Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During a recent interview with CNN host Jake Tapper, the White House deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller, laid out what appears to be the core of the new ideology driving US foreign policy: the notion that might is right. Or, as he put it: “We’re a superpower. And under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”

Miller was referring to the Trump administration’s ambitions to take control of Greenland, if necessary by force. “We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,” he told Tapper. “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.”

The 40-year-old Californian is one of Trump’s most trustworthy advisers and also one of the longest serving, having joined Trump’s first campaign in January 2016. While the president’s first administration had a revolving door of different appointees, many of whom who barely lasted a year, Miller is one of a handful of advisers to serve in both Trump’s first and second terms.

The two reportedly have a close working relationship, meeting daily along with Trump’s chief of staff, Susie Wiles, to go through Trump’s diary and review the executive orders to be signed. Having started out as a speechwriter, Miller’s position has evolved to focus more on interpreting the president’s ideas and executing them as policy initiatives. He is also understood to be a key liaison point between the White House and Capitol Hill, where he briefs lawmakers on Trump’s plans.

Origins of an extremist

Miller’s extreme ideas did not come out of nowhere. In contrast to the vice-president, J.D. Vance and secretary of state, Marco Rubio, whose ideologies have evolved significantly to be in line with Trump’s agenda, Miller has had a long history of supporting radical America First style policies.

While in high school in Santa Monica, Miller is said to have complained about students having to pick up rubbish, saying janitorial staff should do it instead. As a 16-year-old he contributed an article to a local website, criticising his fellow Hispanic students for a lack of language skills.

While at Duke University, where he studied political science, he contributed a number of articles to the college website, attacking multiculturalism and championing right-wing issues. He was also part of a group at Duke, Students For Academic Freedom, that criticised what they saw as political bias among faculty staff. These ideas would resurface in his attack on universities as a Trump administration official.

Moving to Washington, Miller first worked as an aide to then Republican representative Michele Bachmann before taking a job with Republican senator Jeff Sessions as press secretary. One of his main focuses was in developing critiques of immigration, collaborating with groups such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform and the Centre for Immigration Studies.

This is where he developed the ideas that have formed the backbone of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies, including the now notorious family separation policy, by which children were often taken from their parents – who were subject to prosecution for attempting to cross the US southern border illegally. The policy was judged to be so harsh that the UN openly condemned it as cruel and unnecessary.

Immigration has been one of the main focuses of Miller’s work in Trump’s second term. He is understood to behind the decision to deploy immigration and customs enforcement agents en masse on the streets of US cities with power to detain and deport suspected illegal immigrants. Other radical policies bearing Miller’s hallmark are the plan to end the American policy of birthright citizenship, in contravention of the 14th amendment to the US constitution.

But then many of the policy ideas he espouses have brought Miller into conflict with American constitutional law. He has publicly declared that in some circumstances it should be permissible to suspend a person’s habeas corpus right to a trial before they can be imprisoned and he has questioned the power of the judiciary to hold the administration to account over executive decisions on matters such as deportations and due process.

Personality politics

If relatively unknown during Trump’s first term, Miller’s profile has grown considerably in the first 12 months of the second Trump administration. A YouGov poll conducted in September 2025 found that 50% of respondents had heard of him and he had a popularity rating of 18%.

But if he is disliked and feared by many on Capitol Hill, as well as among the wider public, Miller has an ideological ally and staunch supporter in his wife Katie, who achieved instant fame on January 3 after tweeting a map of Greenland with the US flag superimposed on it, accompanied by the word “SOON”.

Within hours the US president had voiced his intention to intervene in Greenland for reasons of national security and to secure access to its huge reserves of mineral resources.

Like her husband, Katie worked in the first Trump administration, at the department of homeland security. She once told a reporter that even the administration’s separation policy was not a problem for her, claiming: “DHS sent me to the border to see the separations for myself, to try to make me more compassionate, but it didn’t work.”

She now runs The Katie Miller podcast, which she established as a “place for conservative women to gather online”. Among other things, it provides a regular and uncritical platform for administration officials.

But the Millers’ growing public profile could prove to be a double-edged sword for the Trump administration. Despite saying out loud what many on the far-right of the Republican party want to hear, their apparent extremism is increasingly a focus for Trump’s critics. California’s democrat governor Gavin Newsom – generally thought to be preparing for a presidential run in 2024, has taken to referring to Miller as Voldemort, the personification of evil in the Harry Potter novels.

