The Conversation – Africa – Page 12

September 18, 2025

Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Assistant Professor, Harvard University

At the Boston waterfront sits the Institute of Contemporary Art, an architectural marvel that gleams against the harbour in a wealthy neighbourhood. My Uber driver, an African immigrant, remarks as I get out: “Be careful, this is an expensive area.” His comment hints at the subtle tensions of race and class in such affluent spaces, where one’s presence as an outsider is immediately registered. I assure him I’ve just come to see the art.

I’d come to see Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera’s first solo museum show in the US, Hidden Battles/Hondo Dzakavanzika. This exhibition is a landmark moment of recognition for one of southern Africa’s leading contemporary artists.

When most artists are grappling with history and archives, Zvavahera is focused on the dreams she has in her sleep, not as a retreat from the past or the urgency of the now, but as a parallel form of knowledge.

As a scholar of African literary histories and archives and how they intersect with visual culture, I find Zvavahera’s work particularly powerful. It uncovers layers of meaning that operate at the subconscious, where personal memory, cultural narratives, and the imagination intersect.

From an archival perspective, the exhibition is compelling because it frames these dreamscapes with materiality – paint, paper, canvas, brushstrokes – making each a document of emotional and cultural knowledge.

Zvavahera engages deeply with the traditional spirituality and African Pentecostal beliefs in which she was raised. She illuminates spirits and revelations. But she alters these dreams with emancipatory gestures: drawing in bodily features, concealing them as they morph into animal-like figures or plants. When looking closely, it’s as if the canvas was cut then sutured back with careful stitches, with each move a restoration of dignity. This is the delicacy of her brushstrokes.

The Boston gallery positions itself as a site for amplifying singular global voices in art, like Zvavahera’s. Her refusal to translate dreams into rational explanation is central to her practice. Boston audiences encounter Zimbabwean perspectives not as illustrative or ethnographic, but as intellectually and aesthetically complex. Zvavahera is placed within transnational conversations while her particular lived experiences are preserved.

The work on the show was made between 2021 and 2025, a time filled with mourning and melancholy, during and after the COVID pandemic. Zvavahera is a prophet who uses the canvas to transform dark dreams into vivid, colourful prayers. She says:

People say their prayers with words, and I’m saying my prayers with a painting.

Who is Portia Zvavahera?

Born in Harare in 1985, Zvavahera channels childhood experiences, ancestral presence, and mystical narratives into her paintings. The work blurs the line between the figurative and the abstract.

Growing up in Harare’s art scene, both modernist and indigenous art inspired her practice. She found mentorship and support from Gallery Delta and formal training from the National Gallery of Zimbabwe.

Her work has earned awards and international acclaim for its emotive force and poetic intensity.

The exhibition

Zvavahera’s canvases are layered with pigment and texture, incorporating printmaking techniques alongside stencilling, delicate lace, batik wax, and even palm fronds from her garden.

The dream paintings on show are all vast in scale, almost overwhelming in their presence. They appear as recurring visions, or fragments from a psyche as troubled as it is fertile.

The imagery conjures a world of vulnerability. Spectres in her dreams besiege her and try to snatch her children, harm her body, make her grandmother sick, unsettle her spirit. But she does not succumb. Instead, she renders them into haunting paintings and drawings, binding them into linen, oil and ink.

Their titles draw from Shona proverbs and folktales. Kurwira vana (fighting for the children). Tinosvetuka rusvingo (jumping over the wall). Hondo yakatarisana naambuya (the battle that grandmother is facing). They aren’t simply explanatory notes but portals, resisting simplification, pulling the viewer into the language of a cosmology not easily domesticated by English.

Zvavahera is an artist of scale, but also of duration. The canvases demand that viewers linger. To stand before the work is to enter a meditative space, one where line and colour pulse with life. In one caption she writes:

I know there’s going to be a battle in the future when I see a bull in my dreams.

The bull, like the angelic and demonic figures in her work, are not allegory but omen, a herald of struggle. This is the artist’s autobiography in colour.

What haunts is not only the possibility of harm, but also the persistence of love. Viewers witness the artist’s insistent refusal to let her children, her spirit, her imagination, be taken over. To dream is to fight; to paint is to protect. Her canvases stage encounters between the forces of good and evil, and transform them into visions of resilience.

Running through this series is a mystical or magical impulse that is especially vivid in her characters. Her paintings and drawings develop a kind of surrealist mystic experience.

Zvavahera’s work matters because it demonstrates how art can navigate the intimate and the ancestral, the personal and the collective. It offers a worldview that’s too often marginalised in art world conversations. She brings to the fore the depth of the African imagination.

Her show is testament to the fact that African artists are not only present on the global art stage, they’re also helping shape the questions, forms and languages of art itself.

Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Zimbabwean artist Portia Zvavahera turns her prayers into paintings – https://theconversation.com/zimbabwean-artist-portia-zvavahera-turns-her-prayers-into-paintings-265213

September 18, 2025

Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Janet Remmington, Research Associate, Humanities Research Centre (and African Literature Department, University of the Witwatersrand), University of York

For black people living in South Africa during apartheid, simply moving around the country was a fraught activity, let alone crossing its borders. This was especially the case for black women, who were “rock bottom of the racial pile”, as South African writer Lauretta Ngcobo expressed it.

Coming to power in 1948 and ruling for over 40 years before democracy in 1994, the white-minority apartheid government took various race-based policies to extremes. An emphasis was on trying to control movement, keeping the black majority “in their place”.

From the 1950s, the state extended pass laws, targeting black women. It also complicated overseas travel with extra bureaucratic and financial burdens.

Mobility restrictions caused an outcry, especially among the growing body of black working women in industrialising cities and towns. These women connected their everyday challenges with broader sociopolitical issues. They injected new energy and forms of activism into organisations involved in the liberation struggle, including the African National Congress (ANC).

In a recent study, I explore the stories of black women who refused to stay put in the face of apartheid’s controls. For these women, mobility was a powerful form of anti-apartheid resistance – and of self-assertion.

I highlight how in 1954, a number of these women, working across race lines, founded the Federation of South African Women (Fedsaw) and drafted the Women’s Charter. The pioneering document laid groundwork for the broader Freedom Charter, which enshrined ideas on freedoms of movement and thought:

All shall be free to travel without restriction from countryside to town, from province to province, and from South Africa abroad.

Even though these ideals would only be realised much later, these activist women broke apartheid’s rules by travelling, exchanging ideas and making connections across borders.

