The Conversation – Africa – Page 34

July 21, 2025

Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marian Selorm Sapah, Senior lecturer, University of Ghana

Impact craters are formed when an object from space such as a meteoroid, asteroid or comet strikes the Earth at a very high velocity. This leaves an excavated circular hole on the Earth’s surface.

It is a basic geological process that has shaped the planets from their formation to today. It creates landscapes and surface materials across our solar system. The moon is covered with them, as are planets like Mercury, Mars and Venus. On Earth, impacts have influenced the evolution of life and even provided valuable mineral and energy resources. However, very few of the impact craters on Earth are visible because of various processes that obscure or erase them.

Most of the recognised impact craters on Earth are buried under sediments or have been deeply eroded. That means they no longer preserve their initial forms.

The Bosumtwi impact crater in Ghana is different, however. It is well preserved (not deeply eroded or buried under sediments). Its well-defined, near-circular basin, filled by a lake, is surrounded by a prominent crater rim that rises above the surface of the lake and an outer circular plateau. This makes it a target for several research questions.

As an Earth scientist, I joined a research team from 2019 to better understand the morphology of the crater. We carried out a morphological analysis of the crater (a study of its form, structure and geological features).

This study concluded that the activities of illegal miners are a threat to the sustainability of the crater. We also discovered that the features of the Bosumtwi impact crater can be considered as a terrestrial representation for a special type of impact crater known as rampart craters. These are common on the planets Mars and Venus and are found on icy bodies of the outer solar system (like Ganymede, Europa, Dione, Tethys and Charon).

For future studies, the Bosumtwi impact crater can be used to help understand how rampart craters form on Mars and Venus. So the Bosumtwi impact crater should be protected and preserved.

The crater

The Bosumtwi impact crater is in Ghana’s mineral-rich Ashanti gold belt. It is the location of the only natural inland lake in Ghana. As one of the world’s best-preserved young meteorite impact craters it is designated as an International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage site.

It is one of only 190 confirmed impact crater sites worldwide, one of only 20 on the African continent. Its lake is one of six meteoritic lakes in the world, recognised for their outstanding scientific value.

At almost 1.07 million years old, the crater offers unparalleled opportunities for studying impact processes, climate history and planetary evolution. It’s an irreplaceable natural laboratory for researchers and educators.

Beyond its scientific importance, the crater holds cultural significance for the Ashanti people of Ghana. The lake at its centre serves as a sacred site and spiritual landmark. The crater’s breathtaking landscape also supports eco-tourism and local livelihoods, contributing to Ghana’s economic development while maintaining exceptional aesthetic value.

The research

As part of further research work on the 2019 study, in 2025 we have discovered through field work and satellite data analysis that illegal artisanal mining is prevalent in the area and threatening the crater. This refers to informal, labour-intensive extraction of minerals, primarily gold. It is conducted by individuals or small groups using basic tools and rudimentary machinery. The use of toxic chemicals such as mercury and cyanide, and practices such as river dredging, cause severe environmental harm.

Illegal miners are encroaching on and around the crater rim, posing severe threats to its environment and sustainability. Their activities have become more prevalent over the course of less than 10 years, indicating a growing problem. If unchecked, it could lead to irreversible damage to the crater.

These mining operations risk contaminating the lake with toxic heavy metals. The consequences of these are grave. They include destroying critical geological evidence, accelerating deforestation, and degrading the land. All this damages the crater’s scientific, cultural and economic value.

The International Union of Geological Sciences geoheritage designation of the crater underscores the urgent need for protection measures. The loss of this rare geological wonder would represent not just a national tragedy for Ghana, but a blow to global scientific heritage.

Immediate action is required. This includes enhanced satellite monitoring (tracking illegal mining, deforestation and environmental changes) using optical imagery (such as Sentinel-2, Landsat, PlanetScope). These tools can detect forest loss, identify mining pits and sediment runoff, and analyse changes over time.

Stricter enforcement of mining bans, and community engagement programmes, will help preserve the Bosumtwi impact crater’s unique attributes for future generations of scientists, students, tourists and local communities who depend on its resources.

Marian Selorm Sapah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana has a rare treasure, a crater made when a meteor hit Earth: why it needs to be protected – https://theconversation.com/ghana-has-a-rare-treasure-a-crater-made-when-a-meteor-hit-earth-why-it-needs-to-be-protected-260600

July 21, 2025

Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Hanri Mostert, SARChI Chair for Mineral Law in Africa, University of Cape Town

A US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda binds the two African nations to a worrying arrangement: one where a country signs away its mineral resources to a superpower in return for opaque assurances of security.

The peace deal, signed in June 2025, aims to end three decades of conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

A key part of the agreement binds both nations to developing a regional economic integration framework. This arrangement would expand cooperation between the two states, the US government and American investors on “transparent, formalized end-to-end mineral chains”.

Despite its immense mineral wealth, the DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world. It has been seeking US investment in its mineral sector.

The US has in turn touted a potential multi-billion-dollar investment programme to anchor its mineral supply chains in the traumatised and poor territory.

The peace that the June 2025 deal promises, therefore, hinges on chaining mineral supply to the US in exchange for Washington’s powerful – but vaguely formulated – military oversight.

The peace agreement further establishes a joint oversight committee – with representatives from the African Union, Qatar and the US – to receive complaints and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda.

But beyond the joint oversight committee, the peace deal creates no specific security obligations for the US.

The relationship between the DRC and Rwanda has been marred by war and tension since the bloody First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo wars. At the heart of much of this conflict is the DRC’s mineral wealth. It has fuelled competition, exploitation and armed violence.

This latest peace deal introduces a resources-for-security arrangement. Such deals aren’t new in Africa. They first emerged in the early 2000s as resources-for-infrastructure transactions. Here, a foreign state would agree to build economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, hospitals) in an African state. In exchange, it would get a major stake in a government-owned mining company. Or gain preferential access to the host country’s minerals.

We have studied mineral law and governance in Africa for more than 20 years. The question that emerges now is whether a US-brokered resources-for-security agreement will help the DRC benefit from its resources.

Based on our research on mining, development and sustainability, we believe this is unlikely.

This is because resources-for-security is the latest version of a resource-bartering approach that China and Russia pioneered in countries such as Angola, the Central African Republic and the DRC.

Resource bartering in Africa has eroded the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich nations such as the DRC and Angola.