All of which is unlikely to resonate well with the independent voters that the Republicans desperately need to win over if they are not to lose vital ground in November’s midterm elections.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Stephen Miller: portrait of Donald Trump’s ideologue-in-chief – https://theconversation.com/stephen-miller-portrait-of-donald-trumps-ideologue-in-chief-272869

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Serdy, Professor of the Public International Law of the Sea, University of Southampton

Relations between the US and Russia have hit a fresh bump after the US coastguard boarded a vessel sailing in the Icelandic waters, claiming it was in breach of sanctions on Venezuela. The incident immediately sparked claim and counter-claim from the US and Russia.

The US claimed it was acting correctly to execute a warrant issued by a US federal court. Russian officials, meanwhile, were reported by the country’s Tass news agency as saying this was in clear breach of the law of the sea, saying “no state has the right to use force against ships properly registered in the jurisdictions of other states”. The statement asserted that the Bella 1 – which was recently renamed as the Marinera – had received a temporary permit to sail under the Russian flag on December 24.

Unlike the dramatic abduction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, from his Caracas palace on January 3, which the United States (US) does not even appear to be trying to defend in international law terms, the interdiction of the Marinera/Bella 1 appears to raise a new point of the law of the sea which may offer at least some prospect for Washington to show itself to be on the right side of the law.

Before the change of flag, the US seemed to be selecting with some care the ships carrying Venezuelan oil that it was targeting. These were either stateless or suspected of flying a false flag, which provides no protection under Article 92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which is also the customary international law rule for non-parties such as the US.

Stateless ships are vulnerable

Being stateless, or acting in a way that gives warships on the high seas a valid basis for treating it as though it were stateless, is a position that any ship would be recommended to avoid if at all possible. A ship that is stateless has by definition no flag state to assert the protective exclusive jurisdiction over it on the high seas.

Unclos also provides that a ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, and swaps them depending on the circumstances, “may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State”. This means it can be regarded legally as stateless.

Thus, until the change of flag reported on December 31, not just the US but any State was entitled to treat the Marinera/Bella 1 as stateless. This made it vulnerable to interception on the high seas and the exercise of domestic law enforcement jurisdiction over it by the State of the interdicting warship or coastguard vessel.

So the legal position remains unclear. It may be a question of whether the US was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 when it changed its flag. If so the US may be entitled to disregard the reregistration.

Unclos allows for what it refers to as “hot pursuit”. It says that: “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third [another] State.” Since no other circumstance in which the right ceases is mentioned, including the ship ceasing to be stateless, this leaves it open to the US to argue that it was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 and was thus not required to call off its pursuit.

But this argument has limited usefulness as there’s doubt as to whether this was actually a hot pursuit at all. The term is used for pursuits that begin in one of the maritime zones of the State conducting it – not on the high seas.

Claim and counter-claim

So far the Russian Ministry of Transport has claimed that the US action is contrary to the Article 92 rule. Russia insists that the change of registry occurred as long ago as December 24. To counter this, the US could say that it wasn’t until the Russian flag was painted on the ship’s hull, which was reported on December 31, that the Article 92 rule could be invoked against the US.

Article 92 also lays down that: “A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.” This is often misunderstood and assumed to mean that a change of flag in mid-voyage – such as appears to have occurred in this case – is not permitted at all. But a closer reading reveals that this is not the case. What it prevents is a change of flag without a corresponding change of registration.

But that is not the position here. Assuming there was a real registration to Russia, that is what counts. Painting on a flag because you don’t have a physical one is simply evidence of that.

Reflagging while under pursuit is a new point in the international law of the sea to the extent that no previous incident of it is known. In the absence of a clear answer on this, the way this incident plays out is itself going to set the precedent for the future on this issue. We’ll need to hear the competing legal narratives of the US and Russia to see which of them is the more convincing.

Andrew Serdy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. US boards a ship sailing under a Russian flag: what we know and don’t know about the legal position – https://theconversation.com/us-boards-a-ship-sailing-under-a-russian-flag-what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-the-legal-position-272957

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Shortly after the US military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on January 3, US president Donald Trump restated his claim to Greenland. The White House sees Greenland, which is part of the kingdom of Denmark, as crucial for national security and is reportedly considering a range of options to acquire the island. This includes “utilising the US military”.

Trump’s proclamations have led to a sense among Europeans that US aspirations for dominance over the western hemisphere extend beyond Latin America. And the fact that Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, told congressional leaders in Washington that the administration wants to buy Greenland, not invade it, is unlikely to make them feel much better.

Their worries that Trump is serious about annexing Greenland are not unfounded: the US president has repeatedly expressed his desire to make Greenland part of the US, starting back in his first term. But some of the presumed implications, like the dissolution of Nato as foreseen by Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, are at least for now overblown.

