Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Roberta Garrett, Senior Lecturer in Literature and Cultural Studies, University of East London

Emerald Fennell’s film adaptation of Wuthering Heights has been pulling in the crowds recently, which is quite a feat in troubled times for cinema. Published in 1847, Emily Brontë’s tale of psycho-sexual power dynamics is just one of many enduring female-authored 19th century novels exploring female sexuality and desire for autonomy. These characters existed within a system that allowed women few education or career opportunities.

The ever-popular work of canonical British female writers such as Jane Austen, the (other) Brontë sisters and George Eliot were very different in style and tone. But they also draw attention to various forms of gender inequality.

Their novels focused on issues such as inheritance and property laws, the pressure on young women to marry for financial security, the sexual double standard and the lack of career prospects for women. In doing so, they gave voice to the frustrations of an expanding female readership in the 19th century.

The work of these and lesser-known female authors was crucial in shaping and fuelling public debates on what was referred to in the mid-Victorian period as “the woman question” (women’s right to vote). It later became the first-wave feminist movement in the late 19th and early 20th century.

The emergence of two inventive new literary forms in the early 20th century were key. One was modernism and the other the new printed paperback; both were intertwined with the expansion of women’s concerns and desires in the social and cultural sphere.

Modernism saw the burgeoning of experimental female writers such as Virginia Woolf and Jean Rhys in the 1920s. Then came popular genres such as mass market romance and what is now described as “cosy” crime fiction in the 1930s. Women writers and readers were creating spaces in high art and mass culture that centred female experience and domestic and personal life from the beginning of the 20th century.

The second wave

Given the importance of novels and reading to the history of feminist struggle, it is not surprising that second-wave feminism drew heavily on women’s literary heritage. This saw the publication of landmark academic studies of women’s writing such as Elaine Showalter’s A Literature of Their Own (1977), and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Guber’s The Madwoman in the Attic (1979). And with them came the proliferation of university courses on women’s writing.

The 1960s and 1970s also witnessed the birth of polemical feminist bestsellers. This included Germaine Greer’s The Female Eunuch (1970) and “consciousness raising” popular novels, such as The Woman’s Room (1977) by Marilyn French.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a more diverse group of feminist writers came on the scene. Writers like Margaret Atwood, Angela Carter, Alice Walker, Audre Lorde, Toni Morrison, Octavia Butler and Rita Mae Brown, continued to shape and expand the political and cultural scope and influence of women’s writing into queer, black and postmodernist forms.

Bookgroups, BookTok and the feminist novel

In our own era, while men are reading fewer and fewer novels, female writers and readers are keeping the world of fiction alive. Aside from being the major purchasers of fiction, women are far more likely to enhance and socialise their literary interests. Local book groups and online review and recommendation communities such as Booktok are popular spaces for exploring new literature.

They are also the driving force in the creation and consumption of successful new literary cycles. For example, one of the publishing success stories of the last ten years in English language fiction was the female-centred psychological thriller/domestic noir crime novel. This included the likes of Gone Girl (2014), The Girl on the Train (2016), Big Little Lies (2017) and The Housemaid.

As feminist literary critics have pointed out, not only are these novels predominantly written and narrated by women. Through widespread circulation and screen adaptations, they have also continued to bring to light key gender and power issues such as coercive control, domestic violence and the murder of women. At the lighter end of the spectrum, the recent explosion of “romantasy” fiction (a romance-fantasy hybrid) focuses on female desire and pleasure.

The boundary between literary and genre fiction is becoming increasingly blurred. But contemporary female writers such as Rachel Cusk, Bernadine Evaristo, Anna Burns and Eimear McBride continue to produce innovations in style and form. And younger female writers of “rage” and “sad girl” novels like Ottessa Moshfegh, Oyinkan Braithwaite, Rachel Yoder, Raven Leilani and Aria Aber are not afraid to explore edgy and unsettling accounts of women’s experience.

In life-writing, creative non-fiction and autofiction, women’s stories have also proliferated. Post #MeToo bestsellers such as Acts of Desperation (2022) by Meghan Nolan, and Three Women (2020) by Lisa Taddeo, tearing down comfortable myths of equality and exposing the persisting inequalities in women’s personal relationships.

