Category: The Conversation – Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christophe Premat, Associate Professor in French Studies (cultural studies), head of the Centre for Canadian Studies, Stockholm University

Congolese thinker, philosopher and linguist Valentin-Yves Mudimbe died on 21 April 2025 at the age of 83. He was in the US, where he had lived for many years.

A towering figure in African critical thought, Mudimbe’s work – translated and studied worldwide – has profoundly shaped postcolonial studies. He leaves a groundbreaking intellectual legacy on the colonisation of knowledge and the condition of Africans.

At a time when debates on decolonising knowledge are gaining ground, Mudimbe’s passing invites us to revisit the work of a thinker who, since the 1980s, paved the way for a radical critique of imposed “categories”. He wanted to help rebuild intellectual frameworks which imagined and defined Africa on its own terms, not through the labels or categories imposed by colonial powers.

As a specialist in postmodern and postcolonial theories, I think he had considerable influence on the field of postcolonial studies.

He was one of the most influential African thinkers of the 20th century. His impact did not come from activism, but from careful, sustained intellectual work. With his seminal work The Invention of Africa (1988) he profoundly disrupted African and postcolonial studies. His work went far beyond the usual east-west divide.

A journey between Africa and exile

Valentin-Yves Mudimbe was born in 1941 in Jadotville (now Likasi), in the Democratic Republic of Congo. His early education took place in a Benedictine monastery. Later, he pursued further studies at Louvain in Belgium.

His religious education left a lasting mark on his thinking. It shaped his critical approach to knowledge. His work often explored the connections between language, power, and how ideas become institutionalised.

In 1970, Mudimbe returned to the newly independent Congo. He began teaching at the National University of Zaïre. The country was then caught between postcolonial hope and growing disillusionment.

Under Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime, the political atmosphere grew stifling for independent thinkers. The state had adopted the rhetoric of “authenticity”, turning it into a tool of control. Faced with this ideological stranglehold, Mudimbe chose exile in 1979.

He relocated to the US, where he taught at Stanford and later Duke University. There, he continued his work of critical deconstruction. Yet, despite his physical distance, he remained deeply committed to Africa’s future.

Deconstructing the ‘colonial library’

First published in English in 1988 as the The Invention of Africa, the book was translated into French in 2021 under the title L’Invention de l’Afrique, (Présence africaine).

Mudimbe offers much more than a critique of colonial representations. He examined the “colonial library”. It refers to the vast collection of religious, anthropological and administrative texts that, for centuries, framed Africa as an object to be studied, dominated and “saved”. Mudimbe was always careful not to accept ideas just because they were passed down. Instead, he was always looking for new ways to think freely and independently.

Unlike Edward Said, the Palestinian-American literary theorist and critic who exposed how the west constructed a mythologised “Orient”, Mudimbe revealed something more insidious. He showed that Africa was often imagined as a void to be filled. It was cast as a cultural blank slate, which helped justify the colonial mission.

This radical deconstruction raised a crucial question: how can we produce knowledge that does not, even through critique, reproduce the very colonial frameworks it seeks to challenge?

The book’s impact was profound, resonating across Africa, Europe and North America. It created an intellectual foundation for thinkers like Achille Mbembe, Souleymane Bachir Diagne and Felwine Sarr, who, in turn, continued to explore what truly decolonised African thought might look like.

Building something new

Mudimbe was never satisfied with existing structures. He aimed to build something new from the ground up. For him, liberating Africa required a rebuilding of knowledge systems. He rejected the assumption that western intellectual frameworks alone could define Africa. He also warned against essentialist temptations – the trap of creating new conceptual prisons in the name of authenticity.

His thinking followed a rigorous method: analysing discourse, questioning inherited categories, and dismantling false assumptions.

This demanding work aimed to empower Africa to think for itself without cutting itself off from the rest of the world.

His fiction – Between Tides (in French, Entre les eaux. Dieu, un prêtre, la révolution), Before the Birth of the Moon (Le Bel Immonde in French), Shaba Deux : les carnets de mère Marie Gertrude – embodies the same refusal to be stereotyped.

His characters navigate colonial legacies, state nationalism and rigid identity politics through stories of displacement and fragmented memory.

Language itself becomes a battleground for creativity in his novels. Sharply crafted, his prose captures the diversity of contemporary African experience. Through both his literary and philosophical works, Mudimbe consistently insisted that identity is never a given. It is always a construct to be questioned.

A living legacy

As Africa navigates complex geopolitical transformations and redefines its cultural identities, Mudimbe’s intellectual legacy proves more vital than ever. His work challenges us to recognise that true liberation extends beyond political sovereignty or cultural revival. It requires the radical work of reinventing how knowledge itself is produced and validated.

Mudimbe’s lasting legacy urges us to remain intellectually vigilant in a world where knowledge is constantly shifting. He challenges us to reject rigid categories, embrace complexity with care, and make room for uncertainty instead of rushing to resolve it.

For Mudimbe, to decolonise knowledge means relentless critique paired with creative reconstruction. It means building pluralistic and open frameworks that honour Africa’s diverse experiences without nostalgia or complacency.

Christophe Premat is a lecturer and researcher in Francophone cultural studies at the Department of Romance and Classical Studies at Stockholm University. In 2018, he published the book For a Critical Genealogy of the Francophonie, released by Stockholm University Press. He states that he worked at the French Institute of Sweden / French Embassy in Stockholm from 2008 to 2013, dealing, among other things, with issues related to the Francophonie. He is currently a member of CISE (Confédération Internationale Solidaire Écologiste), an association of French citizens abroad founded in 2018 (https://cise-francaisdeletranger.net/). He is the head of the Centre for Canadian Studies at Stockholm University.

– ref. Valentin-Yves Mudimbe: the philosopher who reshaped how the world thinks about Africa – https://theconversation.com/valentin-yves-mudimbe-the-philosopher-who-reshaped-how-the-world-thinks-about-africa-255902

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gabriele Cosentino, Assistant Professor, American University in Cairo

After being released from detention in 2011, Egyptian engineer and activist Wael Ghonim told the media:

If you want to liberate a society, all you need is the internet.

He’d been taken into custody for his role in the revolution that toppled the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Part of the success of this unprecedented popular uprising was due to the role of social media in mobilising citizens around a common political cause.

In 2025, after a decade under the repressive government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, it’s fair to say that little has remained of Ghonim’s vision. Social media use in Egypt is closely guarded by the authorities to detect signs of opposition. Citizens are routinely detained, even for the slightest criticism of the government.

In 2018 Egypt introduced a new law, apparently to curb the problem of online misinformation and disinformation. This law is, in reality, often used to stifle dissent. Egyptians today operate within unclear boundaries of what is permissible to say online. The result is widespread self-censorship for fear of arrest.

As a scholar of political communication and new media I’ve written books on global social media. I teach students about the social and political impact of digital and social media in Egypt. The video sharing platform TikTok is a frequent subject in my classes because it reveals both the liberating and the repressive effects of social media use in Egypt.

TikTok stands out for its ability to create viral videos and sudden micro-celebrities. This has made it a lightning rod for government crackdowns. But it has also connected people across socio-economic divides and bred a lively new cultural and political debate – one that’s not as easy for the government to police.

TikTok in Egypt

Since 2020, TikTok has become immensely popular in Egypt, with an estimated 33 million users over 18 years old.

