The Conversation – Africa – Page 17

January 26, 2026

Uganda’s boda-boda drivers: the digital economy hasn’t been the route to formal work and better protection – research

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rich Mallett, Research Associate and Independent Researcher, ODI Global

Digital labour platforms – like fast food delivery and cab hailing services – are having a dramatic impact on people’s labour rights and working conditions around the world.

In western countries like the UK and the US, their rise has intensified a process of labour casualisation already several decades in the making. Under the guise of “flexibility”, platforms have heralded a return to insecure, temporary forms of employment that offer few rights or benefits to workers.

But in “less developed” countries like Uganda, the growth of the digital gig economy is often considered a boon. Across the global south, it has been claimed that platforms are not only creating millions of new jobs, but they are actually helping to formalise an informal economy so vast it accounts for an estimated 70% of total employment in low- and middle-income countries.

Existing research suggests that by guiding informal workers towards compliance with registration and licensing requirements or making them more visible to state authorities, digital labour platforms are capable of “counteracting informal economic activity”.

But is it all as straightforward as it seems?

In a new research paper I put this claim to the test through a case study of moto-taxi work in the Ugandan capital city, Kampala.

Moto-taxi (or boda boda) work is a hugely important source of income in Uganda, providing livelihoods for an estimated 350,000 people in the capital alone. Over the past decade, ride-hail platforms have descended upon this vast industry, claiming to offer safer, better paid work and a step towards formality.

Drawing on 112 interviews, 370 driver surveys and scans of relevant media, my research reaches a different conclusion. Despite shifting online, digital moto-taxi drivers remain as they always were – informal workers in an unprotected labour market.

This raises fundamental questions about the capacity of digital labour platforms to bring about positive transformations in the global informal economy.

Fallacies of ‘plat-formalisation’

As the new paper shows, moto-taxi workers’ inclusion within the new platform economy brings them no closer to formal labour status in any meaningful way.

This is illustrated by three key insights from my findings.

First, despite early collaborative engagement with state actors, Uganda’s ride-hail companies have tended to operate in unilateral, platform-specific ways that undermine prospects for sectoral standardisation. Each platform enforces its own rules over drivers, and these do not always line up with government legislation.

Take driver licensing, for example. While some companies insist that drivers must have a valid driving permit before working through their apps, others bypass this requirement completely. Market leader SafeBoda, for instance, instead chooses to enrol new drivers in road safety training at a purpose-built “academy”. Though a positive step towards safer driving standards, this is not the same as formalisation.

Second, Uganda’s ride-hail platforms accept zero legal responsibility for the welfare and safety of those using their apps, including cases of “bodily injuries, death, and emotional distress and discomfort”. Despite claiming to help regulate the industry, these companies’ designation of informal moto-taxi workers as independent “gig workers” keeps drivers distanced from state labour regulation.

And third, my findings indicate corporate reluctance to share data with government. According to one city planner I talked with, while the platforms tended to talk positively about public-private collaboration, when push came to shove they would often “withhold their data”. Recent evidence suggests this is continuing to happen, further highlighting the limits of private data ownership and non-binding agreements around data sharing. Without access to this information, it is difficult for governments to register workers, tax them effectively and extend labour protections.

Profiting from informality

Ride-hailing may not have led to better, more formalised work for Uganda’s moto-taxis. But what is has done is open up new revenue streams for the various local and international companies involved. The result: a formalisation not of drivers’ labour but of their wealth.

As detailed in the paper, some of the techniques here include:

Commissions. Drivers regularly lose 15%-20% of their trip fares in the form of company commission fees. With digital technology, these are increasingly being captured via cashless payment systems that deduct fees and other equipment-related debts automatically.
Equipment. Many companies operate by selling drivers the gear they need to function in the ride-hail economy. SafeBoda, for instance, regularly charges new riders somewhere in the region of US$140 for a smartphone, crash helmets and branded uniforms. Drivers often take this on as debt and pay it back incrementally over time, only to later discover that this does not, in all cases, entitle them to actual ownership. As one former employee at the company told me:

The helmet itself is a business. It’s on the side, you can’t see it. The phone is a business. It’s about business besides riders. It’s all about getting commission on things.

Corporate tie-ins. Through a series of funding relationships and “private-private partnerships”, Uganda’s ride-hail platforms make drivers visible and accessible to a whole host of banks, insurance agencies and alternative credit lenders. These financial actors are all keen to find lucrative new markets at the “bottom of the pyramid”. Ride-hailing is simply the vehicle for this.

The formalisation agenda remains important. It is central to achieving better working conditions and stronger labour protections for hundreds of millions of workers around the world.

But for private digital platforms operating across Africa’s informal economies, the bottom line is often not about “counteracting informal economic activity” at all. It is about profiting from it.

This article draws on doctoral research, for which the author received funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

– ref. Uganda’s boda-boda drivers: the digital economy hasn’t been the route to formal work and better protection – research – https://theconversation.com/ugandas-boda-boda-drivers-the-digital-economy-hasnt-been-the-route-to-formal-work-and-better-protection-research-270993

January 26, 2026

Crime-fighting in Lagos: community watch groups are the preferred choice for residents, but they carry risks

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Adewumi I. Badiora, Senior Lecturer, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Olabisi Onabanjo University

Criminal activities have developed into a security crisis in Nigeria. Alongside the responses of security agencies such as the police and military, there has been a huge local response, with community groups mobilising in the face of criminal attacks.

For example, communities in Zamfara State, north-west region, repelled a bandit attack, causing the death of 37 bandits in August 2024. In Sokoto State, north-west region, residents rescued kidnapped individuals and recovered the body of the deceased village head in August 2024. In Kwara state, north-central region, community groups rescued people from their abductors in December 2025.

But how effective are these community-organised interventions?

I’m an urban and community safety researcher who has studied various aspects of insecurity in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s south-west, for more than a decade now.

In a recent paper I sought to answer this question in relation to Lagos. As Nigeria’s largest city with an estimated population exceeding 20 million, Lagos faces severe, complex crime challenges driven by rapid, poorly managed urbanisation and high unemployment rates. I surveyed 62 stakeholders in a bid to evaluate community-driven crime prevention strategies. Respondents included residents, members of the state and community groups who were playing important roles in the city’s security processes. This was qualitative research.

Many respondents expressed little or no trust in formal security agencies. Their expectations that the police could protect them were low.

A resident interviewed for the study said that while people like politicians got police protection, ordinary citizens did not:

That is why everyone has devised ways to protect themselves and family.

