Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Williams, Professor of Palaeobiology, University of Leicester

The age of humans is increasingly an age of sameness. Across the planet, distinctive plants and animals are disappearing, replaced by species that are lucky enough to thrive alongside humans and travel with us easily. Some scientists have a word for this reshuffling of life: the Homogenocene.

Evidence for it is found in the world’s museums. Storerooms are full of animals that no longer walk among us, pickled in spirit-filled jars: coiled snakes, bloated fish, frogs, birds. Each extinct species marks the removal of a particular evolutionary path from a particular place – and these absences are increasingly being filled by the same hardy, adaptable species, again and again.

One such absence is embodied by a small bird kept in a glass jar in London’s Natural History Museum: the Fijian Bar-winged rail, not seen in the wild since the 1970s. It seems to be sleeping, its eyes closed, its wings tucked in along its back, its beak resting against the glass.

A flightless bird, it was particularly vulnerable to predators introduced by humans, including mongooses brought to Fiji in the 1800s. Its disappearance was part of a broad pattern in which island species are vanishing and a narrower set of globally successful animals thrive in their place.

It’s a phenomenon that was called the Homogenocene even before a similar term growing in popularity, the Anthropocene, was coined in 2000. If the Anthropocene describes a planet transformed by humans, the Homogenocene is one ecological consequence: fewer places with their own distinctive life.

It goes well beyond charismatic birds and mammals. Freshwater fish, for instance, are becoming more “samey”, as the natural barriers that once kept populations separate – waterfalls, river catchments, temperature limits – are effectively blurred or erased by human activity. Think of common carp deliberately stocked in lakes for anglers, or catfish released from home aquariums that now thrive in rivers thousands of miles from their native habitat.

Meanwhile, many thousands of mollusc species have disappeared over the past 500 years, with snails living on islands also severely affected: many are simply eaten by non-native predatory snails. Some invasive snails have become highly successful and widely distributed, such as the giant African snail that is now found from the Hawaiian Islands to the Americas, or South American golden apple snails rampant through east and south-east Asia since their introduction in the 1980s.

Homogeneity is just one facet of the changes wrought on the Earth’s tapestry of life by humans, a process that started in the last ice age when hunting was likely key to the disappearance of the mammoth, giant sloth and other large mammals. It continued over around 11,700 years of the recent Holocene epoch – the period following the last ice age – as forests were felled and savannahs cleared for agriculture and the growth of farms and cities.

Over the past seven decades changes to life on Earth have intensified dramatically. This is the focus of a major new volume published by the Royal Society of London: The Biosphere in the Anthropocene.

The Anthropocene has reached the ocean

Life in the oceans was relatively little changed between the last ice age and recent history, even as humans increasingly affected life on land. No longer: a feature of the Anthropocene is the rapid extension of human impacts through the oceans.

This is partly due to simple over-exploitation, as human technology post-second world war enabled more efficient and deeper trawling, and fish stocks became seriously depleted.

Partly this is also due to the increasing effects of fossil-fuelled heat and oxygen depletion spreading through the oceans. Most visibly, this is now devastating coral reefs.

Out of sight, many animals are being displaced northwards and southwards out of the tropics to escape the heat; these conditions are also affecting spawning in fish, creating “bottlenecks” where life cycle development is limited by increasing heat or a lack of oxygen. The effects are reaching through into the deep oceans, where proposals for deep sea mining of minerals threaten to damage marine life that is barely known to science.

And as on land and in rivers, these changes are not just reducing life in the oceans – they’re redistributing species and blurring long-standing biological boundaries.

Local biodiversity, global sameness

Not all the changes to life made by humans are calamitous. In some places, incoming non-native species have blended seamlessly into existing environments to actually enhance local biodiversity.

In other contexts, both historical and contemporary, humans have been decisive in fostering wildlife, increasing the diversity of animals and plants in ecosystems by cutting or burning back the dominant vegetation and thereby allowing a greater range of animals and plants to flourish.

