Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Renewed fighting in Syria in recent weeks between government-aligned forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) isn’t just a local issue. It has serious implications for the stability of the rest of the Middle East.

Syrian government forces launched an offensive in early January into areas of northeastern Syria controlled by Kurdish forces. The operation enabled the government to gain control of key oil and gas fields and major border crossings with Iraq and Turkey.

Of particular concern to Syria’s neighbours, though, is the thousands of former Islamic State (IS) fighters who have been held in prisons run by the SDF in the region. One camp, al-Hol, reportedly held about 24,000 detainees, primarily women and children. There were also diehard IS supporters from around the world at the camp.

Amid concerns the prisoners would escape with the SDF retreat, the US military began moving detainees from Syria to other facilities in Iraq last week. Some prisoners, however, were able to escape.

Though both sides agreed to a ceasefire that would see the SDF forces incorporated into the Syrian armed forces, it remains shaky.

The government’s offensive has also resulted in mass displacement, mistreatment of civilians and what the SDF claims are Islamic State-style killings of its forces and civilians.

And there are concerns the Islamic State will take advantage of the chaos to regroup and try to destabilise the region once again.

A pattern of violence

The fighting has followed a pattern disturbingly similar to other violent episodes following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government to forces led by now-President Ahmed al-Sharaa in late 2024.

Al-Sharaa has pledged to protect minorities in the new Syria he is building, but religious and ethnic minorities have specifically been targeted. This includes the Druze in southern Syria and Alawite communities in the west.

There have been credible reports of summary executions, arbitrary killings and kidnappings.

When the Islamic State controlled large portions of Syria around 2014, its violent actions against civilians – in particular, minorities such as the Yazidis and Kurds – were widely condemned as potential war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In al-Sharaa’s Syria, the violence has allegedly been carried out by government security forces, as well as armed factions affiliated with the government, including foreign fighters.

And al-Sharaa’s government has been supported – or at least tolerated – by international actors, most notably the United States. US President Donald Trump praised al-Sharaa earlier this month for his “tremendous progress”, adding, “I think he’s going to put it all together.”

Trump even met al-Sharaa during a visit to Saudi Arabia in May at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

As a result, violent actions that once triggered airstrikes and global outrage are now met largely with silence, caution or political justification.

This shift is most stark in the treatment of Kurdish forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces. These forces have been among the US government’s most effective local partners in the fight against Islamic State for years.

Despite this record, violence against Kurdish civilians has elicited little meaningful reaction. Instead, US policy has focused on supporting the Syrian government structure and urging Kurdish leaders to accept the new political order and fully integrate into state institutions.

For Kurdish communities, this demand carries profound risks. The experiences of the Druze and Alawites offer little assurance that disarmament and territorial concessions will be met with protection or political inclusion.

Many Kurds fear laying down arms without security guarantees could expose them to similar attacks.

A return of Islamic State

Another destabilising consequence of the fighting in eastern Syria has been the collapse of the detention network built to prevent the return of IS.

The US has said up to 7,000 detainees could be transferred from Syria to detention facilities in Iraq in its operations.

While framed as a logistical and security necessity, the announcement immediately triggered alarm across Iraq, where memories of the 2014 Islamic State invasion remain vivid. That was fuelled, in part, by prison breaks from poorly secured detention facilities in Iraq and Syria.

In response to these concerns, Iraqi security forces have deployed in large numbers along the Syrian border to prevent escaped IS detainees from infiltrating the country.

US and Turkish agendas

At the centre of this unfolding crisis is the US, which favours a centralised Syrian state under a single trusted authority. This is easier to manage diplomatically and militarily than a fragmented country with competing armed factions.

This approach also aligns with Trump’s broader regional ambitions, including expanding the Abraham Accords by persuading more regional countries to normalise ties with Israel.

Turkey, a NATO member and key US ally, also has a vested interest in the future of Syria. Ankara, a key backer of al-Sharaa, has long viewed any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria as an existential threat, fearing it would embolden Kurdish demands inside Turkey.

Together, these overlapping agendas reveal why the international response to the fighting in eastern Syria has been so muted. Concerns over civilian protection or the potential regrouping of the Islamic State have been trumped by the strategic realignment taking place with a post-Assad Syria.

Kurdish forces, once indispensable partners, now find themselves caught between shifting alliances and competing regional interests — another casualty of a new international order defined by convenience rather than principle.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As Syria’s new government consolidates its power, the Kurdish minority fears for its future – https://theconversation.com/as-syrias-new-government-consolidates-its-power-the-kurdish-minority-fears-for-its-future-274110

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emily Hunt, PhD Candidate, School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Sydney

A great white shark is a masterwork of evolutionary engineering. These beautiful predators glide effortlessly through the water, each slow, deliberate sweep of the powerful tail driving a body specialised for stealth, speed and efficiency. From above, its dark back blends into the deep blue water, while from below its pale belly disappears into the sunlit surface.

In an instant, the calm glide explodes into an attack, accelerating to more than 60 kilometres per hour, the sleek torpedo-like form cutting through the water with little resistance. Then its most iconic feature is revealed: rows of razor-sharp teeth, expertly honed for a life at the top of the food chain.

Scientists have long been fascinated by white shark teeth. Fossilised specimens have been collected for centuries, and the broad serrated tooth structure is easily recognisable in jaws and bite marks of contemporary sharks.

But until now, surprisingly little was known about one of the most fascinating aspects of these immaculately shaped structures: how they change across the jaw and to match the changing demands throughout the animal’s lifetime. Our new research, published in Ecology and Evolution, set out to answer this.

From needle-like teeth to serrated blades

Different shark species have evolved teeth to suit their dietary needs, such as needle-like teeth for grasping slippery squid; broad, flattened molars for crushing shellfish; and serrated blades for slicing flesh and marine mammal blubber.

Shark teeth are also disposable – they are constantly replaced throughout their lives, like a conveyor belt pushing a new tooth forward roughly every few weeks.

White sharks are best known for their large, triangular, serrated teeth, which are ideal for capturing and eating marine mammals like seals, dolphins and whales. But most juveniles don’t start life hunting seals. In fact, they feed mostly on fish and squid, and don’t usually start incorporating mammals into their diet until they are roughly 3 metres long.

This raises a fascinating question: do teeth coming off the conveyor belt change to meet specific challenges of diets at different developmental stages, just as evolution produces teeth to match the diets of different species?

Previous studies tended to focus on a small number of teeth or single life stages. What was missing was a full, jaw-wide view of how tooth shape changes – not just from the upper and lower jaw, but from the front of the mouth to the back, and from juvenile to adult.

Teeth change over a lifetime

When we examined teeth from nearly 100 white sharks, clear patterns emerged.