For more than two centuries, women’s writing has not only reflected the constraints of patriarchy but actively challenged and reshaped them. As long as women continue to write, read and reimagine the world through fiction, novel reading will remain a vital site of feminist resistance and possibility.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org; if you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

Roberta Garrett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Female writers and readers have been challenging the patriarchy for more than 200 years – https://theconversation.com/female-writers-and-readers-have-been-challenging-the-patriarchy-for-more-than-200-years-276231

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

The American people are bitterly divided over the conflict in Iran. The US president, Donald Trump, won office in 2024 after campaigning on a message of “no new wars”. So the conflict that began with airstrikes conducted with the Israeli military in the early hours of February 28, and which has quickly spread into the rest of the region, has polarised opinion across the country.

An Economist/YouGov poll completed on March 2 provides early information about what Americans think of the war so far. The poll asked the following question: “Would you support or oppose the US using military force to overthrow the government of Iran?”

There is a great deal of confusion about what the objectives of the war are, since the messaging from Trump, and his senior officials, has veered from preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, to destroying the country’s ballistic missile capability, to regime change.

But, from the point of view of polling, this is as good a question as any for finding out what Americans think. Altogether 32% of them support the war and 45% oppose it.

A divided society

The responses to this question analysed by gender, race, age and education appear in the graph. Those who were uncertain are not included in the totals.
The graph shows that large variations exist among the different groups in relation to their attitudes to the war.

The relationship between attitudes to the war and the
social backgrounds of respondents

The largest differences are in relation to race. Some 37% of white respondents support the war and 44% oppose it. In contrast 7% of black people support it and 60% oppose. Hispanics were in between these two, but rather closer to whites than to blacks.

The was a large gender difference in the responses as well with 37% of men in support but only 26% of women. A marked age difference existed too with only 21% of 18-to-29 year olds supporting and 50% opposed. At the same time some 40% of those over the age of 65 supported the war with 49% opposed. Finally, 34% of those without a college degree were in support compared with 27% with a college degree. Overall, young black women with a college degree were most likely to oppose the war, whereas older white men without a college degree were most in support.

A question of politics

The social backgrounds and attitudes to the war of respondents are interesting, but they are overshadowed by the polarisation of opinion among supporters of the political parties and ideological factions. These appear in the second chart.

The relationship between attitudes to the war and the
political affiliations of respondents

The striking feature of this chart is the difference between respondents who identify with the Democrats and those who identify with the Republicans. Only 8% of Democrats support the war compared with 64% of Republicans. The highest level of support comes from respondents who are Maga (Make American Great Again) supporters. No less that 75% of them support the war and only 10% oppose it.

There is similar polarisation among liberals, which refers to anyone on the left of the ideological spectrum in the US, and conservatives. Only 8% of liberals support the war compared with 66% of conservatives. Moderates are in between the two with 25% of them supporting and 50% opposing the war.

What it could mean for November’s mid-term elections

One theory of elections argues that individuals have a set of well-defined preferences over policies and so they support the party which is closest to them in relation to these policies. In this analysis, policy preferences are summarised by the left-right ideological dimension, or alternatively by the liberal-conservative dimension in politics.

In fact, it appears that in reality the reverse is true with voters choosing a party or leader and then changing their views to fit in with those of their newly adopted party. The 47th US president is an extreme case of this, because he constantly changes his mind. Before he was elected, he promised that the US would not get involved in any more wars in the middle east. It appears that most Republicans and nearly all the Maga supporters are quite willing to go along with the U-turn and agree with anything he does.

This is a big advantage for a president who is so polarising, since it means that he can rely on a body of loyal supporters even when they don’t know the latest policy changes. However, it is a weakness when it comes to elections because the Democrats and Independents together easily outnumber the Republicans and Maga supporters in the electorate.

The Cooperative Election Study, a large-scale survey conducted at the time of the presidential election in 2024 showed that 32% of respondents in their national survey identified with the Democrats, 27% with the Independents and 30% with the Republicans. In short, the Republicans are up against a coalition of Democrats and Independents who make up just under 60% of the voters. Add the factor that many Americans are outraged by the president’s behaviour and you have a winning coalition for the opposition in the mid-term elections.

