Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By John Deni, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies, US Army War College

NATO fighter jets shot down multiple Russian drones in Polish airspace on Sept. 10, 2025, sparking fears of an expanding Russia-Ukraine war.

The incident represented the first such incursion by unmanned Russian aircraft into the territory of a NATO member since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moscow said it did not target Poland, raising the possibility of the drones unintentionally straying off course. But several European leaders indicated that they believed the incursion to be intentional.

Poland responded with a rare move, invoking Article 4 of the NATO treaty. The Conversation turned to John R. Deni, a nonresident Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense,” to explain what invoking these articles means – and what might happen next.

What is Article 4 of the NATO Treaty?

Article 4 can be invoked by any NATO member that feels threatened. Under its terms, a member state can request a consultation of the North Atlantic Council, or NAC – the highest political decision-making body in the NATO alliance.

A NAC meeting in itself isn’t unusual. Every NATO summit is a NAC meeting at the level of heads of states. And a NAC meeting takes place every Wednesday at ambassadorial level in Brussels.

But what Article 4 does is open the way for a special meeting of the NAC to consult over the next steps that the alliance should take.

While invoking Article 4 is a big deal, it doesn’t carry the same weight as invoking Article 5.

What is Article 5?

Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the part of the treaty that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 32 members of NATO.

The NATO treaty was signed in April 1949, and Article 5 is central to it. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Western European countries sought a way to defend themselves in the event Germany again arose as a security challenge. By the late 1940s, concerns shifted toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stationed large military forces across Eastern Europe, staged a coup in Czechoslovakia and blockaded Berlin.

Initially, the United States was skeptical of joining any kind of postwar alliance in Europe, but Soviet actions convinced American leaders to sign on as a way of maintaining Western Europe as free and open.

Article 5 doesn’t automatically get triggered once a NATO member is attacked; the country attacked needs to request that the alliance invoke it. In this case, that would mean Poland, should Polish officials conclude that Russian missiles were sent deliberately.

What does triggering either require of the US?

Under Article 4, all NATO members, including the U.S., are required to join discussions at the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main decision-making body. That could be followed by a joint declaration or plan of action.

Invoking Article 5, however, has more serious consequences. It means that the United States would be called upon to help defend any European ally, or Canada, if attacked.

But there is an important caveat. Article 5 was written in such a way that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked.

In the case of the U.S., the executive branch – that is, the president – would need to consider the views and responsibilities of Congress. If the president were to decide on direct military action, then Congress would likely be involved in some capacity – and, of course, only Congress has the power to declare war.

But Article 5 doesn’t necessarily require a military response. In fact, there is enough flexibility in the language of the treaty for a more nuanced response.

This is vital. Each member of NATO remains a sovereign state and can’t be compelled into military action. Decision-making over the use of force remains at the national level; such choices are not simply handed over to a supranational organization.

When have articles 4 and 5 been triggered in the past?

Article 4 has been invoked several times over NATO’s lifetime. It was invoked by Turkey amid concerns over cross-border terrorism as a result of the Syrian War. More recently, it was invoked by eight NATO members in Eastern Europe after the Feb. 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Article 5 has been triggered only once before in the seven decades of NATO’s existence. That was on Sept. 12, 2001 – the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

The European allies came to the U.S.’s defense on that occasion. They did this by deploying patrol aircraft in U.S. airspace. Additionally, when the decision was made to invade Afghanistan, several NATO countries in which American troops are based – especially Germany – provided guards for U.S. military bases overseas so that American soldiers could deploy.

What does Poland hope to achieve in invoking Article 4?

Article 4 allows any member country that perceives a serious security threat to bring it to the attention of all the allies. Taking this step allows Poland to make its case to all NATO members and get across its concerns and the level of threat from Russia it perceives.

I would expect Poland to use an Article 4 meeting to highlight the many times Russian military forces have violated the airspace of allies all along the eastern frontier and especially in northeastern Europe.

In some instances, these violations can be chalked up to pilot or operator error, but in recent years the regularity of violations has led many observers in the West to conclude Russia is purposefully violating allied airspace.

The intent of these violations is varied. Sometimes, as in the case of these drones over Poland, it may be to take a circuitous route to the intended target – likely Ukrainian civilians and military facilities in Western Ukraine – so as to avoid Ukrainian air defenses. In other cases, Russia is likely trying to intimidate smaller NATO allies or probing Western defenses to test reaction times and means of response.

Regardless, Poland, like many allies in Eastern Europe, has justifiably lost patience with Moscow’s repeated violations. By invoking Article 4 and bringing this to NATO’s table, Warsaw likely hopes to secure the unequivocal backing of its allies in responding more aggressively, as it did, in coordination with the Dutch, in shooting down these Russian drones.

How might we expect the US to respond?

The United States is likely to stand firmly behind Poland’s efforts to defend itself in the wake of this egregious violation of Polish airspace.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki had what was regarded as a highly successful meeting at the White House in early September, during which President Donald Trump said the U.S. commitment to Poland – both political as well as the military presence – would remain and could in fact grow. The U.S. sees Poland as a staunch ally in a special category of particularly close partners. Beyond that, it’s at least theoretically possible that U.S. air defense assets based in Germany, including Patriot air defense battalions, might be deployed to Poland to beef up defenses there, but it’s unclear whether such a request has been made.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization he may be affiliated with.
_
_Sections of this article were originally included in a story published by The Conversation on Nov. 16, 2022.

John Deni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Poland responds to Russian drones incursion by invoking Article 4 of the NATO treaty − what happens next? – https://theconversation.com/poland-responds-to-russian-drones-incursion-by-invoking-article-4-of-the-nato-treaty-what-happens-next-265051

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

The Israeli airstrike targeting senior Hamas political leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, represents the crossing of a number of lines.

Resulting in the deaths of six people but seemingly failing to kill any members of Hamas’ leadership, the strike was the first serious attack on the sovereignty of any of the six Gulf Arab states by Israel to date.

The bombing, which destroyed a building in a busy residential area of the Qatari capital, Doha, was also an act of international aggression under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. And it marks a major escalation in the post-Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli-involved conflicts across the Middle East.

But it isn’t the first time Israel has targeted individuals being hosted by one of the Gulf States. In 2010, Israeli operatives were successful in killing a senior Hamas operative in the United Arab Emirates.