Further, resources-for-security deals are less transparent and more complicated than prior resource bartering agreements.

DRC’s security gaps

The DRC is endowed with major deposits of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese and tantalum. These are the building blocks for 21st century technologies: artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, wind energy and military security hardware. Rwanda has less mineral wealth than its neighbour, but is the world’s third-largest producer of tantalum, used in electronics, aerospace and medical devices.

For almost 30 years, minerals have fuelled conflict and severe violence, especially in eastern DRC. Tungsten, tantalum and gold (referred to as 3TG) finance and drive conflict as government forces and an estimated 130 armed groups vie for control over lucrative mining sites. Several reports and studies have implicated the DRC’s neighbours – Rwanda and Uganda – in supporting the illegal extraction of 3TG in this region.

The DRC government has failed to extend security over its vast (2.3 million square kilometres) and diverse territory (109 million people, representing 250 ethnic groups). Limited resources, logistical challenges and corruption have weakened its armed forces.

This context makes the United States’ military backing enormously attractive. But our research shows there are traps.

What states risk losing

Resources-for-infrastructure and resources-for-security deals generally offer African nations short-term stability, financing or global goodwill. However, the costs are often long-term because of an erosion of sovereign control.

Here’s how this happens:

certain clauses in such contracts can freeze future regulatory reforms, limiting legislative autonomy
other clauses may lock in low prices for years, leaving resource-selling states unable to benefit when commodity prices surge
arbitration clauses often shift disputes to international forums, bypassing local courts
infrastructure loans are often secured via resource revenues used as loan security. This effectively ringfences exports and undermines sovereign fiscal control.

Examples of loss or near-loss of sovereignty from these sorts of deals abound in Africa.

For instance, Angola’s US$2 billion oil-backed loan from China Eximbank in 2004. This was repayable in monthly deliveries of oil, with revenues directed to Chinese-controlled accounts. The loan’s design deprived Angolan authorities of decision-making power over that income stream even before the oil was extracted.

These deals also fragment accountability. They often span multiple ministries (such as defence, mining and trade), avoiding robust oversight or accountability. Fragmentation makes resource sectors vulnerable to elite capture. Powerful insiders can manipulate agreements for private gain.

In the DRC, this has created a violent kleptocracy, where resource wealth is systematically diverted away from popular benefit.

Finally, there is the risk of re-entrenching extractive trauma. Communities displaced for mining and environmental degradation in many countries across Africa illustrate the long-standing harm to livelihoods, health and social cohesion.

These are not new problems. But where extraction is tied to security or infrastructure, such damage risks becoming permanent features, not temporary costs.

What needs to change

Critical minerals are “critical” because they’re hard to mine or substitute. Additionally, their supply chains are strategically vulnerable and politically exposed. Whoever controls these minerals controls the future. Africa must make sure it doesn’t trade that future away.

In a world being reshaped by global interests in critical minerals, African states must not underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. They hold considerable leverage.

But leverage only works if it is wielded strategically. This means:

investing in institutional strength and legal capacity to negotiate better deals
demanding local value creation and addition
requiring transparency and parliamentary oversight for minerals-related agreements
refusing deals that bypass human rights, environmental or sovereignty standards.

Africa has the resources. It must hold on to the power they wield.

Hanri Mostert receives funding from the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. She is a member of the Expropriation Expert Group and a steering committee member of the International Bar Association’s (IBA) Academic Advisory Group (AAG) in the Sector for Energy, Environmental, Resources and Infrastructure Law (SEERIL).

Tracy-Lynn Field receives funding from the Claude Leon Foundation. She is a non-executive director of the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa.

– ref. Africa’s minerals are being bartered for security: why it’s a bad idea – https://theconversation.com/africas-minerals-are-being-bartered-for-security-why-its-a-bad-idea-260594

July 21, 2025

Johannesburg’s creative hubs are booming: how artists are rejuvenating a failing inner city

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mariapaola McGurk, Lecturer in Innovation & Entrepreneurship, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

Johannesburg is weathering a storm of crises. Nowhere is its complex tangle of challenges more visible than in the inner city, where crime, overcrowding, and infrastructure collapse – such as roads literally exploding – paint a grim picture. Cultural institutions haven’t been spared either, with long-standing landmarks like the Johannesburg Art Gallery caught in cycles of neglect and crisis.

Yet, while many avoid the inner city or speak only of its decline, the creative and cultural practitioners of Johannesburg never left. In fact, artists, architects, fashion designers, animators, musicians and the like have been hard at work. They’re building, dreaming and shaping a new urban reality that could become the beacon of hope this city needs.

As a researcher and visual artist, I recently completed a PhD study that focused on Johannesburg’s cultural and creative industries. My research revealed that a clear understanding of the existing structures and dynamics within this industry is essential for developing effective strategies to strengthen its role in local economic development.

Here I explore one such opportunity: creative hubs. I argue that they represent a low-hanging fruit for the inner city’s growth and revitalisation.

Urban renewal

Numerous articles have explored strategies for the city’s economic development and urban renewal. One group of scholars recently outlined four critical focus areas: coordinated efforts across government levels; an active civil society; a shift in political culture; and restored leadership in a revitalised administration.

These are vital interventions, but they still beg a deeper question. What is the new “gold” of the “City of Gold”, the mining town founded in 1886 and on track to become a megacity by 2030?

What is it that truly sets Johannesburg apart, nationally and globally? What strengths already exist that, if nurtured, could help address the city’s challenges? The answer may not lie in building something entirely new, but in recognising and investing in what already thrives. The city’s people, its culture, and its extraordinary creativity.

In 2004, Unesco launched the Creative Cities Network. Today it comprises 246 cities in 80 member states. South Africa has three cities in the network: Cape Town (design), Durban (literature) and Overstrand (gastronomy). Johannesburg has never applied to belong.

Cities are acknowledging the economic and social value of the cultural and creative industries, particularly in addressing challenges such as youth unemployment, micro-enterprise growth, equity and community development.

Yet cities globally are grappling with how to retain creative professionals. This is the case in cities like Toronto, Sydney, Los Angeles, Cologne or Barcelona. Rising property prices, the redevelopment of industrial areas into commercial or luxury spaces, and short-term rental agreements are displacing these professionals from the urban cores they help energise. Cities are coming up with incentives and programmes to correct this.

