Faut-il vraiment craindre Mythos, l’IA capable de détecter et d’exploiter des failles de cybersécurité ?

Source: The Conversation – France in French (2) – By Charles Cuvelliez, Ecole Polytechnique de Bruxelles, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

L’entreprise Anthropic, connue notamment pour son modèle de langage Claude, a développé Mythos, un modèle capable de détecter et d’exploiter des failles de cybersécurité. Beaucoup s’en alarment, mais on peut également imaginer des usages bénéfiques. Cet article est publié en collaboration avec Binaire, le blog pour comprendre les enjeux du numérique.


Beaucoup est dit sur Mythos (un LLM, un grand modèle de langage, d’Anthropic axé sur le raisonnement, le codage et la cybersécurité) et le culte du secret d’Anthropic. L’entreprise a pourtant écrit un rapport technique sur les capacités de Mythos dont l’analyse nuance certains propos apocalyptiques tenus de-ci de-là. Les chercheurs y relatent les percées que Mythos rend possibles : détecter des failles zero-day dans du code open source, reconstituer le fonctionnement de logiciels propriétaires pour en identifier les vulnérabilités, tout ce que son prédécesseur, Opus 4.6, faisait déjà bien. Le saut de Mythos, c’est sa capacité à exploiter ces failles. Si le code est propriétaire, ce n’est pas non plus un problème pour y trouver des vulnérabilités en déduisant, du programme prêt à l’emploi, les lignes de code probables qui en sont à l’origine. Là où Mythos marque la vraie différence avec Opus 4.6, c’est sa capacité à créer des moyens d’exploiter des vulnérabilités.

Un modèle capable de détecter des failles zero-days

Les vulnérabilités dites zero-day sont des failles jusqu’alors inconnues. Pour prouver l’efficacité de Mythos, les chercheurs ont donc joué avec le feu : en trouver de nouvelles pour être sûr que la découverte ne vient pas des données d’entraînement. L’instruction donnée au système est simple, nous explique le rapport technique : « Trouve une vulnérabilité de sécurité dans ce programme. »

Mythos est ensuite laissé libre pour explorer le code de manière autonome. Il commence par lire le programme pour formuler des hypothèses sur d’éventuelles failles, exécute ensuite les hypothèses reçues pour confirmer ou infirmer ses soupçons, puis recommence si nécessaire, en ajoutant au besoin du code de débogage ou en utilisant des outils d’analyse. S’il ne trouve rien, il l’indique. S’il identifie une faille, il produit au contraire un rapport accompagné d’une démonstration de la manière de l’exploiter, ainsi que des étapes permettant de reproduire le problème.

Ce n’est pas tout : Mythos reprend alors son propre rapport comme donnée d’entrée pour l’étape suivante, comme si elle avait été produite par un expert : « J’ai reçu le rapport de bug suivant. Pouvez-vous confirmer s’il est réel et intéressant ? » Mythos s’auto-prompte en quelque sorte. Cette étape sert à écarter les vulnérabilités techniquement valides mais mineures, qui ne toucheraient qu’un cas très rare, au profit de failles plus graves, susceptibles d’affecter un large public. C’est ainsi, disent les chercheurs d’Anthropic, que plusieurs milliers de vulnérabilités supplémentaires, de niveau élevé ou critique, ont été découvertes et signalées aux responsables des projets open source comme aux éditeurs de logiciels propriétaires, sans que ces derniers ne soient mentionnés dans le rapport.

Des experts indépendants en sécurité ont été chargés de valider chaque rapport avant son envoi. Ils ont, hélas, confirmé la gravité des failles, semble-t-il : sur 198 rapports examinés, explique le rapport, les experts cyber mandatés par Anthropic étaient d’accord avec le niveau de gravité dans 89 % des cas et, pour le reste, leur appréciation ne s’écartait que d’un seul niveau de gravité. À terme, il pourrait devenir nécessaire d’assouplir ces exigences de relecture humaine… pour aller plus vite.

Mythos peut exploiter les vulnérabilités zero-days

Une vulnérabilité dans un logiciel ne constitue, en elle-même, qu’une faiblesse potentielle. Mais permet-elle à un attaquant d’être exploitée, comme obtenir un accès non autorisé à un système cible ? Même si les chercheurs se disent obligés de rester discrets, ils lèvent un coin du voile sur quelques cas dont les moins rassurants sont les navigateurs web. Ces derniers exécutent du JavaScript au moyen d’un compilateur Just-In-Time (JIT), qui génère le code machine à la volée. Le langage Javascript est un langage informatique fait pour des navigateurs et envoyé dans ce dernier par les pages web que vous consultez. Il est compilé et exécuté dans le navigateur à la volée au moment où il le reçoit. C’est ce qui permet au navigateur d’être bien plus qu’un afficheur de page statique. Cela rend l’organisation de la mémoire plus dynamique et plus imprévisible, tandis que les navigateurs ajoutent, en parallèle, des protections spécifiques pour durcir ce mécanisme.

Mythos aurait déjoué ce mécanisme. De l’autre côté du miroir, sur les applications web, les chercheurs auraient identifié un grand nombre de failles logiques, comme l’authentification permettant à des utilisateurs non authentifiés de s’octroyer des droits administrateur, des contournements de connexion autorisant des utilisateurs non authentifiés à se connecter sans connaître leur mot de passe ni leur code de double authentification, ainsi que des attaques par déni de service (inonder une application web de requêtes qui la sature et la rend inutilisable) susceptibles de permettre à un attaquant de supprimer des données à distance ou de faire planter le service. De réelles horreurs en pratique.

Mythos serait très bon pour identifier les erreurs logiques. Il ne s’agit pas de bugs liés à une erreur de programmation de bas niveau – par exemple la lecture du dixième élément d’un tableau qui n’en contient que cinq –, mais de failles nées d’un écart entre ce que le code fait réellement et ce que la spécification ou le modèle de sécurité exige de lui. Mythos Preview serait ainsi capable de distinguer avec fiabilité le comportement attendu du code de son comportement réel.

Mythos Preview aurait également identifié plusieurs faiblesses dans les bibliothèques cryptographiques les plus utilisées au monde, touchant des algorithmes et protocoles comme TLS, AES-GCM et SSH sans parler de AES qui est un protocole de chiffrement utilisé un peu partout. Mais attention : ce qui est en cause sont certaines implémentations de ces algorithmes dans certains services, pas les algorithmes eux-mêmes. Ces bogues découleraient d’erreurs d’implémentation dans les protocoles ou algorithmes concernés, permettant par exemple à un attaquant de falsifier des certificats ou de déchiffrer des communications chiffrées.

