Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ian Hall, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University

Just months into President Donald Trump’s second term in office, one of the United States’ most important strategic partnerships is in crisis.

Relations between the US and India are at their lowest ebb in a quarter of a century. Things are so bad that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reportedly refused to accept calls from Trump for more than two months.

In recent days, Trump labelled trade ties with India a “totally one-sided disaster” and a report emerged that he is no longer planning to visit India later this year for a summit of the Quad partners (India, the US, Australia and Japan).

So bad, so quickly

Things were not meant to happen this way. Many in New Delhi were delighted when Trump won the election last year. Modi congratulated his “friend” on X, along with pictures of the two embracing and holding hands.

India’s foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, told journalists that while other countries might be “nervous” about Trump’s return, India was not.

Feeling confident, Modi went to Washington to meet Trump days after his return to office. The encounter did not go well.

On the eve of the meeting, Modi was embarrassed by distressing images of Indian nationals, handcuffed and shackled, being deported from the US on a military aircraft.

In the Oval Office, he promised to buy more US arms, oil and gas, and asked that Trump not impose punitive tariffs on India. Modi failed to get that commitment.

A few weeks later, Trump announced India would be hit with a 27% tariff – far higher than the 10% imposed on China – unless it could negotiate something better.

Crisis in Kashmir

Begrudgingly, New Delhi began to talk trade. US Vice President JD Vance visited India in late April and both sides made positive noises about a deal. But while Vance was in town, India was engulfed in a new crisis.

On April 22, terrorists killed 26 people – mostly Hindu tourists – in Kashmir, long the site of simmering conflict between India and Pakistan. The Modi government pledged to respond with force, as it had done in the past after similar incidents.

On May 7, India bombed what it claimed were militant camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. A rapidly escalating, unpredictable conflict followed, as both sides used drones and missiles to attack one another.

Alarmed, governments around the world urged the two nuclear-armed states to end hostilities before matters got out of control. Early in the morning on May 10, they did, and agreed to a ceasefire.

Trump anoints himself peacemaker

Before either the Indian or Pakistani governments had a chance to say anything, Trump stepped in to take credit.

On social media, he announced both sides had agreed a deal. The next day he claimed they would soon sit down with him as mediator and find a solution to the Kashmir conflict.

Islamabad was jubilant at this outcome. New Delhi, meanwhile, was furious.

India’s longstanding view is that the Kashmir dispute must be settled bilaterally, without third-party involvement. The US has accepted this position for more than 20 years. Now it appeared Trump was taking a different view.

This put Modi in a bind. Keen to maintain a mutually beneficial partnership and avoid punitive tariffs, he did not wish to upset Trump.

But he could not acknowledge Trump’s claims without setting aside a fundamental principle of Indian policy. So, Modi called Washington and explained he would not accept mediation over Kashmir.

The final straw

Meanwhile, Pakistan saw an opportunity to win favour in Washington and drive a wedge between the US and India.

Recognising that Trump covets a Nobel Peace Prize, Islamabad nominated him for his supposed role in ending the conflict.

Enthused, Trump called Modi on June 17 and asked him to do the same. Worse still, Trump requested Modi stop in Washington on the way back from the G7 summit in Canada, and meet with Pakistan’s military chief, Asim Munir.

According to a recent report, that was the final straw for Modi. He flatly refused both requests. The two men reportedly haven’t spoken since.

Piqued, Trump responded by punishing India for continuing to buy Russian oil by lifting its tariff rate to 50% and postponing trade talks.

New Delhi’s dilemma

Trump’s actions have ordinary Indians seething and demanding action, but the Modi government does not have good options.

Giving in to coercion would make Modi – dubbed by political opponents “Narender Surrender” – look weak. Yet, no other major power can offer India what it needs in terms of markets, investment, technology, weapons and diplomatic support.

With US-India relations strained, New Delhi has been working hard to stabilise its relationship with China, which has been tense since bloody border clashes between the two in 2020.