A recent World Cities Cultural Forum report offers a solution in the form of Creative Land Trusts. These permanently hold land and assets at affordable rates for creatives. They take property out of speculative real estate markets. They’re designed to support not galleries or theatres, but the studios and workspaces where creative production actually happens.

Similar initiatives are happening in London, Helsinki and San Francisco.

Mapping Johannesburg’s creative hubs

Unlike cities that are trying to reverse the exodus of creatives, Johannesburg’s inner city has seen a recent surge in creative hub development.

A creative hub is a physical or digital space (in this case physical) designed to bring together cultural and creative professionals for studio space, collaboration, networking and the exchange of ideas.

Over the last year, 21 creative hubs have been mapped in the city, the majority newly established. Notable examples include Transwerke Studios, Asisebenze Art Atelier, Victoria Yards and Oovookoo. Remarkably, 19 of the 21 hubs identified in my open-source mapping process are in the inner city. Only two are government run – Transwerke and Downtown Music Hub.

Across Johannesburg, creative hubs buzz with independent activity, yet share a common commitment to cultivating talent, business support and community impact. They are evidence of innovative partnerships between creatives and property developers.

Inside these spaces, artists and creatives get opportunities through gallerist and investor visits (access to markets). They build practical and entrepreneurial skills through tailored workshops. And they collaborate on projects that place social upliftment at their heart.

Some hubs focus on offering studio spaces, while others extend their reach beyond their walls, blending artistic expression with community development and public engagement.

By actively building community and opportunity, creative hubs are becoming

lighthouses for the new urban economy.

They are small business incubators, urban beautification engines and potential cultural tourism hotspots. An event like Contra Fair opens the doors of art studio hubs once a year. Entrepreneur and social activist Tebogo Moalusi has now taken the lead in the establishment of Creative20. This will become a platform for revitalising Johannesburg’s creative cities campaign.

Neglected by the city

And yet the cultural and creative industries remain almost entirely absent from the city’s strategic planning. The Johannesburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy fails even to mention the sector.

This is despite Gauteng, the province that houses Johannesburg, being the epicentre of South Africa’s creative economy. It contributes 46.3% of the industry’s gross domestic product and generates the highest employment impact. Johannesburg hosts the majority of creative businesses in the province.

The Gauteng 2030 Strategy highlights three high-growth sectors: agro-processing, cultural and creative industries, and high-tech/knowledge sectors, including digital and gaming. Two of these directly involve the creative economy. Yet there’s been little effort to integrate them into Johannesburg’s urban development agenda.

If Johannesburg is serious about inclusive economic development and sustainable urban growth, it must recognise and invest in the cultural and creative industries which are already thriving within its borders.

Mariapaola McGurk consults to Creative20 Organisation

– ref. Johannesburg’s creative hubs are booming: how artists are rejuvenating a failing inner city – https://theconversation.com/johannesburgs-creative-hubs-are-booming-how-artists-are-rejuvenating-a-failing-inner-city-260224

July 21, 2025

African media are threatened by governments and big tech – book tracks the latest trends

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hayes Mabweazara, Senior Lecturer in Sociological & Cultural Studies (Media, Culture & Society), University of Glasgow

Media capture happens when media outlets lose their independence and fall under the influence of political or financial interests. This often leads to news content that favours power instead of public accountability.

Media Capture in Africa and Latin America: Power and Resistance is a new book edited by news media scholars Hayes Mawindi Mabweazara and Bethia Pearson. It explores how this dynamic plays out in the global south and how journalists and citizens are resisting it. We asked them four questions.

What is media capture and how has it reshaped itself in recent times?

Media capture describes how media outlets are influenced, manipulated or controlled by powerful actors – often governments or large corporations – to serve their interests. It’s an idea that helps us understand how powerful groups in society can have a negative influence on news media. While this idea isn’t new, what has changed is how subtly and pervasively it now operates.

These groups include big technology organisations that own digital media platforms – such as X, owned by xAI (Elon Musk), and Instagram and Facebook, owned by Meta. But it’s also important to consider Google as a large search engine that shapes the news content and audience of many other platforms.

This matters because the media are important for the functioning of democratic societies. Ideally, they provide information, represent different groups and issues in society, and hold powerful actors to account.

For example, one of the key roles of the media is to provide accurate information for citizens to be able to decide how to vote in elections. Or to decide what they think about important issues. One big concern, then, is the effect of inaccurate or biased information on democracy.

Or it might be that accurate information is harder to access because algorithms and platforms make it easier to access inaccurate or biased information. These can be intended and unintended consequences of the technology itself, but algorithms can amplify misinformation and fake news – especially if this content has the potential to go viral.

So, what’s particular about media capture in the global south?

This is a really interesting question that is still being investigated, but we have some ideas.

First of all, it’s useful to know that media capture scholarship from the global north emerged around the time of the 2008 financial crisis. The influence of financial institutions on business journalists was one of the first areas of study. Since then, research in the US has focused on the capture of government-funded media organisations like Voice of America. And on how digital platforms like Google and Facebook can lead to capture.

In the global south, scholars have drawn attention to the importance of large media corporations in understanding media capture. For example, in Latin America, there’s a high level of what’s called “media concentration”. This is when many media outlets are owned by a few companies. These companies often own companies in other sectors, which means that critical reporting on business interests presents a conflict of interest.

But to focus on Africa, scholars have drawn attention to governments as a source of pressure on journalists and editors. This can be through direct pressure or what we might call “covert” pressure. Withholding advertising that helps to fund media outlets is an example, or offering financial incentives to stop investigating certain topics.

Researchers are also concerned about the influence of big tech in Africa. Digital platforms like Google and Facebook can shape the news and information that citizens have access to.

Can you share some of the studies from the book?

Our book includes many interesting studies – from Colombia, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America to Ethiopia and Morocco in Africa. We’ll share a few African cases here to give an overview of the issues.

The book’s contribution on Ghana warns us that although more overt “old” types of media capture may have subsided, transitional democracies can feature messier, more nuanced forms of media control. This can be evident in government pressures and through capture of regulators.

In the Morocco chapter, we see the threat to media freedom presented by digital platforms owned by global tech giants. This is known as “infrastructural capture”. It means news organisations become dependent on tech giants to set the rules of the game for democratic communication.