The activist-traveller

These women’s high-risk journeys struck me as being characteristic of what journalist and scholar Mahvish Ahmad describes as a musāfir: an activist-traveller in a politically hostile environment who breaks new ground for others so they may be free.

The mobile black women workers I have been researching have not previously been brought into view as travellers with things to say about their journeys and movements. Their travel texts are diverse, many available only in archives. They include speeches, commentaries, handwritten accounts, interviews, letters and memoirs. Some memoirs were officially published, but outside the country.

Their outputs were not the products of high education or stylised writing, but produced in the intensity of the times by working women.

Elizabeth Mafekeng

When Elizabeth Mafekeng, president of the Food and Canning Workers’ Association, was denied a passport in 1955, she boarded a plane in disguise as a domestic helper. That’s how determined she was to get to the World Conference of Workers in Bulgaria. She also took in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and China, commenting in the press that she “saw the way people should live in the world” where race was not pronounced.

Returning to South Africa, she was punished for her transgressive travel. She became the first woman sentenced to political banishment by the apartheid state. Again she took mobility into her own hands, fleeing with her two-month-old baby to then Basotholand (today’s Lesotho).

Lilian Ngoyi and Dora Tamana

Lilian Ngoyi, leader of the Garment Workers Union and president of the ANC’s Women’s League, travelled to Switzerland, London, Berlin, the Soviet Union, China and Mongolia in 1955.

Ngoyi and Dora Tamana first tried to board a ship under “European names”, only to be arrested. On a second attempt, they succeeded by air using affidavits and a raft of explanations, eventually arriving in London after stopovers in Uganda, Italy and the Netherlands. Their destination was the World Congress of Mothers in Switzerland on behalf of Fedsaw. There they forged powerful solidarity networks.

Tamana reflected in a letter:

When I saw all these things, different nations together, my eyes were opened and I said, I have tasted the new world and won the confidence of our future.

On return, Ngoyi and Tamana played leading roles in the 20,000-strong 1956 women’s anti-pass march to parliament.

Frances Baard

Frances Baard was a domestic worker turned union organiser who presented the Women’s March petition to the apartheid state.

She travelled around South Africa extensively despite police harassment. Her organising work connected domestic workers, factory workers and other exploited labourers, for which she was imprisoned and banished. In her memoir, she spoke of the mind’s ability to travel:

Even though they ban me … my spirit is still there … free.

Florence Mophosho

My research includes those who travelled into exile like Florence Mophosho.

She was one of the few exiled women leaders of the ANC in the 1960s, based for years in Tanzania and travelling far and wide for the Women’s Secretariat. She stressed that travel was vital to advance the work of political freedom as well as global women’s emancipation. This wasn’t always appreciated by male colleagues.

Emma Mashinini

The apartheid government loosened some mobility restrictions in the 1980s. But this didn’t mean moving around was free or unencumbered. Emma Mashinini, who led the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union, undertook “a hundred and one travels” within and beyond South Africa to progress freedom for her people.

In 1981, Mashinini was thrown into solitary confinement for six months. In the eyes of the state, she had “overreached” as a black woman traveller-organiser. She insisted in her memoir that it was her country and she intended to come and go.

Moving to be free

Understanding this travel and writing history helps shine new light on (often unsung) black women trade unionists and organisational leaders as anti-apartheid movers and shakers.

Insisting on mobility came at great personal cost, but in a sense these women never went alone. They travelled to gain ground for the greater cause of freedom, while discovering new versions of themselves along the way.

Janet Remmington does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Travel as activism: 6 stories of Black women who refused to ‘stay put’ in apartheid South Africa – https://theconversation.com/travel-as-activism-6-stories-of-black-women-who-refused-to-stay-put-in-apartheid-south-africa-263854

September 18, 2025

Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Solaja Mayowa Oludele, Lecturing, Olabisi Onabanjo University

On any street in Lagos, Abuja or Port Harcourt, you’ll find abandoned plastic bottles lying around. Each year, about 2.5 million tonnes of plastic waste are produced in Nigeria and much of it winds up in landfills or in the environment.

But plastic waste can be useful. In some places it’s converted to textiles and clothing. Adidas, a global shoe and apparel maker, uses ocean plastics to produce sneakers, and the clothing brands H&M and Patagonia have put their money into recycled polyester collection. They collect post-consumer plastic waste (like used plastic bottles), clean it, shred it into flakes, melt it down into pellets, and then spin these pellets into polyester yarn, which is used to make new sportswear and footwear.

We’re a team of sustainability researchers and social scientists with expertise in circular economy, ethics and plastic waste management. In a recent study, we reviewed the opportunities and challenges of using recycled polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastics (the type of plastic used in beverage bottles) in Nigeria’s fashion industry.

Evidence from other regions, such as Europe and North America, shows that producing polyester fibres from recycled PET rather than unused materials can cut carbon emissions by over 45%. But little is known about its potential in Nigeria.

Our review mapped and analysed academic studies, industry reports and policy documents to identify technical, economic, environmental, social and regulatory factors shaping the adoption of recycled PET in Nigerian fashion.

We developed a theoretical model showing how knowledge from local crafts, industrial design, environmental science and policy frameworks interact to influence this emerging practice. And we made some proposals about how to foster a socially inclusive, ethically responsible and environmentally sustainable textile industry in Nigeria.

We believe that incorporating plastic waste into the Nigerian textile industry could reduce pollution, generate employment and cut a niche in the world of sustainable fashion.

Barriers beyond technology

Plastic bottles don’t have to be a social or environmental hassle. They can be a source of economic power. The concept of “waste to wealth” is more than a catchphrase – it has the potential to revive the textile industry.

But there are a number of obstacles.

Poor infrastructure: Nigerians do not have large recycling plants. Recycling tends to be small scale or informal. Recovered PET bottles are typically exported or down-cycled into low-grade products like mats or stuffing.

Consumer perceptions: In a recent survey conducted in Lagos only 18% of consumers had heard about recycled textiles. Nigerians think of recycled clothes as a sign of poverty or as second-hand goods, not as quality clothing.

Comfort: Recycled polyester is often uncomfortable to wear in hot, damp climates, as the fabric tends to retain moisture and heat. Nigeria’s average daily temperatures range from 25°C to 35°C with high humidity. The uptake among consumers will not improve until these technical problems are addressed.

Policy gaps: In Europe, companies must assume responsibility for the end of their products’ lives. In Nigeria there are no comparable regulations, incentives or infrastructure supporting sustainable textiles. This leaves local brands with little motivation to innovate.