That operation in Dubai set back Gulf-Israel relations for years. Similarly, the impact of the Doha strike will be consequential for what remains of Israeli ties in the Gulf now, as well as for the web of U.S.-Arab Gulf state defense partnerships that have underpinned regional security for decades.

Indeed, as an expert on Gulf Arab politics, I believe the latest development represents the gravest crisis for Israel’s budding relations in the Gulf.

The tangled history of Israel-Gulf ties

Aside from a Saudi contingent that fought in the 1948 war, the Arab Gulf countries have not been direct military participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, they have deployed resources in other ways, such as providing financial support to states actively involved in fighting Israel and participating in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo.

In addition, the Gulf states maintained the Arab League boycott of Israel until the 1990s, when the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott – which targeted outside companies and third countries that did business with Israel – were gradually diluted. Formal ties also emerged in the 1990s, with Qatar and Oman leading the way in hosting Israeli trade offices and the latter receiving visits by two Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 and Shimon Peres in 1996. Gulf Arab countries also hosted multilateral meetings as part of the Oslo peace process that launched in 1993 between Israeli and Palestinian leaders.

And yet, Israeli outreach to the Gulf states has always been vulnerable to upswings of violence in the occupied Palestinian territories, which led to the closure of the trade missions in Muscat, the capital of Oman, and Doha in the 2000s. Ties reached their lowest ebb in January 2010 after the Israeli security service Mossad dispatched a 27-strong death squad to Dubai to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a senior weapons procurer for Hamas.

With Israeli operatives traveling into and out of the UAE using forged European and Australian passports, the killing infuriated the Emirati leadership and sent the discreet effort of building bilateral relations into a deep freeze for several years.

Ties only began to thaw in the turbulent aftermath of the Arab uprisings when Israel authorized the sale of sophisticated Pegasus spyware in 2013 as an “olive branch” to the UAE.

The subsequent upward trajectory of relations, which culminated in the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, illustrated how shared interests in regional geopolitics could act as a salve for bilateral antagonism. The accords, initially signed by Bahrain and the UAE, represented the first recognition of Israel by an Arab state since Jordan back in 1994.

The gloomy diplomatic outlook after Doha

But it will be harder to repair ties this time around – not least because the strike on Doha comes after months of Gulf states’ mounting concern at the extensive and open-ended scope of Israeli attacks across the Middle East and the ongoing war in Gaza, which most Arab Gulf leaders have described in genocidal terms.

Over the past year, Israel has hit targets in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Yemen. In the process, Israel has destroyed large areas of southern Lebanon; bombed the ministry of defense in Syria; killed Ismail Haniyeh, a former head of the Hamas political office in Doha; killed the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in Yemen and multiple members of his cabinet; and launched the 12-day war against Iran.

That pattern of behavior caused deep alarm among Gulf officials who have strenuously sought to “de-risk” the region as they focus on large-scale development projects such as Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia.

The war with Iran was particularly emblematic of these regional fears. Indeed, it ended with an Iranian missile strike on Qatar that targeted Al Udeid, the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East and the location of the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command. The June 23 strike appeared to be a choreographed face-saving measure of limited retaliation after President Donald Trump had ordered U.S. airstrikes against three nuclear facilities in Iran the previous day. But the sight of the Qatari night sky lighting up with interceptor fire and missile debris falling in Doha nevertheless caused shock waves in the Gulf.

It was the first time a Gulf capital had came under attack by a state, rather than a militant nonstate group, since Iraq launched Scud missiles during the Gulf War in 1991 following its invasion of Kuwait.

Talk of diplomatic red lines

Iran’s attack on the U.S. air base in Qatar in June generated statements of solidarity with Doha from all other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, reflecting the degree to which the six Gulf Arab countries have come back together after the political rifts that divided them in the 2010s. The GCC has been most cohesive at times that its members perceive a common external threat, such as during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. That has also been evident after Israel’s military engagements since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks.

Over the summer, alarm at Israel’s regional wars led prominent Saudi commentators to describe Israel as a chief spoiler, a routine violator of international norms and a contributor to instability. Such language had previously been reserved primarily for Iranian actions.

Anwar Gargash, a foreign policy advisor to UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan whose name adorns the Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi, described the Sept. 9 Israeli strike on Qatar as “treacherous.” It remains to be seen whether this is a red line which leads the UAE, or Bahrain, to suspend the Abraham Accords or break diplomatic ties with Israel.

Going forward, officials in Doha and other GCC capitals will be urgently assessing the implications of a strike by one U.S. partner and in the vicinity of a U.S. base meant to deter and detect regional aerial threats in the first place. And while the Trump administration has officially denied foreknowledge or involvement in the Israeli attack, even being caught in the dark will invite commentary about the apparent ineffectiveness of American deterrence and further damage Gulf states’ confidence in the U.S. defense and security support.

When Israeli forces killed Haniyeh, another Hamas political leader, in July 2024, they waited until he left Doha to attend the presidential inauguration in Iran before they struck in Tehran. Until now, the assumption had been that Israel would hit targets in states adversarial to the U.S. rather than allies or partners.

That line has been crossed, and across the Gulf there will be concern about what else may happen – for example, to Houthi delegates being hosted in Oman.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Israeli strike in Doha crosses a new line from which relations with Gulf may not recover – https://theconversation.com/israeli-strike-in-doha-crosses-a-new-line-from-which-relations-with-gulf-may-not-recover-264954

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jean-Pierre Scheerlinck, Honorary Professor Fellow, Melbourne Veterinary School, Faculty of Science, The University of Melbourne

For decades, beekeepers have fought a tiny parasite called Varroa destructor, which has devastated honey-bee colonies around the world. But an even deadlier mite, Tropilaelaps mercedesae – or “tropi” – is on the march. Beekeepers fear it will wreak even greater havoc than varroa – and the ripple effects may be felt by the billions of people around the world who rely on honey bee-pollinated plants.

From Asia to Europe

Tropi’s natural host is the giant honey-bee (Apis dorsata), common across South and Southeast Asia. At some point, the mite jumped to the western honey-bee (Apis mellifera), the species kept by beekeepers around the world. Because this host is widespread, the parasite has steadily moved westwards.

