Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Stella Huangfu, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Sydney

Global oil markets have reacted swiftly to escalating tensions in the Middle East as the United States and Israel continue their assault on Iran.

After oil tanker traffic through a key chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz, stopped,
the benchmark oil price, Brent crude, jumped about 6% to over US$77 a barrel. It initially spiked as high as US$82, its highest level since January 2025.

A roughly US$10 jump in a matter of days is a significant move and delivers an immediate inflationary jolt for oil-importing economies.

What does this mean for households, businesses and central banks?

Why oil still matters

Oil may no longer dominate the global economy as it did in the 1970s, but it remains embedded in modern production.

It feeds directly into petrol prices, diesel, aviation fuel and shipping, and shapes the cost of transporting and producing everything from food to manufactured goods. When oil prices rise quickly, the effects spread beyond energy markets.

Economists call this a “negative supply shock”: the result is production becomes more expensive. Companies can absorb higher costs or pass them on to consumers. In practice, they usually do both.

The result is an uncomfortable mix of higher inflation and slower economic growth.

The inflation impact will weigh on central banks

The most immediate effect is at the petrol pump. Higher crude prices lift fuel costs and push up headline inflation. For households already facing cost-of-living pressures, that can be felt quickly.

For example, when the price of oil goes up by $10 a barrel, the rough rule of thumb is that the price of gasoline for US drivers could rise by about 25 cents a gallon. Elsewhere, such as Australia, it’s estimated at around 10 cents a litre more for every US$10 rise.

Transport and logistics costs also increase, and some of those higher costs filter into the broader price level over time.

How much inflation rises depends how long the disruption to oil markets lasts. A brief spike might add only a few tenths of a percentage point to inflation. A sustained increase would be more problematic.

Central banks are watching closely. Inflation in the US and Europe has eased from post-pandemic peaks. In Australia, inflation has fallen from its pandemic highs, but recent data show renewed upward pressure. Reflecting those concerns, the Reserve Bank of Australia raised the official cash rate in February.

An oil shock could weaken global growth

Higher fuel costs risk adding fresh momentum to inflation now, arriving at precisely the wrong time, just as policymakers at the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank were hoping it was coming under control.

In one of the first comments from a central banker on the economic impact of the conflict, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s governor today noted the supply shock could add to inflation pressures.

However, Governor Michele Bullock also warned that a prolonged impact on energy markets

could have adverse effects on global economic activity and result in downward pressure on inflation. It is not obvious how this might play out.

Oil-driven inflation is particularly challenging for central banks. Raising interest rates cannot affect the supply of oil. Unlike demand-driven inflation – where strong consumer spending can be cooled by higher interest rates – supply-driven inflation reflects higher production costs.

If central banks lift rates to contain prices, they risk slowing growth further. But the interest rate rises cannot directly lower oil prices.

Pressure on household budgets

Higher oil prices also squeeze household budgets.

When families spend more on fuel, they have less to spend elsewhere. Since household consumption typically accounts for around 60% of the economy in advanced economies, even modest shifts in spending can matter.

Businesses face similar pressure. Higher energy and transport costs reduce profit margins and can delay hiring or investment.

The effects vary by country. Europe is a major net energy importer. While Australia exports coal and gas, it relies heavily on imported oil and refined fuel. That leaves both economies exposed to higher global oil prices.

The United States is more mixed: higher prices support its energy sector, but still lift costs for most households.

The current jump in the oil price is not enough to trigger a global recession. But it adds another headwind as global growth moderates.

How does this compare with 2022?

The obvious comparison is the oil price surge following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Then, crude prices briefly climbed above US$120 a barrel, intensifying already high inflation. In response, the US Federal Reserve hiked rates rapidly to rein in inflation.

Today’s situation is less extreme. Prices are well below those peaks, global demand is softer, and interest rates in the United States, Europe and Australia are several percentage points higher than they were in early 2022. Inflation has been trending down in most major economies.

Still, households may be more sensitive now. After years of rising prices and higher interest rates, consumer confidence is fragile. Even moderate increases in petrol prices can influence spending.

The key question is whether this is temporary, or the start of a sustained climb.

What if prices rise further?

If oil prices continue moving higher – especially toward US$100 a barrel – the risks would increase.

Inflation would be pushed higher. Central banks could face an uncomfortable choice: tolerate higher energy-driven inflation or keep interest rates higher for longer.

Financial markets would adjust quickly, and volatility could rise.

The most serious scenario would involve supply disruptions that constrain global output, increasing the risk of slower growth combined with persistent inflation.

A shock, but not yet a crisis

For now, the 6% jump in oil prices represents a clear inflationary impulse and a moderate drag on growth. It complicates the outlook, but does not resemble past energy crises.

What matters most is persistence. If prices stabilise, the impact should be manageable. If they continue to climb, oil could again become a central driver of global inflation – and a renewed challenge for central banks.

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Read more:
The oil price surge is just one symptom of a supply chain network that is not fit for this age of global tensions

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Stella Huangfu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why surging oil prices are a shock for the global economy – but not yet a crisis – https://theconversation.com/why-surging-oil-prices-are-a-shock-for-the-global-economy-but-not-yet-a-crisis-277228

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

US-Israeli joint strikes on Iran over the weekend have seen war break out in the region once again and the death of Iran’s supreme leader. Iran has retaliated with volleys of ballistic missiles and drones targeted at Israel, but also several of its Persian Gulf neighbours.

Iran has launched hundreds of missiles and drones across the gulf, at targets in United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, grounding planes as a result. This is in spite of none of these nations coordinating officially with the US and Israel in their initial operations.

This is a deliberate strategy by the Iranian government, designed to exact early and substantial costs on its neighbours and overall stability in the region.