Lessons from global and local experiments

Other countries and brands have shown what’s possible. Adidas has transformed thousands of tonnes of plastic taken from the oceans into sneakers and sportswear. H&M operates a take-back programme worldwide which gathered over 14,768 tonnes of worn garments in 2022. Patagonia has a programme called Worn Wear which invites customers to repair and reuse their clothes.

Nigeria can learn from these examples, but also has its own sources of innovation. Startup enterprises such as Chanja Datti in Abuja are testing community-based recycling and recovery. Circular fashion – where clothing is designed to be reused, repaired and recycled instead of discarded – can also be cultural fashion, as designers in Nigeria like Maki Oh are incorporating traditional textures and sustainable practices.

The way forward

At least four changes are essential to transform plastic waste into fashion in Nigeria:

1.) Take a stake in decentralised recycling centres

Regional centres with small but technologically prepared centres could generate, process and upcycle the PET waste into fibres. This would lower transport expenses, provide employment and feed directly into textile manufacturers.

2.) Assist small and medium textile enterprises

Nigeria has a fashion industry dominated by small businesses. They can be given access to finance, sustainable practice training and affordable technology to scale the use of recycled fabrics.

3.) Educate consumers

Recycled fashion needs to be perceived by Nigerians as stylish and of good quality rather than second-hand. Perceptions can be shifted through public education, collaboration with popular designers and influencers.

4.) Create enabling policies

Tax incentives to sustainable producers, recycling start-up grants and procurement policies that focus on recycled textiles would encourage industry players. Laws must not promote waste and excessive dependence on imports.

Why this matters globally

Sustainable fashion is not only a western issue. Nigeria boasts one of the largest young populations in the world, a dynamic fashion industry and a huge plastic waste crisis. Should Nigeria be able to incorporate the use of recycled plastics in its textile industry, it may serve as an example to other poor economies facing similar circumstances.

Solaja Mayowa Oludele does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Nigeria’s plastic waste could enrich the fashion industry: here’s how – https://theconversation.com/nigerias-plastic-waste-could-enrich-the-fashion-industry-heres-how-264919

September 18, 2025

Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthias Vanmaercke, Associate professor BOF Faculty of Science, KU Leuven

In fast-growing cities like some in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heavy rains are carving huge scars into the land. Known as urban gullies, these deep erosion channels can swallow homes, destroy roads and displace entire communities.

They can grow to hundreds of metres long and dozens of metres wide, splitting neighbourhoods in two. Once established, they keep expanding with each major downpour.

The consequences are devastating. In Kinshasa, the DRC’s capital, heavy rainfall in December 2022 triggered rapid gully expansion, destroying homes and claiming dozens of lives.

Urban gullies form when rainwater runoff cuts deep channels into fragile soils. The erosive force of concentrated water exceeds the strength of these soils. The gullies usually form after intense rain on steep slopes. Urbanisation makes the situation worse as vegetation is removed to build houses, greatly increasing the likelihood that heavy rainfalls will simply run off the top soil. Roads also play a critical part as they can change how water flows across the landscape, forming direct pathways along which runoff can accumulate.

Our new study reveals the staggering scale of the problem in the DRC. Our research team of Congolese and Belgian earth scientists and geographers identified 2,922 urban gullies in 26 DRC cities.

We used satellite imagery and population data to identify the gullies. Our detailed, nationwide mapping effort – the first to map gully erosion across an entire country – shows that this is not a series of isolated incidents but a widespread and fast-growing hazard.

But urban gullies can be avoided by adequate urban planning and infrastructure. This includes adapted zoning plans and measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention and infiltration systems, increased vegetation cover and targeted engineering works to divert runoff safely.

The crisis in numbers

Many of the urban gullies in the DRC are huge. A typical example is easily 250 metres long and 30 metres wide. Together, they stretch nearly 740 kilometres.

Kinshasa alone has 868 mapped gullies (221km in total). With about 17 million inhabitants, it is the DRC’s largest city and one of Africa’s megacities, where rapid, unplanned growth (around 6.6% per year) makes gully erosion a major urban hazard. Kinshasa is also tropical with annual rainfall typically above 1,000 millimetres.

By reconstructing how these features expanded between 2004 and 2023, we calculated that 118,600 people in the DRC were forced from their homes. Displacement has accelerated sharply: before 2020, about 4,600 people were displaced annually; today, the figure is more than 12,000.

The study also looked ahead. In 2023, some 3.2 million Congolese lived in areas considered at risk of future gully expansion. Of these, more than half a million are in zones where the chance of losing their homes within a decade is very high.

Several factors make Congo’s cities especially prone to gully erosion. Many are built on steep slopes with sandy soils that are highly erodible. Rapid, unplanned urban growth strips vegetation and increases impermeable surfaces such as rooftops and roads, which funnel runoff into concentrated flows.

The link with roads is particularly striking: 98% of all mapped gullies were connected to the road network, either forming along unpaved streets or fed by runoff from poorly drained roads.

The problem is set to worsen. Congo’s urban population is booming, driven by both natural growth and migration. Informal neighbourhoods often lack basic infrastructure, leaving rainfall to carve its own destructive paths.

Climate change adds another layer of risk. Rainfall intensity in tropical Africa is projected to rise by 10%-15% in the coming decades. Since heavy downpours are a trigger for gully formation, expansion rates could double if no action is taken.

Prevention over cure

Once formed, gullies are extremely hard and costly to stabilise. Local communities often try to slow their advance, but without proper engineering solutions, most efforts fail. Stabilising a single large gully can cost the DRC more than US$1 million, an impossible burden for most municipalities.

The study shows that prevention is the only viable long-term strategy. That means paying careful attention to how cities are planned and built. Measures such as better road drainage, rainwater retention systems and strategic vegetation cover can reduce the risks.

Above all, improved spatial planning is crucial to stop new neighbourhoods from being built in vulnerable areas. The effectiveness of specific urban gully control measures remains largely unknown and poorly documented, apart from an earlier case study in the DRC that showed that many measures fail. But such measures should not be confused with better spatial planning. This means avoid constructing houses and roads in areas that are sensitive to urban gully formation, or at least making sure that rainwater is safely stored or evacuated.

We argue that the best strategy for limiting the impacts of urban gullies is preventing them.

Above all, urban gullies must be recognised as a disaster risk on par with floods and landslides. Only then can policies and investments be developed that are needed to protect vulnerable populations.

A problem in the rest of Africa too

Although the DRC is at the epicentre of the crisis, similar problems are emerging elsewhere in Africa, including Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi and Madagascar.

