From kneecap necklaces to umbilical cord keepsakes: the risks of keeping and consuming human tissue

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Taylor, Professor of Anatomy, Lancaster University

Some parents keep their baby’s umbilical cord as a sentimental keepsake after birth pu_kibun/Shutterstock

Celebrity outfits and endorsements often dominate social media, but Elton John recently drew attention for a very different reason. The musician has been spotted wearing jewellery made from his own kneecaps.

After a double knee replacement in 2024, he asked his surgeon if he could keep his patellae, the bones at the front of the knee, and later worked with jeweller Theo Fennell to turn them into wearable pieces.

While jewellery made from kneecaps is unusual, it raises a broader question: what happens to tissue once it leaves the body, and why do some people want to keep it?

Elton is not alone in wanting to hold on to parts of the body. Many people keep baby teeth or their children’s first lost tooth as sentimental objects. Social media is also full of stories about people preserving removed tonsils, adenoids, an appendix, or a newborn’s umbilical stump. Some of these are biologically inert keepsakes. Others carry medical and safety considerations.

In most cases, tissue removed during surgery is handled very differently. It is usually sent to a laboratory for testing, known as pathology, to confirm a diagnosis or check for disease. After that, it must be disposed of safely as clinical waste because it can carry biological risks. It is now relatively uncommon for patients to keep surgically removed tissue.

Handling human tissue can pose risks, especially for professionals working in operating theatres or pathology labs with unfixed tissue. “Unfixed” means the tissue has not been treated with chemicals to preserve it and kill microbes. Healthcare staff who use needles or sharp instruments are particularly vulnerable to exposure to blood-borne viruses such as hepatitis or HIV. Depending on the source, other pathogens may also be present, for example respiratory microbes in lung tissue.

Some keepsakes fall somewhere between harmless and medically relevant. Parents sometimes keep the umbilical stump after a baby is born. This small piece of tissue dries up and falls off naturally, usually within the first couple of weeks. If it is not kept clean and dry, it can become infected with a condition called omphalitis, meaning inflammation and infection of the stump.

Placenta

The most debated example of keeping human tissue comes after childbirth. Following delivery of the baby, the placenta is also delivered. This temporary organ connects the developing foetus to the uterus and acts as an interface for exchange of oxygen, nutrients and waste products between mother and baby, while keeping their blood supplies separate to prevent immune rejection and blood incompatibility.

Some people choose not only to keep the placenta but to consume it, a practice known as placentophagy. The idea comes from the belief that because the placenta nourishes the foetus during pregnancy, it must contain nutrients that can help the mother recover after birth. During pregnancy, nutrients such as calcium are transferred to the developing baby, and mothers can lose close to 4% of their bone mineral density. However, most nutrients stored in the placenta have already been passed to the foetus before birth.

Claims about the benefits of placentophagy are not strongly supported by scientific evidence. The nutrients present in placental tissue can generally be obtained through a balanced meal. Research in animal models has shown some positive effects, and similar findings have been reported in those studies, but these results have not been reproduced in humans.

People consume the placenta in various ways. It may be blended raw into smoothies, cooked into foods such as lasagne, steeped in high-strength alcohol to create a tincture, or dried and made into capsules, which is the most common approach, known as encapsulation.

Health risks

But there are also potential health risks. The placenta contains elevated levels of oestrogen, and high concentrations of this hormone in the bloodstream can increase the risk of thromboembolism, a condition in which blood clots form and travel through the circulation.

The placenta also acts as a filter during pregnancy, limiting the transfer of certain substances to the baby. Studies show that some heavy metals and other ions can accumulate in placental tissue, meaning levels may be higher in the placenta than elsewhere in the body.

In 2017, the CDC reported a case in which a baby developed repeated infections with group B Streptococcus agalactiae, a bacterium commonly found in the gut or vagina. Investigators traced the source of the infection to the mother consuming placenta capsules contaminated with the same bacterium. The process used to produce capsules reduces bacterial levels but does not completely remove them in all cases. Eating the placenta raw carries even greater risks, including exposure to bacteria such as E.coli.

Many animals eat their placentas after giving birth, largely to remove evidence that could attract predators and to reclaim nutrients. For humans, those same nutrients are easily obtained from a normal diet, and the medical benefits remain uncertain. At present, more robust studies are needed to determine whether placentophagy offers any genuine health advantages.

Whether transformed into jewellery, kept in a memory box or blended into a smoothie, once tissue leaves the body it moves from the personal and sentimental into the medical and biological. The meanings people attach to it vary widely, but the scientific questions about safety, benefit and risk remain the same.

The Conversation

Adam Taylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. From kneecap necklaces to umbilical cord keepsakes: the risks of keeping and consuming human tissue – https://theconversation.com/from-kneecap-necklaces-to-umbilical-cord-keepsakes-the-risks-of-keeping-and-consuming-human-tissue-276470

What oil, stocks and bonds are telling us about the Iran conflict and how long it might last

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daniele D’Alvia, Lecturer in Banking and Finance Law, Queen Mary University of London

When a conflict escalates, financial markets respond within minutes. That reaction is not just panic or speculation – it is a kind of collective judgement about what might happen next.

Tensions involving the US, Israel and Iran triggered a sharp jump in oil prices when Asian markets opened on Monday (rising by as much as 13% amid fears of supply disruption). Major Gulf indices fell steeply, and in some cases trading was suspended amid volatility.

At the same time, investors moved into so-called “safe-haven” assets. Gold prices rose, and demand increased for traditionally defensive currencies such as the US dollar and Swiss franc.

This may sound like distant noise or random financial moves. In reality though, it is one of the clearest signals we have about how serious investors think the situation with Iran could become.

Markets are forward-looking. They do not only react to what has happened – they try to price what they expect will happen. Here’s how to read the signals.

Oil: the first warning light

Oil is usually the first market to move during Middle East tensions. That is because the region plays a crucial role in the global supply of energy. A particular point of concern is the strait of Hormuz, a narrow shipping route through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil exports pass.

When oil prices jump, it does not mean supply has already stopped. It means traders believe there is a higher risk that supply could be disrupted.

Think of it like insurance. If the risk of damage rises, the price of insurance goes up immediately – even if no damage has yet occurred. Oil markets work in a similar way. Prices reflect the probability of trouble.

Why does this matter? Because oil affects almost everything. Higher oil prices push up fuel costs. Fuel affects transport. Transport affects food prices and goods on supermarket shelves. If oil remains expensive for weeks or months, it can push inflation higher.

So when oil spikes, markets are signalling that they see real economic risk – not just political drama.

At present, the scale of the oil move suggests markets are seriously reassessing the probability of disruption. The crucial question is persistence. If prices stabilise quickly, investors may believe escalation will be contained. If they remain elevated, markets are signalling expectations of prolonged instability.

Bonds: investors looking for safety

The second place to look is the bond market. A bond is essentially a loan. When you buy a government bond, you are lending money to a government in exchange for interest. US government bonds (Treasuries) are widely seen as one of the safest investments in the world.

In times of uncertainty, investors often move their money into these safer assets. This is known as “flight to safety”. When many people buy bonds at once, bond prices go up and their yields (the interest rate that is paid) go down.

You don’t need to follow bond charts every day to understand the message. If investors are accepting lower returns just to keep their money safe, it tells us they are worried.

If oil prices are rising while investors are piling into safe government bonds, markets may be signalling two concerns at the same time: higher short-term prices and weaker economic growth ahead. That is a difficult combination for any economy. Bond markets, in other words, are measuring anxiety.

Stock markets: how long will this last?

Stock markets reflect confidence in companies and economic growth. When shares fall sharply, it often means investors expect profits to be squeezed or business conditions to worsen. But the key issue is duration.

If stock markets fall briefly and then stabilise, investors may believe the conflict will be contained. If losses spread and persist, it suggests markets expect a longer or more disruptive episode.