While TikTok hasn’t taken on the explicit political dimension that Facebook or Twitter did over a decade ago, it has already become the theatre of a series of incidents that have landed its users in the crosshairs of the authorities. This has exposed political rifts and tensions.

Most of the incidents are related to the ability of TikTok to work as a “virality engine” – even users with few followers can gain a sudden and sometimes problematic celebrity.

But while Egyptian authorities have evidently been cracking down on TikTok users, there have been no concrete plans to ban the platform. In fact, some government branches have used it to advance their own initiatives. The Ministry of Youth and Sports, for example, signed an agreement with TikTok to launch the Egyptian TikTok Creator Hub, designed to educate youth on using social media responsibly.

Women targeted

Since 2020, Egyptian authorities have arrested TikTok users under charges ranging from the violation of family values to the spread of false information and allegations of belonging to terrorist organisations. Most of these TikTokers didn’t post explicit sexual or political content, making the charges against them appear exaggerated. These cases suggest the authorities are closely monitoring the platform, following strict moral and political considerations.

The most high profile cases have involved young women, most notably Haneen Hossam and Mawada Eladham, who were arrested in 2020 for violating family values. Article 25 of Egypt’s anti-cybercrime law states that content “violating the family principles and values upheld by Egyptian society may be punished by a minimum of six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine”. It leaves the definition of family values purposefully vague.

Observers have noted that this vagueness has allowed the law to be applied in a range of different cases. More than a dozen women have faced similar charges, endured pretrial detention and been handed lengthy prison sentences.

The arbitrary nature of many of the charges suggests a possible deeper motive: policing the presence of young women in digital spaces where they can gain influence and financial independence outside traditional family or work structures.

TikTok has given ordinary users in Egypt unprecedented visibility, in some cases allowing them to challenge social norms, often through humour. This appears to have unsettled authorities, who appear to have sought to send a message to the broader population.

Arrests

TikTok-related arrests have not been limited to family values. In 2022, three users were arrested for criticising rising food prices. They were charged with spreading fake news, despite the fact that inflation in Egypt was rising sharply.

In 2023, a parody skit of a fake jail visit by a TikToker went viral. The creators were arrested and charged with belonging to a terror organisation, spreading fake news and misusing social media.

---

Read more:
Why some governments fear even teens on TikTok

---

Such arrests indicate that TikTok content that touches on politically sensitive matters, even in jest, is posing a new type of challenge for the Egyptian government. The state is particularly concerned with viral content that might bring attention to its poor human rights record. This includes notoriously bad conditions in jails.

‘Egypt’ and ‘Masr’

At the same time, the platform is proving able to connect people from very different social and economic backgrounds, as it is seen to do globally.

Egypt is very hierarchical. Small, affluent elite groups live in a separate and secluded socio-economic reality from the majority of the population. Thirty percent of Egyptians live under the poverty line.

On TikTok, the more privileged, cosmopolitan section of society is referred to as “Egypt”. The poor and disenfranchised are “Masr” (مصر), the Arabic word for Egypt.

TikTok is aimed at generating viral content more than it is a networking site, like Facebook, that’s based on pre-existing social connections. The result is a virtual common space where the two sides can interact in new ways. This engenders unique social and cultural dynamics also observed in other countries.

---

Read more:
TikTok in Kenya: the government wants to restrict it, but my study shows it can be useful and empowering

---

“Egypt” watches “Masr” create all kinds of content – from singing and dancing routines to live begging. “Masr” gets to peek into the otherwise inaccessible world of the wealthy.

In the current climate of an economic crisis, this divide can be glaring. While most Egyptians are struggling with inflation, the cost of living and unemployment, the wealthy flaunt their lifestyles on TikTok.

When wealthy TikTokers post content complaining about relatively petty issues like a long wait for valet parking at a luxury restaurant or boast about their weekly allowance, it reveals their disconnect from the everyday hardships faced by the less privileged.

Users are able to comment freely on each other’s videos, sharing their unvarnished opinions. A student boasting about their weekly allowance of 3,000 EGP (US$60) might be told, “This is some people’s monthly salary.”

Political consequences

Since it first appeared in 2020, TikTok in Egypt has evolved from a platform mainly geared towards silly and entertaining content by teenagers. It’s become an outlet for people of all ages interested in gathering information, keeping abreast of current trends and events, and also a space for political engagement, especially on the issue of Palestine.

---

Read more:
Young Nigerians are flocking to TikTok – why it’s a double-edged sword

---

There hasn’t been an obvious politicisation of TikTok in Egypt yet and there might never be, given the strict policing by authorities. But TikTok’s ability to expose divisions in Egyptian society and connect citizens across demographic cleavages could potentially have unexpected political consequences in the near future.

Shahd Atef contributed to the research for this article

Gabriele Cosentino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. TikTok in Egypt: where rich and poor meet – and the state watches everything – https://theconversation.com/tiktok-in-egypt-where-rich-and-poor-meet-and-the-state-watches-everything-253278

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Charlotte Baker, Professor of French and Critical Disability Studies, Lancaster University

People with albinism face widespread discrimination in many sub-Saharan African countries. In Tanzania, this minority has been subjected to extreme forms of violence. The government’s failure to protect their rights prompted the filing of a case before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The case was brought by Tanzanian and international civil rights groups against the government of Tanzania. They were seeking more robust legal protections from the state for people with albinism.

In February 2025, the court delivered a landmark judgment, holding Tanzania accountable for human rights violations against persons with albinism. Charlotte Baker, who has researched sociocultural aspects of albinism in sub-Saharan Africa, explains the significance of the ruling.

What is the background to the case?

Albinism is a relatively rare genetically inherited condition. It occurs in all countries of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, an estimated 1 in 4,000 people have albinism. The condition results in a lack of pigmentation in the hair, skin and eyes, causing vulnerability to skin cancer and visual impairment.

Human rights violations and abuses against people with albinism in Tanzania are common. They include discrimination, verbal abuse and bullying. People with albinism also face exclusion from public services, including education and health. They are additionally subjected to extreme forms of violence that include killings, abductions, mutilations and infanticide. Even after a person with albinism has died, their graves are at risk of exhumation to obtain body parts for sale.

A range of traditional and more modern beliefs drive the oppression of people with albinism. However, structural reasons related to social inequities have created a market in the body parts of people with albinism. These are used for the production of “charms” by “witchdoctors” who promise they’ll bring wealth and success.

---

Read more:
Traditional beliefs inform attitudes to disability in Africa. Why it matters

---

A few societies are more accepting of albinism and venerate people with the condition, such as the Bamiléké in Cameroon. However, the majority experience discrimination.

The first media reports of attacks on people with albinism in Tanzania emerged in 2007, bringing international attention to the issue. Since then, over 700 attacks and killings in 28 countries have been reported to the Canadian NGO Under the Same Sun, although many more go unrecorded. The organisation works to end discrimination and violence against persons with albinism.

In Tanzania, there have been 209 reports of attacks since 2007. Most recently, on 25 June 2024, a two-year-old girl with albinism was abducted and killed in Kagera region, about 1,500km from the capital Dar es Salaam.

What does the court ruling mean for persons with albinism?