My research found that these commmunity-organised interventions have emerged in different forms. The commonest is community vigilante groups. These are self-appointed resident security volunteers who take it upon themselves to confront criminals in their neighbourhood. This is common in low-income neighbourhoods of Lagos because they have to deal with crime but feel they can’t rely on the police to patrol, unlike elite neighbourhoods.

A successful urban security strategy

Lagos community vigilante groups range from small groups of volunteers on streets, and informal neigbourhood watches, to well structured local community bodies. Community vigilante members are mostly men. But women are not explicitly excluded, and they are an important source of information.

The groups were using local knowledge to help the police. They compiled information on crimes, suspicious activity and criminal suspects in their area and provided it to the police as needed. In some cases, they joined the police intelligence response team to raid hideouts of criminals in their areas.

A resident interviewed for the study said:

We are local people. We know our community very well. We can easily spot strangers and suspicious movements. This local knowledge is what we have, that the police do not have. So, we complement their efforts by providing dependable intelligence for their work. Beyond that, we also escort police patrol, and our presence has helped them to penetrate streets they would not have been able to navigate by themselves.

The relationship between the police and community groups was “semi-formal”. Arrangements were made by the communities with little or no intervention by the state. The collaborations were owned, structured and sustained by residents.

Some of those involved in the groups were remunerated through financial contributions by residents. However, they “occasionally” received financial support from the local government authorities, individual local politicians and donors.

Successes

My research showed there had been some positive results. Residents confirmed that the collaborations brought safety to their community and had helped to reduce crime and insecurity, particularly where the police were lacking.

A resident interviewed for the study said:

Things are a little better. Before now, it was dreadful as criminals and hoodlums operate openly. Although there is still a long way to go, there has been a commendable level of improvements in our security in the last five years.

Some ongoing issues

Despite its success, several concerns were raised in my study.

First, community vigilante groups are a patchwork of isolated groups. Organisations are fragmented and weak. This could be dangerous because it creates unaccountable groups that can easily change from being protectors to being a threat. That can be seen in the Bakassi Boys (south-east Nigeria), Yan Sakai (north-west Nigeria) and global examples like Mungiki (Kenya) and Autodefensas (Mexico).

Second is the question of the legality of community groups in terms of the provisions of the Nigerian constitution, the Police Act and the Public Order Act. Their legal status is “complex” as they operate in a grey area. Most of them do not have the backing of the federal government, which has the constitutional authority to manage policies regarding them.

Third, while community vigilante groups fill security gaps created by an under-resourced police force, their activities sometimes lead to conflicts because they act as judge, jury and executioner.

A police officer interviewed for the study said:

The activities of vigilantes are usually unlawful in the way and manner they deal with suspected criminals … The lawful thing for them is to report suspected criminals to the police, but many times, they take law into their own hands.

Still, residents view the groups as legitimate because of their perceived effectiveness, deep local knowledge, community ties and quick action.

Fourth, relationships between community groups and the police range from amiable and collaborative to distrustful and hostile. Mutual distrust risks escalating violence rather than reducing it.

A member of a vigilante group put it this way:

We cannot totally entrust suspects and our community to the police. We have situations where suspects were released without any investigation and prosecution. Not only that, corrupt police officers do give hints to these suspects about key vigilante members behind their arrests, and these criminals go all-out for them after their unlawful freedom from the police custody.

Moving forward

To overcome the challenges, the following steps should be taken:

reform of Nigeria’s security governance, allowing states to create their own police forces
formal recognition and support of community groups
adopting policies to curb the proliferation of the groups
working more closely with community groups to deal with some of the underlying reasons for insecurity. These include political negligence, youth unemployment, poverty and inequality.

Adewumi I. Badiora does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Crime-fighting in Lagos: community watch groups are the preferred choice for residents, but they carry risks – https://theconversation.com/crime-fighting-in-lagos-community-watch-groups-are-the-preferred-choice-for-residents-but-they-carry-risks-273667

January 25, 2026

Global demand for shea butter is growing: but it’s not all good news for the women who collect the nuts

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Francois Questiaux, Researcher, Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen

Shea butter has become a highly sought-after ingredient in cosmetics and food manufacturing worldwide. Since the early 2000s its use as a substitute for cocoa butter has driven a dramatic rise in international demand. The shea butter industry has grown by more than 600% over the last 20 years.

The shea tree is semi-domesticated across the dry savannah region in a “shea belt” west to east from Senegal to South Sudan, and about 500km north to south. It is not planted but protected within farmland and also found in communal bushland.

An estimated 16 million women collect and process shea fruits in rural west Africa, turning them into dry kernels for sale or processing the kernels into shea butter.

Global companies, development agencies and NGOs frequently present the shea industry as a pathway to women’s economic empowerment in the region.

To explore this idea, we conducted research into how the rise in demand for shea butter has affected women collectors in Burkina Faso and Ghana. These two countries are among the lead exporters of dry shea kernels.

The study formed part of our work on agrarian change, political ecology and livelihoods. We study relationships between producers and other actors of global value chains, as well as the impacts of externally induced changes on smallholders.

We combined data from a survey of 1,046 collectors in 24 communities with data from interviews with 18 collectors.

Our results show that the shea boom has intensified competition for access to trees. Over 85% of collectors surveyed reported an increase in the number of shea nut collectors in their community over the past 10 years. We also documented how access to shea trees was becoming more restricted, especially for women who rely most heavily on shea for their livelihoods.

Our results point to widening inequality within the collector population, even as the overall value of the shea sector grows.

Global demand meets local tenure systems

Historically, access to nuts was governed by a combination of customary rules and social norms. Women could usually collect freely on communal land, and also on farmland belonging to their households or relatives. Shea was often treated as a semi–open-access resource, available to women of the community according to need.

This system has come under pressure.

Firstly, as prices have increased over the last three decades, so have the number of people collecting.

Secondly, the common land is shrinking. Expansion and mechanisation of agriculture, population growth and peri-urban development have reduced the areas that once served as shared collection spaces.

Several collectors we interviewed noted that land previously considered “bush” had been converted into fields, removing an important safety net for those without farmland.

As a result, access to shea trees is increasingly tied to access to private land. Over 55% of our survey respondents reported that collection on private fields had become more restricted, with landowners enforcing boundaries more tightly. This shift reflects a broader tendency in both countries for land rights to become more individualised as resources acquire market value.

Third, resource pressure has introduced new forms of conflict, like trespassing on land. Conflicts reinforce exclusion, as landowners become more reluctant to allow non-family members onto their fields.