An unpopular neighbour

In spite of Iran’s relative size and military power in the region, the Iranian government is not well liked by its neighbours. At best, Iran is seen as a rival, at worst an adversary.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have spent more than a decade in a proxy war over Yemen.

Iran also claimed historical ownership over Bahrain as recently as December last year.

The rest of the gulf states, namely the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, have fostered more pragmatic relations with Iran by keeping regular diplomatic channels open and offering to mediate disputes within the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Despite simmering tensions, Iran has never been in a direct military confrontation with any of these states.

So why send the bombs?

Almost all of the gulf states have one important thing in common: they all have security guarantees from the US and host US military bases.

Iran sees this as one of the most effective ways it can retaliate for a few reasons. Firstly, these bases are firmly in the range of its most plentiful ballistic missiles.

Bases in the gulf also have significant strategic value to the US. The base struck in Bahrain over the weekend was the headquarters of the US Fifth Navy Fleet.

Al Udeid Airbase, just outside of Doha, the capital of Qatar, was also targeted with Iranian ballistic missiles. Al Udeid is home to US Central Command (US-CENTCOM), coordinating military operations across the region. It’s also home to 10,000 US troops – the most in the area.

However, Iran is aware of how sophisticated US early warning systems are and likely doesn’t expect to significantly damage US infrastructure.

What’s the aim then?

Instead, the strategy is to make the region less stable and ensure all its neighbours feel it. It’s effectively vowing that if operations continue, the relative peace and prosperity the gulf has enjoyed will come to an end.

Iran is hoping its neighbours will see this as a war of choice by the US and Israel, with them being dragged into the hostilities. Gulf states will be forced to either double-down on their alliance with the US or work toward deescalation.

It’s not clear if this strategy will pay off. It’s possible this could lead to even more military pressure on Iran if the gulf states become more involved in operations.

At the same time, the increasingly strained relations between the gulf states and Israel over the last two years would likely make several of them reluctant to get more involved.

It’s also impossible for Iran to keep this strategy up indefinitely. Even though it has the region’s most extensive and varied arsenal of missiles, at some point it will run out of ordnance. Other countries may choose to just wait it out.

Iran has made this kind of action a signature of its long-held “forward defence” strategy – attacking targets far away from its borders to show the depth of its reach. Using its drone and missile arsenal is simply one way to tell the region, and the world, the regime will not go quietly.

Dragging the whole region into chaos

Alongside this, Iran has a damaged, but still far-reaching network of independent proxies across the region. Groups in Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon are likely to stay loyal to the Islamic Republic and employ long-term insurgent strategies in its name.

The Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah has already fired projectiles into Israel. This has restarted hostilities across the Lebanese border, opening up another front for Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world’s oil travels, is another part of the region Iran can weaponise. Already, two oil tankers have been attacked in the strait and the price of Brent Crude has risen 13%.

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Read more:
Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran’s regime was built for survival. A long war is now likely

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Put another way, the extent of these attacks are a signal. These are not the same as the calculated deescalatory strikes Iran conducted in 2024 and 2025.

This war is existential for the Islamic Republic. Its strikes across the gulf are designed as a reminder that it will do all it can to drag the entire region into chaos, uncertainty and instability to save itself.

At a minimum, Iran wishes to create political consequences for all involved. The question is whether the regime will survive long enough for these consequences to have an effect.

Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why did Iran bomb Dubai? A Middle East expert explains the regional alliances at play – https://theconversation.com/why-did-iran-bomb-dubai-a-middle-east-expert-explains-the-regional-alliances-at-play-277218

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf have found themselves in a position they have long sought to avoid: on the front line and bearing the brunt of a widening Middle East conflict.

Having been dragged into a war of choice by the U.S. – one which many around the world are calling a war of aggression – all six Gulf Cooperation Council nations have been struck by Iranian retaliatory attacks in response.

Military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all been hit. But the missiles and drones from Iran have been aimed at civilian infrastructure, too, including airport, ports and hotels in the opening days of U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran.

In scale and scope, the barrage marks a major departure from Iran’s previous response to being attacked by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. In contrast, during a 12-day war in June 2025, Tehran only attacked one base in Qatar, and even then forewarned authorities in Doha.

Instead, what is occurring in the region is a scenario that planners in Persian Gulf capitals have long warned about: a deliberate attempt by Tehran to widen conflict and hit nations it sees as allied to the West.

As an expert on Gulf dynamics, I see the unfurling events as undoing years of work to de-risk the region and placing in jeopardy the unique selling point and business models that have underpinned the Gulf states’ global rise.

A cornered regime fighting for survival

Ever since the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants on Israel, policymakers in the Gulf nations have sought to avoid the regionalization of conflict.

Qatar led the way in mediating between Israel and Hamas, while Oman has done the same with the U.S. and Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has maintained regular dialogue with Iran to de-escalate regional tensions.

Each of the successive escalations between Israel and Iran – in April and October 2024 and then in June 2025, with the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes – brought the region closer to, without tipping over into, all-out war.

But Iran’s actions in the opening days following what Washington has named “Operation Epic Fury” have signaled that the comparative restraint it showed during the 12-day war is firmly off the table.

The Islamic Republic is now a cornered regime fighting for its survival. As such, it is lashing out and seeking to spread the pain to regional neighbors. The logic in this approach is that Gulf nations could put pressure on the U.S., which may fear the cascading costs of a prolonged regional conflict.

Gulf nations are also obvious targets for Iran. With Iran lacking the capability to hit the U.S. mainland through conventional weapons, the American military bases that dot the Gulf region are within the reach of Tehran’s ballistic arsenal.