Assuming there is an American move against Greenland, this would not be the first time two Nato allies have been at loggerheads. France pulled out of Nato’s military structures in the late-1960s over concerns about losing its foreign policy autonomy and possibly being drawn into the Vietnam war.

Greece withdrew from military participation in the alliance in 1974 after neighbour and fellow Nato member Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern, predominantly Turkish-Cypriot, part of the island. Tensions between the two Nato members continue to this day but have not brought the alliance down.

Nato also rode out the Suez crisis in 1956. This crisis saw Britain and France, together with Israel, invade Egypt to regain control of the Suez canal before withdrawing after intense US pressure.

The alliance also survived the “cod wars” between the UK and Iceland in the 1970s. And Nato did not disintegrate during the rift that emerged between its members in the run-up to – and in the aftermath of – the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

What sets all of these previous examples apart from an American move against Greenland is that this would be the first time the US engages in an aggressive act against a Nato ally. This would hardly be something that Denmark and its European allies could accept, especially if it involves the use of force.

But not accepting US aggression can come in many different forms. On the spectrum of possible responses, the least likely is an activation of the EU’s mutual defence clause, which would be followed by military hostilities between European states and the US. The EU does not have the military capabilities, nor is it likely to have the political will, to go to war with the US.

A mass European exodus from Nato is also far from a foregone conclusion. Nato’s founding treaty does provide an option for members to leave in its article 13, which foresees a “notice of denunciation” and a 12-month period until an exit takes full effect. But given the security threats that Europe currently faces from Russia, even a temporarily dysfunctional Nato would be better than no Nato at all.

In the event that the US moves to take control of Greenland, political paralysis within Nato would almost be certain. This would probably involve escalating rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic and a Danish withdrawal from military participation in Nato.

European diplomatic protests against American action over Greenland might lead Trump to declare that the US is withdrawing from Nato. But that, too, is not straightforward. Such a move would require approval in the US Senate and consultation with members of both houses of Congress.

There would probably be significant pushback both from US lawmakers and from the Pentagon. This is because a US withdrawal from Nato would entail a possibly rushed and almost certainly chaotic transfer of responsibilities in the Nato command structure and would raise major questions about US military bases in Europe.

None of this would be in the interests of American security and would certainly undermine US abilities to project force outside the western hemisphere.

Europe’s next steps

So, for Europe, the first order of the day is not to panic and rush into any ill-advised actions. While it is important to match Trump’s aggressive rhetoric, it is also key not to be drawn into needless escalation. In the long-term, an even deeper transatlantic fracture is ill-suited to the European interest in a revitalised Nato.

Security in the Arctic is a joint priority for the alliance, not just for the US. Greenland is a critical node in north Atlantic security, but so are Iceland and Norway as well as US bases in Europe. Emphasising these shared interests may not cut much ice with Trump but it is likely to strengthen congressional resolve to push back against the president’s threats to the transatlantic alliance.

At the same time, Europe should not rush into any hasty deals with Trump over Greenland. While US security concerns, and possibly even economic interests, could be accommodated in existing arrangements, anything beyond that – such as selling Greenland to the US in exchange for renewed US commitments to Nato and Europe – would be foolish.

Not only can Trump not be trusted to keep any promises he might make in order to get a deal done but he could also not credibly commit his successors. Hence, any arrangement that the Europeans may now undertake to manage American hostility may be counterproductive if it cannot be undone should the mood in Washington change to become less anti-European.

And there is still a faint hope in Europe that things might get better either after the US mid-term elections in 2026 or the presidential elections in 2028. As always, there is also the possibility that Trump’s strategic focus might zoom in on some other issue – such as a protracted failure of US policy in Venezuela – and so take his eyes off Greenland.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.

Mark Webber is Senior Non-resident fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome and a trustee of NATO Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy to carry out research on NATO.

– ref. US action against Greenland would undermine Nato, but now is not the time to panic – https://theconversation.com/us-action-against-greenland-would-undermine-nato-but-now-is-not-the-time-to-panic-272911

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Will Smith, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, University of Nottingham

Domestic pigeons have surprising cultural significance. They inspired Charles Darwin in his thinking about evolution, delivered wartime messages to save lives, and have symbolic meaning around the world.

The domestic pigeon is among the best understood animals on the planet, with research published weekly on various aspects of their biology. Yet we know very little about their wild ancestors. Because of this, I have been visiting Scotland’s Outer Hebrides since 2019 to study the truly wild pigeon.

Millennia of human-pigeon interactions arose from the domestication of a small, blue-grey bird – the rock dove – 5,000-10,000 years ago, probably in the Middle East. Most of us are familiar with feral pigeons. Found cooing and strutting throughout the world’s cities, these animals descend from escaped domestic birds.

