains a reset of the nuclear file broadly along the lines of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), albeit under a new political brand.
Iranian officials have proposed a staged arrangement that would cap uranium enrichment at 3.67%, well below the level needed for a nuclear weapon. Such an arrangement would return intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections with the prospect of ultimately transferring stocks of higher‑enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for phased sanctions relief.
This would not represent a fundamental concession by Tehran. These were the parameters it accepted 11 years ago under the deal brokered by Barack Obama. But it would significantly lengthen Iran’s nuclear “breakout time” (the time it takes to produce enough weapons-grade uranium). It would also restore transparency that has been steadily eroded since the first Trump administration pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018.
For Washington, such a deal would fall short of longstanding demands for “zero enrichment” – but that position has so far proved unattainable. Even US officials now appear more focused on verifiable constraints than absolute prohibitions, understanding that China recognises the right to enrich uranium as a matter of sovereignty.
A capped and monitored programme would allow the US president to claim that Iran had been forced back under strict controls, while avoiding a further costly regional war. The irony is that this would largely put Iran back into an agreement that Obama agreed and which Trump, with considerable bluster, withdrew from in 2018. This appears to be a stumbling block for the US president.
A second and related off‑ramp concerns the duration rather than the existence of enrichment limits. Recent talks have stalled over US demands for a 20‑year moratorium on enrichment, which Iran has countered with proposals closer to five years. A compromise, such as a seven to ten-year limit with built‑in reviews, would give both sides something to sell domestically. It would represent long‑term risk reduction for Washington and for Tehran it would be a reaffirmation of Iran’s right to a nuclear future.
Time‑limited arrangements have precedent in arms control. They are known as confidence and security building measures and are often used in conflict prevention and resolution to build trust between parties while working towards a resolution. And they may be more politically durable than maximalist demands that are more likely to collapse as political conditions change.
Beyond the nuclear issue, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as Iran’s most potent source of leverage. Roughly one-fifth of global oil passes through the waterway, and even limited disruption has sent energy prices climbing this year. Former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev – a close ally of Vladimir Putin – recently described the strait as Iran’s “real nuclear weapon”. It’s a comment that captures how central maritime pressure has become to Tehran’s strategy.
An agreement guaranteeing the strait’s unconditional reopening without harassment, tolls, or threats, would provide immediate economic relief worldwide and give Washington a highly visible diplomatic win.
But Gulf states have expressed concern that such a bargain could end up managing rather than dismantling Iran’s leverage. It would effectively normalise – rather than remove – Iran’s ability to threaten shipping during crises.
For neighbouring countries, stabilisation without broader de‑escalation risks entrenching a dangerous precedent. This makes it all the more important that any Hormuz‑focused deal be tied to wider commitments on restraint and established confidence-building measures.
Lowering the stakes
Process matters as much as substance. Increasingly, mediators such as Pakistan, Oman and China appear to favour “sequenced de‑escalation”. This is where limited reciprocal steps, including mutual adherence to ceasefire agreements, shipping guarantees and relaxation of both sides’ maritime blockades, are locked in before negotiations widen to sanctions relief and regional security.
This approach lowers the political stakes of any single concession and reduces the risk that talks collapse under the weight of unresolved disputes. However, this scenario would make it harder for the US administration to define the agreement as a victory.
Similarly, there is the question of political narrative. The US president has vacillated between threats of overwhelming force and signals of fatigue with the conflict. This suggests he has a strong desire for an exit that can be framed as victory.
A narrowly defined agreement that could be rebranded, front‑loaded with Iranian compliance and heavy on enforcement language may prove more acceptable than a comprehensive treaty – even if its substance closely resembles older Obama-era frameworks.
The problem is the Trump administration’s failure to maintain a consistent narrative of what it wants from Iran. This presents a challenge to the established research on conflict resolution. The US president, in particular, has made understanding the US position difficult. In years to come, this crisis may be a useful case study when it comes to exploring conflict resolution theory. But, right now, it makes a settlement very hard to envisage.
David J. Galbreath has received funding from the UKRI.
Incels – involuntary celibates – believe they have been unconditionally excluded from the dating market and are doomed to remain virgins. This has negative implications for their mood and self-esteem, as well as the women and girls they grow to resent.
Addressing gender based discrimination and violence requires experts who are well prepared and able to support discussion around these sensitive topics in a manner that does not further stigmatise young people.
Many young people worry about falling behind their peers socially and sexually. Sociological research shows this pressure is observable from high school onward, with pupils mocking each other if they do not appear sufficiently experienced or interested. Survey data finds inexperienced adults are seen as less desirable, even by those who share their inexperience.
Virginity and masculinity
Research in the US found that women were more likely to see their virginity as something to be shared with the right person, while men are more likely to see it as a source of shame to be opportunistically cast off. These sentiments reflect the traditional view of virginity in men as a sign of inadequacy.
Incels take this perception to the extreme, positioning themselves at the bottom of a natural male hierarchy because of women’s supposedly hardwired preferences for alpha males.
This is in contrast to other parts of the manosphere, populated by masculinity influencers. They start from a similar premise – that dating is unfair – but teach followers how to “game” the system. This may be through pseudoscience, body modification, coercion, dehumanisation and dominance.
Incels see their struggle to fit in with adulthood as something inflicted upon them by a combination of biology and social engineering. They envision the same sexual marketplace as the likes of Andrew Tate, but feel unable to compete in it. This perceived helplessness acts as a justification for their grievances. In this way, they outsource their sexual development, positioning women as gatekeepers to respectability and misogyny as transgressive rebellion.
Crucially, incels’ sense of exclusion goes beyond sexuality. An illustration of this was found in research which suggested that regional inequality is a predictor of incel activity on social media. In other words, economically unequal environments are associated with more incel sentiments. If young men can see “the good life”, but feel blocked from achieving it and their position at the bottom of a hierarchy is inescapable, it can make them feel trying is pointless.
It may seem counterintuitive that incels gravitate towards a philosophy that tells them their life cannot get any better. But this fatalistic worldview, that offers secret knowledge to explain romantic alienation as a scientific inevitability, offers temporary comfort. It absolves responsibility.
Incels often see themselves as rivals in a misery economy, where the goal is to be the most “trucel”: the person with the odds stacked most against them, who therefore has the best reason to be a virgin. But over time, the permanency of their position can become overwhelming as the sadness turns to rage. Most incels confine their anger to messageboards. But in extreme cases incel beliefs have inspired real-world violence including harassment, stalking and even acts of murder.
Research on the influence of “manfluencers” and incel culture in schools suggests that these online cultures do not remain confined to the internet. They spill into classrooms, shaping boys’ attitudes towards girls and women teachers. They normalise sexist behaviour, placing yet more responsibility on teachers to deal with the consequences. One outcome is that the Department for Education has seen a rising number of Prevent referrals related to inceldom.