With urban populations across the global south expected to nearly triple by 2050, gully erosion could become one of the defining urban hazards of the century.

The deep scars running through Congo’s cities are not just features of the landscape, they are reminders of the urgent need to rethink how urban growth is managed in vulnerable regions.

Matthias Vanmaercke receives funding from the University of Leuven. The research behind this article was funded through the Belgian ARES research collaboration project PREMITURG (Prevention and Mitigation of Urban Gullies: lessons learned from failures and successes, D.R. Congo)

– ref. Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them – https://theconversation.com/soil-erosion-is-tearing-drc-cities-apart-whats-causing-urban-gullies-and-how-to-prevent-them-264497

September 17, 2025

Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon?

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

Cameroonians go to the polls in October 2025 in what some people hoped might be a break from the country’s troubled recent past. They thought that President Paul Biya (92) might stand aside to allow a transition.

Three years ago I was one of those who expressed optimism about the 2025 poll. But I was wrong.

Biya is set to run yet again for an 8th term. He is already one of Africa’s longest ruling presidents, behind only Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Nguema.

Biya is on the cusp of achieving lifetime presidency since taking office in 1982.

In July 2025, after months of speculation, he confirmed in a tweet that he would run again.

Having weathered coups, silenced dissent, defied death rumours, and outlasted generations of challengers, he reminded friend and foe alike that he remains at the centre of Cameroon’s political ecosystem.

I am a long time scholar of and commentator on African politics, regime transformation, democratic transition and broader governance. Given regional developments that have seen the military deposing long term leaders, one might expect Biya to superintend a managed transition. The intriguing question is: what is it about the situation in Cameroon that continues to defy logic?

There is evident restlessness and frustration among young Cameroonians as well as clear clamour for change. Yet, the incumbent remains the front-runner, supported by the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement, and his near-total command of the state’s political machinery.

Simply, the system has been designed to serve Biya’s interests. With government control of the media, resources, and judicial and electoral institutions, it is unlikely that the opposition can bring about systemic change.

Some things have changed, however. Biya’s previous wins were landslides that left no room for debate. This time things could potentially be different on account of high-profile defections from his party. These men will be challenging him at the polls.

The field

The last electoral cycle, leading up to the 2018 poll, was characterised by subdued challenges and a co-opted or deeply divided opposition. This time Biya appears to face a relatively organised opposition.

Initially, 83 candidates signalled their interest. In July the electoral commission cleared 13 to run. The commission controversially disqualified Maurice Kamto, a renowned legal scholar who performed respectably in the 2018 electoral cycle with 14% of the vote.

Human Rights Watch warned that this would cast a shadow over the credibility of the electoral process.

Nevertheless, several credible figures across the political spectrum remain in the race and present alternatives.

Biya faces two other former allies turned political adversaries.

One is Issa Tchiroma Bakary, his minister of employment and vocational training. A longtime insider of the regime, he served in various ministerial roles and was long considered a loyalist. Yet in June 2025, he resigned from the government, delivering a searing critique of the system he once represented.

He then launched his campaign, running on the ticket of the Front for the National Salvation of Cameroon.

The minister of tourism and leisure, Bello Bouba Maigari, still formally holding office, declared his intention in July 2025 to run against his boss in the October elections.

This announcement was especially striking given the deep political history between the two men. Maigari is not just any cabinet member. He is a long-standing confidant of the president, having been appointed Biya’s prime minister in 1982 and hailing from the vote-rich northern region. The decision to enter the race marks a shift from loyal lieutenant to presidential challenger, revealing the growing fissures within the ruling elite.

Others in the race worth noting are:

Akere Muna, a former speaker who swore in Biya in 1982 and a tireless advocate for transparency and accountability. He ran for the top job in 2018 (but withdrew at the last minute).
Cabral Libii, from the Cameroon Party for National Reconciliation, a young and dynamic leader who also ran for president in 2018 and garnered 6% of the total vote.
Joshua Osih, a seasoned politician with a strong track record.

The issues

The nation’s pressing issues remain the same as they have been for a long while.

These include:

Endemic corruption. Cameroon is ranked 140 out of 180 countries by Transparency International. The reasons are systemic decay of state institutions and maladministration.
Economic stasis, including stubborn unemployment forecast at 7.34% by Statista; 23% live below the international poverty line and 3.3 million are food insecure.
The ongoing anglophone regional crisis pitting the English speaking regions against the dominant francophone centre.
Biya’s ability to govern and the succession question, given his very advanced age and the potential vacuum or infighting if he couldn’t complete his term.

The external dimension

Western actors have been consistent critics of Biya’s regime in the recent past. However, some have adopted a more cautious tone, balancing criticism with strategic interests.

The US, for instance, suspended some military assistance to Cameroon in 2019 over human rights abuses. But it continues counter-terrorism cooperation against Boko Haram.

The European Union, while pressing for peaceful resolution of the anglophone conflict, remains an important trade and aid partner.

China has become Cameroon’s largest bilateral creditor and a top trading partner. According to a report by Business in Cameroon, in 2024 Cameroon owed about 64.8% of its external bilateral debt to China. This is primarily for infrastructure loans that have funded projects like the Kribi Deep Sea Port, the Yaoundé-Douala highway, and hydropower stations.

For regime survival, Biya has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy. Beijing’s diplomatic stance of non-interference and respect for sovereignty resonates with Cameroonian political elites wary of western scrutiny and criticism over democratic backsliding and the anglophone conflict.

But Biya has not severed ties with the west. For example, the government maintains partnerships with France for security training, with Germany for decentralisation support, and with the US for counterinsurgency.

This balancing is not simply geopolitical. It is also deeply embedded in domestic patronage networks. Foreign aid, loans and investments serve as resources to consolidate elite power, strengthen the patronage system and suppress dissent.

The October polls are sure to reaffirm the status quo.

David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Paul Biya at 92: will defections weaken his grip on absolute power in Cameroon? – https://theconversation.com/paul-biya-at-92-will-defections-weaken-his-grip-on-absolute-power-in-cameroon-264915

September 16, 2025

Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Nikos Smit, Postdoc in evolutionary/behavioural ecology, University of Turku

Our understanding of female-male power relationships in animals has changed over time. Evolutionary biologists once thought that male mammals held clear-cut power over females. Later, species with pronounced female power over males were presented as exceptions in a landscape of strict male power. Spotted hyenas and certain primates, including bonobos and most lemurs, were examples of female dominance.

These views were reinforced by the assumption that males and females competed over different resources: males over females, and females over food.