In our near-future world there are opportunities to support wildlife, for instance by changing patterns of agriculture to use less land to grow more food. With such freeing-up of space for nature, coupled with changes to farming and fishing that actively protect biodiversity, there is still a chance that we can avoid the worst predictions of a future biodiversity crash.

But this is by no means certain. Avoiding yet more rows of pickled corpses in museum jars will require a concerted effort to protect nature, one that must aim to help future generations of humans live in a biodiverse world.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Welcome to the ‘Homogenocene’: how humans are making the world’s wildlife dangerously samey – https://theconversation.com/welcome-to-the-homogenocene-how-humans-are-making-the-worlds-wildlife-dangerously-samey-274092

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon Haslett, Pro Vice-Chancellor and Professor of Physical Geography, Bath Spa University; Swansea University

People living on the low-lying shores of the Bristol Channel and Severn estuary began their day like any other on January 30 1607. The weather was calm. The sky was bright.

Then, suddenly, the sea rose without warning. Water came racing inland, tearing across fields and villages, sweeping away the homes, livestock and people in its path.

By the end of the day, thousands of acres were underwater. As many as 2,000 people may have died. It was, quite possibly, the deadliest sudden natural disaster to hit Britain in 500 years.

More than four centuries later, the flood of 1607 still raises a troubling question. What, exactly, caused it?

Most early explanations blamed an exceptional storm. But when my colleague and I began examining the historical evidence more closely in 2002, we became less certain that this was the full picture. For one, eyewitness accounts tell a more unsettling story.

The flood struck on January 30 1607 – or January 20 1606, according to the old Julian calendar, which was still in use at that time. The flood affected coastal communities across south Wales, Somerset, Gloucestershire and Devon, inundating some areas several miles inland. People at the time were no strangers to storms or high tides – but this was different.

Churches were inundated. Entire villages vanished. Vast stretches of farmland were ruined by saltwater, leaving communities facing hunger as well as grief. Memorial plaques in local churches and parish documents still mark the scale of the catastrophe.

Much of what we know about how the event unfolded comes from chapbooks, which were cheaply printed pamphlets sold in the early 17th century. These accounts describe not just the damage, but the terrifying speed and character of the water itself.

One such pamphlet, God’s Warning to His People of England, describes a calm morning suddenly interrupted by what witnesses saw approaching from the sea:

Upon Tuesday 20 January 1606 there happened such an overflowing of waters … the like never in the memory of man hath been seen or heard of. For about nine of the morning, many of the inhabitants of these countreys … perceive afar off huge and mighty hilles of water tombling over one another, in such sort as if the greatest mountains in the world had overwhelmed the lowe villages or marshy grounds.

Our interest in the event arose from reading that account. It gives a specific time for the inundation – around nine in the morning – and emphasises the fair weather and sudden arrival of the floodwaters.

From a geographer’s perspective, this description is striking. Sudden onset, wave-like forms and an absence of storm conditions are not typical of storm surges. To us, the language was reminiscent of eyewitness accounts of tsunamis elsewhere in the world. This suggested a tsunami origin for the flood should be evaluated.

Until the early 2000s, few researchers seriously questioned the storm-surge explanation. But as we revisited the historical sources, we began to ask whether the physical landscape might also preserve clues to what happened in 1607. If an extreme marine inundation had struck the coast at that time, it may have left geological evidence behind.

In several locations around the estuary, we identified a suite of features with a chronological link to the early 17th century: the erosion of two spurs of land that previously jutted out into the estuary, the removal of almost all fringing salt marsh deposits, and the occurrence of sand layers in otherwise muddy deposits

These features point to a high-energy event. The question was what kind?

Testing the theory

To explore this further, we undertook a programme of fieldwork in 2004. We examined sand layers and noted signatures of tsunami impact such as coastal erosion, and analysed the movement of large boulders along the shoreline. Boulder transport is particularly useful, as it allows estimates of the wave heights needed to move them.