Markets are not predicting headlines. They are estimating how long uncertainty might last and how deeply it might affect trade, energy supplies and consumer confidence.

Modern financial markets are highly interconnected. A shock in one region can ripple quickly across continents because supply chains, investment funds and large companies operate globally. That is why even a regional conflict can affect pension funds and savings accounts elsewhere.

Equity markets are not judging politics. They are estimating economic consequences.

What this means for markets – and for the conflict

Taken together, oil, bonds and equities provide a temperature check of expectations. Right now, markets are clearly pricing higher geopolitical risk. The sharp initial oil move shows concern about supply. The shift towards safer assets signals caution. Equity volatility reflects uncertainty about the duration of the conflict.

However, markets are not yet behaving as though they expect a systemic global crisis. We are seeing repricing – not collapse. That distinction matters.

As a finance expert, I believe markets are acting as early warning systems. If escalation of the conflict threatens to cause sustained disruption to energy infrastructure or shipping routes, we would expect the oil price to stay elevated, continued safe-haven flows and broader equity declines.

That would tighten financial conditions globally because higher energy prices push up inflation, falling stock markets reduce household wealth and confidence, and increased demand for safe assets raises borrowing costs for business and governments. In other words, credit becomes more expensive, investment decisions are delayed and consumers become cautious. This could slow economic growth.

If, however, tensions stabilise or de-escalate, markets may reverse quickly. Financial systems adjust rapidly when perceptions of risk change.

The broader implication is that modern conflicts transmit economic effects almost instantly through markets. Even before physical supply chains are interrupted, expectations alone can influence inflation, investment and policy decisions.

Markets do not determine the course of a conflict. But they shape the economic environment in which political decisions are made. For now, they are signalling caution – not panic. Whether that caution turns into something more severe will depend less on today’s headlines and more on whether disruption proves temporary or structural. That is what investors are watching. And it is what we should be watching too.

The Conversation

Daniele D’Alvia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What oil, stocks and bonds are telling us about the Iran conflict and how long it might last – https://theconversation.com/what-oil-stocks-and-bonds-are-telling-us-about-the-iran-conflict-and-how-long-it-might-last-277326

Why science GCSEs matter more than we think in a post-truth age

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sophie Bartlett, Research Associate in Administrative Data Research Wales, Cardiff University

Concerns about living in a “post-truth” society – where evidence struggles to compete with misinformation, ideology and emotion – are now familiar. From vaccine hesitancy to climate change denial, public debates increasingly hinge not on a lack of information, but on how people judge evidence, expertise and uncertainty.

These concerns are often framed as a problem of facts. But a deeper issue may be at play – whether people have the skills to weigh competing claims, understand uncertainty and decide what counts as good evidence. Our new research suggests that science education could play a far bigger role in shaping those skills than is usually recognised.

Many philosophers and educationalists have argued that education plays a central role in preparing citizens to navigate an uncertain world. Today, organisations such as Unesco, the UN body for education, science and culture, are grappling with how schools and universities can respond to rising misinformation and declining trust in expertise. Higher education institutions and academics are attempting to find practical solutions to this challenge. Public concern often focuses on people rejecting scientific conclusions outright.

But the deeper challenge is epistemic: difficulty judging what counts as good evidence, how confident we should be in claims and when disagreement is legitimate rather than conspiratorial.

Our findings suggest science education – even for students who go on to study non-science subjects – may be crucial in shaping these abilities.

Using linked administrative data from more than 8,000 pupils in the UK, we examined achievement in GCSE science at age 15. We then looked at how this related to outcomes in the six most popular post-16 subjects: maths, biology, history, chemistry, English literature and physics.

Some results were expected. Students who achieved the equivalent of an A or A* in GCSE science were significantly more likely to go on to gain strong grades in science A-levels. But what surprised us was how far this effect extended beyond science.




Read more:
Post-truth politics and why the antidote isn’t simply ‘fact-checking’ and truth


High-achieving GCSE science students were more likely to achieve higher grades in every one of the six subjects we studied, including humanities. Even more strikingly, GCSE science turned out to be a stronger predictor of later success in history and English literature than GCSE maths. It was also a stronger predictor of success in history than GCSE English language (or Welsh language in Wales).

That matters because GCSE English language and maths are routinely used as determinants for post-16 education. Science rarely is. For decades, maths and English have been treated as the foundations of academic progress and employability. Science, by contrast, has often been justified mainly in economic terms – as a way to produce future scientists and fuel innovation.

Our findings suggest something broader is going on.

What is science education really doing?

Science education appears to be doing more than teaching just subject knowledge. It seems to help develop transferable ways of thinking that support learning across disciplines.

Educational researchers have long argued that science classrooms cultivate skills such as evaluating evidence, reasoning about cause and effect, handling uncertainty and distinguishing claims from data. In a world shaped by science and technology, these abilities increasingly matter in almost every career, and in everyday civic life.

Success in science at age 15 seems to signal – or help build – forms of reasoning that support later achievement. These skills matter in subjects like history and English, where students must weigh sources, construct arguments and interpret complex information.

This fits with wider research showing that scientific reasoning is linked to better judgement of misinformation. It is also associated with a stronger grasp of risk and probability, and a more nuanced engagement with expert disagreement. In a post-truth context, these skills may be just as important as subject-specific knowledge.

Implications for a post-truth society

This has implications for how science is taught and defended. If science education really does foster transferable ways of reasoning, curricula that prioritise experimentation, argumentation and uncertainty may matter more.

So too does teaching the nature of scientific knowledge, rather than relying on rote learning. Reducing science to memorisation risks stripping away precisely the features that seem to deliver long-term benefits.

Our findings also raise broader questions. How explicitly are these forms of reasoning made visible to students? Are assessments capturing them? And could non-science subjects draw more directly on the epistemic practices that science helps to cultivate?

Science education may need to do more to articulate its connections to other disciplines. History, English and other subjects may benefit from making shared ways of thinking more explicit.

In an increasingly polarised, misinformation-rich public sphere, the value of science education should not be judged solely by how many future scientists it produces. Our research suggests its influence is wider and longer-lasting: helping young people develop tools for thinking that support learning and judgement across many areas of life.

If we are serious about addressing the challenges of a post-truth society, science classrooms may be one of our most important – and underappreciated – starting points.

The Conversation

Sophie Bartlett receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), grant reference: ES/W012227/1, and is part of Administrative Data Research (ADR) Wales.

Chris Taylor receives funding from ESRC (Grant number ES/W012227/1) and Welsh Government.

ref. Why science GCSEs matter more than we think in a post-truth age – https://theconversation.com/why-science-gcses-matter-more-than-we-think-in-a-post-truth-age-276306

Can flashing light alter your mind? The science of stroboscopic stimulation

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katie Edwards, Commissioning Editor, Health + Medicine and Host of Strange Health podcast, The Conversation

Sergiy Katyshkin/Shutterstock

Light therapy sounds wholesome. Clean. Almost pastoral. Sit in front of a lamp. Feel better.

In our latest episode of the Strange Health podcast, we discovered that it can also mean strapping on a flashing mask and watching your own brain generate kaleidoscopic hallucinations behind closed eyelids.

The spark for this episode was a stroboscopic light device called the Lumenate Nova, promoted on social media by celebrities including Jennifer Aniston and Rosamund Pike, who serves as the brand’s creative director and is also an investor. The device claims to use carefully timed pulses of light to guide users into altered, meditative states, described by the company as “sober tripping”.

I was sceptical but gave it a go. “Sober tripping” sounded like a level of experimentation I could live with.

After watching what looked like brightly coloured fireworks, I eventually felt as if I were surrounded by a mountainscape, basking in a warm ray of sunshine coming from the left side of my vision. I had to remind myself I was on my sofa in Doncaster at 7pm. There was no sun.

The visions quietened my usually chatterbox brain. For 15 minutes, that alone felt like relief.