Unequal effects across collector groups

Our research distinguishes three types of collectors:

dedicated collectors, who derive all of their annual income from collecting and selling shea nuts
diversified collectors, who combine shea collection with farming or other activities
collector–traders, who not only collect nuts but also purchase them from others to sell at higher prices later in the year.

These groups experience the shea boom in different ways.

Dedicated collectors have the most limited access to private land. Only 16% of them collect from their own fields, compared to 38%-43% among the other groups. They depend on the communal bush.

Diversified collectors have better access to private fields than dedicated collectors, but still face similar challenges as bush areas shrink. And they have less time to spend collecting, limiting their ability to compensate for increasing competition.

Collector-traders maintain more secure access to private fields and receive more assistance from household members. Over half report receiving help from men, such as transporting nuts or protecting fields from trespassers. This is significantly more than dedicated or diversified collectors. The additional labour gives them a strategic advantage.

More work, but not more income

Rising prices might suggest that women would earn more from shea today than a decade ago. Yet this is not what most collectors experience. Only 48.7% reported an increase in shea income over the past 10 years, despite the international boom.

Total annual income from shea remains very low – on average only US$174 (purchasing power parity) per year, with differences between collectors.

For poorer collectors, several factors suppress income gains:

limited access to shea trees constrains the volume of nuts they can gather
many have to sell nuts early in the season, often at low prices, to meet immediate cash needs. Better-off collector-traders can purchase nuts cheaply, store them, and profit from higher prices later in the year.

Rethinking the ‘win-win’ narrative

The findings challenge the claim that integrating women into the global shea value chain will empower them and reduce poverty. The boom has indeed created new economic opportunities, but these are unevenly distributed. Market expansion has strengthened the position of those with greater land access and financial capital. At the same time it’s undermined the livelihoods of those who rely exclusively on the resource.

Our study does not prescribe specific policy measures, but its findings point to several possible avenues for intervention.

First, measures that strengthen women’s land and tree rights are likely to be critical. Recent work on peri-urban Ghana, for example, calls for wider rights to land and shea trees for women in policy and tenure reforms.

Second, empirical studies of female shea actors in Ghana suggest that collective organisation, better access to finance and improved infrastructure (notably storage facilities) can enhance women’s position.

Finally, evidence from northern Ghana indicates that women themselves recommend changes in farming practices to sustain the resource base.

Francois Questiaux is a Postdoc at the University of Copenhagen.
This project was funded by a grant from the Danish Independent Research Fund (Obstacles, Grant 2102-00030B) and a grant from the Innovation Fund Denmark (Sheaine, Grant 9067-00030B)

Marieve Pouliot is an Associate Professor at the University of Copenhagen. This project was funded by a grant from the Danish Independent Research Fund (Obstacles, Grant 2102-00030B) and a grant from the Innovation Fund Denmark (Sheaine, Grant 9067-00030B).

– ref. Global demand for shea butter is growing: but it’s not all good news for the women who collect the nuts – https://theconversation.com/global-demand-for-shea-butter-is-growing-but-its-not-all-good-news-for-the-women-who-collect-the-nuts-273242

January 25, 2026

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland: the strategic calculations at play

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

Somaliland is not internationally recognised as a sovereign state, though it declared independence from Somalia in 1991. A territory becomes a sovereign state when its independence is recognised by the United Nations. For this reason, it has no seat at the UN and is considered, under international law, part of Somalia.

Nevertheless, Somaliland holds elections and maintains relative internal stability. It is also attracting increasing informal diplomatic engagement – though not formal recognition – from Ethiopia, the United States and, most recently, Israel.

This growing interest highlights a geopolitical paradox. An unrecognised polity has become strategically relevant in the Red Sea region, along the Gulf of Aden at the Horn of Africa. This is a key corridor linking the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

On 26 December 2025, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This made Israel the first UN member to do so. While the concrete effects of the decision remain uncertain, Israel’s move fits into a broader strategy to strengthen its presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.

Of all the African states, landlocked Ethiopia has come closest to formally recognising Somaliland, driven by its wish to get direct access to the Red Sea via the port of Berbera. This has become more urgent amid regional competition and instability.

US officials have defended Israel’s right to recognise Somaliland, but the US itself hasn’t done so despite speculation that it might.

I have studied the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa and recently published a book on the competing interests in the Red Sea. For me, this latest development raises two key questions: what is Somaliland’s strategic importance and why the growing interest now?

In short, Somaliland is important because it is located on one of the world’s most critical maritime routes. Current regional instability has increased the importance of partners that can provide security, access and political stability, even without formal recognition.

Israel’s strategic calculation

Israel has framed its recognition of Somaliland primarily in terms of regional security and strategic stability. It has cited the need to safeguard maritime routes in the Red Sea and counter growing threats in the Horn of Africa.

Beyond these stated reasons, however, Israel is motivated by national security considerations. Following the 7 October 2023 attacks and Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, the importance of existing strategic priorities in the Red Sea region has increased.

Somaliland’s location on the Gulf of Aden puts the territory – and any external actors with a presence there – in a position to monitor some of the world’s most important maritime and undersea communication routes.

Of particular concern to Israel is the threat posed by Iran-aligned actors, such as Houthi fighters in nearby Yemen. Engaging with Somaliland provides strategic depth and the potential for an early warning system.

Iran has capacity to exert indirect influence through proxy forces that target maritime routes and regional security.

Attacks on shipping by Houthi missiles and drones launched from Yemen take place just a short distance from Somaliland.

Establishing a presence in Somaliland, or simply relying on it as a partner, would enhance Israel’s ability to monitor Houthi activities and counter threats to maritime traffic.

An increased presence also provides a counterweight to the growing influence of Saudi Arabia and Turkey through diplomatic, economic and – in Turkey’s case – military engagement across the region.

Israel and the UAE both view Somaliland as a relatively non-aligned actor capable of reducing Turkish and Saudi influence in the Horn of Africa.

For Israel, engaging with Somaliland is a calculated risk, based on the belief that the strategic benefits outweigh the diplomatic and political risks.

Ethiopia: the vital need for sea access

Ethiopia is another catalyst of Somaliland’s growing importance. Eritrea’s secession in 1993 made Ethiopia a landlocked country. At present it relies heavily on Djibouti for sea access.

The Red Sea region

The port of Berbera in Somaliland offers Ethiopia politically stable and geographically convenient access. This explains Ethiopia’s interest in signing a memorandum of understanding with the breakaway state in January 2024. Although the agreement has not been widely implemented, it has drawn international attention back to Hargeisa’s claims.