Incel attitudes can spill into the classroom, affecting male teens’ relationships with their female peers and teachers. MAYA LAB/Shutterstock
Social media and video sharing platforms play a large role in both spreading and profiting from this material, so are being increasingly targeted by regulators such as Ofcom. This may well become a catalyst for stricter digital governance.
But at a local level, a meaningful response to these issues must include expanded access to mental health support. Young people also need healthier outlets, both on and offline, for openness and connection.
In schools, education on rejection, empathy, relationship dynamics, self-worth and social skills can play a vital role here. It requires a whole-school approach in which teachers are themselves supported and equipped to respond. A whole-school approach should also mean that individual staff are not left to carry the burden.
This begins with the identification of whole school guiding principles for education interventions. Some schools are supporting all staff to recognise and respond to incel terminology, to recognise the eco-system and appeal of influencers. Specific workshops and lesson plans are also being developed and tested.
Schools and teachers should not be left to tackle this issue alone. Parents are the first port of call for safeguarding young people and they require education and support in recognising and challenging harmful online influences at home.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Empirical research in the behavioural sciences shows that the Trump administration has not, to date, adopted an efficient strategy to negotiate with Iran. Negotiations between the US and Iran on April 11-12 in Islamabad, Pakistan were deemed the last attempt at ending a war that’s on the verge of causing a global economic crisis.
To explain why the first round of negotiations between the US and Iran failed, US Vice President Vance said Iran did not agree to terms about its nuclear efforts and that the US gave Tehran its “final and best offer”. Vance put an end to the 21-hour long talks and the US delegation made a swift exit after it had stayed less than 24 hours in the country.
The US’s “final and best offer” has shown a deep misunderstanding of the dynamics and the psychology of negotiations. It would be laughable if world peace, looming world hunger, and a catastrophic economic crisis weren’t at stake.
What led to the breakdown in talks?
Contrary to what Vance claimed, putting an offer in the early stage of a negotiation is quite counter-productive to solving a conflict.
It often escalates into a war of positions where negotiators mostly seek to defend and argue about their positions, thus becoming cognitively rigid rather than trying to understand what drives the other party’s behaviour. In contrast, an offer in the later stages of negotiations enables everyone to first understand the underlying (unpublicised) interests, motivations, needs and concerns of the different parties.
When an offer is made later rather than earlier, negotiators have more leeway to exchange information and explore creative solutions that meet the different parties’ underlying interests; they are less likely to engage in positional, competitive bargaining early in the process (which then colours the entire subsequent interaction). What this means in plain terms is a key measure of negotiators’ effectiveness is their ability to seek information and ask questions rather than solely making claims.
Even when both parties are willing to reach painful compromises, a lot of time is required to explore underlying interests, discuss thorny issues, disclose sensitive information, and look for solutions that are mutually acceptable. In fact, research has shown that discussing multiple simultaneous offers, that is, discussing several potential scenarios and options for compromise at the same time, is more efficient than making a single unilateral offer.
It takes time to build trust and at the beginning the parties interpret every move from the other side through the lens of the distrust they experience themselves. For example, people reject an offer that comes from the other side just because it comes from the other side: they evaluate an offer based on who makes it, regardless of how interesting it is intrinsically; this phenomenon characterises negotiation and has been termed reactive devaluation. This is because we construe that another person’s offer must be solely driven by their interests, and we construe our interests as antagonistic to theirs.
Second, the “psychological cost” of walking away from a negotiation evolves over time.
At the beginning of a negotiation, walking away and reaching an impasse bears little psychological cost because little energy or effort have been invested whereas at the end of a negotiation, walking away and reaching an impasse is far more costly: an impasse would mean that all the time spent was for nothing. This is an application of a bias that is well-known by psychologists, namely escalation of commitment. The more (the less) we invest time and pursue a certain course of action, the more (the less) we want it to succeed.
Thus, results from empirical research converge to demonstrate that negotiation is a game with different phases or sequences: open discussions first; bargaining at the end. Using aggressive tactics early in negotiations makes finding out about interests and uncovering cooperative solutions very unlikely. The ability not to close one’s mind too early in the process and keep things open throughout as much as possible is critical. This is why patience is key in negotiations.
Managing the timing dimension in negotiations is clearly essential for success. The same behaviour put at the end rather than at the beginning of negotiations will yield completely different results.
In negotiations, it’s often a question of when to make a move rather than whether to make a move.
In this way, empirical research on negotiations suggests that negotiation is like a dance. One needs to proceed by trial and error before constructing compromises that are mutually acceptable. It takes time to understand someone else and build a relationship – exactly as is the case in a romantic relationship.
Needless to say, the aforementioned research has mostly been published in US academic journals dedicated to the behavioural sciences. It is well known to negotiation scholars and experts in the US.
Dissecting the telltale signs of amateurism
Vance’s position that the US gave Iran its “final and best offer” was, thus, that of an amateur. This is all the more apparent given that negotiations between the US and Iran are quite complex and include multiple issues: reopening the strait of Ormuz, implementation of steps to limit and control Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, access to a civil nuclear program, the lifting of economic sanctions, guarantees that war will not resume, etc.
Wanting to reach an agreement on such difficult issues in such little time denoted a lack of negotiation experience that was simply astonishing.
Negotiations that led to an agreement with Iran on nuclear matters under the Obama administration took more than 20 months, whereas those led by Vance in Pakistan earlier this month took 21 hours.
In this respect, the failure of the US versus Iran talks in Pakistan was in no way surprising. It was fully consistent with, and predicted by, empirical research on the psychology of negotiation.
Making an early offer is very ineffective in solving conflict. For instance, the very same error explained why negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians failed in Camp David in 2000, even though the two parties wanted to reach a compromise at that time – the consequences of this failure have been catastrophic. As a close observer recalled, the parties made their initial offers early in the negotiation process, well before “neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians had been prepared to fully own up to the fears and needs of the other”.
All of this has denoted a major flaw by the Trump administration in how to handle negotiations with Iranians (among others) since the start of the war till now. Negotiating is not about imposing terms unilaterally on the other party. Nor is it about making the other party capitulate and accept an unconditional surrender. That strategy works in negotiations where there is only one variable to negotiate upon (typically, a competitive issue such as price), or when you undoubtedly are in a position of power – as would be the case if you were a wealthy real estate developer in New York city. But that strategy does not work in negotiations where there are multiple variables to negotiate upon and where meeting complex, underlying interests and discovering creative solutions is necessary to achieve a good deal, or when the balance of power is uncertain.
To paraphrase yet another Republican US President Eisenhower, negotiation is:
“The art of getting someone else to do something you want done because he wants to do it.”
On all counts, what happened between the US and Iranian delegations on April 11-12 in Pakistan did not look like real negotiations.
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Marwan SINACEUR a reçu des financements de ESSEC Research Center, Fondation ESSEC, Fondation INSEAD, Stanford University.
