Por qué el apoyo mayoritario a Palestina no se traducirá en la creación de un Estado

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Estadounidenses pro palestinos se reúnen en Nueva York en una marcha hacia la ONU el 18 de septiembre de 2025. Selcuk Acar/Anadolu via Getty Images

Es probable que el reconocimiento de un Estado palestino domine los debates en la Asamblea General de la ONU que se celebra esta semana en Nueva York.

De los 193 Estados miembros, unos 150 reconocen ya el Estado palestino. Australia, Canadá y el Reino Unido se han convertido en los últimos en hacerlo. Y se espera que ese número aumente en los próximos días, ya que varios países más anunciarán oficialmente un reconocimiento similar.

El hecho de que una serie de naciones occidentales estén añadiendo sus nombres a la lista casi universal del sur global supone una importante victoria diplomática para la causa de una nación independiente, soberana y autónoma para los palestinos. Por el contrario, implica una gran derrota diplomática para Israel, especialmente dos años después de contar con el apoyo masivo de las naciones occidentales tras el ataque del 7 de octubre por parte de Hamás.

Como estudiosa de la historia moderna de Palestina, sé que este momento diplomático lleva décadas gestándose. Pero también soy consciente de que ya se han producido avances simbólicos e insignificantes sobre esta cuestión.

La realidad sin Estado

La lucha por la creación de un Estado palestino se remonta al menos a 1967. Durante la guerra de los seis días contra una coalición de Estados árabes, Israel conquistó y amplió su control militar sobre el resto de lo que era la Palestina histórica , una franja de tierra que se extiende desde el río Jordán, al este, hasta el mar Mediterráneo, al oeste.

Al término de la guerra, Israel había tomado el control de Cisjordania, Jerusalén Este y la Franja de Gaza.

A diferencia de lo que ocurrió tras la guerra de 1948, que condujo a su independencia, Israel optó por no conceder la ciudadanía israelí a los palestinos que vivían en las zonas recién conquistadas. En su lugar, comenzó a gobernarlos mediante una serie de órdenes militares.

Un hombre extiende los brazos para enfatizar su discurso mientras se encuentra de pie ante un atril.
Yasser Arafat se dirige a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas en 1974.
Bettmann / Contributor

Estas órdenes controlaban casi todos los aspectos de la vida palestina, y muchas siguen vigentes en la actualidad. Por ejemplo, si un agricultor quiere cosechar sus olivos cerca de un asentamiento judío en Cisjordania, necesita un permiso. O
si un trabajador de Gaza quiere trabajar dentro de Israel, necesita un permiso israelí. Incluso rezar en una mezquita o iglesia en Jerusalén Este depende de la obtención de un permiso.

Este sistema de permisos servía como un recordatorio constante a los palestinos que vivían en los territorios ocupados de que carecían de control sobre sus propias vidas cotidianas. Mientras tanto, las autoridades intentaban aplastar la idea de la nacionalidad palestina mediante políticas como la prohibición de exhibir públicamente su bandera. Eso, y otras expresiones de identidad nacional en los territorios ocupados, podían acarrear penas de hasta 10 años de prisión.

Estas políticas encajan con la creencia, expresada en 1969 por la entonces primera ministra israelí Golda Meir, de que «en esta zona no existe tal cosa como los palestinos».

El auge del nacionalismo palestino

Casi al mismo tiempo que Meir hizo ese comentario, los palestinos comenzaron a organizarse en torno a la idea de la creación de un Estado.

Aunque la idea ya se había planteado anteriormente, la creación de un Estado se codificó como doctrina oficial en una resolución en febrero de 1969 en Egipto. Esto ocurrió durante una sesión del Consejo Nacional Palestino, el órgano legislativo de la Organización para la Liberación de Palestina (OLP), que se formó en 1964 como representante oficial de sus ciudadanos en los territorios ocupados.

Esa resolución pedía un Estado libre, secular y democrático en Palestina –incluido todo el Estado de Israel– en el que musulmanes, cristianos y judíos tuvieran los mismos derechos.

A partir de ese momento, la lucha contra la ocupación tomó dos caminos paralelos: la presión diplomática y la resistencia armada.