Another compelling case is Nigeria, where researchers explore ties between media ownership and political patronage. The authors argue that the Nigerian press is failing in its democratic duty because of its reliance on advertising and sponsorship income from the state. Added to this are ineffective regulatory mechanisms and close relationships with some big businesses that own newspapers and printing presses.

How can media capture be resisted in the global south?

The studies in the book show some ways forward and we do think it’s important to be optimistic! Resistance takes many forms. Sometimes it comes through legal and policy reform aimed at increasing transparency and media diversity. In other cases, it’s driven by social movements, investigative journalists and independent media who continue to operate under pressure.

The chapter on Uganda shows that journalist groups working with media advocacy organisations can strategically act to resist government media capture and harmful regulations. For example, to push back against one legislative change, several groups formed a temporary network called Article 29 (named after the article in the Ugandan constitution protecting free speech) and the African Centre for Media Excellence produced a report criticising the proposed changes.

One of the chapters on Ghana also shows how networks such as journalists, media associations, human rights groups and legal organisations can mobilise to push back against government influence. Organisations including the Ghana Journalists Association and Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association have played key roles in, for example, taking the media regulator to court to overturn laws that would have led to censorship. These findings are echoed in Latin America, where research on Mexico and Colombia also found professional journalism to be a strong source of resistance.

The conversation must also include rethinking how we define capture itself. If we frame it only as total control, we risk missing the everyday ways influence operates – and the spaces where it can be resisted. We would also say it’s really important that citizens are aware and alert to the issues when they think about how they access news media and what platforms they use. This is sometimes called “media literacy” and is about people being more knowledgeable about where trustworthy news comes from.

You can listen to a podcast about the book over here.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. African media are threatened by governments and big tech – book tracks the latest trends – https://theconversation.com/african-media-are-threatened-by-governments-and-big-tech-book-tracks-the-latest-trends-258017

July 20, 2025

South African university programmes to support black students aren’t working. What needs to be done

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anthea Adams, Lecturer: Academic Staff Development, Rhodes University

Most universities and colleges have formal and informal programmes and initiatives to support student and staff development. Their goal is to create learning experiences that help students succeed academically. Typically, academic development practitioners design and run these programmes. They are usually academics themselves. To help students, they use tools like data analytics to design tutoring and mentoring programmes. For staff, development might include formal courses, webinars, workshops and seminars. Education researchers Anthea Adams, Sandra Williams, Patricia Muhuro and Charlene Van Wyk-Geduld reflect on their recent paper on academic development in South African higher education.

What is the role of academic development in South African higher education?

It started in the early 1980s when black students were first allowed to register at universities that had previously been reserved for white students.

After 1994 when South Africa became a democracy, the main aim of academic development was to help transform society by giving black students better opportunities to succeed at university.

Research on whether these efforts were making a difference in improving student learning, and our reflections, show a mismatch between what academic development is supposed to achieve and how it is being carried out in practice.

What is the mismatch between goals and practices?

Academic development has come a long way, mainly thanks to government support and funding. There is evidence of this in research and annual progress reports submitted to the Department of Higher Education and Training. This evidence clearly shows the positive impact of academic development efforts over the years.

But even with these strides, we can’t ignore a major concern: many black students drop out of university or do not progress with their studies as expected. This tells us that there’s a serious disconnect between what academic development aims to achieve and its actual practices.

One of the biggest red flags is the ongoing gap in graduation rates across different population groups. For example, the Council on Higher Education’s 2022 review of higher education highlighted that in 2018, white students were six percentage points more likely to complete their studies than black students.

What’s also worrying is that South African curricula and learning approaches are not yet relevant to diverse learning contexts. Students, academic staff and professional organisations like the Higher Education Learning and Teaching Association of Southern Africa have all said that academic development practices may not sufficiently address the academic realities of the majority of students.

What lessons can we learn?

We propose that academic development work should be based on research that can genuinely support all students’ success.

A number of scholars have argued that the quality of current research on academic development work contributes to the mismatch between its goals and actual practices. The research is not yet as theoretical, scholarly and critical as it needs to be to help us fully understand and improve academic development work.

This critique helps us understand why academic development research often feels limited to one specific context. This is particularly true of research that looks into why some students are dropping out or struggling to complete their studies.
This kind of research doesn’t offer insights that help practitioners and academics think more broadly about how to apply the findings in different learning contexts.

Valuable work is being done by both veteran and less experienced academic development practitioners. Their efforts have influenced academic development work as we know it today. But we should respond to the observation that most academic development work is still, in practice, limited to one context.

What is the way forward?

Less experienced academic development practitioners and scholars may find it daunting to produce research rich in theory. Therefore, we propose working together in communities of practice to build networks and benefit from reciprocal mentorship opportunities.

Mentors can be peers or seasoned academic development practitioners and researchers. They can help each other unpack what it means to produce rigorous research based on real-life teaching and learning contexts.

Working alongside each other and sharing knowledge and expertise can be fulfilling. It can also be the catalyst for building theory that will advance an understanding of academic development work. Opportunities to form peer networks help academics develop confidence and competence as teachers and scholars.

This kind of work can happen naturally as long as the context is supportive. However, we recognise opportunities for both formal and informal reciprocal mentoring relationships. This is based on our reflections on our teaching experiences and engagements in postgraduate diplomas in higher education.

Several scholars support the proposal for national directives to develop academics as university teachers and scholars. Professional development initiatives, such as postgraduate diplomas, can be conducive learning spaces where academics can engage in the scholarship of teaching and learning.

In other words, supported by experienced facilitators, academics can use research and evidence to interrogate how they teach and how students learn.

Professional development initiatives are not a panacea for the mismatch between academic development goals and actual practices. However, they can be a place where academics help each other to build theory in academic development. Only then, by working together, can academics respond to challenges casting a shadow on academic development work.

– ref. South African university programmes to support black students aren’t working. What needs to be done – https://theconversation.com/south-african-university-programmes-to-support-black-students-arent-working-what-needs-to-be-done-251954

July 17, 2025

East African countries and open borders: great strides, but still a long way to go

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

It’s not uncommon to find a Ugandan taxi driver in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, just as one regularly meets Zimbabwean Uber drivers in South Africa. But there is a big difference. A Ugandan working in Rwanda most likely has a secure legal right to be there, whereas Zimbabweans working in South Africa are often uncertain of their current or future legality.

East Africa has made greater strides towards the free flow of people crossing borders and seeking work than most of Africa. Only the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) is in the same league.

