Category: The Conversation – Global Perspectives

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Benjamin Isakhan, Professor of International Politics, Deakin University

Since October 2023, Israel’s war in Gaza has caused mass human suffering. But it has also brought devastation to the cultural heritage of the Palestinian people.

In our recent article in the International Journal of Heritage Studies, we documented the extent of heritage destruction in Gaza and analysed the strikingly limited response by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

We argue that UNESCO’s failures have consequences beyond Gaza, as they weaken deterrence of attacks on heritage sites globally and risk normalising impunity for these types of crimes in conflict.

Heritage destruction in Gaza

Gaza has a rich and layered heritage, with archaeological traces dating to at least 1300 BCE. It has long sat at the crossroads of many cultures, and has been controlled by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks and Romans.

Gaza is also home to historical sites important to the three main faiths of the region – Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Much of this cultural heritage now lies in ruin. UNESCO’s Gaza damage assessment list includes 150 sites that have been damaged or destroyed since the war began.

Some of these are globally significant sites. Two are on UNESCO’s World Heritage Tentative List:

• the Wadi Gaza Coastal Wetlands, considered a reserve of outstanding biodiversity

• the Anthedon Harbor, Gaza’s oldest known seaport, inhabited between 800 BCE and 1100 CE.

Other damaged or destroyed sites include:

• the Greek Orthodox Saint Porphyrios Church, which dates to 425 CE and is sometimes referred to as the third-oldest church in the world

• the seventh-century Great Omari Mosque, thought to be the first mosque in Gaza, along with its 13th-century library containing rare Islamic manuscripts

• the Qasr al-Basha, a fortress also known as Pasha Palace, which was built in the mid-13th century by the Mamluk sultanate and had been turned into an archaeological museum

• a Roman cemetery (Ard-al-Moharbeen), thought to have at least 134 tombs dating back to 200 BCE.

UNESCO’s failures

Apart from creating this list, UNESCO has been relatively muted in its response, compared with the role the agency has played in other conflicts.

This doesn’t mean it’s been completely silent. It has issued several statements condemning the destruction in Gaza and calling on “all involved parties to strictly adhere to international law”.

It has also elevated one heritage site to its List of World Heritage in Danger – the Saint Hilarion Monastery. Taking this step strengthens the protections around the site, with potential penalties for intentional damage.

Yet, despite these efforts, we question whether UNESCO has truly met the moment. Our analysis identifies a pattern of omission and understatement that is difficult to reconcile with UNESCO’s own mandate and the legal architecture that exists to protect cultural property in armed conflict.

For example, UNESCO has failed to publicly invoke the 1954 Hague Convention in relation to Gaza, which aims to protect cultural sites during conflict. The agency has cited it in virtually every major conflict since its ratification.

It also didn’t seek urgent action from the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly to protect cultural sites. The agency did this in response to the Islamic State’s acts in Syria and Iraq (including the desecration of the World Heritage site of Palmyra). In 2017, for instance, the security council passed a resolution backed by UNESCO that laid out a number of steps to help protect cultural heritage in conflict.

Similarly, UNESCO has not worked with the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice to initiate proceedings against Israel or Israeli officials for the destruction of heritage in Gaza. The agency did this after conflicts in the Balkans and Mali. These trials established the intentional destruction of cultural property during conflict as a war crime.

Finally, UNESCO has not taken its usual approach of explicitly naming Israel as the perpetrator of cultural destruction in Gaza. It has taken this step in many recent conflicts. This includes Ukraine, where is has frequently named and condemned Russia as the perpetrator.

Why has UNESCO been so cautious?

One explanation offered by critics is geopolitical constraint. UNESCO has increasingly been criticised for an overdependence on voluntary state contributions. This can make the agency reluctant to confront powerful countries for fear of alienating supporters.

This dynamic is certainly evident in UNESCO’s long and strained relationship with Israel and the US. Both formally withdrew from UNESCO in 2019 because the agency had described Israel as an occupying power in Gaza and the West Bank, and condemned its destruction of Palestinian heritage.

But we argue there’s something more troubling occurring – the erosion of UNESCO’s willingness and capacity to activate the legal and normative tools it helped build.

Once a mighty advocate for the protection of culture worldwide, UNESCO has slowly withered into a largely ineffective and technocratic agency that sidesteps complex issues and is hamstrung by internal division.

UNESCO’s response

In response to the arguments raised here, UNESCO sent a detailed email explaining its actions on heritage protection in Gaza. These are some of the points raised by a UNESCO spokesperson:

On citing the 1954 Hague Convention:

Across different conflicts, UNESCO sometimes explicitly cites the 1954 Hague Convention […] and in other instances use the broader formulation “international law”.

UNESCO also communicates with the concerned Member States bilaterally […] This has been done on several occasions through correspondence addressed to the authorities of Israel, for example to remind Israel of its obligations under the 1954 Hague Convention.

On explicitly naming Israel as a perpetrator:

UNESCO is not a judiciary body, therefore its role is not to assign responsibility. In specific case of Ukraine, there are several Security Council and/or UNESCO governing bodies decisions that may explain specific statements.

On the lack of willpower to use its tools and resources on Gaza:

UNESCO activates its legal, normative and programmatic tools within the remits of its mandate and available funds. The needs are enormous, and we take this opportunity to renew UNESCO’s call in support of the people of Gaza.

Why Gaza matters

UNESCO’s limited response to the destruction in Gaza matters. Heritage protection is not only about salvaging damaged sites and trying to rebuild them. It’s also vital for defining unacceptable conduct and deterring future violations.

When the world’s foremost body on the protection of cultural heritage limits itself to cautious generalities, it fosters a permissive environment. It allows this destruction to be treated as regrettable collateral damage of war, rather than an actionable crime. This undermines UNESCO’s credibility.

It can also set a dangerous precedent. If the large-scale destruction of heritage occurs in full view of the world, with no repercussions, future belligerents may believe the costs of heritage crimes will be tolerated.

Benjamin Isakhan has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the United Kingdom Research and Innovation fund, and the Australian Department of Defence.

Eleanor Childs does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Gaza’s cultural sites have been decimated. UNESCO’s muted response sets a dangerous precedent – https://theconversation.com/gazas-cultural-sites-have-been-decimated-unescos-muted-response-sets-a-dangerous-precedent-275091

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jane Goodall, Emeritus Professor, Writing and Society Research Centre, Western Sydney University

Anyone who engages in serious dialogue with a Large Language Model (LLM) may get the impression they are interacting with an intelligence. But many experts in the field argue the impression is just that. In philosopher Daniel Dennett’s words, such systems display “competence without comprehension”.

The hype about Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) from big corporations and their celebrity spokespersons has prompted a backlash, in which scepticism turns to cynicism, often tinged with paranoia about how “stochastic parrots” may start to control our lives.

“Intelligence” itself has become an overheated topic, one that calls for less assertiveness, more cool thinking, and refreshed attempts at a starting point.