Under international human rights law, the fundamental human rights of persons with albinism must be protected under the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These include a right to:

• life

• adequate standards of living and social protection

• equality and non-discrimination

• freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse

• education, health, work and employment.

Upholding the rights of people with albinism would ensure that they were treated fairly and with respect.

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights found that, although some steps have been taken in the right direction, Tanzania has violated the right to life of persons with albinism by not protecting them as required under Article 4 of the African Charter. It also found the state violated the right to non-discrimination by failing to put enough measures in place to fight myths and stereotypes relating to albinism.

This ruling sets a legal precedent across Africa. It’s a signal to other states of their obligations under the African charters on human rights and children’s welfare.

What does the Tanzanian government need to do?

The court determined that superstitions and harmful beliefs had led to discrimination and the targeted killings of persons with albinism. It ordered the government of Tanzania to make provision for nationwide awareness campaigns for at least two years to combat myths and superstitions about albinism.

The court requires the Tanzanian government to amend the 1928 Witchcraft Act to criminalise attacks against persons with albinism. This is in response to UN Resolution 47/8 on the elimination of harmful practices related to accusations of witchcraft and ritual attacks.

The government of Tanzania is also ordered to implement its national action plan on the protection of persons with albinism. This is in line with the African Union Plan of Action to End Attacks and Other Human Rights Violations Targeting Persons with Albinism. The national action plan should address stigma and structural issues that lead to discrimination.

The government must also ensure the right to health protection. This includes access to skin and eye health services. Providing protective clothing and sunscreens can be lifesaving.

Meeting the needs of children with albinism in educational settings must be a priority for the Tanzanian government. This can mean minor adaptions to classroom layouts and access to visual aids. Most importantly, it requires a change in attitudes among teaching staff and other pupils.

Tanzania has also been ordered to establish a compensation fund and compensate persons with albinism who have been victims of violent attacks.

What power does the court have to ensure enforcement?

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has instructed Tanzania to publish the judgment on government websites within three months. It should remain accessible for at least a year.

The government must also submit a report on the implementation of the ruling within two years. If it hasn’t fully complied within three years, a hearing will be held. However, the court has a non-compliance crisis and there are no built-in consequences in its protocol.

The partners involved in bringing the case will monitor Tanzania’s compliance with the court’s orders.

The Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa has called on civil society organisations, policymakers and human rights defenders to support efforts to protect the rights of people with albinism in Tanzania and beyond.

Charlotte Baker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Attacks on people with albinism in Tanzania: African court holds government responsible – why it matters – https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-people-with-albinism-in-tanzania-african-court-holds-government-responsible-why-it-matters-251275

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Eric Friedman, Researcher, Georgetown University

The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief has been a cornerstone of global HIV/Aids prevention, care and treatment for over two decades. Pepfar has enjoyed broad bipartisan support in the US, but its future is now uncertain. Public health scholars Eric A. Friedman, Sarah A. Wetter and Lawrence O. Gostin explain Pepfar’s history and impacts, as well as what may lie ahead.

The early years

Many people today have forgotten the sheer devastation that the Aids pandemic wrought on the African continent, first spreading widely in east Africa in the 1980s. By the end of the 20th century, life expectancy in the region had decreased from 64 to 47 years.

Millions of children were infected and many grew up as orphans, with HIV taking the life of one or both of their parents. Children, especially girls, were taken out of school to nurse sick relatives or because school fees were unaffordable.

Underfunded health systems were near collapse, as were the economies of many African countries.

Infection rates in several countries on the continent topped 30% of their adult populations.

These devastating figures persisted despite the discovery of highly effective antiretroviral therapies in the 1990s. These drugs rapidly became widely available in rich countries, beginning in 1996, leading to an 84% decline in death rates over four years.

But cost kept the drugs out of reach for African countries.

Only about 100,000 of the 20 million people infected with HIV in Africa were accessing drug treatment in 2003.

The turnaround

A major breakthrough came when US president George W Bush proposed a bold global initiative, Pepfar, in his 2003 State of the Union Address. Pepfar would dedicate US$15 billion over five years with the goals of preventing 7 million new infections, treating 2 million people, and caring for another 10 million infected with HIV or orphaned by the disease.

By 2005, more than 800,000 people were being treated for HIV in Africa – an eightfold increase from only two years prior. Under Pepfar, the costs of antiretroviral treatment per person per year in low- and middle-income countries fell from US$1,200 in 2003 to just US$58 in 2023.

Pepfar maintained bipartisan support throughout both Democratic and Republican-led administrations and Congresses. Through 2018, it had been reauthorised three times, each for five years.

The programme has lived up to its promise. The investment of over US$110 billion since being launched has been transformative, with sub-Saharan Africa benefiting the most.

Globally, Pepfar has saved 26 million lives and prevented nearly 8 million babies from being born with HIV. In 2024, more than 20 million people were receiving HIV treatment through Pepfar, which was also supporting well over 6 million orphans, vulnerable children and their caregivers, and enabled nearly 84 million people to be tested for HIV that year.

Its importance extends beyond Aids. The programme directly supports more than 340,000 health workers, a tremendous contribution in Africa especially, given severe health worker shortages in much of the continent.

Pepfar-supported health services integrate HIV services with tuberculosis care, treatment and prevention. And since 2019, Pepfar has been part of a partnership for screening and treating women with HIV for cervical cancer, focused on 12 high-burden countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

But the past two years have been ones of political discord and major disruption.

Troubles begin

The trouble began in May 2023, with Pepfar due for a five-year reauthorisation.

A key member of Congress, along with organisations against abortion, raised concerns that Pepfar was supporting abortions, even though there was no such evidence at the time. In fact, by law Pepfar is prohibited from supporting abortions.

House Republicans sought to include abortion restrictions in the Pepfar reauthorisation. But Congress passed a reauthorisation bill without abortion provisions in March 2024, to last until 25 March 2025.

Ever since then, the threats posed to a five-year Pepfar reauthorisation have grown.

The Trump effect

In January, Pepfar reported to Congress that its own investigators had found that four nurses in Mozambique had used Pepfar funding to perform abortions (which are legal in Mozambique), 21 in all. Pepfar officials froze funds to the four nurses and required staff to attest to understanding that they were prohibited from providing abortion as part of US-funded health services.

Days later Pepfar, along with most other US foreign assistance programmes, suffered a severe blow. President Donald Trump signed an executive order pausing all further disbursements and new obligations of foreign assistance funds for 90 days, pending a sweeping review.

Four days later, secretary of state Marco Rubio issued a directive that went even further, also requiring organisations to stop work, even those that had already received funds needed to operate.

By 27 January, virtually all US foreign assistance programmes had come to a halt, including Pepfar programmes.

Following an outcry, Rubio issued a waiver for lifesaving humanitarian assistance on 28 January. With confusion over what was covered, including whether the waiver encompassed HIV medicines, he issued another waiver on 1 February, covering Pepfar treatment and care programmes, including prevention of and treatment for TB and other opportunistic infections, as well as prevention of mother-to-child transmission programmes.

But organisations receiving US foreign assistance funds needed to get individual approval to resume, and the administration had put much of USAid’s staff on administrative leave. USAid (along with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) has a central role in administering Pepfar. Many others, including contractors embedded in USAid operations, have been furloughed or fired.

Very few people existed to process requests to resume work. Furthermore, USAid’s payment system appeared not to be working.