But it’s not that simple, as the research of our colleagues and our own work on various primates has shown.

We reviewed studies of primate species and found that power relationships between the sexes varied significantly. In our sample, only 25 species exhibited clear male power, 16 exhibited clear female power, and the remaining species (about 70%) exhibited moderate or no sex biases in power. Most primate females can compete directly with males and often overpower them.

Size and strength differences between males and females

Males don’t always have all the power even when they are much larger and stronger than females.

In an earlier study, we showed that female mandrills in Gabon sometimes outrank males that are more than three times heavier than them.

Gorillas are an interesting case too. Apart from the big difference between males and females in body and canine tooth size, they are also typically presented (by scientists and non-scientists) as the species with the strictest male-biased power over females among great apes. They’ve become the “male power archetype” among animals.

We drew on 25 years of data about mountain gorillas in Uganda, to test if males strictly overpower females. Our findings suggest that females may leverage support from the most powerful males to gain power over other males. Or they may leverage access to themselves, and some males yield to females to acquire such access.

Our findings in mandrills and gorillas contribute a new perspective on the ecology and evolution of female-male power relationships in great apes and other primates that is not solely based on size and strength. They call for future work to investigate similar long-standing assumptions regarding the evolutionary origins of intersexual relationships across species.

Factors influencing power across primates

Our comparative analysis showed that intersexual power is influenced by different factors. Generally, females rely less than males on physical force and coercion in order to gain power. Female power is more likely to prevail in species that are monogamous, have little or no body size difference between adult females and males, and/or forage primarily in trees. These are conditions that give females greater control over reproduction.

By contrast, male power is more likely to prevail in species where males mate with multiple females, are primarily terrestrial, and have larger bodies or greater weapons than females.

Even when these conditions are met, however, there isn’t always a clear-cut bias in intersexual power of a social group or species.

Male mandrills and gorillas mate with multiple females and are terrestrial. In these species males generally have more power than females, and the highest ranking individual in a group’s social hierarchy is always a male. Yet power is not clear-cut and females can overpower other males.

What males and females compete for

Finally, our studies suggest that females and males often compete directly over access to resources.

In the comparative study across primates, we found that contests between females and males represented on average almost half of all contests in a social primate group.

In the study on mountain gorillas, we found that power relationships between females and males determined priority of access to a precious food resource, and when a female overpowered a male, she always had priority over him.

Altogether, these new findings suggest that:

most primate societies do not have clear-cut sex-biases in power
even in species with extreme male-biases in size and strength, females can overpower males
females and males compete directly over similar resources.

These findings refine our interpretation of intersexual relationships across animals. They caution against oversimplified views based solely on physical strength while neglecting the complexity of their social landscape.

Finally, this work shows that the human profile does not really resemble other primates where there is clear male dominance or clear female dominance. Instead, humans are closer to those “intermediate” species with moderate and flexible dominance relationships. This can inform attempts to reconstruct power relationships between men and women in early humans.

Elise Huchard receives funding from CNRS and the French Agence Nationale pour la Recherche (ANR).

Nikos Smit does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Who’s got the power? Studies of male and female primates show it’s not simple – https://theconversation.com/whos-got-the-power-studies-of-male-and-female-primates-show-its-not-simple-263292

September 16, 2025

Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Dina Wahba, Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, University of Freiburg

A special train left the Egyptian capital of Cairo for Aswan, a town close to the border with southern neighbour Sudan, in July 2025. The train, publicised by the Egyptian government as shiny, air-conditioned and free of charge, runs a weekly service. It is transporting Sudanese refugees who are willing to go back home. Sudan, however, has been in the midst of civil war since April 2023.

The train arrives in Aswan after around 12 hours. Travellers then continue via bus or ferry into Sudan. Little is known about what happens when travellers arrive in the country.

As at mid-2025, more than 190,000 Sudanese refugees had gone back home from Egypt. This is a five-fold increase in returns from 2024. Egypt hosts the largest number of Sudanese who have fled the war. More than 1.2 million Sudanese have crossed into Egypt since April 2023, making them the largest refugee community there.

The army-led Sudanese government – which regained control of Khartoum in March 2025 after losing the capital two years earlier – promotes return as part of its alleged efforts for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

However, camouflaged behind Egypt’s voluntary return programme is a far more complex political reality, with refugees in the centre.

Initially, Egypt kept its borders relatively open, allowing women, children and older men to enter visa-free under a long-standing deal with Sudan.

As refugee numbers rose, however, new restrictions were imposed and brutally enforced from June 2023. These restrictions were codified in a new law adopted in 2024.

We have studied socio-political dynamics in Egypt and African refugee politics. In our view, while the voluntary return initiative is widely promoted by Egyptian and Sudanese authorities as a sign of solidarity and reconstruction, it masks a policy environment aimed at reducing the Sudanese population in Egypt.

Egypt has a contentious history of refugee protection. In recent years, refugees have faced hostile sentiments from host communities and rising xenophobia. Sudanese refugees in particular have been denied access to public spaces or rental property, and have faced physical violence.

The government’s response has focused on appeasing domestic audiences in the face of economic decline by providing external scapegoats. This does not bode well for the future of refugee protection in Egypt.

Countries often scapegoat refugees and other migrants to retain legitimacy with their own citizens, especially when there are pervasive inequalities that states cannot or will not bridge. This is the case in Egypt.

Egypt and Sudan’s shifting relations

Refugee hosting is never just a question of humanitarian or ethical protection measures. It is deeply embedded in domestic and external policy interests, as well as the global geopolitical context.

Egypt changed its open-border agreement with Sudan on 10 June 2023. It required all Sudanese to obtain visas before entry. Wait times stretched to two to three months, and an illicit market of visa “facilitators” sprang up, charging between US$1,500 and US$2,500 per person.

Egypt’s reception of displaced Sudanese took a more restrictive and controlling approach, including deportations. Its asylum law, passed in December 2024, formalises these harsh measures. Vague national security clauses enable status revocations and penalise the “illegal” entry of refugees.

Politically, Egypt has backed the Sudanese army as the cornerstone of stability. It backed Sudan’s October 2021 military coup and has aligned with the army in the ongoing civil war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces.

While the civil war continues to rage in many regions of Sudan, army-led forces have control of the centre and east of Sudan, supporting the push for the special train programme.

Additionally, Egypt has been a core beneficiary of European Union (EU) efforts to stop onward migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe. Though Egypt is no longer one of the most significant routes to Europe – this has shifted to Libya – Egyptians make up one of the largest national groups of irregular migrants arriving in Europe. With rising numbers of refugees in Egypt, the EU fears the situation could spiral.