First, tooth shape changes dramatically across the jaw. The first six teeth on each side are relatively symmetrical and triangular, well suited for grasping, impaling, or cutting into prey.

Beyond the sixth tooth, however, the shape shifts. Teeth become more blade-like, better adapted for tearing and shearing flesh. This transition marks a functional division within the jaw where different teeth play different roles during feeding, much like how we as humans have incisors at the front and molars at the back of our mouths.

Even more striking were the changes that occur as sharks grow. At around 3m in body length, white sharks undergo a major dental transformation. Juvenile teeth are slimmer and often feature small side projections at the base of the tooth, called cusplets, which help to grip small slippery prey such as fish and squid.

As sharks approach 3m, these cusplets disappear and the teeth become broader, thicker, and serrated.

In many ways, this shift mirrors an ecological turning point. Young sharks rely on fish and small prey that require precision and an ability to grasp the smaller bodies. Larger sharks increasingly target marine mammals: big, fast-moving animals that demand cutting power rather than grip.

Once great whites reach this size, they develop an entirely new style of tooth capable of slicing through dense flesh and even bone.

Some teeth stand out even more. The first two teeth on either side of the jaw, the four central teeth, are significantly thicker at the base. These appear to be the primary “impact” teeth, taking the force of the initial bite.

Meanwhile, the third and fourth upper teeth are slightly shorter and angled, suggesting a specialised role in holding onto struggling prey. Their size and position may also be influenced by the underlying skull structure and the placement of key sensory tissues involved in smelling.

We also found consistent differences between the upper and lower jaws. Lower teeth are shaped for grabbing and holding prey, while upper teeth are designed for slicing and dismembering – a coordinated system that turns the white shark’s bite into a highly efficient feeding tool.

A lifestory in teeth

Together, these findings tell a compelling story.

The teeth of white sharks are not static weapons but living records of a shark’s changing lifestyle. Continuous replacement compensates for teeth lost and damaged, but at least equally important, enables design updates that track diet changes through development.

This research helps us better understand how white sharks succeed as apex predators and how their feeding system is finely tuned across their lifetime.

It also highlights the importance of studying animals as dynamic organisms, shaped by both biology and behaviour. In the end, a white shark’s teeth don’t just reveal how it feeds – they reveal who it is, at every stage of its life.

This research has received in kind support for collection of specimens from the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development through the Shark Management Program. David Raubenheimer has no other relevant relationships or funding to declare.

Ziggy Marzinelli is an Associate Professor at The University of Sydney and receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Ian Potter Foundation and the NSW Environmental Trust.

Emily Hunt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Great white sharks grow a whole new kind of tooth for slicing bone as they age – https://theconversation.com/great-white-sharks-grow-a-whole-new-kind-of-tooth-for-slicing-bone-as-they-age-272805

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer in International Studies in the School of Society and Culture, Adelaide University

Five years ago, on February 1 2021, Myanmar’s top generals decapitated the elected government. Democratic leaders were arrested, pushed underground or forced into exile.

Since then, the economy has spluttered and foreign investors have headed for the exit. The only growth industries – mostly scam centres, drugs and other criminal activities – enrich those already well-fed.

The military junta has kept its stranglehold via draconian curbs on civil and political liberties. It has bolstered its fighting forces through ruthless conscription, including of child soldiers. They now face rebellions in almost every corner of the ethnically diverse country.

It helps that the military brass can still depend on international support from Russia. China, meanwhile, is playing a careful game to ensure its interests – including prized access to the Indian Ocean for oil and gas – are secured.

And US President Donald Trump’s second term in office has introduced newly unpredictable and detrimental elements to great power politics.

The US government last year cited “notable progress in governance and stability [and] plans for free and fair elections” as justification for removing the Temporary Protected Status designation for immigrants from Myanmar. Although a federal judge blocked this decision a few days ago, this may eventually force previously protected Myanmar citizens to return home.

However, far from being free and fair, the month-long elections that just concluded in Myanmar have been devoid of meaningful democratic practice.

They will entrench the junta and provide little more than a patina of legitimacy that anti-democratic major powers will use to further normalise relations with Myanmar’s military leaders.

Myanmar’s deeply flawed election

The multi-stage elections were being held in only a fraction of the country currently under the military’s authority. Elections were not held in opposition-held territory, so many otherwise eligible voters were disenfranchised.

As such, there is no serious opposition to the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Civil and political space is also heavily restricted, with criticism of the election itself being a criminal offence.

The main opposition would be the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, which has won by a landslide in every national election it has participated in since 1990. But it has been banned, along with dozens of other opposition political parties. Its senior leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been imprisoned.

Citizens have been coerced into taking part in an election with only electronic-voting machines. This is against a background of expanded surveillance and pervasive fear.

Break up of Myanmar?

Despite recent military gains by the junta, supported by Russian military technology and Chinese government pressure, the lines of control may be starting to solidify into an eventual Balkanisation, or break up, of Myanmar into hostile statelets.

The prospects for a future federalised democratic Myanmar seem increasingly remote.

Since the coup there are many areas now under full opposition control. Take, for instance, a recent declaration of independence by a breakaway ethnic Karen armed group. While they represent only one part of the Karen community in eastern Myanmar, this could well precipitate a flood of similar announcements by other ethnic minorities.

Other groups might declare themselves autonomous and seek backing from governments and commercial and security interests in neighbouring countries such as China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh.

Most neighbouring countries will be uneasy about any further fracturing of Myanmar’s territorial integrity. Some, however, see potential benefits. China, for example, supports some ethnic armed groups to protect its strategic economic assets and maintain stability and influence along its borders.

Will international rulings have any impact?

While the conflict continues at home, Myanmar’s military leadership is defending itself at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. It faces claims it committed genocide against the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority, particularly during the massacres of 2017.

During the three-week hearings, the junta has argued its “clearance operations” were merely counterterrorism activities, despite the 700,000 refugees it created.

Given the disdain for international law shown by Russia, China and the Trump administration in the US, any finding against the junta will have limited practical impact anyway.

What next?

Meanwhile, some countries in the the ASEAN bloc appear to be softening their opposition to the junta.

Recently, the Philippines foreign secretary met with Myanmar’s senior military leadership in the country’s first month chairing the bloc. This highlights the conundrum faced by regional leaders.

In the years immediately after the coup, ASEAN sought to keep Myanmar’s junta at arm’s length. But a number of key ASEAN players, particularly the more authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, would prefer to find a way to normalise engagement with the generals.

From that perspective, the flawed elections are a chance to embrace superficial democratisation and renewal.

This leaves the Myanmar people – millions of whom have fought hard against the coup and its negative consequences – with invidious choices about how to best pursue their independence and freedom.