It has now been detected in Ukraine, Georgia and southern Russia, and is suspected to be in Iran and Turkey. From there, it is expected to enter eastern Europe, then spread across the continent. Australia and North America are also at risk.

Why tropi spreads so fast

Like varroa, tropi is a tiny mite that breeds inside capped brood cells, the life stages of the honey-bee when the late larvae and pupae develop inside honeycomb cells that are sealed by a layer of wax. The mite feeds on bee pupae and transmits lethal viruses, such as deformed wing virus – the deadliest of the bee viruses. But there are crucial differences.

Varroa can survive on adult bees for long periods, but tropi cannot. Outside brood cells, it lives only a few days, scurrying across the comb in search of a new larva.

Because tropi spends more time in capped cells, it reproduces quickly. A capped cell that contains a female varroa will result in one or two mated varroa offspring emerging with the adult bee. Tropi offspring develop faster inside a capped cell than varroa offspring, so a tropi “mother” may result in more offspring emerging than a varroa infested cell, more quickly overwhelming the colony.

As a result, colonies infested with tropi can collapse far faster than those plagued by varroa.

Current control methods

In parts of Asia where the parasite is already established, small-scale and commercial beekeepers often manage it by caging the queen for about five weeks.

With no eggs being laid, no brood develops, leaving the mites without a food source. This method is practical where beekeepers manage dozens of hives, but not in places like Europe where commercial operations often involve thousands.

Another option is treating the beehive with formic acid, which penetrates brood cell caps and kills the mite without necessarily harming the developing bee, provided concentrations are kept low. This treatment may offer beekeepers a practical tool.

Why varroa treatments won’t work

Many wonder whether the chemicals used against varroa could also fight tropi. The answer is, mostly no.

Varroa spends much of its life outside of a capped cell clinging to adult bees, where it comes into contact with mite-killing chemicals known as miticides spread through the colony on bee bodies. By contrast, tropi rarely attaches to adults, instead darting across comb surfaces.

Because of this, it is far less exposed to chemical residues. Treatments designed for varroa are often ineffective against the faster-breeding tropi.

Managing both mites together will be particularly difficult. Combining treatments risks harming colonies or contaminating honey. For instance, formic acid for tropi and insecticides such as amitraz for varroa might interact at even low levels, killing the bees as well as the parasites.

There is also the danger of resistance. Over-use of varroa treatments has already produced resistant strains, reducing the effectiveness of several once-reliable chemicals. Introducing more compounds to fight tropi, without careful integrated pest management, could accelerate this process and leave beekeepers with few effective tools.

The wider impact

The spread of tropi will not only devastate beekeepers but also agriculture more broadly. Honey-bees are critical pollinators of many crops. Heavier hive losses will raise costs for both honey production and pollination services, affecting food prices and availability.

Research is underway in countries such as Thailand and China to develop better management strategies. But unless effective and practical treatments are found soon, the spread of this new mite around the world could be catastrophic.

The story of varroa shows how quickly a single parasite can transform global beekeeping. Tropi has the potential to be even worse: it spreads faster, kills colonies more quickly, and is harder to control with existing methods.

---

The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Robert Owen, a beekeeper who completed a PhD on the varroa mite at the University of Melbourne in 2022, to this article.

Jean-Pierre Scheerlinck does work for the CIS, drafting the Australian Pollination Security Status Report. He has received funding from the ARC and NHMRC.

– ref. Deadlier than varroa, a new honey-bee parasite is spreading around the world – https://theconversation.com/deadlier-than-varroa-a-new-honey-bee-parasite-is-spreading-around-the-world-264891

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Amelia Scott, Honorary Affiliate and Clinical Psychologist at the Woolcock Institute of Medical Research, and Macquarie University Research Fellow, Macquarie University

Even a single night of sleep trouble can feel distressing and lonely. You toss and turn, stare at the ceiling, and wonder how you’ll cope tomorrow. No wonder many people start to worry they’ve developed insomnia.

Insomnia is one of the most talked-about sleep problems, but it’s also one of the most misunderstood.

But just because you can’t sleep, it doesn’t mean you have insomnia. You might have another sleep disorder, or none at all.

What is insomnia?

Let’s clear up some terms, and separate short-term or intermittent sleep problems from what health professionals call “insomnia disorder”.

Sleep problems can involve being awake when you want to be asleep. This could be lying in bed for ages trying to fall asleep, waking in the middle of the night for hours, or waking up too early. Having a sleep problem is a subjective experience – you don’t need to tally up lost hours to prove it’s a problem.

But insomnia disorder is the official term to describe a more problematic and persistent pattern of sleep difficulties. And this long-term or chronic sleep disorder has clear diagnostic criteria. These include at least three nights a week of poor sleep, lasting three months or more. These criteria help researchers and clinicians make sure they’re talking about the same thing, and not confusing it with another sleep problem.

So, what are some reasons why a sleep problem might not be insomnia?

1. It’s short term, or comes and goes

About a third of adults will have a bout of “acute insomnia” in a given year. This short-term problem is typically triggered by stress, illness or big life changes.

The good news is that about 72% of people with acute insomnia return to normal sleep after a few weeks.

Insomnia disorder is a longer-term, persistent problem.

2. It doesn’t affect you the next day

Some people lie awake at night but still function well during the day. More fragmented and less refreshing sleep is also a near-universal part of ageing.

So if your sleep problem doesn’t significantly affect you the next day, it usually isn’t considered to be insomnia.

For people with insomnia, the struggle with sleep spills into the day and affects their mood, energy, concentration and wellbeing. Worry and distress about not sleeping can then make the problem worse, which creates a frustrating cycle of worrying and not sleeping.

3. It’s more about work or caring

If you feel tired during the day, an important question is whether you’re giving yourself enough time to sleep. Sometimes sleep problems reflect a “sleep opportunity” that is too short or too irregular.

Work schedules, child care, or late-night commitments can cut sleep short, and sleep can slip down the priority list. In these cases, the problem is insufficient sleep, not insomnia.

You might have noisy neighbours or an annoying cat. These can also affect your sleep, and reduce your “sleep opportunity”.

The average healthy adult gets around seven hours sleep (though this varies widely). For someone who needs seven, it usually means setting aside about eight to allow for winding down, drifting off, and waking overnight.