Psychological impact on Gulf nations

The scale of the Iranian attacks on targets in the Gulf nations in the opening two days of the current conflict underscores the extent to which Iran’s response now differs from that of June 2025: In the first two days of the conflict, Iran had fired at least 390 ballistic missiles and 830 drones at the Gulf states. By comparison, the Iranian strike on the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar last year involved 14 ballistic missiles and was a one-off attack on a single target.

Air defense systems in Gulf nations have neutralized most of the incoming Iranian missiles, to date, and actual damage and casualties have been limited to a handful of deaths and injuries in the dozens.

But it is the intangible and psychological impact on Gulf cities under attack that threatens to inflict profound damage on the reputation and image of cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council nations have presented the Gulf as an oasis of stability and havens to live and work.

This is especially the case for Dubai, which has marketed itself strongly as a hub for business and tourism. But it is also applicable to other Gulf nations as well, such as Qatar, which relies heavily on a steady stream of large-scale meetings and events.

Iran’s attacks on civilian infrastructure and soft targets – airports in Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and hotels in Bahrain and Dubai – serve to puncture this image of safe and secure Gulf capitals.

This choice of targets by Iran likely reflects a calculation that leaders in the Gulf countries would immediately feel the full impact of the war and push Washington hard to find a resolution and quick.

The subsequent targeting by Tehran on oil and gas facilities, including Ras Laffan in Qatar and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, serves as a further and highly consequential step. It has already triggered a forceful response from Qatar, which shot down two Iranian jets on March 2.

There is concern among Gulf nations that the next step in the ladder of escalation could involve targeting the desalination plants that are so vital to overcoming water scarcity in the region.

Vulnerable to escalation

As critical hubs in the global economy by virtue of their reserves of oil and gas and centrality to international shipping and aviation, the Gulf nations are uniquely vulnerable to further escalation by Iran.

Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha have invested heavily in creating airlines that function as “super-connectors” capable of linking any two destinations worldwide with a stop in the Gulf. A Feb. 28 drone strike on Dubai International Airport, the world’s busiest for international travel, illustrated the impact that Iran’s asymmetric responses could have on the global hub model that has come to dominate world air travel.

Already, closure of airspaces over Qatar and the UAE, as well as in Bahrain and Kuwait, has stranded tens of thousands of passengers and created the biggest disruption to global travel since the COVID-19 pandemic.

In addition, cargo operations essential to local supply chains have been heavily impacted, at the same time that seaborne trade through the Strait of Hormuz has been similarly interrupted.

Whereas initial spikes in oil prices and insurance premiums at the start of the 12-day war last year fell away as it became clear that energy infrastructure was not significantly targeted, the opposite has happened this time.

Peril and uncertainty

But the short-term shock to the global economy is not what will be of primary concern to the Gulf Cooperation Council members. Not since the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War, has the region faced so much peril and uncertainty.

And that is what Iran’s leaders are banking on. The attacks across the Gulf by Tehran are not, after all, without strategy. The intent is to expand the conflict, thereby significantly raising costs to the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf.

Tehran’s hope is that the economic impact will encourage Gulf leaders to press Trump for an endgame. But in attacking capitals across the region, Iran risks perhaps doing the opposite: rupturing any chance of bettering ties with rivals in the region and instead pushing them further back into Washington’s orbit after a period of drift.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in – https://theconversation.com/irans-targeting-of-airport-ports-and-hotels-in-reaction-to-us-strikes-has-forced-gulf-nations-onto-front-lines-of-a-war-they-want-no-part-in-277208

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Natasha Heap, Lecturer in Aviation, University of Southern Queensland

Travellers are being advised not to cancel their tickets for flights through the Middle East and check with their airlines, as airspace remains closed indefinitely.

If travellers cancel a ticket, they may lose some of their consumer rights and ability to claim refunds.

The US and Israeli bombing of Iran and the closure of airspace and airports is affecting all global airlines that fly through the region. The closures will have a flow-on effect, leading to significant disruption to the global airline industry that may take weeks to clear.

Tens of thousands of travellers affected

The Middle East is home to three of the world’s largest airlines: Emirates and Etihad, both in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar Airways, based in Qatar.

Over the past 20 years, the region has become the global hub of international aviation. It is not only the three airlines that call the region home that are affected by the current conflict.

Emirates has issued a notice to all passengers advising it has suspended all operations to and from Dubai until 3pm UAE time on March 2.

Passengers booked to travel on or before March 5 have two options: rebook on an alternative flight or request a refund. Etihad has issued similar advice. Qatar is referring travellers to its app.

Other carriers that fly through the region, such as Lufthansa have also issued notices to their passengers.

Virgin Australia and Qantas’ operations are not directly affected by the airspace closure. However, some passengers may be affected if travelling on partner airlines. It is essential for people due to travel to check with their airline.

Travel insurance for cancellations is unlikely to be helpful, because acts of war that disrupt travel are explicitly excluded from coverage.

It could take weeks to clear the backlog of travellers just from the past weekend. US President Donald Trump has said the operations could last for “4 weeks or less”.

Tens of thousands of travellers are stranded in the Middle East waiting for the airspace to reopen so they can continue their journey.

The General Civil Aviation Authority in the UAE announced the UAE government will bear the cost of accommodating all stranded passengers in their country. There are around 20,000 people stranded in the UAE, and many more in other countries across the region.

Plans in place to keep passengers safe

Airlines have been watching the rising tensions in the region very closely. They’re used to dealing with unexpected operational disruptions.

With the major shutdown of Middle Eastern airspace in June 2025 still fresh in people’s minds, the airlines were quick to factor that experience into their decisions this time around.

The current situation is a little different to June 2025. Following US and Israeli bombing of targets in Iran at the weekend, Iran responded with missiles and drones that hit both civilian and military targets in several countries across the region.

Dubai International Airport and Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport were both hit by drone attacks or debris. Both of these airports are for civil use. They are not military assets.