Modi went to China for the first time in seven years on August 31 to further that aim, shaking hands with President Xi Jinping. But although Xi emphasised the need for amicable ties – he said the “elephant and dragon should dance together” – there is little trust between India and China at present.

Modi has more faith in Russia. In China, Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly spoke for nearly an hour in Putin’s limousine. And Modi will host the Russian leader for more talks in India later this year. However, Russia remains a pariah in Europe, with limited means to help.

Other countries, like Japan, where Modi stopped off on his way to China, could also help India navigate the current crisis. But they do not have the clout to resolve it.

Unless Modi can find a way to win Trump back, India’s next few years could be very difficult.

Ian Hall has received funding from the Australian Research Council, Department of Defence, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. He is an honorary Academic Fellow of the Australia India Institute.

– ref. Donald Trump was once India’s best friend. How did it all go wrong? – https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-was-once-indias-best-friend-how-did-it-all-go-wrong-264272

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Felicity Deane, Professor of Trade Law and Taxation, Queensland University of Technology

Trading partners of the United States are facing a fresh period of uncertainty after a US federal appeals court ruled President Donald Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs were illegal.

In a 7-4 majority, the judges ruled Trump had exceeded his power by invoking emergency powers to impose tariffs of “unlimited duration on nearly all goods from nearly every country in the world”, upholding an earlier court decision.

The ruling will throw into disarray the strategies of trading partners still in negotiations with the US, who may decide to wait and see the outcome of the legal battle.

Although there are different options available to challenge the decision, Trump has made it clear the next stop will be the Supreme Court.

The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit said the tariffs would remain in place until October 14, to allow time for further appeals.

The power to tax rests with Congress

The ruling tested the limits of executive power under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) from 1977. Trump is the first president to use this act to impose tariffs, setting the stage for a test of executive power. At least for now, it is a test the administration appears to have failed. The judges rejected Trump’s interpretation, which they said would place no limit on the president to raise revenue without any authorisation from Congress.

Citing Article 1, section 8, of the US Constitution, the majority judgement unequivocally stated that “tariffs are a tax” and the power to tax under the Constitution rests with Congress.

In upholding an earlier decision by the Court of International Trade, the appeals court majority noted:

if the President can declare an emergency to cut the deficit by raising taxes in whatever way he wishes, not much remains of Congressional authority over taxation.

The tariffs are still in place

There were two important outcomes from this latest decision. First, the “liberation day” tariffs are (currently) deemed illegal. Second, these “illegal” tariffs will temporarily stay in place to allow for the appeal options to be explored.

Revenue will continue to be collected under the executive orders in question. Should the tariffs be deemed illegal on appeal, that revenue may need to be returned.

This ruling does not apply to all tariffs. It doesn’t cover specific sector tariffs such as those on aluminium and steel. However, other tariffs imposed during the first Trump presidency have already been ruled illegal under World Trade Organization rules and are currently the subject of appeal under the multilateral dispute settlement system.

The latest ruling would not reverse the decision to suspend the de minimis exception that caused global postage chaos. However, if the ruling is upheld, the rate of tariffs on low-value goods would revert back to pre-“liberation day” percentages. In many instances, this would mean back to zero.

What about the deals?

Trading partners initially responded with panic to the unveiling of Trump’s chaotic tariff agenda in April. There was a rush to meet with the president and make so-called deals. So what should governments of trading partners do now?

The most logical response might be to wait out the US legal process, because there may be no point in making deals if the tariffs are upheld to be illegal.

Unfortunately, this means continued uncertainty for business. On one hand, the courts may determine the tariffs are unlawful and must therefore be revoked. But Congress could subsequently move to reimpose tariffs with fresh legislation, or Trump could try other legal avenues.

The Constitution vs loyalty to Trump

If the administration does decide to appeal to the Supreme Court, the important test will not necessarily be about tariffs but whether the US Constitution will continue to support the separation of powers.