Ethiopia’s cautious approach has aimed at avoiding further regional tensions.

Domestic political factors also influence its tepid response. The country is dealing with several potentially secessionist insurgencies within its borders. There could be consequences for supporting a secessionist movement.

An additional factor is Ethiopia’s close political and economic relations with China and Turkey, which both strongly support Somali territorial integrity.

It is this combination of regional ambition and domestic constraint that explains Addis Ababa’s cautious response to Israel’s announcement.

The United States: balancing realism and norms

Washington officially continues to support Somalia’s territorial integrity, largely due to its counter-terrorism cooperation with the federal government in Mogadishu.

However, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has reignited debate within US strategic and policy circles. Some favour Somaliland’s recognition. They point to US security interests and global trade.

There is growing openness to engaging with Somaliland incrementally, stopping short of fully breaking diplomatic ties with Mogadishu.

Much of the US debate focuses on recognition itself, but this risks missing the more consequential issue: the precedent Somaliland could set.

Not all that glitters is gold

The typical portrayal of Somalia as a failed state and Somaliland as a democratic oasis is simplistic.

Unlike many secessionist movements, Somaliland is not a newly formed political entity. Consequently, beneath its apparent internal cohesion lie deep and persistent fault lines. Hargeisa does not control all the territory it claims. The eastern regions have never entirely accepted Somaliland’s authority.

This cleavage came to a head in violent clashes in Las Anod between 2022 and 2023. Local militias took control of the area, which now functions as a self-administered entity recognised as a federal state within Somalia.

Somaliland’s growing strategic relevance masks its unresolved internal divisions. It illustrates a broader trend in geopolitics now: stability and utility increasingly matter more than legal status alone.

For external actors, engagement with Somaliland may offer short-term gains in a volatile region. But without addressing its internal fractures and contested sovereignty, recognition risks creating new sources of instability rather than resolving old ones.

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI)

– ref. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland: the strategic calculations at play – https://theconversation.com/israels-recognition-of-somaliland-the-strategic-calculations-at-play-273817

January 24, 2026

Edwin Mtei, Tanzania’s first central bank governor, left lessons on leadership

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Aikande Clement Kwayu, Lecturer, Tumaini University Makumira

Edwin Mtei, who passed away on 20 January 2026, was the first governor of Tanzania’s Central Bank after independence from Britain.

He filled the post until 1974.

Mtei was appointed by Julius Nyerere, who served as president from 1964 until his resignation in 1985. Nyerere once said of Mtei: “Once a governor, always a governor”, as quoted in Mtei’s autobiography, From Goatherd to Governor. He meant Mtei would always carry the title of governor, given his contribution to starting the Central Bank. Nyerere continued to call Mtei “Governor” even after he transferred him to other posts.

The life and work of Mtei is of central interest to my research as a political scientist who has studied Tanzania’s political history and development politics.

Mtei didn’t take over an established office. The country had obtained its independence only four years before the establishment of the bank in 1965. The newly independent country was using a common currency under the East African Currency Board. Once Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda each decided to be autonomous in 1965, it fell upon Mtei to set up the bank in Dar es Salaam from scratch. He presided over both on technical and logistical matters, including monetary policies, architectural design of the bank’s building, and a design for the national currency.

His work was remarkable as it contributed to the institutionalisation of the country’s economic and financial structures.

Following his tenure as governor, Mtei assumed a bigger government role. He became the secretary general of the East Africa Community from 1974 to 1977 and minister of finance from 1977 to 1979.

As finance minister he took a stand against many of the policies championed by Nyerere, in particular his customised socialist policies – known as ujamaa. Mtei had a different view on how to address the economic problems facing Tanzania. He expressed these to the president – a bold step, given that most government leaders of the time didn’t dare express different views from those of the president.

Mtei resigned in 1979. After Tanzania amended its constitution in 1992 to allow a multiparty system, Mtei founded an opposition party, Chadema, with a liberal ideology that reflected the economic views he had proposed as finance minister.

Chadema has survived to be the leading opposition party in the country to date, despite the limited civic space for opposition politics in Tanzania.

In each of his various roles, Mtei made a mark on Tanzania’s political history.

He leaves several lessons for leaders. Leadership is about conviction. Losing a position for taking a moral stand will eventually lead to a better position with bigger impact. It is professional to give credit even to your opponents. Different views do not mean enmity.

Differences with Nyerere

Nyerere’s economic policies, as set out under the Arusha Declaration, began to show signs of strain.

Following a number of crises such as the oil crisis in 1979 and the Uganda-Tanzania war in 1978-1979, the policies could not facilitate economic recovery in the country. The late 1970s and 1980s were bad years for Tanzania’s socio-economic welfare. All economic variables were negative: for example, inflation rose to 29% per year from 1978 to 1981; between 1979 and 1984, rural income declined by 13.5% in real terms and non-agricultural wage income fell by 65%.

Frustrations about how he was expected to lead the ministry and rescue the country’s economy led him to take a bold step. He resigned in 1979.

Nevertheless, Mtei continued to respect Nyerere. He expressed admiration for Nyerere’s conviction and his determination to build the nation, albeit with an “ineffective” approach.

The farmer

Following his resignation, Mtei became a coffee farmer. He was also active in policy advocacy in the coffee sector as chair of the Tanganyika Coffee Growers Association and a member of Tanzania Coffee Board and Tanzania Coffee Curing Company.

His coffee farm was an estate that he bought after selling his house in a prestigious neighbourhood in Dar-es-Salaam. He actively maintained his coffee estate up to his old age and died in his farm house.

His mastery of finance and economics as well as international knowledge and contacts must have played a big part in his success in the coffee business.

Early life

Mtei came from the Chaggaland on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro. He was brought up by a single (widowed) mother with limited resources. In his autobiography he narrated how, at a very young age, he would count banana and coffee trees and identify different species.

Mtei had an entrepreneurial spirit, like two other figures from the same era and region: Erasto N. Kweka and Reginald Mengi.

Kweka was bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania’s Northern Diocese. He served from 1976 to 2004. During his tenure, the diocese was involved with development projects including a bank, hotels, hospitals, schools and universities. He came to be known as “Bishop of Projects”.

Mengi owned media and manufacturing industries in Tanzania. Kweka, Mengi and Mtei were all born in the 1930s and grew up in Chagga land. Reading from their biographies, they shared similar childhood experiences and upbringing.

The three peers became prominent national figures in different capacities. All three were raised in the context where coffee had been introduced and they saw and experienced the economic impact of coffee through the establishment and development of a cooperative society, in particular the Kilimanjaro National Coffee Union (KNCU). The union provided education scholarships and other financial services to the farmers and their families. It contributed directly and indirectly to the education and interactions of Kweka, Mengi and Mtei.