The decisions of the Trump administration are being challenged in court in the US on the grounds that they are illegal and unconstitutional because they are usurping Congress’s power to determine how the US government spends funds, among other violations of the law.

Nonetheless, as of this writing, despite a court order to resume funding, it remains entirely frozen, and most programmes are still shut down. The day after the court ordered the government to pay nearly US$2 billion it owes organisations for work already done, the administration revealed that it had terminated the vast majority of foreign assistance awards, including some for Pepfar. Details have not been made public. Meanwhile, the US Supreme Court put a short-term pause on the lower court’s order to immediately pay the money already owed.

The impact

The impact has been immediate. People on HIV treatment could not pick up additional medicine, leading to treatment interruption. Pepfar-funded health services had to turn away patients. Health workers supported by Pepfar, among them 40,000 in Kenya, could no longer be paid.

Many organisations that relied on Pepfar funds also had to lay off staff. Community groups have been affected and many have suspended their services entirely.

It remains unclear what the future holds – how severe the cuts will be, and to what programmes. In the near term, much depends on the courts and whether the administration implements court orders, as it has yet to do. In the longer term, Congress could seek to resume Pepfar to its former strength, though this would mean acting against the administration’s wishes. Even then, it is not clear whether the administration would spend the money allocated, and the damage already done to Pepfar programmes and trust in the US government will not be repaired quickly.

Pepfar is currently funded at US$7.5 billion annually. It accounts for over 10% of all US foreign assistance and over half of US global health assistance.

The separate Pepfar waiver suggests the deepest support for Pepfar is for HIV treatment programmes, as well as others meant to be protected under the waiver. Barring vast cuts to foreign assistance and Pepfar, these programmes are most likely to be at least spared, though the administration has terminated even some grants that had been covered by the waiver.

Other Pepfar programmes, particularly with respect to HIV prevention, are most vulnerable.

Rethinking priorities

The vulnerability of different African countries to Pepfar cuts varies widely. Some fund most of their own HIV programmes. South Africa’s HIV programmes are 74% domestically funded, with the balance coming from Pepfar (17%) and the Global Fund (7%).

But Pepfar funding accounts for about 90% of all HIV funding in Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire, and more than half of HIV medicines purchased for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Zambia are purchased by the US.

If there are significant Pepfar funding cuts, it is doubtful that other wealthy countries will be able to compensate. And because the US, through Pepfar, is the largest contributor to the Global Fund, it is unlikely that the Global Fund could fill the gap either.

Under these circumstances, unless countries increase their domestic HIV spending, the dramatic progress in combating HIV/Aids in Africa could begin to become undone.
The conversation in Africa must focus on ending reliance on foreign assistance and developing resilient financing mechanisms to continue the fight to end Aids.

Lawrence O. Gostin is Director of the WHO Collaborating Center on Global Health Law

Eric Friedman and Sarah Wetter do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Pepfar funding to fight HIV/Aids has saved 26 million lives since 2003: how cutting it will hurt Africa – https://theconversation.com/pepfar-funding-to-fight-hiv-aids-has-saved-26-million-lives-since-2003-how-cutting-it-will-hurt-africa-250413

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Sam Filby, Research Officer, Research Unit on the Economics of Excisable Products, University of Cape Town

It’s become common to see kids, some in their school uniforms, puffing on a vape.

The World Health Organization points to the enticing flavours and targeted marketing to young people as the key reasons behind this trend.

In the US, e-cigarettes are the most commonly used tobacco product among middle and high school students aged 12 and older, with 5.9% of students reporting use.

Surveys from the UK indicate that 20.5% of children (aged 11–17) have tried vaping, and that 7.6% of children currently vape. Similar usage rates ranging from 3.3% to 11.8% have been found in south-east Asia. Evidence on vape use among adolescents living in Africa is more scarce.

We are public health researchers who have studied the phenomenon in South Africa. Our latest study, published in The Lancet’s eClinical Medicine, found that vaping among South African pupils is sky high. We surveyed over 25,000 South African high school students across 52 schools in eight of South Africa’s nine provinces.

An estimated 16.8% of the sampled learners currently use e-cigarettes.

Research has shown conclusively that children should not use these products because of the health risks.

Our findings in South Africa show that high rates of adolescent vaping are not restricted to high income countries.

Harmful impact on young minds and bodies

In a 2016 report, the US surgeon general called vaping among young people an “urgent public health problem”.

One reason for this is that these products commonly deliver nicotine. Nicotine use during adolescence harms the developing brain, with potential long-term effects on learning, memory and attention.

Nicotine is also an addictive substance. Addictive behaviour in general is associated with the development of mental illness, further fuelling the mental health problems experienced by some adolescents.
Substance abuse can lower their inhibitions, leading to increased high-risk behaviours.

Non-nicotine vapes are also bad for health. The chemical composition of specific flavours such as cherry, cinnamon and vanilla have also been shown to cause damage to the lung lining and blood vessels.

The rising popularity of e-cigarette use among adolescents globally should make helping young people with quitting vapes a priority.

Surveying South African schools

We approached schools predominantly in major centres like Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban. All were “fee-paying” schools. We were not able to include less well resourced schools without easy internet access or non-fee-paying schools.

We categorised the schools into three brackets:

• lower-fee schools: annual fees between R20,000 and R40,000 (US$1,100-2,100)

• medium-fee schools: annual fees between R40,000 and R90,000 (US$2,100-4,800)

• high-fee schools: annual fees more than R90,000 (over US$4,800).

Around 17% of pupils in our sample attended lower-fee schools, 64% attended mid-fee schools, and 19% attended high-fee schools. Around 31% of learners attended co-ed schools, 41% attended all-boys’ schools, and 29% attended all-girls’ schools.

Students were asked about their use of four products in the 30 days preceding the survey: e-cigarettes, tobacco cigarettes, cannabis and hookah pipes.

Students who indicated that they currently vaped were asked additional questions
about their vaping history and habits. We also asked students about their
reasons for starting and continuing to vape.

Using this data, we studied e-cigarette use, nicotine dependence, and the mental
health and social stressors associated with vaping among a large sample of South
African high school learners.

Alarming rates

Our study found that 16.8% of high school learners we surveyed were currently using e-cigarettes. There were far lower rates of tobacco cigarette use (2%), cannabis use (5%) and hookah pipe use (3%).

The proportion of learners reporting e-cigarette use increased by grade: around 9% of grade 8 students reported using vapes, but this rose sharply to an average of 29.5% among grade 12 pupils (who will turn 18 in their final school year). Some schools had usage rates as high as 46% among grade 12 pupils.

Among the learners who indicated that they vaped, 38% vaped daily, and more than half of the learners in our sample reported that they vaped four or more days per week.

Around 88% of pupils reported using vapes that contained nicotine. About 47% reported that they vaped within the first hour of waking up – this is highly suggestive of nicotine addiction. We estimate that up to 61% of high school learners who vape could be seriously addicted to nicotine.

Why adolescents start and continue vaping

We found that the primary reasons for starting vaping differed from the main reasons for continuing to vape.

• Just over half (50.6%) of the students who vaped cited social influences
  (family, friends, peer pressure, the need to fit in) as reasons for starting. Around 20% of learners indicated that they’d started vaping to cope with stress and anxiety, while 16.2% said they had started out of general curiosity.

