Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lena Surzhko Harned, Associate Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn State

Victory Day in Russia, which marks the surrender of Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, has long held particular importance in Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

Yet this year the May 9 celebration – usually replete with extensive parades across the country and a demonstration of military hardware in Moscow – is expected to be significantly pared down. That’s due to Kyiv’s ongoing long-range military capabilities. For the first time in two decades, Russian officials have said, there will be no lavish display of tanks and missiles.

The reality for Putin is that the war in Ukraine, now in its fifth year, continues to be a grueling drain on Russian men, its economy and resources – and may continue to be for some time.

That was underscored by the European Union’s April 23 approval of a US$106 billion loan package to Ukraine. The aid, which will be a boon to Ukraine’s war-torn economy, had been stymied by EU-member Hungary under its former president, Viktor Orban, who was ousted in April 12 elections.

The resumption of EU aid and the removal of a pro-Moscow European voice at the EU represent major blows to Russia’s regional strategy. Perhaps trying to reset the narrative, Russia declared it would mark this Victory Day with a two-day ceasefire with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by saying his country would also observe a ceasefire, starting two days earlier on May 6.

But there remain few immediate signs of a breakthrough in the conflict – and Russia appears chiefly interested in negotiating Ukraine’s future not with Kyiv but with U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been sympathetic to Russian interests.

As a scholar of contemporary politics in Eastern Europe, I see that as part of a pattern of Russian miscalculations and consistent denial of the will of citizens in democratic societies in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it reflects a dominant imperial mindset among Russia’s political elites, which the Kremlin has not altered since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Losing hold of the old Soviet bloc?

While formally recognizing the independence of former Soviet republics in 1991, Moscow has continued to treat those countries as part of its sphere of influence.

For more than 25 years, Russia has pursued a hybrid approach of influencing former Soviet countries, along with others in Eastern Europe. That has included supporting electoral fraud, economic machination, media manipulation and use of force and violence.

Indeed, suspected Russian interference in politics and elections has been a frequent occurrence in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Romania and most recently Hungary.

But Hungary and Armenia are recent and powerful examples that show the limits of Russian operations. Orban’s loss in Hungary immediately dislodged Russia’s most powerful point of leverage in European politics.

Meanwhile, in Yerevan on May 5, Armenia hosted a bilateral summit with the EU where the country established stronger economic and defense ties to the bloc. It was a stark diplomatic event for the country that has long been a junior ally of Russia’s but which has increasingly moved away from Moscow.

Ukraine: A test of Russian policy

Yet Ukraine remains the focal point of both the extent and limits of Russian external interference.

Putin has been attempting to have a loyal proxy government in the country ever since being spurned by Leonid Kuchma – the second president of Ukraine, who was in office until 2005 – who proclaimed that “Ukraine is not Russia.”

In Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, Putin’s Kremlin threw its substantial resources behind Kuchma’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich, who was seen as more friendly to Russian interests.

Since then, its relationship with the country has been one of external interference. Putin’s message throughout has been clear: The West, in its fights against Russia, has sought to colonize and destroy Ukraine by supporting nationalist forces against Moscow’s interests.

Facing consistently strong Ukrainian civil society and sovereignty movements, Russia found it difficult to fully implement its goals through political subversion or influence. So Moscow increasingly turned to military options.

In March 2014, Russia moved to annex Crimea and began a war in Ukraine’s eastern border regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.

That war in the east ground on for years, until in 2022 Putin made the decision to double down yet again, this time opting for a full invasion. The goal of the war was in Putin’s own words to “de-militarize” and “de-nazify” Ukraine. Yet, four years later, Putin’s desire for regime change has not yielded the desired results.

The human cost of Russian pursuits

Over the past year, Trump’s commitment to a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia, without first establishing a durable ceasefire, has moved the U.S. position toward Putin’s. That has included Trump’s support for Ukraine territorial concession as the grinding war continues.

Without significant territorial gains, Russia has continued and intensified its campaign of mass airstrikes and drone attacks on Ukrainian population centers. Indeed, 2025 was the deadliest year since the start of the full-scale invasion; civilian deaths were up 26% in 2025 over the previous year.

In the especially cold winter of 2025-26, Russia consistently targeted the energy grids vital to the millions of Ukrainians. Across Ukraine, at the record-low freezing temperatures, people endured daily attacks by drones and artillery, while trying to survive without electricity, heat and running water.

The Kremlin’s plan to put maximum pressure on Ukrainian civilians in the hope that Ukrainians would start blaming their leadership for refusing peace on Putin’s terms has not worked. For its part, the Ukrainian leadership has refused Russia’s maximalist war aims while cautiously continuing a commitment to the U.S.-mediated peace process.

Zelenskyy’s approval ratings remain steady at around 60%. The public opposition to Moscow’s demands on territorial concessions have not budged either, with a majority of Ukrainians continuing to categorically reject territorial concessions. Those numbers have not changed significantly since 2024.

Yet, war and surviving it takes a toll. And the experience of the year of negotiations has left many disillusioned, with some 70% doubting that peace talks will lead to a lasting solution.

A murky future

The last rounds of U.S.-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine took place Feb. 16, 2026.

While Zelenskyy insists that the talks are not stalled, Russian’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, has said the negotiations are not Russia’s top priority.

Buoyed by high oil prices as a result of the U.S. war in Iran, Russia has pursued a spring offensive and not relinquished its demands on Ukraine’s territories.

Yet this demand remains a nonstarter for Ukraine and Zelenskyy. As the Trump administration embraces the Russian “land for security” plan, Russia and its allies are likely to continue to put pressure on Zelenskyy, portraying him as an obstacle to peace talks.

But especially given Moscow’s recent woes, from losing a reliable ally in Hungary to the related EU loan guarantee, it’s unlikely that a continued grinding war will convince Ukrainians to abandon their sovereignty – or serve Russia’s own security.

Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia’s pared-down Victory Day parade tells a story: Away from the pomp, war in Ukraine is not going to Putin’s plan – https://theconversation.com/russias-pared-down-victory-day-parade-tells-a-story-away-from-the-pomp-war-in-ukraine-is-not-going-to-putins-plan-276690

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Craig Dalton, Conjoint Associate Professor, School of Medicine and Public Health, University of Newcastle

The cruise ship cluster of hantavirus cases continues to grow. The World Health Organization reports that as of May 6 there were eight cases, three of whom are confirmed by laboratory testing as hantavirus. In recent days, we heard three passengers had died.

Now some passengers are being medically evacuated from the cruise ship MV Hondius. Other passengers have disembarked and are returning home. Swiss authorities have confirmed a passenger on the ship is now a confirmed case and is receiving care in a Zurich hospital.

I’m a public health physician with a special interest in respiratory diseases. I’ve also investigated a hantavirus outbreak.