While the African Union’s Free Movement of Persons protocol has faltered at a continental level, some of the regional economic communities have made progress. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) allows visa-free travel across almost all its borders.

Ecowas and the East African Community (EAC) have driven ambitiously towards regional common markets including the freeing up of job-seeking, residential settlement and business development across the borders of member states.

The New South Institute, a think-tank focused on governance reforms in the global south, is nearing the end of a research programme on migration governance reform in Africa. Our new report is on East Africa.

We have found that unlike much of the global north, the African continent is moving towards more open borders for people. In some of the global south the promise of economic growth outweighs political fears. Yet progress is slow, and not coordinated. Mostly migration reform happens in regions and between neighbours.

The progress in the East African Community is particularly notable compared with other African regional communities. We identify a number of reasons for this, including strong leadership and co-operation between state and non-state actors.

The commitment to free movement

The East African Community adopted its Common Market Protocol in 2010. The bloc is made up of Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia.

The regional body’s common market pact includes the movement of goods, services, capital and people. It gives people the right – on paper at least – to find employment across borders, the right to reside and the right to establish a business. There is also a commitment to the harmonisation and mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications and labour policies to ease mobility.

Even before the common market protocol, the regional bloc began to establish one-stop border posts on many of its internal borders to facilitate the flow of goods and people. Though they don’t all operate the same way or equally well, they have been successful at easing movement.

Uneven outcomes

The common market’s impact on the movement of people has been uneven within the region. Most integrated are Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda, which allow the cross-border movement of citizens with standardised identity documents – they do not need passports.

It is also relatively easy to get jobs across these borders.

Tanzania and Burundi are close to the inner circle but still require passports, though no visas. The three states which joined more recently, South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia, are all fragile states with governance systems that do not always meet the standards needed for acceptance into all the privileges of the regional bloc.

In practice there is differential treatment. Generally, it is more difficult for citizens of the three latecomers to get regular access and jobs in their regional partners.

Another limitation when it comes to the mobility of people is that little progress has been made in the formal harmonisation of education, health and social welfare systems between member states. This inhibits job seeking across borders.

In addition, national labour laws, which tend to require permits for foreigners, still apply to varying degrees in the region. Some countries are more permissive. For example, Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have a reciprocal no-fee work permit agreement.

Another shortcoming has been that the outcomes of court processes in enforcing the freedom of movement have been disappointing. This is so even though the regional bloc has an active East African Court of Justice. Its legal mandate includes the enforcement of the bloc’s treaty and its protocols.

In some cases the court has found that national actions inhibiting the movement of persons were trumped by the regional protocol. It has instructed the errant governments to comply. But its ability to enforce the decisions is minimal.

Reasons for success

Leadership has been important. The fact that the strongest economy in the region, Kenya, has been part of the leading echelon is significant.

Rwanda and Uganda have led by example too. Rwanda was one of the first countries on the continent to offer visa-free entry to all other African countries. For its part, Uganda is widely admired for its refugee inclusion programmes.

Another factor outlined in our report has been the opportunity for collaboration fostered by relationships between formal institutions, such as governments, and non-state actors such as the International Organisation for Migration. Interactions between these various players have created opportunities for officials and policymakers from states of the region to meet, discuss issues of concern, and develop relationships of trust and understanding.

Another non-state donor-funded actor, TradeMark Africa, which was established in 2010 to support in the implementation of the common market in east Africa, provided considerable support. For example it supported the implementation of the regional One-Stop Border Post programme..

Way forward

Based on our report we identified changes that could make a positive difference.

Firstly, the development of reliable, harmonised systems in the region to collect and manage data on population mobility and employment. This would build confidence that policy was being made on the basis of reliable information.

Secondly, reducing friction in cross-border monetary transactions, including migrants’ remittances. This would make it easier for migrants to send some of their income to their countries of origin.

Thirdly, improvements to population registers, identity documents, passports and cross-border migration management systems. Improvements would build mutual trust in the integrity of systems and pave the way for further commitments to lowering migration barriers.

Fourth, cooperation on cross-border access to social services such as health and education. This is one of the most important intermediate steps towards freeing up mobility for the citizens of the region.

Fifth, reconsidering some of the amendments made to weaken the East African Court of Justice in 2007. This would strengthen the de jure powers of the court, adding considerably to the entrenchment of cross-border rights in the region.

Ultimately, the key constraint in the region is political and security instability, which holds back social and economic development. Nevertheless, incremental progress on mobility is possible despite issues in the fragile states, even though it may result in asymmetric progress within the East African Community.

Alan Hirsch’s work on migration governance is part of his responsibilities while employed as a Senior Research Fellow at the New South Institute.

– ref. East African countries and open borders: great strides, but still a long way to go – https://theconversation.com/east-african-countries-and-open-borders-great-strides-but-still-a-long-way-to-go-261021

July 16, 2025

Sudan’s war is an economic disaster: here’s how bad it could get

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Khalid Siddig, Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader for the Sudan Strategy Support Program, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. What began as a struggle for power has turned into a national catastrophe. More than 14 million people have been displaced. Health and education systems have collapsed and food insecurity threatens over half the population of about 50 million.

The war has disrupted key sectors, triggering severe economic contractions, and worsening poverty and unemployment levels.

Sudan’s finance minister reported in November 2023 that the war had resulted in economic losses exceeding US$26 billion – or more than half the value of the country’s economy a year earlier. The industrial sector, which includes manufacturing and oil refining, has lost over 50% of its value. Employment has fallen by 4.6 million jobs over the period of the conflict. More than 7 million more people have been pushed into poverty. The agrifood system alone has shrunk by 33.6%. These estimates exclude informal economy losses.

My research applies economy-wide models to understand how conflict affects national development. In a recent study, my colleagues and I used this approach to answer the question: what will happen to Sudan’s economy and poverty levels if the war continues through 2025?

To assess the economic impact of the conflict, we used a Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model. This is a tool that captures how shocks affect different sectors and other agents of the economy, such as firms, government and households.

Based on our modelling, the answer is devastating: the conflict could shrink the size of Sudan’s economy by over 40% from 2022 levels, plunging millions more into poverty.

We modelled two scenarios to capture the potential trajectories of Sudan’s economy.

The extreme scenario assumes a sharp initial collapse, with a 29.5% contraction in the size of the economy in 2023 and 12.2% in 2024, followed by a 7% decline in 2025, reflecting some stabilisation over time.