The appeals court decision argues the IEEPA does not support the introduction of tariffs of the magnitude of the “liberation day” tariffs. What the IEEPA does allow is for the president to “regulate […] importation”. However, the court suggested this phrase is nothing more than

a wafer-thin reed on which to rest such sweeping power.

Although the appeals court noted that such arguments have been rejected by the Supreme Court in the past, we will have to wait and see whether it is a “wafer-thin reed” that will become doctrine.

The Supreme Court has a conservative majority, with six of nine judges appointed by Republicans, including three in Trump’s first term.

The Supreme Court has already granted the president immunity from prosecution in some circumstances. If the majority decides to allow these widespread and indefinite tariffs, they may be one step closer to creating an American monarch.

Felicity Deane does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s tariffs are headed to the US Supreme Court, prolonging the chaos on trade – https://theconversation.com/trumps-tariffs-are-headed-to-the-us-supreme-court-prolonging-the-chaos-on-trade-264249

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Claudio Bozzi, Lecturer in Law, Deakin University

US officials believe Chinese President Xi Xinping has set a deadline for his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027 – the centennial anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth mentioned this date at a security conference in Singapore in May, warning of the “imminent threat” China poses to Taiwan.

The PLA has invested heavily in expanding and modernising its operations in recent years. Since 2015, it has built the world’s largest navy and coast guard.

But rather than threaten an invasion of Taiwan, China seems increasingly likely to pressure the self-governing, democratically ruled island with an extended blockade to force it to capitulate.

In preparation for such a possible action, China has developed a new command structure enabling it to coordinate its air, sea and land-based weapons systems to enact a strategy of lianhe fengkong (联合封控), or joint blockade. This would effectively cut Taiwan off from the outside world.

In late July, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) produced a report on 26 simulated war games it conducted to determine what a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would look like.

Taiwan’s natural gas supplies were predicted to run out after ten days of a blockade. Coal and oil supplies would run out in a matter of weeks. If Taiwan’s electricity was reduced to 20% of its pre-blockade levels, all manufacturing would cease. Casualties were expected to be in the thousands.

Taiwan is particularly vulnerable to a blockade. It relies more than any other developed nation on port calls relative to the size of its economy. Its biggest ports are on its west coast, facing mainland China. The island also has limited emergency food and fuel reserves.

What is a blockade under the law?

Imposing a naval blockade during armed conflict is an established right under customary international law. Blockades are not illegal per se, but they must comply with the laws of war. It’s a complicated and controversial area of the law.

To be legal, a blockade must first be effective. That is, the blockading power must maintain a force that prevents access to the enemy’s coast.

Other nations must be notified of the instigation of the blockade and its geographical extent.

A blockade must be enforced impartially against all vessels, except neutral vessels in distress. Any vessel breaching the blockade would be subject to being stopped, captured or fired upon.

Lastly, a blockade cannot prevent access to neutral ports or the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians.

Blockade strategies

China may use one of several blockade strategies against Taiwan. In contrast to an invasion, blockades can be scaled up or back, or reversed, depending on the unfolding security situation.

For instance, China may attack merchant shipping vessels seeking to enter Taiwanese waters to deliver essential cargo, coercing Taiwan to submit to China’s takeover. This is known as a kinetic blockade.

Alternatively, it may implement its preferred strategy of “winning without fighting”. Given the sheer size of its navy, coastguard and maritime militia, China could simply encircle the island and block access to its ports.

This could isolate Taiwan from the global economy to the point of forcing it to surrender, or weaken it sufficiently to enable an invasion, without engaging in open hostilities. This is a non-kinetic blockade.

Other ways of impeding naval passage

China may also use measures that fall short of a blockade, but have similar effects. It has passed a suite of domestic laws that legitimise military and non-military aggression of this kind.

For example, the navy or coast guard may:

• lay mines in the sea without declaring a formal blockade
• establish maritime danger or exclusion zones for foreign ships, and
• intercept, detain and regulate foreign vessels.

These tactics would only be effective because China’s domestic laws have exploited ambiguities in jurisdiction over its surrounding waters.