Whatever happens in the war, Trump is unlikely to recover his popularity for the Republicans not to lose control of the House of Representatives – and possibly the Senate – in the mid-term elections in November.

Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC.

– ref. What Americans think of the war in Iran – https://theconversation.com/what-americans-think-of-the-war-in-iran-277627

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steven David Pickering, Honorary Professor, International Relations, Brunel University of London

Organic food is often presented as a healthier, greener or more ethical choice. But when people decide whether to pay extra for organic milk, eggs or vegetables, something else is going on.

Organic food belongs to a curious category that economists call “credence goods”. These are the products whose key qualities can’t be verified even after you’ve bought them. There’s no way that you can tell by looking at, tasting or cooking a food item whether it was genuinely produced to organic standards. Instead, you have to take it on trust.

That makes buying organic less about what’s on the plate and more about what’s going on in people’s heads.

When people pay more for organic food, they are effectively buying a promise: that production followed certain rules, that certification means something and that the system policing those rules is credible. Whether people are willing to pay that premium depends not just on how much the food costs or how much money they earn. It also depends on how much trust they place in the certification and regulatory system behind the label, and how comfortable they are paying more for something they cannot personally verify.

As part of our ongoing research into trust, we conducted two large surveys with around 1,300 respondents in Britain and 1,500 in Japan. We asked people whether they would be willing to pay more for organic versions of everyday foods such as dairy products, meat, eggs and vegetables.

We also asked a few simple questions about trust (both trust in government and trust in other people) as well as how willing respondents were, in general, to take risks.

We got the same message back from both countries. In both the UK and Japan, people who trusted the government were more willing to pay extra for organic food. This was true regardless of whether the product was milk, eggs or vegetables, and regardless of age, gender, education or political views.

Willingness to take risks mattered too. People who described themselves as more comfortable taking risks were more willing to pay a premium for organic food. Paying more for something you can’t directly verify is, after all, a form of everyday risk taking.

Trust in other people (what social scientists call “generalised trust”) played a slightly different role. It mattered most when organic food was seen as reflecting personal values, such as environmental responsibility or ethical production, rather than having guaranteed quality.

Where Japan and the UK differ

Comparing results from the UK and Japan helps explain why trust plays such a pivotal role in these shopping decisions.

Japan’s organic certification system is centralised and state-led. Organic food is less common, but public trust in the government remains relatively high. In this context, institutional credibility is crucial. If consumers trust the state, they are more likely to trust the organic label it oversees.

In the UK, organic food is more widely available than in Japan, but certification is fragmented across government bodies and private organisations. Here, trust spreads outwards: confidence in other people, social norms and shared values plays a bigger role alongside institutional trust.

In both cases, however, the basic logic is the same. Organic labels work only when the system behind them is trusted. This has important implications at a time when food prices are rising and trust in public institutions is under pressure in many countries.

Promoting organic food is often framed as a matter of better information or clearer labelling. But our findings suggest that even perfect labels won’t persuade consumers if confidence in institutions is weak, or if paying more feels like too much of a gamble.

When trust erodes, ethical consumption becomes harder. This isn’t because people stop caring about sustainability or animal welfare, but because they stop believing the promises attached to higher prices.

Organic food, then, depends on trust. And without that trust, even the most well-intentioned labels will struggle to sell.

Steven David Pickering received funding from the UKRI’s ESRC (grant reference ES/W011913/1).

Yosuke Sunahara receives funding from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS, grant reference JPJSJRP 20211704).

Martin Ejnar Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Choosing to buy organic food depends more on trust than taste – what our new study in the UK and Japan shows – https://theconversation.com/choosing-to-buy-organic-food-depends-more-on-trust-than-taste-what-our-new-study-in-the-uk-and-japan-shows-275163

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Matthew Powell, Teaching Fellow in Strategic and Air Power Studies, University of Portsmouth

The US and Israel have launched a coordinated air campaign in recent days to destroy Iran’s missile capabilities and navy, curb its ability to develop nuclear weapons and eliminate its leadership. The strikes have been accompanied by calls from Donald Trump for the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their government.

In his statement announcing the start of the operation on February 28, Trump said: “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.” It is clear that Trump is hoping US and Israeli air power can weaken the regime in Tehran sufficiently for the Iranian people to finish the job themselves.