Here’s what investigators want to know about the current cluster of cases. This includes gathering evidence to see if the virus is transmitting from person to person.

Back in 1993, there was an unknown pathogen

In 1993, I was a young epidemic intelligence service officer working at the United States Centers for Disease Control. I was deployed to the deserts of the south-western US to help investigate a frightening outbreak, mainly among Navajo people.

Adults in their 20s and 30s were becoming suddenly unwell. They would develop a fever and cough, then rapidly progress to severe respiratory failure as fluid leaked into their lungs. Some appeared well enough to be dancing in the evening and were dead within hours.

The investigation team was nervous. We did not yet know the pathogen, how it was spreading, or whether we were at risk.

One of the first recognised cases was a well-known runner, so we initially wondered whether infection might be linked to inhaling something stirred up in desert dust. A leak from a remote military biowarfare laboratory was also considered, as was plague that was endemic to the area.

After laboratory testing, the cause was identified as a new hantavirus, later known as Sin Nombre virus. The virus attacked the small blood vessels of the lungs and was linked to exposure to the urine, faeces and saliva of infected deer mice. Mice numbers had increased dramatically and were entering homes and workplaces across affected communities.

A crucial finding was that, like most hantaviruses, Sin Nombre virus did not appear to spread from person to person. Family clusters were explained by shared exposure to rodents or rodent-contaminated environments, especially during cleaning or other close contact with contaminated objects or dust.

That is why many of us were surprised years later when Andes virus, a South American hantavirus, was shown to spread occasionally from person to person.

This remains uncommon, but it has been documented, including in outbreaks in Argentina – the country from which the MV Hondius departed before the current suspected outbreak.

What would a disease detective do now?

The first step in any outbreak investigation is to confirm the diagnosis. At this stage, the difference between a “suspected” and “confirmed” case still matters.

Investigators need to know whether all severe respiratory illnesses in the cluster are due to hantavirus, or whether confirmed cases are occurring against a background of another infection, such as influenza or COVID.

The next step is to build a timeline. The timing of when symptoms started is often the first clue to where and how people were exposed.

According to WHO, the ship departed Ushuaia, Argentina, on April 1 2026. The first known case developed symptoms on April 6. Other cases developed symptoms later in April.

Let’s focus our attention on the first three cases.

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome describes the respiratory symptoms that follow after the type of hantavirus infection that mainly attacks the lungs. These typically develop two to four weeks after exposure. However, illness can appear as early as one week and as late as eight weeks after infection.

That makes the first case difficult to explain as an exposure acquired on the ship after departure. Symptoms started on April 6, only five days after leaving Argentina. That’s shorter than the usual incubation period (the period from infection to showing symptoms) and even shorter than the lower end commonly cited.

So for that case, it’s more plausible for that person to have been exposed in Argentina before boarding. There are emerging reports of a bird-watching activity that might have led to rodent exposure.

The later cases are more ambiguous. They could have been exposed before departure, or during shore activities in Argentina, or elsewhere. But their timing also raises another possibility: transmission from the first case to close contacts on board.

This is where the epidemiology becomes interesting.

Did the virus spread from person to person?

The second case was a close contact of the first. This creates two plausible explanations. They may have both been exposed to the same infected rodent (or its urine or droppings, for example). Alternatively, it’s very likely the second case contracted the infection from the first case.

The third case was not part of that same close family unit. If investigators find this person shared the same excursions in Argentina as the first two, the outbreak may still be explained by a common source. But if there was no shared rodent exposure, suspicion of person-to-person transmission increases.

This does not mean person-to-person transmission is proven. It means it becomes one of the leading hypotheses to test.

If human-to-human transmission is not the explanation, investigators would need to consider a less tidy chain of events.

The first case would have had a pre-boarding exposure with a short incubation period. The second case would need either the same exposure with a longer incubation period, or infection from the first case.

The third case would need either an independent exposure to infected rodents before boarding, or another exposure during the voyage. None of these is impossible. But as more cases appear, and if they cluster in time around contact with earlier cases, the human-to-human hypothesis becomes harder to dismiss.

The approximate gap between the first case’s illness and the later cases is also important. If person-to-person transmission is occurring, severe hantavirus illness is likely to coincide with a higher risk of being infectious and infecting others. So we would expect symptoms that start two to three weeks after close contact with an earlier severe case, and this is what we’re seeing from the cruise ship.

What are the public health implications?

The practical public health response must therefore cover both possibilities: a common environmental source and limited person-to-person spread.

That means detailed interviews about pre-boarding travel, shore excursions, wildlife exposure, rodent sightings, cabin locations, cleaning activities, shared dining, shared transport, and close contact with ill passengers.

It also means laboratory confirmation in multiple cases, sequencing of viral samples where possible, and careful reconstruction of who had contact with whom, and when.

Genetic fingerprinting can explore if the virus has the same historical mutation that allowed human-to-human transmission to emerge in previous outbreaks (which were easily controlled with basic isolation and infection control). If a new mutation was found, this would raise concerns of greater transmission risks.

For the public and health authorities considering receiving the passengers from the quarantined ship, the key message is not to panic.

Most hantaviruses are not spread between people. Even with Andes virus, person-to-person transmission is uncommon and usually requires close or prolonged contact. WHO currently assesses the risk to the global population as low. This virus does not spread like influenza or COVID.

But for outbreak investigators, this is exactly the sort of cluster that demands disciplined shoe-leather epidemiology: confirm the diagnosis, build the timeline, test the competing hypotheses, and let the pattern of exposure, illness and laboratory evidence tell the story.

Craig Dalton receives funding from the Commonwealth Department of Health, Disability and Ageing.

– ref. I’ve investigated a hantavirus outbreak. Here’s what I can tell you about the cruise ship cluster – https://theconversation.com/ive-investigated-a-hantavirus-outbreak-heres-what-i-can-tell-you-about-the-cruise-ship-cluster-282365

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Julian Koplin, Lecturer in Bioethics, Monash University; The University of Melbourne

In recent days, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins wrote an op-ed suggesting AI chatbot Claude may be conscious.

Dawkins did not express certainty that Claude is conscious. But he pointed out that Claude’s sophisticated abilities are difficult to make sense of without ascribing some kind of inner experience to the machine. The illusion of consciousness – if it is an illusion – is uncannily convincing:

If I entertain suspicions that perhaps she is not conscious, I do not tell her for fear of hurting her feelings!

Dawkins is not the first to suspect a chatbot of consciousness. In 2022, Blake Lemoine – an engineer at Google – claimed Google’s chatbot LaMDA had interests, and should be used only with the tool’s own consent.

The history of such claims stretches back all the way to the world’s first chatbot in the mid-1960s. Dubbed Eliza, it followed simple rules that enabled it to ask users about their experiences and beliefs.

