The Conversation – Africa – Page 47

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Aleksi Ylönen, Professor, United States International University

More than three decades after unilaterally declaring independence from Somalia, Somaliland still seeks international recognition as a sovereign state. Despite a lack of formal acknowledgement, the breakaway state has built a relatively stable system of governance. This has drawn increasing interest from global powers, including the United States. As regional dynamics shift and great-power competition intensifies, Somaliland’s bid for recognition is gaining new currency. Aleksi Ylönen has studied politics in the Horn of Africa and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He unpacks what’s at play.

What legal and historical arguments does Somaliland use?

The Somali National Movement is one of the main clan-based insurgent movements responsible for the collapse of the central government in Somalia. It claims the territory of the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The UK had granted Somaliland sovereign status on 26 June 1960.

The Somali government tried to stomp out calls for secession. It orchestrated the brutal killing of hundreds of thousands of people in northern Somalia between 1987 and 1989.

But the Somali National Movement declared unilateral independence on 18 May 1991 and separated from Somalia.

With the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991, the movement’s main enemy was gone. This led to a violent power struggle between various militias.

This subsided only after the politician Mohamed Egal consolidated power. He was elected president of Somaliland in May 1993.

Egal made deals with merchants and businessmen, giving them tax and commercial incentives to accept his patronage. As a result, he obtained the economic means to consolidate political power and to pursue peace and state-building. It’s something his successors have kept up with since his death in 2002.

What has Somaliland done to push for recognition?

Successive Somaliland governments continue to engage in informal diplomacy. They have aligned with the west, particularly the US, which was the dominant power after the cold war, and the former colonial master, the UK. Both countries host significant Somaliland diaspora communities.

The US and the UK have for decades flirted with the idea of recognising Somaliland, which they consider a strategic partner. However, they have been repeatedly thrown back by their respective Somalia policies. These have favoured empowering the widely supported Mogadishu government to reassert its authority and control over Somali territories.

This Somalia policy has been increasingly questioned in recent years, in part due to Mogadishu’s security challenges. In contrast, the Hargeisa government of Somaliland has largely shown it can provide security and stability. It has held elections and survived as a state for the last three decades, though it has faced political resistance and armed opposition.

As new global powers rise, Somaliland administrations have pursued an increasingly diverse foreign policy, with one goal: international recognition.

Hargeisa hosts consulates and representative offices of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Taiwan, the UK and the European Union, among others.

The government has also engaged in informal foreign relations with the United Arab Emirates. The Middle Eastern monarchy serves as a business hub and a destination of livestock exports. Many Somalilanders migrate there.

Somaliland maintains representative offices in several countries. These include Canada, the US, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Taiwan. Hargeisa has alienated China because it has collaborated with Taiwan since 2020. Taiwan is a self-ruled island claimed by China.

On 1 January 2024, Somaliland’s outgoing president Muse Bihi signed a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed for increased cooperation. Bihi implied that Ethiopia would be the first country to formally recognise Somaliland. The deal caused a sharp deterioration of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.

Abiy later moderated his position and, with Turkish mediation, reconciled with his Somalia counterpart, President Hassan Mohamud.

What’s behind US interest in Somaliland?

The US, like other great powers, has been interested in Somaliland because of its strategic location. It is on the African shores of the Gulf of Aden, across from the Arabian Peninsula. Its geographical position has gained currency recently as Yemeni Houthi rebels strike maritime traffic in the busy shipping lanes. Somaliland is also well located to curb piracy and smuggling on this global trade route.

The US Africa Command set up its main Horn of Africa base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002. This followed the 11 September 2001 attacks.

In 2017, China, which had become the main foreign economic power in the Horn of Africa, set up a navy support facility in Djibouti. This encouraged closer collaboration between American and Somaliland authorities. The US played with the idea of establishing a base in Berbera, which hosts Somaliland’s largest port.

With Donald Trump winning the US presidential election in 2024, there were reports of an increased push for US recognition of Somaliland. This would allow the US to deepen its trade and security partnerships in the volatile Horn of Africa region.

Since March 2025, representatives of the Trump administration have engaged in talks with Somaliland officials to establish a US military base near Berbera. This would be in exchange for a formal but partial recognition of Somaliland.

What are the risks of US recognition of Somaliland?

Stronger US engagement with Somaliland risks neglecting Somalia.

Mogadishu depends on external military assistance in its battle against the advancing violent Islamist extremist group, Al-Shabaab. It also faces increasing defiance from two federal regions, Puntland and Jubaland.

US recognition would reward Hargeisa for its persistent effort to maintain stability and promote democracy. However, it could encourage other nations to recognise Somaliland. This would deliver a blow to Somali nationalists who want one state for all Somalis.

Aleksi Ylönen is affiliated with the Center for International Studies, Iscte-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and is an associate fellow at the HORN International Institute for Strategic Studies.

– ref. Somaliland’s 30-year quest for recognition: could US interests make the difference? – https://theconversation.com/somalilands-30-year-quest-for-recognition-could-us-interests-make-the-difference-255399

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Busani Ngcaweni, Visiting Adjunct Professor, Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand

The digital revolution is reshaping governance worldwide. From the electronic filing of taxes to digital visa applications, technology is making government services more accessible, efficient and transparent.