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Review: What is Intelligence: Lessons from AI about Evolution, Computing, and Minds – Blaise Agüera y Arcus (MIT Press)

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What Is Intelligence? by Google luminary Blaise Agüera y Arcus is the first book in a new series from MIT in collaboration with Antikythera, a think tank focused on “planetary-scale computation as a philosophical, technological, and geopolitical force”. A foreword from series editor Benjamin Bratton makes the bold claim that “computation is a technology to think with” and that the building blocks of our reality are themselves computational.

Research on intelligence has a chequered history, tainted by eugenics, statistical manipulation and a banal obsession with metrics. Agüera y Arcas counters this by opening up the topic as wide as it can go. A physics graduate with a background in computational neuroscience, he is something of a polymath. He draws explanatory frameworks from microbiology, philosophy, linguistics, cybernetics, neuroscience and industrial history.

His book presents almost as a sequence of foundation lectures in these areas. Its release has been accompanied by dozens of online talks and interviews, in which Agüera y Arcas presents the case that we are up for a seismic shift in how we think about intelligence – biological and artificial.

“Few mainstream authors claim that AI is ‘real’ intelligence,” he writes. “I do.”

Could the nerds be right?

The fundamental case against the “I” in AI is that intelligence is organic, derived from sensory interaction with a physical environment. Agüera y Arcas turns the tables with the premise that computation is the substrate for intelligence in all life forms.

The claim builds on an apparently crude proposition: prediction is the fundamental principle behind intelligence and “may be the whole story”.

What he means by prediction here is something much more radical than what we see with autocorrect. He explains it in biological terms as a process of pattern development. Single cells like bacteria predict sequences of events that may influence their capacity for survival. The synaptic learning rules in single neurons give rise to local sequence prediction.

Agüera y Arcas recounts how his journey into the enigmatic terrain of AI reached a turning point with his counterintuitive recognition that “the nerds were right”: in computation, bigger really was better and might actually be the key to moving from Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) – the kind that can play chess – to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), which can participate in a philosophical discussion.

Setting aside his contempt for the apparently simplistic dedication to scaling up, Agüera y Arcas returned to the biology lab for a reassessment of what was observable in living systems. If every form of life is an aggregation of cooperative parts, he reasoned, the evolution of cells into organs and organisms may be a matter of predictive modelling.

A central tenet of What is Intelligence? is that every form of life is an aggregation of cooperative parts. Links proliferate through patterns that enable increasingly complex functions. When Agüera y Arcas says the brain is computational, it’s not a metaphor: it is not that brains are like computers, they are computers.

Correlations between biological and mechanical forms of intelligence are his deep and abiding interest. What is Intelligence? follows What is Life?, a shorter book in which Agüera y Arcas lays the groundwork for this larger, more ambitious publication.

The two questions remain interwoven, if not fused, in his analysis, which draws on the foundational work of physicist Ewin Schrödinger, mathematicians Alan Turing, John von Neumann and Norbert Weiner, and microbiologist Lynn Margulis.

These are the originators of modern thinking about artificial intelligence, and the quest for origins runs through all Agüera y Arcas’ lines of enquiry.

It is worth noting that Antikythera, the publishing series launched with this book, is named after an ancient device found in a shipwreck off the coast of Greece, which has been called the original analog computer.

Computation was discovered as much as it was invented, Bratton says in his foreword. This might apply to the Antikythera. If it is indeed the first computer, it was literally discovered at the bottom of an ocean.

But it corroborates Bratton’s statement in another sense. As a device for tracking astronomical phenomena, the Antikythera testifies to computation as an aspect of how the universe works.

Getting specific about origins

Agüera y Arcas wants to get more specific about origins. How does pattern emerge from randomness? How does code emerge from an unorganised soup of molecules?

In approaching these questions, he takes his cue from Turing and von Neumann, whose experiments anticipated the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA in 1953. The 1936 Turing machine established a minimalist prototype for computational function with the simple components of a coded tape and a read/write head. Von Neumann brought in a focus on embodied computation, where the components of the machine or body are part of what is written.

This is where Agüera y Arcas situates his work. His breakthrough came from adopting a programming language, devised in 1993, called “Brainfuck”. With just eight command symbols, Brainfuck set the parameters for a controlled experiment, in which Agüera y Arcas and his team used 64 byte tapes coded with “junk” drawn from a soup of code and data.

In the experiment, two tapes are selected at random, joined end to end, and run to test for interaction patterns. Then it’s rinse and repeat. The tapes are returned to the soup, and two more are run.

At first, nothing much shows up amidst the randomness. But after a million or so repeats (not massive in computing terms) the magic starts to happen. Loops appear. Patterns emerge. At around the five million mark, the non-functional code or “Turing gas” transforms itself into a “computorium” of replicating code.

In lectures, Agüera y Arcas shows a screenshot of this on his laptop: a vertical line down the centre of the field of data marks the “phase transition”. The image is reproduced on the cover of his book, as an emblem of the paradigm shift he is tracking.

If the transition to replicating code is indeed an expression of what is happening in the development of life forms, the theory of natural selection may lose its claim to primacy as the explanatory model for evolution. Richard Dawkins enthusiasts, hang on to your hats.

Agüera y Arcas does not engage in a polemical critique of Dawkins, but his book brings Margulis, an early adversary of Dawkins, into the centre of the arena. The pair faced off in a public debate in Oxford in 2009, where Dawkins’ popularised concept of the “selfish gene” came under pressure from Margulis’ theory of symbiogenesis, literally genesis through combination or fusion.

The Dawkins account is based on a Darwinian view of natural selection through competitive advantage; Margulis was drawing on research into the formation of microorganisms through combinations of mitochondria and chloroplasts, once independent life forms.

It was survival of the fittest versus a vision of biological complexity generated through endosymbiosis, a relationship in which one organism lives inside another, potentially resulting in a new life form – or, as Agüera y Arcas sees it, an impetus towards “fit” understood as pattern completion, rather than “fitness” understood as advantage.

Prediction and function

Agüera y Arcas’ central concepts are prediction and function, which work together to explain intelligence as the development of functional complexity through predictive pattern completion.

He is erasing a familiar conceptual boundary here: intelligence does not prompt function, it is function.

Intelligence, he argues, is a property of systems rather than beings, and function is its primary indicator. A rock does not function, but a kidney does. This is demonstrated simply by cutting them in half. The rock becomes two rocks, but the kidney is no longer a kidney.

So does a kidney have intelligence? Or an amoeba? Or a leaf? These questions are opened up, along with the question of whether Large Language Models have intelligence, which may a better way to frame it than asking whether they are intelligent.

Agüera y Arcas is not alone in taking an affirmative position. Influential biologist Michael Levin runs a research laboratory at Tufts University, where he and his team study the functional correlations between natural organisms and synthetic or chimeric life forms in search of “intelligence behaviour in unfamiliar guises”.

Their declared goal is to develop modes of communication with truly diverse intelligences, including cells, tissues, organs, synthetic living constructs, robots and software-based AIs.

Such an approach steers a course between the stochastic parrots view and biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of “morphic resonance,” which proposes that organic form is a manifestation of memory, resonating through generations as genetic heritage. Agüera y Arcas avoids both Sheldrake’s intuitive and telepathic orientations, and the hard-headed constraints of mechanistic determinism.