This is not the first time airports in the region have come under attack. In January 2022, Houthi forces in Yemen launched a drone attack on Abu Dhabi’s airport. Three people were killed.

The airline hubs have few alternatives

Some airlines affected by the airspace closure will be able to adjust their schedules and routes to avoid the area to try and lessen the impact both to their passengers and their business profitability.

However, the carriers that call the Middle East home have built their networks and highly profitable businesses using the hub and spoke model. They bring passengers into the hub, which is a transfer point to then fly them onward to their destinations. With the airspace closed, these airlines cannot bring passengers in or fly them out.

It would be nearly impossible for the main carriers in the Middle East to temporarily move their base of operations to another country.

They are large organisations. Emirates currently has a fleet of 261 passenger aircraft in service. Simply finding a place to park all the aeroplanes would be a significant challenge.

Complex systems within systems

Running an airline is like putting together a complex jigsaw puzzle with constantly moving pieces.

Beyond the aircraft, airlines need large teams of pilots and cabin crew, as well as extensive catering, cleaning, refuelling and maintenance operations. These systems are highly integrated and location-specific. This makes it extremely difficult to relocate or replicate them in another country at short notice.

Currently, the Middle Eastern carriers have large numbers of aircraft, crew and passengers stranded at the far reaches of their networks. For all airlines, the safety and security of their passengers and crew is their priority.

When the airspace reopens, airlines will face significant challenges to work through the backlog of stranded passengers. Extra flights and adjustments to schedules will likely be needed.

It remains unclear how long the airspace will be closed. But the airlines will already be working on plans to restore full operations quickly and safely when the time comes.

Will this latest airspace closure reduce demand for travel through the Middle East? It may in the short term. However, people will continue to travel. The Middle Eastern airline hubs are geographically located for global connectivity. The hope is the current military action and regional instability will be short-lived.

Natasha Heap does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Booked to travel through the Middle East? Here’s why you shouldn’t cancel your flight – https://theconversation.com/booked-to-travel-through-the-middle-east-heres-why-you-shouldnt-cancel-your-flight-277191

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Bosch, Associate Professor (Law), Edith Cowan University

As the US and Israel began their joint assault on Iran, reports emerged from Iran that a strike hit the Shajarah Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in the southern city of Minab.

The school was reportedly packed with young pupils at the time. Iranian authorities say more than 150 people were killed, including children, and 60 more injured (these figures are yet to be independently verified).

Videos verified by international media show rescue workers digging through collapsed concrete, school bags being pulled from the debris, and scorch marks along the remaining walls.

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Warning: this gallery contains graphic images.

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The New York Times says it has verified videos that show the school next to a naval base belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, or IRGC, and a strike hitting that base.

Iranian representatives at the United Nations have characterised the strike as a deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure and labelled it a war crime and a crime against humanity.

Neither the United States nor Israel have publicly confirmed hitting the school. The US military’s Central Command (Centcom) said:

We are aware of reports concerning civilian harm resulting from ongoing military operations. We take these reports seriously and are looking into them. The protection of civilians is of utmost importance, and we will continue to take all precautions available to minimize the risk of unintended harm.

At present, we do not have enough verified facts to reach a firm legal conclusion about what happened.

But given the questions about the legality of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran – and deeper questions about whether we’re witnessing the “death of international law” more broadly – incidents like this illustrate the continuing importance of the law, especially in times of conflict.

Which targets are protected under the law?

In armed conflict, international humanitarian law applies. International humanitarian law is built on foundational principles that must inform all decisions by armed forces concerning what they target:

• distinction

• proportionality

• military necessity

And precautions must be taken to avoid incidental harm to civilians.

So what do these terms mean?

The principle of distinction requires parties to an armed conflict to always distinguish between civilian objects and military objects.

Attacks may only be directed against combatants and military objects. Civilians and civilian objects, such as schools, hospitals and public transport, are protected and may not be directly targeted.

If there is any doubt about whether a target is military or civilian in nature, it must be presumed to be civilian.

Schools are not merely buildings. They are protective spaces, and their destruction can cause immediate loss of life and long-term societal damage.

Children under 18 also enjoy special protection under international humanitarian law. They, too, may not be directly targeted.

This protection is not absolute, however. Any civilian object (including schools) can lose their protected status if they become military objectives. A school used as a military base, artillery position or command post could meet that definition.

So far, we have no evidence the school in Minab was being used for military purposes or that it was intentionally targeted.

Proportionality and precautions in attacks

What, then, if the school was not intentionally targeted, but was incidental collateral damage from an attack directed at the IRGC barracks nearby?

International humanitarian law recognises civilian objects may be affected by attacks on military objectives.

Incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects is only lawful if it satisfies the test of proportionality and military necessity under the law. All feasible precautions must also have been taken to minimise harm to civilians.

So, if a school near a military target is hit, the legality of that strike turns on whether the expected harm to children and the school was excessive compared to the military advantage gained by striking the target.

Also important: did the military commanders take all feasible precautions to assess the effect of the attack on nearby civilians or civilian infrastructure? This includes the specific weapons that are used and the timing of the attack.

Why international law matters

In recent years, we have witnessed a number of countries and their leaders openly flouting international law and the rules-based order. Yet, it would be a profound mistake to conclude that international law has ceased to matter. Even grave breaches do not negate the system itself.

As renowned American international law scholar Louis Henkin famously wrote in 1979:

Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.

Henkin’s point was not naïve optimism. Daily compliance of international law remains the norm in diplomacy, trade, aviation, maritime navigation, treaty compliance and peaceful dispute settlement.

Violations do occur – sometimes brazenly – but they are exceptions to an overwhelmingly compliant pattern of behaviour.

The fact that some states breach foundational rules such as the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter does not render international law illusory.