• Common reasons cited for continuing their vape use were to cope with
  anxiety, depression or stress (28.4%), or because they were addicted (14.9%).

Some learners explicitly stated addiction in their reasoning:

It’s an addiction, no matter what I try I can’t stop. (female, 17)

Others described it more as a habit:

It has become a habit. I have to consume something constantly. (female, 18)

Less than 10% of students identified social influences as the reason they continued to vape.

Around 46% of students did not list addiction as a reason for continuing to vape, although their reported vaping habits aligned with patterns typically seen in individuals who are highly addicted. This suggests that many learners in our sample may lack awareness of what constitutes addiction.

---

Read more:
South Africa’s new vaping tax won’t deter young smokers

---

What needs to be done

Our research underscores the urgent need for a coordinated public health response
to address the vaping crisis among high school learners.

The South African government must pass the Tobacco Products and Electronic
Delivery Systems Control Bill. This legislation will ensure that vapes cannot be sold near schools or online.

The restrictions on the advertising of vaping products provided for in the bill may aid with this as well as the deglamorisation of vaping among young people – reducing the general curiosity that leads many young people to begin in the first place.

The dangerous myth that “vaping is safe” also needs to be debunked.

Finally, we need to help addicted teenagers to stop vaping.

Punishing students for vaping is unlikely to be an effective strategy. Parents must be more aware of the signs of vaping and the underlying issues driving it.

Healthcare professionals should ask young people about their vape use during routine checkups.

And school counsellors should teach coping strategies to help teens navigate life’s challenges.

Sam Filby receives funding from the African Capacity Building Foundation and Cancer Research UK and has previously received funding from the CDC Foundation and the US Department of State.

Richard van Zyl Smit does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Vaping hits alarming levels among South African teens – new study of fee-paying schools – https://theconversation.com/vaping-hits-alarming-levels-among-south-african-teens-new-study-of-fee-paying-schools-244843

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Susan Goldstein, Associate Professor and Director of the SAMRC/Wits Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science – PRICELESS SA (Priority Cost Effective Lessons in Systems Strengthening South Africa), University of the Witwatersrand

Non-communicable diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and cardiovascular conditions account for over 70% of global deaths annually.

In South Africa, non-communicable diseases cause more than half of all deaths. Diabetes ranks as the second leading cause after tuberculosis.

A major contributor to rising diabetes rates is the high consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages, including cooldrinks.

The World Health Organization recommends a tax of at least 20% on sugary drinks as an effective tool to help reduce consumption and curb related health risks.

South Africa introduced a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages, officially known as the Health Promotion Levy, in 2018.

The tax applies at R0.0221 ($0.0012) per gram of sugar beyond a 4g/100ml threshold, amounting to an 8% of final selling price. The tax has increased slightly since it was introduced, but not in line with inflation. The Health Promotion Levy therefore falls short of the original 20% target as industry pressure led to a watered-down version of it.

I lead the South African Medical Research Council/Wits Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science – PRICELESS SA, which has been studying various aspects of the levy for over 10 years.

PRICELESS SA is still in the process of measuring the health and financial impact of not implementing the Health Promotion Levy at the recommended 20%. A lack of recent data adds to this challenge. But it is worth noting that the World Obesity Report shows that obesity is still a severe problem in South Africa.

Without interventions, obesity in South Africa is projected to affect 30 million adults and 10 million children by 2035. In 2019 there were 55,238 deaths in South Africa from non-communicable diseases attributable to obesity, and with an annual increase of 2.3% in obesity, deaths are going to increase.

Taxing sugary beverages is effective

Despite the sugar industry’s claims that the Health Promotion Levy is ineffective, global evidence strongly suggests otherwise. Countries that have implemented such taxes have seen significant declines in sugar consumption.

Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes have been implemented in 103 countries and territories globally and have been shown to be effective in many countries.

In Ireland there was a 30.2% reduction in sugar intake through these beverages.

In California a study showed a decrease in overweight and obesity among young people living in cities where there was a sugary beverage tax.

In Mexico, a sugar-sweetened beverages tax at 1 peso ($0.05) per litre was introduced in 2014, and by 2016, sugary drinks sales had dropped by 37%.

Similarly, in the UK, a tax introduced in 2018 led to a 35.4% reduction in sugar consumption from taxed beverages.

The levy has had a positive impact in South Africa. Studies show decreased purchasing of these beverages. There were greater reductions in sales among lower socioeconomic groups and in sub-populations with higher sugary drink consumption.

Mean sugar from taxable beverage purchases fell from 16.25 g/capita per day from the pre-health promotion levy announcement to 10.63 g/capita per day in the year after implementation.

Lower-income households, which initially purchased more taxable sugary beverages than wealthier households, showed the most significant reductions in consumption after the tax was enforced.

This is particularly important as non-communicable diseases disproportionately affect poor and vulnerable populations.

Stronger taxation on sugary beverages not only decreases consumption but also encourages reformulation by manufacturers, leading to healthier products.

The levy does not cause job losses

Sugar-related industries often argue that the tax has led to massive job losses.

Our research contradicts these claims.

A recent study carried out by PRICELESS SA, funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies through the University of North Carolina and the South African Medical Research Council, showed no significant association between the levy and employment levels. It showed that the levy had not been associated with job creation or job losses in sugar-related industries. These include agriculture, beverage manufacturing and commercial enterprises that sell food and beverages.

The study suggests several factors that may explain this:

Firstly, firms may reallocate labour within their operations rather than
cut jobs.

Secondly, many beverage producers have responded to the tax by reformulating their products, reducing the sugar content and using non-nutritive sweeteners rather than reducing production.

Thirdly, demand for taxed sugary drinks has not declined enough to affect employment.

Finally, consumers often switch to untaxed alternatives produced by the same companies, preventing financial losses to the industry.

Increasing the levy is beneficial to the public purse

The recent delay of South Africa’s budget speech, due to disagreements within the government over the proposed value added tax increase of two percentage points, highlights the urgent need for additional and alternative revenue sources.

South Africa’s health system is experiencing a massive financial burden due to overweight and obesity, costing R33 billion (US$1.78 billion) annually. This expense accounts for 15.38% of the government’s health expenditure and 0.67% of the country’s GDP. On a per-person basis, the annual cost of overweight and obesity is R2,769 (US$150).

On the other hand, the levy generated R5.8 billion (US$313m) in revenue over its first two fiscal years.

Beyond raising funds, a higher tax rate would provide public health benefits and savings for health services.

Based on our research, increasing the levy to 20% in South Africa could reduce obesity rates by 2.4 to 3.8 percentage points, prevent 85,000 strokes, and save 72,000 lives over two decades.

These improvements potentially save over R5 billion (US$270m) in medical costs.

Unlike other taxation measures, which affect all consumers equally, the levy primarily targets discretionary purchases, making it a fairer fiscal tool.

Therefore, government must act – raise the Health Promotion Levy to 20% and cut the sugar-fuelled health crisis at its root.

Raising the levy to 20% would be a smarter tax for a healthier nation.

Darshen Naidoo, Legal Researcher and Associate Lecturer at PRICELESS SA, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg contributed to the article.