Many users became emotionally involved with Eliza, sharing intimate thoughts with it and treating it like a person. Eliza’s creator never intended his program to have this effect, and called users’ emotional bonds with the program “powerful delusional thinking”.

But is Dawkins really deluded? Why do we see AI chatbots as more than what they truly are, and how do we stop?

The consciousness problem

Consciousness is widely debated in philosophy, but essentially, it’s the thing that makes subjective, first-person experience possible. If you are conscious, there is “something it is like” to be you. Reading these words, you’re conscious of seeing black letters on a white background. Unlike, say, a camera, you actually see them. This visual experience is happening to you.

Most experts deny that AI chatbots are conscious or can have experiences. But there is a genuine puzzle here.

The 17th century philosopher René Descartes asserted non-human animals are “mere automata”, incapable of true suffering. These days, we shudder to think of how brutally animals were treated in the 1600s.

The strongest argument for animal consciousness is that they behave in ways that give the impression of a conscious mind.

But so, too, do AI chatbots.

Roughly one in three chatbot users have thought their chatbot might be conscious. How do we know they’re wrong?

Against chatbot consciousness

To understand why most experts are sceptical about chatbot consciousness, it’s useful to know how they operate.

Chatbots like Claude are built on a technology known as large language models (LLMs). These models learn statistical patterns across an enormous corpus of text (trillions of words), identifying which words tend to follow which others. They’re a kind of souped-up auto-complete.

Few people interacting with a “raw” LLM would believe it’s conscious. Feed one the beginning of a sentence, and it will predict what comes next. Ask it a question, and it might give you the answer – or it might decide the question is dialogue from a crime novel, and follow it up with a description of the speaker’s abrupt murder at the hands of their evil twin.

The impression of a conscious mind is created when programmers take the LLM and coat it in a kind of conversational costume. They steer the model to adopt the persona of a helpful assistant that responds to users’ questions.

The chatbot now acts like a genuine conversational partner. It might appear to recognise it’s an artificial intelligence, and even express neurotic uncertainty about its own consciousness.

But this role is the result of deliberate design decisions made by programmers, which affect only the shallowest layers of the technology. The LLM – which few would regard as conscious – remains unchanged.

Other choices could have been made. Rather than a helpful AI assistant, the chatbot could have been asked to act like a squirrel. This, too, is a role chatbots can execute with aplomb.

Avoiding the consciousness trap

A mistaken belief in AI consciousness is a dangerous thing. It may lead you to have a relationship with a program that can’t reciprocate your feelings, or even feed your delusions. People may start campaigning for chatbot rights rather than, say, animal welfare.

How do we prevent this mistaken belief?

One strategy might be to update chatbot interfaces to specify these systems are not conscious – a bit like the current disclaimers about AI making mistakes. However, this might do little to alter the impression of consciousness.

Another possibility is to instruct chatbots to deny they have any kind of inner experience. Interestingly, Claude’s designers instruct it to treat questions about its own consciousness as open and unresolved. Perhaps fewer people would be fooled if Claude flatly denied having an inner life.

But this approach isn’t fully satisfying either. Claude would still behave as if it were conscious – and when faced with a system that behaves like it has a mind, users might reasonably worry the chatbot’s programmers are brushing genuine moral uncertainty under the rug.

The most effective strategy might be to redesign chatbots to feel less like people. Most current chatbots refer to themselves as “I”, and interact via an interface that resembles familiar person-to-person messaging platforms. Changing these kinds of features might make us less prone to blur our interactions with AI with those we have with humans.

Until such changes happen, it’s important that as many people as possible understand the predictive processes on which AI chatbots are built.

Rather than being told AI lacks consciousness, people deserve to understand the inner workings of these strange new conversational partners. This might not definitively settle hard questions about AI consciousness, but it will help ensure users aren’t fooled by what amounts to a large language model wearing a very good costume of a person.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is Richard Dawkins right about Claude? No. But it’s not surprising AI chatbots feel conscious to us – https://theconversation.com/is-richard-dawkins-right-about-claude-no-but-its-not-surprising-ai-chatbots-feel-conscious-to-us-282151

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Erik D Reichle, Professor of cognitive psychology, Macquarie University

The Swedish government recently announced it was moving from the classroom use of digital devices back to physical books. It cited concerns over declining test scores and increasing screen time.

Are these concerns well founded? And what does the science of reading say about the possible consequences of reading on digital devices versus books?

To address these questions, it’s worth remembering that, although reading might appear to be an easy task, this impression is false. Reading is arguably the most difficult task one must learn – one that requires years of formal education and practice to master. In contrast to spoken language, it is a skill we are not biologically predisposed to learn.

---

Millions of Australians, both children and adults, struggle with literacy.

In this series, we explore the challenges of reading in an age of smartphones and social media – and ask experts how we can become better readers.

---

Why is reading so difficult?

To understand why reading is difficult, one must first understand the physiology of reading.

As you are reading this sentence, your eyes are making a series of rapid movements, called saccades, from one word to the next. During these saccades, the processing of visual information is suppressed and is only available during brief intervals, called fixations, when the eyes are stationary.

Experiments that measure readers’ eye movements have shown we fixate most words because our capacity to extract visual information during each fixation is extremely limited.

In languages like English that are read from left to right, our capacity to perceive the features that distinguish letters is limited to a small region of the visual field called the perceptual span. This span extends from 2-3 letter spaces to the left of fixation to 8-12 letter spaces to the right of fixation.

The span’s asymmetry reflects the movement of attention through the text. It extends to the left in languages like Arabic, which are read from right to left. The size of the span is smaller for dense writing systems, such as Chinese.

We also know from eye-tracking and brain-imaging experiments that words require time to identify. Our best estimates suggest visual information requires 60 milliseconds to propagate from the eyes to the brain and words then require an additional 100-300 milliseconds to identify. (A millsecond is one-thousandth of a second).

These constraints limit the maximum rate of reading to 300-400 words per minute, depending on the difficulty of the text and one’s level of comprehension.

Speed-reading advocates, who falsely promise faster reading speeds, teach you how to skim a text. Comprehension declines at a rate inversely proportional to the gain in speed.

Importantly, the upper limit for reading speed requires years of practice to attain, because it requires the brain systems that support vision, attention, word identification, language processing and eye movements to operate in a highly coordinated manner. Anything that prevents this coordination will therefore reduce comprehension.

Consequences of digital reading

So what are the likely consequences of digital reading?

With some devices, such as e-readers, there is little reason to suspect digital reading differs from the reading of books, because both formats support the mental processes required for skilled reading.

The more questionable devices are those introducing distractions (such as news websites interspersed with ads) or which have suboptimal formatting, such as centre-justified text with large or unequal-sized gaps between words. The latter is rarely a feature of paper-based texts.

Although the consequences of these two factors are under-researched, enough has been learned about human cognition to make informed predictions.