The thesis presented in What is Intelligence? is unfamiliar rather than intrinsically difficult. Much of the explanation is easy enough for the general reader to follow, though Agüera y Arcas has a tendency to veer into more the technical and abstract terrain of programming, as if addressing an insider audience. The extensive glossary does not include standard programming terms, such as logic gates, gradients, weights and backpropagation.

At over 600 pages, What is Intelligence? is a marathon read and it is encumbered by tangential excursions. I’m not sure why Agüera y Arcas needs to go into the history of industrialisation, or anthropological studies of the Pirahā people of the Amazon. This is a book for dipping into rather than swallowing whole.

But its ideas are important. They may well be part of a major transformation in our thinking about where human intelligence sits in the rapidly evolving environment of AI.

Jane Goodall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is AI really ‘intelligent’? This philosopher says yes – https://theconversation.com/is-ai-really-intelligent-this-philosopher-says-yes-271721

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Benjamin D. Muir, Casual Academic, School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University

Emily Brontë died of tuberculosis 177 years ago, yet this adaptation is still the worst thing that has ever happened to her.

This is how one Letterbox’d user described writer-director Emerald Fennell’s film adaptation of Brontë’s classic tale.

Reviews for the film are mixed at best. While some critics have praised the visuals, detractors return to the same argument: it is not a good adaptation.

Good adaptations take advantage of the affordances the cinematic medium provides, so some changes are permissible. Fennell goes well beyond this, altering essential characters, relationships and themes to the point that the film feels like erotic fan-fiction with a Hollywood budget.

To synopsise, Brontë’s story is a tragedy of intergenerational trauma. It follows Heathcliff, an abused serial abuser, and Catherine, an intergenerational manipulator. The pair’s toxic relationship – and mutual revenge on everyone they knew (beyond the grave in Catherine’s case) – wreaks havoc.

Visually loud, emotionally mute

Given its tagline “the greatest love story ever told”, Fennell’s film was destined to make some changes.

The frame narrative of the novel is missing. The novel is told through housekeeper Nelly Dean, who is recounting it to Heathcliff’s tenant, Lockwood. The film, meanwhile, starts in Catherine’s childhood and ends at her death.

This also means Fennell stops short of the final act of the novel. In doing so, she omits an entire generation of important characters on whom the original Catherine and Heathcliff – two traumatised, irredeemable wrecking balls – foist their damage.

The interpersonal dynamics that underpin Brontë’s story are warped into a vacuous caricature, missing the point with virtuosic flair. And make no mistake: there is flair. The visual design is bombastic, pointedly anachronistic, and utterly at odds with the novel’s gloomy Gothic countenance.

Brontë’s perpetually grey and haunted moors are swapped for technicolour highlights, elaborate outfits and, at times, saturated tangerine sunsets. It watches like Sofia Coppola attempting Edgar Allan Poe – or a Charli XCX clip (guess who wrote the original soundtrack). This is an odd liberty for a film named after the story’s original setting – the stormy Wuthering Heights estate.

As pioneering Gothic theorists Sanda Gilbert and Susan Gubar write, the Heights in the novel are blanketed by “a general air of sour hatred” that manifests as “continual, aimless violence”.

In the Gothic, setting functions as a haunted presence that reflects the characters’ aberrant psychological states. The past haunts, even when there are no ghosts.

Fennell’s version retains the melodrama, but not the foreboding, hate and malice. And despite the explicit sexuality (none of which appears in the novel beyond euphemism), her take on the story feels oddly toothless. Neutered, even. It trades Gothic for vaudeville.

The erasure of Hindley and Heathcliff

To say the film lacks the novel’s social commentary is an understatement.

From the opening scene, the changes to the source material are clear. We see a young Catherine witnessing a hanged man with an erection – and this tone remains for the entire runtime.

Hindley – Catherine’s brother who forces Heathcliff into servitude, and is arguably the lynchpin of Heathcliff’s revenge – is also entirely absent from the film.

Literary critic Terry Eagleton notes how it is Hindley’s inherited status that enables his abuse of Heathcliff. It is Heathcliff’s lack of wealth, status and property that sees Catherine wed the wealthy Edgar Linton; and, as theorist Arnold Kettle argues, it is Heathcliff’s weaponisation of wealth and inheritance that finally serves as his vehicle for revenge.

To remove these factors is to remove the novel’s entire moral framework.

In the film, Heathcliff’s grievances shrink to Catherine choosing to marry Edgar Linton. This is as close as the film comes to the novel’s treatment of classism, racism and intergenerational trauma.

Likewise, ending on Catherine’s death erases the consequences of the deuteragonists’ manipulations – namely the suffering of their respective children and servants.

The casting of Jacob Elordi as Heathcliff has its own controversy. In the novel, Heathcliff’s ambiguous racial identity, within the context of Georgian England, shapes almost every interaction he has.

Even though it’s not clear what his racial identity is (some scholars point to hints that suggest he may have escaped from slavery), his character is defined by “othering”. This is something Elordi’s Heathcliff is at no risk of believably experiencing.

The film flattens the novel’s broader account of how trauma replicates across generations, and how systemic marginalisation can both attract and beget abuse.

On abuse – perhaps Fennell’s strangest departure from the source material is reframing Heathcliff’s treatment of Isabella (Edgar Linton’s sister and later Heathcliff’s wife) as a consensual BDSM dynamic.

Brontë’s Heathcliff terrorises Isabella physically and emotionally, and implicitly sexually, until she flees with their son.

The switch from repressed, complex desire in the novel to explicit sex scenes (absent from the book), and the rewriting of abuse as kink, seems to cater to audiences raised on post-50 Shades Of Grey erotica rather than Victorian Gothic.

Literary classics for a Tiktok generation

Like 2020’s colourful Austen adaptation, Emma (well received as a film, but criticised as an adaptation), Fennell’s Wuthering Heights signals a trend towards the “tiktokification” of literary adaptations.

Hollywood has long taken liberties with books, but this recent wave feels engineered for clips, reels and virality, rather than the necessary sacrifices of adaptation.

We know it’s possible to have adaptations with both flair and substance. Consider Baz Luhrmann. The Oscar-nominated Romeo + Juliet (1996) is just as visually bombastic, yet the extent of verbatim Shakespeare retains a dedication to the source that Fennell’s film lacks.

So what does it have to offer? Virality. Even this article contributes to the internet firestorm that will ensure Wuthering Heights’ commercial success. It will ragebait critics far longer than such a limp effort deserves – and we are all its victims.

Benjamin D. Muir does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Wuthering Heights looks lush – but it’s a bad film and a worse adaptation – https://theconversation.com/wuthering-heights-looks-lush-but-its-a-bad-film-and-a-worse-adaptation-276179

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Felicity Deane, Professor of Trade Law and Taxation, Queensland University of Technology

US President Donald Trump has announced the United States will increase baseline tariffs on imports from all countries to 15%, as the fallout continues from a seismic Supreme Court ruling on Friday.

Trump had imposed sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” last year under an emergency powers act, but the court ruled this law did not authorise him to do so.

Speaking in the wake of the ruling on Friday, Trump admonished the justices of the Supreme Court. He called the Democratic justices who ruled against the tariffs a “disgrace to the nation”.