Mtei was appointed executive director for African affairs at the International Monetary Fund in 1983. To his credit, Nyerere didn’t hold grudges and recommended him for the post.

Mtei saw his main job as proposing reforms in fiscal policies to solve Tanzania’s economic problems. In his autobiography he said Nyerere started to understand the imperative of the reforms and allowed negotiations to begin with the Bretton Woods institutions.

But events intervened. Nyerere was stepping down, though Mtei tried to convince him to stay.

Mtei noted in the autobiography that he thought Nyerere would be the most effective person to lead the reform. In contrast, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s autobiography
gives all credit for reforms to Mwinyi, who ran Tanzania between 1985 and 1995.

Given the level of political polarisation seen in Tanzania and the personalisation of politics, the life of Mtei offers many lessons.

Aikande Clement Kwayu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Edwin Mtei, Tanzania’s first central bank governor, left lessons on leadership – https://theconversation.com/edwin-mtei-tanzanias-first-central-bank-governor-left-lessons-on-leadership-274160

January 22, 2026

Colonial tax records hold 3 lessons for South Africa today – economic historian

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Johan Fourie, Professor, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University

In 1825, a tax collector compiling a census in South Africa’s Cape Colony paused to write a poem in the margin of his work. In it, he complained about the idle chatter of townsmen in Stellenbosch and uncooperative taxpayers. It is a tiny window on the regular frustrations of a 19th-century taxman. But the poem survives only because the bureaucracy did.

Year after year, from the 1660s to the 1840s, local officials appointed by the Dutch East India Company and, after 1806, the British colonial government, recorded settler households, their harvests and their labour obligations in ledgers known as opgaafrolle (tax censuses). Read closely, these records provide fleeting glimpses of lived experience; taken together, they allow us to trace long-term social and economic dynamics.

We often treat the past as distant. But the 18th-century Cape Colony also serves as an experiment for current-day economic historians in state capacity, market trust and inequality. Those themes remain central to South Africa today, and to the experience of many African economies shaped by colonial institutions.

Over the past year, my team and I at the Laboratory for the Economics of Africa’s Past at Stellenbosch University have published three studies that return to the Cape’s archival record with new data and new methods. Together, they suggest three lessons that still resonate: the non-neutrality of administrative data; how markets are social as well as economic institutions; and how inequality endures.

1. Data is never neutral

The opgaafrolle were fiscal instruments, introduced under Dutch East India Company rule in the second half of the 17th century and maintained under Batavian and British administrations in the early 19th century. Their purpose was straightforward: to record who lived where, what they owned, what they produced and what could be taxed.

In a paper co-authored with colleagues and students, we analyse the complete series of tax censuses for Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, two of the earliest and wealthiest districts of the Colony, close to Cape Town, between 1685 and 1844. These records allow us to trace kinship networks, marriage patterns, changes in agricultural output and the evolution of slave ownership over nearly 160 years.

The Cape was a slave economy. Enslaved people, brought from territories across the Indian Ocean, were recorded as assets in settler households. Indigenous Khoesan people are not included in these records, although there is little doubt that they, too, worked on settler farms. They are traced in later records.

For this study, we simply wanted to know what these detailed records, unique for their time, revealed about life at the Cape. We found they could be used to understand not only the economy, but also social life. For example, surnames showed marriage patterns that preserved wealth within the family.

The broader lesson is that data – in this case, administrative data – is never neutral. Some things are never recorded, like the Khoesan workers on farms. And when things are recorded, they can easily be biased, for a variety of reasons. Cape farmers underreported production to reduce their tax burden, for example. Enslaved people, by contrast, were recorded with far greater consistency in the censuses, partly because “owners” were not required to pay a slave tax.

Any serious engagement with administrative data, past or present, therefore requires attention to incentives and institutions. This is particularly important as South Africa today debates policy using census and administrative data whose limitations are often poorly understood. There are real consequences for planning and accountability.

2. Markets are social institutions before they are economic ones

Tax records tell us what households declared about their productive activities. To understand more about their consumption, we need different sources.

In another paper, we turn to the Cape Orphan Chamber’s auction records. These auctions were held when estates were liquidated, often after a death, and they recorded who bought what, at what price, and from whom. The dataset covers the period from 1701 to 1825 and has recently been fully transcribed.

What emerges is a picture of markets embedded in social relationships. Auctions were public events. Family members often bid on household goods to keep them within the family or to support widows and children. Credit – borrowing to invest in new tools or to acquire enslaved people – flowed along kinship lines. Consumption – buying an ox, or a wagon, or a Bible – was a public signal of status, belonging and obligation.

This matters for contemporary Africa. Economic policy often treats markets as anonymous spaces where prices alone coordinate behaviour. Yet across much of the continent, markets still operate through trust and reputation. For example, one recent study shows African firms in historically pastoral regions remain smaller, partly because pastoralists are less likely to trust those outside the immediate family.

Even today, credit access, business partnerships and labour arrangements remain deeply relational. The Cape’s auctions remind us that markets have always been social institutions and that ignoring this leads to poor policy design.

3. Inequality is not a modern deviation but a historical constant

South Africa’s extreme inequality is often attributed to 20th-century industrialisation, apartheid policy and post-apartheid failures. While all of these matter, they do not tell the full story.

In another paper, I measured inequality in the Cape Colony between 1685 and 1844. The study used an expanded set of tax censuses, as well as probate inventories – lists of assets that people owned when they died – and slave valuation rolls – the lists created to compensate slave owners during the period of emancipation.

Wealth was highly unevenly distributed from the earliest periods of settlement. Today the situation would be described as severe inequality.

Even if we only consider settlers (and exclude enslaved and Khoesan inhabitants), wealth was very skewed. A small elite owned most productive resources.

Even more surprising, similar patterns appear in the limited records we have for Khoesan settlements.

In other words, wealth was severely unequally distributed not only between groups but also within.

This perspective forces us to rethink how we talk about inequality today. If inequality has deep historical roots, then it cannot be understood simply as a recent malfunction of modern capitalism, nor fixed by narrow technical adjustments to tax rates or social transfers.

Inequality, in other words, is not an anomaly to be corrected back to some imagined baseline of equality, but a recurring outcome of how societies organise power and production. That does not make severe inequality morally acceptable, but it does shift the policy question. The relevant issue is not whether inequality exists, but whether those at the bottom are becoming less poor and are more able to move up.