Susan Goldstein on behalf of PRICELESS receives funding from the Bloomberg Foundation, the SAMRC and the National Institutes for Health Research

– ref. Sugary drinks are a killer: a 20% tax would save lives and rands in South Africa – https://theconversation.com/sugary-drinks-are-a-killer-a-20-tax-would-save-lives-and-rands-in-south-africa-251393

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

Urban parks in Kumasi, the capital city of Ghana’s Ashanti region, are fast disappearing or in decline. Kumasi was designed 60 years ago as a “garden city”, with green belts, parks and urban green spaces. These have been encroached on by developments and are in a poor condition.

Like other cities in Ghana, Kumasi has been growing. According to the latest population data from Ghana’s Statistical Service, the population of Kumasi in 1950 and 2024 was 99,479 and 3,903,480 respectively. The city’s current annual population growth rate is 3.59%.
This growth is a challenge for city authorities.

Adding to the challenge is the fact that in Ghana, political authorities and traditional leadership exist together. It’s the capital of the Ashanti Region and the capital of the ancient Ashanti Kingdom. Most of the land is owned by the traditional authority. This makes it difficult sometimes for city authorities to enforce planning regulations.

We are urban planners who have conducted research on environmental planning, urban informality and inclusive city development. We studied the extent to which areas demarcated as urban parks in the Kumasi Metropolis have been rezoned, and why there’s been encroachment into urban parks.

Our study showed that 88% of the 16 parks studied in the Kumasi Metropolis had either been rezoned or encroached upon by other land uses. This was done in an unplanned way. Zoning regulations have not been enforced and urban sprawl has not been controlled. Part of the reason is that land scarcity drives up its value and customary authorities have an incentive to allow other uses. As a result, the city has lost green spaces that are important for their environmental, traditional and recreational functions.

Decline of urban parks in Kumasi Metropolis

To understand why Kumasi has been losing its green spaces, our study looked at 16 parks across six communities within the Kumasi Metropolis.

The World Health Organization recommends there should be 9m² of green space per city dweller. We calculated that Kumasi currently has only 0.17m² of green space per city dweller.

We also noted significant changes in land zoned for parks. This was mainly due to the politics of land ownership and administration. Other social factors played a part too. The results of the research showed that out of the 16 existing parks studied, 14 (88%) had been rezoned to residential or commercial use or encroached upon by other uses.

The rezoning of parks was gradual, unapproved by local planning authorities, and unplanned. Existing land tenure arrangements and laxity in the enforcement of laws are some of the barriers affecting park development and management in the city.

An official of the city’s Physical Planning Department indicated that places zoned as parks were supposed to be owned, controlled, managed and protected by the state. But this was not the case, because of the complex land tenure arrangement of the city, where most land is customarily owned.

Though Ghana’s land tenure system recognises customary ownership, the determination of land use remains the responsibility of local planning authorities. Land sold for physical developments must conform to an approved scheme prepared by the Physical Planning Department. In most cases, the parks rezoned by the customary owners were in contravention with spatial planning laws (such as the Land Use and Spatial Planning Act, 2016).

The representative of the planning department noted that even though it prepared layouts that made provision for parks and open spaces, it was often helpless when it came to enforcement and other land use regulations. We were told that information about the land ownership and transfer process between government agencies and customary landowners was not made available to the department.

Due to poor coordination and increased demand for land for development, about 88% of land demarcated for park development across the study communities had been leased or sold to private developers by the customary landowners.

Our study also revealed a lack of funding for parks development and management. All the agency officials confirmed that parks were planned for but the funds to support their development and management were inadequate. They explained that property values rose as a result of urban development, leading to intense competition among various land uses. We were told that landowners were willing to sell any land available in their community at a higher value without considering its use in the community.

Bringing back the green

The once green city of Kumasi has lost much of its foliage. We suggest that this decline can and should be stopped.

City authorities can incorporate cultural elements that highlight the identity of neighbourhoods to promote ownership and a sense of place in the design of parks. Local planning institutions, custodians of land and residents should collaborate so that plans meet everyone’s needs.

Traditional authorities, together with relevant city authorities, should consciously ensure that parks are developed, protected, managed and sustained. Laws and regulations which guide park use and protection should be enforced strictly.

Finally, parks and green spaces can only survive if there is sustainable funding. City authorities could consider green taxation and charges. For example, they can fine residents whose activities threaten the environment, and use the money to fund parks and green spaces. A percentage of property tax can be dedicated to the protection and development of green spaces in the city.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Kumasi was called the garden city – but green spaces are vanishing in a clash of landuse regulations – https://theconversation.com/kumasi-was-called-the-garden-city-but-green-spaces-are-vanishing-in-a-clash-of-landuse-regulations-248016

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristina Pikovskaia, Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh

Education, especially higher education, is a step towards adulthood and a foundation for the future.

But what happens when education loses its value as a way to climb the social ladder? What if a degree is no guarantee of getting stable work, being able to provide for one’s family, or owning a house or car?

This devaluing of higher education as a path to social mobility is a grim reality for young Zimbabweans. Over the past two decades the southern African country has been beset by economic, financial, political and social challenges.

These crises have severely undermined the premises and promises of education, especially at a tertiary level. A recent survey by independent research organisation Afrobarometer found that 90% of young Zimbabweans had secondary and post-secondary education compared to 83% of those aged between 36 and 55. But 41% of the youth were unemployed and looking for a job as opposed to 26% of the older generation.

The situation is so dire that it’s become a recurring theme in Zimdancehall, a popular music genre produced and consumed by young Zimbabweans. “Hustling” (attempts to create income-generating opportunities), informal livelihoods and young people’s collapsed dreams are recurrent topics in songs like Winky D’s Twenty Five, Junior Tatenda’s Kusvikira Rinhi and She Calaz’s Kurarama.

I study the way people experience the informal economy in Zimbabwe and Zambia. In a recent study I explored the loss of education’s value as a social mobility tool in the Zimbabwean context.

My research revealed how recent school and university graduates think about the role of education in their lives. My respondents felt let down by the fact that education no longer provided social mobility. They were disappointed that there was no longer a direct association between education and employment.

However, the graduates I interviewed were not giving up. Some were working towards new qualifications, hoping and preparing for economic improvements. They also thought deeply about how the educational system could be improved. Many young people got involved in protests. These included actions by the Coalition of Unemployed Graduates and the #ThisGown protests, which addressed graduate unemployment issues. Some also took part in #ThisFlag and #Tajamuka protests, which had wider socio-economic and political agendas.

Understanding history

To understand the current status and state of education in Zimbabwe it’s important to look to the country’s history.

Zimbabwe was colonised by the British from the late 19th century. The colonial education system was racialised. Education for white students was academic. For Black students, it was mostly practice-oriented, to create a pool of semi-skilled workers.

In the 1930s education was instrumental in the formation of Zimbabwe’s Black middle class. A small number of Black graduates entered white collar jobs, using education as a social mobility tool. The educational system also opened up somewhat for women.

Despite some university reforms during the 1950s, the system remained deeply racialised until the 1980s. That’s when the post-colonial government democratised the education system. Primary school enrolment went up by 242%, and 915% more students entered secondary school. In the 1990s nine more state universities were opened.

However, worsening economic conditions throughout the 1990s put pressure on the system. A presidential commission in 1999 noted that secondary schools were producing graduates with non-marketable skills – they were too academic and focused on examinations. Students’ experiences, including at the university level, have worsened since then.