There is little positive economic news on the horizon. The IMF projects inflation in Myanmar will stay above 30% in 2026 with a real GDP fall of 2.7%. This would compound an almost 20% contraction since the coup. The currency is worth around one quarter of what it was five years ago at the time of the coup.

In practice, this means many Myanmar families have gone backwards dramatically. An untold number are now entangled in illicit and often highly exploitative businesses.

The military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), will undoubtedly form government after the elections. But unlike the USDP-led government that formed after the similarly flawed 2010 election, this new administration is unlikely to pursue political and economic liberalisation sufficient to entice opposition forces to play along.

The people of Myanmar have now been betrayed and brutalised by the military far too often to believe their easy promises.

As a pro vice-chancellor at the University of Tasmania, Nicholas Farrelly engages with a wide range of organisations and stakeholders on educational, cultural and political issues, including at the ASEAN-Australia interface. He has previously received funding from the Australian government for Southeast Asia-related projects and from the Australian Research Council. Nicholas is on the advisory board of the ASEAN-Australia Centre, which is an Australian government body established in 2024, and also Deputy Chair of the board of NAATI, Australia’s government-owned accreditation authority for translators and interpreters. He writes in his personal capacity.

Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 5 years on from the junta’s coup, Myanmar’s flawed elections can’t unite a country at risk of breaking apart – https://theconversation.com/5-years-on-from-the-juntas-coup-myanmars-flawed-elections-cant-unite-a-country-at-risk-of-breaking-apart-272894

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David Blair, Emeritus Professor, ARC Centre of Excellence for Gravitational Wave Discovery, OzGrav, The University of Western Australia

Last year, astronomers were fascinated by a runaway asteroid passing through our Solar System from somewhere far beyond. It was moving at around 68 kilometres per second, just over double Earth’s speed around the Sun.

Imagine if it had been something much bigger and faster: a black hole travelling at more like 3,000km per second. We wouldn’t see it coming until its intense gravitational forces started knocking around the orbits of the outer planets.

This may sound a bit ridiculous – but in the past year several lines of evidence have come together to show such a visitor is not impossible. Astronomers have seen clear signs of runaway supermassive black holes tearing through other galaxies, and have uncovered evidence that smaller, undetectable runaways are probably out there too.

Runaway black holes: the theory

The story begins in the 1960s, when New Zealand mathematician Roy Kerr found a solution of Einstein’s general relativity equations that described spinning black holes. This led to two crucial discoveries about black holes.

First, the “no-hair theorem”, which tells us black holes can be distinguished only by three properties: their mass, their spin and their electric charge.

For the second we need to think about Einstein’s famous formula E = mc ² which says that energy has mass. In the case of a black hole, Kerr’s solution tells us that as much as 29% of a black hole’s mass can be in the form of rotational energy.

English physicist Roger Penrose deduced 50 years ago that this rotational energy of black holes can be released. A spinning black hole is like a battery capable of releasing vast amounts of spin energy.

A black hole can contain about 100 times more extractable energy than a star of the same mass. If a pair of black holes coalesce into one, much of that vast energy can be released in a few seconds.

It took two decades of painstaking supercomputer calculations to understand what happens when two spinning black holes collide and coalesce, creating gravitational waves. Depending on how the black holes are spinning, the gravitational wave energy can be released much more strongly in one direction than others – which sends the black holes shooting like a rocket in the opposite direction.

If the spins of the two colliding black holes are aligned the right way, the final black hole can be rocket-powered to speeds of thousands of kilometres per second.

Learning from real black holes

All that was theory, until the LIGO and Virgo gravitational wave observatories began detecting the whoops and chirps of gravitational waves given off by pairs of colliding black holes in 2015.

One of the most exciting discoveries was of black hole “ringdowns”: a tuning fork-like ringing of newly formed black holes that tells us about their spin. The faster they spin, the longer they ring.

Better and better observations of coalescing black holes revealed that some pairs of black holes had randomly oriented spin axes, and that many of them had very large spin energy.

All this suggested runaway black holes were a real possibility. Moving at 1% of light speed, their trajectories through space would not follow the curved orbits of stars in galaxies, but rather would be almost straight.

Runaway black holes spotted in the wild

This brings us to the final step in our sequence: the actual discovery of runaway black holes.

It is difficult to search for relatively small runaway black holes. But a runaway black hole of a million or billion solar masses will create huge disruptions to the stars and gas around it as it travels through a galaxy.

They are predicted to leave contrails of stars in their wake, forming from interstellar gas in the same way contrails of cloud form in the wake of a jet plane. Stars form from collapsing gas and dust attracted to the passing black hole. It’s a process that would last for tens of millions of years as the runaway black hole crosses a galaxy.

In 2025, several papers showed images of surprisingly straight streaks of stars within galaxies such as the image below. These seem to be convincing evidence for runaway black holes.

One paper, led by Yale astronomer Pieter van Dokkum, describes a very distant galaxy imaged by the James Webb telescope with a surprisingly bright contrail 200,000 light years long. The contrail showed the pressure effects expected from the gravitational compression of gas as a black hole passes: in this case it suggests a black hole with a mass 10 million times the Sun’s, travelling at almost 1,000km/s.

Another describes a long straight contrail cutting across a galaxy called NGC3627. This one is likely caused by a black hole of about 2 million times the mass of the Sun, travelling at 300km/s. Its contrail is about 25,000 light years long.

If these extremely massive runaways exist, so too should their smaller cousins because gravitational wave observations suggest that some of them come together with the opposing spins needed to create powerful kicks. The speeds are easily fast enough for them to travel between galaxies.

So runaway black holes tearing through and between galaxies are a new ingredient of our remarkable universe. It’s not impossible that one could turn up in our Solar System, with potentially catastrophic results.

We should not lose sleep over this discovery. The odds are minuscule. It is just another way that the story of our universe has become a little bit richer and a bit more exciting than it was before.

David Blair receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He is a member of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Gravitational Wave Discovery and is director of the Einstein-First education project that is developing a modern physics curriculum for primary and middle school science education.

– ref. New fear unlocked: runaway black holes – https://theconversation.com/new-fear-unlocked-runaway-black-holes-272429

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Mark Shanahan, Associate Professor of Political Engagement, University of Surrey

Federal immigration agents in the city of Minneapolis are accused of having wrestled a 37-year-old intensive care nurse called Alex Pretti to the ground and then shooting him dead. The killing took place just over a mile from where another American citizen, Renee Good, was allegedly fatally shot by federal agents weeks earlier.

The latest incident prompted angry protests from people in Minneapolis who want the immigration enforcement operation in their city to end. We spoke to Mark Shanahan, an associate professor of political engagement at the University of Surrey, to address several key issues.