Some fieldwork was filmed for a BBC documentary broadcast in April 2005, which featured other colleagues too. It included an argument for a storm, but also another suggesting it isn’t fanciful to consider that an offshore earthquake provided the trigger.

Our results were published in 2007, coincidentally the 400th anniversary of the flood. In parallel, colleagues published a compelling model supporting a storm surge. The scientific debate, rather than being resolved, intensified.

An updating of wave heights based on boulder data using refined formula was published in 2021, suggesting a minimum tsunami wave height of 4.2 metres is required to explain the coastal features – whereas, according to the calculations, storm waves of over 16 metres would be required. This is perhaps unlikely within the relatively sheltered Severn estuary.

The low-lying coasts around the Bristol Channel remain vulnerable to flooding. Storm surges occur regularly, though usually with more limited effects. Climate change is now increasing the risk through rising sea levels and more intense weather systems.

Tsunamis, by contrast, are rare. A report by the UK government’s Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs found it unlikely that the 1607 flood may have been caused by one. However, it also noted that offshore southwest Britain is among the more credible locations for a future tsunami, triggered by seismic activity or submarine landslides.

This distinction matters. Storm surges can usually be forecast. Tsunamis may arrive with little or no warning.

Read more:
From Noah’s flood to Shakespeare’s storms, what literature reveals about our changing relationship with the weather

Scholarly and public interest in the flood has not waned. In November 2024, a Channel 5 documentary brought together several strands of recent research, concluding that the jury is still out on the flood’s cause.

That uncertainty should not be seen as a failure. Evaluating competing explanations is essential when trying to understand extreme events in the past – especially when those events have implications for present-day risk.

Whether the flood of 1607 was driven by storm winds, unusual tides or waves generated far offshore, its lesson is clear. Coastal societies ignore rare disasters at their peril.

The sea has come in before. And it will do so again.

Simon Haslett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Did a tsunami hit the Bristol Channel four centuries ago? Revisiting the great flood of 1607 – https://theconversation.com/did-a-tsunami-hit-the-bristol-channel-four-centuries-ago-revisiting-the-great-flood-of-1607-274135

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Bamo Nouri, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London

Reports of a growing US naval presence in the Gulf have prompted speculation that the US could be preparing for another Middle East war, this time with Iran.

The US president, Donald Trump, has warned of “serious consequences” if Iran does not comply with his demands to permanently halt uranium enrichment, curb its ballistic missile program and end support for regional proxy groups.

Yet, despite the familiar language of escalation, much of what is unfolding appears closer to brinkmanship than preparation for war.

The US president’s own political history offers an important starting point for understanding why this is. Trump’s electoral appeal, both in 2016 and again in 2024, has rested heavily on a promise to end America’s “forever wars” and to avoid costly overseas interventions.

And Iran represents the very definition of such a war. Any all-out conflict with Tehran would almost certainly be long and drag in other countries in the region.

It would also be hard to achieve a decisive victory. For a president whose political brand is built on restraint abroad and disruption at home, a war with Iran would contradict the central logic of his foreign policy narrative.

Meanwhile Iran’s strategic posture is rooted in decades of preparing for precisely this scenario. Since the 1979 revolution, Tehran’s military doctrine and foreign policy have been shaped by survival in the face of potential external attack.

Rather than building a conventional force able to defeat the US in open combat, Iran has invested in asymmetric capabilities: ballistic and cruise missiles, the use of regional proxies, cyber operations and anti-access strategies (including missiles, air defences, naval mines, fast attack craft, drones and electronic warfare capabilities). Anyone who attacks Iran would face prolonged and escalating costs.

This is why comparisons to Iraq in 2003 are misleading. Iran is larger, more populous, more internally cohesive and far more militarily prepared for a sustained confrontation.

An attack on Iranian territory would not represent the opening phase of regime collapse but the final layer of a defensive strategy that anticipates exactly such a scenario. Tehran would be prepared to absorb damage and is capable of inflicting it across multiple theatres – including in Iraq, the Gulf, Yemen and beyond.