Unlike feral pigeons, which thrive in attics (or outside McDonald’s), the rock dove is shy, and mostly found on cliffs or mountains. Domestic pigeons, feral pigeons and rock doves all belong to the same species – Columba livia.

Although rock doves are native to vast swathes of Europe, Africa and Asia, their modern geographic distribution is unclear, thanks to interbreeding with feral pigeons. Across much of their original range, rock doves have gone extinct, replaced by pigeons with a mixture of wild and feral ancestry. For example, they have been completely subsumed into the feral pigeon gene pool across England and Wales.

Nevertheless, wild-looking pigeons were known to live in parts of Scotland and Ireland. Among ornithologists and casual birdwatchers, these birds were sometimes said to be “proper” rock doves, and sometimes wild-feral hybrids. It was this mystery that inspired me to study these birds which, living in remote habitats (and being difficult to distinguish from feral pigeons), had been neglected by scientists for decades.

In 2022, my colleagues and I published the first genetic study of these Scottish and Irish populations. We confirmed that they are wild rock doves, but that wild-feral interbreeding is common. We found that rock doves have thinner beaks and rounded heads, whereas feral pigeons have an engorged cere (the white fleshy lump above the beak).

Most interestingly, the rock doves of the Outer Hebrides, off the west coast of Scotland, remain genetically distinct, with limited evidence of interbreeding with feral pigeons. Future genetic research will hopefully identify similar colonies surviving elsewhere (wild-looking populations are also seen in parts of Asia, north Africa, and the Mediterranean).

For now though, Outer Hebridean rock doves represent the “wildest” (having the least feral pigeon ancestry) known contemporary population in the world. Foraging in meadows, and roosting in sea caves, they have, against scientists’ expectations, escaped the impacts of domestication. This is probably because pigeon keeping has always been rare in the Outer Hebrides, and few feral pigeons make it across the sea from mainland Britain.

Each year, I spend several weeks in the Outer Hebrides studying the rock doves. To allow individual birds to be followed throughout their lives, they need to be fitted with coded leg rings. Urban feral pigeons can be captured with a hand net and some birdseed, but their warier cousins require a more thoughtful approach.

We find that the best way is to target them overnight, when they are roosting. We take measurements, photographs and blood samples, before returning them to sleep. We have so far incorporated over 1,200 birds into our study.

Outer Hebridean rock doves are sparsely distributed, in colonies of up to a hundred birds. They rest and breed in caves, rocky crags and ruined buildings. Living among golden eagles and red deer, it’s a completely different lifestyle to that associated with feral pigeons.

In 2025, we published the results of a GPS tracking trial. We tracked rock doves from a colony in a disused barn, to see whether life in a human-built environment affects their behaviour.

Although naturalists have long discussed a classic rock dove “commuting” behaviour (travelling many miles each day, between roosting and foraging sites), this is not what we observed with our barn-dwelling birds. While many Outer Hebridean rock doves still commute (they are seen traversing the islands each morning and evening), the doves we tracked had abandoned this behaviour, associating almost exclusively with farmland.

This may give us a rare window into the earliest stages of domestication in this species. Our observations suggest that, instead of being deliberately retrieved from nature and actively farmed, rock doves were probably first attracted by agriculture, abandoning their natural commuting behaviour to live alongside us. Providing roosting structures likely enhanced this process – and we started building dovecotes at least 4,000 years ago.

The exciting thing about working with rock doves is that much of their biology
remains a mystery. We now know that genetically distinct populations persist, but there’s little information about their reproduction, predators or diseases.

Studying wild rock doves gives us a rare chance to establish how one of science’s model species lives in nature. This may yield insights into domestication, wild-feral hybridisation, and human-wildlife relationships – contributing to the wider understanding of our place in the natural world.

Will Smith’s research on rock doves has previously been funded by the Edward Grey Institute and the John Fell Fund (both of the University of Oxford), the British Trust for Ornithology, the Scottish Ornithologists’ Club, the British Birds Charitable Trust, the Houghton Trust, and the John Muir Trust. His research is currently funded by the Leverhulme Trust (as an Early Career Fellow), the Genetics Society, and the British Ecological Society.

– ref. What I’ve learned from studying the wild pigeon – https://theconversation.com/what-ive-learned-from-studying-the-wild-pigeon-269116

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Arash Beidollahkhani, Research Fellow at the Global Development Institute, University of Manchester

Protests that began in late December over rising prices and a collapsing currency have now spread to most of Iran’s 31 provinces, with demonstrators taking aim at the country’s rulers. The demonstrations signal a deep challenge to a political order that many Iranians see as incapable of delivering stability, dignity or a viable future.