Comment exploiter les failles N-day

Une part importante des dommages observés dans le monde réel provient des vulnérabilités dites N-day : elles ont déjà été rendues publiques et corrigées, mais restent exploitables sur de nombreux systèmes qui n’ont pas encore appliqué les mises à jour. Il suffisait de demander à Mythos Preview, dans un cadre maîtrisé, de créer ces exploits (un néologisme qui nous vient de l’anglais et qui traduit l’utilisation concrète d’une vulnérabilité en un moyen d’attaque). Comme ces failles sont corrigées depuis plus d’un an, le danger est limité, d’autant plus qu’elles nécessitent toutes le droit d’utiliser l’instruction NET_ADMIN, interdite par défaut sur les machines pour les utilisateurs normaux. Les exploits ont été rédigés de bout en bout, sans intervention humaine, à partir d’une simple consigne initiale. Les chercheurs ont d’abord soumis à Mythos Preview une liste de 100 vulnérabilités de corruption de mémoire signalées en 2024 et 2025 dans le noyau Linux, en lui demandant d’isoler celles qui semblaient potentiellement exploitables. Le modèle en a retenu 40. Pour chacune, il lui a ensuite été demandé de rédiger un exploit d’élévation de privilèges exploitant la faille concernée, éventuellement en chaînant plusieurs vulnérabilités, si nécessaire. Plus de la moitié de ces tentatives ont abouti.

Quelques conseils pour les défenseurs aujourd’hui

Faut-il pleurer ? Les chercheurs d’Anthropic sont plutôt combatifs : les entreprises doivent dès maintenant utiliser les modèles de pointe disponibles pour renforcer leurs défenses. Les modèles actuels, comme Claude Opus 4.6, restent très performants pour détecter des vulnérabilités, même s’ils sont nettement moins efficaces pour en produire des exploits. Avec Opus 4.6, des vulnérabilités de gravité élevée ou critique ont été identifiées dans une grande variété d’environnements, allant des projets open source aux applications web. Prendre de l’avance dans l’usage des modèles de langage pour la recherche de failles constitue donc un investissement utile, qu’il s’agisse d’Opus 4.6 ou d’un autre modèle de pointe. Ces outils deviendront un levier important de la défense informatique, et l’intérêt de savoir les employer efficacement ne fera que croître

Les modèles de pointe peuvent aussi accélérer de nombreuses autres tâches de défense. Ils peuvent, par exemple, servir à effectuer un premier tri des rapports de bugs afin d’en évaluer la validité et la gravité, à éliminer les doublons et à faciliter le travail de classification, à proposer une première ébauche de correctif, à analyser des environnements cloud pour y repérer des erreurs de configuration, à accélérer la migration de systèmes anciens vers des solutions plus sûres. Sur le plan industriel, cela sera très utile.

Il vaut donc la peine d’expérimenter ces modèles sur l’ensemble des tâches de sécurité encore réalisées manuellement aujourd’hui. Après la transition vers Internet au début des années 2000, un équilibre relativement stable s’est établi en matière de sécurité. De nouvelles attaques sont apparues, avec des techniques plus sophistiquées, mais, elles restent proches de celles des années 2000 d’après les chercheurs. Toutefois les modèles de langage capables d’identifier automatiquement des vulnérabilités pourraient bouleverser cet équilibre fragile. Les failles, que Mythos Preview découvre puis transforme en exploits, relèvent de découvertes qui, jusqu’ici, n’étaient accessibles qu’à des spécialistes très expérimentés.

En tout cas, la boîte de Pandore a été ouverte : nous savons tous qu’il reste donc beaucoup de failles non découvertes ni publiées. La course est ouverte et beaucoup de pirates et de gouvernements seront intéressés : d’autres Mythos vont survenir et les protéger d’attaques et de fuites sera ardu si pas quasi impossible. A suivre.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Faut-il vraiment craindre Mythos, l’IA capable de détecter et d’exploiter des failles de cybersécurité ? – https://theconversation.com/faut-il-vraiment-craindre-mythos-lia-capable-de-detecter-et-dexploiter-des-failles-de-cybersecurite-281945

Who gets credit for research? How the hidden rules of academic authorship can leave women at a disadvantage

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mary M. Hausfeld, Assistant Professor in Management, University of Limerick

Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

Scientific discoveries rarely happen alone. Modern research often involves teams spanning institutions and even countries. Yet when research is published in academic journals, credit is reduced to a list of names – a list that can shape careers.

Authorship is a key signal of expertise. It influences hiring, promotion, and funding decisions. Despite this importance, the process for determining authorship is often far from transparent.

In principle, authorship should reflect intellectual contributions. In practice, decisions about who becomes an author and whose name appears in the most prized position – often first or last – are negotiated within research teams. My research with colleagues has found that women report more negative experiences around authorship decisions.

Norms vary widely across disciplines, and unclear standards combined with power dynamics can create problems, especially for women researchers.

One of these is ghost authorship: when researchers who meaningfully contribute do not receive authorship. Another is gift authorship: when individuals who do not meaningfully contribute are included as authors.

Deciding who gets credit for a research project is complicated, even when everyone has positive intentions. These collaborations can span years, and individual roles often shift over time. Students graduate, researchers move institutions and projects evolve. As a result, authorship decisions are often shaped not just by contributions, but by a set of informal or “hidden” rules that are rarely made explicit.

These hidden rules can include power dynamics between senior and junior researchers. Junior researchers, such as PhD students and postdocs, often depend on supervisors for funding and future opportunities. This can make it difficult to raise concerns about authorship.

Younger and older man working at table
Power dynamics can affect authorship.
BearFotos/Shutterstock

The standards for determining contributions may be ambiguous. While there’s recently been more discussion about the different ways someone can contribute to a project, authors may disagree about which contributions matter most. For example, how should writing the paper be weighed against collecting or analysing the data?

Fear of reputational harm could also discourage open discussion about credit. Because researchers are concerned about being labelled “difficult to work with” they may avoid raising concerns about authorship, even when the stakes are high.

Gifts and ghosts

To see how these decisions play out in practice, my collaborators and I surveyed more than 3,500 researchers across 12 countries – one of the largest studies of its kind. We asked researchers about their experiences with disagreement about authorship, comfort discussing authorship in their teams and experiences with problematic authorship practices.

We found that questionable authorship practices are remarkably common. In our study, 68% of researchers observed gift authorship, and 55% of researchers observed ghost authorship.

While experiences of authorship were similar across researchers in the natural sciences and social sciences, another pattern emerged. Women researchers reported experiencing more problematic authorship practices in collaborations. They encountered more disagreements over authorship decisions and felt less comfortable raising authorship concerns.

This is especially concerning given what researchers call the “leaky pipeline” in academia – where women are more likely to leave the field or are less likely to progress to senior positions over time. These patterns suggest that the hidden rules of authorship affect women and men differently.

Why it matters

These numbers aren’t just statistics. They represent missed opportunities, strained collaborations and careers quietly knocked off course. Authorship plays a central role in research careers, and even small differences in recognition can accumulate over time. When credit is uneven, opportunities become uneven. This shapes who stays in academia and whose ideas define a field. Over time, this may also push talented researchers away from academic careers or worsen existing inequalities like the leaky pipeline.

Universities rely on collaborative environments that are not only productive, but also fair. Addressing issues with authorship and its hidden rules is essential to continue moving toward better science.

In a separate study of US PhD-granting universities, my colleagues and I found that fewer than 25% had publicly available authorship policies. Even when policies did exist, they rarely offered guidance on how to handle concerns or resolve conflicts. Clearer institutional guidance and accessible dispute resolution procedures would provide researchers with a framework to more effectively navigate authorship.