Rather, it underscores the importance of naming breaches for what they are and defending the legal order that most states, most of the time, continue to respect.

If the strike on the Minab school is ultimately shown to have violated the principles of distinction, proportionality and military necessity, it would not prove Henkin wrong; it would prove his point.

International law matters precisely because departures from it can be identified, judged and condemned.

The rubble of a girls’ school is not evidence that the law is meaningless; it is a stark reminder of why the law exists, and why insisting on compliance remains essential.

Shannon Bosch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Does international law still matter? The strike on the girls’ school in Iran shows why we need it – https://theconversation.com/does-international-law-still-matter-the-strike-on-the-girls-school-in-iran-shows-why-we-need-it-277196

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Hussein Dia, Professor of Transport Technology and Sustainability, Swinburne University of Technology

As Israel and the United States strike Iran, global oil markets are on edge.

Oil prices have begun rising even before any disruption to supply. Oil traders are factoring in the possibility the Strait of Hormuz might close.

Roughly 20% of the world’s traded oil passes through this narrow waterway between Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south. One oil tanker has been bombed and traffic has all but halted. In global energy markets, the mere threat of interruption can push prices higher.

Oil isn’t like most commodities. Control of the energy-dense fuel shapes geopolitics. Three-quarters of the world’s population live in countries dependent on oil imports for cars, trucks and other uses. Controlling the flow of oil and, increasingly, gas, has long been used as leverage, from the oil shocks of the 1970s to Russia cutting European gas supplies in 2022.

Any serious disruption to tanker traffic in the Gulf would send shockwaves through global oil markets and threaten economic stability. Long queues have already been reported in Australia as motorists vie to fill up before possible price spikes.

As international tensions increase, nations from Cuba to Ukraine to Ethiopia are accelerating plans to reduce their oil dependence and boost energy security.

Half a century of oil leverage

The power of oil became obvious during the 1973 oil embargo, when major Middle East oil producers slashed supply in a bid to reshape US foreign policy. Prices quadrupled, economies stalled and energy security became a central political issue almost overnight. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries have since coordinated supply to drive up prices.

Today, the mechanisms of control look different but the power created by oil dependence remains.

Even before US military action, sanctions on major producers such as Iran and Venezuela have cut supply and reshaped trade flows.

Current tensions near chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz introduce risk premiums into prices.

Oil markets are forward-looking, meaning prices reflect not only current supply and demand but expectations of what might happen next.

The strikes on Iran have seen prices of Brent crude – the global benchmark – trading around US$76 (A$107) per barrel, up from roughly US$68 (A$96) a few weeks earlier. Because prices are global, political instability anywhere can have economic consequences everywhere.

Who’s reducing dependence on oil?

In 2015, India blocked Nepal’s oil imports, triggering chaos. In response, authorities encouraged the very rapid growth of electric vehicles. Oil imports have begun to fall.

More recently, the Russia–Ukraine war and US strikes on Venezuela and Iran have brought new focus on reducing oil imports and bolstering domestic energy security.

In oil-dependent Cuba, US pressure has slashed the supply of oil. Blackouts are common and cars stay put. In response, authorities and businesses are importing 34 times as many Chinese solar panels as they did a year ago.

It’s not ideology driving this shift – it’s necessity. Electric vehicle imports, too, are soaring. “Cuba may experience the fastest energy transition in the world,” a Cuban economist told The Economist.

Why renewables change the equation

Unlike oil, solar panels and wind turbines can avoid being shipped through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz. Renewables are not traded in the same globally centralised way. Power is generated locally and increasingly across many smaller sites.

Russia has long targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power plants during the war. In response, Ukraine is ramping up renewables as fast as possible, as decentralised power generation is much harder to destroy. As a Ukrainian energy expert told Yale360, a single missile “could take out” a coal power station, while a wind farm would require 40 missiles.

Decentralised power is more resilient, meaning damage to one farm won’t collapse the grid.

Resilience through electric transport

Electrification of transport is a key plank of these new approaches to energy security.

Electric vehicles powered by locally-produced electricity reduce exposure to global oil markets. This thinking is visible in Ethiopia’s decision to ban new internal combustion cars.

China imports most of its oil – much of it from Iran. Beijing has been accelerating its rapid shift to electric vehicles. Last year, EVs made up 50% of new cars in China and 12% of the total fleet. China is increasingly using oil to make plastics, not for transport. Last year’s uptick in imports was due to stockpiling of huge volumes amid global uncertainty.

Australia’s exposure

Australia imports the vast majority of its refined fuels. We would have about a month’s worth of petrol before we ran out.

If wars drive up oil prices, pain at the petrol pump will flow through to freight costs, food prices and inflation.

While the EV shift is accelerating, Australia is slow by global standards. Even as electricity rapidly goes green, transport remains overwhelmingly dependent on foreign oil. That leaves Australia exposed.

Energy policy is security policy

Renewables do not eliminate geopolitical risk. Power grids face cyber threats. Critical mineral supply chains introduce new dependencies – and much of today’s solar panel, battery and EV manufacturing is concentrated in China.

But there is a clear structural difference. Decentralised systems are harder to manipulate through supply chokepoints. Solar panels, once installed, generate energy locally. The vulnerability shifts from ongoing fuel imports to upfront manufacturing dependence.

Oil has shaped global politics for decades because it’s transportable, globally traded and only a few countries have large reserves.

Reducing oil dependence is often framed as climate policy. But it is also vital to energy security and national security. Cutting oil use boosts resilience to shocks and reduces the leverage of other nations.

The Iran crisis may not lead to sustained price spikes. Supply may adjust. Markets may stabilise. But leaders will be rethinking the wisdom of exposure to globally traded oil in a volatile world.

Hussein Dia receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the iMOVE Australia Cooperative Research Centre, Transport for New South Wales, Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, Victorian Department of Transport and Planning, and Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts.