South Africa is making progress in its digital journey. In 2024 it climbed to 40th place out of 193 countries, from 65th place in 2022, in the United Nations e-Government Index. This improvement makes the country one of Africa’s digital leaders, surpassing Mauritius and Tunisia.

South Africa has identified more than 255 government services for digitisation. Already, 134 are available on the National e-Government Portal. This achievement is remarkable. Nevertheless, the shift to digitisation comes with challenges and risks.

Some countries have weakened the state’s role by rapidly outsourcing key government functions. But South Africa has the opportunity to build a model of digital transformation that strengthens public institutions rather than diminishes them.

New technologies must bring tangible benefits for citizens. Digital transformation can improve public administration. But, if mismanaged, it could burden taxpayers with costs.

Benefits

Digital transformation comes at a cost. This is particularly true if the state fails to use its procurement power to negotiate reasonable prices. Infrastructure upgrades, cybersecurity measures, software licensing and system maintenance require substantial financial investment.

The question is whether these expenses are a necessary step towards a more efficient and accessible government.

Two South African examples illustrate that digital transformation can save money and enhance service delivery quality.

The first is the South African Revenue Service. Its goal is to ensure that taxpayers and tax advisers can use the service from anywhere and at any time. The changes made more than a decade ago show that digital systems can yield substantial financial gains. After introducing e-filing in 2006, the revenue service streamlined tax processes, reduced inefficiencies and led to higher compliance rates. Ultimately this led to improved revenue collection.

Similarly, digitising social grant payments has had a number of positive effects. In a chapter of a recent edited volume on public governance, my colleagues and I wrote a case study about how the South African Social Security Agency used basic technologies and platforms like WhatsApp and email to process a grant during the COVID pandemic. It allowed over 14 million people to apply, paid grants to over 6 million beneficiaries during the first phase of the project.

South African Social Security Agency annual reports show that over 95% of grant beneficiaries receive their payouts electronically through debit cards, instead of going to cash points. This improves security and lets beneficiaries decide when to get and spend their money.

There are fears that automation could result in massive job losses. But global experience has shown that digitalisation does not necessarily lead to large-scale retrenchments. Instead it can shift the nature of work to other responsibilities.

The South African Social Security Agency provides a compelling case. Its transition to digital grant payments did not lead to job losses. Similarly, the expansion of e-filing at the revenue service has not resulted in workforce reductions. In both cases efficiencies improved.

These cases highlight that digital transformation is reshaping roles rather than displacing employees. Public servants are moving into areas such as cybersecurity, data analysis and AI-driven decision-making.

Shortcomings and pitfalls

A number of inefficiencies are at play in government services.

Firstly, most government digital operations still work with outdated paper-based systems. The lack of a uniform digital identity creates bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays.

Secondly, fragmented procurement of equipment in government has led to duplicated efforts, increased costs and fruitless expenditure.

Thirdly, different departments often use isolated and incompatible digital systems. This reduce the mutual benefits of digital transformation. The State IT Agency has been blamed for inefficiencies, procurement failures and questionable spending.

Fourthly, South Africa’s public service remains fragmented. Citizens still struggle to access government services seamlessly. They often move between departments to complete what should be a single transaction.

Without a centralised system, departments operate in isolation, duplicating efforts, increasing costs and eroding public trust.

Fifth, a lack of skills. Increasing reliance on digital tools requires expertise in data analytics, cloud computing and automation. Many public servants lack the training to take on these new roles. The National Digital and Future Skills Strategy was introduced in September 2020 to bridge this gap, but its effectiveness depends on its implementation.

Introducing it in 2020 at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic forced government to make digital leaps which otherwise might have taken longer. To sustain services, technology had to be rapidly adopted, including basic things like holding Cabinet meetings online, using a system rapidly developed by the State Information Technology Agency.

Sixth, security concerns complicate the transformation. As government systems become digital, they become vulnerable to cyberattacks. South Africa must put in place cybersecurity infrastructure to prevent identity theft, data breaches and service disruptions. A cyberattack on one department could affect the entire public sector.

What needs to be done

Government must streamline procurement, improve coordination and eliminate inefficiencies to ensure interdepartmental collaboration.

A single, integrated e-government platform would:

cut red tape
reduce queues
increase efficiency.

Government needs to upskill civil servants and improve their digital literacy.

Government must create a seamless e-government system that connects services while protecting citizens’ personal information. The success of digitalisation depends on technological advancements as well as the level of trust citizens have in government systems. Without strong security measures, transparency and accountability, even the most sophisticated digital tools will fail to gain public confidence.

South Africa has the chance to demonstrate that a strong, capable state can successfully integrate technology while safeguarding public interests. It should take full advantage of offers by Microsoft, Amazon and Huawei to support digital skills training in the public sector in a way that does not advantage one company’s technologies over others. Choices of technology must be user-centric, not based on preferences of accounting officers and chief information officers. Leaders of public institutions must be measured on their ability to digitally transform their organisations.

Busani Ngcaweni is affiliated with the National School of Government, Wits and Johannesburg Universities.

– ref. Digital government can benefit citizens: how South Africa can reduce the risks and get it right – https://theconversation.com/digital-government-can-benefit-citizens-how-south-africa-can-reduce-the-risks-and-get-it-right-254089