Pero los acontecimientos sobre el terreno socavaron la idea de un único Estado para todos según lo previsto en la resolución de El Cairo.

El final inconcluso de la guerra árabe-israelí de 1973 abrió la puerta a una mayor diplomacia entre Israel y los Estados árabes. Egipto e Israel decidieron que la diplomacia les ayudaría a alcanzar sus objetivos, lo que culminó en el tratado de paz entre Egipto e Israel de 1979. Pero el tratado también dejó a los palestinos sin el apoyo árabe unificado.

Mientras tanto, a lo largo de la década de 1970, la ocupación israelí se profundizó y afianzó con la construcción de asentamientos israelíes, especialmente en Cisjordania.

La OLP respondió en 1974 con la publicación de lo que se conoció como el Plan de 10 Puntos, en el que se orientaban hacia la búsqueda del establecimiento de una autoridad nacional en cualquier parte de la Palestina histórica que pudiera ser liberada.

Luego, en 1988, un año después del inicio de la primera intifada palestina, la OLP declaró unilateralmente la independencia en los territorios ocupados en 1967.

La medida fue en gran medida simbólica: Cisjordania, Gaza y Jerusalén Este seguían bajo ocupación, y la OLP se encontraba entonces en el exilio en Túnez.

Pero representó la unión de los palestinos en el exilio –la mayoría de los cuales procedían de ciudades y pueblos que ahora formaban parte del Estado de Israel– con los palestinos de los territorios ocupados.

La declaración fue redactada por el poeta palestino Mahmoud Darwish, que creció en Israel, y proclamada por Yasser Arafat, líder de la OLP en el exilio.

También fue un momento de gran esperanza. Lo que la mayoría de los palestinos querían era que la comunidad internacional los reconociera como un organismo nacional, merecedor de un lugar en la mesa con otros Estados-nación.

Compromiso y rechazo

Cisjordania, la Franja de Gaza y Jerusalén Este comprenden alrededor del 22 % de la Palestina histórica. Por lo tanto, la declaración significaba efectivamente que los palestinos renunciaban al 78 % restante de lo que consideraban su tierra.

La reacción de la comunidad internacional ante la declaración de la OLP fue dividida. Muchos países del Sur Global que habían sido colonizados en el pasado reconocieron inmediatamente la independencia palestina.

Unos 78 países avalaron la declaración. Israel la rechazó de plano, al igual que Estados Unidos y la mayoría de los países occidentales.

La oposición de Washington fue tal que Estados Unidos denegó el visado a Arafat antes de su previsto discurso ante las Naciones Unidas en su sede de Nueva York. Como resultado, la reunión de diciembre de 1988 tuvo que trasladarse a Ginebra.

Aunque se negaron a aceptar la condición de Estado palestino, Estados Unidos e Israel comenzaron a reconocer a la OLP como órgano representativo del pueblo palestino. Esto formaba parte de los Acuerdos de Oslo, un proceso diplomático que muchos creían que trazarían una hoja de ruta para una eventual solución de dos Estados.

Mientras que algunos palestinos consideraban los acuerdos como un avance diplomático, otros se mostraron más escépticos, entre ellos Darwish y el profesor palestino-estadounidense Edward Said, que creían que Oslo era un regalo envenenado: aunque se presentó como un paso hacia una solución de dos Estados, el acuerdo no decía nada sobre un Estado palestino en el ínterin.

En realidad, los Acuerdos de Oslo no han conducido a la creación de un Estado. Más bien, crearon un sistema de autonomía fragmentada bajo la recién creada Autoridad Palestina que, aunque estaba destinada a ser provisional, se ha convertido en permanente.

A la Autoridad Palestina solo se le concedieron poderes limitados y se le privó de una independencia real. Aunque tenía cierta influencia en la educación, la sanidad y los servicios municipales, Israel mantuvo el control de las tierras, los recursos, las fronteras y la economía palestinas. Esto sigue siendo así hoy en día.

Nuevo impulso para el reconocimiento del Estado

La desilusión con los Acuerdos de Oslo contribuyó a la segunda intifada, mucho más violenta de 2000 a 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, líder de la Autoridad Palestina tras Arafat, respondió impulsando de nuevo el reconocimiento internacional de la condición de Estado.