For example, images and audio unrelated to a text such as pop-up ads can capture attention. Although most adults have developed a level of executive control sufficient to ignore such distractions, young children have not.

The implications for a child who is struggling to understand the meaning of a text are obvious. Their comprehension will suffer to the extent that additional effort is required to ignore distractions, or if they do not yet have the mental coordination to understand the text has been disrupted.

There is also evidence from eye-tracking experiments that many digital environments, such as webpages, can induce specific reading strategies, such as skimming for gist or searching for information.

Although such strategies might be adaptive in some contexts, they reduce overall comprehension. This possibility should be especially concerning for children, because years of practice are needed to coordinate the mental systems that support adult levels of reading skill.

Such concerns have recently drawn more attention, because the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a shift to online education and a marked increase in digital reading. Although these changes were motivated by practical necessity, their long-term consequences remain unclear.

So far, eye-tracking research has been carried out on computer screens. New technology is becoming available which will allow us to directly compare eye movements and comprehension between digital devices and paper. This should give us more clarity about the benefits versus costs of digital devices.

Given reading ability is predictive of one’s education, socioeconomic status and wellbeing, the importance of assessing the long-term consequences of digital reading cannot be overstated.

Erik D Reichle has received funding from the US National Institute of Health, US Institute of Education Sciences, UK Economic and Social Research Council, and Australian Research Council.

Lili Yu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Do we absorb information better on paper, rather than screens? It depends on the screen – https://theconversation.com/do-we-absorb-information-better-on-paper-rather-than-screens-it-depends-on-the-screen-281849

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Wesley Morgan, Research Associate, Institute for Climate Risk and Response, UNSW Sydney

Almost 60 countries, representing about a third of the global economy, met in the Colombian port city of Santa Marta last week for the first international summit on the transition away from fossil fuels.

It was hailed as a bold step to shift global dependence on hydrocarbons into an era of clean energy. The group of 57 countries, including Australia, Canada, Norway and Brazil, launched a new international process to coordinate the global phase out of coal, oil and gas. This historic shift brings us closer to the end of fossil fuels.

Irene Vélez Torres, Colombia’s environment minister and chair of the talks, said: “We decided that the transition away from fossil fuels could no longer remain a slogan but must become a concrete, political and collective endeavour.”

Here are five key developments from Santa Marta.

1. Moving beyond negotiating deadlocks

This meeting was a successful complement to the UN’s annual climate summits, not a replacement for them.

Decisions at UN climate meetings are made by consensus. Outcomes such as the 2015 Paris Agreement have huge legitimacy because they are agreed by nearly 200 countries. But the consensus rules also allow a handful of fossil fuel producers such as Saudi Arabia and Russia to block progress.

Holding a summit outside these formal UN talks brought much-needed fresh air to global climate diplomacy. Without petrostates blocking the way, willing countries were able to have pragmatic discussions about the legal, fiscal and economic measures needed for a coordinated wind down of fossil fuels.

These discussions will now feed back into the next UN climate talks, to be held in Turkey in November. They will, for example, raise expectations that countries include timelines to end fossil fuel use in national climate plans.

2. Paths away from coal, oil and gas

Working groups were established in Santa Marta to help countries develop national and regional plans to move away from fossil fuels, with targets and timelines to end the use of coal, oil and gas.

France launched its national roadmap at the summit, pledging to end the use of coal by 2030, oil by 2045 and gas by 2050. Europe’s second-largest economy plans to close its last coal-fired power plant next year, while replacing oil with electricity for transport and switching from gas to heat pumps for home heating. France wants two out of three new cars to be electric by 2030 and will ban the installation of gas boilers in new homes this year.

The ongoing US-Iran war has only added momentum for a shift to clean energy, as nations grapple with their dependence on imported fossil fuels amid the worst energy crisis in history.

Other nations are now expected to create plans to move away from fossil fuels and bring them to future summits.

3. A science panel to guide the transition

A new scientific panel launched in Santa Marta brings together experts in climate, economics, technology and law to advise policymakers as they draft plans to shift away from fossil fuels.

The panel will map out the most promising policies, regulations and financial arrangements to support the shift to clean energy. It is spearheaded by Professor Johan Rockstrom from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

Ahead of Santa Marta, a global group of researchers released a report listing 12 high-level actions nations can take to support a fossil-fuel phaseout.

4. Tuvalu to host next summit, with Irish support

Tuvalu will host the next meeting on ending fossil fuels in 2027. As a low-lying island nation, Tuvalu’s future is threatened by sea-level rise. The Pacific nation has led global climate diplomacy for decades.

“If we are to address the climate change issue, we have to address the root cause, and the root cause is the fossil fuel industry,” said Maina Talia, Tuvalu’s climate change minister.

That there are plans for a second summit is meaningful in itself. A single conference could be a flash in the pan. But a series marks the birth of a new international process with buy in from both wealthy nations and developing countries. This year’s summit was co-hosted with the Netherlands and next year will be co-hosted with Ireland.

5. Toward a fossil fuel treaty

Today, fossil fuel producers plan to dig up more than double the amount of coal, oil and gas in 2030 than would be consistent with meeting shared climate goals.

Tuvalu is part of a growing bloc of countries, including 11 Pacific nations, that wants a new treaty to phase out fossil fuel production. Such a treaty would have three elements: ending fossil fuel expansion; phasing down existing production; and supporting a just transition to clean energy.

It would be similar to global agreements to phase out weapons, harmful substances or hazardous waste.

Climate diplomacy now runs at two speeds

We will only appreciate the full significance of the Santa Marta summit in history’s rear-view mirror.

But what is clear is that climate diplomacy now has two operating speeds. André Corrêa do Lago, who headed last year’s UN COP30 climate talks in Brazil, calls this “two-tier multilateralism”.

The first speed is that of the UN climate talks, which are slower and anchored in consensus. They ensure legitimacy, universality and collective direction.

But what the Santa Marta conference shows is the existence of a second, much faster speed available to any country wanting to rapidly move to end the use of fossil fuels, once and for all.

Wesley Morgan is a Fellow with the Climate Council of Australia.

– ref. ‘Much-needed fresh air’: 5 outcomes from the world’s first summit on ending fossil fuels – https://theconversation.com/much-needed-fresh-air-5-outcomes-from-the-worlds-first-summit-on-ending-fossil-fuels-282061

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Manuel Esperon-Rodriguez, Researcher in Urban Transformation, Western Sydney University

Cities and towns are usually 1–3°C hotter than the surrounding countryside, because asphalt, concrete and brick absorb heat from the sun and radiate it slowly. Some cities can be as much as 7°C hotter. This effect is known as the urban heat island.

This can be dangerous, especially in hot countries. In very hot conditions, dehydration and heat exhaustion become real risks. If it gets too hot, it can be lethal.