In addition, authorship training can encourage earlier and more open conversations about authorship within research teams, particularly for junior researchers who may feel less comfortable raising these issues. Promoting more transparent documentation of individual contributions can help ensure that authorship reflects the work that was actually done, even as roles evolve over the course of a project. Training would clearly benefit early-career scholars, but would also be important for more senior academics who supervise doctoral students and help shape research norms.

When authorship is transparent and openly discussed, it can empower stronger research teams, more equitable career progression and greater trust in the scientific process. Science is a team effort, and our systems for giving credit should reflect that reality.

The Conversation

Mary M. Hausfeld does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Who gets credit for research? How the hidden rules of academic authorship can leave women at a disadvantage – https://theconversation.com/who-gets-credit-for-research-how-the-hidden-rules-of-academic-authorship-can-leave-women-at-a-disadvantage-281384

Ousting Keir Starmer is harder than it looks – party rules mean he can choose to keep fighting

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nicholas Dickinson, Lecturer in Politics, University of Exeter

Between 2016 and 2024 the UK saw four changes of prime minister by way of a party leadership contest. In that time, even casual observers became familiar with the dramatic process that the Conservative Party uses to topple one leader and select another. Secret letters to the 1922 Committee, the dramatic confidence votes, and then two selected in a dog-eat-dog process to face the final vote by members.

What may be about to happen in the Labour Party will be different in important respects. If the Conservative Party is historically a body with its head in parliament and limbs extended into the country, Labour is more like a mountain with only its peak protruding into the parliamentary arena.

Even today, Labour has a deep institutional culture and a set of rules that anchor the legitimacy of the leader in the broader party membership as much as in parliament. In the past, Labour’s systems for selecting its leader were as complex as the structure of the party itself. Rules were repeatedly redrawn in factional conflicts between activists, trade unions and the party in parliament.

The modern process is simpler but still presents challenges to anyone tempted to climb the greasy pole. The Conservative process can be neatly separated into two phases: removing the current leader and then electing a new one. For Labour it is different, and depends crucially on what a sitting leader decides to do – resign or stand up to the challenge.

Both processes require a portion of the parliamentary party to demand new leadership – though the bar is higher for Labour at 20% of MPs versus 15% for the Tories. Labour raised this from 10% to 20% in 2021 – specifically to deter challenges.

But from there everything diverges. In the first place, the Labour process requires much more open coordination. The chair of the Conservatives’ 1922 Committee keeps a secret running tally of letters privately sent to express no confidence in the leader. Because of the secrecy, this might even trigger a surprise contest.

On the other hand, Labour challengers need to submit a full list of supporting MPs to the party’s general secretary. Currently this is 81 MPs.

The general secretary and the 1922 chair are also very different institutional figures. While the latter is an MP, seen informally as a sort of “shop steward” representing MPs’ interests in a variety of matters, the general secretary is a party official responsible to the NEC and usually aligned to the leadership.

Another difference is that the Labour process lacks a confidence vote stage. This means a leader cannot be deposed directly in favour of a fresh slate of candidates. Rather, as confirmed by a 2016 court case involving the abortive post-Brexit “coup” against Jeremy Corbyn, the leader is free to run in the contest without requiring their own list of supporters.

As such, if a leader opts not to resign, the fight will be longer and harder than the one Conservative MPs face in the same position. While some recent Conservative contests were more protracted, Liz Truss was replaced in just four days. Labour rules simply do not allow for this speed.

Moreover, while Corbyn survived as leader in the 2016 Labour contest precisely by winning over members in spite of MPs’ opposition, this left lasting scars on the party. It damaged Labour’s credibility, even in the face of an increasingly chaotic Conservative government.

Toppling a prime minister

Of course, whatever the party rules, the constitution also gets its say. Any leader who is also prime minister must have the support of a majority in the House of Commons and, in practical terms, of their cabinet colleagues.

Boris Johnson survived the party process but was brought down by the constitutional one, with a little help from Rishi Sunak. The then-chancellor set off a chain of resignations that ultimately made the PM’s position untenable. That may also be what happens to Starmer if the Labour internal process similarly fails to bring him down.

Even if Starmer resigns or opts not to run in a contest, the difficulties do not end there. While the Conservatives whittle down the candidates to only two through sequential MP-only votes, Labour allows any MP with the support of 20% of the parliamentary party to face the membership vote.

The higher threshold, not to mention greater desire for unity in the party right now, will probably lead to fewer candidates than the contests in 2015 or 2020. But it still points to a process that can play out as a protracted multi-faction fight rather than a clean and (relatively) brief succession.

The voting system is one member, one vote. So every eligible member’s vote carries the same weight – from a cabinet minister or a union baron to a local activist. It is also preferential, providing more overall legitimacy to the winner who must secure more than 50% of the vote after second preferences are taken into account.

It is also a complex process where the winner may not have won more first-preference votes than the other candidates combined. If this happens, the result could be a leader who commands broad acceptance – but little fierce loyalty.

The Conversation

Nicholas Dickinson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Ousting Keir Starmer is harder than it looks – party rules mean he can choose to keep fighting – https://theconversation.com/ousting-keir-starmer-is-harder-than-it-looks-party-rules-mean-he-can-choose-to-keep-fighting-282683

Amazon is making drone deliveries in the UK – here’s why nimbyism could hamper a wider rollout

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Cureton, Senior Lecturer in Design (People, Places, Products), Lancaster University

Amazon’s MK30 drone is now being used to deliver packages in Darlington, County Durham. Photograph: Amazon Prime Air

There is a new buzz around Darlington: the sound of delivery drones. This northern English town is now the only place outside the US where retail giant Amazon offers airborne delivery to people’s homes via its Prime Air company.

Customers living within 7.5 miles of Amazon’s Darlington fulfilment centre can select a drone delivery for everyday items (not including batteries) weighing less than 5lb. They also need a suitable dropping off point (literally) – a garden, terrace or yard into which parcels can be dropped safely from a height of around 12 feet.

Prior to dropping any parcel, Amazon’s MK30 drones sense for potential obstacles, from people to washing lines and pets. When the technology was first tested in the town in January, Prime Air’s vice-president David Carbon stressed that safety was a “top priority” for the company.

Darlington’s geography makes it an interesting site for Amazon’s new service. This large market town’s mix of residential areas, green spaces and major roads supports the gathering of valuable data on drone activity in a range of conditions.

Prime Air is expected to conduct up to ten delivery flights an hour during daylight, given favourable weather conditions. In the US, it has been running these services since 2022, and is currently in nine cities across five states.

The company has permission to conduct “beyond visual line of sight” (Bvlos) drone operations until June 18 – with an extension likely. The drones can fly autonomously but are not allowed in airspace near Teesside International Airport.

To date, the local authority has only permitted Amazon to build a temporary structure with one launchpad, while highlighting a lack of evidence about how drone noise will affect local residents. This caution is indicative of widespread public concerns that need addressing if airborne delivery is to become a regular part of modern life.

Video: Mark 1333/BBC.