He also said he felt “ashamed” of members of the court he considered conservative who had voted against his use of emergency powers.

Trump’s statement was riddled with insults and inaccuracies. However, he admitted he had tried to “make things simple” by using the emergency powers act. He went on to say he does have other options, but those options would take more time. This was one part of his speech that was indeed accurate.

With the clock already ticking on his landmark trade agenda, and the multi-billion dollar question of refunds looming, what might Trump do next? Here’s what could now be in store for both Australia and the world.

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Read more:
Supreme Court rules against Trump’s emergency tariffs – but leaves key questions unanswered

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Scrambling for alternatives

The new 15% rate is an increase on the 10% global baseline tariff enacted shortly after the ruling using a different law, and will hit some Australian exports.

This part of the law has never been used. However, it appears to clearly allow the president to impose tariffs of up to 15%, and for a period of no more than 150 days.

But Trump said during this five-month period, his administration would investigate the use of yet another law, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.

This section does allow the president to impose tariffs in response to foreign countries who violate US rights under international trade agreements, or that burden or restrict US commerce in “unjustifiable”, “unreasonable” or “discriminatory” ways. However, it requires some steps to be followed.

The process for using this law is detailed and cannot be subverted. It would likely take either years or vast amounts of resources to introduce tariffs that were anywhere near the “Liberation Day” tariffs.

If nothing else, it requires consultations with the countries upon whose goods those tariffs will be imposed.

Section 301 has previously been used to impose tariffs on China, following an investigation by the United States Trade Representative in 2018.

Another option

Another avenue for the president to bypass Congress is a specific section of a different law, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, that applies to a particular sector of the economy.

This is the power used to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium in the first Trump administration in 2018.

However, it can’t be used to recreate sweeping tariffs on all foreign imports. This provision is generally product-specific and requires an investigation into the national security threat.

Its use to impose steel and aluminium tariffs has been challenged by multiple trading partners at the World Trade Organization. A panel of experts ruled the US had used a special national security exception erroneously.

However, despite this violation, Trump has suggested that he isn’t bound by international law.

The question of refunds

The Supreme Court’s ruling on Friday means all tariffs introduced under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were unlawfully collected.

If all collected duties are refunded, it’s estimated the total repayment could reach approximately US$175 billion (A$247 billion).

Much to the president’s frustration, there was no clarity within the Supreme Court’s ruling on the process for refunds of illegally collected tariffs.

That silence, which prompted Trump to refer to the decision as “terrible” and “defective”, was likely because this would be handled by other courts.

Back in December, the US Court of International Trade stated it would have the authority to order reliquidation and refunds of the sweeping tariffs if the Supreme Court ultimately ruled them unlawful.

Many large companies had already anticipated this ruling, and acted to get on the front foot. For example, in late November, large retailer Costco sued the Trump administration to secure a full refund of tariffs in the event the Supreme Court deemed them unlawful.

In late December, faced with an avalanche of similar cases, the Court of International Trade temporarily halted all cases where companies were claiming relief from IEEPA tariffs ahead of the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Refunds may not be straightforward

Some importers have argued that because the tariff payments were itemised, receiving refunds should not be messy.

But the process for refunds may not be as straightforward as it should be. Trump suggested they could be “in court for the next five years”.

What does this all mean for Australia?

Australia’s previous 10% rate was much lower than many other nations, but now at 15% the playing field has been levelled – at least for the next 150 days.

Australian exporters don’t pay these tariffs directly themselves, but may be pressured to absorb some of the cost, and it makes their imports less competitive in the US market.

However, not all Australian exporters are in the same position. The proclamation issued by the White House listed some exceptions, including beef, critical minerals, energy products and pharmaceuticals.

At Friday’s press conference, Trump said “great certainty” had been brought back to the United States and the world. In truth, the uncertainty is far from over.

Felicity Deane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump hikes global tariffs to 15% as the fallout from Supreme Court loss continues – https://theconversation.com/trump-hikes-global-tariffs-to-15-as-the-fallout-from-supreme-court-loss-continues-273105

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Rutland, Professor of Government, Wesleyan University

Perceived wisdom has it that the longer a war goes on, the less enthusiastic a public becomes for continuing the conflict. After all, it is ordinary citizens who tend to bear the economic and human costs.

And yet, as the war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 enters its fifth year, the attitude of the Russian public remains difficult to gauge: Just over half of Russians, according to one recent poll, expect the war to end in 2026; yet a majority say that should negotiations fail, Moscow needs to “escalate” with greater use of force.

As observers of Russian society, we believe this ambiguity in Russian public opinion gives President Vladimir Putin the cover to continue pushing hard for his goals in Ukraine. Yet at the same time, a deeper dive into the Russian public’s apparent support for the war suggests that it is more fragile than the Russian president would like to believe.

Putin’s social contract

From Day 1 of the conflict, Western strategy has been predicated on the belief that economic sanctions would eventually cause either the Russian elite or its society to persuade Putin to abandon the war.

This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the legitimacy of Putinism rests on a social contract of sorts: The Russian people will be loyal to the Kremlin if they enjoy a stable standard of living and are allowed to pursue their private lives without interference from the state.

The Russian economy has been struggling since 2014, so many analysts believed that this social contract was coming under strain even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, after four years of war, the combination of exclusion from European markets and a tripling of military spending has led to economic stagnation and mounting pressure on living standards.

One problem with the social contract approach is that it tends to downplay the role of ideology.

It is possible that Putin’s “Make Russia Great Again” propaganda resonates with a significant part of the Russian public. Polling has consistently placed Putin’s approval rating above 80% since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict.

Of course, the validity of the results of polls in an authoritarian society at war cannot be taken at face value. Yet, one shouldn’t rule out that some of that support is genuine and rests not just on a stable economy but also on popular endorsement of Putin’s pledge to restore Russia’s power and influence on the world stage.

Rallying Russians

Some scholars point to a “rally around the flag” effect. There was an apparent surge in Putin’s approval rating after the use of military force against Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.

It is hard to tell whether the surge in support for Putin reflects a genuine shift in opinion or just a response to media coverage and what people perceive as the acceptable response.

The Kremlin has tried to hide the costs of the war from the public: concealing the true death toll and avoiding full-scale mobilization of conscripts by recruiting highly paid volunteers. It is also trying to keep the economy stable by drawing down the country’s reserve funds.

That leaves open the question of whether the “Putin consensus” will break down at some point in the future if the costs of the war start to hit home for a majority of Russians.

The problem with polls

The consensus view among observers is that a small minority of Russians oppose the war, a slightly larger minority enthusiastically support the war, and the majority passively go along with what the state is doing.

There are still some independent pollsters conducting surveys in Russia that report a high level of support among respondents for the “special military operation” against Ukraine, with figures ranging between 60% and 70%.

A number of researchers have pointed out the difficulty in getting an accurate snapshot of Russian public opinion, given that the polling questions might make the respondent fearful of being accused of breaking laws that penalize “spreading fake news” and “discrediting the army” with a lengthy prison sentence.