Why has sending in federal immigration agents caused such trouble in Minnesota?

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, the national guard has been deployed to several US cities to quell what have generally been Donald Trump-inflated crises, with illegal migration among the most prominent. However, in December, the Supreme Court ruled that Trump did not have authority for such deployments.

So, since then we have seen federal agents with US Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement taking the battle largely to minorities in cities with Democratic party leadership as part of the president’s violent attack on illegal immigration, a situation he has described as “the greatest invasion in history”.

Minneapolis is a Democrat-run city in a Democrat-led state. The governor is Tim Walz who ran for vice-president on the Kamala Harris ticket against Trump in the 2024 election. Walz has faced allegations, which he denies, of overlooking alleged widespread fraud in the financing of public safety net programmes, supposedly involving segments of the Somali-American community.

While most of these allegations have been refuted, they gave Trump reason to send in federal agents. This has ramped up tensions between state officials and the administration, causing brutal and unnecessary deaths in the community and pitting ordinary Minnesotans against federal government officials.

How does the situation in Minnesota reflect the second amendment right to bear arms?

It’s a reversal of virtually all of the second amendment debates that have been seen in recent years. The second amendment was introduced to the US constitution in 1791 through the Bill of Rights due to a deep mistrust of centralised military power and a desire to ensure that the newly formed federal government could not disarm the populace.

The founding fathers envisaged a “natural right of resistance and self-preservation”. Trump’s actions in sending in armed federal agents to conduct enforcement operations in various states appear to fulfil the founding fathers’ concerns.

The agents are trampling all over not only citizens’ second amendment right to bear arms (officials seemingly connected Pretti’s killing to him carrying a weapon) but also their first amendment right to freedom of assembly.

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Read more:
Shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis has put America’s gun lobby at odds with the White House

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How have the fatal shootings affected Trump’s popularity?

Trump’s popularity is on the decline. His failure to deliver on the economic promises outlined in his election campaign, scatter-gun approach to international relations and the widening gulf between rhetoric and achievement have all damaged his standing in the polls.

In a CNN poll published on January 16, almost six in ten respondents described Trump’s first year back in office as a failure with the president focused on the wrong priorities.

And what support he does have is ebbing rapidly as federal immigration agents appear out of control, targeting many more documented citizens than illegal migrants, spreading fear and operating as if they are above the law.

With what looks like high levels of gaslighting coming from Homeland Security officials, voters are turning against the increasing autocracy of this administration, believing in the evidence widespread across the media rather than highly contentious statements from Trump’s lieutenants.

Is it unusual for former presidents to speak out the way Barack Obama and Bill Clinton have?

It certainly is. There is a longstanding tradition in the US of, and implicit agreement among, former presidents to avoid public criticism of the incumbent. Such reticence to speak is generally a sign of respect for the office and an acknowledgement of the unique and difficult challenges of the presidency.

But Trump 2.0 is no normal presidency. The 47th president’s style is both combative and retributive, and there seems to be an increasing feeling of it being out of step with the desires and best interest of the country he leads.

Trump’s march to autocracy creates crises where he regards himself as the hero the country needs to overcome its ills. His predecessors take a different view.

Whether it’s Obama calling out the assault on core American values or Clinton’s condemnation of the “horrible scenes” in Minneapolis as “unacceptable” and avoidable, Democrat past presidents have not held back. Notably, the only living previous Republican president, George W. Bush, has so far kept his own counsel.

What can be done to prevent further violence?

Most simply, Trump could end the deployment of federal immigration agents to Minneapolis and refrain from similar actions in the future. He is clearly looking for an off-ramp and sending his “border czar”, Tom Homan, to Minneapolis to direct operations could be the first step to de-escalation. But Trump abhors being called out as wrong and, at least beyond Minneapolis, is far more likely to double down on the immigration enforcement activities.

Realistically, the most likely de-escalator is Congress showing some teeth and refusing to fund further federal immigration enforcement activity. Democrats could force another government shutdown over the issue, and need just a handful of Republicans to flip in order to refuse to sanction a 2026 budget for the Department of Homeland Security.

At a public level, the greater the scrutiny of immigration enforcement agencies, the closer the fact-checking of official statements and the more cohesive the opposition to Trump’s deportation policy, the greater the chance of effectively opposing it.

It is midterm year – and the greater the public pressure, the more likely Republican legislators are to cleave away from the Trump line. While he currently controls the levers of power, that control remains fragile. Even Trump may soon realise that overt, violent, coercive autocracy is not a vote winner.

Mark Shanahan has a new edited collection, Trump Unbound, coming out in October 2026 to be published by Palgrave Macmillan.

– ref. Why the shooting of Alex Pretti in Minneapolis is so significant – expert Q&A – https://theconversation.com/why-the-shooting-of-alex-pretti-in-minneapolis-is-so-significant-expert-qanda-274318

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester College

Tariffs are on, until they are not. Military force is an option … and then it’s off the table.

Erratic behavior and unpredictability is having a moment in foreign policy circles. In the White House and elsewhere, it is seemingly being viewed as a strategic asset rather than a weakness.

But it is far from a new strategy. Wild threats, sudden policy reversals and intentionally confusing language have long been used to keep adversaries off balance and gain leverage.

In fact, the concept has its own name in international relations: “madman theory.” As outlined by Cold War strategists Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas Schelling, it holds that projecting a readiness to take extreme action can shape an opponent’s calculations by heightening fears of escalation.

While the theory was meant to be explanatory, in the sense that observers used it to explain apparently irrational behavior, it has sometimes been used in a prescriptive way, as an approach consciously adopted by leaders.

The 3 conditions for madman success

The madman theory has historical roots going back to Machiavelli, but it is most closely associated with Richard Nixon, who, as incoming president, reportedly used the term to explain his approach to trying to force North Vietnam’s surrender in the Vietnam War.

Historians see evidence of the theory’s limited applicability in episodes such as Nixon’s 1969 placing of the U.S. military on nuclear alert, which appeared to have reinforced Soviet caution even if it did not bring about an end of the Vietnam War.

The theory was more applicable in Nixon’s era because of three background conditions that were in place.

The first was information scarcity. During the Cold War, signals traveled more slowly than they do today and through narrow channels. Messages were filtered by professional diplomats, intelligence analysts and military officers.

Ambiguity could be sustained. A country’s leader could appear possibly unhinged without being instantly decoded, contextualized or publicly dissected. “Madman” signaling depended on this controlled opacity.

The second condition was a stable adversary with a shared notion of risk. Nixon’s gambit worked, when it worked at all, because Soviet leaders were deeply conservative risk managers operating inside a rigid hierarchy. They feared miscalculation because they believed it could lead to the Soviet Union’s fall — or at least their fall within it.