4. It’s another sleep disorder

Other sleep disorders can look like insomnia, such as:

• obstructive sleep apnoea (when your breathing stops multiple times during sleep) can cause frequent awakenings through the night and daytime sleepiness

• restless legs syndrome creates an irresistible urge to move your legs in the evening that often interferes with falling asleep. It’s often described as jittery feelings or having “creepy crawlies”, and is often undiagnosed

• circadian rhythm problems, such as being a natural night owl in an early-bird world, can also lead to trouble falling asleep.

5. Medications and substances are interfering

Caffeine, alcohol and nicotine all create insomnia symptoms and worsen the quality of sleep.

Certain medications can also interfere with sleep, such as stimulants (for conditions such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder or ADHD) and beta-blockers (for various heart conditions).

These issues need to be considered before labelling the problem as insomnia. However, it’s important to keep taking your medication as prescribed and discuss any concerns with your doctor.

Getting the right help

If your sleep is worrying you, the best first step is to see your GP. They can help rule out other causes, review your medications, or refer you for a sleep study if needed.

However, once insomnia becomes frequent, chronic (long term) and distressing, you can worry too much about your sleep, constantly check or track your sleep, or try too hard to sleep, for instance by spending too much time in bed. These psychological and behavioural mechanisms can backfire, and make good sleep even less likely.

That’s why “cognitive behavioural therapy for insomnia” (or CBT-I) is recommended as the first-line treatment.

This is more effective, and longer-lasting than sleeping pills. This therapy is available via specially trained GPs, and sleep psychologists. You can take part in person or online.

In the meantime

If you’re in a rough patch of sleep:

• remind yourself that short runs of poor sleep usually settle on their own

• avoid lying in bed panicking if you wake at 3.30am. Instead, step out of bed or use the time in a way that feels restful

• keep a consistent wake-up time, even after a poor night. Try to get some morning sunlight to reset your body clock

• make sure you’re putting aside the right amount of time for sleep – not too little, not too much.

Amelia Scott is a member of the psychology education subcommittee of the Australasian Sleep Association. She receives funding from Macquarie University.

– ref. Do I have insomnia? 5 reasons why you might not – https://theconversation.com/do-i-have-insomnia-5-reasons-why-you-might-not-262701

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jamon Couch, Lecturer, Department of Microbiology, Anatomy, Physiology & Pharmacology, and PhD Candidate, La Trobe University

It’s a quiet morning. You lace up your shoes, step outside and begin a brisk morning stroll. But as you take those first few steps, there it is, a faint grinding noise, almost like the crunch of gravel underfoot, except … the sound is coming from your knee!

Thinking back, you recall noticing a similar sound as you were walking up the stairs last week. You pause, do some quick stretches and continue walking. But the grinding sound quickly returns.

A wave of dread follows: Is there something wrong with my knee? Is that bone-on-bone? Am I getting arthritis?

This is a common experience for people of all ages. Before you hit the panic button, let’s unpack what these noisy knees – known in medical terms as “knee crepitus” – might really mean.

What is knee crepitus? How common is it?

Knee crepitus refers to the audible crackling, creaking or grinding sounds that occur when you bend or straighten your knee. You might hear it when climbing stairs, standing up from a chair, or even just as you walk.

Surprisingly, we don’t know what actually causes knee crepitus. Theories suggest these knee joint noises may be attributed to damaged knee cartilage, tendons moving over bones, or the popping of normal gas bubbles in the fluid surrounding the knee.

But current scientific evidence is insufficient to confidently determine the origin of this common symptom.

Our recent review of the 103 studies of knee crepitus (involving 36,439 people) found 41% of people in the general population had noisy knees.

There is a common perception that this crackling, creaking or grinding noise is a sign of a damaged or arthritic knee. However 36% of people who had no pain and had never injured their knee also had knee crepitus.

So, knee crepitus is common across the population, including among people with no knee problems at all.

But I heard it’s an early sign of arthritis…

Having knee crepitus can create worry, and make people fearful of exercising and using their knees. People often ask: Am I causing further damage to my knees? Does this mean I’m going to get arthritis?

Noisy knees are more common among older adults with arthritis: 81% of people with osteoarthritis have knee crepitus.

However, knee crepitus isn’t always a sign of impending knee problems and shouldn’t stop you from exercising and using your knees. In a study of 3,495 older adults (mean age 61 years), two-thirds of people who reported “always” having knee crepitus did not develop symptomatic osteoarthritis over the next four years.

If you’re a younger adult with a previous knee injury, the story is much the same: knee crepitus is still common, particularly after a knee injury, but it’s not always a sign of underlying problems.

Our recent study looked at 112 young adults (with a median age of 28) who had a previous knee injury requiring surgery. We found those with knee crepitus were twice as likely to have cartilage damage (particularly in the kneecap area) in the first year post-surgery. However, having knee crepitus did not mean worse outcomes in the future.

It seems that while those with knee crepitus may experience worse pain and symptoms in the early stages following knee injury, this does not translate to worse recovery or greater rates of osteoarthritis over the long term.

What should I do about my noisy knees?

Given noisy knees are common in those without knee pain, injury or arthritis, you generally shouldn’t be concerned. Yes, your knees might wake your baby as you step away from their cot, and perhaps a quiet yoga studio might draw focus on your knees, but generally speaking, if it’s not painful, it’s nothing to worry about.

Unfortunately, there are no effective treatments for knee crepitus. The best advice is to keep doing the things that help to improve overall knee health: getting regular exercise, both aerobic and resistance-based, and achieving and maintaining a healthy body weight.

Just be cautious about sourcing information online, as more than half of the advice available on the internet about knee clicking isn’t supported by research.

So, when should you be concerned?

Although knee crepitus is often benign, there are circumstances where you could consult your health-care provider. This includes if your noisy knees are:

• accompanied by pain, swelling, instability, or locking

• associated with other signs of arthritis, such as stiffness, redness, or reduced mobility.

In such cases, a health-care provider may recommend a physical assessment to examine structures in and around the knee joint, and evaluate the impact of your symptoms on your quality of life and participation in activities.

The clinician may recommend:

• physiotherapy and exercise to strengthen supporting muscles
• seeing a dietitian for advice about weight management
• anti-inflammatory medication.