– ref. The strikes on Iran show why quitting oil is more important than ever – https://theconversation.com/the-strikes-on-iran-show-why-quitting-oil-is-more-important-than-ever-277192

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Digital Storytelling Team, The Conversation

The US and Israel have launched joint coordinated attacks on Iran, prompting retaliatory strikes from Iran on Israel and US military bases in the region.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in the strikes, Iranian state media reported.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council says he was killed early Saturday morning at his office. Satellite imagery shows significant damage to parts of the Leadership House compound, which is Khamenei’s office in Tehran.

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Iranian school struck

More than 100 children have reportedly been killed by US and Israeli air strikes on a school, according to Iranian authorities. They say the strikes hit a girls’ elementary school in the city of Minab in the country’s south.

Video has emerged of crowds of people searching through the rubble.

“Hundreds of civilians have been killed and injured as a result of the aggression and atrocious crime of the United States regime and the Israeli regime, and the deliberate … targeting of civilian infrastructure,” Amir-Saeid Iravani, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, told an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council.

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Digital Storytelling Team does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. At a glance: US-Israel attack on Iran – https://theconversation.com/at-a-glance-us-israel-attack-on-iran-277186

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shannon Brincat, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of the Sunshine Coast

The joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran represent a further erosion of the international legal order. Under international law, these attacks are neither preemptive nor lawful.

Israel and the United States launched Operation Shield of Judah and Operation Epic Fury while diplomatic negotiations between Washington and Tehran were actively underway on Iran’s nuclear program.

Just two days earlier, the most intense round of US-Iran talks concluded in Geneva, with both sides agreeing to continue. US President Donald Trump indicated he would give negotiators more time. Then came the bombs.

The illegality of the attack

Israel said the strikes were “preventive”, meaning they were to prevent Iran from developing a capacity to be a threat. But preventive war has no legal basis under international law. The UN Security Council did not authorise any military action, meaning the sole lawful pathway for the use of force for self-defence was never pursued.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Preemptive self-defence, as we have argued previously, has extremely narrow prescriptions under the Caroline doctrine. It requires a threat to be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means”. No such conditions existed with Iran on February 28.

Central to the current crisis is that it was Trump who ended the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, which had regional support for controlling Iran’s nuclear program. The US director of national intelligence testified in March 2025 that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons, which the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency affirmed.

US intelligence also reportedly indicated it would take three years for Iran to build a nuclear weapon. Moreover, US and Israeli strikes on Iran last year had put the program back by months. Trump claimed Iran’s nuclear program had been obliterated.

Regime change by force is unlawful

Trump said the attacks were intended to end Iran’s nuclear weapons program and bring about regime change. Trump urged Iranians to “take over your government”, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the goal was to “remove the existential threat posed by the terrorist regime in Iran”.

Forcible regime change violates the foundational principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention under the UN Charter.

The strikes targeted Iran’s supreme leader, president, and military chief of staff, as well as military infrastructure. Deliberately targeting heads of state also crosses a threshold that distinguishes military operations from acts of aggression.

Attacking heads of state is illegal under New York Convention, for obvious reasons of stability. With the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the power vacuum will only increase the hardship on the ground for Iranians.

In addition, promises to return the shah – Iran’s previous monarch – have not considered the authoritarian implications of such rule.

Reports that an airstrike on an elementary school in Minab killed at least 100 girls aged between seven and 12 underscore the human cost of unplanned regime change.

US and Israeli statements imply that regime change is prioritised over any plans of a replacement. But just like the aftermath of the death of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi that saw slavery return to Libya, or how Islamic State filled the power vacuum after the death of dictator Saddam Hussein in Iraq, regime change requires extremely careful planning.

In this case, there is no obvious plan to rebuild or stabilise Iran after these strikes. Western allies have expressed concern that Washington lacks a coherent strategy for the aftermath of the attacks, noting the minimal preparation for post-conflict reconstruction and government transition.

As Mexico’s representative stated at the UN Security Council following recent US actions in Venezuela, the historical record of regime change shows it has only “exacerbated conflicts and weakened the social and political fabric of nations”. According to The Atlantic, “complete chaos” is likely.

Diplomacy as deception

Launching strikes during active negotiations violates the principle of good faith in Article 2(2) of the UN Charter. As the Arms Control Association noted, Iranian policymakers had already accused the US of bad faith after the June 2025 strikes disrupted previously scheduled talks.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry denounced the February 28 attacks as striking during negotiations, violating international law.

World leaders’ response

We should be dismayed by the worrying acceptance of increased brazen illegality by Western leaders, including our own prime minister. Anthony Albanese has supported the strikes as “acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon”. This places Australia, once again, in open contradiction with basic principles of liberal international order.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement urging Iran to negotiate a solution, condemning Iranian retaliatory attacks. However, they did not directly comment on the US and Israeli strikes on Iran. Their silence is deafening.

Russia and China criticised the US-Israeli actions and urged an immediate end to military operations and a return to diplomatic negotiations.

The international legal order is now in free-fall. When powerful states conduct illegal wars under the guise of prevention, weaponise diplomacy as cover, and openly pursue regime change, the “rules-based order” is literally dead.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Neither preemptive nor legal, US-Israeli strikes on Iran have blown up international law – https://theconversation.com/neither-preemptive-nor-legal-us-israeli-strikes-on-iran-have-blown-up-international-law-277173

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amin Saikal, Emeritus Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Australian National University; The University of Western Australia; Victoria University

The joint US–Israel strikes on Iran, which killed the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on Israel and neighbouring Arab countries have again plunged the Middle East into war.

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said their aim is to bring about a favourable regime change in Iran. The implications of this for Iran, the region and beyond should not be underestimated.