With an annual defence budget approaching US$900 billion (£650 billion), there is no question that the US has the capacity to initiate a conflict with Iran. But the challenge for the US lies not in starting a war, but in sustaining one.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offer a cautionary precedent. Together, they are estimated to have cost the US between US$6 and and US$8 trillion when long-term veterans’ care, interest payments and reconstruction are included.

These conflicts stretched over decades, repeatedly exceeded initial cost projections and contributed to ballooning public debt. A war with Iran – larger, more capable and more regionally embedded – would almost certainly follow a similar, if not more expensive, trajectory.

The opportunity cost of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were potentially greater, absorbing vast financial and political capital at a moment when the global balance of power was beginning to shift.

As the US focused on counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations, other powers, notably China and India, were investing heavily in infrastructure, technology and long-term economic growth.

That dynamic is even more pronounced today. The international system is entering a far more intense phase of multipolar rivalry, characterised not only by military competition but by races in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and strategic technologies.

Sustained military engagement in the Middle East would risk locking the US into resource-draining distractions just as competition with China accelerates and emerging powers seek greater influence.

Iran’s geographic position compounds this risk. Sitting astride key global energy routes, Tehran has the ability to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Even limited disruption would drive oil prices sharply higher, feeding inflation globally. For the US, this would translate into higher consumer prices and reduced economic resilience at precisely the moment when strategic focus and economic stability are most needed.

There is also a danger that military pressure would backfire politically. Despite significant domestic dissatisfaction, the Iranian regime has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to mobilise nationalist sentiment in response to external threats. Military action could strengthen internal cohesion, reinforce the regime’s narrative of resistance and marginalise opposition movements.

Previous US and Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure have not produced decisive strategic outcomes. Despite losses of facilities and senior personnel, Iran’s broader military posture and regional influence have proved adaptable.

Rhetoric and restraint

Trump has repeatedly signalled his desire to be recognised as a peacemaker. He has framed his Middle East approach as deterrence without entanglement, citing the Abraham Accords and the absence of large-scale wars during his presidency. This sits uneasily alongside the prospect of war with Iran, particularly the week after the US president launched his “Board of Peace”.

The Abraham Accords depend on regional stability, economic cooperation and investment. A war with Iran would jeopardise all of these. Despite their own rivalry with Tehran, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have prioritised regional de-escalation.

Recent experience in Iraq and Syria shows why. The collapse of central authority created power vacuums quickly filled by terrorist groups, exporting instability rather than peace.

Some argue that Iran’s internal unrest presents a strategic opportunity for external pressure. While the Islamic Republic faces genuine domestic challenges, including economic hardship and social discontent, this should not be confused with imminent collapse. The regime retains powerful security institutions and loyal constituencies, particularly when framed as defending national sovereignty.

Taken together, these factors suggest that current US military movements and rhetoric are better understood as coercive signalling rather than preparation for invasion.

This is not 2003, and Iran is neither Iraq nor Venezuela. A war would not be swift, cheap or decisive. The greatest danger lies not in a deliberate decision to invade, but in miscalculation. Heightened rhetoric and military proximity can increase the risk of accidents and unintended escalation.

Avoiding that outcome will require restraint, diplomacy and a clear recognition that some wars – however loudly threatened – are simply too costly to fight.

Bamo Nouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why it would be a big mistake for the US to go to war with Iran – https://theconversation.com/why-it-would-be-a-big-mistake-for-the-us-to-go-to-war-with-iran-274592

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Justin Stebbing, Professor of Biomedical Sciences, Anglia Ruskin University

Cancer and Alzheimer’s disease are two of the most feared diagnoses in medicine, but they rarely strike the same person. For years, epidemiologists have noticed that people with cancer seem less likely to develop Alzheimer’s, and those with Alzheimer’s are less likely to get cancer, but nobody could explain why.

A new study in mice suggests a surprising possibility: certain cancers may actually send a protective signal to the brain that helps clear away the toxic protein clumps linked to Alzheimer’s disease.