The moderate scenario, based on World Bank projections, applies a 20.1% contraction in 2023 and a 15.1% drop in 2024, also followed by a 7% reduction in 2025, indicating a slower but more prolonged deterioration.

We estimated the annual figures and report only the aggregate impacts through 2025 for clarity.

We found that if the conflict endures, the value of Sudan’s economy will contract by up to 42% from US$56.3 billion in 2022 (pre-conflict) to US$32.4 billion by the end of 2025. The backbone of livelihoods – agriculture – will be crippled. And the social fabric of the country will continue to fray.

How we did it

Our Social Accounting Matrix multiplier model used data from various national and international sources to show the impact of conflict on the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare.

We connected this to government and World Bank data to reflect Sudan’s current conditions.

This allowed us to simulate how conflict-driven disruptions affect the value of the economy, its sectors and household welfare.

What we found

Under the extreme scenario, we found:

Gross domestic product collapse: Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the total value of all goods and services produced in a country within a year. It’s a key indicator of economic health. We found that the value of Sudan’s economy could contract by up to 42%. This means the country would be producing less than 60% of what it did before the conflict. This would affect incomes, jobs, government revenues and public services. The industrial sector – heavily concentrated in Khartoum – would be hardest hit, with output shrinking by over 50%. The value of services like education, health, transport and trade would fall by 40%, and agriculture by more than 35%.
Job losses: nearly 4.6 million jobs – about half of all employment – could disappear. Urban areas and non-farm sectors would be worst affected, with over 700,000 farming jobs at risk.
Incomes plummet: household incomes would decline across all groups – rich and poor, rural and urban – by up to 42%. Rural and less-educated households suffer the most.
Poverty spikes: up to 7.5 million more people could fall into poverty, adding to the 61.1% poverty level in 2022. In rural areas, the poverty rate could jump by 32.5 percentage points from the already high rural poverty rate pre-conflict (67.6% of the rural population). Women, especially in rural communities, are hit particularly hard. Urban poverty, which was at 48.8% pre-conflict, increases by 11.6 percentage points.
The agrifood system – which includes farming, food processing, trade and food services – would lose a third of its value under the extreme scenario.

Why these findings matter

Sudan was already in a fragile state before the war. It was reeling from decades of underinvestment, international sanctions and institutional breakdown.

The war has reversed hard-won gains in poverty reduction. It is also dismantling key productive sectors – from agriculture to manufacturing – which will be essential for recovery once the conflict ends. Every month of continued fighting adds to the damage and raises the cost of rebuilding.

Our projections already show major economic collapse, yet they don’t include the full extent of the damage. This includes losses in the informal economy or the strain on household coping strategies. The real situation could be even worse than what the data suggests.

What needs to be done

First and foremost, peace is essential. Without an end to the fighting, recovery will be impossible.

Second, even as conflict continues, urgent action is needed to stabilise livelihoods. This means:

supporting agriculture in areas that remain relatively safe. Food production must be sustained to prevent famine.
restoring critical services where possible – particularly transport, trade and retail – to keep local economies functioning
protecting the most vulnerable, such as women in rural areas and the elderly, through expanded social protection and targeted cash assistance.

Third, prepare for recovery. The international community – donors, development banks and NGOs – must begin laying the groundwork for post-conflict reconstruction now. This includes investment in public infrastructure, rebuilding institutions and re-integrating displaced populations.

The bottom line

Sudan’s war is more than a political crisis. It is an economic catastrophe unfolding in real time. One that is deepening poverty, destroying livelihoods and erasing years of progress.

Our research provides hard numbers to describe what Sudanese families are already experiencing every day.

The country’s economy is bleeding. Without a shift in the trajectory of the conflict, recovery could take decades – if it happens at all.

Khalid Siddig does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sudan’s war is an economic disaster: here’s how bad it could get – https://theconversation.com/sudans-war-is-an-economic-disaster-heres-how-bad-it-could-get-260609

July 16, 2025

Bribery in South Africa: law now puts a duty on companies to act

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rehana Cassim, Professor in Company Law, University of South Africa

Bribery is one of the most common forms of corruption in South African companies and state institutions. This has a number of harmful outcomes.

Firstly, research shows that it weakens democracy and slows down economic growth. It also creates expensive barriers for honest businesses to succeed because it distorts fair competition. If bribery is not stopped or punished it has a demoralising effect, because it erodes trust and creates a culture where ethical conduct is undermined.

In 2024 a new law came into force in South Africa that puts a duty on companies to take proactive steps to prevent bribery. This law falls under a broader law dealing with corruption in South Africa.

The new provisions make it a crime for companies to fail to prevent bribery by an associated person. This is a major policy shift in South African anti-corruption law, and aligns with the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery legislation.

An associated person is anyone who performs services for the company. This can include suppliers, joint venture partners, distributors, consultants, and other professionals advising the company. It can even be other companies, like subsidiaries.

In my research I found that South Africa took inspiration from the United Kingdom (UK) Bribery Act 2010. The law makes it a criminal offence for commercial organisations to fail to prevent bribery by associated persons.

Despite some successes, enforcement of the UK Bribery Act has been slow and the volume of prosecutions has been low.

Based on my research into company conduct, given the current challenges in law enforcement and the low conviction rates for crimes of corruption, the new law might not work as well as hoped.

But with improved enforcement, it has potential to reduce bribery in South Africa.

What’s behind the new law?

The new addition to the law was introduced after a commission of inquiry found evidence of widespread bribery and corruption under former president Jacob Zuma.

For example, Angelo Agrizzi, former chief operating officer of African Global Operations (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Bosasa), testified that Bosasa won about US$129 million in government tenders by paying about US$4 million in bribes to politicians and government officials. He said that every contract in which Bosasa was involved was linked to bribery and corruption.

The new law is designed to prevent this from happening.

If a person associated with a member of the private sector or an incorporated state-owned entity gives, agrees or offers to give a bribe (or gratification) to another person, the company could be held liable. This applies to companies as well as individuals, partnerships, trusts and other legal entities.

The bribe must be given by the associated person to get business for the company or to gain a business advantage for it. Importantly, a company can be found guilty even if it didn’t know about the bribe.

What counts as a bribe?

A bribe (or gratification) is not just money. It includes avoiding a loss or other disadvantage, releasing any obligation or liability, or giving any favour or advantage.

