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April 15, 2026

¿Suenan mejor los vinilos que otro tipo de formato de reproducción de música?

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Ana María Barbancho Perez, Profesora Titular de Universidad en el área de Teoría de la Señal y Comunicaciones, Universidad de Málaga

Los vinilos vuelven a estar de moda… ¿o dejaron de estarlo alguna vez? HopeNFPhotography/Shutterstock

Hace unas décadas parecía que los discos de vinilo habían desaparecido de nuestras vidas. En un entorno digital –con dispositivos para escuchar música que van desde los CDs a las plataformas de streaming–, los requerimientos (de tiempo y espacio) que exigía la música analógica parecían condenar a los vinilos a su desaparición. Pero han vuelto o, en cierta medida, su vuelta demuestra que nunca se habían ido. Actualmente son el mayor referente del resurgimiento de lo analógico y muchos defienden su existencia por encima de cualquier otra opción.

Pero la gran pregunta sigue en el aire: ¿realmente suenan mejor los vinilos que la música digital?

Proceso de grabación: vinilo vs. digital

Para responder, veamos primero cómo se registra la música en un vinilo y en un sistema digital.

En los discos, el sonido se graba en un surco en espiral que se extiende desde el borde exterior hasta el centro del disco. Los surcos tienen forma de “V”, lo que permite almacenar la información en estéreo, ya que cada canal se graba en una de las paredes de esa “V”. Los surcos deben ser poco profundos para evitar problemas mecánicos, como perforaciones o movimientos bruscos que hagan saltar la aguja.

Estos surcos registran variaciones microscópicas proporcionales a la presión del sonido original. Sin embargo, antes de grabarla, la señal musical se modifica: se reducen los sonidos graves y se amplifican los agudos. Esto se realiza para adaptarse al funcionamiento de la aguja. Por eso, los tocadiscos incluyen un circuito que invierte este proceso: se amplifican los graves y se atenúan los agudos.

Almacenar audio en formato digital, como puede ser un CD, es muy diferente. La señal analógica no se guarda de manera continua, sino que para “representarla” se obtiene un determinado número de muestras del audio. En el caso de los CDs hablamos de 44 100 muestras por cada segundo. Tras esto hay que cuantificarlas, es decir, aproximar el valor de la muestra a los valores del conversor A/D (analógico-digital), para que este le asigne un código binario. Este valor se asigna usando 16 bits por muestra, lo que significa que disponemos de todas las combinaciones posibles de esos 16 bits. Esto se traduce en 65 536 valores.

Estos valores cumplen las condiciones necesarias para que se reproduzcan correctamente todas las frecuencias que el oído humano percibe. Sin embargo, este proceso no es perfecto y produce un pequeño error que se manifiesta como un leve ruido añadido a la señal original.

Los estudios de grabación utilizan formatos de audio profesional con más calidad que los de los CDs. Para esto, usan una frecuencia de muestreo mayor y más bits por muestra (24bits). Así, consiguen una representación más precisa de la señal y reducen el ruido introducido durante la conversión digital. Sin embargo, estos archivos requieren mucho más espacio de almacenamiento y no son prácticos para su uso doméstico. Por ello, se adaptan para que en un CD se puedan almacenar unos 80 minutos de música (aproximadamente 15-20 canciones).

Una torre de CDs con unos auriculares alrededor. — ¿Están los CDs también muertos o solo esperan su momento de resurrección?
Jakub Adamczuk/Shutterstock

Otros formatos de grabación y reproducción de música, como el popular MP3, son modelos de representación del audio con pérdidas. Esto significa que se elimina parte de la información original del sonido para que ocupe menos espacio. Por ello, su calidad siempre va a ser inferior a la de los vinilos y CDs. Las plataformas de streaming usan esos modelos con el objetivo de que las canciones carguen más rápido y consuman menos datos.

Calidad de sonido en casa: ¿vinilo o CD?

Para comparar de forma justa, en un entorno doméstico, qué formato sonaría mejor entre un disco de vinilo y un CD utilizaremos el mismo equipo de reproducción, compatible con ambos, y asumiremos que los dos están recién comprados.

En este escenario, el vinilo ofrecerá mejor sonido. Será más limpio, libre de ruido de muestreo o cuantificación, y con un rango de frecuencias completo. Aunque parte de estas frecuencias no son audibles, en determinados espacios sí tienen efecto en la percepción del sonido. Además, el vinilo aplica un proceso de ecualización propio que aporta un carácter particular distinto al del formato digital. De hecho, muchos sistemas de grabación digital actuales incluyen complementos o plugins que imitan esta característica sonora de los vinilos.

Además, el equipo utilizado para reproducir vinilos puede incluir amplificadores de gran calidad, incluso, en algunos casos, amplificadores de válvulas. Aunque estos últimos generan cierta distorsión, se considera que aportan calidez al sonido, haciendo su escucha más agradable.

Una imagen en la que se ven un vinilo, una cinta casete, un CD, un MP3... — A lo largo de las décadas los formatos de reproducción de audio han ido cambiando.
Luigi Bertello/Shutterstock

Hay que tener en cuenta, sin embargo, que el vinilo pierde con el uso, por desgaste. También el CD, si no es original o se ha conservado mal, puede dañarse y sufrir fallos en la lectura de las muestras digitales, lo que influye en la calidad del audio e incluso llega a provocar interrupciones en la reproducción.

Depende de la audiencia

Al llevarlo a ejemplos concretos, existen pequeños matices en los que se pueden diferenciar ambos sonidos.

Si pensamos en una guitarra acústica, en el CD habrá un silencio absoluto antes de que empiece a sonar, mientras que en el vinilo se percibirá primero un ligero sonido de fondo que proporciona calidez. De igual forma, en el vinilo el roce de los dedos del guitarrista contra las cuerdas se escuchará dulce y aterciopelado, mientras que en el CD será más agudo, dado que reproduce el sonido sin ningún tipo de suavizado y resulta más metálico.

Aunque en el caso de la música digital en streaming o CD, a menudo la audiencia no se preocupa por estos elementos, en este aspecto gana de nuevo el vinilo. No obstante, hay que recordar que el audio digital ofrece una calidad constante. Además, es fácil de transportar y almacenar, mientras que los vinilos se deterioran con cada reproducción y requieren más espacio y cuidados para su conservación.

Sin embargo, no podemos negar que estos ofrecen un sonido más cálido y completo que el formato digital. Tal vez por ello sigan atrayendo tanto a nostálgicos como a nuevas generaciones.

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Ana María Barbancho recibe fondos del Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades de los Proyectos PID2021-123207NB-I00 y PID2024-156798OB-I00, financiados por MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 y FEDER UE, y por Universidad de Málaga, Junta de Andalucía: TIC208-G-FEDER.

Isabel Barbancho recibe fondos del Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades de los Proyectos PID2021-123207NB-I00 y PID2024-156798OB-I00, financiados por MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 y por FEDER, UE y por Universidad de Málaga, Junta de Andalucía: TIC208-G-FEDER.

Lorenzo José Tardón García recibe fondos del Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades de los Proyectos PID2021-123207NB-I00 y PID2024-156798OB-I00, financiados por MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 y FEDER UE, y por Universidad de Málaga, Junta de Andalucía: TIC208-G-FEDER.