This approach has been criticised by some world leaders. British prime minister Keir Starmer, for instance, told MPs on March 2 that his government “does not believe in regime change from the skies”. And, in any case, history offers few examples in which an aerial bombing campaign aimed at enabling regime change has produced positive outcomes.

There are strategic benefits to using air power. It is inherently flexible in how it can be deployed, which allows for the escalation and deescalation of violence with greater ease than is possible with land or naval power. The speed and reach of air power also broadens the range of available military targets, while simultaneously reducing the need to expose troops to risk.

But air power has several limitations. Perhaps the main limitation is that, unlike ground forces, air power is unable to hold and secure territory that would allow for the consolidation of control. This was evident following the Libyan revolution in 2011, where a Nato air campaign supported a rebellion that overthrew the country’s ruler, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

Despite the initial success of the rebellion, Libya soon fell into chaos. Two main competing governments, supported by complex networks of militias, have spent the past decade or so vying for control. This has created a deeply divided, highly fragile state.

This is not to say putting western boots on the ground to help manage a transition would have led to a different outcome. Several years earlier, ground forces were unable to prevent Iraq from descending into civil war after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. But what is clear is that the deployment of air power alone was not sufficient to influence the political direction of Libya once Gaddafi had been removed.

Situation in Iran

The lesson from Libya is that fomenting a revolution when you have little ability to control how events play out on the ground can lead to unfavourable outcomes. This can be applied directly to the current situation in Iran.

As was the case in Libya, it is far from clear what will replace the government in Tehran should it fall. Iran’s opposition is fragmented and disorganised. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last shah, has positioned himself as a possible successor to the current leadership.

But the level of support for him within Iran is unclear. Surveys by the Gamaan group, an organisation that attempts to gauge political sentiment in Iran, suggest roughly one-third of people are strong supporters of Pahlavi and another third strongly oppose him.

With no unified opposition ready and able to enact a provisional government if the regime falls, the result is likely to be a power vacuum. This could possibly result in a civil war that further destabilises the region.

At the same time, there is no guarantee that the US-Israeli air campaign will encourage the Iranian people to topple their country’s leadership. Rounds of protests in recent years have been met with brutal repression by the authorities, with estimates suggesting tens of thousands of protestors were killed during the latest crackdown in January 2025.

It will remain a significant risk to protest against the Iranian regime, regardless of the damage that has been inflicted on the country’s leadership. Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said that “49 of the most senior Iranian regime leaders” had been “wiped off the face of the Earth” in the opening US-Israeli strikes.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which operates parallel to Iran’s regular armed forces, exists solely to support the regime and answers directly to the supreme leader. It has upward of 190,000 troops under its command and is supported by the Basij paramilitary force, which claims it can mobilise around 600,000 volunteers.

Trump has threatened the IRGC and the Basij with certain death unless they lay down their arms. They are unlikely to take notice of these threats. However, if they do, there is effectively no one to accept their surrender – it is impossible to surrender to an aircraft tens of thousands of feet in the sky.

The removal of the regime in Tehran will be wished for by many across the globe. But there is no guarantee an air campaign will lead to its demise, nor is it clear that what follows will be any better. As Libya shows, what could follow the overthrow of the Islamic Republic is instability and chaos – a situation that could create more problems than it solves.

Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran conflict: air campaigns rarely work as intended – they often make matters worse – https://theconversation.com/iran-conflict-air-campaigns-rarely-work-as-intended-they-often-make-matters-worse-277319

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

As the war in the Middle East spreads and intensifies, the one in Ukraine continues. While geographically some 2,500km (1,600 miles) apart, the consequences of US president Donald Trump’s latest military adventure for the Russian war against Ukraine will be acutely felt across several areas. In the short term, the Kremlin will probably feel emboldened to double down on its aggression, but this is unlikely to shift the dial significantly towards Russian victory in the long term.

The targeted killing of Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by a precision US strike would have reminded the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, of his reportedly “apoplectic” reaction to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011. Comments on social media from the likes of far-right Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin, who posted, that “one by one, our allies are being systematically destroyed”, and former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who alleged that the “talks with Iran were just a cover”, are unlikely to have steadied Putin’s nerves.