Looking back to think forward

The 18th-century Cape Colony does not offer ready-made policy solutions. What it offers is perspective. It shows how states govern through what they can observe and record, how markets operate through social ties as much as prices, and how inequality can persist across centuries.

The frustrated tax collector in Stellenbosch could not have imagined that his tax records would one day inform debates about governance, markets and inequality. Yet they can. They remind us that the past continues to shape the constraints within which policy is made, and the possibilities for change.

Johan Fourie receives funding from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond.

– ref. Colonial tax records hold 3 lessons for South Africa today – economic historian – https://theconversation.com/colonial-tax-records-hold-3-lessons-for-south-africa-today-economic-historian-273407

January 21, 2026

Tanzania’s president raised hopes for women’s political representation – the 2025 elections show much remains to be done

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Victoria Melkisedeck Lihiru, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, The Open University of Tanzania

President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s historic rise as Tanzania’s first woman head of state broke a decades-old tradition of male dominance. In keeping with political precedent, she also became chairperson of the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party. That made Hassan the first woman to hold this position.

For decades, women’s representation in Tanzania’s parliament has relied heavily on reserved quota seats rather than direct electoral success. With a woman as president, women’s rights organisations held high expectations for reforms that would dismantle systemic barriers to women’s political participation.

The reform priorities they championed included defined gender representation in party leadership. They also sought measures to address weaknesses associated with reserved seats. The quota system could be improved by introducing uniform nomination procedures, geographical accountability and term limits. Lobbyists also sought robust laws to end violence against women in elections.

Nine months into her tenure, Hassan established a taskforce to review Tanzania’s multiparty democratic framework. Among other things, its report made two important proposals to promote gender inclusion in political participation:

a requirement that no gender should constitute less than 40% of leadership positions within political parties
a mandate for all political parties to entrench equality and strengthen internal democracy.

The taskforce report crystallised in three key laws:

These new laws contained several positive developments. All political parties were required to implement gender and social inclusion policies. Gender-based violence was recognised as an electoral offence.

I am a legal scholar with a research interest in women’s political participation on the continent, both at the national level and within political parties. I was keen to assess how the reforms undertaken in 2024 would pan out in the 2025 elections.

My analysis of the 2025 election results shows that there were some minor gains. Women constituted 32.2% (558 out of 1,735) of parliamentary candidates in 2025, up from 23.3% in 2020. This suggests a modest expansion of women’s participation at the candidacy stage. But it also underscores the persistence of structural barriers to equal political competition, with men comprising 68% of parliamentary candidates.

However, the limited progress observed at the parliamentary level collapses sharply at the local level. Only 9.6% (700 out of 7,289) of candidates for local councils were women. This is an alarmingly low figure, given the importance of these positions for developing future leadership pipelines.

It’s my argument that the 2025 elections demonstrate that the presence of a woman at the helm, while symbolically powerful, does not necessarily translate into a gender-equitable electoral environment.

Reform gaps

Public participation was made a central part of the legislative process. This was a welcome shift from the previous administration’s approach in which most laws were passed under certificate of urgency. But the reforms glaringly failed to advance tangible progress.

Conspicuously missing were mandatory quotas for women’s representation across crucial spheres: party leadership, nomination lists, and electoral-management bodies.

Furthermore, there are no political-party financing mechanisms or public subsidies to women, youth, or persons with disabilities that would improve equity. The lack of exemptions from election deposits for marginalised groups further reinforced existing structural barriers to political participation.

The appointment procedures outlined in the Independent Electoral Commission Act offered no assurance of gender balance within the electoral management body’s composition.

What can be said for the reforms is that they strengthened accessibility measures for persons with disabilities and illiterate voters. Also significant was the expansion of the Independent Electoral Commission’s mandate to include local-government elections. This addressed long-standing demands to detach the local elections from ministerial influence.

A particularly significant change was the abolition of unopposed victories. All candidates, even in uncontested races, would now face a mandatory “Yes” or “No” vote. The abolition of unopposed victories removed a key mechanism through which electoral outcomes were previously engineered at the nomination stage.

Under the old system, party elites could secure automatic wins by blocking or pressuring rivals – often women aspirants – out of the race. This often left more influential candidates to be declared elected without voter input. Requiring a mandatory “Yes” or “No” vote reintroduced voter scrutiny, reduced the incentive to manipulate nominations, and limited the use of procedural exclusion to sideline women candidates.

Political parties as gendered gatekeepers

My analysis of party practices towards the 2025 general elections shows that these limitations in national law found parallels in political-party practices. In January 2025, Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)’s internal elections resulted in all top positions being retained by men. This continued a trend dating back to 1992.

Chadema’s “No Reform, No Elections” stance led to its controversial exclusion from the 2025 polls. Its absence carried gendered implications, given the party’s consistent record of fielding a higher number of female candidates than other parties.

In 2020, Chadema fielded 58 women candidates, compared to CCM’s 24. While all CCM women candidates reportedly won their seats, only one Chadema woman did so. Chadema’s absence in the 2025 elections therefore reduced the overall pool of female aspirants.

At ACT-Wazalendo, the party’s Dorothy Semu was sidelined in favour of Luhaga Mpina for the presidential race. Mpina, a CCM defector, was then barred from contesting due to legal and procedural battles.

Against this backdrop, CCM appointed Asha Rose Migiro as its first female party general secretary, a milestone in a wider context of political manoeuvring.

Women as candidates

Women were represented as presidential candidates (18%) and as running mates (53%). The United Movement for Democracy became the first party in Tanzanian history to field women for both executive positions. For the first time, Zanzibar featured women, Laila Rajab Khamis, Isha Salim Hamad and Naima Salum Hamad, on the presidential ballot.

There were 272 elective parliamentary seats in 2025. This translates to 115 reserved seats for women. The 155 are joined by 36 women elected from constituencies. The representation of 39.5% is an improvement over the 2020 election outcome of 37.5%.

The 2025 national elections unfolded amid nationwide demonstrations which prompted a curfew in the capital and a nationwide internet shutdown. President Hassan was announced to have received 97.6% of the votes and was sworn in. However, both the Southern African Development Community and African Union missions reported that the elections fell short of regional standards for democratic and inclusive processes.

Opposition sources and later the government reported widespread electoral violence that led to death and destruction of properties.

Symbolism without structural change

The results of this election show that Tanzania is yet to address the structural challenges associated with women’s reserved seats.