Most importantly, creaky knees alone, without other symptoms, are not normally cause for concern. So, lace up those shoes and keep moving.

Jamon Couch receives funding from an Australian government Research Training Program scholarship.

Adam Culvenor receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council and Medibank Better Health Research Hub.

– ref. My knee is clicking. Should I be worried? Am I getting arthritis? – https://theconversation.com/my-knee-is-clicking-should-i-be-worried-am-i-getting-arthritis-264472

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Christine Hosking, Conservation Planner/Researcher, The University of Queensland

In a historic move, the New South Wales government has announced a Great Koala National Park will be established on the state’s Mid North Coast, in a bid to protect vital koala habitat and stop the species’ sharp decline.

The reserve will combine existing national parks with newly protected state forest areas, to create 476,000 hectares of protected koala habitat. Logging will be phased out in certain areas, and a transition plan enacted for affected workers and communities.

Conservationists have welcomed the move as a win for biodiversity. However, some industry groups have raised concerns about the economic impact on the region’s timber operations.

The announcement, which follows a long campaign by koala advocates, shows the NSW government recognises the importance of protecting biodiversity. But announcing the national park is just the first step in saving this iconic species.

A worrying decline

Koalas are notoriously hard to count, because they are widely distributed and difficult to spot.

In 2016, a panel of 15 koala experts estimated a decline in koala populations of 24% over the past three generations and the next three generations.

Habitat loss and fragmentation is the number one threat to koalas. Others include climate change, bushfires, disease, vehicle strikes and dog attacks.

The decline gave momentum to calls by conservationists and scientists for the establishment of a Great Koala National Park, taking in important koala habitat on the NSW Mid North Coast.

In 2023, the NSW government pledged A$80 million to create the park. The announcement on Sunday increased the pledge to $140 million.

Announcing the development, NSW Premier Chris Minns said it was “unthinkable” that koalas were at risk of extinction in that state.

The government also proposed the park’s boundary and announced a temporary moratorium on timber harvesting within it – as well as a support package for logging workers, industries and communities.

However, the logging industry remains opposed to the plan.

Not the end of the story

The creation of the park is a welcome move. It will protect not just koalas but many other native species, large and small.

But on its own, it’s not enough to save the NSW koala population. Even within the national park, threats to koalas will remain.

For example, research shows climate change – and associated heat and less rainfall – threatens the trees koalas use for food and shelter. Climate extremes also physically stress koalas. This and other combined stresses can make koalas more prone to disease.

Bushfires, and inappropriate fire management, can degrade koala habitat and injure or kill them outright.

The NSW government says logging must immediately cease in areas to be brought into the park’s boundary. However, logging pressures can remain, even after national parks are declared. Forestry activities must cease completely, and forever, if the park is to truly protect koalas.

What’s more, recreational activities, if allowed in the national park, may negatively impact koalas. For example, cutting tracks or building tourist facilities may fragment koala habitat and disturb shy wildlife.

These threats must be managed to ensure the Great Koala National Park achieves its aims.

Prioritising nature

Of course, the creation of a new national park does not help koalas outside the park’s boundaries. Koala populations are under threat across their range in NSW, Queensland and the ACT.

That’s why the national recovery plan for the koala should be implemented urgently and in full. It includes increasing the area of protected koala habitat, restoring degraded habitat, and actively conserving populations. It also includes ending habitat destruction by embedding koala protections in land-use planning.

As I have previously written, koala protection areas should be replicated throughout the NSW and Queensland hinterlands. My research shows the future climate will remain suitable for koalas in those areas.

And logging must be curbed elsewhere in Australia, such as in Tasmania, where it jeopardises threatened species and ancient forests.

The Great National Koala Park promises be a sanctuary for koalas and other wildlife, and a special place for passive, nature-based recreation and tourism. Yes, the plan has detractors. But saving Australia’s koalas means prioritising nature’s needs over that of people.

And we must not forget: the national park is just one step on a long road to preventing koala extinctions.

Christine Hosking does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Koalas are running out of time. Will a $140 million national park save them? – https://theconversation.com/koalas-are-running-out-of-time-will-a-140-million-national-park-save-them-264789

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Dodd, Professor of Journalism, Director of the Centre for Advancing Journalism, The University of Melbourne

Rupert Murdoch has succeeded in securing his vision for the future of News Corporation, the global media empire he has always thought of as his family business.

To achieve this, he has torn apart his family. He has also ensured his media outlets, especially Fox News, remain committed to his hard right-wing views.

With hindsight, this deal was inevitable. The 94-year-old mogul had just one remaining job to do as chairman emeritus of News Corp: to ensure that when he dies, the company he built and moulded remains in his image.

This announcement says he has found a way, which may give him some comfort but is profoundly disappointing to anyone who cares about public interest journalism.

There’s no longer any prospect of his children from his first and second marriages, Prudence, Elisabeth and James, who are now known as the “departing beneficiaries”, staging a coup after his death to wrest control from Rupert’s chosen successor and elder son Lachlan, who has headed News Corporation and Fox Corporation since Murdoch stepped aside in 2023.

Lachlan has taken a lesson from Rupert’s dealmaking playbook. He has thrown money at the problem by paying his three siblings more than he had previously offered for their respective shares. According to The New York Times, the three siblings will receive US$1.1 billion (A$1.7 billion) each for all their shares in the company.

Their agreement brings an end to the bitter battle the three siblings fought with their father and brother over the latter’s infamous attempt to revoke a seemingly irrevocable trust created at the end of Murdoch’s longest marriage, of 32 years, to Anna Murdoch (now Anna Maria dePeyster).

She had hated how her husband pitted their children against one another in the battle for succession, so she negotiated an agreement that would give each of the four children from the first two marriages a vote in the family trust. It also ensured Rupert retained enough votes in the trust so he could not be outvoted by his four (voting) children.

When Rupert anointed Lachlan his successor, upsetting the others, speculation was aired that when Rupert died, and his votes with him, the three siblings might oust Lachlan as chief executive and take control of the company. Worse, in Rupert’s eyes, they might change the editorial direction of the company, in particular Fox News.

That is what has changed. The family trust has also been re-engineered with an increased lifespan from 2030 to 2050, and folds in Murdoch’s daughters from his third marriage, to Wendi Deng – Grace and Chloe. This shores up the trust so they can’t sell out and dilute Lachlan’s shareholding.