The decline has been driven by systemic and institutional problems in primary and secondary education, like reduced government spending, teachers’ poor working conditions, political interference and brain drain. This, coupled with the collapse of the formal economic sector and a sharp drop in formal employment opportunities, severely undermined education’s social mobility function.

‘A key, but no door to open’

My recent article was based on my wider doctoral research. For this, I studied economic informalisation in Zimbabwe’s capital city, Harare. It involved more than 120 interviews during eight months of in-country research.

This particular paper builds on seven core interviews with recent school and university graduates in the informal sector, as well as former student leaders.

Some noted that education had lost part of its value as it related to one’s progression in society. As one of my respondents, Ashlegh Pfunye (former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students Union), described it, young people were told that education was a key to success – but there was no door to open.

Some of my respondents were working in the informal sector, as vendors and small-scale producers. Some could not use their degrees to secure jobs, while others gave up their dreams of obtaining a university degree. Lisa, for example, was very upset about giving up on her dream to pursue post-secondary education and tried to re-adjust to her current circumstances:

I used to dream that I will have my own office, now I dream that one day I’ll have my own shop.

Those who had university qualifications stressed that, despite being unable to apply their degrees in the current circumstances, they kept going to school and getting more certification. This prepared them for future opportunities in the event of what everyone hoped for: economic improvement.

Historical tensions

Some of my interviewees, especially recent university graduates and activists, were looking for possible solutions – like changing the curriculum and approach to education that trains workers rather than producers and entrepreneurs. As Makomborero Haruzivishe, former secretary-general of the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union, said: “Our educational system was created to train human robots who would follow the instructions.”

Entrepreneurship education is a popular approach in many countries to changing the structure of classic education. In the absence of employment opportunities for skilled graduates, it is supposed to provide them with the tools to create such opportunities for themselves and others.

---

Read more:
Nigeria’s universities need to revamp their entrepreneurship courses — they’re not meeting student needs

---

In 2018, the government introduced what it calls the education 5.0 framework. It has a strong entrepreneurship component. It’s too soon to say whether it will bear fruit. And it may be held back by history.

For example, the introduction of the Education-with-Production model in the 1980s, which included practical subjects and vocational training, was met with resistance because it was seen as a return to the dual system.

Because of Zimbabwe’s historically racialised education system, many students and parents favour the UK-designed Cambridge curriculum and traditional academic educational programmes. Zimbabwe has the highest number of entrants into the Cambridge International exam in Africa.

Feeling let down

The link between education and employment in Zimbabwe has many tensions: modernity and survival, academic pursuits and practicality, promises and reality. It’s clear from my study that graduates feel let down because the modernist promises of education have failed them.

Parts of this research have been funded by the University of Oxford and the Leverhulme Trust (ECF-2022-055).

– ref. Education in Zimbabwe has lost its value: study asks young people how they feel about that – https://theconversation.com/education-in-zimbabwe-has-lost-its-value-study-asks-young-people-how-they-feel-about-that-244661

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christian Siderius, Senior researcher in water and food security, London School of Economics and Political Science

Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing at 2.7% per year and is expected to reach two billion by the year 2050. The region’s urban population is growing even faster: it was at 533 million in 2023, a 3.85% increase from 2022.

The need to feed this population will put pressure on land and water resources.

I’m part of a group of researchers who have looked at whether regional food production would be sufficient to supply growing urban populations. By and large, we have found high levels of food self-sufficiency. But climate change could put a spanner in the works.

We have also looked at the potential of local water conservation measures to help achieve food self-sufficiency in sub-Saharan Africa.

Our study shows that measures such as better irrigation or water harvesting could boost food production while buffering the vagaries of weather.

We found that ambitious – yet realistic – adoption of such measures increases food supply to cities and makes the region as a whole self-sufficient.

A new model

In large parts of eastern Africa, rainfall is relatively abundant and well distributed over the growing season, resulting in good yields. In future, however, the gap between water availability and crop water demand is expected to increase.

We wanted to know whether sub-Saharan Africa would be able to increase its food production to meet future demand, in a changing climate. To do so, we built a novel foodshed model which simulates crop production using climate data and links urban demand to nearby food supply. Foodsheds have been defined as areas where supply matches demand. We assessed various water management measures that could buffer weather variability or increase production (or both). Understanding the potential of such measures can help mobilise and target much needed investments in Africa’s food system.

Conserving water and growing more food

First, we looked at whether regional food production was sufficient to supply growing urban populations.

Combining large databases and crop simulations, we outlined the regions that food might come from for urban areas. Sub-Saharan Africa produces 85% of its overall crop food demand at present, according to our calculations, much of it in eastern Africa. Tanzania, Kenya, and even Uganda – if it were to use its food exports for domestic consumption – come close to being self-sufficient.

Local exceptions are the large cities of Mombasa, the largest port city in Kenya, and Arusha, an important tourism and diplomatic and conference hub in Tanzania, and their immediate surroundings.

In future, a larger population will demand more food. At the same time, the gap between how much water is available and how much crops need is expected to increase. Higher water losses due to higher temperatures will not be fully compensated for by changes in rainfall, according to climate model projections. And even where rainfall is projected to increase, more extreme events are likely to affect crop production. It might rain either too much or too little, which will lead to higher year-to-year variability.

Our study shows that local water conservation measures could buffer some of the projected negative impacts of climate change in eastern Africa. It could also boost food production.

Water harvesting, soil conservation and making sure water infiltrates in the soil would slow runoff and store more water in the soil.

Irrigation systems should be gradually upgraded to drip irrigation or sprinklers. This will improve irrigation efficiency and water consumption. On rainfed areas, rainwater harvesting reservoirs should be installed. The water stored could be used for supplemental irrigation during dry periods. Soil moisture conservation measures will also be applied. These measures will prevent water from evaporating from the bare soil. Irrigation could offset occasional drought risk and so provide better financial stability or create possibilities for planting a different or a second or third crop, further increasing production and income.

Even the foodsheds of rapidly growing cities such as Dar es Salaam in Tanzania will be able to supply enough to meet demand from relatively short distances.

Large scale expansion of irrigation onto new lands should, however, be considered carefully. Potential trade-offs with energy and tourism incomes must equally be considered.

In an earlier study, assessing Tanzania’s ambitious formal irrigation expansion plans, we found that expansion without water conservation measures would pose considerable risk to hydropower production in the new Julius Nyerere Hydropower Project. It would also be a risk to river-dependent ecosystems and national parks and the substantial tourism income that they generate.

---

Read more:
Kenya needs to grow more food: a focus on how to irrigate its vast dry areas is key

---

Why our findings matter

Producing more food in Africa is essential to keep pace with population growth and changing diets. The alternative is an increasing dependence on imports from outside the continent. In 2021, the total value of Africa’s food imports was roughly US$100 billion. Imports can be a useful supplement to local production, but major food exporters in Europe and America are already producing at peak productivity. They have limited scope to increase area and production.

Security concerns around global supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and broader geo-political realignment have also made countries wary of relying too much on others.

Our study confirms the potential of Africa to supply much of the increased demand for food within the continent. We looked at all food crops, including regionally important ones such as cassava, beans and millet. Countries in eastern Africa play a pivotal role.