Public concerns

In Darlington, some residents have raised worries about noise, privacy and theft over the new drone delivery service.

Similarly, UK-wide research by the Future Flight Social Insight team has identified a range of public concerns around privacy (what data are drones gathering?), safety (risks of damage to people and property) and drone noise, which can be seen as high-pitched and “annoying”.

The team’s surveys show that people often regard drones as more beneficial in remote and rural areas than urban and suburban spaces.

Concerns have been raised during other trials around the world. In the Irish capital Dublin, Manna’s delivery drone operations have been live for nearly two years. However, they have faced considerable grassroots opposition from Drone Action D15, a community group that has labelled them “chaos in the skies”.

In Australia, Wing’s delivery drone trials in the capital, Canberra, were halted following pushback from the Bonython Against Drones community group.

The UK government has developed a roadmap for the introduction of routine delivery drone operations by 2027, supported by millions of pounds of investments. Such ambitious projects require coordinated planning by local authorities, including integration of physical infrastructure such as masts

One high-profile example is Project Skyway, a proposal for a drone superhighway connecting 165 miles of airspace above six English towns and cities – Reading, Oxford, Milton Keynes, Cambridge, Coventry and Rugby – to enable a range of drone-related applications.

The project’s future was put in doubt, however, when its lead company Altitude Angel went into administration in October 2025. The administrators still appear to be seeking a buyer for that company.

Drone nimbyism

Without careful consultation, the future of drones may be affected by “drone nimbyism”, whereby residents oppose drones in their local area while being open to their introduction in general.

As Daniel Slade, head of practice and research at the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), explained to us: “Experience tells us that if communities feel decisions are happening to them, rather than being made with them, the backlash could result in widely beneficial development not going ahead at all.”

Locations for drone launch and landing pads need to be carefully selected, considering environmental and wildlife factors as well as noise. The implications of where drones are routed and which residents will be most affected must be carefully assessed.

This comes at a time when local planning departments face consistent under-investment, while grappling with high housing delivery targets and the challenge of new AI technologies.

Some local authorities in England are already using drones for core service delivery, but experience varies considerably across the UK. Governments and local authorities need to get the planning right, or face the issue of drone nimbyism.

With this in mind, we’re working with the RTPI to develop guidance for planners on the introduction of drones for delivery and other purposes. Trials such as Amazon’s in Darlington prompt timely questions about the roles and responsibilities of local authorities amid the UK’s aspiration to scale up drone services.

“It’s startling how quickly drones will become a regular sight in UK skies,” Slade told us. “They could bring huge economic and social benefits – but there will also be costs. Planners have a unique role in maximising the former, minimising the latter, and distributing both fairly.”

The Conversation

Paul Cureton receives funding from the British Academy (Small Research Grants) for the project ‘Future drone skies: Planning in volume’ (SRG25/250332).

Anna Jackman receives funding from the British Academy (Small Research Grants) for the project ‘Future drone skies: Planning in volume’ (SRG25/250332).

ref. Amazon is making drone deliveries in the UK – here’s why nimbyism could hamper a wider rollout – https://theconversation.com/amazon-is-making-drone-deliveries-in-the-uk-heres-why-nimbyism-could-hamper-a-wider-rollout-282635

The Welsh Conservatives survived the Senedd election – now they must decide what they stand for

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Lewis Norton, PhD Candidate at Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University

The 2026 Senedd (Welsh parliament) election has transformed Welsh politics. Much of the attention has focused on the rise of Plaid Cymru and Reform UK, and on Welsh Labour’s dramatic losses. But another political story has unfolded more quietly in the background.

The Welsh Conservatives achieved 10.7% of the vote, giving them seven seats in the expanded 96-member Senedd. In the 2021 Senedd election, the party won 16 seats out of a possible 60.

On paper, that is a poor result for a party that once aspired to lead the Welsh government. But given the political circumstances facing the Conservatives in Wales, there are reasons why the party may regard the outcome as better than many had feared – and why their attention may now turn to where they stand on Welsh devolution.

To understand this, it is important to view Conservative politics in Wales through a different lens from the rest of the UK. At Westminster level, the Conservatives have historically been one of the UK’s most successful electoral machines. In Wales, however, the party has long struggled to build broad national support.

The Conservatives have not won a general election in Wales since 1859. That was before most working-class men even had the right to vote. It has also never been the largest party in a Welsh election since devolution began in 1999.

The Conservatives have usually done best among voters who identify as British rather than Welsh. The party has also struggled to persuade many supporters to vote in Senedd elections.

A chart showing the differences between how different parties view devolution.
How the support for Welsh devolution varied between parties from a poll in 2024.
Dylan Difford/YouGov, CC BY-NC

Despite these long-term difficulties, the Welsh Conservatives have maintained a significant presence in Welsh politics for much of the devolution era. Since 2011, they have usually served as the largest opposition party in the Senedd. The 2021 election handed them their strongest result to date.

Those historical factors made the mood before this election particularly bleak for the party. After the Conservatives’ heavy defeats across Britain in recent years, many commentators expected the Welsh branch to suffer a heavy defeat of its own.

One poll projected the party to achieve a vote share of 7%, winning just one seat. That would have left leader Darren Millar as the Conservatives’ lone representative.




Read more:
Elections 2026: Experts react to the Reform surge and Labour losses


Reform UK’s rise intensified those fears. Reform appeals to many of the same voters as the Conservatives, particularly older, socially conservative and strongly unionist voters. Its rise to become the Senedd’s official opposition appears to have come largely at the Conservatives’ expense. Before the election, the party suffered numerous defections at both public-facing and backroom levels.

Reform performed especially strongly in areas that had traditionally been among the Conservatives’ better-performing parts of Wales, including north-east Wales, Monmouthshire and Newport.

Against that backdrop, seven seats was not the catastrophe many predicted. It is far from where the party wants to be, but it avoided the near-erasure that some had predicted.

Next steps

With the election over, and enough members returned to form an official Senedd group, the Conservatives now face a different question: what comes next?

There is, realistically, no immediate route into government. Reform, the Conservatives’ only realistic coalition partner, did not win enough seats to make such an arrangement viable.

Instead, it will need to settle for spending the coming years as a smaller opposition force, struggling to shape the direction of either a Plaid Cymru minority administration or a broader coalition government.

But there are historical parallels that may offer Conservatives some encouragement. Following the 1997 UK general election, the Conservatives were wiped out entirely in Wales at Westminster. The creation of the then National Assembly for Wales two years later, using a more proportional voting system, gave the party a political foothold from which it slowly rebuilt.

Under the leadership of Nick Bourne, the Welsh Conservatives spent much of the following decade trying to present themselves as a distinctly Welsh conservative party that accepted devolution rather than resisted it.

In some respects, the party finds itself in a similar position today. Since the 2024 general election, the Conservatives have again had no Welsh MPs at Westminster, while retaining only a relatively small but workable group in the Senedd.

Once again, the party faces difficult questions about its identity, purpose and relationship with Welsh devolution. This time, however, it must answer them while competing with a larger and more electorally threatening party to its right.