Iran’s military might was never going to be a match for the US and Israel. So instead it turned to the highly effective weapon it has at its disposal – geography.
Blocking off the Strait of Hormuz has shaken the global economy. It has doubled the price of a barrel of crude oil, which has a knock-on effect on the price the rest of the world pays for everything from fuel to heating and food to holidays.
It also made Donald Trump have a rethink. The world is now waiting to see what happens next in a stretch of water which carries around 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas.
For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has been an extremely valuable geopolitical asset. And its surprisingly strong negotiating position demonstrates a classic principle of game theory, the mathematical study of strategic interactions.
This principle, sometimes referred to as Rubinstein bargaining, basically says that during a conflict, each side’s strength depends on two things: how badly off it would be without a resolution, and how impatient it is to get things resolved.
Iran will certainly be badly off if the war continues, using up its stockpiles of missiles and drones while its infrastructure gets bombed. But dictatorships can afford to be patient, crushing dissent if it arises.
The Strait of Hormuz, then, has played an enormous role in the conflict so far. The US’s position is much weaker than first thought because of a stretch of water the world can’t do without.
Game theory suggests that to achieve a position of strength, countries and regions need to come up with their own version of the strait – something others need which will strengthen their negotiating position.
It doesn’t have to be a shipping route, of course. China’s version could be its global dominance in manufacturing. It would be very hard for most countries to live without the things China makes.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s strength is its natural resources, such as most of the world’s cobalt being mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the future, it may also be able to leverage the fact it is the last continent with a young and growing population, while the rest of the world is rapidly ageing.
The EU’s strength, meanwhile, has been the size of its united single market. It has been able to leverage this market to get preferential treatment, protecting its produce and exports. It also managed to impose European standards on food and products across the world.
But the EU’s strength is by no means guaranteed. Most economic growth is now expected to come from the likes of China, India or Indonesia, weakening Europe’s negotiating position. Research suggests the only way to get some of this strength back is to integrate European markets even more, and to enlarge the EU further.
This is also why the UK will soon probably return to the European single market, one way or another. Brexit has considerably weakened the international negotiating position of both the UK and EU.
Strait and narrow
Having a version of the Strait of Hormuz seems especially important now that alliances and divisions have become much less clear. Old alliances and promises have lost a lot of their meaning.
The US has threatened to leave Nato, and said it would annex Canada and Greenland. Both it and Russia have jointly campaigned for the failed re-election of Viktor Orbán in Hungary.
But in a world without reliable alliances, all countries are interdependent. Supply chains are so interconnected that a small change in one country can have a major impact on the other side of the world. Oil tankers not moving near Iran could mean no pork sausages in UK grocery stores this summer.
In these circumstances, game theory tells us that success requires two things: not relying on a single partner, and offering something that others cannot do without. When everything is about leverage, power comes from being impossible to ignore.
The countries that will thrive in the next decades will be those which manage to establish their own version of the Strait of Hormuz. And make sure they never need to sail through anyone else’s.
Renaud Foucart does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
To receive a nomination at the Bafta Game Awards is to be placed amongst the very best video games developed each year. This year’s ceremony saw 42 games nominated, demonstrating a wide range of gaming excellence. Among the nominees were designers, voice actors and composers, each contributing to the validation of video games as a cultural form.
Now in their 22nd year, the awards took place on April 17 in London where outstanding achievement in animation went to Dispatch, with Lego Party awarded best family game, Kingdom Come: Deliverance 2 best narrative, and the coveted best overall game gong going to Clair Obscur: Expedition 33.
For the winners, awards can result in boosted sales. Clair Obscur: Expedition 33 saw more than 92,000 copies sold overnight following the awards. The win adds to the game’s overwhelming success story both economically and culturally since its release in April 2025. Such accolades not only translate to individual success, they also gain legitimacy for the game industry as a whole. So how can an awards show aid an entire medium?
Part of the answer lies in how awards shape cultural perception, not just commercial success. Regardless of their aesthetics and storytelling prowess, video games are still considered by many as being an example of “low culture”. The Bafta awards have been one way to challenge this perception, offering a prestigious arena for celebration and recognition.
The British Academy of Film and Television Arts is a British arts charity that has been in operation since 1947 with a mission to “advance the art and technique of film”. The first film awards were held in 1949, with TV awards introduced in 1955. Games first gained recognition within the respected Bafta tradition in 2004.
A video game can take years of work to develop and requires the collaboration of many creatives across a variety of disciplines. Writers, artists, animators, programmers, sound designers, voice actors and musicians are all part of the process.
Bafta runs initiatives such as scholarships, mentorships and programmes for young game designers. Celebrating video games with the annual awards show makes a statement that the medium is as worthy as film or television in terms of cultural contribution.
How does recognition impact the industry?
Legitimacy is often accompanied by economic support at a regional, national and international level. The more video games are considered culturally valuable, the more governments and art charities are interested in investing in them.
However, video game development is currently risky, with thousands of layoffs this year so far. Young graduates looking for an entry role may not find much available even with large developers like Epic Games which laid off 1,000 workers in March, attributed to a downturn in Fortnite engagement that began in 2025.
Initiatives to support studios entering the industry have increased in frequency and monetary value since 2015 with the creation of the UK Games Fund (UKGF). The support programme started with a £4 million prototype fund to help small developers produce working mock-ups of ideas to show investors. Funding is vital for the development of the industry as it allows creatives to take risks with the medium without risking their livelihoods.
Economic support initiatives create positive feedback loops where developers have the freedom to advance the art and technique of games and then see their work acknowledged through awards. This subsequently raises the profile of video games to funders.
This year the Baftas follow an increase to the funding available for British game studios from the UK government. As part of the opening of the London Games Festival – a week of talks and demonstrations from the UK games industry held every April – the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport announced a £30 million “power up” for the UK games industry.
Grants from the fund will be split into three categories. Up to £20,000 is available to invest in newly formed companies, with £100,000 for the prototyping of new games and £250,000 to aid with completing games and helping established studios expand.
The Bafta Game Awards have been a key part of the festival’s programme since its inception in 2016. The money, announced just as the best of global video games are being celebrated, will be used to support next generation of exciting young video game developers.
Charlotte Gislam is part of GAMEMHEARTS which is supported by the European Union Horizon Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 101132543
Neta Yodovich is part of GAMEMHEARTS which is supported by the European Union Horizon Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 101132543.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nathan Critch, Research Associate, Department of Politics, University of Manchester
Keir Starmer’s decision to appoint Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the US keeps coming back to haunt him. It has now emerged that Mandelson was granted security clearance by the Foreign Office, despite concerns raised during the vetting process. Top Foreign Office civil servant Olly Robbins was sacked over these revelations.