Under the deal, a new company called Holdco, owned by Lachlan, Grace and Chloe, will own all the remaining shares of News Corp and Fox Corporation that previously had been held by the Murdoch family trust. The departing beneficiaries will sell their personal holdings in News Corp and Fox so none of them has any interest in either business. What’s more, they’ve agreed to a standstill clause that prevents them or their affiliates buying back in.

In 2019 alone, the company News Corporation made a reported US$71 billion (A$107 billion) from the sale of its entertainment assets to Disney. After that sale, the children were each given US$2 billion (just over A$3 billion).

Having already been referred to in the litigation as “white, privileged, multi billionaire trust-fund babies”, the three departing siblings have been made even wealthier by this agreement.

It was announced in a company press release on September 8 with an uncharacteristically sedate headline: “News Corp announces resolution of Murdoch family trust matter”.

It appears the decision to settle was in part driven by signals emanating from the probate court in Reno, which last year ruled in favour of Prudence, Elisabeth and James. Recently, however, the presiding appellate judge, Lynne Jones, appeared supportive of Rupert and Lachlan, saying “Who knows better than Rupert Murdoch the strengths and weaknesses of his family and his children?”

This may have weakened the three children’s bargaining power and forced them to accept some sort of buyout.

James may have contributed to this by granting an interview to The Atlantic which was published in February, in which he was highly critical of his father and gave away inside information from the probate hearings. Rupert and Lachlan’s lawyers pushed for James to be punished, a move that appeared to have support from the Reno court.

Clearly it was wishful thinking to believe Prudence, Elisabeth and James would stage a takeover and restore sensible programming to the Murdoch media. But it remains an irony, in a case replete with them, that it was James’ candid comments in an insightful 13,000-word profile casting much-needed light on a notoriously secretive family, which weakened the three siblings’ bargaining position.

Those comments helped ensure Rupert, and ultimately Lachlan, will be able to continue running their media empire as they see fit. Initially, that will mean little change, which is of course the problem. If News mastheads and Fox News continue as they have, we can look forward to more coverage denying the need to urgently act on climate change, more distortion of important issues and more support for assaults on democracy by the Trump administration. This is the kind of content that prompted James, if not all of the departing beneficiaries, to protest in the first place.

At least now we know the answer to this question: What choice would three multi billionaires make if they were offered another billion dollars each or the opportunity to transform a global media business for the better?

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Murdoch resolves succession drama – a win for Lachlan; a loss for public interest journalism – https://theconversation.com/murdoch-resolves-succession-drama-a-win-for-lachlan-a-loss-for-public-interest-journalism-264866

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Steven Chown, Director, Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future and Professor of Biological Sciences, Monash University

Our planet continues to warm because of greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. The polar regions are especially vulnerable to this warming. Sea ice extent is already declining in both the Arctic and Antarctic. The Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are melting, and abrupt changes in both polar environments are underway.

These changes have significant implications for society through sea level rise, changes to ocean circulation and climate extremes. They also have substantial consequences for polar ecosystems, including polar bears and emperor penguins, which have become iconic symbols of the impacts of climate change.

The most effective way to mitigate these changes, and lower the risk of widespread impacts, is reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet decarbonisation is slow, and current projections suggest temperature increases of roughly 3°C by 2100.

Given the expected change, and the importance of the polar regions for planetary health, some scientists and engineers have proposed technological approaches, known as geoengineering, to soften the blow to the Arctic and Antarctic.

In research published today in Frontiers in Science, my colleagues and I assessed five of the most developed geoengineering concepts being considered for the polar regions. We found none of them should be used in the coming decades. They are extremely unlikely to mitigate the effects of global warming in polar regions, and are likely to have serious adverse and unintended consequences.

What is polar geoengineering?

Geoengineering encompasses a wide range of ideas for deliberate large-scale attempts to modify Earth’s climate. The two broadest classes involve removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and increasing the amount of sunlight reflected back into space (known as “solar radiation modification”).

For the polar regions, here are the five most developed concepts.

Stratospheric aerosol injection is a solar radiation modification approach that involves introducing finer particles (such as sulphur dioxide or titanium dioxide) into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight back out to space. In this case, the focus is specifically on the polar regions.

Sea curtains are flexible, buoyant structures anchored to the seafloor at 700 metres to 1,000m depth and rising 150m to 500m. The aim is to prevent warm ocean water from reaching and melting ice shelves (floating extensions of ice that slow the movement of ice from Greenland and Antarctica into the ocean) and the grounding lines of ice sheets (where the land, ice sheet and ocean meet).

Sea ice management includes two concepts. The first is the scattering of glass microbeads over fresh Arctic sea ice to make it more reflective and help it survive longer. The second is pumping seawater onto the sea ice surface, where it will freeze, with the aim of thickening the ice – or into the air to produce snow, to the same general effect, using wind-powered pumps.

Basal water removal targets the ice streams found in the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets. These streams are fast-moving rivers of ice that flow toward the coast, where they can enter the ocean and raise sea levels. Water at their base acts as a lubricant. This concept proposes to remove water from their base to increase friction and slow the flow. The concept is thought to be especially relevant to Antarctica, which has much less surface melting than Greenland, and therefore melt is more about the base of the ice sheet than its surface.

Ocean fertilisation involves adding nutrients such as iron to polar oceans to promote the growth of phytoplankton. These tiny creatures absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which gets stored in the deep ocean when they die and sink.

The risk of false hopes

In our research, we assessed each of these concepts against six criteria. These included: scope of implementation; feasibility; financial costs; effectiveness; environmental risks; and governance challenges.

This framework offers an objective way of assessing all such concepts for their merits.

None of the proposed polar geoengineering concepts passed scrutiny as concepts that are workable over the coming decades. The criteria we used show each of the concepts faces multiple difficulties.

For example, to cover 10% of the Arctic Ocean with pumps to deliver seawater to freeze within ten years, one million pumps per year would need to be deployed. The estimated costs of sea curtains (US$1 billion per kilometre) are underestimates of similar-scale projects in easier environments, such as the Thames Barrier near London, by six to 25 times.