To address this, Egypt signed a 7.4 billion euro (US$8.7 billion) deal with the EU in March 2024 to increase control of its (sea) borders and cooperate on returns from Europe. Thus, Egypt’s return of refugees to Sudan is in the EU’s interests.

Under such complicated settings, refugees become pawns. Egypt’s train, therefore, serves domestic policy interests of reducing Sudanese refugees, addresses the general hostile environment these refugees face and supports Cairo’s external policy interests.

What about the refugees?

When it comes to Sudan, the big question is whether states are violating a core tenet of refugee protection: the principle of non-refoulement. This states that countries cannot return refugees to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm.

Many Sudanese may choose to return not because they’re hopeful but as a result of economic hardship in Egypt, uncertainty with regard to their legal status, and fear.

The UN Refugee Agency advances three “durable solutions” for the return of refugees:

local integration, which is difficult in Egypt
resettlement to a third country, which has become increasingly difficult in the current global environment. The US, for instance, suspended all its resettlement programmes in January 2025.
returning voluntarily to the country of origin.

Where possible, states aim to return people – both refugees and other migrants – voluntarily. This is often done with the assistance of the International Organisation for Migration. However noble this process may be, migrants may still feel coerced.

Though army-controlled areas in Sudan like Khartoum, Sennar and El Gezira have seen relative calm, key conflict zones like Darfur and Kordofan are still actively contested. Humanitarian agencies caution that the ongoing violence undermines the voluntary nature of return.

What can be done

Usually after a conflict ends, the UN Refugee Agency draws up tripartite agreements with the countries of origin and asylum, and itself. This establishes the conditions for refugees to return and establishes proper reintegration programmes.

In the Egypt and Sudan case, however, it’s not clear who is financing the return train. Where is the tripartite agreement between Sudan, Egypt and the UN Refugee Agency? Is this even on the table given the continuing conflict in Sudan?

The trickiest part is what happens in the long run for those returning to conflict. This can amount to what scholars call “slow deportation”, where return, even when allegedly voluntary, undermines a serious commitment to refugee protection.

What Sudanese refugees need is not air-conditioned trains. Rather, they need protection of their full political, social and legal rights, as the world promised in the aftermath of the atrocities of the second world war in 1951.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Research Council for the project “The Political Lives of Migrants: Perspectives from Africa” (Grant no: 101161856).

Dina Wahba does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Refugee protection in Egypt: what’s behind the return train to Sudan – https://theconversation.com/refugee-protection-in-egypt-whats-behind-the-return-train-to-sudan-264917

September 15, 2025

Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The relationship between inequality and economic growth is a complex one, especially in Africa. Inequality is the result of a host of factors, including policy choices, institutional legacies and power structures that favour elites. Professor Imraan Valodia, director of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies spoke to Ernest Aryeetey, emeritus professor of Development Economics at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana about the issues.

What policy choices have African governments made that have worsened inequality?

Firstly, structural adjustment policies. Many African countries undertook these during the late 20th century, often encouraged by international financial institutions. These policies included public sector retrenchments, the removal of subsidies, and reduced social services. They disproportionately affected the poor by weakening the state’s role in redistributing public goods, and limiting access to essential services.

The programmes also increased income inequality by choosing free markets over social protection. Later efforts to address the consequences were often “too little, too late.”

Secondly, taxation and fiscal policies. Most tax systems in Africa have relied on indirect taxes (such as VAT or consumption taxes) rather than progressive, direct taxes on income and wealth. As a result, poorer households often bear a heavier relative tax burden while the wealthiest benefit from exemptions or evasion.

Early post-independence taxation rarely did much to redistribute wealth, and efforts to tax the informal sector have been minimal or poorly designed. They have failed to capture significant resources for social spending.

Thirdly, education and healthcare investment. Policy choices have often perpetuated access gaps between urban and rural populations and among socioeconomic classes. Investments tended to favour cities and privileged groups, so that not everyone had the same opportunities. This “urban bias” in public spending reinforced existing inequalities. Rural people’s needs remained unmet.

Fourthly, weak social protection. Until the expansion of more comprehensive schemes in the 2000s, many Africans were left poor and vulnerable, without adequate safety nets.

Fifth, economic structures favour elites. African governments have often maintained or even reinforced economic structures that concentrate wealth and opportunity for just a few. Examples include policies favouring extractive industries or resource sectors controlled by politically connected groups. Land tenure, trade policies and access to state contracts and licences have frequently favoured the powerful.

Sixth, limited regional and gender inclusion. Early public policies rarely met the needs of women, youth, rural areas, or marginalised regions. Exclusion from land ownership or financial services, and limited emphasis on affirmative action, reinforced systemic inequalities. Only in recent decades have some governments begun to address these gaps, but progress remains uneven.

Are these choices linked to the capture of public policy by elites?

Yes. Privileged groups have often shaped or manipulated state policies in ways that protect their interests and reinforce inequality.

Colonial and postcolonial legacy. Policies and institutions established during and after colonialism often allocated resources and power to a narrow elite, either colonial settlers, expatriates or local collaborators. Today’s elites inherited and sustained many of these structures. They still control wealth, land, and market opportunities.

Economic structure and resource control. Many African economies remain oriented around extractive industries and primary commodities such as oil and minerals. Policies around resource extraction, trade and land tenure have often favoured elites through preferential access, tax exemptions and regulatory loopholes.

Policy design and fiscal choices. The design of tax systems has typically favoured indirect taxes (like VAT). These do not affect elite wealth. Efforts to tax high incomes, property or capital gains are underdeveloped or easily evaded.

Social protection and service delivery. Safety nets and public goods (like quality education, healthcare, or infrastructure) often target formal sector workers or urban residents (where elites reside). They neglect the informal sector, rural poor and marginalised groups.

Political patronage and governance. State resources, positions and contracts go to loyalists, family members, or ethnic/regional networks.

What have been the 3 biggest inequality drivers?

Firstly, regressive fiscal policies. These include broad based taxes such as transaction levies and VAT. They take a larger share of low income earners’ cash flows. Wealthier groups benefit from exemptions or low tax rates.

Secondly, rapid, elite led privatisation and market liberalisation. Selling state assets or opening key sectors (energy, telecoms and transport) to politically connected investors concentrates profits and market power. Informal workers and small firms are left with reduced earnings.

Patronage, corruption and political capture keep things that way.