So what is actually happening? Stroboscopic light delivers rhythmic pulses that pass through the eyelids and stimulate the retina. When those flashes align with rhythms the visual system naturally oscillates at, including alpha-range activity, signals in the visual cortex begin to synchronise with the pattern. The result can be surprisingly vivid: spirals, tunnels, lattices, shifting colours and, for some people, more complex scenes with recognisable shapes and places.

The brain is constantly predicting what it expects to see. It breaks visual input into edges, colour and movement, then rebuilds it into the seamless scene we experience. When rhythmic light disrupts those patterns, the brain tries to make sense of the signals. Sometimes that means geometry. Sometimes it feels like landscapes.

We spoke to David Schwartzman, a research fellow at the Sussex Centre for Consciousness Science at the University of Sussex, who has been studying these effects for more than a decade. He describes stroboscopic hallucinations as a controllable way to explore how the brain constructs visual experience. They offer a glimpse of the underlying machinery of perception rather than a treatment in themselves.

Interest in stroboscopic light is not new. In 1819, the Czech anatomist Jan Purkyně described geometric patterns seen when moving his fingers in front of a candle with eyes closed. In the 1960s, artists Brion Gysin and Ian Sommerville built the “Dreamachine”, a spinning cylinder designed to induce altered states without drugs.

More recently, a large public installation called Dreamachine toured the UK in 2022, allowing tens of thousands of people to lie inside a purpose-built structure and experience synchronised light and sound. Participants reported everything from gentle patterning to overwhelming geometric worlds.

But what about the health claims? The phrase “light therapy” now covers very different technologies. Some regulate sleep and mood. Others aim to alter perception itself. Bright light therapy is well established for seasonal affective disorder (SAD). Used correctly, typically in the morning at prescribed intensities, it can help regulate circadian rhythms and improve mood in some people. That is different from stroboscopic stimulation, which targets visual perception rather than sleep-wake cycles.




Read more:
How light can shift your mood and mental health


Research into strobe-based interventions for depression is ongoing. Early studies are exploring safety, tolerability and whether the immersive experience might influence mood in ways researchers are beginning to compare with psychedelic-assisted therapy. It is promising, but not yet a standard treatment.

There are also experimental trials using 40 hertz flickering light in Alzheimer’s disease, based on the idea that synchronising brain rhythms could influence disease processes. This approach remains in clinical testing and is not an established therapy.

There are risks. Flashing lights can trigger seizures in people with photosensitive epilepsy, although only a small proportion of people with epilepsy are photosensitive. Even in people without epilepsy, intense exposure can cause discomfort, headaches or nausea. Dose, brightness and individual sensitivity matter. People with epilepsy or migraine disorders may be advised to avoid stroboscopic devices.

Light can be therapeutic. It can also overwhelm. From SAD lamps to UV treatment for psoriasis and neonatal jaundice, light is powerful biology, but it is not automatically benign.

Strange Health is hosted by Katie Edwards and Dan Baumgardt. The executive producer is Gemma Ware, with video and sound editing for this episode by Anouk Millet. Artwork by Alice Mason.

Listen to Strange Health via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here. A transcript is available via the Apple Podcasts or Spotify apps.

The Conversation

David Schwartzman receives funding from the Medical Research Council (UKRI083) and was partly supported by a grant from the UK Government for his participation in the Dreamachine Programme, as part of Unboxed2022. Katie Edwards received a Lumenate Nova device as a PR sample for editorial use in this episode.

Dan Baumgardt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Can flashing light alter your mind? The science of stroboscopic stimulation – https://theconversation.com/can-flashing-light-alter-your-mind-the-science-of-stroboscopic-stimulation-276034

Too close to Trump: How Indonesian President Prabowo gambles sovereignty, humanity for US’ approval

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Karina Utami Dewi, Dosen Jurusan Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) Yogyakarta

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and US President AS Donald Trump at a conference room at the International Congress Centre, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt on Oct. 13, 2025. Muchlis Jr/Biro Pers Sekretariat Presiden, CC BY

The Indonesian public has grown increasingly uneasy with President Prabowo Subianto’s foreign policy pivot toward the United States. From Indonesia’s decision to join the Board of Peace (BoP) initiated by Donald Trump to the signing of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) on February 19, 2026, the trajectory is clear: Jakarta is tilting towards Washington at a cost many fear will be borne by ordinary Indonesians.

Prabowo once framed his diplomacy as rooted in resilience, autonomy, and national interests. However, in practice, his recent manoeuvres suggest a readiness to align closely with Trump’s agenda, even if it means diluting Indonesia’s bargaining position.

Prabowo’s efforts to draw Indonesia closer to the US under the Trump’s administration raise serious doubts about his underlying motives. Rather than clearly advancing long-term national interests, these efforts appear driven by transactional calculations and short-term gains.

Rehabilitating personal image at the public expense

Prabowo was barred from entering the US for a decade over alleged human rights violations tied to 1998. The ban was lifted in 2020 when he served as Indonesian Defence Minister during which Trump first served his tenure.

The lifting of the ban drew harsh criticism from human rights groups such as Amnesty International for providing impunity over the violations he was accused of. It was also condemned by prominent US lawmakers like Senator Patrick Leahy, author of the US human rights legislation known as the Leahy Law, who stated Prabowo was legally ineligible to enter the country.

Indonesia's foreign policy appears to be repurposed as a vehicle to polish Prabowo's international standing.
President Prabowo Subianto and President Donald Trump at the conference hall at the International Congress Centre in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on Monday, 13 October 2025.
Muchlis Jr/Biro Pers Sekretariat Presiden, CC BY

Today, his closeness to Trump signals more than diplomacy. Rather, it also suggests a personal redemption arc playing out on the global stage – from a figure who was once rejected by Washington to one who now stands shoulder to shoulder with the White House.

Trump’s public praise of Prabowo as a “tough” leader at the BoP Summit was symbolically powerful.

What is unfolding looks less like statecraft and more like image management. Indonesia’s foreign policy appears to be repurposed as a vehicle to polish Prabowo’s international standing.

Trump and Prabowo: transactional power over principles

Trump’s foreign policy stance is defined by transactional deals and loyalty politics, moving far from human rights issues or democratic values, which were previously the main guidelines for his predecessors in conducting foreign policy. Prabowo’s leadership style appears strikingly compatible.

Trade agreement which reduces Indonesia's export tariffs to the US from 32% to 19% could be framed as a quick win for Prabowo
President Prabowo Subianto and President Donald Trump sign a trade agreement on reciprocal tariff in Washington.
Ministry of State Secretary of the Republic of Indonesia, CC BY

In international relations, transactionalism or transactional diplomacy refers to a strategy that prioritises short-term gains and treats statecraft much like a business deal. It favours bilateral over multilateral agreements, with a tendency towards a zero-sum world view, disregarding value-based policy-making and longer-term strategic diplomatic goals.

Eric Jones writes in The Jakarta Post that Prabowo-Trump relationship reflects a “strongman’s mirror” – a psychological and political alignment between two leaders who view power as something personalised, not institutional. Trump relies on loyalty and patronage, while Prabowo appears comfortable with similar transactional logic. Both project a performative, personality-driven style of leadership.

This model could work to Prabowo’s advantage. Under Trump, lingering human rights concerns regarding Prabowo are no longer a diplomatic obstacle. The recent trade agreement, which reduces Indonesia’s export tariffs to the US from 32% to 19%, could even be framed as a quick diplomatic win for Prabowo, in line with transactional diplomacy’s emphasis on tangible, immediate outcomes.

The compatibility between Trump’s and Prabowo’s leadership styles could therefore produce smoother, more flexible ties than if the US were led by an administration that prioritises institutional norms and liberal values.