The third condition was credibility built through restraint elsewhere. The madman pose only works if it is exceptional. Nixon appeared dangerous to adversaries precisely because the American system normally appeared controlled. His apparent erratic behavior was exceptional in a context of bureaucratic orderliness.

But the world of those three conditions is gone.

Threats today are tweeted, clipped, reframed, leaked, mocked and talked about in real time. Unpredictability doesn’t have time to breathe public fear into existence. Rather, it can devolve into noise.

And nations such as Iran, Russia and China operate in a world they already regard as unstable and unjust. Volatility does not frighten them; it is the environment they expect. In such conditions, apparent irrationality can invite probing, hedging or reciprocal escalation.

Meanwhile, erratic behavior is no longer exceptional or unexpected.

Many a madman would struggle today

Unpredictability only works if it’s strategic rather than designed on the fly. Trump has blustered, contradicted himself publicly, ramped-up rhetorically and then backed down, mostly without receiving obvious concessions.

The more this happens, the more predictability he creates about unpredictability.

And once unpredictability becomes expected, it loses its coercive force.

This dynamic is evident in Trump’s handling of both Iran and Greenland. In the Iranian case, pressure — including military strikes — has been applied without clearly defining where escalation would end.

With Greenland, coercive threats aimed at an ally only strained NATO without producing compliance.

In neither instance did unpredictability translate into durable leverage. Instead, it generated uncertainty about objectives and limits.

A bigger problem for any leader wishing to adopt a madman strategy is that today’s international order and media ecosystem are more inured to volatility. Threats no longer freeze opponents into caution.

Friendly nations hedge their bets. For example, faced with U.S. threats over tariffs, India strengthened ties with China.

Meanwhile, enemies test boundaries. Russia, for example, has treated Trump’s ambiguous signaling on Ukraine as little more than a green-light for it to continue its campaign to conquer the Donbas region.

Does the madman have a future?

There are still limited circumstances in which ambiguity can serve a strategic purpose.

Limited uncertainty about specific responses can reinforce deterrence by keeping adversaries cautious. U.S. strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, for example, leaves it unclear whether Washington would intervene militarily in the case of an attack by Beijing, discouraging the locking of any side into automatic escalation.

That part of the madman approach remains effective. But what no longer works is volatility untethered from clear objectives and visible limits.

The madman theory was built for a rigid, rule-bound world. It is least effective precisely where today’s politics feels most chaotic.

This article is part of a series explaining foreign policy terms commonly used but rarely explained.

Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Rebirth of the madman theory? Unpredictability isn’t what it was when it comes to foreign policy – https://theconversation.com/rebirth-of-the-madman-theory-unpredictability-isnt-what-it-was-when-it-comes-to-foreign-policy-274098

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Anthony Clarke, Research Associate, School of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Curtin University

Ask people how Stonehenge was built and you’ll hear stories of sledges, ropes, boats and sheer human determination to haul stones from across Britain to Salisbury Plain, in south-west England. Others might mention giants, wizards, or alien assistance to explain the transport of Stonehenge’s stones, which come from as far as Wales and Scotland.

But what if nature itself did the heavy lifting in transporting Stonehenge’s megaliths? In this scenario, vast glaciers that once covered Britain carried the bluestones and the Altar Stone to southern England as “glacial erratics”, or rocks moved by ice, leaving them conveniently behind on Salisbury Plain for the builders of Stonehenge.

This idea, known as the glacial transport theory, often appears in documentaries and online discussions. But it has never been tested with modern geological techniques.

Our new study, published today in Communications Earth and Environment, provides the first clear evidence glacial material never reached the area. This demonstrates the stones did not arrive through natural ice movement.

While previous research had cast doubt on the glacial transport theory, our study goes further and applies cutting-edge mineral fingerprinting to trace the stones’ true origins.

A clear mineral fingerprint

Giant ice sheets are messy, leaving behind piles of rock, scratched bedrock and carved landforms.

However, near Stonehenge, these tell-tale clues are either missing or ambiguous. And because the southern reach of ice sheets remains unclear, the glacial transport idea is open to debate.

So, if no big and obvious clues are present, could we look for tiny ones instead?

If glaciers had carried the stones all the way from Wales or Scotland, they would also have left behind millions of microscopic mineral grains, such as zircon and apatite, from those regions.

When both minerals form, they trap small amounts of radioactive uranium – which, at a known rate, will decay into lead. By measuring the ratios of both elements using a technique called U–Pb dating, we can measure the age of each zircon and apatite grain.

Because Britain’s rocks have very different ages from place to place, a mineral’s age can indicate its source. This means that if glaciers had carried stones to Stonehenge, the rivers of Salisbury Plain, which gather zircon and apatite from across a wide area, should still contain a clear mineral fingerprint of that journey.

Searching for tiny clues

To find out, we got our feet wet and collected sand from the rivers surrounding Stonehenge. What we discovered was striking.

Despite analysing more than seven hundred zircon and apatite grains, we found virtually no mineral ages that matched the bluestone sources in Wales or the Altar Stone’s Scottish source.

Zircon is exceptionally tough: grains can survive being weathered, washed into a river, buried in rocks, and recycled again millions of years later. As such, zircon crystals from Salisbury Plain rivers span an enormous stretch of geological time, covering half the age of the Earth, from around 2.8 billion years ago to 300 million years ago.

However, the vast majority fell within a tight band, spanning between 1.7 and 1.1 billion years old. Intriguingly, Salisbury River zircon ages match those from the Thanet Formation, a blanket of loosely compacted sand that covered much of southern England millions of years ago before being eroded.

This means zircon in river sand today is the leftovers from ancient blankets of sedimentary rocks, not freshly delivered sand from glaciers during the last Ice Age 26,000 to 20,000 years ago.

Apatite tells a different story. All grains are about 60 million years old, at a time when southern England was a shallow, subtropical sea. This age doesn’t match any potential source rocks in Britain.

Instead, apatite ages reflect the squeezing and uplifting caused by distant mountain-building in the European Alps, causing fluids to move through the chalk and “reset” apatite’s uranium-lead clock. In other words, the heating and chemical changes erased the mineral’s previous radioactive signature and started the clock ticking again.

Much like zircon, apatite isn’t a visitor brought in by glaciers but is local and has been sitting on Salisbury Plain for tens of millions of years.

A new piece of the Stonehenge story

Stonehenge sits at the crossroads of myth, ancient engineering and deep-time geology.

The ages of microscopic grains in river sand have now added a new piece to its story. This gives us further evidence the monument’s most exotic stones did not arrive by chance but were instead deliberately selected and transported.