Mandelson was controversial long before Starmer appointed him in 2024. A New Labour figure known as the “prince of darkness” due to his reputation as an adept but often ruthless and underhand political operator, Mandelson had already been embroiled in a number of scandals involving allegations of corruption. He was also known to have had a close relationship with convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, as well as close business links in China.
Starmer fired him in September 2025 after emails were released showing Mandelson offering supportive messages to Epstein, who faced charges of soliciting a minor at the time. Further emails released by US officials suggested that Mandelson might have passed privileged and market-sensitive information to Epstein during the fallout of the financial crisis. In February 2026, the former ambassador was arrested on suspicion of misconduct in public office. He has denied criminal wrongdoing and has not been charged.
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that Mandelson did not pass the vetting process carried out by the Cabinet Office’s UK Security Vetting team. Almost all civil servants are required to go through some form of vetting. But as a top diplomat, Mandelson was subject to the most intensive form of scrutiny. From what is known about the process, red flags were probably raised about Mandelson’s links with Chinese and Russian business interests, though the exact details have not been made public.
Starmer and his allies have argued that Robbins did not tell the prime minister about concerns raised in the vetting process as he should have. In giving evidence to MPs, Robbins said that Number 10 took a “dismissive” approach to the vetting process. He also said that he was under “constant pressure” to approve Mandelson’s clearance due to this being a political priority for Starmer. Mandelson’s appointment was announced publicly before the vetting took place.
The opposition is piling on the pressure for Starmer to resign. But behind speculation about the prime minister’s future stands a deeper set of constitutional questions about accountability and standards in public life.
From Starmer’s perspective, the scandal has revealed a pressing need to improve the independent scrutiny of appointments. He has ordered a review into vetting procedures, and argued that failings lie with civil servants in the FCDO and with the robustness of vetting processes – not with him.
On one level, this defence is an effort to deflect blame. Yet the response also fits with Starmer’s approach to politics as a follower of rules and lover of process.
In arguing for a more robust independent process around vetting in their attempts to avoid blame, Starmer and his allies invoke a longstanding critique of Whitehall culture. This view treats independent, depoliticised scrutiny and checks and balances as key missing links in British politics. Building these would be vital for ensuring transparency and accountability around appointments and politics more broadly.
Since coming to office, Starmer has consistently argued for a rewiring of the British state to modernise the government. Like academics, thinktanks, journalists and former Whitehall insiders before him, Starmer’s view suggests that Whitehall and the centre of the British state operate in an antiquated way. When it comes to accountability and standards, the government arguably lacks proper independent scrutiny and constitutional checks and balances to hold decision-makers to account.
Instead, Whitehall is too reliant on a “good chaps theory of government”, which suggests politicians typically act with the best of intentions and therefore do not need to be subject to independent scrutiny.
Who is responsible?
Critics, echoing Robbins’ testimony, have argued that Starmer and his allies pressed Mandelson’s ambassadorship as a political priority, announcing it before vetting procedures had been completed in order to push through the appointment.
Many have pointed out that Mandelson’s reputation as a potentially suspect character was well known before the release of the Epstein files. Within this narrative, blame for the appointment of Mandelson lies squarely with Starmer.
In a sense, this approach offers a different view of British politics. In terms of appointments – both to top civil service positions and to more political posts – the UK’s approach has been argued to resemble medieval “court politics”. Here, the ruler decides their key advisers on the basis of their own preferences and objectives.
This too implies a lack of proper checks and balances around appointments. But one of the proposed advantages of such a system is that it places accountability and responsibility for decisions clearly in the hands of elected politicians. Britain has a longstanding tradition of individual ministerial accountability.
Starmer, however, is now seemingly weakening this tradition by deflecting blame onto the civil service and its processes. It is this notion of direct political accountability that Starmer’s opponents are invoking when they call for his resignation.
Overall, these two images of British politics are contradictory and indicative of the emergence of an increasingly incoherent form of government. On the one hand, the state has failed to move towards modern and robust independent scrutiny of ministerial decision-making around appointments. On the other hand, politics has shifted away from a culture of clear, individual ministerial accountability.
This leaves Britain in a “worst of both worlds” scenario when it comes to accountability and standards in public life. It has neither robust independent scrutiny, nor clear lines of political accountability. More than anything, the Mandelson vetting scandal reveals the need to fix this broken system.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Who counts as an intellectual? In many traditions, the figure of the intellectual is tied to the search for truth, social critique and public engagement. From the Dreyfus Affair (a political scandal in 1894 in France that mobilised writers and thinkers to defend justice) to postcolonial debates, intellectuals are those who intervene in society, not just to interpret the world, but to challenge it.
In the African context, this role takes on particular urgency. Intellectuals on the continent and in the diaspora have long navigated a complex terrain shaped by colonial legacies, political constraints and global inequalities. They are not simply producers of knowledge. They are mediators between worlds, engaged in a struggle over meaning, identity and historical narrative.
As a scholar of cultural studies and postcolonial thought, I’ve sought, in a new French book, to analyse their paths not as isolated figures, but as part of a broader constellation of what we’ve called “African intellectual sensibilities”.
These are ways of thinking that are at once critical, situated and globally engaged. This approach highlights how African thinkers contribute not only to debates about Africa, but also to the redefinition of knowledge production itself.
So, identifying African thinkers is not just an exercise in recognition. It’s part of a broader effort to rebalance an intellectual history that has too often marginalised or misrepresented African contributions. As Congolese philosopher Valentin-Yves Mudimbe famously argued, Africa has often been constructed as an object of knowledge rather than a subject producing it.
From this perspective, here are six intellectuals whose work helps us rethink Africa and the world.
The famous
1. Valentin-Yves Mudimbe (1941-2025)
Mudimbe is one of the most influential African philosophers of the late 20th century. His seminal work The Invention of Africa dismantles what he calls the “colonial library”, the body of western knowledge that has historically defined Africa from the outside.
Rather than simply rejecting western thought, Mudimbe proposes a critical archaeology of knowledge. His work invites us to rethink how Africa can be known and, crucially, how it can speak for itself. He shifts the question from what Africa is to who has the power to define it.
His contribution goes further. By drawing on thinkers like Michel Foucault from France, he shows that knowledge is never neutral. It’s embedded in structures of power. This allows Mudimbe to expose how academic disciplines, from anthropology to history, have participated in constructing a distorted image of Africa.
His work opened the way for a generation of scholars who now seek to produce knowledge from within African perspectives rather than about Africa as an external object.
2. Achille Mbembe (born 1957)
A major voice in contemporary global theory, Cameroonian historian Mbembe explores how power operates in postcolonial societies. In works such as On the Postcolony and Critique of Black Reason, he analyses the afterlives of colonial violence and their impact on subjectivity.
Mbembe: thinking about power, violence and the postcolonial condition. Wikimedia Commons/Heike Huslage-Koch, CC BY-SA
Mbembe also emphasises the need for Africa to produce its own narratives. For him, intellectual work is inseparable from historical trauma, but also from the possibility of reinvention.