A risky departure from Indonesia’s free-and-active tradition

Indonesia’s long-standing “free-and-active” (bebas-aktif) foreign policy has defined its identity since independence and emphasised strategic autonomy amid great-power rivalry. For many Indonesians, Prabowo’s alignment with Trump’s transactional approach has drawn criticism and anger, as it signals a shift away from that principle and may erode diplomatic independence.

The decision to join the Board of Peace has also sparked concerns over potentially weakening Indonesia’s position as one of the first countries to support Palestinian independence.

No deals at the cost of sovereignty

Closer ties with the US under Trump’s controversial leadership do not automatically betray Indonesia’s national interest. However, overreliance on transactionalism, at the expense of enduring principles, risks making the relationship volatile. The recent pushback by the US Supreme Court against Trump’s tariff policy shows how quickly US policy can change.

Indonesia’s real strength lies not in personal ties to certain leaders, but in its consistency in maintaining autonomy and balance. Its free-and-active politics is a strategic asset, not a slogan to be traded for short-term legitimacy at the cost of credibility and sovereignty.

The Conversation

Karina Utami Dewi tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.

ref. Too close to Trump: How Indonesian President Prabowo gambles sovereignty, humanity for US’ approval – https://theconversation.com/too-close-to-trump-how-indonesian-president-prabowo-gambles-sovereignty-humanity-for-us-approval-276636

Baisse de l’aide à l’Afrique : la fin d’une priorité française

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Marc Raffinot, Economie du développement, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL

La France a récemment annoncé une baisse sensible de son aide publique au développement (APD), de l’ordre de plusieurs milliards d’euros sur les prochaines années. Cela a suscité un certain émoi parmi les acteurs de la solidarité internationale.

La loi de finances initiale pour 2026 consacre la poursuite de la baisse commencée en 2024 des moyens alloués à la mission « Aide publique au développement » qui regroupe la plus grosse part des crédits de l’aide. Si la loi est promulguée, ces moyens se réduiraient à 3 669 millions d’euros en crédits de paiement, soit une baisse de plus de 38 % par rapport à 2023 et de plus de 16 % par rapport à 2025.

Ils pourraient de surcroît, comme cela a été souvent le cas, faire l’objet d’une « régulation » en cours d’année.

Pour avoir étudié le financement du développement ainsi que l’aide publique au développement, nous constatons que l’aide publique au développement, que la loi de programmation de 2021 avait placée au rang des politiques publiques prioritaires, est désormais sacrifiée. Pourtant, l’annonce de cette baisse ne signifie pas automatiquement une diminution équivalente de l’aide effectivement reçue par les plus pauvres. La réalité est beaucoup plus complexe.

En premier lieu, parce que la définition de l’APD ne renvoie pas à ce qui est reçu directement par les citoyens des pays aidés mais à un ensemble de dépenses publiques conventionnellement agréées (les dépenses militaires sont exclues). Seulement 60 % environ de ce qui est comptabilisé comme APD en France arrive sur le terrain (essentiellement aux États, pas directement à des personnes).

Ainsi, dans l’APD, on comptabilise aussi les frais de scolarité et les bourses des élèves scolarisés en France venant de pays en développement (environ 10 % en 2023), la prise en charge en France des réfugiés (11,6 %), ainsi que le coût de gestion du système lui-même (6,8 %).

En second lieu, une baisse du budget de l’APD n’entraîne pas une baisse proportionnelle de l’APD. L’APD de la France a atteint 15,4 milliards de dollars US en 2024 (environ 14,2 milliards d’euros, pour des crédits budgétés de 5,8 milliards d’euros. En effet, l’APD ne comprend pas que des dons inscrits au budget mais aussi des prêts « concessionnels », c’est-à-dire bonifiés par une subvention (« élément-don »).

Si un euro de don coûte un euro de ressources budgétaires, un euro de prêt coûte beaucoup moins, en fonction du degré de bonification. Augmenter la part des prêts permet ainsi de limiter l’impact de la baisse des ressources budgétaires sur les montants décaissés.

En troisième lieu, la part de l’aide bilatérale française consacrée à l’Afrique subsaharienne a diminué, passant de 21,8 % en 2020 à 17 % en 2024. Cette aide se réoriente vers les pays émergents et africains les plus riches. En 2023, les pays qui reçoivent le plus d’APD de la part de la France sont dans l’ordre : Côte d’Ivoire, Maroc, Egypte, Sénégal, Indonésie, République dominicaine, Bolivie, Cameroun, Inde et Mexique. Un tiers de l’APD va à des pays à revenu intermédiaire, contre 18 % aux pays les moins avancés.

Les considérations géostratégiques

Entre le budget et le terrain se situe tout un ensemble d’organismes qui répartissent et gèrent ce budget (ce que l’on nomme parfois « l’industrie de l’aide »).73 % de l’APD (dite “bilatérale”) est octroyée par des instances françaises : le ministère des Finances (Trésor), le ministère des Affaires étrangères, le groupe de l’Agence française de développement (AFD), une constellation d’ONG (1,2 % du total en 2023). 37 % de l’APD (APD multilatérale) est allouée à des acteurs multilatéraux, comme l’UE, la Banque mondiale, le FMI, etc.

Enfin, la répartition obéit à de multiples objectifs qui relèvent de moins en moins de la solidarité internationale. La lutte contre l’émigration illégale, l’accès aux matières premières, les considérations géostratégiques et désormais avant tout le soutien aux exportations françaises sont déterminants.

Pour analyser les conséquences possibles sur l’Afrique subsaharienne de ces baisses de moyens, il faut avoir à l’esprit trois points :

Un mouvement général de baisse

L’évolution de l’aide française s’inscrit dans un mouvement général et sans doute, durable. La baisse concerne en effet l’ensemble des pays développés, au premier rang desquels les États-Unis. La première décision notable de la présidence Trump a été le démantèlement de l’USAID, agence bilatérale d’aide.

L’OCDE prévoit également une baisse de l’APD comprise entre 10 % et 18 % sur 2024-2027, les pays les moins développés et l’ Afrique étant les plus touchés. L’effondrement en cours de l’APD s’inscrit dans la reconfiguration internationale en gestation.




Read more:
Gel de l’aide américaine : une menace potentielle pour l’agriculture au Sénégal


La fonction politique de l’aide au service du partage de la prospérité pour éviter la guerre avait été mise en avant par le président américain Harry Truman en 1949. Or il est de moins en moins question de partage de prospérité dans le « capitalisme de la finitude » théorisé par l’économiste fiançais Arnaud Orain. La coopération s’efface peu à peu au bénéfice d’un mercantilisme assumé dans le cas des pays européens, et, dans le cas américain, du chantage et de la coercition revendiquée.

Dans le cas français, l’ambiguïté des motivations de l’aide se réduit en faveur de la promotion des exportations.

Une réduction progressive de la part de l’APD dans le financement du développement

L’APD est dépassée depuis 2010 dans sa contribution au financement global des économies africaines par les transferts de migrants, et souvent par les investissements directs étrangers (IDE). Les marchés financiers internationaux ont pris une importance croissante. Mais ces ressources sont inégalement réparties entre pays et secteurs.

L’APD a une importance très inégale dans le financement des différents pays. En 2023, elle représente une part majeure du budget malgache mais marginale de celui du Kenya, tandis que les transferts des migrants financent surtout la consommation et l’éducation, les IDE se concentrent sur l’énergie, la construction et les industries extractives. Les financements privés internationaux (eurobonds) ciblent une quinzaine de pays seulement..

Augmenter la part de prêts aide à maintenir le montant total, mais tous les pays ne peuvent pas s’endetter davantage. L’Afrique comprend de nombreux pays à risque élevé ou en situation de surendettement selon le FMI. Les prêts financent mieux les infrastructures que les secteurs sociaux comme l’éducation ou la santé, qui ne sont pas immédiatement rentables.