– ref. ¿Suenan mejor los vinilos que otro tipo de formato de reproducción de música? – https://theconversation.com/suenan-mejor-los-vinilos-que-otro-tipo-de-formato-de-reproduccion-de-musica-275628

April 15, 2026

Iran’s military forces combine state-of-the-art drones and hackers with out-of-date conventional weapons

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Paul J. Springer, Professor of Comparative Military Studies, Air University

Revolutionary Guard personnel stand under an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle, the Shahed-136, while participating in a military rally in Tehran, Iran, on Jan. 10, 2025. Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images

Six weeks of U.S. and Israeli bombardment have served to degrade Iran’s nuclear facilities and cripple parts of its military.

But the Islamic Republic’s offensive capabilities have been built up over nearly 50 years, during which Iran has been either at war or under the threat of conflict.

As an expert in military history and theory, I believe that to understand what may come next in Operation Epic Fury, it’s valuable to grasp the development of Iran’s modern military structure, capabilities and international activities.

Iranian military technology

Prior to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran’s military was largely supplied by Western powers, particularly the United States.

It entered the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 with a substantial amount of then-modern equipment. That included nearly 80 F-14 fighter aircraft, over 200 F-4 and F-5 aircraft and thousands of tanks.

But Iran’s military was exhausted when the war ended in 1988. And the government had by then become a world pariah, making resupply all but impossible.

Although Iran imported some military equipment from the Soviet Union and China in 1990, its economy could not support substantial military spending.

Ironically, the arms embargoes that Iran faced during and after its war with Iraq made the regime self-reliant on its weapons stockpiles. And that triggered the development of a substantial domestic arms industry.

Most modern Iranian military equipment consists of reverse-engineered American and Soviet equipment, much of it obsolete. Since 1990, however, Iranian missile technology has substantially improved. That’s due to domestic production and importing expertise from other marginalized states, such as North Korea.

Smoke rises from a warehouse in an open field. — Smoke rises from an oil warehouse on the outskirts of Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdistan region, following a suspected drone strike on April 1, 2026.
Gailan Haji/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

Starting in the 1990s, Iran also innovated a series of one-way attack drones, a relatively inexpensive way to attack distant targets.

The modern Iranian military

The Iranian military is split into the regular military, or “Artesh,” and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Artesh plays a domestic defense role akin to a militia, while the Revolutionary Guard serves as the more professional military force.

The Revolutionary Guard projects regional power. During the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war, for instance, it provided improvised explosive devices to insurgents targeting American forces.

The Revolutionary Guard tends to receive the bulk of Iranian military resources, including the best personnel and equipment. Quds Force, the unconventional warfare wing of the Revolutionary Guard, has long played a role in exporting the revolutionary beliefs of the Iranian rulers. The Quds Force provides arms and guidance to proxies throughout the Middle East, primarily by fomenting insurrections against Arab Sunni governments.

Iran has long been the patron of Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, whose primary goal is the eradication of Israel. More recently, Iran has also engaged in substantial support of Hamas in Gaza, despite the fact that Hamas is a Sunni organization, while the rulers of Iran are members of the Shiite branch of Islam.

Iran has constantly sought means of exerting military influence beyond its borders, without risking external attack. It has embraced the use of cyber warfare, a method of attack with a relatively low cost for participation and a potentially outsized influence on the world stage.

Iranian hackers have attacked Western military and government networks, including a hack of FBI Director Kash Patel’s personal emails. Iranian-backed hackers have also launched attacks on infrastructure and cultural institutions, including U.S. wastewater treatment plants and electrical grids.

Missile traces are seen in the sky. — Missile traces are seen over Damascus, Syria, during Iran’s missile attacks against Israel on June 14, 2025.
Hummam Sheikh Ali/Xinhua via Getty Images

Iran’s pursuit of atomic weaponry

Iran’s government has relentlessly pursued nuclear weapons since at least the 1980s.

The Iranian government has always maintained that its nuclear program is to provide power for the developing nation, rather than weaponry. But definitive evidence of uranium enrichment far beyond the requirements of power generation have caused Western states to demand an end to the Iranian nuclear program.

In 2010, cybersecurity researcher Sergey Ulasen discovered an incredibly complex malware program, dubbed Stuxnet, that was created to undermine the Iranian nuclear program by disrupting the function of enrichment centrifuges. No nation has ever taken responsibility for the attack, which set back Iranian uranium enrichment efforts by years.

In 2015, after negotiations with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany, Iran agreed to halt its uranium enrichment program in exchange for relief from economic sanctions and the release of frozen Iranian assets. The negotiations resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA.

Although the Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA in 2018, the agreement continued to function, and Iran seemed poised to reenter the global economy.

A machine produces a yellow substance. — Machines use yellow cakes to produce uranium hexafluoride at the uranium conversion facilities in Isfahan, Iran, on Feb. 3, 2007.
Behrouz Mehri/AFP via Getty Images

However, in 2020 the Iranians restarted their nuclear program. They also ramped up production of ballistic missiles and one-way attack drones.

In June 2025, the United States and Israel launched a massive aerial attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, an effort that Trump characterized as having destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran responded by launching a wave of ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel, most of which were intercepted before entering Israeli airspace.

The missile and interceptor war

Prior to Operation Epic Fury, analysts estimated that Iran possessed 3,000 ballistic missiles and tens of thousands of one-way attack drones. They also concluded that Iran had a substantial production capacity to increase its stockpiles.

In the first six weeks of the current conflict, Iran expended at least 650 missiles in attacks on Israel and hundreds more against other targets in the region.

The U.S. has placed a heavy emphasis on attacking missile production and storage facilities. But it’s difficult to ascertain how many missiles and drones the Iranian military might still possess.

Iranian production and transportation has almost certainly sustained substantial losses in capacity. And U.S. and Israeli aircraft prowl the skies over Iran seeking signs of mobile launchers or attempts to transport missiles to firing locations.

The rate of Iranian missile fire has substantially declined since the first days of the conflict, but it has never dropped to zero. That has led some analysts to suspect that Iran maintains a significant cache of long-range weaponry in reserve, while U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth argues that it has lost the capacity to launch major barrages.

Paul J. Springer is a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His comments represent his own opinion and do not reflect the official policy of the United States Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Air Force.

– ref. Iran’s military forces combine state-of-the-art drones and hackers with out-of-date conventional weapons – https://theconversation.com/irans-military-forces-combine-state-of-the-art-drones-and-hackers-with-out-of-date-conventional-weapons-280547

April 15, 2026

Canada cannot afford to lose international research talent — here’s what needs to change

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Evren Altinkas, Adjunct Professor, Department of History, University of Guelph

The Canadian government launched the Global Impact+ Research Talent Initiative in December 2025 designed to entice international researchers to come to Canada.

The initiative, which the government says will “invest up to $1.7 billion over 12 years to attract and support more than 1,000 leading international and expatriate researchers,” is a significant investment.

This is especially important amid declining cross-country budgets for post-secondary education and research.

But our work shows there are important challenges with recruiting and retaining internationally trained researchers.

Problems with points

International researchers face limited specific immigration pathways.