One project that planned to spread glass microbeads on ice has also been shut down citing environmental risks. And at their most recent meeting, the majority of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties made clear their view that geoengineering should not be conducted in the region.

Polar geoengineering proposals raise false hopes for averting some disastrous consequences of climate change without rapidly cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

They risk encouraging complacency about the urgency of achieving net zero emissions by 2050 or may be used by powerful actors as an excuse to justify continued emissions.

The climate crisis is a crisis. Over the time available, efforts are best focused on decarbonisation. The benefits are rapidly realisable within the near term.

Steven Chown receives funding from the Australian Research Council and The Wellcome Trust. He is the lead of the Action Group on Climate for the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, a patron of the Mouse-Free Marion project, a member of the Korea Polar Research Institute’s Policy Advisory Panel, and chair of the White Desert Foundation’s Grant Advisory Panel.

– ref. High-tech plans to save polar ice will fail, new research finds – https://theconversation.com/high-tech-plans-to-save-polar-ice-will-fail-new-research-finds-264794

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Romain Fathi, Senior Lecturer, School of History, ANU / Chercheur Associé at the Centre d’Histoire de Sciences Po, Australian National University

Over the past year, French President Emmanuel Macron has emerged as one of the most influential leaders on the global stage.

His diplomatic activism has reshaped alliances, advanced European priorities and positioned France as a central player in addressing some of the world’s most pressing challenges.

In recent months alone, Macron has:

• cemented a coalition to offer Ukraine security guarantees and military support from 26 countries

• convinced many countries to follow France’s lead in recognising a state of Palestine

• secured a massive trade deal with Vietnam, strategic agreements with Indonesia, and cooperation deals with Brazil and Singapore

• pushed for a High Seas Treaty to protect the world’s oceans.

Domestically, however, his presidency is in crisis. His approval ratings have plummeted to as low as 15% as he has grappled with political paralysis, public discontent and a fragmented National Assembly.

The latest blow to Macron’s presidency occurred this week when his chosen prime minister was ousted by the assembly after serving just 270 days.

This domestic instability has raised questions about France’s – and Macron’s – political future. Some in France are calling for him to step aside before the end of his term in April 2027, triggering new elections.

Revolving door of prime ministers

Macron’s troubles began after his re-election in April 2022 against Marine Le Pen, a victory seen by many as a vote against the far right rather than an endorsement of his agenda.

Traditionally, a freshly elected president gains a strong parliamentary majority, but Macron’s coalition lost its majority in the June 2022 legislative elections.

The first prime minister of his second term, Élisabeth Borne, resigned after 19 months, amid a public and legislative backlash against Macron’s pension reforms. Her successor, Gabriel Attal, faced the same legislative deadlock and did not last six months.

In June 2024, Macron dissolved the National Assembly, hoping fresh elections would resolve the persistent political instability. It backfired. The elections produced an even more fragmented parliament, making governance nearly impossible.

It took Macron seven weeks to appoint a new prime minister, Michel Barnier, during which time France successfully hosted the 2024 Olympics under a caretaker government, a rare bright spot in the political chaos.

Barnier lasted just three months. His replacement, François Bayrou, resigned this week after a resounding no-confidence vote.

Macron has few good options

Macron wasted no time in appointing a successor this week, Sébastien Lecornu, whose key mission will be to pass the October budget.

The 39-year-old Lecornu is a Macron faithful and has been a member of every government since Macron become president in 2017. He has most recently served as a steady defence minister during the Russian war on Ukraine.

At this stage, however, the new government is not likely to last long, for the same reason the others have fallen: a politically fragmented National Assembly that has sought to oppose Macron at every opportunity. Key to Lecornu’s survival will be his ability to appoint well-known ministers from both the moderate left and moderate right, a difficult equation.

Macron has few options to address the bitter opposition he faces in the assembly. He could dissolve the body again, but this risks further empowering the far left and far right, who are pushing for new elections.

Or, he could buckle to the pressure to resign. However, there is no legal obligation for him to do so, and he remains committed to serving out his term.

Growing popular frustration

This decision risks making him even more unpopular in the short term.

Many citizens blame Macron for the current instability, dating back to his election in 2017. When he came into office, Macron revolutionised the French political landscape. The country had traditionally been ruled by either the moderate left (the Socialists) or the moderate right (the Republicans). But Macron delivered a majority at the centre, which had not been seen since 1974.

The issue, however, is that this weakened the moderate left and right. By siphoning supporters from both sides to build his coalition, he decimated the Socialists and Republicans. This in turn gave more power to the far left and far right to become a more vocal and destabilising opposition.

The public also widely views Macron’s decision to call snap elections last year as a reckless gamble that only deepened the country’s divisions.

And his pension reforms, economic policies and perceived favouritism towards the wealthy continue to fuel public anger.

In fact, Macron faces a new wave of nationwide protests on Wednesday called Bloquons Tout (Let’s Block Everything) over economic inequality, rising costs of living and his policies.

Where to from here?

Macron insists it’s his duty to uphold France’s institutions, even in turbulent times. He has signalled his intention to stay the course, using his constitutional powers to govern, despite the lack of a stable majority.

Yet, the French public is growing impatient. His optimism and resilience are being tested as never before.

The coming months will be crucial. If he can pass the budget and restore some stability, he may yet salvage his second term.

If not, France could face a prolonged period of political paralysis, with no clear resolution in sight, at least not until the next scheduled presidential election in April 2027.

Macron can’t run in 2027 – he is barred from serving for more than two consecutive terms. However, he may have ambitions to run again in 2032, despite how toxic his brand has become.

In the end, Macron’s legacy may hinge on how he navigates the current crisis. Paradoxically, although the French have lost confidence in his domestic political vision for France, the moderate majority still believes the potential alternatives (such as Le Pen) are far riskier, and Macron knows this.

Romain Fathi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Emmanuel Macron’s presidency is in survival mode. How did France’s political paralysis get so bad? – https://theconversation.com/emmanuel-macrons-presidency-is-in-survival-mode-how-did-frances-political-paralysis-get-so-bad-264870

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jeff Bachman, Associate Professor, Department of Peace, Human Rights & Cultural Relations, American University School of International Service

Is the conflict in Eastern Europe a “special military operation in Ukraine” or a “Russian invasion”? And when it comes to events in the Middle East, are we talking about the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” the “War on Gaza” or the “Israel-Hamas war”?