The Levada Center, which is still regarded as an independent and relatively reliable pollster, conducts its interviews face to face in people’s homes but has a very low response rate. Polls conducted online, in return for monetary rewards, can try to find demographically balanced respondents, but the problem of wariness about giving answers that are critical of the regime remains. In Russia’s current political environment, refusing to answer or giving a socially acceptable response is a rational strategy.

Some scholars, such as those associated with the Public Sociology Laboratory, which looks at public sentiment in post-Soviet states, still conduct fieldwork inside Russia, sending researchers to live incognito in provincial towns and observe social practices involving support for the war.

Their ethnographic research finds little evidence for a “rally around the flag” effect in provincial Russian society. Other analysts have turned to digital ethnography of social media as an alternative source of insight. But analysts unfamiliar with the local and digital context risk mistaking performative loyalty for genuine belief.

‘Internal emigration’

Most Russian citizens try to avoid political discussion altogether and retreat into what is often described as “internal emigration” – living their own lives while keeping interactions with the authorities to a minimum.

This practice dates back to the Soviet period but resurfaced as political repression increased after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.

There is no doubt that there are many fervent war supporters in Russia. They are quite vocal and visible because the state allows them to be – such as the military bloggers reporting from the front lines.

Apart from looking at opinion polls and social media, one can also probe the level of genuine support for the war by looking at everyday practices. If popular support for the war were enthusiastic, recruitment offices would be overwhelmed. They are not.

Instead, Russia has relied heavily on financial incentives, aggressive advertising, prison recruitment and coercive mobilization. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of men have sought to avoid conscription by leaving the country, hiding from authorities or exploiting legal exemptions.

Symbolic participation follows a similar pattern. State-sponsored Z symbols continue to dominate public space – the letter Z is used as a symbol of support for the war, in slogans such as “Za pobedu,” which translates to “for victory.” But privately displayed signs of support have largely disappeared.

Humanitarian aid to be sent to soldiers on the front lines or occupied Ukraine is often collected through schools and churches, where participation is shaped by social or administrative pressure. But many participants frame their involvement as helping individuals rather than supporting the war itself.

Reality vs. lived experience

High-profile propaganda products frequently fail to resonate. Music charts and streaming platforms in Russia are dominated not by patriotic anthems but by an eclectic mix of songs about personal relationships, such as Jakone’s moody ballad “Eyes As Wet As Asphalt,” songs in praise of “Hoodies” and even a catchy Bashkir folk song.

Book sales show strong demand for works such as George Orwell’s “1984” and Viktor Frankl’s Holocaust memoir “Man’s Search for Meaning,” suggesting that readers are searching for ways to understand authoritarianism, trauma and moral responsibility rather than celebrating militarism.

And instead of watching the state-backed film “Tolerance,” a dystopian tale of moral decay in the West, Russians are streaming the “Heated Rivalry” gay hockey romance.

Putin’s campaign to promote what he sees as traditional values appears not to be cutting through. Divorce rates are among the highest in the world – and birth rates continue to fall.

Heading into the Ukraine war’s fifth year, the gulf between the Kremlin version of reality and the lived experience of ordinary Russians remains. It echoes a pattern we have seen before: In the final decade of the Soviet Union the Kremlin became increasingly out of touch with the views of its people.

History will not necessarily repeat itself – but the masters of the Kremlin should be conscious of the parallels.

Elizaveta Gaufman receives funding from European Union’s Horizon Research and Innovative Programme under Grant Agreement No. 101132671.

Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. As war in Ukraine enters a 5th year, will the ‘Putin consensus’ among Russians hold? – https://theconversation.com/as-war-in-ukraine-enters-a-5th-year-will-the-putin-consensus-among-russians-hold-275666

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emma Shortis, Adjunct Senior Fellow, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University

The stunning arrest of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor by UK police on suspicion of misconduct in public office must have chilled many powerful American men to the bone. They may now wonder: could something like this now happen in the US?

The former prince’s arrest is related to his association with dead sex offender Jeffrey Epstein and allegations he shared confidential material. Andrew has consistently denied wrongdoing and has been released under investigation.

To see UK police making arrests over allegations relating to Epstein contrasts strongly with the US where, so far, little has happened to further investigate those linked to the disgraced financier.

So, will we now see stronger Epstein-related investigative efforts and possibly even arrests in the US? And why haven’t we seen anything like that, so far?

Will this actually prompt stronger action in the US now?

It’s possible. The whole situation is fairly unpredictable, and there has been mounting pressure on people named in the Epstein files to resign or step aside, particularly in higher education.

In Congress, US lawmakers are pushing hard for accountability.

It’s important to remember the collapse of the rule of law in the US is far from inevitable.

The Epstein story still has a long way to play out yet, if only because of the weight of the documentary evidence that needs to be sorted through.

It’s also possible the arrest and potential prosecution of Mountbatten-Windsor (and others outside the UK) may end up revealing more from the Epstein story than has come out of the Department of Justice (DOJ) releases, which have been selective.

If the Mountbatten-Windsor case goes to trial – which is still far from certain – and as the scandal reverberates across Europe, that may end up circumventing efforts we have seen so far from the DOJ to slow-walk the release of Epstein-related documents and information.

Why haven’t big arrests like this happened in the US so far?

The most obvious reason is the stranglehold the Trump administration has on the DOJ.

The performance of the attorney-general, Pam Bondi, in the recent judiciary committee hearing is a fair indication of that.

To have the attorney-general – instead of being accountable and answering legitimate questions about the Epstein files – waxing lyrical about US President Donald Trump being the greatest president in American history tells you a lot about the political capture of that department.

Another extremely unsubtle sign of that capture is the large banner featuring Trump’s face that has just been slung across the Justice Department building.

All this tells you the DOJ is not an independent government department anymore. It has been captured and weaponised by the Trump administration.

It’s the same story at the FBI; instead of taking strong action over revelations appearing the Epstein files, the agency appears to be focused on investigating Trump’s claims about 2020 election “fraud” in Georgia.

That shouldn’t exactly be a surprise, given FBI Director Kash Patel wrote a series of children’s books depicting Trump as an unjustly wronged “king”.

The unfortunate truth is there’s no satisfactory answer as to why no significant arrests have been made in the US in relation to the Epstein files.

It’s partly the Trump administration’s capture of these agencies and departments.

But it’s also that the Epstein scandal implicates so many of the powerful in the US. These are enormous networks that span political divides, including some of the richest people in the world. And, of course, they’re very good at protecting themselves.

It’s also a marker of Trump’s capture of his political base. Viewed from the outside, it defies logic. You’d think a movement that coalesced around conspiracy theories there was a powerful cabal of paedophiles at work in the US would be loudly calling for arrests after the Epstein revelations.

The fact they’re not shows how ingrained their loyalty is, and the depth of the personality cult that has developed around Trump.

This base is far from a majority of the American people, but it is one that has – for now at least – largely captured the major levers of power in the US.

So following Andrew’s arrest, will anything happen in the US? It’s possible, but don’t hold your breath.

The other major news is it now looks increasingly likely Trump is about to start a war in Iran.

It’s common for people to say he does things like that to distract from the Epstein story.