One of his key contributions is the concept of “necropolitics”, which examines how modern forms of power determine who may live and who must die. This framework has been widely used to analyse conflicts, borders and inequalities far beyond the continent.
At the same time, Mbembe insists on moving beyond victimhood. His work points toward what he sees as an emerging African future, shaped by mobility, creativity and new forms of belonging in a globalised world.
The fascinating
3. George Ayittey (1945–2022)
Ghanaian economist and thinker Ayittey stands out for his uncompromising critique of postcolonial African elites. While acknowledging the impact of colonialism, he argues that many of Africa’s problems today stem from internal governance failures such as corruption, authoritarianism and institutional decay.
Ayittey: rethinking governance and postcolonial elites. Wikimedia Commons/Gage Skidmore, CC BY-SA
One of his most influential ideas is the distinction between “cheetahs” and “hippos”. Cheetahs are a new generation of reform minded Africans, hippos are entrenched elites resistant to change. This captures a broader critique of political stagnation and elite capture.
Ayittey also insists on the importance of indigenous African institutions as resources for political renewal. His work is therefore not only critical, it is also programmatic, calling for a reconstruction of governance.
4. Kwasi Wiredu (1931-2022)
Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu is one of the most important figures in African philosophy. His central project, conceptual decolonisation, aims to free African thought from uncritically adopting western philosophical categories.
For Wiredu, language plays a crucial role. Philosophical problems are often shaped by the language they’re formulated in. By returning to African languages, he shows that debates about truth, personhood or political organisation can be reframed in very different ways.
His work on consensus-based political systems, inspired by Akan traditions, is particularly influential. Rather than relying on majoritarian democracy, Wiredu explores forms of deliberation that include agreement and social cohesion. In the process, he does not reject universality. He redefines it from within African intellectual traditions.
5. Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (born 1957)
Nigerian sociologist and gender scholar Oyěwùmí’s work offers a powerful critique of western ideas being applied to the rest of the world. In The Invention of Women, she argues that gender, as understood in western societies, was imposed on Yoruba social structures through colonialism.
Oyěwùmí: rethinking gender. Wikimedia Commons/O Oyěwùmí, CC BY-SA
Her research demonstrates that social organisation in Yoruba society was not originally structured around gender in the same way.
Rather than gender serving as the main axis of social difference, other markers such as age and status played a more central role. This challenges the assumption that categories such as man and woman are universally foundational.
More broadly, her work invites us to question how knowledge travels and how it can distort the realities it claims to describe.
He criticises the global division of intellectual labour, where African scholars are often confined to producing data while the theory is developed elsewhere. For him, the issue is about who has the authority to produce knowledge.
His work calls for African perspectives to be put in the centre of global debates and for a transformation of the structures that continue to marginalise them.
Beyond a list
African intellectuals are not a uniform group. They operate across disciplines such as philosophy, history, economics, sociology and literature, and across spaces around the world.
What unites them is a shared engagement with a central question. How can Africa be thought critically in a world still marked by unequal power relations?
There are, of course, many other prominent African thinkers whose work deserves attention. The figures here have been chosen because they are particularly representative of different ways of thinking from and about Africa.
Each of them opens a distinct intellectual pathway, whether through the critique of knowledge, the analysis of power, the rethinking of social categories or the transformation of political and philosophical frameworks.
Christophe Premat is a professor in Francophone cultural studies at the Department of Romance and Classical Studies at Stockholm University. He co-authored in 2025, with Buata B. Malela, the book Sensibilités intellectuelles africaines (Éditions Hermann).
Moins connue du grand public que le Medef, l’Association française des entreprises privées, ou Afep, est-elle moins influente ? Cette discrète organisation exerce pourtant un travail de lobbyisme. Alors que s’approche la prochaine élection présidentielle, quel rôle jouera-t-elle ?
Après une absence totale de présence en ligne, l’Association française des entreprises privées (Afep), est désormais sélectionnée par les algorithmes comme prioritaire, par rapport aux deux autres associations partageant le même acronyme• : l’Association française des enfants précoces ou l’Association française d’économie politique.
Elle reste pourtant toujours aussi discrète que méconnue. Il suffit de prononcer ce sigle auprès d’amis ou de collègues pour constater la très faible connaissance de cette organisation qui ne suscite que peu d’articles dans la presse. Son siège se trouve dans le VIIIᵉ arrondissement de Paris, et aucun manifestant n’est jamais venu y battre le pavé.
Et cependant, il s’agit bien là d’un archétype à partir duquel on pourrait décliner un ensemble de notions de science politique, et de questions politiques intéressées, autour des problématiques de « l’influence », de la « pression », des « groupes de veto », voire, de manière plus caricaturale, de l’emprise du « grand capital » sur le pouvoir politique).
Pour comprendre l’Afep, il faut d’abord comprendre le couple qu’elle forme avec le Medef, le Mouvement des entreprises de France. L’Afep a été créée en 1982 par Ambroise Roux, alors ex-président directeur général de la Compagnie générale des eaux, ancien président omnipotent de la commission économique du Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF, devenu Medef en 1998) et réputé « parrain du capitalisme français ». En créant l’Afep, il refonde l’Association des grandes entreprises françaises faisant appel à l’épargne (Agref), créée en 1969. Les nationalisations de 1982 avaient clairsemé les rangs de l’association, et les oppositions entre le nouveau président du CNPF Yvon Gattaz et Ambroise Roux expliquent cette refondation qui compte alors 36 affiliés.
« Il s’agit de proposer aux pouvoirs publics des études touchant aux problèmes des entreprises, démontrant la nécessité d’importantes réformes, et qui, ayant analysé cette conclusion, la transformerait en un document comprenant un exposé des motifs, le texte de loi et un certain nombre de décrets d’application », aurait-il déclaré alors selon sa biographe.
L’Afep n’est pas une organisation patronale représentative, comme le CNPF puis le Medef. N’étant pas un partenaire social, l’Afep ne négocie pas. En outre, ce ne sont pas des fédérations ou des unions territoriales qui y adhérent, comme dans la principale confédération patronale, mais des entreprises individuelles.
N’y entre pas qui veut, et le nombre des cooptés est actuellement de 117, dont une bonne trentaine de très grandes entreprises familiales, ce qui peut aussi expliquer l’engagement très fort sur certaines questions fiscales patrimoniales les concernant.
Certaines entreprises multinationales y restent, même si leur chiffre d’affaires réalisé en France est minoritaire, quand d’autres préfèrent ne pas en être, considérant l’Afep comme trop hexagonale (Essilor). Elle affiche une part du produit intérieur brut (PIB) marchand français de 13• % et déclare salarier 2,1 millions de personnes en France, selon son rapport annuel.