The bribe does not actually have to be given. It is enough if the associated person agrees or offers to give the bribe.

It is not clear yet if hospitality or promotional expenditures count as bribes.

Under the UK Bribery Act a hospitality payment is not regarded as a gratification unless it is disproportionate. In my view South Africa should follow the same approach.

For example, if paying for transport from the airport to a hotel for an on-site visit, taking clients to dinner, or giving them tickets to an event aligns with the norms for the industry, this probably will not be seen as a bribe.

Facilitation payments is another tricky area. These are small bribes made to minor officials to get routine administrative tasks done, such as applying for visas, clearing customs or getting licences.

The new law doesn’t say whether facilitation payments are regarded as bribes. In my view, they should be.

What companies need to do

Companies can avoid liability under the new law if they can prove that they had adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery by associated persons.

But the law doesn’t explain what “adequate procedures” are. Until the South African government provides guidance on this, it is useful to look at the guidance provided under the UK Bribery Act. It recommends the following:

Companies should adopt procedures that are proportionate to the bribery risks they face and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities.

So a larger company operating in a high-risk market where bribery is known to be common must do more to prevent bribery than a smaller company in a low-risk market where bribery is less common.

The company’s board of directors should foster a culture where bribery is never acceptable.
Companies should periodically assess their exposure to potential bribery risks.
Companies should carry out due diligence procedures on their associated persons.
Companies should communicate their anti-bribery polices internally and externally. They should also provide training to ensure that everyone understands their anti-bribery position.
Companies should monitor their procedures and improve them where necessary.

The way forward

The South African government should urgently publish official guidelines to help companies understand what they must do to comply with the new law.

The principles of South Africa’s corporate governance code, the King IV Report, can also be used to help companies comply with the new law. These principles promote ethical leadership, an ethical culture, risk management, accountability and transparency.

Guidelines are also important for small and medium enterprises. They also have a legal duty to put in place adequate procedures to prevent bribery.

Companies that have not already put in place anti-bribery procedures should act quickly. And they should check that their corporate hospitality policies are reasonable and proportionate to their businesses.

Companies should also evaluate their relationships with the people associated with them.

Setting up anti-bribery procedures may have cost implications. But not having them could cost far more. Having adequate procedures in place is the only defence under the new law.

Rehana Cassim does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bribery in South Africa: law now puts a duty on companies to act – https://theconversation.com/bribery-in-south-africa-law-now-puts-a-duty-on-companies-to-act-260148

July 15, 2025

Lagos is young and diverse, so what shapes ethnic and religious prejudice among teens? Our study tried to find out

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Leila Demarest, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Lagos State, with an estimated population of 20 million, is Africa’s largest metropolis. Home to Nigeria’s commercial capital, it is a magnet for internal migration, drawing in a mix of the country’s ethnic groups. Nigeria is estimated to have between 150 and 500 distinct ethnic groups, many of which are represented in Lagos.

The original inhabitants of Lagos were Yoruba. As the colonial capital, the city experienced early migration from the Igbo group from the south-east. The Hausa-Fulani, from the north, are another important group to have been drawn to Lagos. More recent migration to the city has also been caused by insecurity in the north of Nigeria.

The social interactions between people from diverse backgrounds have been studied extensively as dynamics of exclusion are often pervasive in developed and developing societies alike. In multi-ethnic societies in Africa where there has been violent conflict, the question of peaceful coexistence is all the more important.

In Nigeria, past ethno-religious violence has led to massive casualties. The 1960s Biafra war and lethal riots in Kaduna and Jos in recent decades stand out. Lesser tensions are also present in Lagos state around competition for jobs and access to political power.

Intergroup tensions in Lagos may give rise to concerns about the risk of more serious threats.

But do we see this in adolescents, who haven’t yet started competing with each other for jobs and resources? In schools, young people generally have equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and potential for friendship. Could new generations overcome the adversarial past?

We have decades of research between us straddling group behaviour and identity formation, peace and conflict dynamics, and ethnicity and religion in sub-Saharan Africa. For our research we aimed to gain a picture of intergroup dynamics among Lagos adolescents.

We concluded from surveying young people that higher diversity levels encourage more friendships and cross-group political discussions, which lead to positive relations between ethnic groups. But waiting for this to happen naturally may not be the best approach. It may leave smaller minority groups exposed to discrimination in the meantime. Policy interventions may encourage a quicker development of positive relations.

Survey of Lagos adolescents

Nigeria has a large youth population. Half of the people who live in Lagos state are younger than 25. That could have an important impact on future developments in the city, including intergroup relations.

In 2019, we surveyed final year secondary school students in 36 schools across the state to find out how they viewed other societal groups and which factors affected their views. Most previous research on intergroup relations has focused on adults.

We aimed to obtain a sample of Lagos adolescents who experienced diversity in their daily lives. To achieve this, we drew from both urban and rural districts. Our final sample contained 70 % Yoruba, 16 % Igbo, 2 % Hausa-Fulani, and 12 % other minority group adolescents.

We found that:

adolescents who reported more cross-group friendships had more positive attitudes, including higher trust, towards other groups
those exposed to political discussions in diverse contexts were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards other ethnic and religious groups
when youths experienced more diversity in their schools and neighbourhoods they were less likely to stereotype members of groups
they were also less likely to report a preference for their own group when it comes to teachers, future bosses, marriage partners and electoral candidates.

In contrast, youths exposed to political discussions in ethnic enclaves held negative views.

Diversity and contact

We used statistical analyses to investigate intergroup relations among our youth sample. We first asked whether there was a relationship between exposure to other groups and attitudes towards them. While urban areas, especially megacities like Lagos, are often characterised by diversity, many ethnic enclaves or homogeneous neighbourhoods exist.

We found that higher exposure to diversity had mixed effects. It was associated with less stereotyping and in-group preference, but also related to lower trust in others in general.

Mixed effects are not surprising, as scholars have long held that exposure to diversity does not really tell us how people actually relate to one another: what matters more is positive contact between individuals from different groups. Contact has been robustly associated with more positive intergroup attitudes in predominantly western-focused studies. In Africa-focused studies results have been mixed, with some finding positive and others no real impact of contact.

Our findings provide evidence for positive contact theory as adolescents with more cross-group friendships held more positive attitudes towards other groups and also had higher trust. This demonstrates actual positive contact is more important than mere exposure to diversity.