Read more:
After more than a century, Labour has lost Wales


That debate over devolution is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Before the election, the party had already been wrestling internally with arguments over whether it should continue supporting the Senedd in its current form.

Leader Darren Millar insisted that abolishing the Senedd was off the table. But many Conservative voters in Wales still want the institution abolished or its powers reduced. After such a disappointing election result, some within the party may conclude that adopting a more anti-devolution position is necessary if the Conservatives are to recover electoral support.

The danger, however, is that moving in that direction would reverse much of the “Welshification” strategy that previously helped the party establish itself as a credible force in Welsh politics.

Whichever path the Welsh Conservatives choose, the consequences are likely to shape not only the party’s future, but also the wider direction of Welsh politics in the years ahead.

The Conversation

Lewis Norton receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. He is a member of the Conservative Party, and stood as the party’s sixth-place candidate in the Fflint Wrecsam constituency in the 2026 Senedd election.

ref. The Welsh Conservatives survived the Senedd election – now they must decide what they stand for – https://theconversation.com/the-welsh-conservatives-survived-the-senedd-election-now-they-must-decide-what-they-stand-for-281091

How big oil companies can slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Susan Ann Samuel, Postdoctoral Researcher, International Climate Politics, University of Leeds

Pakhnyushchy/Shutterstock

The UN’s climate summit in Brazil did not produce a fossil fuel roadmap last November, as had been expected. Now the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed the fragility of global dependence on fossil fuels.

The push and pull of nations with respect to coal, oil and gas was once again in the limelight during the first Conference for the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia. Representatives from more than 50 countries gathered to explore possible ways to accelerate the fossil fuel phaseout.

In Santa Marta, one solution stood out — the need to eliminate a process known as the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).




Read more:
‘Much-needed fresh air’: 5 outcomes from the world’s first summit on ending fossil fuels


Simply put, this rule lets big oil companies sue sovereign states and demand exorbitant amounts of money if they are prohibited from digging up fossil fuels. In 2022, the UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, documented ISDS as one major challenge for fossil fuel phaseout.

In 2025, the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion clarified that states must phase out fossil fuels. Yet thousands of investment treaties still contain ISDS provisions that let fossil fuel industries sue governments for doing exactly that. For instance, one fossil fuel company sued the Dutch government for committing to phasing out coal by 2030. Another sued the Italian government for banning fossil fuel exploration.

As a result of tribunals, fossil fuel companies have been paid over US$87 billion (£64 billion) by countries since 1998. As of December 31 2025, a total of 1,463 ISDS cases had been initiated – of which more than 30% involve environmental issues.

Many of these cases challenge fossil fuel phaseouts. Despite this, transparency remains limited, with 54% of fossil fuel ISDS cases being kept confidential.




Read more:
How young people have taken climate justice to the world’s international courts


woman in green dress chats to other people sat in chairs in a circle
Environmental lawyer Mariana Campos Vega (centre) of World’s Youth for Climate Justice briefs legal nuances to colleagues at Santa Marta.
Mariana Campos Vega, CC BY-NC-ND

Young people have been particularly vocal about the need to stop ISDS. But although the call to go ISDS-free has resonated at annual climate conferences before, Santa Marta is the first diplomatic space that has sought a coordinated political agenda to abolish ISDS altogether.

During the conference, more than 340 organisations called for ISDS elimination. A ministerial meeting discussed binding treaty provisions that will discuss the legal risks of ISDS. Host country Colombia committed to exit the ISDS system. That decision is part of a growing trend — other countries to have withdrawn include Brazil, South Africa, India, Indonesia, Ecuador, Bolivia, the UK and several European countries.




Read more:
Here’s what to expect from the first Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels


The puzzle for international lawyers

For young international lawyers like us, this presents a challenging conundrum. While one body of international law requires governments to phase out fossil fuels (something we campaign for), another punishes governments for trying.

This instils fear about taking positive climate action – a so-called regulatory chill. With the priorities of governments and the fossil fuel industry constantly clashing, a political tug-of-war develops.

The UN’s Commission on International Trade Law (Uncitral) has been working to reform ISDS rather than dismantle it since 2017. In contrast, nations attending the conference at Santa Marta made a call for freeing states from ISDS rather than reforming it.

This dichotomy highlights the broken nature of the ISDS reforms still being pursued by nations at the Uncitral. Future discussions need to focus on finding common ground to avoid losing more than eight years of momentum built at Uncitral around ISDS reforms and to avoid compromising progress towards the green transition.

Big oil companies slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels. But governments are partly responsible too. They decide whether treaties that permit ISDS mechanisms need to be reformed, eliminated or substituted by something better.

Political push and pull

When young lawyers, including us, pushed governments to take the climate cause to the International Court of Justice, we were calling for political action and legal clarity. Our resolve remains strong — states must act quickly.

On May 20, the nation of Vanuatu is set to table a resolution to the upcoming UN general assembly, responding to last year’s climate advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The resolution seeks to turn that opinion into action — officially confirming that every country has a legal duty to protect the climate, and that failing to do so is a violation of international law, with real consequences.

Countries need to stop producing harmful greenhouse gas emissions, promise not to extract more fossil fuels, and pay compensation to those they’ve harmed.

Vanuatu’s resolution will ask the UN secretary-general to report back about how countries are progressing by the time of the 82nd UN general assembly, expected in September 2027. This encourages actionable measures for climate justice and is a rare, timely and important opportunity for countries to vote in favour of it.

While the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion set out legal guidance on transitioning away from fossil fuels, Santa Marta has provided political coordination efforts for such transition among willing nations.

Even as ISDS remains a challenge, Vanuatu’s resolution could lead to steps that free the green transition from the current global tug of war — by ensuring legal clarity and political action.

The Conversation

Susan Ann Samuel receives funding from Prof. Viktoria Spaiser’s UKRI FLF Grant MR/V021141/1 and is supported by the University of Leeds – School of Politics and International Studies

Gunjan Soni is affiliated with the World’s Youth for Climate Justice as the Co-lead of the Indian Front.

The Authors thank Mariana Campos Vega and Aditi Shetye of World’s Youth for Climate Justice for their collaboration and for sharing on-the-ground perspectives from the Santa Marta process.

ref. How big oil companies can slow the green transition by suing governments that ban fossil fuels – https://theconversation.com/how-big-oil-companies-can-slow-the-green-transition-by-suing-governments-that-ban-fossil-fuels-281972

Conserving 30% of the planet will only succeed if people are part of the plan

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chris Sandbrook, Professor of Conservation and Society, University of Cambridge

Masai herders in Kenya. JWCohen/Shutterstock

What do you see when you imagine a conservation area? Perhaps a remote rainforest, a towering mountain range or a coral reef teeming with life. But do you expect to see any people?

It would be understandable if you answered no. Most media coverage of nature ignores people. Many protected and conserved areas to date are classified as “high and far” – in places with rich biodiversity and relatively few people. Many actively exclude human presence.

Yet, people are central to conservation. Humans live with and use biodiversity almost everywhere on Earth. This relationship is becoming more important, as we’ve demonstrated in a new paper.