Sept présidents et une présidente
Elle a eu huit président·es, désigné·es par consensus, depuis sa création• : souvent, au XXᵉ siècle, des « •patrons d’État• ».
Patricia Barbizet est la première présidente. Sortante et bien que contestée car jugée peu audible, elle devrait voir son mandat reconduit en mai 2026, mais pour un an seulement. En attendant la recherche d’une personnalité apte à gérer la conjoncture post-élection présidentielle…
« Ma ligne directrice a toujours été d’éviter de représenter officiellement une organisation patronale, parce que je tiens à ma liberté de parole sur tous les sujets qui concernent la vie de la cité. » (Entretien avec Michel Offerlé.)
Transactions délicates
La cooptation du président donne lieu à des transactions délicates entre équilibre économique et anticipation politique. L’Afep garde par ailleurs un droit de regard sur l’élection du président du Medef et aussi un droit d’évocation sur tout ce qui peut concerner « la cause patronale », vis-à-vis du Medef qu’elle peut cornaquer, si besoin, par le canal des grandes fédérations et des grandes entreprises.
Il s’agit donc d’un club coopté, où la cotisation est élevée, 70 000 euros. Avec un budget de 9,3 millions d’euros, cela permet de salarier 17 personnes dont 8 femmes, directeurs et directrices réputé·es très pointu·es dans les domaines fiscal, environnemental et juridique, souvent recrutés par la revolving door (ces chiffres m’ont été communiqués par l’Afep par courriel. L’Afep, par ailleurs, ne souhaite pas informer sur le montant des cotisations. Le rapport financier n’est pas communicable. Les salariés sont au total 27 en incluant « l’équipe d’assistantes et des services généraux »).
Cette expertise « maison » est adossée à une autre expertise qui est fournie gratuitement par les grandes entreprises qui y délèguent, pour des travaux de commissions, plus d’un millier de leurs cadres supérieurs. Le budget de 9,3 millions devrait donc être considérablement réévalué en fonction de cette expertise mise à disposition par les entreprises.
Maîtriser l’agenda
Cette organisation agit à plusieurs niveaux dans la construction des problèmes publics qui peuvent impacter directement ou indirectement sa « raison d’être » : il s’agit de mettre à l’agenda des mesures et de les cadrer, d’éviter la mise à l’ordre du jour de celles qu’elle juge néfastes, ou même de s’approprier un problème qui ne deviendra pas public. L’échelle bruxelloise (Commission européenne, ndlr) peut aussi être importante, en agissant, comme tous les lobbies, ou en contournant, ici aussi, par le haut (accès direct à des commissaires) et par le bas (cocktail avec des assistants parlementaires). Ses activités les plus visibles sont recensées sur son site (avec des dirigeants de la DGFIP ou du Trésor, de l’Autorité des marchés financiers ou AMF, de la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés ou CNIL, de la direction générale de la Commission de Bruxelles, du Conseil international des normes de durabilité ou ISSB, ou bien encore des représentants des gouvernements hongrois ou polonais lors de leur présidence de l’UE [rapport 2024]). Si l’Afep exerce une influence, elle intervient rarement publiquement dans le débat public.
Fondamentalement, les dirigeants de l’Afep ne partagent ni les formes de l’action de celui qui était parfois surnommé le « •Baron• », ni certaines de ses orientations, ni la confiance dans le bilan du chantier de la refondation sociale. Son projet d’intégrer l’Afep dans le Medef n’avait pas eu de suites. De façon inhabituelle, un « Appel de 56 patrons », du 24 octobre 2001, contre la loi de modernisation sociale visait aussi le Medef.
« C’est assez dépolitisé… d’être presque être un partenaire technique au sens de l’élaboration du corpus législatif et réglementaire, et pas du tout sur le débat d’idées, et même peu sur l’argumentaire fort (…) on ne fait pas de grands développements, de grands argumentaires, de grands discours, et pas de communication à la presse, on est dans l’idée qu’il ne faut pas exister médiatiquement et donc, en revanche, on essaie de développer quelque chose qui est une compétence technique, (…) c’est central la compétitivité comparée de l’économie française… on va aller à la solution, elle est là, c’est propre, c’est bien et, du coup, ça va progressivement créer une réputation d’organisation qui est assez agréable pour les pouvoirs public » (un ancien permanent de l’Afep in Offerlé 2013).
« On agit avec des argumentaires chiffrés et par la culture des “tricolonnes” : texte du gouvernement / nos commentaires / nos amendements » (Entretien Michel Offerlé avec un ancien président de l’Afep en 2010.)
La période plus médiatique de Maurice Lévy, président de 2010 à 2012, publicitaire, a été dépassée. Et sans être la grande muette qu’elle avait été auparavant, l’Afep est redevenue discrète et plus abstinente ; sacrifiant cependant à l’air du temps, par quelques interventions publiques, tels les Top AFEP et Top Jeunes qui se déroulent annuellement au Conseil économique, sociale et environnemental.
On ne quémande pas
Le cœur du métier de l’Afep, c’est l’influence, non la pression « vulgaire », mais la capacité à se rendre souvent indispensable eu égard à sa réputation – incontournable ? – de maîtrise des dossiers bons pour l’entreprise et bons pour la France. Contrairement à beaucoup de groupes d’intérêts, l’Afep ne quémande pas, mais elle est consultée et on la sollicite.
Elle distille, instille, fournit du prêt-à-penser ou plutôt du prêt-à-légiférer ou, mieux, du prêt-à-réglementer (car la réglementation de niche peut être particulièrement importante). Des réunions périodiques entre secrétaires généraux des grandes entreprises, des déjeuners de travail ou des dîners avec des politiques, et une présence requise des grands patrons en personne aux réunions du CA de l’Afep : on convoque, on auditionne ou on informe et l’on instruit ses interlocuteurs sélectionnés.
C’est ainsi que l’Afep promeut le plus souvent l’autorégulation, comme, par exemple, en matière de gouvernement des entreprises. Elle est, avec le Medef, le dépositaire du code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées, qui n’est pas simplement un outil de gestion.
La crise du Covid a été toutefois l’occasion pour l’Afep et ses membres de plaider plus ouvertement, pour un allégement des normes environnementales. La période récente, post-macronisme de 2017 triomphant dans le pro-business, et post-dissolution, a perturbé le savant équilibre antérieur. Elle sort de son habituelle réserve et publie un communiqué après la dissolution, le 17 juin 2024.
BFM, 2026.
Et l’Afep s’est davantage montrée ces derniers mois. Elle intervient dans le débat fiscal par une conférence de presse pour présenter « La contribution économique et sociale des grandes entreprises françaises à l’économie nationale en 2024 ». Début 2026, un proche de l’Afep revient sur la question fiscale, « On ne grandit pas un pays en attaquant ses champions » (AFP, 19 janvier 2026) et sa présidente lance un appel au sursaut, « contre les renoncements et la fuite en avant budgétaire – davantage de dépenses et davantage de taxes – qui mènent inexorablement au décrochage ».