The comprehensive ranking system (CRS), also known as the point system), is the primary mechanism for skilled workers to attain permanent residence in Canada. The CRS ranks prospective immigrants based on their scores in relation to age, education, language and work experience. The federal government then invites candidates at or above a certain cutoff score to apply for permanent residency.

However, research by Christina Clark-Kazak, the second author of this story, shows how age-based points are inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 15 of the Charter, on equality rights, prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.

At the same time, these age-based points don’t make sense alongside work experience points. The result? An incoherent policy.

It takes many years to obtain a PhD. In Canada’s immigration ranking system, a PhD only yields 14-15 more points than a Master’s and 28-30 more than a Bachelor’s degree.

At the same time, applicants aged 30-40 years lose five points per year. After they turn 45, they receive no points.

The average age of a PhD graduate is 35. It can take several years to land an academic job in Canada.

Due to this age discrimination and undervaluing of education in the CRS, many talented colleagues with extensive training and experience don’t meet the points threshold.

To partially address this issue, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) introduced new categories for express entry in February 2026. These include a category for “researchers and senior managers with Canadian work experience.”

Immigration Minister Lena Metlege Diab has described the new categories as a way to “drive innovation and growth.”

However, in a March 4 announcement of invitations to apply for permanent residence under the revamped Express Entry system (the only draw to date since IRCC introduced new categories), only 250 invitations were announced, and none went to researchers.

Immigration status is an equity issue

Evren Altinkas, the first author of this story, has analyzed collective agreements across Canadian universities. This analysis demonstrates a systematic absence of immigration status as a recognized equity category within hiring frameworks.

Across dozens of institutions — including institutions that have significant global rankings, like the University of Toronto, University of British Columbia and McGill University — there is no explicit contractual language addressing internationally trained or displaced scholars.

Many collective agreements contain general employment equity or diversity clauses. But these overwhelmingly focus on domestically recognized categories such as gender, race and Indigeneity, leaving immigration status unaddressed.

This omission reflects a broader pattern of “invisibility” of non-status and precarious migrants in Canadian institutional frameworks.

Even where limited references exist — such as provisions connected to the Scholars at Risk Network at institutions like University of Ottawa or the University of Guelph — these remain exceptional rather than systemic.

Policies and agreements are barriers

Current equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) policies and collective agreements therefore pose interconnected practical, legal and behavioural barriers to recruiting and retaining internationally trained researchers.

Pervasive hiring norms include asking about Canadian experience — only recently set to change for some employers in Ontario
— and contribute to underemployment and skill mismatch.

The limited recognition of foreign credentials also systematically disadvantages immigrants.

Legally, immigration regimes create uncertainty that institutions and unions are not structurally equipped to accommodate. This is particularly the case with Canada’s increasingly complex “two-step” system of temporary to permanent residency.

The absence of immigration status within EDI discourse reinforces a narrow conception of diversity. This overlooks transnational academic trajectories.

Research shows that internationally educated researchers face persistent labour market barriers. These include visa precarity and limited institutional pathways into stable academic employment.

Even when funding mechanisms exist to support EDI-related scholarship or professional development, these are rarely designed to address structural constraints faced by internationally trained researchers.

This gap ultimately reveals a misalignment between Canada’s reliance on highly skilled immigrants and the institutional barriers embedded within academic labour systems.

Talented researchers voting with their feet

In this context, research shows both underemployment of talent and the departure of university-educated immigrants from Canada.

The Institute for Canadian Citizenship demonstrates “those with doctorates are nearly twice as likely to leave as those with a bachelor’s degree.”

The Canadian economy cannot afford to lose internationally trained academic and research talent. This is particularly true amid ongoing trade tensions with the United States and broader global economic uncertainty.

Canada’s competitiveness increasingly depends on its ability to attract and retain highly skilled workers in research, innovation and higher education.

Reports from the federal government emphasize that immigrants account for a significant share of growth in the highly educated labour force, especially in STEM and knowledge sectors.

Canada needs domestic innovation

Trade disruptions and protectionist policies — particularly in relation to the United States — have heightened the need for domestic innovation capacity.

Failing to integrate internationally trained researchers into stable academic positions risks exacerbating “brain waste,” where highly skilled people are underemployed despite labour shortages.

In a period marked by inflation, supply chain instability and shifting global alliances, retaining global talent is not only an equity issue but an economic imperative.

Canada’s long-term resilience depends on aligning immigration policy with institutional hiring practices in higher education and research sectors.

A path forward

We recommend three key changes to immigration policy and hiring practices.

First, along with more than 100 signatories of an open letter to the federal government organized through the interdisciplinary research partnership network UnborderED Knowledge (the “ED” in the name emphasizes education), we call for designated permanent residence pathways for internationally trained researchers.

The February 2026 Express Entry announcement provides an opportunity for IRCC to make a specific draw for researchers with a point threshold that redresses age biases in the CRS. They should do so as soon as possible.

Second, hiring practices in research institutions must acknowledge and accommodate immigration status as an equity issue, as outlined in the Tri-Agency Best Practices Guide for Recruitment, Hiring and Retention.

Third, in line with findings from the Ontario Human Rights Commission, federal and provincial governments should work with employers across all sectors to ensure that international researchers are not unfairly penalized for foreign credentials and experience.

Christina Clark-Kazak receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Evren Altinkas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Canada cannot afford to lose international research talent — here’s what needs to change – https://theconversation.com/canada-cannot-afford-to-lose-international-research-talent-heres-what-needs-to-change-276799

April 15, 2026

How commercial sand dredging is reshaping the largest lake in the UK – new study

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Neil Reid, Reader (Associate Professor) in Conservation Biology, Queen’s University Belfast

Algal blooms on Lough Neagh have harmful effects on wildlife and water quality. Studio 70SN/Shutterstock

At Lough Neagh in Northern Ireland, sand has been dredged commercially for decades. Large vessels remove sand from the lakebed and transport it to the shore. Because this happens underwater, the scale of the activity is largely invisible. Regulation has focused on where dredging is allowed and how much sand is removed.

Sand is used by the construction industry to make concrete. Demand for sand as a raw material is rising globally. Much of it taken from rivers, coasts and lakes.

But my team’s new research shows that this sand dredging is not just disturbing specific parts of the lakebed. That disruption is much more widespread and may be affecting the entire ecosystem.

Lough Neagh, the largest lake in the UK, supplies drinking water to 41% of the population of Northern Ireland and supports fisheries, wildlife and local livelihoods. Yet it is now at the centre of an environmental crisis. Toxic blue-green algal blooms caused by an overgrowth of the cyanobacteria Microcystis aeruginosa clog up the entire ecosystem.

Lough Neagh has experienced severe blue-green algal blooms each year since 2023, which can damage both environmental and public health. These blooms are mainly driven by nutrient pollution, warming waters and invasive species. Cumulative release of phosphorus and sustained sediment disturbance by dredging probably frees up nutrients in the system that could contribute to thresholds necessary for algal blooms to occur.

The current management by the Lough Neagh Action Plan focuses on reducing nutrient pollution and doesn’t yet consider sand dredging as a contributing factor.

To understand what is happening below the surface, my team worked with researchers at Newcastle University using sonar mapping to examine parts of the lakebed. Our findings revealed major physical changes. In some areas, dredging had carved deep depressions into the sediment, lowering the lakebed by up to 17 metres. These are not small disturbances. They reshape the lake’s structure.