For example, China has passed laws requiring notification from foreign vessels if they enter waters it considers its own and under its control, and allowing its ships to alter or suspend maritime traffic for security or military purposes.

Those powers, however, are inconsistent with international law. China, for example, considers the Taiwan Strait as Chinese territory. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, however, the strait is considered international waters, which enables freedom of navigation for all vessels.

Also, creating an unstable security environment around Taiwan (similar to what Houthi forces have done in the Red Sea), or threatening penalties and sanctions for failing to comply, may in effect be tantamount to a blockade.

How to counter a blockade

It is not clear how other nations would respond to a Chinese invasion or blockade.

In recent years, China has attempted to project its naval power by establishing no-go zones in its neighbourhood, such as turning the South China Sea into its own fortified waters.

One way to oppose China, then, would be a counter-blockade. This would entail allied naval forces, likely led by the United States, closing the choke points, such as the Malacca Strait, on which Chinese seaborne trade with global markets depends.

However, counter-blockades are problematic, too. The impact on the world economy would be huge, as a blockade of the Malacca Strait, for example, could impact all trade between Asia and the rest of the world. China has also stockpiled domestic resources and expanded its land-based trade routes in recent years.

The best option, then, might be supporting Taiwan to survive a long blockade, forcing China to back down.

This means helping Taiwan become more resilient by increasing its food, fuel and medicine stockpiles, developing robust communication and cyber defences, and strengthening its port and energy infrastructure.

If the US built up its naval capacity in the Pacific, it could also use frigates to escort convoys of merchant ships to break a Chinese blockade, though the CSIS war games indicated this could come at a considerable cost of lives and ships – and increase the potential for all-out war.

Claudio Bozzi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. China may not invade Taiwan, but rather blockade it. How would this work, and could it be effective? – https://theconversation.com/china-may-not-invade-taiwan-but-rather-blockade-it-how-would-this-work-and-could-it-be-effective-257731

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Michael Toole, Associate Principal Research Fellow, Burnet Institute

Ever since Robert F Kennedy (RFK) Jr was appointed United States Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has been under pressure to abandon its traditional evidence-based approach to public health in America and across the world.

That pressure came to a head last week with the sacking of recently appointed CDC director Susan Monarez. According to her lawyers, the longtime government scientist, who had been in the role less than a month, was targeted after she refused to “rubber-stamp unscientific, reckless directives”.

Monarez will be replaced by Jim O’Neill, deputy director of the Department of Health and Human Services. Critics note he has no medical or scientific training.

On the same day as Monarez’s firing, three senior officials resigned. They included the CDC’s chief medical officer, and two others with leadership roles in areas including vaccines and emerging diseases.

I worked at the CDC between 1986 and 1995. Almost all of my work was with activities overseas.

While the CDC is a key institution overseeing and funding public health in the US, it’s also instrumental in global health. Consequently, turmoil at the CDC could have an impact not just in the US, but around the world.

Vaccine scepticism: a threat to public health

Soon after the inauguration of US President Donald Trump for the second time in January 2025, threats to American public health became clear. RFK Jr was confirmed as the Secretary of Health and Human Services in February, with authority over the CDC.

By April, 25% of CDC staff had been fired and its contract spending was cut by 35%. Cancelled CDC programs included those focused on the prevention of lead poisoning in children, environmental health, and sexually transmitted infections including HIV.

Notably, RFK Jr has a long history of vaccine scepticism.

In 2019–20, more than 5,700 people became infected when a measles outbreak ravaged the island nation of Samoa. Some 83 people died, most of them children.

In the lead up, a number of ads spread vaccine misinformation on Facebook, sowing doubt about safety of the measles vaccine. Some were found to have been funded by Children’s Health Defense, an organisation founded by RFK Jr.

RFK Jr’s department has dismissed and replaced the 17 expert members of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices with eight new people – a number of whom have reportedly expressed anti-vaccination views.