Thirdly, under-investment in universal social services. Cuts to health, education and social safety nets limit upward mobility for the poor and maintain regional and gender gaps.

Lastly, resource dependence and economic structure. Many African economies focus on industries like oil, minerals and cash crops. These benefit political and business elites but don’t diversify industries or create jobs. The benefits of growth go mostly to the already privileged. Most citizens and entire regions are excluded.

Which countries have managed best to change this?

Rwanda has a progressive income tax structure. Low value mobile money transactions are exempt from tax. Key utilities such as electricity and water remain largely public, which has reduced the impact of taxes on the poor.

Rwanda has also made efforts towards inclusive governance. Examples include quotas for women, investments in health and education, and a focus on rural inclusion.

Botswana has pursued a cautious privatisation agenda. The state retains majority ownership in diamonds, telecoms and banking. Revenues were channelled into universal primary education and health.

Despite its dependence on diamonds, it does well at channelling resource wealth into national savings, infrastructure and public services. This while maintaining relatively high institutional quality and political stability.

Ethiopia, pre 2020 reforms which saw the role of the private sector being broadened.

Before then, the country had focused on massive public investment in primary education, health extension services and rural road networks. At the same time it avoided large scale privatisation of basic utilities. This limited the social service gap.

In addition, it has invested in manufacturing and export-led growth. This has generated jobs and gradually shifted the economy away from depending on primary commodities. Inequality has reduced compared to resource-dependent peers.

Have technology advances affected inequality differently on the continent?

Yes.

Technology has the potential to reduce inequality by expanding access to markets, services, information and financial inclusion. But gaps in digital infrastructure, affordability and skills have caused technology to sometimes reinforce, rather than alleviate, disparities in African countries.

Digital divide and urban-rural gaps. Access to digital technologies is highly uneven. Rural areas, the poor, women and less-educated groups are less likely to use the internet or benefit from digital services. This divide is much starker in Africa than in advanced economies, where technology adoption is nearly universal. As a result, new technologies can benefit urban, educated and higher-income groups the most. This widens inequalities if not accompanied by robust, inclusive policies.
Mobile leapfrogging, but patchy inclusion. Africa’s rapid leap to mobile phone use has often skipped fixed-line infrastructure. This has brought financial inclusion and new markets to millions, such as M-Pesa in Kenya. Still, large parts of the continent remain excluded due to affordability, lack of electricity, limited digital skills and language barriers.
Economic structure and global value chains. Limited integration into global value chains and a small high-tech sector mean most jobs on the continent remain in low-productivity informal work.

Why do the effects differ?

Firstly, late, unequal adoption. The industrial revolution and subsequent technological advances arrived late and unevenly. Colonial and postcolonial legacies left Africa behind in both education and infrastructure. This made it harder for broad segments of the population to benefit from new technologies.

Infrastructure scarcity forces societies to adopt mobile solutions directly, bypassing legacy banking but also making them vulnerable to policy shocks.

Secondly, policy and market failures. Inadequate regulation, weak competition and high costs of devices and data are brakes on digital transformation. Digital public goods, such as e-government and online education, reach only connected groups. And digital skills gaps further entrench the social digital divide.

Imraan Valodia receives funding from a number of foundations and institutions that support independent academic research.

– ref. Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right – https://theconversation.com/inequality-in-africa-what-drives-it-how-to-end-it-and-what-some-countries-are-getting-right-265265

September 15, 2025

Ansaru terror leaders’ arrest is a strategic change for Nigeria: what could happen next

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Attacks by non-state armed groups are a security challenge in the Sahel, including Nigeria.

In northern Nigeria, the activities of Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (also known as Boko Haram), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) contribute to the instability of the Nigerian state.

On 16 August 2025, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s national security adviser, announced the arrest of two leaders of Ansaru: Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri.

They appeared before the Federal High Court in Abuja on 11 September. Usman pleaded guilty to the charge of illegal mining activities and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. They are currently facing a 32-count charge including engagement in acts of terrorism, and other violent crimes.

As a scholar of security studies, I can offer some thoughts about the importance of the arrest, possible responses from Ansaru and how Nigeria should respond.

Who are the two men arrested?

Mahmud Muhammed Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri are two key leaders of Ansaru, a terrorist organisation that formed as a breakaway faction of Boko Haram in 2012 in Kano state. Boko Haram is a Salafi Jihadist militant group operating in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. It’s known for its efforts since 2010 to establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.

Ansaru functioned until 2013 before it appeared to fizzle out. Its operations included a prison break in November 2012, an attack on a Nigerian military convoy heading to Mali in January 2013 and the kidnapping of seven expatriates working with Setraco Construction Company in Bauchi in February 2013.

Since 2013, not much has been heard about the group. Some linked its silence to the death of its leader Abubakar Adam Kambar in 2012. Others said it had been forced back into mainstream Boko Haram by that group’s then leader Abubakar Shekau.

But Ansaru revived between 2018 and 2020 and has been recruiting and involved in rising banditry and kidnapping in North West and North Central.

The arrested leaders are prominent figures in Ansaru. An official statement revealed that Mahmud Muhammad Usman is the amir (leader) and Mahmud al-Nigeri serves as the deputy and chief of staff.

Both have undergone extensive training from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb region. Al-Qaeda is a pan-Islamic militant group leading a global Islamist revolution aimed at uniting the Muslim world. It was established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 and he remained its leader until 2011, when he was killed.

Strategic significance of the arrest

Arresting leaders is known in counterterrorism as “leadership decapitation” or “snakehead strategy”. This involves capturing or killing the leaders or high-ranking commanders of terrorist organisations.

Not all policymakers and academics agree about the effectiveness of that tactic. States facing terrorism challenges, such as Israel, the United States and Russia, often use it, but most research shows it is not that effective.

It may temporarily incapacitate the group, but the group may bounce back even more brutally.

The targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden decimated al-Qaeda but paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State as a global caliphate. Islamic State has been lethal in its operations, particularly in the Sahel.

And the 2009 killing of Muhammed Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram, led to the emergence of Abubakar Shekau. Under him, Boko Haram became more formidable until he died in 2021.

The case of the Ansaru leaders is different, however. It is target arrest and incarceration.

This strategy has advantages for Nigeria and the broader Sahel region.

Incarceration of the two leaders means Ansaru won’t be able to take key decisions for some time. And it will deny the group some key technical know-how. Terrorist organisations seldom get new leaders while others are still alive.

Al-Nigeri is not only deputy and chief of staff, he is an expert in planning and implementing attacks and kidnapping in Nigeria and Niger. He underwent training in the Maghreb in handling weapons and making explosive devices.