For real change to occur, high-level representation must be accompanied by deep structural reforms. These include:

mandatory party quotas within political party leadership structures and candidate lists
gender quotas in the composition of Independent National Electoral Commission
a proportional representation electoral system
equitable resourcing for women aspirants and candidates
allowing independent candidacy
a mindset shift that challenges societal biases and affirms women’s leadership among citizens and electoral stakeholders.

The political commitment for substantive gender equality must go above merely numerical representation.

Victoria Melkisedeck Lihiru does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Tanzania’s president raised hopes for women’s political representation – the 2025 elections show much remains to be done – https://theconversation.com/tanzanias-president-raised-hopes-for-womens-political-representation-the-2025-elections-show-much-remains-to-be-done-271863

January 21, 2026

What should education look like today? 6 essential reads on learning together

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lyrr Thurston, Copy Editor, The Conversation

The United Nations made 24 January the International Day of Education to highlight the role of education in peace and development. In 2026 the theme is “the power of youth in co-creating education”. This refers to “involving young people and students in global decision making in education” and to young people’s initiatives to safeguard everyone’s right to education.

To mark the occasion, we’re sharing some of the articles our authors have contributed in the past year.

Learning to flip

School children don’t always seem too enthusiastic about their role in learning. An official education policy might encourage active learning and critical thinking, but all too often the reality in schools is “chalk and talk”, or rote learning, where only the teacher’s input counts.

What stops educators from using more effective methods? Lizélle Pretorius tells the story of what happened when she asked teachers to “flip the classroom” – getting learners to contribute more.

Nigeria’s private school closures

Simply getting into school and staying there is a challenge for many children in Nigeria, where authorities have been shutting down private schools on safety and quality grounds. Thelma Obiakor studied the reasons that children are enrolled in these schools in the first place, and what the consequences of closing them could be.

Violence at school

It’s hard to imagine young people being able to co-create their education if they are exposed to violence at school. This is a problem in southern African countries like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Eswatini, Zambia, Malawi and Angola, according to researchers. Gift Khumalo, Bokang Lipholo and Nosipho Faith Makhakhe reviewed the studies to learn more about what’s creating this problem and how it can be solved.

The dangers of AI

What does co-creating education mean in a world where artificial intelligence (AI) can do so much? Well, human expertise and critical thinking matter more than ever, argue Sioux McKenna and Nompilo Tshuma. They outline four dangers facing students, and three steps universities can take to prepare them.

AI as an opportunity

AI is actually an opportunity to learn critical thinking, writes Anitia Lubbe. Let AI take some pressure off educators by doing certain kinds of tasks, freeing up more time for self-directed learning. And test the uniquely human skills and attributes of students.

Measuring what matters

In the academic world, you get what you test for. Researchers are judged and rewarded on the basis of indicators like citation counts and journal impact factors – and these are biased against African scholarship, according to Eutychus Ngotho Gichuru and Archangel Byaruhanga Rukooko. They propose a new, complementary metric which puts a value on the local relevance and community impact of academic output. This would also measure co-creation of knowledge with communities, interdisciplinary teamwork and other cooperative efforts.

– ref. What should education look like today? 6 essential reads on learning together – https://theconversation.com/what-should-education-look-like-today-6-essential-reads-on-learning-together-273941

January 20, 2026

Fighting climate change in the Sahel is worsening conflicts – new research shows how

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Folahanmi Aina, Lecturer in Political Economy of Violence, Conflict and Development, SOAS, University of London

The Sahel, the semi-arid African region stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, has become the epicentre of global terrorism, given the high number of attacks by armed groups and the resulting fatalities, including those suffered by civilians. This development is rooted in a complex interplay of factors. They include state fragility, illicit economies, limited presence of government in rural areas, and conflicts driven by resource scarcity due to climate shocks.

I am a political scientist with regional expertise in conflict, security and development in west Africa. In a recent policy brief for a research programme, I set out how climate change mitigation efforts in Sahelian communities have intensified pre-existing tensions.

The research involved extensive fieldwork and interviews in July and August 2025 with community members in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. The aim was to understand the interaction between various pressure points and crises playing out in their lives.

Livelihoods are under pressure as a result of climate change. Resources are scarce and unevenly allocated. Governance structures are weak and armed groups compete for control.

The findings were clear: climate action can either exacerbate or alleviate crises.

Many climate mitigation efforts are large-scale projects, like building solar farms, extensive reforestation initiatives, or bio-fuel plantations. The Great Green Wall initiative and the Agriculture Climate Resilient Value Chain Development Project in Niger are examples.

These projects are deemed vital for reducing carbon footprints. But carrying them out in fragile states poses a risk. In the Sahel, misconceived environmental security policymaking can have adverse impacts and even fuel the very insecurity it aims to prevent. Top-down approach objectives can be at odds with local social and ecological realities.

I conclude from my findings that the United Nations’ approach to climate change mitigation in the Sahel requires a re-evaluation. What’s needed are adaptation interventions that are:

conflict-sensitive
community-led and context-specific
designed using a transboundary process. This is because interventions are capable of shaping political economies, security arrangements and community relations across borders, not just within them.

A fragile environment

My research confirms that climate change in Sahelian communities has intensified pre-existing tensions. These include:

Insecurity: Local populations are exposed to conflicts that are made worse by climate-induced pressures. This includes farmer-herder disputes over diminishing grazing land, intercommunal clashes for access to scarce water resources, and ethno-religious tensions aggravated by competition over livelihood opportunities.

Interviews conducted with farmers, pastoralists and community heads, among others, highlighted how shifts in rainfall patterns, long droughts and unpredictable harvests are directly undermining livelihoods. People are being forced into daily coping strategies that sometimes heighten local conflicts.

State fragility: Interviews with key informants, including local vigilantes, paint a picture of governments’ inability to provide security, deliver basic services or mediate rising disputes.

As a result communities have been forced to find alternative forms of governance and protection. These include local vigilante groups, traditional community elders and informal resource management committees.

Criminal networks: Climate vulnerability and state fragility have created an environment that allows violent extremist organisations to operate and expand their influence. These groups range from armed bandits to violent extremist organisations such as Boko Haram and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). They are not merely a result of ideology. They are consequences of a system in distress. They strategically exploit the insecurities and grievances that climate change and state fragility have created.

A Malian community leader put it perfectly. He warned that if a community

becomes a dry land … the armed group can use this opportunity to install themselves.

Towards a conflict-sensitive approach

Statements from people interviewed reflect simple, yet profound, solutions.

The central message is the need for local ownership and community involvement.

A traditional ruler from Burkina Faso, for instance, insisted that:

if projects come, they must include the community from the beginning, to ensure people feel respected, build trust, and ensure that solutions respond to real needs.