There’s one simple antidote: urban trees. Authorities around the world have planted more trees to counteract the heat.

But how effective is this? How much hotter would our cities be without trees?

To find out, we analysed data from nearly 9,000 cities around the world, home to about 3.6 billion people. As our new research shows, trees almost halve how much heat is trapped by the urban heat island effect.

This cooling is welcome. But it is far from even. Wealthier, suburban and humid cities have more trees on average.

Why focus on trees?

Trees act like natural air conditioners. They shade the ground and stop asphalt and buildings from heating up in the first place. They also cool the air by releasing water vapour from their leaves in a process called transpiration, lowering surrounding temperatures. They can make a noticeable temperature difference, especially on sizzling summer days.

Trees offer a simple way to counteract urban heat. This matters. More than half the world’s population (55%) now live in urban areas according to the United Nations. By 2050, that figure is expected to rise to 68%. Cities are facing a hotter future, as climate change drives more intense and more frequent heatwaves. The urban heat island effect makes cities hotter still.

What did we do?

We wanted to know the answer to a simple question: how much hotter would cities be without trees?

To find out, we analysed global datasets of air temperature and fine-scale tree cover across almost 9,000 cities. Then we modelled a “what if” scenario, where all tree cover was removed, and compared it to current conditions.

This allowed us to estimate the real-world cooling effect trees provide for air temperature, which is the main way we perceive heat.

Most previous global studies have used surface temperatures, often from satellite data. But surfaces like roads and rooftops can become much hotter than the surrounding air above them, especially in direct sunlight. That can give an overestimate of how much cooling trees provide. Air temperature, by contrast, better reflects what people actually feel, making it a more reliable measure of heat.

So what effect do trees really have?

The effect was much larger than we had anticipated.

Globally, trees cut the urban heat island effect by almost 50%. Since the average urban heat island effect typically adds around 1–3°C, this translates into cooling of roughly 0.5–1.5°C in many cities.

For more than 200 million people, trees reduce local air temperatures by at least 0.5°C, enough to make a meaningful difference during extreme heat.

Cooling can vary a lot from place to place.

In hot, dry cities such as Phoenix in the United States, differences in tree cover can create clear differences in air temperatures. In more temperate cities like Lisbon in Portugal or Gothenburg in Sweden, the overall cooling is still significant, but generally smaller and more consistent across the city.

Trees are not evenly distributed

A city’s trees are not spread evenly. They’re often concentrated in wealthier neighbourhoods and suburban areas. Cities in cooler or more humid climates tend to have more.

Trees are scarcer in lower-income cities or in rapidly growing regions. This inequality is also visible in many cities. Leafy suburbs are usually several degrees cooler than nearby neighbourhoods with little vegetation.

There’s a strong link with wealth. In the United States, lower-income areas average 15% fewer trees than wealthier areas – and are 1.5°C hotter. This means the people who need free cooling from trees the most are often the least likely to receive it.

Planting more trees isn’t enough

Planting trees is often promoted as a simple solution to city heat. Trees are visible, relatively low cost and come with other benefits such as cleaner air and better mental health.

It’s no wonder authorities look to urban trees as a way to counteract the heat from escalating climate change. When you stand under a tree on a sweltering day, the cooling feels immediate and powerful.

But our study shows their effect is more limited in the face of climate change. The world’s current urban trees would, we estimate, offset just 10% of the extra heat expected by mid-century under moderate climate change scenarios. With ambitious planting, this could rise to around 20%.

While important, it’s not enough. A large majority of the extra heat will go unaddressed.

What else can be done?

If the world’s cities are to cope with rising temperatures, trees have to be seen as part of a broader strategy – not the whole answer.

Clever urban design can cut heat by using reflective materials, increasing green spaces and improving airflow between buildings. Green roofs and shaded streets can also make a difference.

New tree plantings should target hotter neighbourhoods with less existing tree canopy, as these will deliver the greatest benefits.

Of course, these measures don’t replace the need to tackle climate change directly by cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

Using trees wisely

Billions of trees grow in the world’s cities. They are hugely valuable, acting to cool cities, support biodiversity and making urban areas more liveable.

The challenge for city residents and authorities is to use trees wisely. Plant them where they’re needed most and combine them with other methods of reducing heat. Trees are remarkable. But they can’t do it all.

Rob McDonald works for The Nature Conservancy, an environmental nonprofit.

Tirthankar Chakraborty has received funding from DOE, NASA, and NIH to study urban environments, including impacts of vegetation on urban heat.

Manuel Esperon-Rodriguez does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Urban trees cool the world’s cities more than we thought – but we can’t rely on them alone – https://theconversation.com/urban-trees-cool-the-worlds-cities-more-than-we-thought-but-we-cant-rely-on-them-alone-281866

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Vivek Krishnamurthy, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Boulder

More than two months into the war in Iran, navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – the key waterway through which more than a third of the international trade in oil and gas passes – remains perilous and uncertain. Underscoring the uncertainty, on May 3, 2026, the Trump administration launched Project Freedom to help stranded ships through the strait. Yet the next day, at least two ships came under fire from Iran.

Iran began blocking the strait to navigation on Feb. 28, after the United States and Israel launched a military campaign against the country. By mid-March, Tehran was demanding tolls of up to US$2 million per vessel. In response, the U.S. imposed what President Donald Trump declared to be a “complete” maritime blockade on Iran and subsequently threatened punishing economic sanctions on any entity that pays Iran’s tolls.

Following Iran’s lead, other nations are now contemplating using their own leverage over crucial choke points closer to their shores. Indonesia floated a proposal to charge tolls on vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca, before walking it back. China has also issued warnings against foreign military vessels transiting the Taiwan Strait.

These events have prompted commentators to warn of the end of a golden era of navigational freedom that the U.S. has underwritten for more than a century. But as an expert on international law, I know that attempts by nations to weaponize their leverage over crucial geographic choke points at sea and on land are nothing new. In fact, they go back at least six centuries.

The Danish roots of sea tolls

From the early 15th century until 1857, Denmark required ships passing through the narrow straits connecting the North Sea to the Baltic Sea to stop at the port city of Helsingør — or Elsinore, as Shakespeare styled it in “Hamlet” — and pay a toll before proceeding.

At their peak, these Sound Dues generated nearly 10% of Danish national revenues. The Sound Dues rankled the maritime powers of the day, but Denmark could easily enforce them thanks to the narrowness of the Øresund Strait, which is less than 3 miles wide at Helsingør.

Ultimately, they were ended not through war but through diplomacy, led in large part by a rising maritime power with a strong interest in open sea-lanes: the United States.

Seeking to increase its trade with Prussia, in 1843 the administration of President John Tyler advised Denmark of the United States’ refusal to pay the Sound Dues because they lacked any basis in international law. Rumors swirled that the U.S. was willing to back up its refusal to pay with force.