Although Khamenei’s killing is a significant blow to the Islamic regime, it is not insurmountable. Many Iranian leaders have been killed in the past, including Qassem Soleimani, Tehran’s regional security architect, who was assassinated by the US in January 2020.

But they have been replaced relatively smoothly, and the Islamic regime has endured.

Khamenei’s departure is unlikely to mean the end of the Islamic regime in the short run. He anticipated this eventuality, and reportedly last week arranged a line of succession for his leadership and that of senior military, security and political leaders if they were “martyred”.

However, Khamenei was both a political and spiritual leader. He has commanded followers not only among devout Shias in Iran, but also many Muslims across the wider region. His assassination will spur some of them to seek revenge, potentially sparking a wave of extremist violent actions in the region and beyond.

A regime built for survival

Under a constitutional provision of the Islamic Republic, the Assembly of Experts – the body responsible for appointing and dismissing a supreme leader – will now meet and appoint an interim or long-term leader, either from among their own ranks or outside.

There are three likely candidates to be his successor:

• Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, the head of the judiciary
• Ali Asghar Hejazi, Khamenei’s chief-of-staff
• Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini.

The regime has every incentive to do what it must to ensure its survival.
There are many regime enforcers and defenders, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its subordinate paramilitary Basij group, across the country to suppress any domestic uprisings and fight for the endurance of the regime.

Their fortunes are intimately tied to the regime. So are a range of administrators and bureaucrats in the Iranian government, as well as regime sympathisers among ordinary Iranians. They are motivated by a blend of Shi’ism and fierce nationalism to remain loyal to the regime.

Trump and Netanyahu have called on the Iranian people – some 60% of whom are below the age of 30 – to topple the regime once the US-Israeli operations have crippled it.

Many are deeply aggrieved by the regime’s theocratic impositions and dire economic situation and took to the streets in protests in late 2025 and early 2026. The regime cracked down harshly then, killing thousands.

Could a public uprising happen now? So far, the coercive and administrative state apparatus seems to be solidly backing the regime. Without serious cracks appearing among these figures – particularly the IRGC – the regime can be expected to survive this crisis.

Global economic pain

The regime has also been able to respond very quickly to outside aggression. It has already hit back at Israel and US military bases across the Persian Gulf, using short-range and long-range advanced ballistic missiles and drones.

While many of the projectiles have been repelled, some have hit their targets, causing serious damage.

The IRGC has also set out to choke the Strait of Hormuz – the narrow strategic waterway that connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean. Some 20% of the world’s oil and 25% of its liquefied gas flows through the strait every day.

The United States has vowed to keep the strait remain open, but the IRGC is potentially well-placed to block traffic from going through. There could be serious implications for the global energy supply and broader economy.

Both sides in this conflict have trespassed all of the previous red lines. They are now in open warfare, which is engulfing the entire region.

A prolonged war looks likely

If there was any pretence on the part of Washington and Jerusalem that their attacks would not lead to a regional war, they were wrong. This is
already happening.

Many countries that have close cooperation agreements with Iran, including China and Russia, have condemned the US-Israeli actions. The United Nations secretary-general António Guterres has also urgently called for de-escalation and a return to diplomatic negotiations, as have many others.

But the chances for this look very slim. The US and Iran were in the middle of a second round of talks over Tehran’s nuclear program when the attacks happened. The Omani foreign minister, who mediated between the two sides, publicly said just days ago that “peace was within reach”.

But this was not enough to convince Trump and Netanyahu to let the negotiations continue. They sensed now was the best time to strike the Islamic Republic to destroy not just its nuclear program but also its military capability after Israel degraded some of Tehran’s regional affiliates, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and expanded its footprint in Lebanon and Syria over the last two and a half years.

While it is difficult to be definitive about where the war is likely to lead, the scene is set for a long conflict. It may not last days, but rather weeks. The US and Israel do not want anything short of regime change, and the regime is determined to survive.

With this war, the Trump leadership is also signalling to its adversaries – China, in particular – that the US remains the preeminent global power, while Netanyahu is seeking to cement Israel’s position as the dominant regional actor.

Pity the Iranian people, the region and the world that have to endure the consequences of another war of choice in the Middle East for geopolitical gains in an already deeply troubled world.

Amin Saikal does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump and Netanyahu want regime change, but Iran’s regime was built for survival. A long war is now likely – https://theconversation.com/trump-and-netanyahu-want-regime-change-but-irans-regime-was-built-for-survival-a-long-war-is-now-likely-277193

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Thomas, Lecturer in Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader for 36 years, has been killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on his country, Iranian state media reported.

As one of Iran’s longest-serving leaders, Khamenei was almost as ubiquitous in Iranian society as his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

And despite the fact Khomeini authored the Iranian Revolution, some say Khamenei was actually the most powerful leader modern Iran has had.

In more than three decades as supreme leader, Khamenei amassed unprecedented power over domestic politics and cracked down ever more harshly on internal dissent. In recent years, he prioritised his survival – and that of his regime – above all else. His government brutally put down a popular uprising in December 2025–January 2026 that killed thousands.

Ultimately, though, Khamenei will not be remembered by most Iranians as a strong leader. Nor will he be revered. Instead, his legacy will be the profound weakness his regime brought the Islamic Republic on all fronts.

Khamenei’s rise through the ranks

Khamenei was born in the city of Marshad in northeastern Iran in 1939. As a boy, he began to form his political and religious world view by studying at Islamic seminaries in Najaf and Qom. At 13, he started to embrace ideas relating to revolutionary Islam. These included the teachings of cleric Navab Safavi, who often called for political violence against the rule of the shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Khamenei met Khomeini in 1958 and immediately embraced his philosophy, often referred to as “Khomeinism”.