A respondent in Nigeria, too, said that “when the locals engage with government many solutions come aboard”. In Niger, a local actor stressed the need to “involve the population more in the decision-making process concerning them”.

These comments point to policy directives. They argue for a departure from the top-down, expert-driven model of development.

For climate change mitigation to be a force for peace, it must be integrated with peacebuilding and state-building efforts. Involving local authorities and community-level institutions in making decisions can lead to interventions that are context-sensitive, legitimate and responsive to local realities.

This translates to linking climate finance to projects that provide not only renewable energy infrastructure but also schools, health centres and sustainable livelihoods. It means transparent, community-led dialogue to resolve conflicts before they escalate across the Sahel region.

Next steps

The Sahel’s plight is a powerful lesson for the global community. The interconnectedness of climate change, state fragility and conflict is a complex adaptive system. It cannot be solved with single-sector interventions. The challenges are too intertwined, and the stakes are too high.

International development and climate policy must shift. Climate change mitigation is not a technical exercise, but an opportunity to rebuild broken social contracts, foster community resilience and promote equitable development.

Addressing root causes instead of symptoms can turn a vicious cycle of fragility into one of peace and development.

Folahanmi Aina does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Fighting climate change in the Sahel is worsening conflicts – new research shows how – https://theconversation.com/fighting-climate-change-in-the-sahel-is-worsening-conflicts-new-research-shows-how-273673

January 19, 2026

Nigeria’s former election umpire has been appointed an ambassador: why this is a red flag

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Onyedikachi Madueke, Teaching Assistant, University of Aberdeen

The Nigerian Senate confirmed the appointment of the immediate past chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as an ambassador in December 2025. This has resurfaced concerns about electoral integrity in the country.

Mahmood Yakubu stepped down as head of the electoral commission just three months prior to the ambassadorial appointment.

As a political scientist with published research on the electoral commission and electoral integrity in Nigeria, I argue that even though the president has a right to make the appointment under Section 171 of the constitution, it is still troubling. There are a number of reasons.

Firstly, it raises questions about institutional neutrality and public trust. It looks like a reward for the way elections were administered.

Yakubu’s tenure as chairman included the controversial 2023 general elections. Questions were raised about the commission’s credibility following logistical failures, technological breakdowns and delayed transmission of results. Though the courts ultimately upheld the declared outcomes, the election’s legitimacy remains hotly debated among citizens, civil society and scholars.

The same electoral umpire has been appointed to a prestigious diplomatic role less than three years after conducting an election that returned the appointing authority to power.

Secondly, it undermines public confidence at a time of rising political disengagement. Nigeria’s democracy is facing a legitimacy challenge driven by civic disillusionment, youth disengagement, and declining trust in institutions. Voter turnout in the 2023 presidential election, roughly 26% of registered voters, was one of the lowest in the country’s democratic history.

Thirdly, it reflects a weakening of institutional checks and legislative oversight. Despite widespread objections, the Senate approved the nomination with minimal dissent. A weak or compliant legislature reduces the institutional safeguards that protect elections from political capture.

Nigeria must strengthen electoral governance. This should include cooling off periods for electoral commission officials, stronger Senate oversight, protected institutional autonomy, and sustained civic re-engagement.

Impartiality and the perception of political reward

Electoral commissions thrive on perceived impartiality as much as on legal independence.

In a region where democratic norms are weakening as seen in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea and others, the perception that electoral officials may receive political rewards, especially if they manipulate the electoral institution to favour a candidate, can further erode trust. It sends a signal, intended or not, that electoral umpires can swiftly take on political roles.

This may influence future behaviour within the electoral commission. It becomes harder to preserve the principle of neutrality.

Ebbing trust in elections

Many Nigerians already believe that the electoral umpire is compromised. A 2023 report revealed that some senior electoral officials were politically affiliated with the ruling party.

A 2023 Afrobarometer report showed that 76% of Nigerians expressed a lack of trust in the commission.

In a recent paper, my colleague and I identified constraints on the commission. These included corruption, lack of adherence to its rules, and lack of independence.

Yakubu’s appointment risks deepening cynicism and feeding narratives of elite collusion.

For a democracy already struggling with fractured trust, where young people question whether voting makes a difference, this symbolic gesture may accelerate disengagement. When citizens lose faith in elections, they may turn to protest or apathy. Worse, they might support anti-democratic alternatives such as military intervention. It’s a trend already visible in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger.

Weakening checks and balances

The Senate’s role in the affair raises equally troubling concerns.

Rather than exercising its constitutional role as a check on executive appointments, the Senate appeared to align seamlessly with the president’s preferences. Most of the nominees were only asked by the Senate to bow and go.

This pattern of legislative passivity, common in Nigeria across all tiers of government, mirrors broader regional trends. Parliaments, whether in Togo, Benin or Senegal, have gradually ceded oversight functions to executives.

When political institutions become less independent, electoral oversight becomes more fragile.

A weak or compliant legislature reduces the institutional safeguards that protect elections from political capture.

The confirmation thus symbolises a gradual erosion of institutional balance. It’s a worrying sign in a region where democratic backsliding is accelerating.

What should be done

Reforms are essential.

In the US and Australia, revolving door laws exist to prevent former senior officials who occupied critical positions of trust from using their positions for political gains. They typically observe a cooling-off period before moving into a role that may risk a conflict of interest.

This norm exists to insulate institutional decisions from the prospect of political favour.

Nigeria currently lacks such a safeguard. Introducing a four- to six-year interval before former electoral commission chairs and commissioners could accept political or diplomatic appointments would bring Nigeria in line with international best practice.

Secondly, politically affiliated individuals must not be appointed to any position in the commission. This reform would protect both the individuals and the institution from allegations of political alignment.

Third, the Senate must reassert its constitutional role. It must subject sensitive appointments to genuine debate, ethical screening, and public interest review.

A credible, independent review, focusing on election logistics, technological failures, communication lapses and institutional pressures, would demonstrate a commitment to learning from past shortcomings. Transparency is the antidote to suspicion.

Preserving electoral integrity requires not only laws but also norms, perceptions and trust.

Across west African states, contested electoral processes and the fear that election administrators may align with political incumbents are increasingly widespread.

Nigeria, often viewed as a democratic anchor, cannot afford to reinforce this troubling pattern.

Onyedikachi Madueke does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s former election umpire has been appointed an ambassador: why this is a red flag – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-former-election-umpire-has-been-appointed-an-ambassador-why-this-is-a-red-flag-273529