Y en 2012, la Asamblea General de la ONU votó a favor de mejorar el estatus de Palestina, elevándolo de «observador no miembro» a «Estado observador no miembro».

Dos hombres se dan la mano.
La delegación palestina en la Asamblea General de la ONU antes de la votación para elevar el estatus de Palestina a Estado observador no miembro en 2012.
Stan Honda/AFP via Getty Images

En teoría, esto significaba que los palestinos ahora tenían acceso a organismos internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional y la Corte Internacional de Justicia.

Pero cualquier cambio significativo en el estatus de la soberanía palestina tendría que pasar por el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, no por la Asamblea General.

Estados Unidos sigue oponiéndose a que los palestinos obtengan la condición de Estado independiente. Mientras tenga derecho de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad, la consecución de un Estado verdaderamente soberano seguirá estando fuera de discusión. Y eso seguirá siendo así, independientemente de lo que hagan otros miembros del Consejo de Seguridad como Francia y el Reino Unido.

De hecho, muchos palestinos y otros críticos del statu quo afirman que las naciones occidentales están utilizando la cuestión de la condición de Estado palestino para inhibirse en la tarea diplomática mucho más difícil de hacer responsable a Israel de lo que un organismo de la ONU acaba de describir como un genocidio en Gaza.

The Conversation

Maha Nassar no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Por qué el apoyo mayoritario a Palestina no se traducirá en la creación de un Estado – https://theconversation.com/por-que-el-apoyo-mayoritario-a-palestina-no-se-traducira-en-la-creacion-de-un-estado-265837

El engaño de la luz dorada del otoño, bajo la mirada de la física

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Antonio Manuel Peña García, Catedrático del Área de Ingeniería Eléctrica, Universidad de Granada

Subbotina Anna/Shutterstock

Imagine que está tranquilamente en casa y de repente recibe una de esas “llamadas de la suerte”. Al otro lado del teléfono, un famosísimo presentador vocifera entusiasmado que está en directo y que puede ganar un millón de euros si responde a la siguiente pregunta: ¿de qué color es la luz del otoño?

¿Qué contestaríamos usted o yo? ¿Y mil personas al azar? No tengo pruebas ni dudas de que muchos responderíamos “dorada”. Pero no todos. ¿No todos? ¿Acaso es una sensación subjetiva? Pensemos antes de contestar. Pero rápido, que estamos en directo.

¿Qué dice la física?

En el hemisferio norte, el otoño es el periodo en el que la Tierra se acerca al Sol desde un punto en el que días y noches tienen igual duración (equinoccio de otoño) hasta su máxima cercanía (solsticio de invierno). Comienza el 22 de septiembre y finalizará el 21 de diciembre. Para nuestros vecinos del hemisferio sur, esta época es la primavera.

Aunque esta definición requiere algunos matices, nos da la primera pista para responder a la pregunta del millón.

Lo primero que llama la atención es que el invierno en nuestro hemisferio coincida con la menor distancia al Sol, ya que cuanto más cerca estemos, más radiación solar llega a la Tierra. Sin embargo, es la inclinación de los rayos en cada estación y no la distancia a nuestra estrella es lo que determina la cantidad de luz y calor que recibimos.

Como en otoño la elevación solar máxima va decreciendo y sabemos que el color del cielo pasa del azul al amarillo-rojizo cuando el Sol está más bajo, es lógico que su luz parezca más dorada.

Entonces, la luz del invierno ¿debería ser más dorada todavía? ¿Y los primeros días de primavera?

Pero a mí la primavera se me antoja multicolor. Y el invierno blanco aunque no nieve. ¿Y a usted?

Es más, el otoño puede ser lluvioso, lo que limpia la atmósfera de aerosoles que enrojecen el cielo… A la física no le gusta esa imagen otoñal eminentemente dorada.

Sonata de otoño

Si alguien consagró su pluma a describir la luz, ése fue D. Ramón del Valle-Inclán, el otro gran manco de nuestra literatura.

“Aquel renacimiento de nuestros amores fue como una tarde otoñal de celajes dorados, amable y melancólica”.