The lakebed is a living habitat. It supports organisms such as the larvae of Lough Neagh flies, which form the base of the food web as prey for fish and other animals. It is also where commercially important fish like pollan and eel spawn. When this habitat is removed or repeatedly disturbed, ecosystem recovery can be slow or stall.

Our most striking finding was how far disturbance from dredging spreads. Satellite images showed plumes of sediment trailing behind dredging vessels, sometimes stretching more than a mile at the surface.

Such plumes are not created only during dredging itself, but also when boats move between sites, stirring up sediment in this unusually shallow lake with their powerful propellers. So-called “turbidity corridors” at times cover half of the lake’s surface. Sediment was also seen running off shoreline unloading yards, extending up to more than a mile offshore.

Dredging does not stay where it happens. Its footprint moves with the boats and spreads across the lake.

When sediment is stirred up, the effects ripple through the ecosystem. Cloudy water makes it harder for fish and birds to feed. More importantly, sediments store nutrients, especially phosphorus that may be released back into the water if disturbed.

Lough Neagh holds large amounts of what is known as legacy phosphorus. This has built up as a result of natural processes as well as decades of farm runoff, human wastewater treatment overflows and leaky septic tanks among other sources. When sediments are disturbed, stored pollution could potentially be released back into the water. Because the lake is shallow, that release can quickly affect the whole system.

The consequences for wildlife are significant. Disturbing the lakebed may damage fish spawning grounds and disrupt invertebrates that support the food web. Increased cloudiness can reduce feeding success for fish and birds. Powerful boat wakes could erode shorelines and disturb protected nesting birds. There is also concern for the eel fishery that recently collapsed.

While many factors are involved, widespread disturbance adds further pressure on an ecosystem already at the point of collapse.

Rethinking regulation

Current rules focus on the licensed dredging area and how much sand is removed. Our research suggests that approach is too narrow.

The wider effects including lakebed disturbance, sediment plumes, boat movement, propeller disturbance and runoff from the shore also need to be considered. If efforts to restore the lake focus only on reducing nutrient runoff from the land, other important drivers of decline may be overlooked.

There are practical ways to reduce the environmental footprint of dredging. Adjusting the force of suction used to collect sediment could reduce disturbance. Limiting overflow from the hopper – the part of the flat-bottomed barge used to collect dredged sand and water after suction – could reduce water containing sediment discharging back into the lake. Slower vessel speeds and fixed shipping lanes could confine disturbance.

In shallow waters, boats moving less forcefully – or protecting the lakebed – could stop sediment being churned up. On land, covering sand piles and using ponds or vegetation can help trap runoff before it flows into the lake.

Lough Neagh reflects a global issue. Demand for sand is increasing rapidly, putting pressure on aquatic environments worldwide. This research is the first attempt to measure how far the consequences of sand dredging extend across the UK and Ireland’s largest lake. The effects go well beyond the point of extraction.

If Lough Neagh is to recover, management will need to reflect the true scale of disturbances, including those unseen beneath the surface.

Neil Reid does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How commercial sand dredging is reshaping the largest lake in the UK – new study – https://theconversation.com/how-commercial-sand-dredging-is-reshaping-the-largest-lake-in-the-uk-new-study-279732

April 15, 2026

Netflix’s ‘The Dinosaurs’ rehashes a very old story — of empire and conquest

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Frederick Oliver Beeby Maglaque, Exhibition Researcher, Pacific Museum of Earth and Masters student in Art History, University of British Columbia

“This is the story of the dinosaurs as it has never been told before,” narrates Morgan Freeman in the opening of Neflix’s The Dinosaurs docuseries.

The four-part series combines advanced CGI with real nature footage to create cutting-edge photorealistic visuals and tell a compelling story. The Dinosaurs is undeniably a technical and scientific achievement.

Netflix’s marketing has emphasized the show’s accuracy and engagement of more than 50 scientific advisers. Meanwhile, experts describe some scenes as “speculative,” given our evolving knowledge of the Mesozoic Era.

What The Dinosaurs does tell us, with great accuracy, is a lot about ourselves.

Tracing the rise and extinction of dinosaurs from the Triassic period to the Late Cretaceous period, the show — much like the dinosaur media that came before it — reflects our own reckoning with possibilities of human extinction that is only more necessary as our planet changes rapidly due to climate change.

It also reinforces another familiar narrative: the story of life on Earth as a story of conquest.

A Spinosaurus baits a shark in this dramatic clip from ‘The Dinosaurs.’ (Silverback Films)

Exotic beasts to be tamed, classified

Dinosaurs first entered the visual culture of western science in the 19th century. Famous depictions include two full-sized dinosaurs — an Iguanodon and Megalosaurus — that were unveiled at Crystal Palace Park in London in 1854.

Dinosaur-like figures in the foreground, Crystal Palace in the background. — Engraving The ‘Crystal Palace’ from the Great Exhibition, by George Baxter, after 1854.
(Wikimedia Commons), CC BY

The Crystal Palace itself was designed for the 1851 Great Exhibition — which displayed animals, minerals, cultural objects and more from across the British Empire. It was a steel and glass monument to industrial modernity and imperial power.

These “exotic” fake dinosaurs were placed on small, artificial islands, within lakes in the palace park, where visitors could view them from afar. They were positioned as beasts to be viewed with as much wonder as terror that the combined authority of science and empire could tame and classify. They are still there today.

(Friends of the Crystal Palace Dinosaurs)

Imperial fantasies of extraction

The film Jurassic Park, released in 1993, followed its 19th-century predecessors, depicting dinosaurs as creatures that dwell in distant exotic realms that humans, typically white explorers or scientists, must journey to.

The film is set on the imaginary Costa Rican island of Isla Muerta, where dinosaurs are born from amber extracted from the fictional Mano de Dios mine.

Like the Crystal Palace dinosaurs, they evoke an unknown exotic frontier — shaped by imperial fantasies of extraction. And yet, films like Jurassic Park also question this framing. Characters who seek to dominate nature — the businessman, the lawyer, the big game hunter — ultimately meet their downfall.

A scene inside the fictional Mano de Dios mine in the 1993 movie Jurassic Park.

Dinosaurs versus Earth

So, what happens when these familiar tropes are presented through the hyperrealism of modern dinosaur documentaries, alongside real paleontological discoveries, as “accurate?”

“In a savage and ever-changing world, some will rise and some will fall. But through it all, the dinosaurs will expand their empire and advance relentlessly to seize Earth’s final frontiers,” narrates Morgan Freeman in Episode 3 of The Dinosaurs.

Throughout the series, dinosaurs are portrayed as seeking to colonize the planet. This is evident in the episode titles — Rise, Conquest, Empire, Fall — and in how the other organisms are depicted.

The first episode concludes with a cowboy-style showdown between a dinosaur and a rauisuchian, a Triassic reptile described as a monstrous, lesser “other.” This scene marks the beginning of the dinosaurs’ so-called “reign.”

Again and again, The Dinosaurs tells a story of dinosaurs versus Earth, where natural events like volcanism are described as “Earth’s darkest forces.” The planet itself becomes something to be overcome in the dinosaurs’ pursuit of empire.