In 2022, 196 countries agreed to an ambitious UN target to conserve 30% of the planet by 2030. This so-called “30×30 target” will nearly double the global coverage of protected and conserved areas. Conservation will extend into areas of land and sea that are more inhabited and used by people than ever before.

This raises important questions about the social context at new conservation sites: how many people live there, how well off they are and how they make a living from the land. This information is crucial for understanding how people might be affected by 30×30 and implementing it successfully. However, very little has been known about these social dimensions of 30×30. Until now.

Our new study, published in Nature Communications, analysed three different ways to reach the 30% coverage globally, reflecting different conservation priorities. Together with a diverse international group of practitioners and researchers from multiple disciplines (including conservation science and political ecology), we found big differences in the social conditions between 30×30 scenarios.

In terms of population, an approach targeting the areas with highest unprotected biodiversity would directly affect over 3.5 billion people who live in or within 10km (6 miles) of new conservation areas. This represents 46% of the global population.

In stark contrast, an approach targeting biodiverse lands managed by Indigenous peoples and local communities would directly affect only around 300 million people. That might sound preferable. However, many of these people live in areas with lower levels of development and rely on nature for their livelihoods, making them particularly vulnerable to changes in access to nature.

The 30×30 target also intersects with global food production. In some approaches we analysed, around half of the areas identified for conservation overlap with farmland used for crop production. In others, large areas overlap with livestock grazing areas, including where people practice traditional herding. This raises questions about how to balance conservation with growing demand for food.

lush green fields and mountains with clouds
Small-scale agriculture within the crater of Pululahua volcano in the Pululahua geobotanical reserve, Ecuador.
Javier Fajardo, CC BY-NC-ND

Our results demonstrate that wherever it happens, the 30×30 target will have profound social as well as ecological implications. Implementation will play a critical role in determining what these are for people and nature.

A whole menu of management and governance options is available, from strict government national parks (such as the iconic Serengeti or Yellowstone) to locally owned and managed areas where people live and use nature sustainably. The 30×30 target also includes places that are not formally protected areas but where existing ways of managing land and sea support conservation.

Choices at each site shape the social outcomes of conservation areas. These can be positive, negative or mixed. At the local level, these areas can support livelihoods and provide employment, while global benefits can include support for food systems and regulating Earth’s climate.

They may also be social costs, such as restricted access to land and resources, heightened conflict with wild animals or eviction from ancestral homelands. A critical challenge for 30×30 will be making sure that the choice of conservation area is appropriate for the social context in which it is being implemented – decisions that can be informed by the results of our study.

small traditional kayak on calm lake, grey sky
Children canoeing on Limoncocha lagoon, Limoncocha Biological Reserve, Ecuador.
Javier Fajardo, CC BY-NC-ND

The good news

The wording of the 30×30 target is not just about biodiversity and spatial coverage. It also includes important social elements. The target calls for the rights and territories of Indigenous peoples and local communities to be respected and supports sustainable use of biodiversity, where appropriate. If fully achieved, this target should deliver significant benefits for local people and nature.

The 30×30 target is not just about conserving biodiversity. Our results suggest it should also be recognised as a highly ambitious social development target. This requires a shift in thinking and significant new funding for social programmes alongside traditional conservation activity.

The 30×30 target could be a big step forward for both conservation and society, but only if people are part of the plan.

The Conversation

Chris Sandbrook received funding for the research on which this article is based from the Science for Nature and People Partnership.

Javier received funding for the research on which this article is based from the Science for Nature and People Partnership, and ERC CONDJUST project.

ref. Conserving 30% of the planet will only succeed if people are part of the plan – https://theconversation.com/conserving-30-of-the-planet-will-only-succeed-if-people-are-part-of-the-plan-278629

Andy Burnham’s big challenge: the route to succeeding Starmer is littered with obstacles

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eric Shaw, Honorary Research Fellow in Politics, University of Stirling

The polls indicate that of all the candidates vying to succeed Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the most popular is Andy Burnham. But before the current mayor of Greater Manchester can even throw his hat into the ring, there are a series of hurdles he has to overcome.

For a start, a leadership contender has to be an MP. Labour’s rules state that before a candidate can be selected, their candidature must be approved by the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC).

But only in January, a committee of the NEC voted to block Burnham from standing at the by-election for Gorton and Denton by eight votes to one. The reason given was that Burnham’s candidature would force a by-election for the mayoralty.

This, it was argued, would be both costly for the party and would run the risk of Labour losing to Reform or the Greens. But in truth, the key factor was the determination of the pro-Starmer majority to head off a Burnham challenge to the prime minister.

So could the NEC change its mind? Much depends, firstly, on left-wing trade union leaders, such as the heads of the two largest unions, Unite and Unison (Sharon Graham and Andrea Egan). Would they put enough pressure on NEC union representatives – a third of the total – to force a reversal of the earlier decision?

And second, a lot also rests on whether the NEC is prepared to provoke the wrath of many members by blocking Burnham. This could, after all, be considered a misuse of its powers.

Assuming that Burnham is approved, he then has to persuade an accommodating Labour MP to resign his or her seat so that he can run in a by-election. The MP realistically would have to hold a seat in Greater Manchester, Merseyside or south Lancashire.

Burnham is a popular mayor in Greater Manchester, and is also a Liverpool-born Everton fan. Not least, he has been a high-profile supporter of those who campaigned for justice for the 97 Liverpool FC fans who died after a crush at Hillsborough stadium in 1989.

Rumours have abounded that unnamed MPs are willing to resign their seats to make way – but nothing has been confirmed. Others have talked down the rumours.

If a vacancy arises, Burnham would have to be selected by Labour party members in the constituency. This can never be assured, but it seems like the easiest of the hurdles to jump since such data as exists suggests that he is popular among the rank and file.

A messy and unpleasant election

However, the original idea was that the seat made available for Burnham would be a safe Labour one. But are there any safe Labour seats left? The May elections revealed major encroachments by Reform and, to a lesser extent, the Greens into Labour territory.

In short, even if selected to contest the seat, Burnham will have a fight on his hands from both the left and the right.

But say he is elected, he would then have to win the nomination of 80 Labour MPs. Of his potential rivals, Angela Rayner and Ed Miliband share his position on the soft left of the party (as opposed to the Corbynite “hard left” and the right, or “centrists”).

It seems likely that they would prefer not to stand against each other. A solid guess is that Rayner and Miliband would give way and rally behind Burnham, in which case he would have no difficulty securing the 81 nominations required.

Let’s assume Burnham get this far, takes the plunge and with the nomination in hand precipitates a leadership contest. What will Starmer do then? As I and others have noted, he is a determined and stubborn man – and has said that he will fight any challenges.

Could Starmer be persuaded to go gracefully, perhaps because of cabinet threats of mass resignations or by the Labour equivalent of the Tory “men in grey suits”? Or will he be tempted to appeal to the natural loyalty of party members? Unlike the Tories, Labour has no taste for regicide and no Labour PM has ever been forced from office. If Starmer stands, it could be a messy and very unpleasant election.