Anthony Clarke receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

Chris Kirkland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Grains of sand prove people – not glaciers – transported Stonehenge rocks – https://theconversation.com/grains-of-sand-prove-people-not-glaciers-transported-stonehenge-rocks-271310

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University

During the protests that ripped through Iran in January, one person who gained attention was Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi, who lives in Los Angeles, is the son of the late shah of Iran, who ruthlessly ruled the country before being deposed during the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Pahlavi emerged during the recent upheaval as a prominent political dissident in exile who encouraged and inspired Iranians to demonstrate. It remained unclear, however, what level of popular support he commanded inside Iran, not to mention whether he was, in fact, dedicated to democracy as the descendant of a monarch.

While some Iranians perceived Pahlavi as an opposition leader, others considered him an opportunistic figure with monarchical designs and a mixed track record.

Crown prince to political dissident

Born in Tehran in 1960, Reza Pahlavi was the eldest son of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and his wife, Queen Farah Diba, making him the crown prince.

From 1941 to 1979, the shah ruled Iran with an iron fist. With funding and training from France, the United States and Israel, he established and deployed a secret police force, the SAVAK, that subjected political opponents to surveillance, imprisonment, torture and execution.

As popular discontent against the shah grew in 1974-75, Amnesty International estimated there were between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners in Iran.

Although the shah stated during the 1979 revolution that he would rather flee the country than fire on protesters, his security forces killed approximately 500 to 3,000 Iranians – though those figures are lower than those killed in the latest Iran protests.

In 1980, the shah admitted to mistakes, including acknowledging that his regime had tortured Iranians.

The shah and his family fled Iran in 1979, and the Islamic Republic subsequently was established. After the shah died in 1980, Reza Pahlavi declared himself the next shah and started his political activism against the Islamic Republic from abroad.

More recently, he attempted to organize and unify a divided opposition composed of ethnic and religious groups, leftists, rightists, centrists, republicans and, of course, monarchists. In the process, Pahlavi also aspired to raise his public profile.

From 2013 to 2017, he served as co-founder and spokesperson of the Iran National Council, an umbrella organization of opposition groups, headquartered in Paris. It reportedly suffered defections from some groups, which stifled its ability to accomplish much. In February 2019, Pahlavi helped establish the Phoenix Project of Iran, a think tank in Washington, D.C., dedicated to regime change and a transition plan in Iran.

During the 2022-23 Woman, Life, Freedom protests, sparked by the death of the young Iranian woman Mahsa Amini while in the custody of the morality police, Pahlavi called for rallies against the Iranian government in the United States, Canada and other countries. Leading opposition figures spoke at these rallies, and thousands of people participated.

That same year, some high-profile activists and celebrities, including some his father had imprisoned, endorsed Pahlavi as a leader or figure who could unite the opposition.

Presence and politics

In April 2023, Pahlavi made his first official visit to Israel, where he was hosted by Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The visit was condemned by Iranians, from regime supporters to anti-government activists, who were opposed to monarchy and unsympathetic to Israel.

After Pahlavi’s participation in the February 2025 Munich security conference was nixed, he and his supporters gathered in the city that month and in the summer to unify the political opposition and plan a post-regime transition. For Pahlavi, the meetings may have been simply a face-saving measure after the security conference snub.

As a political dissident, Pahlavi continually called for a popular uprising, regime change and a secular and democratic state. At the same time, he did not rule out the return of the monarchy, albeit a constitutional one, based on a national referendum and constituent assembly.

In an attempt to appease other opposition groups and some anti-monarchy Iranian citizens, Pahlavi occasionally insisted he was “not a political leader” and was “not personally seeking political office” in Iran if the regime fell.

On the foreign policy front – and following in his father’s footsteps – Pahlavi has advocated for Iran to align itself with the United States and Israel.

Unclear support, mixed record

As Pahlavi became more politically active abroad, questions surfaced about his viability as an opposition leader in Iran.

Discounting a 2023 poll conducted by a pro-Pahlavi institute indicating he was widely popular in Iran, it remained difficult to determine his support in Iranian society.

In a 2022 poll conducted by an independent, nonprofit research foundation with 158,000 respondents in Iran, Pahlavi received the highest percentage – 32.8% – among 34 candidates listed to serve on a transitional solidarity council, should the regime collapse.

At the same time, Pahlavi apparently lacked a serious monarchist movement and a strong connection with local opposition leaders and activists in Iran. He purportedly had little, if any, support among reformist or liberal groups in the country.

The lack of clarity concerning support for Pahlavi in Iran explained the hesitation of U.S. officials, including President Donald Trump, to engage with him. That did not deter Pahlavi from attempting to persuade them to abandon diplomatic talks and negotiations with the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program.

Despite the debates outside Iran about Pahlavi’s support within the country, pro-monarchy slogans increasingly appeared in Iranian social media postings and anti-government protests, including those in 2017-18, 2019-20, and 2022-23.

During the 2019-20 protests, the security forces arrested members of monarchist groups around the country and acknowledged their rising popularity and ability to infiltrate the government. Some reformist intellectuals suggested that monarchist slogans were merely a means for Iranian youth and other citizens to channel their anger and frustration at the authorities rather than expressions of true support for Pahlavi.

The slogans also reinforced the regime’s efforts to delegitimize the protests by portraying them as a plot by external and internal enemies, including the monarchists, to destabilize the country.

Throughout the 12-day war in June 2025 between Iran and Israel, which claimed the lives of 1,190 Iranian civilians and injured and displaced thousands more, Pahlavi publicly lamented the destruction of Iran’s military infrastructure that his father had initially built and the price its people paid for a war he blamed on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the regime.

At the same time, he was criticized by prominent political prisoners and other Iranian activists and citizens for betraying his country by supporting the Israeli strikes and failing to condemn them.

After the war, Israeli investigative journalists uncovered an influence operation conducted and funded by Israeli public and private entities to promote – among Persian-speaking audiences on social media – Pahlavi as a potential leader in a post-Islamic Republic Iran. The disinformation campaign created cynicism and controversy concerning Pahlavi’s true popularity inside the country and his tacit connection with Israel before and during the war.

Latest protests and future prospects

During the most recent protests, Pahlavi expressed support for protesters and encouraged them to demonstrate at certain times in the evening. The timing of the protests and demonstrations was intended to increase turnout by accommodating people’s work schedules and to maximize media coverage by aligning with news cycles.

Thousands of protesters turned out in the streets at those times, with some chanting anti-government slogans and others pro-monarchy ones.

His role in the protests was reduced after the regime cut off the internet and telecommunications between the people of Iran and the outside world, as well as among activists inside the country.

While some people praised Pahlavi for inspiring protesters, others asked whether he was responsible for sending them to detention and possible death, as some believed Trump was for similarly encouraging the protesters.