This Mesozoic, non-human history is also told as a story that is always moving toward a known ending. The first episode opens with a Tyrannosaurus rex (T.rex) in the aftermath of the Chicxulub impact, a 100- million megaton blast that struck the Gulf of Mexico region and devastated the planet.

The T.rex closes its eyes as ash falls across an apocalyptic landscape. Dinosaurs are portrayed as conquerors of Earth and as always already doomed to fail — ruled by this so-called “tyrant lizard king.”

A Tyrannosaurus rex takes on an Ankylosaurus in this dramatic clip from ‘The Dinosaurs.’ (Silverback Films)

A story of human mastery

The Dinosaurs engages in what we could call the “dino dialectic” — a trope where dinosaurs are presented as allegorical stand-ins for humans, reflecting an anthropocentric and often colonial vision of the human subject.

As media theorist W.M.T. Mitchell writes, “Dinos R Us.”

At the same time, their inevitable extinction is used to define them as primitive and inferior. Dinosaurs are us, but we remain superior, masters of our fates and of our planetary dominion.

If The Dinosaurs, the latest in an increasing number of contemporary dinosaur documentaries, reflects our own apocalyptic anxieties while reiterating this “dino dialectic,” we are continuing to tell the same story that led us here.

These documentaries are examples of what visual culture scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff calls “Anthropocene visuality” — a way of seeing that “keeps us believing that somehow the war against nature that western society has been waging for centuries is not only right; it is beautiful and it can be won.”

Frederick Oliver Beeby Maglaque receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

Kirsten F. Hodge receives funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the Canadian Association of Science Centres.

– ref. Netflix’s ‘The Dinosaurs’ rehashes a very old story — of empire and conquest – https://theconversation.com/netflixs-the-dinosaurs-rehashes-a-very-old-story-of-empire-and-conquest-279162

April 15, 2026

Canada urgently needs a civilian defence strategy — before the next crisis forces one

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By William Michael Carter, Adjunct professor, Applied Systems Anthropologist (Defence & Security), Toronto Metropolitan University

On April 9, 1917, my great-grandfather, A. Harold Carter, was a 16-year-old underage Canadian Expeditionary Force soldier from the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles, 8th Brigade, 3rd Division.

At 5:30 am, he went over the trench at Vimy Ridge. He was a scrawny, 5’4″ kid from London, Ont., who defied his mother and signed up two years earlier at age 14. He survived.

Almost 109 years after the war that was to end all wars, Canada must once again consider training its citizens, as it did my great-grandfather, for a potential global conflict.

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s first mandate letter in May 2025, a month after his election, clearly prioritized Canada’s industrial, military and civilian global sovereignty as a key pillar of his new government.

His first budget, entitled Canada Strong, attempted to lay the fiscal foundation for Canada to act boldly and decisively, specifically on the much-neglected defence portfolio.

The June 2025 Building Canada Act has begun to cement that industry/civilian vision into reality, and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Inflection Point 2025 seeks to enable the CAF to be “Ready, Resilient and Relevant” to fulfil this mandate.

Canadian needs

Not since the Second World War have all levels of Canadian society — government, industry, citizenry and military — been fully aligned to “ensure that Canada is once again the master of its own defence,” as Carney puts it.

But either by intention or incompetence, the ill-timed leak in November 2025 of the CAF’s Defence Mobilization Plan raised serious concerns due to its suggestion that more than 300,000 federal employees should be trained for emergency quasi-combat duties. The intent was valid, but the context wasn’t.

The CAF’s “Defence of Canada” vision prioritizes a total defence framework. Canada currently deploys an emergency management, whole-of-society governance strategy, which is a layer of total defence, to ensure that all levels of society recover quickly from a crisis.

It’s a tested and proven model used by South Korea’s Civil Defence Corps and Australia’s State Emergency Service, which are primarily focused on disaster relief.

The recently revised Humanitarian Workforce Program is Canada’s primary federal funding vehicle for building a professional, civilian, disaster-response capacity training, led by non-governmental partners.

In practice, a whole-of-society approach is designed to free up the military from non-combat duties during major crises. But a total defence doctrine supports both civilian auxiliary and military roles and responsibilities. Canada is missing that piece of the equation.

A Finnish solution?

Canada’s 400-year legacy of voyageurs, militia, pathfinders and rangers reflects a long tradition of civilian contribution to defence. Since the War of 1812, the country has not faced invasion, due in part to co-ordinated efforts among regular forces, allied Indigenous Nations and civilian auxiliaries.

That history raises a contemporary question: if civilian capability once played a decisive role in national defence, what form should it take today? As modern threats evolve beyond conventional warfare, Canada must reconsider how to structure, train and mobilize civilian expertise, not as an ad hoc reserve, but as a genuine component of national resilience.

Canada could draw from the very successful defence-adjacent, civilian-co-managed National Defence Training Association of Finland (MPK), a mixed-model approach that supports annual training for ex-military personnel, reservists and, specifically, non-military civilians.

The Finnish system is based on a total defence doctrine adopted and successfully deployed primarily by the Scandinavian and Baltic states as a direct result to their proximity to Russia, a much larger adversarial nation. The doctrine recognizes that survival and mobilization of their civilian population is necessary in the face of an existential threat or a major war.

National defence has consequently becomes not only a military function, but also a societal capability.

A Finnish-inspired Canadian Defence Training Organization would align with the intent of the CAF’s Defence Mobilization Plan, while expanding civilian participation beyond national and provincial public service employees to a broader, self-selecting and even transnational pool of defence-minded Canadians.

For Canadians who want to contribute

As part of a broader civilian defence system, volunteers could receive annual training in practical skills like first aid, logistics, communications and evacuation. Over time, the program could also expand to include drone use and countermeasures, as well as small arms training.

It would function as a distributed, community-based resilience network — a modern civilian defence initiative similar to the Canadian Rangers training programs, but adapted for civilian use in southern urban and rural settings.

It would not replace the CAF’s Reserve Force, but instead offer a complementary pathway for civilians who want to contribute to defence in a supporting role.

Using the Finnish model would boldly address Carney’s mandate letter and captures the spirit of the Defence Mobilization Plan within a more Canadian sensibility. It’s defence-oriented without being alarmist.

Many civilians want to contribute to national defence, but are put off by the demands of reserve service and the challenge of fitting it into established civilian lives. This approach would give willing, highly skilled volunteers a way to help defend Canada without taking on a major, immediate commitment.

By adopting the shared military–civilian governance model of Finland’s MPK and drawing on the Canadian Rangers’ strong sense of community and resilience, a Canadian defence training organization could serve as both a force multiplier in times of crisis and a community builder in times of peace.

William Michael Carter does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Canada urgently needs a civilian defence strategy — before the next crisis forces one – https://theconversation.com/canada-urgently-needs-a-civilian-defence-strategy-before-the-next-crisis-forces-one-280194

April 15, 2026

Majorité libérale à Ottawa : une dynamique nouvelle et inespérée

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Allison Harell, Professor of Political Science, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)

En avril 2025, les électeurs canadiens ont choisi l’improbable en réélisant un gouvernement libéral minoritaire, cette fois-ci sous la houlette du nouveau chef Mark Carney. Un an plus tard, grâce à leurs trois victoires aux élections partielles de lundi, ils arrachent une courte majorité pour la première fois depuis 2019.