Il y a désormais une incitation forte à la prise de parole individuelle et collective grand-patronale.
Mesurer l’influence ?
Une approche sociologique des organisations patronales doit toutefois éviter de lui prêter trop d’influence (non, les patrons ne gagnent pas à tous les coups tout le temps ; non, l’Afep ne « fait pas la politique du gouvernement »…) ou de lui en concéder insuffisamment (oui, l’Afep n’est pas un groupe d’intérêts comme les autres), pour la bonne et simple raison que les intérêts qu’elle exprime et pour lesquels elle agit ne sont pas des intérêts comme les autres, puisque les gouvernants se doivent d’être particulièrement attentifs à « l’économie » et aux principaux indicateurs de prospérité économique. Et qu’elle entend en être la propriétaire. Au point qu’on lui prête des victoires (elle s’en attribue aussi parfois la maternité) qui peuvent être plus collectives qu’il n’y paraît.
Mais l’Afep est bien, à côté d’autres lieux dont Le Siècle, un espace de coordination des élites françaises du capitalisme. La question de savoir si l’Afep va recevoir Jordan Bardella « to eat or not to eat »), qui agite actuellement toutes les rédactions, apparaît bien anecdotique (sauf pour Bardella qui veut ce trophée pour « arrimer une partie des élites au bloc populaire »).
Le réseau Entreprise et Cité, autre lieu élitaire discret vient de sauter le pas avec Marine Le Pen, en l’invitant chez Drouant. Le bureau du conseil exécutif du Medef suit. L’Afep recevra le ou la présidentiable du Rassemblement national, en juillet, après la décision en appel du procès des assistants parlementaires du RN. Pour quoi faire ? Connaître enfin le programme du RN ? Lui enseigner l’économie ? L’instrumentaliser ? En tous les cas, elle le fera de manière plus discrète, comme à son habitude.
Michel Offerlé ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
L’action conjointe israélo-américaine engagée le 28 février dernier a précipité les États-Unis dans une impasse stratégique. Le conflit profite à ce stade à la Russie, et de plus en plus de voix aux États-Unis, dans le camp démocrate mais aussi au sein de la galaxie MAGA, dénoncent une guerre qui serait menée dans l’intérêt de Tel-Aviv plus que dans celui de Washington.
Selon le New York Times, c’est après une série de rencontres secrètes avec le premier ministre israélien que Donald Trump aurait souscrit à l’idée qu’un changement de régime en Iran par la désorganisation et la décapitation du pouvoir, ainsi que la neutralisation des capacités balistiques de Téhéran, était un objectif « à portée de main ». Benyamin Nétanyahou l’aurait convaincu que l’Iran n’était pas en mesure « de bloquer le détroit d’Ormuz ni de frapper sérieusement les intérêts américains dans la région ».
Le président américain aurait donc été persuadé du succès inéluctable d’une offensive majeure, en partant du présupposé qu’il s’agissait d’une opération peu coûteuse et dont il pourrait sortir rapidement vainqueur. Un calcul initialement erroné. En effet, la capacité de riposte de l’Iran, qui a su saturer les systèmes de défense adverses à l’aide de drones à bas coût et de missiles balistiques hypersoniques tout en désorientant l’économie mondiale par le blocage du détroit d’Ormuz, a déjoué ces prévisions.
Un enlisement annoncé
Ce risque d’une forte résistance était d’ailleurs largement perceptible puisque le chef d’état-major interarmées Dan Caine aurait mis en garde Donald Trump contre des frappes qui pourraient s’avérer risquées et entraîner les États-Unis dans un conflit prolongé. Les évaluations des services de renseignement avaient également décrit les réactions possibles de l’Iran, précisant notamment que Téhéran se focaliserait plutôt sur des représailles régionales, en ciblant « les bases américaines, les alliés du Golfe et les goulets d’étranglement énergétiques critiques tels que le détroit d’Ormuz ».
Les observateurs s’accordent à reconnaître d’une part que cette résilience iranienne est le résultat de la doctrine de défense en mosaïque des années 2000 qui a permis une continuité opérationnelle, même après décapitation des plus hauts responsables du régime, en dispersant le commandement ; et, d’autre part, que l’Iran était préparé à une guerre d’attrition dans laquelle l’objectif est de dégrader les ressources de l’ennemi plus vite que celui-ci ne peut les reconstituer.
Alain Chouet, ancien chef du service de renseignement de sécurité à la DGSE, rappelle au cours d’un entretien téléphonique que l’Iran s’est préparé à ce choc. « L’armée iranienne est équipée de matériel des années 1970 et n’est pas capable de mener les opérations conventionnelles ; c’est pourquoi les Iraniens se sont préparés à une guerre d’attrition et à attendre au sol. Ce sera une autre paire de manches si les Américains veulent y aller. L’Iran, ce n’est pas l’Irak, ce n’est pas la Somalie, ce n’est même pas la Syrie. C’est 90 millions d’habitants, un vaste territoire sur lequel ils sont tout à fait capables d’infliger de lourdes pertes à quiconque voudrait les envahir – ce que les opinions publiques, en Israël ou aux États-Unis, ne pourraient pas supporter. »
Ce constat est partagé par Olivier Dujardin, ancien militaire spécialisé dans la guerre électronique et le renseignement d’origine électromagnétique. Cet analyste précise que dans la mesure où les Iraniens ont enterré nombre de leurs installations de missiles et caché dans les montagnes une partie de leur production, les Américains se sont retrouvés confrontés à toute une série de problèmes :
« Les États-Unis ont manqué de cibles légitimes à frapper, donc que leur restait-il ? Éventuellement, les raffineries de pétrole, les usines de production d’électricité ; mais ensuite ? Par ailleurs, ils ont consommé énormément de munitions. Les stocks ne sont pas inépuisables ; ils ne pouvaient pas maintenir ce rythme de frappes dans la durée. Un autre aspect du problème est l’usure du matériel. Il faut assurer la sortie des avions, leur maintenance, la récupération des pilotes. Cela pose tout un tas de difficultés. Il est clair qu’ils se sont donné des objectifs inatteignables par l’unique action aérienne. Il aurait alors fallu envoyer des troupes au sol, mais ce n’est pas en mobilisant 20 000 ou 30 000 soldats qu’ils auraient pu faire quelque chose de significatif. Cela suppose des centaines de milliers d’hommes pour pouvoir lancer des opérations contre l’Iran sur un territoire aussi vaste, sec, aride, et montagneux. »
Une guerre israélienne plus qu’une guerre américaine ?
Il apparaît donc que, sous l’influence de Benyamin Nétanyahou, Donald Trump s’est laissé entraîner dans une guerre sans but réel avec un risque d’enlisement pour les forces américaines. Ce n’est d’ailleurs pas la première guerre dans laquelle les États-Unis se lancent après avoir été convaincus par les arguments israéliens.