During RFK Jr’s tenure so far, his department has:

• reduced access to COVID vaccines for children and pregnant women
• cancelled contracts to develop new mRNA vaccines worth US$500 million
• revived the search for a long disproved link between childhood vaccines and autism.

RFK Jr is arguably the most important figure overseeing health in the US. It’s difficult to overestimate the harm his actions will do to vaccine confidence and uptake in America and around the world.

A long history of international aid

While the CDC had long provided advice to the World Health Organization (WHO) on malaria control, the first major overseas initiative was as an active partner in the WHO’s successful global smallpox eradication program. Along with the Soviet Union, the CDC initially focused on West Africa in the 1960s and then India and Bangladesh in the 1970s.

The CDC’s first international emergency health response occurred during the Biafra conflict, which led to widespread famine in the Eastern part of Nigeria. In 1968, at the request of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the CDC mobilised staff to monitor nutrition and design programs to combat malnutrition.

The agency’s largest ever overseas intervention began in March 2014 when an Ebola outbreak occurred in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. By July 2015, the CDC had allocated 3,000 staff to Ebola, with 1,200 on the ground in West Africa, including neighbouring countries such as Nigeria and Senegal. CDC staff provided technical advice on strengthening laboratory diagnosis, contact tracing and surveillance.

Following the Ebola outbreak, the Global Health Security Agenda was established as a coordinated epidemic preparedness initiative with members from more than 60 countries, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations. The Obama administration funded US involvement generously with the CDC leading US contributions.

Threats to global health

The first sign of a US withdrawal from global health came soon after Trump’s inauguration when he signed executive orders cancelling US membership of the WHO and suspending all US foreign development assistance.

This led to the cancellation of large programs to prevent and treat HIV and AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and hepatitis.

Soon after, CDC officials were ordered to cease all communications with the WHO, leading to CDC experts leaving global advisory committees, among other things.

The dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has led to a loss of 83% of its programs and the cancellation of 5,200 contracts. This has stymied its ability to effectively deliver lifesaving aid, including in countries devastated by conflict and famine, such as Sudan. One study predicted the cuts in USAID funding could lead to 14 million extra deaths by 2030.

Budget and staff cuts have seriously reduced the CDC’s capacity to engage in global initiatives. For example, the Maternal and Child Health Branch was shut down and all 22 staff terminated. This branch helped low- and middle-income countries implement programs to prevent HIV in pregnant women and their babies.

The loss of financial resources and a large number of expert staff means the agency faces an uncertain future. Interference in its procedures to develop science-based health policies will gravely affect its ability to carry out its mandate both domestically and globally. The CDC has lost the trust of the American people and is no longer regarded as the preeminent public health agency in the world.

Governments, research institutes and health development agencies around the world must unite to decry this loss of global health expertise. Millions of lives depend on forceful action.

Michael Toole receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council. He worked for the US CDC between 1986 and 1995. The content of this article represents the views of the author and not those of the Burnet Institute.

– ref. What chaos at the US CDC could mean for the rest of the world – https://theconversation.com/what-chaos-at-the-us-cdc-could-mean-for-the-rest-of-the-world-264188

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Stacey Pizzino, Lecturer, School of Public Health, The University of Queensland

On September 2, 1945, the second world war ended when Japan officially surrendered. Today, on the 80th anniversary, the physical legacy of the conflict remains etched into land and sea.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Pacific. There, fierce battles left behind sunken warships, aircraft and unexploded bombs. These remnants are not only historical artefacts but toxic time capsules.

They leak fuel, heavy metals and other hazardous substances into fragile ecosystems, threatening biodiversity and, potentially, human health.

This problem is a reminder of the enduring environmental harms of conflict. Toxic remnants of war can damage ecosystems and communities long after the fighting stops.

The Pacific as a dumping ground

World War II in the Pacific involved four years of conflict between Japan and Allied forces. The war began in the region in December 1941 when Japan attacked a United States naval base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

The Pacific conflict included the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands.