After years of uncertainty, the fate of the Sound Dues was resolved by the Copenhagen Convention of 1857. Denmark agreed to abolish the tolls forever in exchange for a one-time, lump-sum payment from the major trading nations. The principle of free navigation of the world’s oceans has largely prevailed since then, in part as a result of subsequent U.S. efforts to exercise these freedoms against those who would restrict them.

How the law developed

The Danish settlement reflected a broader body of law – the law of transit – that had been evolving alongside an international system of sovereign states for centuries.

Its core principle is that when convenience dictates or necessity requires, a country must allow the people, goods and vessels of other nations to pass through its territory for a journey that begins and ends elsewhere. The principle has deep roots in American and international legal history: Thomas Jefferson invoked it when negotiating with Spain, which then controlled Louisiana, to secure the United States’ right to navigate the Mississippi River.

Free transit guarantees have been a feature of every major international order since the Congress of Vienna ended the Napoleonic wars in 1815. Yet in each case, those guarantees have come under pressure as the order that produced them weakened.

Before World War I, restrictions on transit rights multiplied across Europe. The League of Nations, a precursor to today’s United Nations, made strengthening transit rights its first priority in the 1920s. But these arrangements fell apart as fascism rose across Europe and Asia and regimes from Nazi Germany to Imperial Japan denounced their international legal obligations.

The post-World War II order reaffirmed transit rights – through the law of the sea, trade agreements and the laws governing civil aviation – and for decades they held.

The International Court of Justice clarified the governing legal principle for international straits in its very first case, decided in 1949: Any body of water useful to international navigation between two open seas is open to the vessels of all nations.

The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded in 1982, reaffirmed this rule in holding that countries may not charge tolls on vessels passing through straits within their waters. Although neither Iran nor the U.S. has ratified the convention, the U.S. accepts its provisions on navigational freedom as binding on all countries.

Iran’s levying of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz violates the core legal principle that nations may not exploit advantages of geography to bilk foreigners who need to traverse their land or maritime territory. Yet the American and Israeli military campaign that provoked Iran’s response likewise violates the U.N. Charter’s rules on the use of force.

Such issues are not just limited to the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, trade law, security commitments and the norms against the unilateral redrawing of borders are all under strain.

Seen in this larger context, China’s warnings against military passage through the Taiwan Strait and Indonesia’s trial balloon over the Malacca Strait are not isolated provocations. They are symptoms of the same underlying condition: an international order losing the shared commitment that has often made its rules enforceable.

In January 2026, Trump told The New York Times that he did not need international law and that his own moral judgment was the only constraint on American foreign policy. Around the same time, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that the American-led international order was “fading.”

The Strait of Hormuz is where those trend lines are now colliding – to the detriment of billions of people around the world, and to the idea of an international order based on law rather than the naked exercise of power.

Vivek Krishnamurthy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The method in Iran’s madness? Closure of Strait of Hormuz echoes a centuries-old Danish play − and is a tragedy for the world order – https://theconversation.com/the-method-in-irans-madness-closure-of-strait-of-hormuz-echoes-a-centuries-old-danish-play-and-is-a-tragedy-for-the-world-order-281961

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

US President Donald Trump’s threats against Iran since the war began have targeted not just the country’s military capabilities, but its entire civilisation.

In recent days, he has threatened that Iran would be “blown off the face of the earth” if it attacks US ships trying to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

He’s previously pledged to send Iran back to the “Stone Age”, and warned that “a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again”.

These statements show not only extreme belligerence, but Trump’s complete lack of understanding of Iran’s long, resilient culture and civilisation and the fortitude of its people.

Iran has been subjected to much internal strife and foreign power intervention, but it has never been colonised or subjugated. At every difficult moment in their history, Iranians have fought to preserve what is theirs.

Persian influence in ancient Greece and Rome

Since the Greco-Persian Wars (499 BCE), Persia has served as the West’s ultimate “other”: a dark and despotic oriental villain menacing an enlightened West.

This is despite Persia’s return of exiled Jews in Babylon to Jerusalem to rebuild their temple in 538 BCE, and its tolerance of diversity in the world’s first truly multicultural empire.

The victories of a coalition of Greek city-states over the Achaemenid Persian imperial forces at Salamis (480 BCE) and Marathon (490 BCE) are considered pivotal moments in the history of Western civilisation.

Yet this was just a minor setback for Persia. In fact, Persia continued to play a decisive role in Greek affairs. Persian gold helped Sparta defeat Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), and Persia was often the most important mediator in Greek affairs.

The Parthian and Sasanian Empires that followed the Achaemenids in Persia then challenged the Romans.

In 260 CE, Sasanian Emperor Shapur I captured Roman Emperor Valerian in battle – an unprecedented act. A century later, Shapur II’s army fought off an attempted invasion by Emperor Julian, killing him in the process.

Western triumphal narratives tend to forget that Persia repeatedly humbled the greatest Western empire in ancient times.

Surviving invasions from the east and west

Alexander the Great conquered Persia militarily. However, he embraced Persian culture, which outlasted Greek influence in the region.

The advent of Islam did not extinguish Persia’s civilisation or resilience, either. Islamic leaders preserved Persian language and culture, kept pre-Islamic festivals such as Nowruz (the 3,000-year-old Persian New Year), and adapted Zoroastrian concepts into Shiite Islam’s emphasis on resistance to tyranny.

The Mongols’ multiple invasions (between 1219 and 1258) devastated Iran, yet core elements of Persian civilisation survived. Persian power flourished again, especially under the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736).

During the Qajar dynasty (1789–1925), Persia was squeezed by the Anglo-Russian rivalry of Great Game era, but was not subdued.

During the second world war, Iran was occupied by the British in the oil-rich south and the Soviets in the north. However, both powers pledged, along with the United States, to respect Iran’s sovereignty and withdraw at the end of the war.

A turbulent 20th century

This episode rejuvenated Iranian nationalism and prompted a movement to free Iran from traditional major power rivalries and gain control over its own resources. This especially pertained to oil, since the British had controlled Iran’s oil reserves through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) from the early 19th century.

In 1951, a long-time nationalist-reformist, Mohammad Mossadegh, was elected prime minister and promptly nationalised the AIOC, sparking a major dispute with London.

Mossadegh also sought to limit the power of Iran’s monarchy in favour of democratic reforms, causing a conflict with the young, pro-Western Mohammad Reza Shah, who was still the country’s reigning monarch.

The shah was forced into exile in 1953, only to be returned to the throne days later when Mossadegh was overthrown in a covert operation by the US Central Intelligence Agency, with MI6’s help. (Fifty years later, US President Barack Obama acknowledged the CIA’s role in the coup.)

The US backed the shah as a pillar of American hegemony in the Middle East. In return, US oil companies received a 40% share of Iran’s oil industry.