Il s’agit d’un retournement étonnant : pendant les deux années précédant le scrutin de 2025, les conservateurs jouissaient d’une telle avance dans les sondages que les analystes considéraient leur victoire comme quasi assurée.

Et pourtant, à l’élection du 28 avril 2025, les libéraux ont obtenu 43,8 % des voix, coiffant les conservateurs (41,3 %), alors que le NPD et le Bloc québécois enregistraient une forte baisse par rapport aux résultats de 2021.

Ce bouleversement s’explique par deux événements — dont l’effet pourrait être durable si l’on en juge par les résultats des élections partielles.

D’abord, le choc du retour Donald Trump à la présidence américaine. Son attitude hostile envers le Canada et la vague immédiate de droits de douane, en plus des répercussions économiques, ont changé la perception des Canadiens quant aux risques auxquels était exposé le pays.

Le deuxième événement — la démission de Justin Trudeau début janvier sous l’effet d’intenses pressions politiques — a redéfini l’image du Parti libéral presque du jour au lendemain.

Avec un Mark Carney fermement installé aux commandes du parti, les libéraux se sont présentés aux élections en misant sur le renouveau tout en jouant sur les menaces de Trump de faire du Canada le 51ᵉ État américain.

La question de l’urne : Trump et les droits de douane

Ces deux chocs ont redéfini les priorités. En cette période exceptionnellement tumultueuse, un grand nombre d’électeurs sont sortis des lignes idéologiques partisanes pour accorder leur vote au parti jugé le plus à même de protéger le pays. Et un an plus tard, semble-t-il, les électeurs canadiens continuent de considérer les libéraux sous cet angle.

De nouvelles données issues d’Étude électorale canadienne (EEC) éclairent cette dynamique. À la question de savoir quel parti est le mieux placé pour gérer les relations du Canada avec les États-Unis, 57,8 % des répondants, issus de presque tous les groupes partisans, ont choisi les libéraux.

Mais alors que 80 % des partisans libéraux et conservateurs sont restés fidèles à leur parti, 71,6 % des partisans du NPD et 62,8 % de ceux du Bloc québécois ont changé de camp et voté libéral.

On ne peut pas surestimer l’importance de cette tendance, qui a dominé toute la campagne électorale. Presque un Canadien sur trois a cité les relations avec les États-Unis, Trump ou les droits de douane comme l’enjeu principal des élections fédérales de 2025.

Ce taux se rapproche fortement de celui concernant les préoccupations économiques générales (35 %), lesquelles sont étroitement liées à la situation aux États-Unis.

Gardiens de l’économie

Historiquement, lorsque les électeurs donnent la priorité à la compétence économique, ce sont les conservateurs qui en profitent. Mais en 2025, les turbulences causées par les barrières tarifaires américaines ne se sont pas traduites par en votes pour eux.

Au contraire, une large majorité de Canadiens a soutenu le recours à des représailles tarifaires (68,7 %). En outre, 48 % des Canadiens ont désigné les libéraux comme le parti le plus apte à gérer l’économie, tandis que 39 % ont choisi les conservateurs.

Ce renversement a entraîné une cascade de répercussions. Le vote stratégique des partisans du NPD, en particulier, s’est avéré décisif. Normalement, les partisans d’un parti lui restent fidèles, comme en 2021, où 80 % des partisans néodémocrates avaient voté pour leur parti. Mais en 2025, plus de la moitié ont basculé dans le camp libéral, un comportement très inhabituel.

Un basculement similaire s’est produit au Bloc québécois, quoique dans une moindre mesure, mais suffisamment pour donner aux libéraux un gouvernement minoritaire, ce qui était inimaginable six mois plus tôt.

Une popularité qui ne se dément pas

À l’approche du premier anniversaire de cette élection, les répercussions sont encore manifestes dans l’opinion publique.

Selon un sondage réalisé début 2026, les libéraux détiennent une avance de six points dans les intentions de vote à l’échelle nationale, ainsi qu’un taux d’approbation de 52 %. Quant à Mark Carney, sa cote de popularité nette s’établit à +20.

Si l’on se fie à ces indicateurs ainsi qu’aux résultats des élections partielles, les électeurs n’ont toujours pas éprouvé le « remords de l’acheteur » qui suit parfois les élections stratégiques. Ils semblent même plutôt rassurés par la combinaison de stabilité et de compétence technocratique qu’ils recherchaient en 2025.

Le gouvernement libéral s’est également trouvé raffermi suite à plusieurs changements d’allégeance politique, dont quatre députés conservateurs et une députée néodémocrate. La dernière défection à ce jour, celle de la conservatrice Marilyn Gladu, a placé les libéraux à un seul siège de la majorité — quelques jours seulement avant les trois élections partielles qui viennent de leur donner la majorité.

La suite dépendra fortement de l’évolution de la situation sur la scène internationale. Mais pour l’heure, les Canadiens semblent globalement satisfaits du choix stratégique qu’ils ont fait en avril 2025.

L’Étude électorale canadienne a reçu des financements du Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines.

Daniel Rubenson bénéficie d’un financement du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada

Laura Stephenson a reçu un financement du CRSH (Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada) et de la Fondation Max Bell pour ses travaux de recherche.

Lewis Krashinsky bénéficie d’un financement du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (n° 756-2024-0366).

– ref. Majorité libérale à Ottawa : une dynamique nouvelle et inespérée – https://theconversation.com/majorite-liberale-a-ottawa-une-dynamique-nouvelle-et-inesperee-280644

April 15, 2026

Les minerais critiques, essentiels à la transition énergétique, sont au cœur d’une nouvelle ruée minière

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Margaux Maurel, Doctorante en affaires internationales spécialisée sur les impacts économiques, sociaux et environnementaux des projets d’infrastructure et d’énergie dans les pays du Sud Global et l’activisme transnational. Chercheuse affiliée au CERIUM, HEC Montréal

Les bases d’une gouvernance mondiale pour les minerais critiques, essentiels à la transition énergétique, se heurtent à une course stratégique entre grandes puissances et pays producteurs, où la sécurisation des chaînes d’approvisionnement prime sur l’écologie, la justice sociale et les droits des communautés locales.

La COP30, qui s’est tenue à Belém au Brésil en novembre dernier, a été la première à mettre les minerais critiques sous les feux des projecteurs. S’en est suivie en décembre la 7^e Assemblée des Nations unies pour l’Environnement (UNEA-7), à Nairobi, au Kenya.

Ces minerais critiques, essentiels pour les technologies bas carbone, se situent en très grande majorité dans les pays du Sud Global. La République démocratique du Congo détient près de 50 % des réserves mondiales de cobalt, le Chili, l’Argentine et la Bolivie représentent plus de 35 % des réserves de lithium. Le Chili détient également près de 30 % des réserves mondiales de cuivre tandis que les Philippines et l’Indonésie sont les premiers producteurs de nickel.

Doctorante en affaires internationales à HEC Montréal et chercheuse affiliée au CÉRIUM, mes travaux portent sur la résistance des communautés locales et autochtones face aux projets miniers liés aux minerais critiques. Le bilan des négociations multilatérales de ces derniers mois apparaît, à ce titre, particulièrement révélateur.