It’s possible that lack of access to their expertise and authority will drastically reduce the activities of Ansaru.

Shortly after their arrest, Abduraham Yusuf, son of the Boko Haram founder, who is also a leader of one of ISWAP cells in the region, was arrested in Chad. Similarly, Boko Haram leader Ibrahim Mahamadu, also known as Bakura, was reportedly killed in Niger Republic on 20 August.

I believe these two incidents may be related to intelligence obtained following the arrest of the two Ansaru leaders.

Likely responses from the group

Considering the importance of the two leaders to Ansaru, there are two likely responses from the group.

breaking them out of prison – the group carried out prison breaks in 2012 and 2022
high-profile kidnapping and hostage taking, a trademark of Ansaru.

The March 28 2022 Abuja-Kaduna train bombing incident was believed to have been carried out by Ansaru with the support of some bandits as a retaliation for the Nigerian Police raid of Ansaru Camp in Kaduna State in which two commanders of the group were killed.

Even the parent group, Boko Haram, possibly executed the Chibok kidnapping in 2014 in retaliation for some of its commanders under incarceration of Nigerian government. Given these antecedents, the arrest of their prize leaders may trigger retaliation from the group.

Although the group’s ability to retaliate largely depends on whether it can still function effectively without the inputs of its two leaders in incarceration, the current cordial relationship between Ansaru and some bandits operating in the North West may make this possible.

Responses from the state

The Nigerian government and security forces must brace for likely retaliation from Ansaru. I expect that these two leaders should not be kept together in the same prison facility, and there is a need to adequately fortify prison facilities where they are kept to fend off any possible attack.

Furthermore, security needs to be provided for key places, especially schools, communities, and other vulnerable people that Ansaru may attack in the North West and North Central regions.

Saheed Babajide Owonikoko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ansaru terror leaders’ arrest is a strategic change for Nigeria: what could happen next – https://theconversation.com/ansaru-terror-leaders-arrest-is-a-strategic-change-for-nigeria-what-could-happen-next-264921

September 14, 2025

Hunger among South African students: study shows those studying remotely need financial aid for food

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Angelo Fynn, Specialist Researcher, University of South Africa

Food insecurity is associated with worse academic outcomes. PxHere

The spectre of food insecurity unfortunately haunts many households in South Africa.

Food security is commonly understood as having sufficient and nutritious food to live a healthy, active life. Access to sufficient food is a basic human right and is enshrined in the South African constitution.

Estimates from Statistics South Africa show that the proportion of households experiencing some form of food insecurity rose between 2019 and 2023 from 15.8% to 19.7%. Many households still seem to be feeling the pressure of slow economic growth and consumer price inflation. And a third of South Africans are unemployed.

These pressures affect students too.

The South African higher education sector has made great strides in making tertiary education more accessible. While the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) was established to broaden access to post-school education, by providing for fees, accommodation and a stipend, levels of food insecurity among university students remain high.

It’s hard to say just how high. Sometimes students seek assistance discreetly due to stigma. What we do know is that while the 2025 NSFAS research report talks about a 5% increase in funding, Statistics South Africa figures show inflation rates higher than that for basic food items.

Education researchers are interested in this because food insecurity is associated with worse academic outcomes among university students. It’s linked to lower class attendance and lower academic performance, among other indicators, which then affects their psychological wellbeing.

However, most of this research is based on traditional (full-time) university students. Students in open, distance and e-learning institutions are under-researched when it comes to food insecurity. Distance learning students form a third of all tertiary education students enrolled in South African universities: 371,592 students, according to 2023 audited figures.

My research interests are in how students learn, cope and succeed. My aim is to help university management and academics understand the issues that students face. One of these is food insecurity.

In a study conducted on 7,494 students from a South African distance learning institution, I found that only 27.9% of those surveyed were food secure and 71.7% (5,380 individuals) were moderately to severely food insecure.

The finding is worrying when considered along with the negative impact that food insecurity has on academic outcomes, physical and psychological well-being.

Food insecurity among this group of students cannot be ignored. I recommend that a system of food grants should be considered.

Which students were the most food insecure

The sample of students was drawn from a South African public open, distance and e-learning institution with approximately 370,000 students. These students were from all walks of life. The majority of respondents (5,670) were female; 23% were male (1,705). The institution as a whole has a 70:30 female-to-male ratio.

About 61% (4,573) of respondents were the first in their immediate family to attend tertiary education. About 12% (896) were members of the LGBTI+ community. It was important to consider this group as some research shows they are disproportionately affected by food insecurity.

Only one in five of respondents were working full time and 14% were studying full time. The biggest group (26%) were unemployed and looking for work; 21% were not looking for work. The remainder were engaged in various forms of employment and study.

The majority (43%) indicated that they were dependent on some form of government grant as their main income, followed by 26% who relied on salaries or wages, 10% who were reliant on their parents and 12% who had no form of income. In terms of household income, 40% earned up to R1,200 (about US$68) per month.

When this data was broken down further, stark patterns of food access emerged.

those who identified as Black Africans reported the highest levels of food insecurity (42%)
43.8% of first generation students reported severe food insecurity (compared with 27% of other students who were not first generation students)
members of the LGBTQ+ community were also found to be more at risk of severe food insecurity than the total response population.

Impact of food insecurity on students

Food insecurity has a negative impact on academic outcomes and on physical and psychological wellbeing.

Students may repurpose funds intended for study purposes to buy food, leaving them without the necessary materials to participate effectively in their education.

Psychological impacts of food insecurity can include increased rates of depression and anxiety associated with concerns around obtaining sufficient food.

Students may consume poor, more affordable food, higher in energy density but lower in nutrients.

Food pantries and grants

Open, distance and e-learning institutions face a challenge when it comes to addressing food insecurity. Students are geographically dispersed and may be enrolled in large numbers. The food pantry programmes found in contact institutions are simply not viable as the infrastructure required is large and costly.

Food pantry programmes are one of the most widely used interventions to combat food insecurity at universities globally. Common barriers to use are the stigma associated with using them, high rate of volunteer staff turnover, location of the programmes and complexity of eligibility criteria, among others.

Given the findings, I suggest that food grants for distance education students are necessary. Public-private partnerships could be explored, too, to address the issue of distance education student hunger.

Angelo Fynn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Hunger among South African students: study shows those studying remotely need financial aid for food – https://theconversation.com/hunger-among-south-african-students-study-shows-those-studying-remotely-need-financial-aid-for-food-264542