De l’avis de nombreux observateurs, l’intervention en Irak de 2003 – que le stratège Zbigniew Brzezinski avait qualifiée devant la commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat des États-Unis de « calamité, historique, stratégique et morale… menée sur la base de principes manichéens et d’un orgueil impérial démesuré » – avait déjà été une illustration éclatante du poids du lobby pro-israélien dans l’élaboration de la politique étrangère américaine.
L’universitaire américain John Petras avait ainsi documenté dans son ouvrage The Power of Israel in the United States paru en 2006 l’influence prépondérante sur la politique américaine au Moyen-Orient du lobby pro-israélien, qui s’assure successivement du soutien de responsables au plus haut niveau du gouvernement, du monde des affaires, du milieu universitaire, des fondamentalistes chrétiens et des médias. Il montre comment, ensemble, ils seraient parvenus à garantir le soutien total et inconditionnel des États-Unis à toutes les priorités de l’agenda d’Israël depuis des décennies, même lorsque celles-ci nuisent aux intérêts des États-Unis, comme lors de la guerre en Irak de 2003.
Cette thèse est également défendue par John Mersheimer et Stephen Walt dans leur ouvrage phare le Lobby israélien et la politique étrangère américaine (2009). Ils rappellent que la relation étroite avec Israël constitue la pierre angulaire de la politique américaine au Moyen-Orient et que l’engagement des États-Unis envers Israël est principalement lié aux activités du « lobby israélien ».
Les deux auteurs avaient initialement publié un article intitulé « The Israël Lobby » qui a suscité une vive polémique dans le milieu universitaire, politique et médiatique ; c’est pourquoi ils ont cherché, dans ce livre, à approfondir leur analyse et à détailler la méthodologie pour contrer les critiques acerbes dont ils ont fait l’objet.
Des résultats négatifs pour Washington comme pour Tel-Aviv
Dans ce nouveau contexte de guerre, Israël semble avoir joué un rôle de premier plan dans la décision de mener une offensive d’envergure contre l’Iran. Mais si les objectifs américains ont été mal définis, les buts israéliens apparaissent plus évidents.
« Les Israéliens tentent de ressusciter les frontières telles que pensées par Oded Yinon (expert du ministère israélien des affaires étrangères qui a développé dans les années 1980 l’objectif à démembrer les États arabes, considérés comme le maillon faible de l’ordre international, pour les recomposer sur des bases confessionnelles, ndlr), c’est-à-dire le redécoupage des pays de la région en fonction de critères ethniques, religieux, etc. Aujourd’hui, dans ce projet, Nétanyahou profite du fait que toute l’appréciation de la politique régionale ait été déléguée par Trump à son gendre, Jared Kushner, plus sioniste que les Israéliens, et c’est lui qui mène la danse sur ces dossiers en fonction des critères des sionistes les plus radicaux. Cela dit, c’est, à mes yeux et aux yeux d’un certain nombre de mes anciens camarades des services israéliens, une politique suicidaire », estime Alain Chouet.
Olivier Dujardin rappelle qu’Israël est engagé dans un conflit sur de multiples fronts et que la situation est inextricable : « Cela a déjà un coût pour eux. D’abord, aucun système de défense n’assure une protection totale. Il y a toujours des missiles qui passent. Ensuite, ils ont un épuisement des intercepteurs parce que cela leur coûte très cher d’intercepter des missiles balistiques avec des missiles qui valent plusieurs millions. Ils n’ont donc pas non plus de stocks énormes. De surcroît, ce sont des processus de production et de fabrication très lents, donc ils ne peuvent pas suivre le rythme industriel. Enfin, dernier point, les Iraniens mettent en œuvre des missiles essentiellement de nouvelle génération qui sont par conséquent plus difficiles à intercepter. Tout cela combiné fait qu’il y a quand même des impacts sur le sol israélien et ce n’est pas neutre pour eux », précise-t-il.
Bien qu’il n’existe aucune opposition politique en Israël à ces guerres sur plusieurs fronts, un mécontentement croissant au sein de l’opinion publique est palpable face à l’absence de gains stratégiques, malgré les succès tactiques. Mais la perspective de la guerre comme modalité permanente de la politique israélienne associée à une logique jusqu’au-boutiste commence à avoir un coût significatif pour l’allié américain comme le démontrent les premiers effets de cette guerre contre l’Iran. En effet, la montée vertigineuse des prix du pétrole, du gaz et des produits dérivés profite grandement au rival russe, qui peut ainsi à la fois mieux financer sa guerre en Ukraine et devenir un partenaire commercial plus important qu’auparavant pour de nombreux pays.
David Teurtrie, chercheur associé au Centre de Recherches Europes Eurasie (CREE) et spécialiste de la Russie, indique à cet égard que « les Américains et les Israéliens sont déjà a priori à court de missiles antiaériens – il y a même eu des demandes de transfert depuis la Pologne et la Corée du Sud. Il est donc clair qu’ils n’ont plus de missiles antiaériens pour l’Ukraine. D’autant que, avant même le conflit, les livraisons à l’Ukraine étaient déjà en baisse ». Il ajoute que le contexte actuel accroît les revenus de la Russie non seulement en matière de vente de pétrole mais aussi dans d’autres domaines, notamment les engrais et l’aluminium.
Une guerre impopulaire aux États-Unis
En outre, cette guerre commence à avoir un coût politique interne pour les États-Unis et risque d’affecter à terme leur relation avec Israël dans la mesure où des divisions se font déjà ressentir au sein de la mouvance MAGA. Plusieurs grandes figures de cette mouvance ont exprimé de vives critiques à l’égard d’Israël, dénonçant le risque pour les États-Unis de s’enliser dans une guerre sans fin au détriment de leurs intérêts. À quelques mois des midterms, les Républicains prennent conscience que leur chance de conserver la majorité à la Chambre s’amenuit en raison de la décision de Donald Trump de mener des opérations militaires contre l’Iran.
« Le soutien à Israël dans ce pays a chuté de manière spectaculaire. Aujourd’hui, selon un récent sondage Pew, 80 % des démocrates ont désormais une opinion défavorable d’Israël et 41 % des républicains partagent ce point de vue – et ces chiffres sont encore plus élevés chez les jeunes. Un récent sondage Quinnipiac a également révélé que 60 % des personnes interrogées – dont les trois quarts des démocrates et les deux tiers des indépendants – s’opposent à ce que les États-Unis fournissent des armes à Israël. »
Le Sénat a rejeté les deux propositions de Bernie Sanders visant à bloquer les ventes d’armes et de bulldozers à Israël ; mais la guerre contre l’Iran pourrait être l’une des dernières guerres conduites par les États-Unis à l’initiative d’Israël.
Lina Kennouche ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