For the last 15 years, Pahlavi has intensified his efforts to unify the political opposition and gain greater exposure, culminating in him emerging as a central figure in the latest protests.

Yet there remain questions about whether he is viable as an opposition leader or is simply an opportunist.

His message about a democratic future for Iran has been largely consistent. However, his father’s repressive and imperial legacy, combined with his own royal pedigree and American and Israeli proximity, prevent him from finding favor with Iranians who oppose monarchy and prioritize sovereignty.

Now, the prospect of Iranians across the country rallying around Pahlavi remains as much of an open question as whether they will succeed in creating the conditions for his return by toppling the regime.

Eric Lob is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

– ref. The rise of Reza Pahlavi: Iranian opposition leader or opportunist? – https://theconversation.com/the-rise-of-reza-pahlavi-iranian-opposition-leader-or-opportunist-273423

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies, Dickinson College

More than a year after a ceasefire nominally ended active fighting, much of southern Lebanon bears the ecological scars of war. Avocado orchards are gone and beehives destroyed. So, too, are the livelihoods they supported. Meanwhile, fields and forests have disappeared under the intense fire caused by white phosphorus shelling. Shrapnel and unexploded bombs, however, remain.

Such grim realities are a window into the massive ecological destruction brought to Lebanon as a result of the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel. The number of Israeli airstrikes from October to November of that year ranked among the highest globally in the 21st century.

The conflict proved disastrous for human life, with more than 4,000 people killed, more than 17,000 injured, and 1.2 million civilians displaced internally. But a relatively uncovered aspect of the destruction was the significant effects to the environment.

Farmlands, olive groves, and pine forests were extensively burned by Israel’s airstrikes. Water resources were polluted. Pipelines and waste management were partially or completely destroyed. And the extensive dropping of ordnance and debris left a widespread trail of toxic dust and hazardous chemicals.

The damage to the Lebanon’s environment will have long-term consequences for the country’s agriculture and economy, and on its people’s mobility.
Repairing the damage would involve a multi-year reconstruction project costing an estimated US$11 to $14 billion, according to one World Bank assessment.

As experts in Middle East studies and environmental law, we believe that this destruction also indicates a grave breach of international environmental law and raises the question of whether Israel committed war crimes in Lebanon by deliberately targeting natural resources and engaging in environmental warfare.

Environmental destruction in Lebanon

During the latest war — the sixth such Israeli invasion of Lebanon since 1978 — Lebanon lost around 1,910 hectares of prime farmland, 47,000 olive trees and around 1,200 hectares of oak forests, according to Lebanese state figures.

According to Amnesty International, Israel used white phosphorus, a highly reactive chemical that burns at extremely high temperatures when exposed to air. While international humanitarian law does not necessarily ban its use for military necessity, it clearly dictates that white phosphorus must never be used against civilians.

Data collected by Amnesty International’s Citizen Evidence Lab suggests that Israel deliberately used this incendiary substance in densely populated villages in southern Lebanon to push the civilians out and make their lands unusable. Many civilians were killed, and several had long-term injuries, such as respiratory damages and severe burns.

As to the environment, white phosphorus destroyed fruit, vegetable and olive harvests, burned agricultural lands and left them polluted. White phosphorus also ignited large-scale fires that ravaged oak and pine forests and devastated wildlife. Natural habitats were destroyed, pushing animals whose species are already under stress, such as striped hyenas, golden jackals, and Egyptian mongoose, into residential areas, putting them at risk of being killed.

In the course of the conflict Israel also used cluster munitions, which are widely banned by international law. A cluster bomb consists of several smaller bombs that explode at different times to cover wider areas. But some of these cluster munitions do not explode on impact, thus threatening civilians’ lives and targeting civilians indiscriminately.

Due to these various chemicals and munitions, Lebanon’s soil and water have been contaminated with heavy metals, military scrap, and unexploded bombs.

To be sure, underlying conditions that preceded Israel’s bombing campaign likely worsened the extent of the resulting environmental damage. For example, there are no clear domestic laws in Lebanon banning asbestos, and data indicates the country continued importing the toxic substance well into the early 2000s, well after it had been banned in most other countries.

Several urban and industrial sites were heavily bombed during the 2024 war, especially in south Beirut and Tyre, a major city in southern Lebanon. There is little doubt that the resulting debris contains high levels of asbestos and other toxic substances, which were released with the destruction of buildings, pipelines, paints, roofs, tiles and other old structures.

Environmental protection in armed conflict

Current international humanitarian law provides limited environmental protection during armed conflict. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute qualifies a war crime as any attack launched “in the knowledge that such attack will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.” The cumulative nature of these criteria — being widespread, long term and severe — establishes a high bar for proving a war crime of this nature.

Additional legal frameworks include the 1976 ENMOD Convention prohibiting environmental modification techniques for military purposes and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions that prohibits methods of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage.

In Feb. 2024, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan announced a policy initiative prioritizing environmental crimes within the existing Rome Statute framework.

Further, a growing international movement is pushing to recognize “ecocide,” defined as the mass destruction of ecosystems, as a fifth international crime alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. If adopted, this legal framework would significantly lower the threshold for prosecuting environmental destruction during armed conflict.

Even so, the documented environmental impacts in Lebanon already raise substantive questions regarding the application of international humanitarian law and the legal requirement that military commanders weigh anticipated civilian and environmental harm against expected military gains before launching an attack.

The actions of Israel and other countries in recent years, however, have more broadly raised questions over the viability of international law and institutions’ ability to hold those accused to account.

Moving forward

Although Israel and Lebanon agreed to an internationally supervised ceasefire in Nov. 2024, it has largely been a truce in name only, with continued Israeli strikes targeting southern Lebanon and Beirut since then. Meanwhile, though Lebanon remains committed to the terms of the ceasefire, including the disarmament of Hezbollah, the armed Shiite movement has refused to entirely give up its arms.

Under U.S patronage, negotiations between Lebanon and Israel continue today, with discussions of a land border agreement and the return of Lebanese hostages. But, the negotiations so far have stuck largely to political issues with no mention of environmental damages.

In fact, the question of environmental reparations is not without precedent. Since 2006, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted 19 consecutive resolutions on the Jiyeh oil spill, caused by the Israeli bombing of fuel storage tanks during the July 2006 war. The destruction released up to 30,000 tons of oil into the Mediterranean, contaminating 170 kilometers of Lebanese coastline. The U.N. secretary-general assessed damages at US$856.4 million, and the assembly has repeatedly called upon Israel to assume responsibility for prompt and adequate compensation — calls that have gone unanswered for nearly two decades.