L’aide multilatérale française a été proportionnellement plus touchée que l’aide bilatérale. Cette situation réduira les contributions françaises aux mécanismes de financement de la Banque mondiale et de la Banque africaine de développement destinés aux pays les plus pauvres, ainsi qu’aux grands fonds internationaux consacrés à la santé, au climat et à l’éducation.

Au sein de l’aide bilatérale, les dons projet de l’Agence française de développement et l’aide humanitaire sont réduits proportionnellement plus que les bonifications d’intérêt permettant de faire des prêts.

À quoi peut-on s’attendre ?

Tenter d’isoler l’impact de la réduction de l’aide multilatérale française sur l’ Afrique subsaharienne ne fait guère de sens car l’impact final dépend du comportement des autres contributeurs.

La réduction des aides multilatérales sur ces deux thèmes vient ajouter ses effets délétères à la quasi-disparition de l’aide américaine, très orientée vers la santé et les actions d’urgence. La baisse des moyens des fonds d’urgence, tels que le Programme alimentaire mondial, a déjà un impact grave dans des pays ou des régions en crise (Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sahel).

La France, deuxième contributeur historique du Fonds mondial de lutte contre le Sida, la tuberculose et le paludisme, réduit sa contribution de 58 % (11,3 milliards de dollars US) annoncés contre 18 attendus pour 2027-2029), ce qui menace le financement de la santé en Afrique, qui reçoit plus de 70 % de ces fonds.

L’APD bilatérale française, qui bénéficie directement aux États est concentrée sur les infrastructures économiques et les services (24 %), le gouvernement et la société civile (13 %), l’éducation (18 %) et la santé (6 %). La réduction du budget de l’APD et l’accent mis sur la promotion de l’offre française risquent de réduire l’aide aux pays les plus pauvres d’Afrique et aux secteurs sociaux (éducation et santé). Or les gouvernements africains, compte tenu de leurs priorités et de leurs moyens grevés par le paiement des dettes, ne devraient guère compenser cette baisse de l’aide aux secteurs sociaux, malgré les incitations du FMI. À la clé, un sous-financement des services de base et une poursuite de la privatisation, déjà très engagée en matière d’éducation.

Politiquement, la réduction de l’aide aura un impact limité, car elle est souvent perçue comme post-coloniale et déconnectée des priorités des gouvernements “bénéficiaires”. Le recentrage de l’aide française sur des infrastructures visibles sera apprécié par les pouvoirs, mais sa baisse sera perçue comme une nouvelle preuve du déclassement de l’Occident, qui incite à diversifier les partenariats, éventuellement vers la Russie qui investit le secteur de la sécurité.




Read more:
Russie en Afrique: Les raisons de l’offensive de charme


Les principales réactions à la baisse de l’APD sont d’ailleurs venues de l’ « industrie de l’aide », et en particulier des ONG, qui mettent en avant l’impact négatif (réel) sur leur activité, qui ne représente toutefois qu’une partie très marginale de l’APD française.

Enfin, l’aide n’étant efficace que si elle dispose de canaux de distribution opérationnels, l’impact des restrictions budgétaires sur la situation financière de l’AFD interroge. Ses moyens humains, immobiliers et financiers ont été dimensionnés pour une hausse de l’aide.

Que retenir ?

Sur le plan géographique, les pays africains les moins avancés et/ou les moins « endettables » devraient être les plus affectés par la baisse de l’aide française ; tandis qu’au plan sectoriel, la santé, l’éducation et le développement rural seront les plus atteints. Les plus pauvres en paieront le prix, à moins d’une baisse des gaspillages de l’“industrie de l’aide”, ou encore d’une bien improbable réallocation par Paris de l’aide vers les plus pauvres.

Les restrictions croissantes aux migrations renforcent toutes ces tendances négatives, tout en discréditant la notion même d’“aide au développement”.

Au-delà de la réduction de l’APD, le risque d’une impasse financière affectant l’ensemble de l’Afrique subsaharienne ne peut être écarté. Toutes les sources de financement sont aujourd’hui menacées à des degrés divers, notamment par la baisse des prêts chinois et le rationnement du crédit des marchés financiers internationaux en l’absence de traitement du surendettement de l’Afrique.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Baisse de l’aide à l’Afrique : la fin d’une priorité française – https://theconversation.com/baisse-de-laide-a-lafrique-la-fin-dune-priorite-francaise-276075

South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Robert Donaldson, Senior Research Associate, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town

In presenting the 2026 national budget to South Africa’s parliament on 25 February, finance minister Enoch Godongwana characterised this as the turning point in South Africa’s public finances – heralding improved confidence, increased growth and rising infrastructure investment.

For over a decade, the size of the deficit and the rise in public debt have been central themes in the annual budget.

This year, analysts have welcomed the apparent turnaround in the budgetary outlook. Debt has peaked at just under 80% of GDP. And for the first time in a decade, the Treasury projects that interest on debt will increase more slowly than spending on education or health.

This is a transition that goes back to May 2025, when the rand began to strengthen against the US dollar in the turbulence that followed US president Donald Trump’s April tariff announcements. The South African Reserve Bank’s commitment to lower inflation and Parliament’s opposition to value added tax increases reinforced market sentiment that inflation would be kept in check. Around this time, the 10-year government bond yield began an extraordinary decline from its 11% peak to around 8% today.

These are the financial trends that account for the national treasury’s projected decline in debt service costs as a percentage of GDP. It expects these to fall from 5.4% this year to 5.2% in 2028/29.

But for the economic outlook to improve decisively, growth must rise. It is projected to increase, but not by much: 1.4% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, and then 2% by 2028. The recovery is still very fragile – gross fixed-capital formation, which should be upwards of 25% of GDP, is just 14%. Unemployment is still above 30% of the labour force. And the budget deficit for the year ahead (the difference between expenditure and revenue) is still uncomfortably high at 4% of GDP.

As an economist, I would argue that, if growth is the metric that counts, this is not yet the turning point that will deliver rising living standards and jobs for all.

Growth depends, in the Treasury’s analysis, on continued implementation of structural reforms, several of which form part of the Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela programme, launched in 2020. These include:

  • electricity sector restructuring

  • modernisation of state transport utility Transnet and logistics networks

  • investment in digital infrastructure and an e-visa system

  • boosting export competitiveness.

The Budget Review presents a summary of progress: 62% implementation of electricity reforms, 33% in transport, 11% in the water sector, 67% in telecommunications, 75% in reform of the visa system.

These initiatives will take time to shift the economic growth outlook.

What still needs to be done

Operation Vulindlela recognises that improvements in state capability are priorities of phase 2 of the presidency’s programme. There is a renewed focus on local government. This includes a proposed shift to a “utility model” for water and electricity services in which these functions will be run “like businesses”, to ensure proper infrastructure maintenance and accountability to the public.

Deterioration in local infrastructure is increasingly evident in water supply, roads and local services in many municipalities.

The Treasury also hopes that the implementation of the Public Service Amendment Bill will lead to improvements in professional standards in government, and particularly in municipalities.




Read more:
South African politicians, not bureaucrats, stand in the way of a professional civil service


Is state capability perhaps the key turnaround needed for an improved growth outlook?

The 2026 Budget Review signals a more robust, interventionist approach of the National Treasury to dysfunctional provincial departments and municipalities.

This will include centralised control of payroll and headcounts, enforcement of financial recovery plans, and stricter conditions attached to financial flows to provinces and municipalities.




Read more:
South Africa’s municipalities aren’t fixing roads, supplying clean water or keeping the lights on: new study explains why


It also includes technological reforms, such as the “smart meters grant programme”. Its aim is to improve billing accuracy and address leaks and illegal electricity connections.

But substantial improvements in state capability will not be achieved by top-down interventions and technology projects alone. Substantial reallocations of state resources are also needed. Simply put, resources must be redirected from unproductive to productive activities.

This is where the Treasury’s “targeted and responsible savings” initiative comes into play. Expenditure reviews have been under discussion for several years; in the 2025 medium term budget policy statement the savings programme was introduced to give this practical effect. The 2026 budget includes R4 billion (US$250 million) a year in identified savings.