En su Sonata de otoño (1902), Valle nos pinta el ocaso de una vida amada con un sentimiento jamás igualado en las letras españolas. Y lo hace desde el otoño de su Galicia natal, que para él era, ante todo, dorado.

Este otro pasaje es especialmente revelador:

“Yo también los evoqué un día lejano, cuando la mañana otoñal y dorada envolvía el jardín húmedo y reverdecido por la constante lluvia de la noche. Bajo el cielo límpido, de un azul heráldico, los cipreses venerables parecían tener el ensueño de la vida monástica”.

Sin reparos en describir la mañana como dorada y azul al mismo tiempo.

Y no solo Valle. Son incontables los grandes literatos (¡y pintores!) que han soñado un otoño entre rayos dorados. Desde Octavio Paz hasta Juan Ramón Jiménez. Pero, ¿por qué contradicen a la física? Quizá el poeta moguereño nos de una pista:

“Esparce octubre, al blando movimiento del sur, las hojas áureas y las rojas…”.

¿Es posible que imaginemos el otoño en tonos dorados solo porque es el color característico de las hojas en esta estación? ¿Existe algo en nosotros que acertada o equivocadamente asocie un color a otras sensaciones o viceversa?

Fuego rojo, fuego azul y una misteriosa hipótesis

Si nos hubieran preguntado por el color del fuego o de las cosas muy calientes, la respuesta habría sido más fácil: rojo. Todo el mundo asocia el rojo al calor. Hasta llegar el rojo vivo, expresión de algo extremadamente caliente. ¿Y de qué color son las cosas muy frías? Blancas o azuladas, por supuesto.

Pero la física, que es una aguafiestas, vuelve a la carga con una pregunta burlona: si la llama del soplete es azulada y la de una cerilla, roja, ¿cuál está más caliente? Independientemente de lo que estemos quemando, que influye mucho en el color, si observamos una llama es frecuente que su interior (más caliente) sea azulado y su exterior (más frío), rojo.

El color de las estrellas

También las estrellas azules son más calientes que las rojas. Este hecho lo explica la “curva de emisión del cuerpo negro”, que durante décadas trajo de cabeza a los físicos y desembocó en el desarrollo de la mecánica cuántica. Vamos, que si algún color debe asignarse a las temperaturas, es el azul a las altas y el rojo a las bajas. Y esto es incontestable.

Entonces, ¿por qué asociamos el último a lo caliente? La respuesta es breve: lo hacemos y punto. La llamada “hipótesis del tono-calor” se estableció hace más de un siglo, pero no está claro por qué nuestro cerebro contradice a la física.

El ser humano ha evolucionado durante cientos de milenios junto a fuegos de combustibles vegetales, rojos y poco calientes. ¿Es posible que haya quedado grabado en lo más profundo de nuestro ser que lo caliente es rojo? Yo creo que sí, pero no está demostrado. Como también es posible que las hojas doradas que tapizan árboles y suelos en otoño nos hagan concebir esta estación de ese color.

Literatura y arte dicen que la luz del otoño es dorada sin que la física esté totalmente conforme. Cabe pensar que se trate de una asociación mental atávica. ¿Será aceptable para ganar el millón?

The Conversation

Antonio Manuel Peña García no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. El engaño de la luz dorada del otoño, bajo la mirada de la física – https://theconversation.com/el-engano-de-la-luz-dorada-del-otono-bajo-la-mirada-de-la-fisica-264439

50 años de las últimas ejecuciones del franquismo: ¿por qué fue “inútil” la sangre derramada?

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla, Responsable del Área de Archivo, Investigación y Documentación, Centro Memorial para las Víctimas del Terrorismo

Acampada ante el consulado español en Ámsterdam el 2 de septiembre de 1975 en protesta por el consejo de guerra contra José Antonio Garmendia Artola y Angel Otaegi, integrantes de ETA. Mientras que al primero se le conmutó la condena de muerte, Otaegi fue fusilado el 27 de septiembre de ese mismo año. Fotograaf Onbekend/Anefo/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

El 27 de septiembre de 1975, hace 50 años, la dictadura llevó a cabo sus cinco últimas ejecuciones, también las últimas de la historia de España. En Madrid fueron fusilados tres miembros del FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota): José Humberto Baena, José Luis Sánchez Bravo y Ramón García Sanz. En Burgos y Barcelona, dos integrantes de ETApm (ETA político-militar): Ángel Otaegi Etxeberria y Juan Paredes Manot o Manotas (Txiki).