For the Lebanese people, particularly those who experienced firsthand environmental destruction, the question of Israel’s alleged environmental crimes is not merely an intellectual exercise. Rather, many environmental groups inside and outside Lebanon argue that addressing such issues is necessary to ensure the promotion of human rights in the region and equitable access to unpolluted farmland, water and forests.

Mireille Rebeiz is affiliated with the American Red Cross.

Josiane Yazbeck is affiliated with TERRE Liban and With the International Center for Comparative Environmental Law (CIDCE).

– ref. Lebanon’s orchards have been burnt, wildlife habitat destroyed by Israeli strikes – raising troubling international law questions – https://theconversation.com/lebanons-orchards-have-been-burnt-wildlife-habitat-destroyed-by-israeli-strikes-raising-troubling-international-law-questions-271577

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Eric Van Rythoven, Instructor in Political Science, Carleton University

Looking at headlines around the world, it seemed like United States President Donald Trump’s annexation of Greenland was imminent. Buoyed by the success of his military operation to oust Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Trump has ratcheted up his rhetoric and is now threatening tariffs on any nation that opposes him.

Adding insult to injury, he’s openly mocked European leaders by posting their private messages and sharing an AI-generated image of himself raising the American flag over Greenland.

But behind these headlines a different story is emerging.

Trump’s military threats have toxic polling numbers with the American public. His Republican allies have openly threatened to revolt. European countries are rapidly sending reinforcements, raising the costs of any invasion. And Europeans are starting to think about what economic retaliation might look like.

Far from being inevitable, Trump’s Greenland gambit appears to be on increasingly shaky ground.

No good options

Trump has three options to take control of Greenland: diplomacy, money and military force. The latest diplomatic talks collapsed as Greenland and Denmark’s foreign ministers left the White House in “fundamental disagreement” over the future of the territory.

Simply buying the territory is a non-starter. Greenlanders have already said the territory is not for sale, and U.S. Congress is unwilling to foot the bill. That’s left military force, the worst possible option.

It’s difficult to convey in words just how stunningly unpopular this option is with Americans. A recent Ipsos poll found that just four per cent of Americans believe using military force to take Greenland is a good idea.

To put that in perspective, here are some policies that are more popular:

• Billionaires should pay less tax (five per cent)

• Pardoning convicted drug trafficker and Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez (13 per cent)

• Government book bans (14 per cent)

• Stopping the release of all the Jeffrey Epstein files (seven per cent).

If your official foreign policy is less popular than pardoning drug traffickers, then your foreign policy might be in trouble.

Sensing this unpopularity, Trump has already begun to walk back his military threats. Using his platform at Davos, he claimed “I don’t have to use force. I don’t want to use force. I won’t use force.”

It is too early to tell whether Trump’s claims are sincere. Not long after claiming to be the “president of peace,” he was invading Venezuela and bombing Iran.

The broader point is that if diplomacy has failed, money is a non-starter, and now military action is ostensibly being taken off the table, then Trump has no good options.

The danger of defections

Trump’s political coalition, in fact, is increasingly fragile and in danger of defections. The Republican House majority has shrunk to a razor-thin margin, and Republicans are already signalling a loud break with Trump over Greenland.

Nebraska congressman Don Bacon recently told USA Today: “There’s so many Republicans mad about this … If he went through with the threats, I think it would be the end of his presidency.”

The situation in the Senate looks even worse. Multiple Republican senators have pledged to oppose any annexation, with Thom Tillis and Lisa Murkowski visiting Copenhagen to reassure the Danish government. With enough defections, Congress could sharply curtail Trump’s plans and force a humiliating climb-down.

There’s yet another danger of defection. Senior military officers can resign, retire or object to the legality of orders to attack America’s NATO allies. Just last year, Adm. Alvin Holsey, the leader of U.S. Southern Command, abruptly retired less than year into what is typically a multi-year posting.

Holsey’s departure came amid reports that he was questioning the legality of U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean. Americans still have a high level of confidence in the military, so when senior officers suddenly leave, it can set off alarm bells.

Creating a tripwire

In recent days, Denmark and its European allies have rushed to send military reinforcements to Greenland. These forces, however, have no hope of defeating a committed American invasion. So why are they there?

In strategic studies, we call this a “tripwire force.” The reasoning is that any attack on this force will create strong pressures at home for governments to respond. Once Danes and Swedes — and other Europeans for that matter — see their soldiers being captured or killed, this will force their governments to escalate the conflict and retaliate against the United States.

The Trump administration would like to seize Greenland, face no European forces and suffer no consequences. But the entire point of a tripwire force is to deny easy wins and to signal that any attack would be met with costly escalation. It creates a price to invading Greenland for an administration that rarely wants to pay for anything.

The B-word

Amid the Trump administration’s threats, people are forced to grapple with what comes next. European governments are already quietly debating retaliation, including diplomatic, military and economic responses.

Chief among these is the European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, colloquially known as the “trade bazooka,” that could significantly curb America’s access to the EU market.

But for ordinary Europeans a different B-word will come to mind: boycott.

Some Europeans began boycotting U.S. goods last year amid Trump’s trade threats — but never to the same level as Canadians. That could quickly change if the U.S. engages in a stunning betrayal of its European allies. Fresh anger and outrage could see Europeans follow Canada’s lead.

Trump repeatedly threatened Canada with annexation, and it triggered a transformation of Canadian consumer habits. Canadians travel to the U.S. less, buy less American food and alcohol and look for more home-grown alternatives. Despite Canada’s small population, these boycotts have caused pain for U.S. industries.

Now imagine a similar scenario with the EU. In 2024, the U.S. exported almost US$665 billion in goods and services to the EU. It’s one of the largest export markets for the U.S., fuelling thousands of jobs and businesses.

The real danger for American companies, however, is when consumer pressure moves upwards to governments and corporations. European governments and corporations who buy from American giants like Microsoft, Google and Boeing will start to see public pressure to buy European — or at least not American. America’s most valuable corporate brands risk being contaminated by the stigma of the U.S. government.

Will he, won’t he?

None of this will stop the Trump administration from trying. Trump’s own words — that there is “no going back” on his plans for Greenland — ensure he’s backed himself into corner.

The more likely scenario seems to be starting to play out — Trump will try and then fail. His threats to annex Greenland will likely be remembered next to “90 trade deals in 90 days” and “repeal and place” in the pantheon of failed Trump policies.

The tragedy here is not simply a Trump administration with desires that consistently exceeds its grasp. It’s that the stain of betraying America’s closest allies will linger long after this administration is gone.

Eric Van Rythoven does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s annexation of Greenland seemed imminent. Now it’s on much shakier ground. – https://theconversation.com/trumps-annexation-of-greenland-seemed-imminent-now-its-on-much-shakier-ground-273787