That is not enough. It is less than 0.1% of GDP, and just 1.1% of the gap between government expenditure and revenue.

It’s not just that savings must be found if tax increases are to be avoided while lowering the budget deficit. The targeted and responsible savings initiative is also about shifting resources towards the investment, infrastructure maintenance, housing, police and court services that need to be strengthened. A bolder approach is needed. The goal should be R100 billion (US$6.3 billion) a year.

This means a targeted reconsideration of the “architecture” of the state.

What needs to be fixed

Here are some of the dysfunctionalities that must be addressed:

Two-tier local government: District municipalities serve no discernible democratic purpose. Where they provide cross-boundary services, these can be organised as utilities owned by and accountable to their component local municipalities.

Sector Education and Training Authorities (Setas) and the National Skills Fund: Once again, the Treasury has signalled its intent to “review” the skills funding system. Setas should be liquidated and the levy paid to them by employers abandoned. They are costly and inefficient intermediaries. The levy relief would be a benefit to businesses, allowing them to finance training as needed, not subject to one-size-fits-all rules and bureaucratic processes.

The Road Accident Fund: It is more than 20 years since reform proposals were set out for the Road Accident Fund. It has an unfunded liability of around R400 billion (US$25 billion) arising from road accident compensation claims that have yet to be settled. It should be restructured as a capped benefit scheme, with the balance of cover left to insurance providers.

Unemployment Insurance Fund expansion of mandate: The fund is planning to expand its administrative staff from 3,424 in 2024/25 to 11,424 next year. It also intends to expand its activities from payment of unemployment benefits to provision of skills audits, employment subsidies, and enterprise support. Its reported expenditure increased from R26.0 billion in 2024/25 to R48.8 billion in 2025/26. The Treasury should simply say No. It is absurd that public health and education programmes are subject to strict spending controls while a fund administered by the Department of Employment and Labour is allowed free rein.

Southern African Customs Union transfers: Review of the customs union agreement is long overdue. Its formula-based distribution of over R78 billion (US$4.9 billion) to neighbouring countries next year no longer rests on a defensible rationale from either a trade or regional development perspective.

More broadly, the budget reform that is needed is to extend Treasury’s expenditure planning and control systems to cover the 196 public entities that perform statutory functions and rely on fiscal revenue but fall outside the expenditure control limits of the budget process. Public entity boards and executive staff are often paid more than senior departmental officials, their programmes are not subject to Treasury review, and in many cases they hold funds that should properly be controlled by the Treasury.

Tighter expenditure control can in part be done through existing provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. More complete implementation might require fiscal responsibility legislation.




Read more:
South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it


The Treasury’s plan for fiscal sustainability is to introduce a principles-based “fiscal anchor” that will require each new administration to table a medium-term plan to ensure that debt service costs do not erode service delivery capability. If the expenditure planning system is not extended to include public entities, this will be a toothless tiger.

A version of this article first appeared on the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (Saldru) website.

The Conversation

Andrew Robert Donaldson is a former National Treasury official.

ref. South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-picking-up-but-hasnt-reached-a-turning-point-yet-economist-277263

Reinterpreting ‘awe’: why cross-cultural emotional intelligence needs to be handled with care

Source: The Conversation – France – By Craig L. Anderson, Professor, HEC Paris Business School

Awe has become a kind of emotional currency in Western wellness circles – revered for its ability to boost mental and physical health and even social interactions. There are findings linking awe to increased prosocial behaviour, curiosity, humility, wellbeing, lower post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and more adaptive physiological profiles. And yet across cultures, awe can provoke veneration and wonder or it can stimulate feelings of dread. What if awe does not travel?

That’s the question posed by a new set of cross-cultural studies that I co-authored with researchers from a wide range of academic institutions. The research offers direct evidence of how awe may not be a universal feel-good emotion.

Using daily emotion diaries and physiological data, we found evidence that while awe may be typically experienced as a positive emotion by people in the US in western contexts, in China, it can be experienced with some fear and tension by people in China.

Our findings challenge the assumption that awe always leads to connection or improved wellbeing – and raises big questions about how awe is used in mental health programmes, leadership training, and marketing around the world.

Awe can feel different across cultures

Psychologists and pioneers in the study of awe, Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt define awe as:

“The feeling of being in the presence of something vast that transcends your current understanding of the world.”

Awe is an emotion we experience when we’re faced with something vast and mind-stretching. But this research shows that while the spark may be the same, how we actually feel can be very different depending on culture.

In two studies, we found awe took on a different emotional flavour, depending on where – and how – it was experienced. In the US, awe was more often accompanied by appreciation and amusement. In China, it came with more fear and signs of emotional pressure.

What is ‘awesome’ among student populations?

The first study was based on more than 2,500 diary entries recording moments of awe or joy among 166 university students in China and the US over a two-week period.

The pattern was clear: Chinese-born students studying in Beijing reported feeling more fear during moments of awe than students born and raised in the US.

But that difference did not show up for experiences of joy, suggesting this mixed emotional response was specific to awe.

Looking at the diary entries, we found that the US students felt more awe in response to nature, monuments, or architecture – 18% of the time, than students in China – just 10%. Chinese participants, on the other hand, were more likely to describe awe linked to other people, making up 59% of their entries versus 50% in the US.

Cultural psychology suggests that compared to the US, China’s culture tends to be more collective and more hierarchical. It is possible that feeling awe toward someone powerful may more often come with a feeling of being smaller or less in control, which could explain the higher number of diary entries relating threat-based awe among Chinese students.

Even shared experiences of awe trigger diverging reactions

To examine if these differences persisted in controlled laboratory settings, in a second laboratory-based study we showed American and Chinese participants the same nature video. The clip, taken from the film Planet Earth featured giant waterfalls and sweeping aerial shots of mountain ranges, all set to orchestral music with no narration. The Chinese students reported more fear than the US students – even though both found the video awe-inspiring. The US students, on the other hand, reported feeling more of the good stuff: appreciation, even a bit of amusement.

The physiological data we collected during the viewing backed up what the students reported. Both groups showed similar signs – such as sweating, which signals emotional arousal and steady breathing patterns. But heart rate told a different story: the US students’ heart rate showed a drop, a sign of calm, while the Chinese students’ heart rate showed a slight rise, suggesting tension or alertness.

Why awe’s emotional impact isn’t one-size-fits-all

These findings carry weighty implications. Awe is being used everywhere – in therapy, schools, and even marketing. From nature retreats to big-brand ads, there’s a whole industry built on the idea that awe makes us feel good. But if awe brings fear for some, its effects – on mental health, creativity, or team connection – might not be so straightforward.

An earlier study I co-authored in 2018 with fellow experts Maria Monroy, and Dacher Keltner, shows how awe can help ease post-traumatic stress disorder, especially for military veterans spending time in nature. But if the sense of awe comes with fear, the benefits could fade, or even flip.

This matters for business, too. Companies are using awe in ads, travel and brand events to wow people and build loyalty. But if awe feels unsettling in some cultures, those big emotional plays could fall flat or even push people away.

Our research is not saying awe doesn’t work – just that it does not feel the same for everyone. Culture shapes how we feel, even with emotions we may think are hardwired. The view of awe as purely uplifting might be the exception, not the norm. Knowing that is crucial for creating experiences that can actually work across cultures.


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The Conversation

Craig L. Anderson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Reinterpreting ‘awe’: why cross-cultural emotional intelligence needs to be handled with care – https://theconversation.com/reinterpreting-awe-why-cross-cultural-emotional-intelligence-needs-to-be-handled-with-care-274151

Électrohypersensibilité : réconcilier les personnes qui souffrent et les scientifiques

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Jimmy Bordarie, Docteur, Maitre de conférences, Université de Tours

L’électrohypersensibilité, ou EHS, désigne un syndrome spécifique pour lequel les personnes concernées rapportent divers symptômes qu’elles attribuent aux champs électromagnétiques. De nombreux débats existent aujourd’hui, notamment sur la reconnaissance de l’EHS en tant que maladie, ce qui conduit parfois à des incompréhensions entre la communauté scientifique et les personnes en souffrance.