Alzheimer’s is characterised by sticky deposits of a protein called amyloid beta that build up between nerve cells in the brain. These clumps, or plaques, interfere with communication between nerve cells and trigger inflammation and damage that slowly erodes memory and thinking.

In the new study, scientists implanted human lung, prostate and colon tumours under the skin of mice bred to develop Alzheimer‑like amyloid plaques. Left alone, these animals reliably develop dense clumps of amyloid beta in their brains as they age, mirroring a key feature of the human disease.

But when the mice carried tumours, their brains stopped accumulating the usual plaques. In some experiments, the animals’ memory also improved compared with Alzheimer‑model mice without tumours, suggesting that the change was not just visible under the microscope.

The team traced this effect to a protein called cystatin‑C that was being pumped out by the tumours into the bloodstream. The new study suggests that, at least in mice, cystatin‑C released by tumours can cross the blood–brain barrier – the usually tight border that shields the brain from many substances in the circulation.

Once inside the brain, cystatin‑C appears to latch on to small clusters of amyloid beta and mark them for destruction by the brain’s resident immune cells, called microglia. These cells act as the brain’s clean‑up crew, constantly patrolling for debris and misfolded proteins.

In Alzheimer’s, microglia seem to fall behind, allowing amyloid beta to accumulate and harden into plaques. In the tumour‑bearing mice, cystatin‑C activated a sensor on microglia known as Trem2, effectively switching them into a more aggressive, plaque‑clearing state.

Surprising trade-offs

At first glance, the idea that a cancer could “help” protect the brain from dementia sounds almost perverse. Yet biology often works through trade-offs, where a process that is harmful in one context can be beneficial in another.

In this case, the tumour’s secretion of cystatin‑C may be a side‑effect of its own biology that happens to have a useful consequence for the brain’s ability to handle misfolded proteins. It does not mean that having cancer is good, but it does reveal a pathway that scientists might be able to harness more safely.

The study slots into a growing body of research suggesting that the relationship between cancer and neurodegenerative diseases is more than a statistical quirk. Large population studies have reported that people with Alzheimer’s are significantly less likely to be diagnosed with cancer, and vice versa, even after accounting for age and other health factors.

This has led to the idea of a biological seesaw, where mechanisms that drive cells towards survival and growth, as in cancer, may push them away from the pathways that lead to brain degeneration. The cystatin‑C story adds a physical mechanism to that picture.

However, the research is in mice, not humans, and that distinction matters. Mouse models of Alzheimer’s capture some features of the disease, particularly amyloid plaques, but they do not fully reproduce the complexity of human dementia.

We also do not yet know whether human cancers in real patients produce enough cystatin‑C, or send it to the brain in the same way, to have meaningful effects on Alzheimer’s disease risk. Still, the discovery opens intriguing possibilities for future treatment strategies.

One idea is to develop drugs or therapies that mimic the beneficial actions of cystatin‑C without involving a tumour at all. That could mean engineered versions of the protein designed to bind amyloid beta more effectively, or molecules that activate the same pathway in microglia to boost their clean‑up capacity.

The research also highlights how interconnected diseases can be, even when they affect very different organs. A tumour growing in the lung or colon might seem far removed from the slow build up of protein deposits in the brain, yet molecules released by that tumour can travel through the bloodstream, cross protective barriers and change the behaviour of brain cells.

For people living with cancer or caring for someone with Alzheimer’s today, this work will not change treatment immediately. But the study does offer a more hopeful message: by studying even grim diseases like cancer in depth, scientists can stumble on unexpected insights that point towards new ways to keep the brain healthy in later life.

Perhaps the most striking lesson is that the body’s defences and failures are rarely simple. A protein that contributes to disease in one organ may be used as a clean‑up tool in another, and by understanding these tricks, researchers may be able to use them safely to help protect the ageing human brain.

Justin Stebbing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. People who survive cancers are less likely to develop Alzheimer’s – this might be why – https://theconversation.com/people-who-survive-cancers-are-less-likely-to-develop-alzheimers-this-might-be-why-274304