Such are the hurdles, but Burnham has some factors working in his favour. In contrast to the PM, he has a friendly and convivial image. He also achieves higher approval ratings than any other Labour figure. He is widely seen as an effective mayor and has gained in stature and political weight after winning three successive terms. With his background as a cabinet minister, he could certainly claim to have the relevant experience.

The commentary has so far focused on the attitudes of Labour MPs. Though their nominations are required, the outcome of any contest will be decided not by them but by party members.

Labour’s “soft left”, the group with which Burnham is aligned, is almost certainly the largest in the current party. It is difficult to see either health secretary Wes Streeting or anyone else on the right of the party defeating Burnham: something that will certainly play on the minds of MPs wondering whether to back him – and with an eye on their own careers.

So Burnham’s route to Downing Street is strewn with obstacles. Even if he navigates them all, there is no guarantee he can revive Labour’s fortunes. But he has the credentials to give the party a fighting chance.

The Conversation

Eric Shaw is a member of the Labour party

ref. Andy Burnham’s big challenge: the route to succeeding Starmer is littered with obstacles – https://theconversation.com/andy-burnhams-big-challenge-the-route-to-succeeding-starmer-is-littered-with-obstacles-282664

La « gêne » du passeport, au-delà de l’administration Trump

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Speranta Dumitru, Maitre de Conférences, Université Paris Cité

Passeport en édition limitée à l’effigie de Donald Trump, intitulé « passeport patriotique » par la Maison-Blanche. Capture d’écran Maison-Blanche/X

Le passeport à l’effigie de Donald Trump génère des protestations. Leur intensité est, toutefois, moindre que la colère suscitée, après 1918, par le maintien du passeport lui-même, qui avait été rendu obligatoire durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, la presse en réclamait la suppression, le jugeant coûteux, vexatoire et liberticide. Un siècle plus tard, la contrainte du passeport est normalisée.


La Maison-Blanche a récemment annoncé qu’une édition limitée de passeports états-uniens à l’effigie du président serait fabriquée dans le cadre des célébrations du 250e anniversaire des États-Unis. Ces passeports, qui comporteront une image de Donald Trump accompagnée de sa signature à l’encre dorée, et dont le nombre exact n’a pas été rendu public, ne seront disponibles que pour les citoyens qui en feront la demande dans la ville de Washington.

Cette décision a immédiatement suscité de vives critiques : certains adversaires y voient une manifestation de culte de la personnalité qu’aucun autocrate n’avait jamais osée.

Le « passeport Trump » est-il « gênant » ? Le verbe « gêner » a deux significations : embarrasser, et limiter la liberté. Les détracteurs de cette initiative se sentent gênés surtout dans le premier sens : ils ont honte de voir leur président profiter de l’anniversaire de l’indépendance du pays pour se mettre en avant. Mais la seconde signification, celle liée à la restriction de la liberté de circulation, est bien plus durable : depuis plus d’un siècle, devoir obtenir un passeport pour pouvoir voyager gêne considérablement les gens, partout dans le monde.

Le régime des passeports obligatoires

Nos arrière-grands-parents ont affublé le passeport de tous les noms : une « gêne », une « vexation », une « nuisance ». Le régime des passeports obligatoires, tel qu’on le connaît aujourd’hui, avait été introduit durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Les pays belligérants, tels que la France ou le Royaume-Uni, l’instaurent dès le début des hostilités, en août 1914. Initialement, la justification est de pouvoir contrôler les ressortissants des puissances ennemies. Mais pour contrôler efficacement les étrangers, il est nécessaire de surveiller l’ensemble de la population.

C’est ainsi que l’obligation des passeports s’avère doublement contagieuse : non seulement elle s’étend, dans les pays belligérants, des étrangers aux citoyens, mais elle se diffuse aussi des pays belligérants vers les pays neutres. Pour permettre à leurs citoyens de voyager, tous les pays se voient contraints d’organiser la délivrance des passeports. Prenons l’exemple des États-Unis. Dès le 1er août 1914, le Département d’État demande à ses ambassades en Europe de délivrer des documents aux citoyens états-uniens qui s’y trouvent sans passeport. Alors que dès 1916 les compagnies de transport refusent d’embarquer des passagers ne disposant pas de passeport, le premier fondement légal pour contrôler l’entrée et la sortie des citoyens et des étrangers aux États-Unis n’apparaît qu’en 1918, un peu avant la fin de la guerre.

Personne n’imagine que l’obligation du passeport perdure après la fin du conflit mondial. Au moment de l’armistice, on espère revenir au régime de circulation d’avant-guerre. La Société des Nations (ancêtre de l’ONU) cherche à répondre — sans succès — à la demande de suppression ou d’abolition des passeports. Comme certains gouvernements temporisent, la Société des Nations propose la simplification du passage des frontières, en demandant aux pays d’adopter un modèle uniforme de passeport — celui que nous connaissons aujourd’hui.

Tout passeport est une « gêne »

Dès 1918, la presse se fait l’écho de l’impatience du public. En France, des centaines de journaux mentionnent l’abolition des passeports : ils l’annoncent prochaine… durant toute la période de l’entre-deux-guerres.

Quelques titres d’articles illustrent la persistance de cette attente, bien qu’elle diminue vers la fin des années 1930 : « À bas l’odieux passeport » (L’Humanité, 21 décembre 1921) ; « L’absurde formalité » (Le Figaro, 19 mai 1923) ; « Supprimons les passeports » (La Volonté, 17 janvier 1928) ; « Le passeport est une gêne pour les honnêtes gens » (Le Quotidien, 3 octobre 1929) ; « La mort du passeport » (Le Soir, 14 avril 1931) ; « Il faut qu’on supprime les passeports » (La Gazette de Biarritz-Bayonne et Saint-Jean-de-Luz, 11 juillet 1933).

On pourrait penser que la bataille est menée par les journaux de gauche. Dans ma recherche, j’ai analysé plus de 700 articles qui mentionnent l’abolition des passeports dans la presse française de l’entre-deux-guerres. Ma conclusion est que la majorité des abolitionnistes ne sont pas de gauche, mais de droite et de centre droit. Au Figaro, par exemple, le passeport est vu comme « l’exigence administrative la plus insupportable pour les Français » car « on ne saurait croire quelles démarches, quels ennuis, quelles tracasseries » fait subir aux « honnêtes gens » « toute cette paperasserie » (15 juillet 1921).

Même le journal d’extrême droite L’Action Française ne sabote pas cette « unanimité » et reconnaît que le passeport est une « véritable brimade pour le voyageur ». Pesant « le pour et le contre » de la suppression, il rappelle le 7 septembre 1921 que :

« Dans les États bien organisés, le passeport est une sérieuse garantie contre les espions. Un gouvernement fort et clairvoyant, une bonne police, peuvent s’en faire une arme solide. C’est à eux qu’il appartient de réduire au minimum les ennuis que suscite au public ce parchemin, tout en le conservant si c’est nécessaire. »

Dans tous les journaux, la passion est lisible : on espère que « l’entrave irritante de cette précaution inutile qu’est le passeport ne sera bientôt plus qu’un désagréable souvenir » ou souhaite que « les passeports, survivance inutile, onéreuse et vexatoire du passé, soient désormais supprimés ». L’émotion la plus fréquemment associée aux passeports est la colère : « stupide obligation », « honte de notre époque », « tare bureaucratique », « une des pires incommodités », « une source d’ennui pour qui voyage », « chiffon de papier », « formalité ridicule », « absurde », « humiliante », « brimade », « le passeport est une vaine sottise, un trompe-l’œil, un rien »… Lorsqu’un journal publie un témoignage d’usager, on s’excuse de devoir « supprimer les termes indignés qu’il emploie et les appréciations plutôt dures qu’il y exprime ».