We also found that exposure to political narratives mattered. Youths who were exposed to political discussions in diverse contexts were more likely to hold positive attitudes towards other ethnic and religious groups.

Policy implications

Intergroup attitudes are formed at an early age. Once developed, prejudice or tolerance have a tendency to “stick” over time. Questions on the development of positive attitudes are in need of urgent attention in Africa because of the continent’s youthful populations and many African countries’ experiences with ethnic and religious conflict.

This brings us to the question of whether tolerance of others can be fast-tracked, especially at an early age, and when youth can be targeted through school interventions. Evidence from other (western) studies suggests that multicultural education, in which pupils are exposed to different cultures in the curriculum, cross-group class discussions on political themes, and cross-group school projects, may encourage positive intergroup relations.

These types of policies come with an important warning though. As we have seen during our field work, many schools, especially public schools, face large class sizes due to resource constraints and teacher training is minimal. Corporal punishment is still implemented. Group work and deliberation are difficult to manage with large numbers and a lack of training, and teachers also risk bringing their own prejudices to the classroom.

So it’s important to design interventions carefully and more research is needed to do this effectively in African contexts.

Leila Demarest received funding from the Leiden University Fund (grant reference W19304-5-01)

Arnim Langer receives funding from Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).

– ref. Lagos is young and diverse, so what shapes ethnic and religious prejudice among teens? Our study tried to find out – https://theconversation.com/lagos-is-young-and-diverse-so-what-shapes-ethnic-and-religious-prejudice-among-teens-our-study-tried-to-find-out-260720

July 15, 2025

Africans survived 10,000 years of climate changes by adapting food systems – study offers lessons for modern times

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leanne N. Phelps, Associate research scientist, Columbia University

Imagine living in a place where a single drought, hurricane, or mudslide can wipe out your food supply. Across Africa, many communities do exactly that – navigate climate shocks like floods, heatwaves, and failed harvests.

What’s often overlooked in the development policies to tackle these threats is a powerful sources of insight: Africa’s own history.

Around 14,700 to 5,500 years ago, much of Africa experienced wetter conditions – a time referred to as the African Humid Period. As wet conditions declined around 5,500 years ago, major social, cultural, and environmental changes ensued across the continent.

We’re part of a multidisciplinary team of scientists who recently published a study about how diverse African communities adapted to climate variability over the past 10,000 years. This is the first study to explore thousands of years of change in people’s livelihoods across the continent using isotopic data.

This continent-wide approach offers novel insights into how livelihoods formed and evolved across space and time.

Prior theories often assumed that societies and their food systems evolved in a linear way. In other words they developed from simple hunting and gathering communities to politically and socially complex societies practising agriculture.

Instead, what we see is a complex mosaic of adaptable strategies that helped people survive. For 10,000 years, African communities adapted by mixing herding, farming, fishing and foraging. They blended different practices based on what worked at different times in their specific environment. That diversity across communities and regions was key to human survival.

That has real lessons for food systems today.

Our research suggests that rigid, top-down development plans, including ones that privilege intensifying agriculture over diversified economies, are unlikely to succeed. Many modern policies promote narrow approaches, like focusing only on cash crops. But history tells a different story. Resilience isn’t about choosing the “best” or most “intensive” method and sticking with it. Rather it’s about staying flexible and blending different strategies to align with local conditions.

The clues left behind

We were able to develop our insights by looking at the clues left behind by the food people ate and the environments they lived in. We did this by analysing the chemical traces (isotopes) in ancient human and domestic animal bones from 187 archaeological sites across the African continent.

We sorted the results into groups with similar features, or “isotopic niches”. Then we described the livelihood and ecological characteristics of these niches using archaeological and environmental information.

Our methods illustrated a wide range of livelihood systems. For example, in what are now Botswana and Zimbabwe, some groups combined small-scale farming with wild food gathering and livestock herding after the African Humid Period. In Egypt and Sudan, communities mixed crop farming – focused on wheat, barley, and legumes – with fishing, dairy, and beer brewing.

Herders, in particular, developed highly flexible strategies. They adapted to hot plains, dry highlands, and everything in between. Pastoral systems (farming with grazing animals) show up at more archaeological sites than any other food system. They also have the widest range of chemical signatures – evidence of their adaptability to shifting environments.

Our study also used isotopic data to build up a picture of how people were using livestock. Most animal management systems were reliant on grasses (plants such as millet and tropical pasture), and adapted to diverse ecological conditions. Some systems were highly specialised to semi-arid and mountainous environments. Others included mixed herds adapted to wetter or lower elevation regions. In other cases, animals were kept as stock in small numbers to supplement other livelihoods – providing milk, dung, and insurance against crop failure.

This adaptability helps clarify why, over the past millennium, pastoral systems have remained so important, especially in areas with increasing aridity.

Mixed livelihood strategies

The study also provides strong evidence for interactions between food production and foraging, whether at community or regional level.

Dynamic, mixed livelihood strategies, including interactions like trade within and between communities near and far, were especially apparent during periods of climatic stress. One of these periods was the end of the African Humid Period (from about 5,500 years ago), when a drier climate created new challenges.

In south-eastern Africa, from 2,000 years ago, there was a rise of diverse livelihood systems blending herding, farming and foraging in complex ways. These systems likely emerged in response to complex environmental and social change. Complex changes in social networks – especially around sharing land, resources, and knowledge – likely underpinned the development of this resilience.

How the past can inform the future

Ancient livelihood strategies offer a playbook for surviving climate change today.

Our analysis suggests that over thousands of years, communities that combined herding, farming, fishing and gathering were making context-specific choices that helped them weather unpredictable conditions. They built food systems that worked with the land and sea, not against them. And they leaned on strong social networks, sharing resources, knowledge and labour.

Past responses to climate shifts can inform current and future strategies for building resilience in regions facing socio-environmental pressures.

Leanne N. Phelps is affiliated with Columbia Climate School at Columbia University; Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh, UK; and NGO Vaevae based in Andavadoake, Toliara, Madagascar

Kristina Guild Douglass receives funding from The US National Science Foundation. She is affiliated with the NGO Vae Vae.

– ref. Africans survived 10,000 years of climate changes by adapting food systems – study offers lessons for modern times – https://theconversation.com/africans-survived-10-000-years-of-climate-changes-by-adapting-food-systems-study-offers-lessons-for-modern-times-260240