Improved productivity due to measures proposed would reduce the need for more land elsewhere to grow crops, and limit conflicts related to land use. This is equally important for biodiversity and tourism.

---

Read more:
Diet and nutrition: how well Tanzanians eat depends largely on where they live

---

Looking forward

What we propose requires large investments. Exploring these costs against benefits in a case study in the Rufiji basin in Tanzania we found that most water management measures would be cost effective, but only when considering the overall impact of water conservation on agriculture, hydropower production, and the riverine ecosystem.

Not all farmers will be able to finance these measures themselves. The government and private sector have to provide incentives, reduce risks and increase access to affordable loans.

Nor should these measures be taken in isolation. Other buffer mechanisms to support a stable food supply are increased storage facilities for food, diversified production, and stable and diversified trade relationships.
With farmers innovating, the region’s infrastructure rapidly developing, and expanding urban areas becoming catalysts for growth, there is both the need and the scope to further invest in and improve the region’s food system.

Christian Siderius received funding to conduct this research from the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) for the Future Water Challenges project (E555182DA/5200000978/9) and in preparation of the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit. Other cited work was carried out under the Future Climate for Africa UMFULA project with financial support from the UK Natural Environment Research Council (grants NE/M020398/1 and NE/M020258) and the UK government’s former
Department for International Development.

Christian is a director and founder of Uncharted Waters Ltd, a not-for-profit climate-food system analytics company, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Grantham Research Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom, and Visiting Senior Researcher the Water Resources Management group at Wageningen University in the Netherlands

– ref. Food security in Africa: managing water will be vital in a rapidly growing region – https://theconversation.com/food-security-in-africa-managing-water-will-be-vital-in-a-rapidly-growing-region-241281

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By William G. Moseley, DeWitt Wallace Professor of Geography, Director of Food, Agriculture & Society Program, Macalester College

Rates of hunger in Africa are unacceptably high and getting worse.

The UN State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 report reveals that food insecurity in Africa is the highest of any world region. The prevalence of undernourishment is 20.4% (some 298.4 million Africans) – over twice the global average. The figure has grown steadily since 2015.

Climate change and conflict are contributing to this problem. But I suggest that something more fundamental lies at the heart of the challenge: the ideas and plans used in the postcolonial period to guide how Africa produces food and seeks to reduce malnutrition. While rates of food insecurity vary across the continent, and are worse in central and west Africa, this is a region-wide challenge.

I’m a scholar of African food security and agriculture. In a new book, Decolonising African Agriculture: Food Security, Agroecology and the Need for Radical Transformation, I argue that to feed Africa better, decision-makers and donors ought to:

• reduce the focus on commercial agricultural production as a way to address food insecurity

• stop thinking that agricultural development is solely about commercialising farming and supporting other industries

• adopt an agroecological approach that uses farmer knowledge and natural ecological processes to grow more with fewer external inputs, such as fertilisers.

Conventional approaches have failed across various contexts and countries. I look at what’s going wrong with how governments think about agriculture – and where the focus needs to be instead to tackle Africa’s hunger crisis.

Focus on production agriculture

Many of the core ideas around agriculture date back to the colonial era.

Modern crop science, or agronomy, was developed in Europe to serve colonial interests. The goal was to produce crops that would benefit European economies. Although this approach has been criticised, it still heavily influences agriculture today. The idea is that producing more food will solve food insecurity.

Food security has six dimensions. While increased food production might address one of these dimensions – food availability – it often fails to address the other five: access, stability, utilisation, sustainability and agency.

Food insecurity is not always about an absolute lack of food, but about people’s inability to get the food that is there.

Unstable prices may be one reason. Or people may not have cooking fuel. Agricultural practices may be unsustainable. This often happens when farmers have limited control over how and what they farm.

The west African nation of Mali, for example, has focused on cotton exports based on the idea that it would bolster economic growth and that cotton farmers could use their new equipment and fertiliser to grow more food. Research shows, however, that this led to the destruction of soil resources, indebtedness for farmers, and alarming rates of child malnutrition.

Another example is South Africa’s post-apartheid land reform initiatives, which adopted a large scale commercial agricultural model. This has led to high rates of project failure and has done little to address high rates of malnutrition.

Agriculture as a first step

The second major challenge in addressing Africa’s high malnutrition rates is that many countries and international organisations don’t value agricultural development for itself. It’s seen as the first step towards industrialisation.

Commercial agriculture has become paramount. It tends to focus on a single crop, with expensive inputs (like fertilisers) and with connections to far-away markets. Smaller farms, focused on production for home consumption and local markets, are less valued. These farms may not add to national economic growth in an important way, but they help the poor achieve food security.

For example, the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa funded a rice commercialisation project in Burkina Faso. Women farmers were encouraged to leave traditional practices behind, buy inputs, work with improved seeds, and sell to bigger urban markets. Sadly, research I worked on revealed that this didn’t provide great nutritional gains for the participants.

In another case, as its diamond exports boomed, Botswana largely gave up on pursuing food self sufficiency in the 1980s. Crop agriculture was not seen as a significant contributor to the economy. This undermined the food security of poorer rural inhabitants and women.

Agroecology as the way forward

Mounting evidence of failure suggests it’s time to try a different way of addressing Africa’s food security woes.

Agroecology – farming with nature – is a more decolonial approach. It covers formal research by scientists and informal knowledge of farmers who experiment in their fields.

Agroecologists study the interactions between different crops, crops and insects, and crops and the soil. This can reveal ways to produce more with fewer costly external inputs. It’s a more sustainable and cheaper option.

Common examples of agroecological practices in African farming systems are polycropping – planting different complementary crops in the same field – and agroforestry – mixing trees and crops. These diverse systems tend to have fewer pest problems and are better at maintaining soil fertility.

No African country has fully embraced agroecology yet, but there are promising examples, many unplanned, that point to its potential.

In Mali, for example, farmers briefly abandoned cotton in 2007-2008 due to low prices. There was then an upsurge in sorghum production. This largely saved the country from the social unrest and food price protests that happened in most neighbouring countries.

A few land reform projects in South Africa allowed larger farms to be split into smaller plots, which had higher rates of success and more food security benefits. This suggests that a different, less commercial approach is in order.

The beginning of a revolution

Agroecology is a promising way forward in addressing Africa’s worsening food crisis.

It also has the backing of many African civil society organisations, such as the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa and Network of West African Farmer Organisations and Agricultural Producers.

African government leaders and donors have been slower to recognise the need for a different approach. We are beginning to see signs of change, though. For example, Senegal’s former agriculture minister, Papa Abdoulaye Seck, trained as a traditional agronomist. He now sees agroecology as a better way forward for his country. And the European Union has also begun funding a small number of experimental agroecology programmes.

It’s time for a major shift in perspective. We will hopefully look back on this era as the turning point that ended intellectual colonisation in the agronomic sciences.

William G. Moseley received funding from the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Fulbright-Hays Program. He is affiliated with the Mande Studies Association (MANSA) as president and American Association of Geographers (AAG) as vice president. The views expressed here are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the NSF, Fulbright-Hays, MANSA or AAG.

– ref. Africa’s worsening food crisis – it’s time for an agricultural revolution – https://theconversation.com/africas-worsening-food-crisis-its-time-for-an-agricultural-revolution-244323