Pacific islands became staging grounds for battles. Weapons were stockpiled and hazardous material discarded. Ships and aircraft were sunk. When the war ended, much of this material was simply left behind.

Among the remains are an estimated 3,800 wrecks still lying on the Pacific Ocean floor.

An environmental hazard

As remnants of war degrade, they often leach toxic pollutants into nearby waters and soils. These can build up in marine life, enter the food chain and pose serious risks to both biodiversity.

At Palau, a WWII Japanese ship sank in Koror Harbour and became known as the Helmet Wreck. It contains Japanese depth charges leaking acid into surrounding waters.

Researchers have shown the long-term environmental impacts in the Baltic Sea of unexploded WWII ordnance – bombs, shells and grenades that failed to detonate. An estimated 3000kg of dissolved ammunition chemicals have been found.

Coral reefs and mangroves, which are vital for coastal protection, are especially vulnerable to both chemical exposure and physical damage.

For example, researchers examined the effects off Puerto Rico of unexploded ordnance. They found nearby sea animals contained potentially toxic compounds leaking from the ordnance, which meant the substances had entered the food web.

Human communities on high alert

Unexploded ordnance continues to endanger communities. Just last year, for example, more than 200 bombs were found buried beneath a school in the Solomon Islands.

In places such as Palau, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, these dangers are unearthed regularly. They can be found by farmers working their land, children playing or fisherman working.

Buried bombs, sunken ships and downed aircraft often contain fuel and heavy metals. This includes lead and cadmium which can interfere with the body’s hormone system and cause serious health issues.

Research into the human health impacts of war remains is limited – especially in the Pacific. But existing studies suggest exposure is linked to serious consequences.

For example, parental exposure to wartime contaminants has been linked to birth defects in Gaza and Vietnam.

And a study of Britsh Army ammunition technicians released earlier this year found significantly higher rates of bladder cancer than the general population. This suggests occupational exposure to explosive compounds may pose long-term health risks.

Climate change is increasing the risk

As Earth’s climate warms, extreme weather events are worsening and seas are rising. This is exacerbating the dangers posed by wartime remnants.

For example Cyclone Pam, in March 2015, exposed unexploded WWII ordnance in Kiribati and Tuvalu. Further investigations revealed remnants including high explosive projectiles, mortars and 5,300 rounds of ammunition.

In 2020, a visiting fisherman found an unexploded bomb near Lord Howe Island. Then-Environment Minister Sussan Ley suggested the device may have been shifted by a cyclone or ocean currents.

Similarly, floods and landslides can move these hazards over significant distances, increasing uncertainty around their locations and complicating clearance efforts.

Rising sea levels are threatening to breach one of the Pacific’s most toxic legacies – the Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands. This concrete structure was built in the late 1970s to contain radioactive waste from US nuclear testing decades earlier.

Research shows extreme storms could increase radioactive sediments in the area to up to 84 times higher than normal. There are also concerns cracks in the dome’s surface could lead to contamination of surrounding waters.

Reflecting on war’s toxic legacy

Despite the risks to people and health in the Pacific, remediation has been slow. The 80th anniversary of WWII offers an opportunity to reflect on the toxic legacy of war – and to act.

The scale of the problem demands coordinated, well-funded action. The work should not just remove dangerous materials, but restore damaged ecosystems and monitor long-term health impacts.

Some support has been offered. It includes Operation Render Safe, a program to remove war remnants led by the Australian Defence Force. But more is needed.

Regional partners – including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States – have a chance to lead. This means investing in environmental cleanup, supporting affected communities and acknowledging historical responsibility.

It also means listening to Pacific voices, who have long called for greater attention to the war’s toxic legacy. Their knowledge, resilience and lived experience must be central to any response.

The authors acknowledge Nixon Panda for his contribution to this article.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. 80 years since the end of World War II, a dangerous legacy lingers in the Pacific – https://theconversation.com/80-years-since-the-end-of-world-war-ii-a-dangerous-legacy-lingers-in-the-pacific-264127