Un bilan mitigé de la COP30

En juin 2024, le secrétaire général des Nations unies a créé le Groupe d’experts sur les minéraux essentiels à la transition énergétique. Son mandat : réunir les gouvernements, l’industrie et la société civile afin de discuter « d’équité, de transparence, d’investissement, de durabilité et de droits humains ». En septembre 2024, ce groupe a présenté un ensemble de sept principes et cinq recommandations concrètes, discutés lors de la COP29 à Bakou, puis repris comme référence à Belém.

À la COP30, le Mécanisme d’Action de Belem (BAM), intégré au programme de travail sur la transition juste initié à la COP28, devait poursuivre cette avancée. Soutenu par de nombreuses organisations des sociétés civiles, il a été repris dès le début de la COP30 par le Groupe des 77 et la Chine. Les minerais critiques figuraient dans les premières versions du texte.

Plusieurs États, dont l’Union européenne, le Royaume-Uni, l’Australie et la Colombie, ont plaidé pour une gouvernance mondiale renforcée. La Colombie, aux côtés du Sultanat d’Oman, a même porté l’idée d’un traité mondial contraignant sur la traçabilité et la durabilité des minerais critiques.

Mais ces ambitions se sont heurtées à de fortes résistances et au veto russe et chinois. Les minerais critiques ont disparu de la version finale du programme sur la transition juste. À la place, la résolution non contraignante adoptée à l’Assemblée des Nations unies pour l’environnement appelle simplement à renforcer le dialogue et la coopération internationale en matière de gouvernance minière et de valorisation des déchets miniers. La reconnaissance politique existe, mais elle reste enfermée dans des mécanismes volontaires, sans pouvoir contraignant.

En décembre, les Nations unies lancent à l’UNEA-7, un groupe de travail sur les minerais essentiels à la transition énergétique. Ce groupe a développé sept principes directeurs applicables à toutes les étapes de production et de transformation des minerais et de leur cycle de vie, comme l’équité, la justice, la protection de l’environnement.

Échec du multilatéralisme, vers une course aux accords bilatéraux ?

En janvier, les États-Unis se retirent de nombreuses instances internationales et cessent leur participation active aux négociations de l’UNEA.

Le 4 février, Washington encourage ses partenaires et les États riches en minerais à signer un accord-cadre sur la coopération en matière d’approvisionnement et de traitement des minerais critiques. Ce cadre non contraignant définit une politique coordonnée visant à accélérer les investissements, à réduire la dépendance vis-à-vis des chaînes d’approvisionnement chinoises et à fournir une feuille de route pour le soutien financier et politique.

De leur côté, le 22 novembre, la Chine et l’Afrique du Sud ont lancé l’Initiative bilatérale de coopération pour soutenir la modernisation en Afrique, incluant les minerais critiques.

Le centre de gravité se déplace : de la gouvernance environnementale mondiale vers la sécurisation stratégique des chaînes d’approvisionnement en minerais critiques.

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Tentatives d’accords régionaux pour les pays producteurs

Les pays producteurs de minerais critiques cherchent également à se positionner. Le 13 février, les associations industrielles du nickel des Philippines et d’Indonésie ont annoncé la création d’un corridor indophilippin du nickel.

L’Indonésie, qui a interdit dès 2020 l’exportation de minerai brut pour développer sa transformation locale, est devenue un acteur intermédiaire clé du nickel de qualité batterie. L’annonce d’une coordination régionale pourrait sembler marquer un tournant.

Les cinq piliers évoqués concernent : la gouvernance, les critères environnementaux, sociaux et de gouvernance (ESG), le capital humain, la cohérence réglementaire et la facilitation des investissements. Ils s’inscrivent dans le cadre des discussions de l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est sur les minerais critiques pour la transition.

Mais aucun mécanisme contraignant n’a été annoncé : ni coordination des politiques d’exportation, ni stratégie commune de fixation des prix, ni fonds d’investissement partagé. Il s’agit davantage d’une plate-forme de dialogue que d’un levier de transformation structurelle.

Surtout, la contrainte majeure demeure implicite : l’expansion du raffinage indonésien a été largement financée, conçue et opérée par des entreprises chinoises. La transformation du nickel en Asie du Sud-Est reste profondément imbriquée dans des chaînes de valeur structurées par des capitaux et des technologies chinoises. Sans capacité de transformation autonome et sans contrôle fiscal coordonné, la promesse d’une souveraineté pour les Philippines reste fragile à bien des niveaux. Les Philippines font partie des pays signataires d’accord avec les États-Unis pour le développement de capacités industrielles de raffinage, mais pour le moment, le pays exporte la quasi-totalité du nickel brut, notamment vers la Chine.

Vers une fragmentation de la gouvernance des minerais critiques ?

On observe plutôt un système de règles dispersées, dans un contexte mondial de fortes tensions géopolitiques. Les grandes puissances privilégient la protection de l’accès aux minerais tandis que les pays producteurs oscillent entre industrialisation, recherche d’investissements et pressions géopolitiques.

Pendant ce temps, la crise écologique, la justice environnementale et la justice sociale semblent complètement occultées des récentes négociations. Cette nouvelle ruée minière a des conséquences importantes sur les droits humains, les droits des peuples autochtones et les écosystèmes. Il convient de demander : à qui profite réellement cette nouvelle ruée minière ?

Margaux Maurel ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Les minerais critiques, essentiels à la transition énergétique, sont au cœur d’une nouvelle ruée minière – https://theconversation.com/les-minerais-critiques-essentiels-a-la-transition-energetique-sont-au-coeur-dune-nouvelle-ruee-miniere-267479

April 15, 2026

Why the US and Israel’s alliance endures – even when it strains

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Bamo Nouri, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London

Israel and the US have maintained a close alliance for decades. Their recent joint air campaign in Iran has once again underscored the depth of this partnership. Yet while the strength of their relationship is widely acknowledged, the reasons behind it remain contested.

At the centre of this debate lies the question of whether US support for Israel is driven primarily by domestic political forces, particularly lobbying organisations such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac), or whether it reflects broader strategic imperatives within US foreign policy.

Aipac’s historical influence is well documented. It emerged in the 1950s from the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs and developed into a powerful lobbying organisation. By the 1970s it had become instrumental in securing substantial US military and economic aid, as well as favourable legislative outcomes, for Israel.

US aid to Israel now includes approximately US$3.3 billion (£2.4 billion) annually in military financing and an additional US$500 million for missile defence. Aipac, which has embedded itself across Democratic and Republican political networks, has played a central role in maintaining this flow of support.

But the claim that Aipac drives US policy, which former US counterterrorism official Joe Kent suggested in March when resigning from the Trump administration in opposition to the Iran war, misreads how power operates in Washington.

As scholars of American power, we argue that the US-Israeli alliance has been driven primarily by Israel’s demonstrated value as a strategic asset for the US, rather than solely by the influence of lobbying. Aipac has become effective because it aligns with this existing strategic consensus, not because it created it.

Strategic US asset

This strategic consensus can be traced to the cold war. Israel’s decisive victory in the 1967 six-day war over a coalition of Arab states supported by and aligned with the Soviet Union revealed its utility as a regional proxy capable of advancing US interests in the Middle East.