The Russian leader’s fears about being next after a string of US successes targeting foreign leaders may have been played up somewhat by the western media, but they are not completely unfounded. Putin continues to walk a fine line between paranoia and his outrage over the killing of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, which he condemned in a condolence letter to the Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” but did not mention Trump or the US as the culprits.

Concerns about his own longevity, however, will not be the only things weighing on Putin’s mind and compelling him to double down on his war against Ukraine. The escalation of violence in the Middle East offers Russia several opportunities – at least in the short term.

The sharp rise in oil prices throws Moscow a new lifeline for financing its ongoing war. Not only did prices spike, but the sudden – and probably lasting – inability of Iran to export oil will also have a major impact on China. China bought over 80% of all Iranian oil exports, equivalent to some 13% of China’s oil imports.

China has large stockpiles of oil that will allow it to ride out current inflation. But it is now likely to double down on its energy relationship with Russia.

This will serve both countries well. Russia will deepen its economic ties with China and rebalance the relationship, while China will tap into a reliable supply line that will not be as vulnerable to being choked off as maritime supply routes in a future confrontation with the US.

The closure of the strait of Hormuz and Iranian strikes against oil and gas facilities across the Gulf countries have destabilised global energy markets. This affects 30% of global seaborne oil trade and 20% of all trade in liquefied natural gas.

This offers a market opportunity for Russia and its shadow fleet of tankers, at least in the short term, given that Moscow retains sufficient refining and port capacity, despite a long Ukrainian air campaign against the country’s oil infrastructure.

US diverting arms to Middle East

Another likely benefit for the Kremlin will be disruptions to weapons supplies to Ukraine. While insisting that the US had “virtually unlimited supply” of weapons and munitions, Trump also conceded that there were areas “at the highest end, (where) we have a good supply, but are not where we want to be”.

This is a view echoed within the Pentagon. Defence officials are keen to discuss an acceleration of weapons production with key arms manufacturers.

With large parts of western military support for Ukraine consisting of US weapons paid for by Kyiv’s European allies, US shortages will immediately affect the flow of vital equipment to Ukraine. Even deliveries already agreed could be derailed. In June 2025, during the so-called 12-day war with Iran, the US diverted some 20,000 missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East.

Russia is unlikely to face any similar constraints. On the contrary, a Russian-Iranian deal in late 2022 enabled Moscow to acquire technology from Tehran that allowed the Kremlin to kick-start domestic drone production based on the Iranian Shahed design. Not only has Russia improved the drones, it now also produces them faster and cheaper than Iran ever did.

If western military supplies to Ukraine now dry up even temporarily as a result of an increased focus of the US on the Middle East, Russia’s air superiority and the devastating impact its relentless campaign of missile and drone strikes has had on Ukraine is likely to continue for some time.

At the same time this drives home the point that dependence on the US puts Ukraine and its European allies in an unacceptably precarious position. Ukraine’s own defence industry already meets half of the country’s needs, and the fallout from Iran war will probably further accelerate homegrown military production and innovation across Europe as the traditional US-European alliance frays.

Transatlantic relationships fraying

In the short term, transatlantic decoupling will serve Moscow’s interests more than Kyiv’s. European countries, including the UK, France, and Spain, have been critical of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, earning them the expected rebukes from Trump.

The White House might be too busy to follow through on threats “to cut off all trade” with Spain, but it will equally not put much effort into already fraught mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Given the dismal performance of Trump’s own efforts and those of his negotiation team, as well as the pressure that the US had put on Ukraine rather than Russia to cut a deal, this may not be much of a loss.

But US diplomatic disengagement from the Russian war against Ukraine still poses a problem. The US is the only country with the leverage to bring both sides together and – if Trump were to decide so – achieve a just and sustainable peace agreement.

Ukraine and its European partners may be able to prevent a Russian victory, but it will take some time for them to develop the military and political muscle to force Russia to make meaningful concessions that could pave the way towards a settlement.

If nothing else, Trump’s war of choice in the Middle East will be another factor in prolonging the war against Ukraine. Regardless of its short-term effects, it will not make a Russian victory more likely. But it has thrown the world into additional turmoil for no good reason, and it will delay the much-needed restoration of peace in Europe.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

– ref. What the conflict in Iran means for Putin and Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/what-the-conflict-in-iran-means-for-putin-and-ukraine-277298