La perception de risques pour la santé en lien avec les nouvelles technologies est très répandue. Ce phénomène est appelé « préoccupations de santé modernes ». Il inclut des inquiétudes relatives aux champs électromagnétiques, aux polluants atmosphériques, à l’alimentation, aux antibiotiques ou encore au changement climatique. Ces préoccupations sont souvent citées en lien avec le report de symptômes non spécifiques.

Dans les syndromes dits médicalement inexpliqués, tels que la sensibilité chimique, l’intolérance au bruit ou encore le syndrome des bâtiments malsains, les patients se plaignent également de symptômes non spécifiques qu’ils attribuent à un agent environnemental, et ce, en l’absence d’une pathologie qui pourrait les expliquer. Ces syndromes liés à l’environnement, appelés intolérances environnementales idiopathiques sont polymorphes. L’acronyme SAEF (pour Symptoms Associated with Environmental Factors) vise à les rassembler sous un même terme.

Le cas de l’électrohypersensibilité : repérage et prévalence

L’électrohypersensibilité (EHS) est un syndrome pour lequel aucune affection médicale sous-jacente identifiée ne permet d’expliquer les symptômes associés. Elle est classée parmi les intolérances environnementales idiopathiques (IEI) par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé. On parle alors d’IEI-CEM (CEM pour champs électromagnétiques).

En France, dans un avis rendu par l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire (Anses) en 2018, les IEI-CEM sont définis selon trois critères :

  1. la perception de divers symptômes (fatigue, maux de tête, difficultés de concentration, problèmes dermatologiques et digestifs, etc.) ;

  2. l’absence de troubles cliniquement identifiés susceptibles de les expliquer ;

  3. leur attribution aux champs électromagnétiques tels que les antennes de télécommunication, le Wi-Fi, les lignes électriques à haute tension, les téléphones mobiles et écrans d’ordinateur, etc. par les personnes concernées.

Difficile d’évaluer la prévalence de l’électrohypersensibilité. Selon les dernières études de prévalence au niveau international, autour de 5 % de la population se déclarerait électrohypersensible, soit, en France, plus de 3 millions de personnes. Une partie de la variabilité de ces estimations peut s’expliquer par l’absence de critères objectifs. En effet, initialement, l’évaluation reposait généralement sur une seule question dichotomique « oui/non » demandant si la personne était très sensible. Depuis, il est recommandé d’ajouter des questions supplémentaires, telles que l’apparition des symptômes et l’impact négatif sur la vie quotidienne.

Quelles conséquences pour la santé des personnes concernées ?

L’omniprésence des champs électromagnétiques anthropiques dans nos sociétés entraîne souvent ces personnes à adapter leur mode de vie. Les stratégies d’adaptation utilisées impliquent le plus souvent d’éviter l’exposition en prenant diverses mesures de protection.

Si certaines personnes rapportent alors une amélioration de leur qualité de vie, pour d’autres, cela conduit à une exclusion sociale, une incapacité de travail et des difficultés financières, souvent renforcées par un manque de compréhension de la part de leur famille et de leur entourage professionnel à l’égard des précautions qu’elles prennent.

En outre, la littérature scientifique confirme également que les personnes atteintes d’électrohypersensibilité ont tendance à se sentir inférieures aux autres et mal à l’aise dans leurs relations sociales. Elles rencontreraient également plus de difficultés à maintenir un certain niveau d’estime de soi, auraient une image de soi plus altérée et seraient plus vulnérables. Elles seraient plus sujettes aux troubles anxio-dépressifs, dont nous ne pouvons être assurés à ce jour qu’il s’agisse d’une cause ou d’une conséquence de l’électrohypersensibilité.

Les champs électromagnétiques en cause ?

Pour étudier le lien entre symptômes et champs électromagnétiques, les scientifiques s’appuient sur des méthodologies diverses :

  1. des études observationnelles ;

  2. des études d’évaluation écologique momentanée (une méthode qui consiste à recueillir, plusieurs fois par jour et en temps réel, des données, par exemple, sur les symptômes, les émotions ou les comportements d’une personne dans son environnement de vie habituel) ;

  3. des études d’intervention ;

  4. des études de provocation (une méthode dans laquelle des volontaires sont exposés de façon aléatoire et contrôlée, en double aveugle, à des champs électromagnétiques ou à une condition « fictive/simulée » sans champs électromagnétiques, afin d’observer d’éventuelles modifications de leurs symptômes ou de leur état physiologique).

À noter que, dans la lignée des recommandations de l’Anses, des protocoles de provocation innovants ont également été développés en collaboration avec les personnes concernées.

En dépit, parfois, de certaines limites méthodologiques, les résultats du corpus de littérature sur l’électrohypersensibilité (environ 350 études à ce jour) sont largement consensuels et convergent vers un rejet de l’existence de preuves cliniques ou biologiques valables permettant d’associer ces symptômes aux champs électromagnétiques.

D’autres explications possibles…

Une partie des études a permis de confirmer l’existence d’un effet nocebo ; effet qui se produit lorsqu’une personne s’attend (consciemment ou non) à des conséquences négatives de certains facteurs, comme les champs électromagnétiques, sur sa santé et/ou sa vie en général.

Le Comprehensive Model suggère que les personnes souffrant d’intolérances environnementales idiopathiques en général partageraient une croyance causale, qui conduirait à l’anticipation et à la survenue d’effets nocebo en relation avec l’exposition perçue tandis que les symptômes conduiraient à la validation de la croyance.

Cependant, cette hypothèse n’est pas pleinement satisfaisante, car elle ne peut s’appliquer qu’aux personnes qui considèrent a priori les champs électromagnétiques comme une source de risques pour la santé. Or, en s’intéressant aux trajectoires des personnes atteintes d’électrohypersensibilité, une autre partie de la littérature scientifique souligne la préexistence des symptômes dans certains cas, alors même qu’il n’y avait auparavant aucune crainte au regard des champs électromagnétiques.

Traits de personnalité en jeu

D’autres études s’intéressent au rôle de variables dispositionnelles, c’est-à-dire des variables telles que la personnalité, qui pourraient alors permettre de comprendre, soit l’apparition de ces symptômes, soit la tendance à les attribuer aux champs électromagnétiques. Par exemple, le mode de pensée holistique, c’est-à-dire la tendance à la spiritualité et aux croyances globales en matière de santé ainsi que la détresse liée aux symptômes somatiques seraient des facteurs importants dans les préoccupations de santé modernes.

Plus récemment, des études ont confirmé la relation entre l’électrohypersensibilité et l’hypersensibilité, aussi appelée sensibilité élevée du traitement sensoriel. Les personnes hautement sensibles ont des réactions plus fortes aux stimuli environnementaux, ce qui peut être vécu comme une source de stress et constitue une piste prometteuse pour proposer une prise en charge aux personnes souffrant d’électrohypersensibilité.

Les enjeux d’une collaboration nécessaire

Dans un certain nombre de cas, l’électrohypersensibilité (EHS) ne serait pas une hypersensibilité isolée, dans la mesure où plusieurs auteurs ont affirmé qu’une partie des personnes souffrant d’EHS signalent également d’autres sensibilités (par exemple, des sensibilités chimiques multiples). D’ailleurs, actuellement certains chercheurs étudient l’efficacité de traitements basés sur des thérapies cognitivo-comportementales pour réduire les symptômes associés aux facteurs environnementaux.