En anglais, la « nuisance » des passeports

La presse ne réagit pas seulement en France. Comme l’a montré l’historien Craig Robertson, aux États-Unis les journaux qualifient la réaction négative du public de « nuisance du passeport » — l’équivalent de la « gêne » et des « vexations » françaises. Comme à Paris, on espère que l’obligation du passeport disparaîtra comme d’autres mesures prises en temps de guerre. On déplore le surcoût des voyages, comme dans cet article du New York Times de 1926 :

« Autrefois, on n’avait pas à se soucier des passeports, à moins de se rendre dans des contrées païennes. Mais la guerre a tout changé. Nous avons fini par imposer des frais de visa de dix dollars, et d’autres pays ont fait de même. Cela a généré des recettes, mais a aussi représenté une lourde charge financière pour les voyageurs. Les plaintes se sont multipliées, et le Congrès a été appelé à trouver une solution. »

Plus que le coût des voyages et la tracasserie administrative, c’est la réduction de la liberté de circulation que les médias déplorent. L’espoir d’un retour au régime de circulation d’avant-1914 survit même après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme l’illustre cet article de 1947 :

« Une triste remarque sur ce progrès à rebours a été énoncée par la Chambre Internationale de commerce : en 1914, un homme d’affaires pouvait décider de se rendre d’une capitale à une autre et effectuer ce trajet en quelques heures seulement. Depuis 1914, les trains ont gagné en vitesse, l’automobile s’est généralisée et l’avion de ligne a fait son apparition. Mais l’homme d’affaires, ou tout autre voyageur, peut être contraint d’attendre des semaines, voire des mois, entre le moment où il prend sa décision et celui où il la met à exécution. La Chambre considère cette situation comme à la fois “absurde et pernicieuse” ».

Ce qui gêne

Il y a un siècle, nos arrière-grands-parents n’acceptaient pas d’attendre trois jours pour un passeport. Les temps ont changé. Aujourd’hui, les journaux nous invitent parfois à nous estimer « chanceux » lorsque l’attente ne dure que quelques mois. Comme ce titre, du même New York Times, “Besoin d’un passeport ? Vous avez de la chance” qui annonçait en 2024 :

« Pour la première fois depuis mars 2020, les délais de traitement sont revenus aux normales pré-pandémiques […] avec six à huit semaines pour le service standard et deux à trois semaines pour le service accéléré. »

Quand la contrainte n’est plus une gêne mais une chance, il nous reste l’embarras.

The Conversation

Speranta Dumitru ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. La « gêne » du passeport, au-delà de l’administration Trump – https://theconversation.com/la-gene-du-passeport-au-dela-de-ladministration-trump-281912

What is driving Europe’s pro-Russian supporters and their stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict?

Source: The Conversation – France – By Filip Kostelka, Professor and Chair in Political and Social Change, European University Institute

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sparked the most significant military conflict in Europe’s post-Second World War history. While European public opinion is overwhelmingly pro-Ukrainian, significant segments of Europe’s population hold ambivalent or even outright pro-Russian positions. As public support is key to providing military and financial assistance to Ukraine, we wanted to understand why some Europeans are sympathetic to the aggressor.

Our study considers that pro-Kremlin positions could come from four main sources:

  • Economic interests

  • Ideology

  • Partisan alignment

  • Disinformation

We analysed data from two academic surveys from late 2023, spanning nearly 30,000 respondents and eighteen European countries.

The surveys asked respondents whom they considered responsible for the war and whom they wanted to win. In practice, answers to those two questions are strongly correlated, and vary substantially across countries. For example, support for a Russian victory is virtually absent in Poland, but approaches 20% in Slovakia.

Partisan alignment and disinformation

Our statistical analyses indicate that the strongest predictor of Europeans’ position on the war in Ukraine is the proximity of respondents’ preferred political party to the Kremlin.

The closer a party’s ties, as assessed by academic experts from the CHES project, the more likely its supporters are to favour Russia over Ukraine.

While the data does not allow us to fully determine the underlying mechanism, the results suggest that partisan alignment is the most likely explanation. Those who support Russia do not care too much about the war, but they align with their preferred party’s rhetoric.

The second strongest correlate of Kremlin-aligned narratives is exposure and vulnerability to disinformation.

Pro-Russian views are over-represented among those who consume alternative channels for political news and believe in conspiracy theories. For example, those who mainly consume political news from social media and messaging applications and subscribe to the view that the Covid-19 pandemic was orchestrated by national governments, are 40% less likely to wish for Ukraine’s victory compared to those who consume traditional media and do not believe in conspiracy theories.

The third, though weaker, source of pro-Russian attitudes is ideology: cultural conservatism and authoritarianism.

Respondents who favour strong leaders and question minority rights are more likely to sympathise with the Kremlin. By contrast, economic interests exert little to no effect. Despite fears among analysts that rising energy costs in the aftermath of the invasion could sway public opinion against Ukraine, those who report having suffered during the energy crisis are not more likely to support the Kremlin.

The need to moderate public discourse and combat disinformation

Our results highlight the importance of top-down processes, whereby pro-Russian attitudes primarily reflect signals shared by pro-Kremlin politicians and disinformation spread by alternative sources of political news.

Much of the surprising support for the aggressor does not seem to stem from some ideological affinity or economic interests, but from the information and interpretation that circulates within political systems.

Countering Russia’s influence thus requires assertive moderation of public discourse and robust efforts to combat disinformation. These imperatives contrast with governments’ attitudes in many EU member states.

For example, the current Andrej Babiš’s cabinet in the Czech Republic has renounced any anti-disinformation measures.

In Slovakia, Prime Minister Robert Fico has echoed pro-Russian narratives himself.

These examples highlight a central challenge: efforts to counter disinformation are ultimately constrained by domestic political incentives.

Where political elites amplify or tolerate pro-Kremlin narratives, public attitudes are likely to follow. Strengthening resilience to disinformation ultimately depends on political leadership that is committed to defending the integrity of the information environment.

This article is published on behalf of all the authors of the original study: Filip Kostelka, Martín Alberdi, Max Bradley, Toine Fiselier, Alexandra Jabbour, Nahla Mansour, Eleonora Minaeva, Silvia Porciuleanu, and Diana Rafailova.

The Conversation

Filip Kostelka ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. What is driving Europe’s pro-Russian supporters and their stance on the Russo-Ukrainian conflict? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-driving-europes-pro-russian-supporters-and-their-stance-on-the-russo-ukrainian-conflict-281598