But I see his efforts in Iran (and Venezuela, and elsewhere) as part of a concerted effort to radically reshape American society and the United States’ role in the world. It’s about the reassertion of American power – which Trump understands to mean his own power.

The president unilaterally declaring a war on Iran without the ascent of Congress would defy the law. This is all part of a broader pattern of the Trump administration’s attacks on rule of law and the institutions charged with implementing it.

Overall, Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest throws into stark relief the state of the US compared to other democracies like the UK.

What’s happened in the UK shows the collapse of the rule of law is not inevitable. Institutions can hold, even if they they are slow and deeply flawed.

Perhaps we will one day see institutions in the US working as they are supposed to, too.

Emma Shortis is director of International and Security Affairs at The Australia Institute, an independent think tank.

– ref. Andrew’s arrest: will anything like this now happen in the US? Why hasn’t it so far? – https://theconversation.com/andrews-arrest-will-anything-like-this-now-happen-in-the-us-why-hasnt-it-so-far-276512

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jo Coghlan, Associate Professor, Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, University of New England

When a royal faces scrutiny, it can feel like a rupture with tradition. Yet across the ages, British royals have repeatedly fallen under suspicion. What makes the arrest of Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor so striking is that we have to reach back to the 17th century to find anything comparable.

The royals are by no means strangers to scandal, but allegations of law-breaking are another matter entirely. Mountbatten-Windsor’s fall from grace will have huge repercussions for the British royals, and it also gives us an insight into how the handling of the royals has changed since Queen Elizabeth’s death.

When the crown fell

This is not the first time the British royals have crossed paths with the law. In 1483, Richard III became associated with the disappearance of his nephews, the Princes in the Tower. The two princes were legitimate heirs and therefore direct threats to Richard’s claim to the throne. He was never tried in court, and historians still debate the evidence.

The most dramatic confrontation between monarchy and law came with Charles I. He was accused of treason during the English Civil War. He was arrested in 1649, tried and publicly executed. This act stunned Europe and shattered the belief royals were above the law.

As a consequence, England abolished the monarchy and became a republic under Oliver Cromwell. So the last time a member of the royal family was arrested and tried, the crown itself fell.

That precedent matters because it underscores how rare royal arrests are. For more than three centuries the monarchy has avoided that spectacle. The fact Andrew’s arrest forces comparison with Charles I reveals how rare the moment is.

Reputation as royal strategy

By the 19th century, the monarchy survived less through force and more through reputation. Under Queen Victoria (1837-1901), the crown cultivated domestic virtue and moral seriousness as a shield against instability. Respectability became a strategic defence against scandal.

However, fame and power inevitably lead to very high public interest, and scandals made their way into print culture and later mass media. Prince Albert Victor, the grandson of Queen Victoria, was accused of being Jack the Ripper. It’s a claim historians have largely rejected as conspiracy theory, yet it persists because it speaks to fears about royal cover-ups.

James II was removed from the throne in 1688 during the Glorious Revolution amid claims he undermined Protestantism laws and promoted Catholic officials. His perceived abuse of power, rather than a single prosecutable crime, cost him the throne.

In the 20th century, Edward VIII generated a different kind of unease. After his abdication in 1936, evidence emerged of his sympathy toward Nazi Germany followed by his 1937 meeting with Adolf Hitler in Germany. While there was no prosecution, it did cause serious damage to Edward’s standing and public trust.

The collapse of deference

For much of the 20th century, the monarchy operated within a culture of deference. The press refrained from reporting royals’ private lives and indiscretions were quietly managed. The arrangement insulated the royal family from sustained exposure. However, this began to change after a series of scandals in the 1990s. This eventually led Elizabeth II to call 1992 her annus horribilis.

The rise of tabloid journalism eroded old boundaries, and digital media dissolved them entirely. Silence now intensifies suspicion rather than calming it, as was the case with royal silence about the Princess of Wales’ health in early 2024, forcing them to go public with her cancer battle.

Influence, access and optics

Even before Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest, the optics were damaging.

His arrest lands in this transformed landscape. During his tenure as the United Kingdom’s Special Representative for International Trade and Investment, he cultivated relationships with political leaders and wealthy business figures across the Middle East and Central Asia. Critics questioned whether he blurred the line between official trade promotion and private networking.

The 2010 “cash for access” episode involving Mountbatten-Windsor’s wife Sarah Ferguson deepened that perception. She was filmed offering introductions to Andrew in exchange for substantial payment. Although she apologised and Andrew denied involvement, the imagery of monetised proximity to the crown was corrosive.

In 2021, an undercover investigation suggested the queen’s cousin Prince Michael of Kent was prepared to use his royal status to assist a fictitious company in exchange for payment. He denied wrongdoing, but the harm was done.

A brand without insulation

Under Elizabeth II, longevity conferred authority and steadiness that often softened scandal. Under Charles II, the institution appears more exposed. Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest disrupts and exposes the royal family to reputational damage. While he was later released, the scandal still has a long way to play out.

Charles is a constitutional monarch. He can’t interfere in police investigations or prosecutorial decisions without provoking a constitutional crisis. His authority is symbolic rather than executive.

But he can excise Andrew’s inner circle, including his daughters, further from public life. He has already stripped his brother of his royal titles and told him to leave his home, Royal Lodge.

Yet even that has limits. Charles’s power now rests less on control than on credibility. In a permanently watchful society, judgement is delivered not in private but in full view.

The precedent that lingers

The last time a reigning monarch was arrested, England abolished the monarchy and became a republic. The historical echo is impossible to ignore. It reminds us that when the crown becomes entangled with criminal process, the consequences resonate beyond the individual.

Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest underscores how fragile that trust can be and how decisively it is shaped by the court that really matters, that of public opinion. While Andrew is not the king, the scandal may have been softened if his brother Charles acted more decisevly and sooner to remove him from the inner circles of the monarchy.

Royal scandals chip away at the sense of mystery that has long protected the crown. The monarchy survives not because it holds real political power, but because it represents stability, dignity and something slightly removed from everyday life.

When royals are caught up in scandal, that sense of distance collapses, and the institution can begin to feel more fragile than untouchable.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Could Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest bring down the British monarchy? – https://theconversation.com/could-andrew-mountbatten-windsors-arrest-bring-down-the-british-monarchy-276508

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor has been arrested on suspicion of misconduct in public office. The arrest comes after the US government released files that appeared to indicate he had shared official information with financier and convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein while serving as a trade envoy for the UK. But the police have not given details of exactly what they are investigating.

It is important to be clear that the arrest is not related to accusations of sexual assault or misconduct. In 2022, Mountbatten-Windsor reached a settlement with the late Virginia Giuffre for an undisclosed sum that did not include an admission of liability.

Being named in the Epstein files is not an indication of misconduct. Mountbatten-Windsor has previously denied any wrongdoing in his association with Epstein and and has previously rejected any suggestion he used his time as trade envoy to further his own interests.

What was Mountbatten-Windsor’s official role and why did he lose it?

In 2001, Tony Blair’s government made the then-prince the UK’s special representative for trade and investment. According to the government at the time, his remit was to “promote UK business internationally, market the UK to potential inward investors, and build relationships in support of UK business interests”. He did not receive a salary, but he did go on hundreds of trips to promote British businesses.