S’il existe un réel enjeu tant pour les personnes concernées que pour les scientifiques à comprendre les causes de ce syndrome et l’origine des symptômes, au-delà des convictions des personnes en souffrance, le rôle de la science vise à une amélioration des connaissances pour identifier les causes des troubles décrits. Aussi, ne pas converger vers la même explication ne suppose pas une opposition entre souffrants et scientifiques.

Il est donc plus qu’essentiel de continuer à travailler en collaboration pour comprendre les enjeux de ces préoccupations de santé modernes, leurs causes et leurs conséquences. Les scientifiques doivent intégrer les personnes en souffrance comme des partenaires dans leurs études. Ainsi, l’enjeu relève tout aussi bien de la prise en compte nécessaire des savoirs expérientiels des personnes concernées que du respect des critères assurant une production scientifique de qualité.

The Conversation

Certains travaux cités impliquent les auteurs de cet article et ont fait l’objet d’un financement :
– Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire de l’Alimentation, de l’Environnement et du Travail (Reference: PNREST‐EST/2017/2 RF/19)
– Direction Générale Opérationnelle de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et de l’Environnement du Service Public de Wallonie.

Maryse Ledent est membre de The BioEM Society et de Belgian Association of Public Health (BAPH).
Dans le cadre des travaux liés à cet article, nous avons reçu deux soutiens financiers : de l’Agence nationale de sécurité sanitaire de l’alimentation, de l’environnement et du travail (Reference: PNREST‐EST/2017/2 RF/19) ainsi que de la Direction générale opérationnelle de l’agriculture, des ressources naturelles et de l’environnement du Service public de Wallonie.

ref. Électrohypersensibilité : réconcilier les personnes qui souffrent et les scientifiques – https://theconversation.com/electrohypersensibilite-reconcilier-les-personnes-qui-souffrent-et-les-scientifiques-276239

Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

A yacht sails past a plume of smoke rising from the port of Jebel Ali following a reported Iranian strike in Dubai on March 1, 2026. Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images

Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf have found themselves in a position they have long sought to avoid: on the front line and bearing the brunt of a widening Middle East conflict.

Having been dragged into a war of choice by the U.S. – one which many around the world are calling a war of aggression – all six Gulf Cooperation Council nations have been struck by Iranian retaliatory attacks in response.

Military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all been hit. But the missiles and drones from Iran have been aimed at civilian infrastructure, too, including airport, ports and hotels in the opening days of U.S. and Israeli operations against Iran.

In scale and scope, the barrage marks a major departure from Iran’s previous response to being attacked by U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. In contrast, during a 12-day war in June 2025, Tehran only attacked one base in Qatar, and even then forewarned authorities in Doha.

Instead, what is occurring in the region is a scenario that planners in Persian Gulf capitals have long warned about: a deliberate attempt by Tehran to widen conflict and hit nations it sees as allied to the West.

As an expert on Gulf dynamics, I see the unfurling events as undoing years of work to de-risk the region and placing in jeopardy the unique selling point and business models that have underpinned the Gulf states’ global rise.

an entertainment building can be seen as a missile falls from the night sky, leaving a trail
An intercepted projectile falls into the sea near Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah archipelago on March 1, 2026.
Fadel Senna/AFP via Getty Images

A cornered regime fighting for survival

Ever since the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian militants on Israel, policymakers in the Gulf nations have sought to avoid the regionalization of conflict.

Qatar led the way in mediating between Israel and Hamas, while Oman has done the same with the U.S. and Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has maintained regular dialogue with Iran to de-escalate regional tensions.

Each of the successive escalations between Israel and Iran – in April and October 2024 and then in June 2025, with the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes – brought the region closer to, without tipping over into, all-out war.

But Iran’s actions in the opening days following what Washington has named “Operation Epic Fury” have signaled that the comparative restraint it showed during the 12-day war is firmly off the table.

The Islamic Republic is now a cornered regime fighting for its survival. As such, it is lashing out and seeking to spread the pain to regional neighbors. The logic in this approach is that Gulf nations could put pressure on the U.S., which may fear the cascading costs of a prolonged regional conflict.

Gulf nations are also obvious targets for Iran. With Iran lacking the capability to hit the U.S. mainland through conventional weapons, the American military bases that dot the Gulf region are within the reach of Tehran’s ballistic arsenal.

Psychological impact on Gulf nations

The scale of the Iranian attacks on targets in the Gulf nations in the opening two days of the current conflict underscores the extent to which Iran’s response now differs from that of June 2025: In the first two days of the conflict, Iran had fired at least 390 ballistic missiles and 830 drones at the Gulf states. By comparison, the Iranian strike on the Al-Udeid air base in Qatar last year involved 14 ballistic missiles and was a one-off attack on a single target.

Air defense systems in Gulf nations have neutralized most of the incoming Iranian missiles, to date, and actual damage and casualties have been limited to a handful of deaths and injuries in the dozens.

But it is the intangible and psychological impact on Gulf cities under attack that threatens to inflict profound damage on the reputation and image of cities such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha. In recent years, Gulf Cooperation Council nations have presented the Gulf as an oasis of stability and havens to live and work.

This is especially the case for Dubai, which has marketed itself strongly as a hub for business and tourism. But it is also applicable to other Gulf nations as well, such as Qatar, which relies heavily on a steady stream of large-scale meetings and events.

Iran’s attacks on civilian infrastructure and soft targets – airports in Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and hotels in Bahrain and Dubai – serve to puncture this image of safe and secure Gulf capitals.

This choice of targets by Iran likely reflects a calculation that leaders in the Gulf countries would immediately feel the full impact of the war and push Washington hard to find a resolution and quick.

The subsequent targeting by Tehran on oil and gas facilities, including Ras Laffan in Qatar and Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia, serves as a further and highly consequential step. It has already triggered a forceful response from Qatar, which shot down two Iranian jets on March 2.

There is concern among Gulf nations that the next step in the ladder of escalation could involve targeting the desalination plants that are so vital to overcoming water scarcity in the region.

Vulnerable to escalation

As critical hubs in the global economy by virtue of their reserves of oil and gas and centrality to international shipping and aviation, the Gulf nations are uniquely vulnerable to further escalation by Iran.

Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha have invested heavily in creating airlines that function as “super-connectors” capable of linking any two destinations worldwide with a stop in the Gulf. A Feb. 28 drone strike on Dubai International Airport, the world’s busiest for international travel, illustrated the impact that Iran’s asymmetric responses could have on the global hub model that has come to dominate world air travel.

Already, closure of airspaces over Qatar and the UAE, as well as in Bahrain and Kuwait, has stranded tens of thousands of passengers and created the biggest disruption to global travel since the COVID-19 pandemic.

In addition, cargo operations essential to local supply chains have been heavily impacted, at the same time that seaborne trade through the Strait of Hormuz has been similarly interrupted.

Whereas initial spikes in oil prices and insurance premiums at the start of the 12-day war last year fell away as it became clear that energy infrastructure was not significantly targeted, the opposite has happened this time.

Peril and uncertainty

But the short-term shock to the global economy is not what will be of primary concern to the Gulf Cooperation Council members. Not since the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War, has the region faced so much peril and uncertainty.

And that is what Iran’s leaders are banking on. The attacks across the Gulf by Tehran are not, after all, without strategy. The intent is to expand the conflict, thereby significantly raising costs to the U.S. and its partners in the Gulf.

Tehran’s hope is that the economic impact will encourage Gulf leaders to press Trump for an endgame. But in attacking capitals across the region, Iran risks perhaps doing the opposite: rupturing any chance of bettering ties with rivals in the region and instead pushing them further back into Washington’s orbit after a period of drift.

The Conversation

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Iran’s targeting of airport, ports and hotels in reaction to US strikes has forced Gulf nations onto front lines of a war they want no part in – https://theconversation.com/irans-targeting-of-airport-ports-and-hotels-in-reaction-to-us-strikes-has-forced-gulf-nations-onto-front-lines-of-a-war-they-want-no-part-in-277208