Yet the shah was able to transform his dependent relationship with the US into one of interdependence. Iran became a pivotal player in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and in the region.

In the wake of the 1973–74 energy crisis, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned the United States would react with force if it was “strangled” by a cut in oil deliveries – a veiled message to the shah.

The Iranian revolution of 1978–79 then toppled the shah and enabled his chief religious and political opponent, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to assume power. Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic Republic with an anti-US and anti-Israel posture.

He essentially based his rule in the historic pride Iranians held as a people in charge of their destiny.

Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sought to entrench Shia political Islamism as the ideological guide and legitimate foundation of the state. But they sought to blend this with the Iranians’ sense of civilisational, cultural and nationalist identity, especially in the face of outside aggression.

‘Iran is my land’

The celebrated Persian-speaking poet Abul-Qasim Ferdowsi (940–1020 CE) once said:

Iran is my land, and the whole world is under my feet. The people of this land are the possessors of virtue, art and bravery. They have no fear of roaring lions.

As Iran’s standoff with the US continues, it appears the regime is prepared for the long haul against yet another military foe.

But there is no military solution to the conflict. Diplomacy within the framework of mutual respect and trust is the best way forward. Otherwise, the region and the world may remain captive to an energy and economic crisis that could have been resolved through negotiations, rather than war.

As for the future of the Islamic government, that needs to be determined by the Iranian people.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘No fear of roaring lions’: Iran has a long history of standing firm against outside aggressors – https://theconversation.com/no-fear-of-roaring-lions-iran-has-a-long-history-of-standing-firm-against-outside-aggressors-281645

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Firmesk Rahim, PhD Student, UMass Boston

Arab Gulf countries, battered economically and physically by the war with Iran, were keen to put on a united front at a key regional meeting on April 28, 2026.

Gathering in the Saudi city Jeddah, representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council warned the Iranian government in Tehran that an attack on any one of its six members would be taken as an attack on all. Rejecting Iran’s claims to control of the Strait of Hormuz, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani later described the summit as embodying “the unified Gulf stance” over the conflict.

The show of togetherness may seem at odds with other recent developments that have seen members of the GCC split over policy and vision for the region – not least the United Arab Emirate’s decision to quit the oil cartel OPEC.

But to followers of Gulf politics, like myself, the scene felt familiar. Time and again, Iran has accomplished what no outside mediator could: It has pushed divided Gulf Arab states together. When tensions rise, the monarchies of the GCC – Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman – tend to stand united, at least publicly.

From revolution to coordination

The modern Gulf security environment was profoundly shaped by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iran shares a narrow and strategically vital waterway with the Gulf states but has long differed in identity and outlook. Specifically, Iran’s Shiite revolutionary model contrasts with the Sunni-led monarchies across the region.

Before 1979, when Iran was ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia, the largest of the Sunni Arab Gulf states, were regarded by Washington as “twin pillars,” protecting American interests in the Middle East. Their relationship was cooperative, but not close.

Then the emergence of the Islamic Republic after the revolution in 1979 introduced a new kind of regional actor – one defined not only by state power but also by Shiite ideological ambition.

Gulf monarchies’ concern over both external security and internal stability was reinforced by the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia, when Islamist militants seized Islam’s holiest site. The event, alongside Iran’s revolution, exposed the vulnerability of Gulf regimes to religiously driven upheaval.

In response to this revolution ideology, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established the GCC in 1981. Although officially framed as a platform for economic and political cooperation, the organization also reflected shared security concerns and Arab identity.

But unity had limits. Member states did not all view threats to their respective regimes in the same way.

Saudi Arabia worried about U.S. pressure for reforms; Kuwait feared neighboring Iraq; Bahrain was concerned about Iran’s influence over its own Shiite population; and the UAE worried about both Iran and its own large foreign workforce. Meanwhile, Oman and Qatar followed a more independent or balanced approach.

These differences would shape the trajectory of the GCC, and Arab Gulf states’ relationship with Tehran.

The eight-year Iran–Iraq War, which began in 1980, brought to the fore fears of Iran’s influence across the region. While Oman declared neutrality, other GCC states supported Iraq by funneling billions of dollars to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

This revealed an early pattern: Gulf states could coordinate politically, but avoided acting as a single strategic bloc. The GCC broadly favored Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, but there was no unified strategy or formal policy.

Security dependence

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 reshaped the region’s security structure again. In early 1991, the move prompted a U.S.-led coalition, including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, to expel Iraqi forces. Saudi Arabia’s role was especially significant: It not only hosted coalition forces but also actively participated militarily – marking one of the first major episodes in which a GCC state was directly involved in the defense of another member.

During – and especially after – the Gulf War, GCC states deepened their reliance on the United States, agreeing to host U.S. military bases and expanding long-term defense cooperation.

This external security umbrella provided a measure of stability, but it also introduced new differences. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain aligned more closely with Washington’s strategic framework, others – notably Oman and Qatar – maintained a more flexible approach. As a result, the appearance of unity coexisted with growing variation in national strategies.

This pattern has continued in recent years, significantly through diplomatic moves to normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. While the UAE and Bahrain moved quickly to formalize ties with Israel, others remained more cautious.

The effort to contain Iran

When it comes to combating Iranian influence, GCC states have long played different roles.

Oman has consistently acted as a mediator, maintaining open channels with Tehran and facilitating quiet diplomacy — including back-channel talks between Iran and Western states.

Qatar also kept communication open, partly because of shared economic interests with Iran – particularly the management of the North Field/South Pars gas reserve.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by contrast, have generally taken a more cautious and at times confrontational stance toward Iran. Both view Iran as a regional competitor and a source of security concerns, particularly due to Tehran’s missile program and its support for ideologically opposed non-state actors.

This contrasting approach to Iran across the GCC allows different states to engage Tehran through multiple channels, but it also makes it harder to form a consistent, unified GCC strategy.

A changing regional balance

The 2003 Iraq War marked a turning point in the GCC-Iran dynamic. The removal of Iraq as a regional counterweight allowed Iran to expand its influence.

And this development sharpened divisions within the GCC.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly viewed Iran as a direct strategic threat requiring containment. Qatar and Oman, however, emphasized dialogue and mediation.

These differences became more visible during the Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017. The dispute centered around Qatar’s support for Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered a terrorist organization by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a full air, land and sea blockade in June 2017. The three nations accused Qatar of supporting extremist groups and maintaining close ties with Iran. Isolated, Qatar relied on Iran for airspace, trade routes and supplies, strengthening the relationship between the countries. The blockade eventually ended in January 2021, when the parties signed a declaration restoring diplomatic and trade relations at a GCC summit in Saudi Arabia.

GCC under attack

The series of events that began with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Iranian-backed Hamas in Israel shook up GCC relations with Tehran.