Members of the royal family are often deployed by the government on international missions to promote trade. When negotiating with other countries, particularly those which are also monarchies, sending a prominent figure like a royal may help seal the deal. Indeed, the then-government claimed that the former Duke of York’s “unique position gives him unrivalled access to members of royal families, heads of state, government ministers and chief executives of companies”.

It is not unusual for members of the royal family to be deployed by the government for diplomatic missions. Royals often host incoming state visits and lead similar visits abroad, and can be deployed to lead delegations on more specific missions.

However, Mountbatten-Windsor had an official role as trade envoy. He stepped down from this role in 2011 following reports about his friendship with Epstein, who was convicted of sex offences in 2011.

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Read more:
What exactly is misconduct in public office and could Peter Mandelson be convicted?

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Are royals protected from prosecution?

The monarch is protected by sovereign immunity, a wide-ranging constitutional principle exempting him from all criminal and civil liability. According to the leading 19th century constitutionalist Alfred Dicey, the monarch could not even be prosecuted for “shooting the Prime Minister through the head”. The Prince of Wales also enjoys immunity as Duke of Cornwall, which protects him from punishment for breaking a range of laws.

The State Immunity Act 1978, which confers immunity on the head of state, also extends to “members of the family forming part of the household”. However, this phrase has been interpreted narrowly to apply to a very tight circle of people and does not appear to apply to the monarch’s children in general. For example, in 2002 Princess Anne was prosecuted (though not arrested) for failing to control her dogs in Windsor Great Park after they bit two children.

Nevertheless, there has often been a perception that members of the royal family are held to a different standard when it comes to the law. In 2016 Thames Valley Police were criticised by anti-monarchy groups for not prosecuting the then-prince after newspaper reports alleged he had driven his car through the gates of Windsor Great Park. In 2019 the Crown Prosecution Service declined to prosecute Prince Philip for causing a car crash which injured two people.

The monarch also cannot be compelled to give evidence in court. For example, prosecutors were unable to summon the late queen to give evidence in the trial of Princess Diana’s former butler, who was accused of stealing her jewellery.

In response to Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest, the king said: “What now follows is the full, fair and proper process by which this issue is investigated in the appropriate manner and by the appropriate authorities. In this, as I have said before, they have our full and wholehearted support and co-operation. Let me state clearly: the law must take its course.”

When was the last time a royal was arrested?

You have to go back quite a long way to find the last time that a member of the British royal family was arrested. This was during the English civil war, when Charles I was taken prisoner for treason before being found guilty and ultimately executed in 1649.

A number of royals, including Princess Anne, have committed driving-related offences, including speeding. But this arrest makes Mountbatten-Windsor the first member of the royal family to be arrested in modern times, though it should be noted that he is no longer a royal – he was stripped of all his official titles in October 2025 as his friendship with Epstein came under even more scrutiny.

What limits do police have on investigating royal estates?

Sovereign immunity also prevents police from entering private royal estates to investigate alleged crimes without permission. This can, theoretically, protect members of the royal family from arrest and prosecution. The Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 also bans police from searching royal estates for stolen or looted artefacts.

In 2007, two hen harriers were illegally shot at Sandringham estate. However, Norfolk Police first needed to ask Sandringham officials for permission to enter the estate, by which time the dead birds’ bodies had been removed. Police questioned Prince Harry, but did not bring charges.

Other incidents have allegedly led to Sandringham being accused of becoming a wildlife crime hotspot, with at least 18 reported cases of suspected wildlife offences taking place between 2003-23 – yet only one resulting in prosecution.

Another longstanding legal precedent is that no one may be arrested in the presence of the monarch or within the precincts of a royal palace. It was thought that this rule could protect other members of the royal family and royal employees. However, Mountbatten-Windsor’s arrest at Sandringham suggests that this antiquated principle may no longer hold true today.

Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why has Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor been arrested, and what legal protections does the royal family have? – https://theconversation.com/why-has-andrew-mountbatten-windsor-been-arrested-and-what-legal-protections-does-the-royal-family-have-276466

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Robyn Schofield, Professor and Associate Dean (Environment and Sustainability in Faculty of Science), The University of Melbourne

Space junk returning to the Earth is introducing metal pollution to the pristine upper atmosphere as it burns up on re-entry, a new study has found.

Published today in the journal Communications Earth & Environment, the study was led by Robin Wing from the Leibniz Institute of Atmospheric Physics in Germany. Using highly sensitive lasers, he and his team of international researchers observed a plume of lithium pollution, tracking it back to the uncontrolled re-entry of a discarded Space X Falcon 9 rocket upper stage.

This is the first observational evidence that re-entering space debris leaves a detectable, human-caused chemical fingerprint in the upper atmosphere. This was also the first time a pollutant plume from a specific space junk re-entry event has been monitored from the ground.

With many more satellite launches planned for the future, this event won’t be the last. It highlights the urgent need for governments and the space industry to tackle this problem before it gets out of hand.

A part of the atmosphere we barely understand

The region that comprises the upper stratosphere, mesosphere, and lower thermosphere (around 80 to 120 kilometres above Earth) is one of the least studied parts of the Earth system. It’s too high for balloons, too low for satellites, and too harsh for aircraft.

Yet this region is crucial for radio and GPS communications, upper atmospheric weather patterns, and stratospheric ozone.

The upper atmosphere is largely unpolluted by humans. But the new space age is injecting growing quantities of metals and other pollutants from satellites, rocket bodies and space debris.

The impact this will have on the stratospheric ozone layer, which is crucial to protecting life on Earth from harmful ultraviolet radiation, is as yet unquantified. But early findings are cause for concern.

For example, research from 2024 suggests aluminium and chlorine emissions related to rocket launches and re-entries may slow the ozone layer’s recovery.

Soot from rocket launches is also likely to cause warming in the upper atmosphere.

Finding lithium with lasers

For the new study, the researchers used a highly sensitive laser-based sensor to detect the fluorescence of trace metals in the mesosphere and lower thermosphere. This is not an off-the-shelf and readily available observation system, but it could be.

On February 20 2025, they captured a clear, sudden enhancement in lithium ions from lithium batteries and human-made metal casings used in satellites. These are quite distinct from natural meteor material.

Using atmospheric trajectory modelling, they traced the timing and altitude of the lithium plume directly to the re-entry path of a discarded Falcon 9 rocket stage as it burnt up through the lower thermosphere into the mesosphere over the Atlantic Ocean, west of Ireland.

A rapidly escalating problem

The number of satellites in orbit has exploded from a few thousand a couple years ago to roughly 14,000 right now, driven largely by megaconstellations.

There are many more satellites planned. In fact, SpaceX has applied to launch a megaconstellation of up to one million satellites to power data centres in space. Every one of these satellites will eventually re-enter the atmosphere. So too will the rockets that launch them.

Current estimates suggest that by 2030, several tonnes of spacecraft material will burn up in the upper atmosphere every single day.

So far, there is no regulatory framework for these emissions, few monitoring options and limited scientific understanding of the likely impacts.

The new lithium detection demonstrates that pollutants from re-entry are measurable and can be traced back to individual re-entry events. This is an important step when it comes to holding companies involved in space accountable.