As scholars who study international security, we know that how people refer to a war matters. The name may, for example, signal the speaker’s perspective on who is responsible for the fighting and, therefore, to blame for the death and destruction that follows.

We explored this idea as part of a recent analysis of how scholars discussed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 compared with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The results of our research show that scholars used diametrically opposed language in describing and referring to the two wars. While the vast majority described the conflict between Iraq and the U.S. as the “Iraq war” – referencing just one of the participants – the most common ways of referring to the current conflict in Eastern Europe are variations of the “Russia-Ukraine War” – which includes both participants.

This sparked our interest into delving deeper into war-naming conventions. What we found is that the way wars are referred to in the U.S. – by politician, journalists and in public scholarship – tends to serve state interests and power rather than necessarily reflect the realities of conflicts.

War-naming conventions

There are a number of different ways in which wars are named, but they can be broadly grouped around place, participants or time.

In the first category, you have examples ranging from the “Vietnam War” to the “Falklands War.” Both examples, incidentally, highlight the fact that a war’s name may differ from place to place. The Vietnam War is the “American War” to the Vietnamese, and Argentinians talk of the “War of the Malvinas.”

In the second category are conflicts such as the “Spanish-American War,” the “Franco-Prussian War” and the “Sino-Japanese War” of 1894–1895. These are also subject to some variation, known in France and China as the “War of 1870” and the “Jiawu war,” respectively.

Wars are named after other conventions, too. They can be named after significant factors that make them stand out – examples include holidays in which the conflict took place in the case of the “Yom Kippur War” – or how long they last, such as the “Thirty Years’ War.”

At first look, naming wars after their location, participants, starting date or duration might appear to be an exercise in objective detachment. But examining why one naming convention is used over another can reveal a particular perspective or bias.

Historian Danny Keenan has demonstrated how decisions are made in naming wars that may imply culpability among the actors involved. He notes that what has come to be known as the “New Zealand Wars” was once referred to as “The Māori Wars.”

“It was generally acknowledged that Māori should not bear such responsibility” implied by the earlier name, writes Keenan.

The New Zealand/Māori Wars name change gets at a wider point that naming conflicts after one participant can be problematic, especially when there is a power imbalance.

Take the British naming of their colonial wars after the populations they were subjugating, such as the “Xhosa Wars” or the “Mahdist War.” Naming an interstate war based on the state in which the war is fought – while omitting the name of outside instigators – implies the culpability of that state.

And more powerful actors, such as colonial powers, have historically been able to make their chosen name stick, obscuring their role in the violence.

When apparent objectivity belies bias

While naming wars after both participants seemingly avoids these biases, what becomes evident is that the order in which participants are listed matters. For example, the “Philippine-American War” – fought between 1899-1902 – may imply that the U.S. engaged in that conflict only in response to the actions of an antagonist, even though it was the U.S. that was seeking to deny the Philippines independence.

The results of our research into the U.S.’s and Russia’s respective invasions of Iraq and Ukraine demonstrate how different naming conventions are used politically.

“Iraq war,” we argue, suggests full culpability on Iraq for the war being fought on its territory, despite Iraq having not attacked the U.S. or its allies. It also entirely omits the U.S., even though it was the invading force.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, is referred to by public scholars and media in a variety of ways that emphasize Russia or President Vladimir Putin as an aggressive antagonist. Examples include Russia’s “murderous war on Ukraine”; “Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine”; and “Russian war against Ukraine.”

The New York Times and Foreign Policy Magazine include articles about the war under the topic heading “Russia-Ukraine War,” and The Washington Post and the magazine Foreign Affairs do so under “War in Ukraine.”

Although “War in Ukraine” employs the location naming convention, the other headlines and topic headings use the participants convention, leading with Russia as the antagonist. Noticeably absent is any reference to the “Ukraine War.”

What to call the Middle East conflict?

The naming of the current conflict in the Middle East presents its own issues.

The New York Times and Foreign Affairs, both of which we analyzed for our research, as well as other U.S.-based popular news media such as USA Today and Detroit Free Press, all headline their coverage of Gaza and Israel with the “Israel-Hamas War.”

Based on what research tells us regarding naming conventions, what might this tell us?

First, consider the placement of Israel first. This could identify Israel as the aggressor. However, the use of “Hamas” over “Gaza” is noteworthy. Hamas is recognized by the U.S. and most of the Western world as a terrorist organization. As such, placing Israel first actually can be understood as a legitimation of Israel’s violence.

Also, their is no mention of Palestine, Palestinians, Gaza or Gazans.

This is despite Israeli actions long superseding the targeting of Hamas. Israel’s plans now include the full occupation of, at least, large parts of Gaza and the potential displacement of Gaza’s people.

The move away from the use of “Palestinian” cannot, we argue, be assumed to be incidental. Since October 2023, mentions of the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict have seemingly become rarer, despite the growing, and related, violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Finally, the use of the term “war” in referring to the “Israeli-Hamas war” can itself be problematic as it indicates a certain level of symmetry.

In the current conflict in Gaza, that is not the case: Israel possesses a far superior and advanced military. And since the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, in which 1,200 Israelis were killed, those killed have nearly entirely been Palestinians – over 63,000 as of September 2025.

The difference in size and capability between Israel’s military and Hamas is such that using the term “war” is, we believe, misleading.

It may be more accurate to describe it as an “occupation” or “a noninternational armed conflict.” A growing number of international bodies are calling it a “genocide.”

Challenging war narratives

How media, scholars and politicians refer to specific wars says a lot about how they would like them to be perceived. It is not coincidence, we argue, that wars and violence perpetrated by the U.S. and its allies are typically named in ways that contribute to a beneficial narrative, while the opposite is true when those deemed U.S. enemies are involved.

Repetition of such names for war and violence can reinforce narratives that serve state interests – it makes sense, therefore, for state officials to propagate names that potentially misinform. When news media and experts do the same, however, it undermines society’s ability to substantially challenge dominant framings in times of war.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When it comes to wars − from the Middle East to Ukraine − what we call them matters – https://theconversation.com/when-it-comes-to-wars-from-the-middle-east-to-ukraine-what-we-call-them-matters-263388