The unrest poses the most serious challenge to Iran’s political establishment since 2022. That year, nationwide protests erupted over the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in police custody after she was arrested for violating hijab rules. Those demonstrations were ultimately suppressed through force.

Iran’s political establishment has for decades defined itself through permanent confrontation on multiple fronts: with Israel, the US and what it sees as global imperialism. This posture has reshaped domestic life by subordinating the economy, governance and social stability to ideological resistance.

What the latest protests reveal is not simply frustration with the hardship that has accompanied this political stance. They seem to reflect a growing consensus among Iranians that this order cannot be reformed into something functional and must therefore be replaced.

This has been apparent in the language used by the protesters. Many demonstrators have linked their daily hardships to the regime’s foreign policy priorities, expressed perhaps most clearly through one chant that has echoed through the streets of various Iranian cities in recent days: “Not Gaza, not Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran.”

The slogan is a rejection of the regime’s official stance that sacrifice at home is necessary to fulfil ideological goals of “resistance” abroad. Iran has long pursued a policy of supporting militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to counter the influence of the US and Israel in the Middle East.

Chants of “death to the dictator” – a reference to Iran’s ageing supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – are yet more evidence of the broad rejection of the political order among the Iranian population. They signal that many Iranians now view their economic survival as inseparable from fundamental political change.

The protests have spread across wide sections of Iranian society. What began as strikes by bazaar merchants and shopkeepers in Iran’s capital, Tehran, quickly drew in students, professionals and business owners elsewhere in the country. Protests have even been reported in Qom and Mashhad, cities whose populations have traditionally been loyal to the state.

The state’s initial response to the protests was muted. The government recognised the protests and promised to listen to the “legitimate demands” of the demonstrators. However, despite a warning from US president Donald Trump of US intervention should security forces “kill peaceful protesters”, at least 36 people have died so far. Over 2,000 more people have been detained.

Post-war paralysis

The protests come six months after Iran’s brief but destabilising war with Israel. This conflict severely strained the state’s capacity to govern, with Khamenei largely withdrawing from public view since then due to heightened fears over his safety. Major decisions in Iran require Khamenei’s approval, so his absence has slowed decision-making across the system.

The effects of this have been felt nationwide. Universities and schools have been hampered by repeated closures, shortened schedules and the sudden suspension of in-person classes. Transport networks have faced repeated disruption and economic planning has become nearly impossible.

Prices are now rising fast. The official annual inflation rate stands at around 42%, with food inflation exceeding 70%. The prices of some basic goods have reportedly risen by more than 110% compared with a year ago, and are expected to rise further in the coming weeks.

Iran’s authorities have also intermittently suspended routine daily and weekly activities since the end of the war, such as school days, public office hours, transport services and commercial operations. They cite energy shortages, pollution or security concerns as the reasons for doing so.

Underlying these disruptions is a governing system braced for the possibility of renewed war, either with Israel or possibly the US. The regime is operating in a prolonged state of emergency, which has pushed Iranian society itself deeper into crisis.

Iran’s governing paralysis has been strained further by intensifying competition within the ruling elite. The war with Israel led to the deaths of several senior Iranian military and security figures, which has created gaps in networks of power.

With authority fragmented, rival political, military and security factions have sought to position themselves for influence in a post-Khamenei order. Networks associated with figures such as former president Hassan Rouhani, former foreign minister Javad Zarif and current president Masoud Pezeshkian are pursuing negotiations with western powers to address Iran’s foreign policy challenges.

But others appear to be engaging in talks aimed at securing backing from ideological allies such as Russia and China. These include people in security and intelligence circles, along with figures ideologically aligned with Khamenei like his second-eldest son Mojtaba, current speaker of parliament Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and conservative clerics such as Mohammad-Mahdi Mirbagheri.

These rival strategies have not produced coherent governance. Instead, they have reinforced perceptions among the Iranian public that the system is preoccupied with survival rather than addressing everyday breakdowns in basic administration, public services and economic coordination.

Iran stands at a crossroads. One path leads toward deeper militarisation, elite infighting and prolonged paralysis. The other points towards a reckoning with a political order that large segments of Iranian society no longer believe can deliver stability or welfare.

The protests suggest that the central question for many Iranians is no longer whether the system can be repaired, but whether continuing to live under it is viable at all. What is clear is that Iran is at a critical political moment, with significant changes likely to unfold in the weeks and months ahead.

Arash Beidollahkhani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Iran protests have put the country’s political system on trial – https://theconversation.com/iran-protests-have-put-the-countrys-political-system-on-trial-272781