International regulatory bodies need to be set up to liaise with governments and scientists to establish monitoring networks and instruments to track changes to our atmosphere from this emerging threat.

As the space industry skyrockets, our efforts to understand, monitor and regulate upper-atmospheric emissions must keep pace.

Robyn Schofield receives funding from the Australian Research Council, Medical Research Future Fund, the Reef Restoration and Adaptation Program and Murujuga Rock Art Monitoring Program. She is an ACCESS-NRI board member, an expert advisory group member of The Safer Air Project, Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society expert chair of atmospheric and oceanographic composition and an Associate Investigator of the ARC Centre of Excellence for Weather of the 21st Century. From 2016-2024 she was also an elected member of the International Ozone Commission.

Robert George Ryan receives funding from the Reef Restoration and Adaptation Program and Murujuga Rock Art Monitoring Program. He has also received funding from the European Research Council to research upper tropospheric chemistry. He is an early career researcher member of the Australian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society (AMOS).

– ref. SpaceX rocket left behind a plume of chemical pollution as it burnt up in the atmosphere – https://theconversation.com/spacex-rocket-left-behind-a-plume-of-chemical-pollution-as-it-burnt-up-in-the-atmosphere-276266

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Frederic Lemieux, Professor of the Practice and Faculty Director of the Master’s in Applied Intelligence, Georgetown University

Russian aircraft, drones and missiles have violated NATO airspace dozens of times since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022.

Individually, many of these incidents appear minor: a drone crash here, a brief fighter incursion there, a missile discovered only after the fact.

But taken together, I believe the numbers tell a far more troubling story.

To get a full picture of the scale of violations, I conducted a systematic review of Russian airspace violations against NATO members from 2022 through the end of 2025.

It reveals not just an increase but a sharp acceleration accompanied by rising severity and widening geographic scope. In 2025 alone, NATO members recorded 18 confirmed Russian airspace violations – three times as many as in 2024 and more than half of all incidents recorded over the four-year period. This was not a gradual escalation; it was a dramatic change.

Picking up pace

I identified airspace violations through a systematic review of international news media coverage, corroborated with official NATO press releases and cross-validated against operational assessments and geospatial reporting from the Institute for the Study of War. Included were violations of airspace by drones heavily suspected to be Russian but that could not be 100% confirmed.

Between 2022 and 2024, the annual number of violations rose steadily but modestly. There were four incidents in 2022, five in 2023 and six in 2024.

That corresponds to year-on-year increases of roughly 25% and 20%. In 2025, the count jumped from six to 18, a 200% increase in a single year. And that pace has continued into 2026 – as of Feb. 18 there have been at least two violations of NATO airspace by Russia.

Such a surge is statistically and strategically significant. It strongly suggests that Russian airspace violations are no longer episodic spillovers from the war in Ukraine, but part of a sustained pattern of pressure directed at NATO itself.

The character of these incidents has also changed. In 2022, all four violations were what I classify as low-intensity events: brief incursions into Swedish airspace by Russian fighters, the crash of an Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone in Romania and the later discovery of a Russian cruise missile in Poland. These incidents were serious but short-lived and geographically limited.

By 2023, violations had become more repetitive. Romania alone experienced multiple drone incursions and debris discoveries over several months, often triggering fighter scrambles. All five incidents that year fell into a midrange severity category: more persistent than before but still largely confined to border regions.

The transition toward higher-intensity incursions became clearer in 2024. Of the six violations that year, half involved high-severity characteristics such as deeper penetration of a NATO country or broader geographic exposure.

A Russian cruise missile crossed into Polish airspace, drones entered Romania on multiple consecutive nights, and a Russian drone crashed well inside Latvian territory. These incidents expanded both the depth and the geographic footprint of violations.

Then came 2025. Of the 18 violations recorded that year, a clear majority qualify as high-severity events. These include a Russian drone that penetrated nearly 60 miles (100 kilometers) into Polish territory before crashing near Osiny without prior radar detection; a drone that remained inside Romanian airspace for approximately four hours, crossing multiple counties before crashing in Vaslui; and a massive 21-drone swarm over Poland on Sept. 9-10 that forced the closure of major civilian airports in Warsaw, Rzeszów and Lublin.

Manned aircraft also returned in force. Russian MiG-31 interceptors flew over Estonia for about 12 minutes with transponders – onboard devices that automatically respond to radar signals by transmitting an aircraft’s identity and altitude, enabling air traffic control and air defense systems to track it – switched off. In October, a Russian Su-30 fighter accompanied by an Il-78 refueling tanker violated Lithuanian airspace – an unmistakable signal of endurance and deliberate mission planning.

In December, suspected Russian drones were shot down and later recovered in Turkey on multiple dates, indicating a persistent provocation rather than a one-off incursion.

Perhaps most strikingly, Western Europe was seemingly no longer exempt. On Dec. 4, 2025, five unidentified drones flew over France’s Île Longue naval base, home to the country’s nuclear ballistic missile submarines. French personnel reportedly fired at the suspected Russian drones.

Just weeks later, on Christmas Day, Polish fighters intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea.

Grey-zone tactics

Severity and frequency are not the only dimensions that changed. Geographical reach has, too.

In 2022, Russian violations affected three NATO members. By 2024, that number had grown to four. In 2025, it expanded to six: Romania, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey and France.

Pressure was applied simultaneously in the Black Sea region, the Baltic states and Western Europe.

This widening scope matters because it undermines the idea that these incidents are localized accidents. Instead, they resemble a distributed pattern of Russia probing across NATO’s eastern and southern flanks and into its strategic core.

NATO’s political response reflects this shift. For the first time since the war began, members invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mechanism for collective consultation when a member feels its security is threatened.

Poland did so after the September 2025 drone swarm, and Estonia followed after the MiG-31 incursion later that month. Although only two of the 18 incidents triggered Article 4, their timing is revealing: No such invocations occurred in the previous three years combined.

From a strategic standpoint, the danger lies less in any single violation than in their cumulative effect. Airspace incursions sit in a grey zone between peace and open conflict. They impose operational and psychological costs, test air defense systems and provide valuable intelligence on NATO’s detection thresholds and response times, all while staying below the legal threshold of armed attack.

Testing NATO’s resolve

The data from 2025 and early 2026 show that this grey-zone activity has intensified dramatically. A threefold increase in one year, coupled with a shift toward deeper, longer and more disruptive incidents across multiple theaters, points to a deliberate campaign rather than accidental spillover.

For NATO, the implication is clear. Monitoring individual incidents is no longer sufficient. What now matters is the rate of acceleration, the severity profile and the geographic dispersion of violations.

If current trends persist as the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, the alliance’s greatest challenge may not be responding to a single dramatic breach but managing the mounting pressure created by many smaller ones – each calibrated to test resolve without triggering open conflict.

Frederic Lemieux does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Russia tested NATO’s airspace 18 times in 2025 alone – a 200% surge that signals a dangerous shift – https://theconversation.com/russia-tested-natos-airspace-18-times-in-2025-alone-a-200-surge-that-signals-a-dangerous-shift-273318