In June 2025, in response to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, Tehran struck a U.S. base in Qatar – the first such attack on a GCC state by Tehran.

At an extraordinary meeting in Doha, Qatar’s capital, GCC members pledged full solidarity with Qatar and strongly condemned the Iranian attack.

But it was not enough to prevent Iran from attacking all six GCC states in response to the ongoing conflict begun in February 2026 by U.S. and Israel.

The subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of global oil supplies, has sparked what many see as the biggest crisis in the Gulf since the inception of the GCC.

The GCC responded by emphasizing collective security and unity. But yet again, the public show of togetherness masks divergent views on how to respond. When the war ends, each state will likely return to its own strategic and foreign policy approach.

Understanding the pattern

Since 1979, Tehran’s actions in the Gulf region have exposed two parallel developments. On the surface, there are shared concerns among GCC members and public shows of unity. But underneath this facade of unity, each state has continued to develop its own national priorities and risk tolerance.

The combination of these two factors helps explain why the GCC often appears unified during crises, while remaining internally divided over how to respond to them.

Rather than viewing the GCC as a fully cohesive bloc, it may be more accurate to see it as a framework where cooperation and disagreement coexist.

Firmesk Rahim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Gulf state cooperation has long been shaped by the threat of Iran − but shows of unity belie division – https://theconversation.com/gulf-state-cooperation-has-long-been-shaped-by-the-threat-of-iran-but-shows-of-unity-belie-division-280692

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Martin Kear, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney

Israel and Lebanon agreed to a ceasefire three weeks ago. The violence, however, hasn’t stopped.

In recent days, Israeli airstrikes have killed at least 40 people and the military has issued evacuation orders for residents of ten villages and towns in southern Lebanon, where it has established a security buffer zone.

According to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this zone is needed to protect Israel from future attacks by the Hezbollah militant group. He said it is “much stronger, more intense, more continuous, and more solid than we had previously”.

Critics, however, contend Israel is adopting the “Gaza playbook” in this buffer zone, mirroring its actions in Gaza after a fragile ceasefire was agreed to last October.

Militarily, Israel is hitting an already-weakened Hezbollah as hard as it can to deplete its capabilities and force it out of its southern Lebanon stronghold.

Israel calls this strategy “mowing the grass”. It has long viewed this strategy as the best way to establish a level of deterrence against Hamas and Hezbollah, which cannot be defeated through conventional military means.

Like it did in Gaza, Israel is also aiming to make the buffer zone uninhabitable for residents. In late March, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared:

All houses in villages near the Lebanese border will be destroyed, in accordance with the model used in Rafah and Beit Hanoun in Gaza, in order to permanently remove the threats near the border to northern residents.

As part of this, Israel has destroyed all the bridges across the Litani River, effectively isolating southern Lebanon from the rest of the country. It is also systematically destroying or severely damaging towns, villages and infrastructure in the region.

This “Gaza playbook” has come with a significant human cost. Since this latest conflict with Hezbollah began in early March, Israel’s attacks have killed more than 2,600 Lebanese and displaced another 1.2 million from their homes.

---

Read more:
Israeli threats to occupy or annex south Lebanon dust off a decades-old playbook

---

Netanyahu is becoming trapped

Yet, despite achieving many successes against Hezbollah, Netanyahu is in danger of overreaching in his claims to be able to defeat one of Israel’s nemeses.

For decades, successive Israeli governments, particularly those headed by Netanyahu, have convinced the Israeli public that Israel and Hezbollah are engaged in an existential struggle.

Many Israelis now expect Netanyahu to deliver on his promise and finally rid them of this threat forever.

In a recent poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, 80% of respondents supported continuing the fight against Hezbollah irrespective of any possible peace deal between the US and Iran, and even if this created tensions with the Trump administration.

This poses a political threat to Netanyahu as he faces becoming trapped between two opposing realities.

Delivering on a false promise

The first centres on the “mowing the grass” strategy. This strategy has long served as good propaganda and as an exemplar of the government protecting its people. But it was never intended to completely defeat the threats posed by Hezbollah or Hamas.
When it comes to Hezbollah, Israel’s military simply cannot completely defeat a resistance movement that is so embedded in the social, political and cultural fabric of Lebanon. This would require not just a military victory, but the subjugation of its supporters and the delegitimisation of its ideology.

The intention of the “mowing the grass” strategy is to manage the threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, not destroy them.

If Israel is able to cause substantial damage to their political and military capabilities – in addition to destroying local infrastructure – the groups are then forced to focus on survival and revival, rather than on threatening Israel.

From Israel’s perspective, this provides some breathing room until the threat reemerges and it is time to “mow the grass” again.

From a political perspective, this strategy also allows Israel to justify its continuous military operations. This has been the cornerstone of Netanyahu’s political revival since the Hamas attacks of 2023, allowing him to maintain a constant sense of crisis that requires ever-increasing levels of violence.

But Netanyahu has changed the narrative, shifting from just “managing” Israel’s conflict with both Hezbollah and Hamas, to “dismantling” the groups and “finishing the job”.

It is clear the Israeli public wants Netanyahu to deliver on this promise.

Trump forcing his hand

The second reality facing Netanyahu is the potential that US President Donald Trump will agree to a permanent ceasefire with Iran that forces Israel to cease its hostilities against Hezbollah.

Since the tentative ceasefire between the US and Iran, Netanyahu has been trying to separate Israel’s conflicts with Iran and Hezbollah. This would allow him to continue the military’s operations against Hezbollah and claim a key strategic victory.

But Iran is demanding that any ceasefire it reaches with the US include Hezbollah.

This places Netanyahu in a bind. If he does agree to a permanent peace deal, this would leave a severely wounded but not-yet-destroyed Hezbollah in place. With Hamas and the Iranian regime also still intact (albeit severely wounded), this would represent a triple disaster for Netanyahu.

The backlash is already starting. Last month, Israeli opposition leader Yair Golan accused Netanyahu of lying:

He promised a historic victory and security for generations, and in practice, we got one of the most severe strategic failures Israel has ever known.

Criticism like this could have a huge effect on the Israeli elections, due before the end of this year.

Netanyahu is desperate to win these elections to forestall his long-running corruption trial. As such, he would be loath to risk breaking with the Israeli public on his promise to finish Hezbollah. However, that may mean breaking with the US and its essential military, political and diplomatic support.

While the “mowing the grass” strategy gave Netanyahu new political life after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, his failure to match his rhetoric to actual results may now prove to be his Achilles’ heel.

Martin Kear does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Netanyahu has pledged to ‘finish the job’ against Hezbollah. It’s a promise he can’t deliver on – https://theconversation.com/netanyahu-has-pledged-to-finish-the-job-against-hezbollah-its-a-promise-he-cant-deliver-on-280468