From that point onward, US policymakers framed Israel as a pillar of their Middle East strategy – part of a broader effort to contain the influence of rival powers, project US power overseas and stabilise a region that is central to global energy supplies.

This framing became institutionalised in US policy in the late 1960s. Washington sharply increased arms transfers, supplying Israel with advanced aircraft such as F-4 Phantoms under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Intelligence-sharing arrangements were also expanded between the two countries.

The US perception of Israel as a strategic regional asset grew further in 1970. That year, the US requested that Israel prepare to intervene in Jordan on behalf of the government in its conflict with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Israel responded by moving troops to the border, with the presence of Israeli planes overhead often credited as having deterred invasion by Syrian forces.

Then, during the 1973 Yom Kippur war (again fought between Israel and Soviet-aligned Arab states), the US launched a large-scale airlift of military supplies into Israel. The operation signalled that Israel’s security was now directly tied to American strategy.

From the late 1970s, Israel was incorporated into a wider US-led regional security architecture alongside countries such as Egypt and Jordan. This followed the 1978 Camp David accords and 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which brought Egypt into a US-backed regional order. The US subsequently expanded joint military exercises, positioned military equipment in Israel and deepened defence coordination across these states.

Further evidence underscores the primacy of strategy in the US-Israeli relationship. President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 decision to sell surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia, for example, proceeded despite intense opposition from pro-Israel lobby groups. When core US strategic interests have been at stake, US policy has overridden lobbying pressure.

Formal agreements have reinforced the depth of the US-Israeli alliance. A 2016 memorandum of understanding committed US$38 billion in military aid over a decade. The US is also Israel’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade approaching US$50 billion annually.

Cooperation extends across scientific, technological and industrial sectors, while both states are deeply integrated within international organisations. This dense web of ties cannot be reduced to lobbying influence alone.

Israel has played a significant role in destabilising the Middle East in recent years through its actions in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. It has also effectively undermined the current ceasefire between the US and Iran by continuing to bomb Hezbollah targets in Lebanon.

In light of these developments, does the core premise of the US-Israeli alliance – that Israel helps underpin regional stability in line with US interests – still hold? Or are the foundations of US support for Israel beginning to strain under the pressures of a more volatile Middle East?

We argue that, instead of undermining the alliance, Israel’s continued attacks on Lebanon expose the underlying structure of the US-Israeli relationship. Israel said Lebanon was not included in the ceasefire, a stance that was reinforced by US officials including President Donald Trump and Vice-President J.D. Vance.

They backed Israel’s right to act against Hezbollah, with Trump calling the conflict in Lebanon a “separate skirmish”. This alignment suggests not divergence, but coordination within an asymmetric relationship in which the US provides the overarching strategic framework and Israel executes within it.

Rather than adding strain to the alliance, these developments illustrate its durability. Even where Israeli actions risk escalation or complicate diplomacy, US support remains intact – rooted in a broader convergence of interests centred on maintaining regional dominance.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why the US and Israel’s alliance endures – even when it strains – https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-and-israels-alliance-endures-even-when-it-strains-278517

April 15, 2026

National Car Parks is in administration – some big companies are so dependent on debt that they can’t adjust to change

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Erwei (David) Xiang, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Accounting, Newcastle University

When the UK’s biggest private car park company went into administration last month, some motorists might have been surprised. How could National Car Parks (NCP), a company that charged so much for parking, at so many prime sites across the country, run out of road?

Maybe it was down to a drop in commuters and high street shoppers after COVID? Or perhaps the firm suffered from too many long leases and the rise of new parking apps?

All of these reasons will have featured, but the deeper cause of NCP’s demise lies in the way it was financed. This was not simply a business undone by shifting travel habits – it was a business made dangerously fragile by debt.

Any company can suffer when demand falls. But a company carrying a heavy debt burden suffers differently, because the bill for past borrowing does not shrink when customers disappear. Interest still has to be paid and creditors rarely wait patiently for a market to recover.

NCP now looks like a textbook example of just how exposed firms can become when high borrowing meets rising costs and weaker cash flow.

By the time administrators were called in, NCP’s finances were already deeply impaired. Park24, its Japanese parent company, said that last September the company’s debts exceeded the value of its assets by around £305 million.

It later emerged that NCP had faced years of difficult trading and that parking demand had failed to return to pre-pandemic levels, especially in city centre and commuter locations.

In those circumstances, a business with a stronger balance sheet might have had time to close sites, renegotiate leases or absorb a few years of disappointing demand. But with huge debts, NCP no longer had those options. And once a company reaches the point where liabilities tower over assets, strategic choices become financial emergencies.

The roots of the problem go back further than COVID. NCP was bought and sold several times over the past two decades, passing through private equity firms, and gathering debt along the way, before it was sold in 2017 to Park24 and the Development Bank of Japan. So the debt burden of 2026 was not simply the product of recent trading weaknesses. It was, at least in part, an inheritance from an earlier ownership model.

This is the logic of what’s known as a “leveraged buyout”, where a company is bought largely with borrowed money, and the acquired company’s future cash flow is expected to service the debt.

A car park operator may once have looked well suited to that structure. It had assets, was geographically diverse and was supported by predictable demand. And debt is most manageable in businesses with stable and dependable cash flows. In principle, parking should have fitted the bill.

But the model depends on one crucial assumption – that the underlying business will keep generating sufficiently stable cash flow. If that assumption fails, debt can become a trap. And NCP’s stability turned out to be much more fragile than its financiers appear to have assumed.

From leverage to liability

The post-pandemic shift in commuting did not create NCP’s debt problem then, but it exposed it. Fewer people now travel into city centres five days a week, and online shopping has weakened some of the retail footfall that once helped sustain town-centre parking.

What made this fatal was that NCP’s revenues fell while many of its costs did not. The company had a high concentration of long-term, inflexible leases, meaning it could not simply walk away from loss-making sites or bring costs down in line with lower occupancy. Meanwhile, utilities, maintenance, staffing, business rates and structural upkeep all continued to cost more.

High energy costs, as well as high inflation left the business squeezed from both sides: less money coming in and stubbornly high costs going out.

Empty motorway lanes. — COVID meant no cars, so no parking.
Ink Drop/Shutterstock

Research shows that once a heavily indebted company begins to look shaky, debt becomes harder to refinance and more punishing to carry. And it’s not just NCP. Thames Water is another example of a company providing an everyday service which is weakened by huge debt.

At NCP, administrators will try to keep things going while they explore options. But whatever happens to that brand, it will not be the last British business pushed to the edge by debt.

The British Chambers of Commerce has already warned that the current conflict in the Middle East could push inflation up, while businesses in energy-intensive sectors are sufferering new cost pressures. For heavily indebted firms, that is exactly the kind of environment that turns vulnerability into collapse.

NCP’s failure, then, should not be dismissed as a quirky casualty of hybrid work or a changing market. It is also a warning about what happens when a business is so heavily loaded with debt that it loses the flexibility to respond when the world changes.

Erwei (David) Xiang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. National Car Parks is in administration – some big companies are so dependent on debt that they can’t adjust to change – https://theconversation.com/national-car-parks-is-in-administration-some-big-companies-are-so-dependent-on-debt-that-they-cant-adjust-to-change-280092