This world view was informed by anti-colonial sentiment, Shia Islam and elements of social engineering through state planning, particularly when it came to preserving a “just” Islamic society. Khomeinism stipulates that a system of earthly laws alone cannot create a just society – Iran must draw its legitimacy from “God Almighty”.

The concept of velayat-e faqih, also known as guardianship of the jurist, is central to Khomeinism. It dictates that the supreme leader should be endowed with “all the authorities that the Prophet and infallible Imams were entitled”.

Essentially, this means Iran was to be ruled by a single scholar of Shia Islam. This is where Khomeini, and later Khamenei, would draw their sweeping power and control.

From 1962, Khamenei began almost two decades of revolutionary activity against Pahlavi (the shah) on behalf of Khomeini, who was exiled in 1964. Khamenei was arrested by the shah’s secret police in 1971 and tortured, according to his memoirs.

When the shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to become the new supreme leader.

Khamenei was selected to join the Revolutionary Council, which ruled alongside the provisional government. He then became deputy defence minister and assisted in organising the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This military institution – initially created to protect the revolution and supreme leader – would become one of the most powerful political forces in Iran.

After surviving an assassination attempt in 1981, Khamenei was elected president of Iran in 1982 and again in 1985. He held the presidency during the majority of the Iran–Iraq war – a conflict that devastated both countries in both human and economic cost.

Although subordinate to the supreme leader, Khamenei wielded significant power compared to later presidents, given the revolution was still very young and the Iraq war posed a great threat to the regime. But he remained in lock-step with Khomeini’s wishes. He also managed to build a close relationship with the IRGC that would go far beyond his presidency.

A surprising choice for supreme leader

Khomeini died in June 1989 after a period of deteriorating health, with no clear successor.

Khomeini had initially supported Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri to be his successor. However, Montazeri had become increasingly critical of the supreme leader’s authority and human rights violations in the country. He resigned in 1988 and was put under house arrest until his death in 2009.

Khamenei had the political credentials to lead. He was also a steadfast support of Khomeinism. However, he was seen a surprising choice for supreme leader when he was elected by the Assembly of Experts, a group of Islamic clerics.

In fact, his appointment sparked a significant amount of controversy and criticism. Some Islamic scholars believed he lacked the clerical rank of grand ayatollah, which was required under the constitution to ascend to the position. These critics believed the Iranian people would not respect the word of “a mere human being” without a proper connection to God.

A referendum was held in July 1989 to change the constitution to allow for a supreme leader who has shown “Islamic scholarship”. It passed overwhelmingly and Khamenei became an ayatollah.

Khamenei’s position had been consolidated on paper, but despite being president since 1982, he did not enjoy the same popularity as Khomeini within both the clerical elite and general public.

The constitutional amendments, however, had given Khamenei significantly more power to intervene in political affairs. In fact, he had far more power as supreme leader than Khomeini ever enjoyed.

This included the ability to determine general policies, appoint and dismiss members of the Council of Guardians, and order public referendums. He also had enough power to silence dissent with relative ease.

Consolidating power over the decades

Khamenei worked with his presidents to varying degrees, though he exercised his power to undermine legislation when he disagreed with it.

For example, he largely backed the economic agenda of President Hashemi Rafsanjani (who served from 1989 to 1997), but he often stood in the way of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and Hassan Rouhani (2013–21). Both had attempted to reform Iran’s political system and foster a better relationship with the West.

Khamenei’s most famous intervention in domestic politics occurred after the first term of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–13). After Ahmadinejad claimed victory in the disputed 2009 presidential election, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in one of the largest protest movements since the revolution. Khamenei backed the election result and cracked down harshly on the protesters. Dozens were killed (perhaps more), while thousands were arbitrarily arrested.

Khamenei later clashed with Ahmadinejad and warned him against seeking the presidency again in 2017. Ahmadinejad defied him, but was later barred from running.

After the death of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in 2024, Khameini continued his manoeuvring behind the scenes. After the reformist Masoud Pezeshkian won the presidency, Khameini immediately blocked him from negotiating with the United States over sanctions relief and used his influence to thwart his economic reform agenda.

And when protests again broke out at the end of 2025 over the struggling economy, Khamenei again ordered them to be crushed by any means necessary.

A tarnished legacy

Thanks to the powers vested in him in the constitution, Khamenei also had extraordinary control over Iran’s foreign policy.

Like his mentor, Khomeini, he staunchly supported the regime’s resistance to what it considered “Western imperialism”. He was also a key architect of Iran’s regional proxy strategy, funding militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and others to carry out Iran’s military objectives.

Khamenei had, at times, been amenable to cooperation with the West – namely negotiating with the US over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

During the first Trump administration, however, Khamenei returned to a staunchly anti-Western posture. His government railed against Trump’s scuttling of the 2015 nuclear deal, the reimposed economic sanctions on Iran’s energy sector and the assassination of the head of the IRGC’s Quds force, Qassem Soleimani.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Iran grew even weaker. And Khamenei’s anti-Western posture began to look increasingly hollow. Iran’s defeat in the 12-day war with Israel in 2025 shredded whatever legitimacy his regime had left.

In the months that followed, Khamenei ruled over a population increasingly resentful of the Iranian political system and its leadership. In the 2025–26 protests, some openly chanted for Khamenei’s death.

When Khomenei died in 1989, his state funeral was attended by millions. Mourners pulled him out of his coffin and scrambled for sacred mementos.

Though Khameini served longer, Iranians will likely not show the same grief for him.

Andrew Thomas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran with defiance and brutality for 36 years. For many Iranians, he will not be revered – https://theconversation.com/ayatollah-ali-khamenei-ruled-iran-with-defiance-and-brutality-for-36-years-for-many-iranians-he-will-not-be-revered-259268