Habían sido condenados a muerte por el asesinato de los agentes de la Policía Armada Lucio Rodríguez Martín y Ovidio Díaz López y de los guardias civiles Gregorio Posada Zurrón y Antonio Pose Rodríguez.

68 víctimas mortales entre 1968 y 1975

A finales de la década de los sesenta, organizaciones de extrema izquierda, ultraderecha y nacionalistas radicales habían comenzado a cometer atentados en todo el planeta. En España, ese ciclo de violencia coincidió con la etapa final del régimen. Entre 1968 y 1975 bandas terroristas como ETA, el FRAP y los GRAPO (Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre) causaron 68 víctimas mortales.

La mayoría llevaban la firma de ETA, que había apostado por la estrategia de acción-reacción-acción: cometer atentados para provocar una represión salvaje hasta que estallara una “guerra revolucionaria”. En efecto, la dictadura respondió con leyes, estados de excepción, detenciones masivas, malos tratos y torturas.

Ahora bien, la espiral de acción-reacción no llegó hasta sus últimas consecuencias. La represión era un pilar fundamental del régimen y jamás desapareció, pero se había ido aminorando con el tiempo. Fue importante el papel de Tomás Garicano Goñi, ministro de Gobernación entre 1969 y 1973, quien intentó modernizar las Fuerzas de Orden Público (FOP) para minimizar su faceta más brutal, aunque sus efectos no se vieron a corto plazo.

Indultos pragmáticos

A pesar de que los tribunales siguieron dictando sentencias de muerte desde septiembre de 1963 hasta febrero de 1974, todos los condenados por delitos de sangre con connotaciones políticas fueron indultados por el Gobierno franquista. Ese perdón, más que a consideraciones morales, respondía a dos motivos pragmáticos. El primero, sortear un obstáculo al acercamiento del régimen a Europa occidental. Y el segundo, en palabras del vicepresidente (1967-1973) y luego presidente (1973) Luis Carrero Blanco, no caer en la “trampa” de los terroristas: “hacer mártires”.

En 1973 hubo un punto de inflexión. A consecuencia del creciente malestar de las FOP y de las presiones de la ultraderecha, que lo acusaba de ser un blando, Garicano se vio obligado a dimitir en junio. Y el 20 de diciembre ETA mató a Carrero Blanco, a su escolta y a su chofer.

El nuevo presidente, Carlos Arias Navarro, anunció un proyecto de “democratización del régimen” conocido como “Espíritu del 12 de febrero”. Cosechó el apoyo del sector aperturista del franquismo, pero también el rechazo tanto de la oposición antifranquista como de la extrema derecha. En cualquier caso, a consecuencia del miedo al contagio de la Revolución de los Claveles portuguesa, a la conflictividad laboral, estudiantil y vecinal, así como a las presiones internas, solo logró cambios legislativos menores.

Ejecución de Puig Antich

Pese a su supuesto reformismo, el Gobierno respondió al aumento de la “subversión” con mano dura. Así confirmó la pena máxima impuesta a Salvador Puig Antich, integrante del MIL (Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación), que había matado al subinspector Francisco Anguas Barragán. Fue ejecutado mediante garrote vil el 2 de marzo de 1974. Ese mismo día fue ajusticiado un hombre que había asesinado a un guardia civil.

La ejecución de Puig Antich no originó una gran campaña de protesta, por lo que se dedujo que el coste de la medida era asumible. Sin embargo, no sirvió para detener la ofensiva terrorista.

Tampoco fue suficiente como para aplacar a la ultraderecha, que rompió públicamente con el Gobierno tras el atentado indiscriminado de ETA en la cafetería Rolando, perpetrado el 13 de septiembre de 1974. En esta acción terrorista murieron 13 personas y unas 70 resultaron heridas.

En octubre, el sector más liberal abandonó el Gobierno Arias, con lo que el proyecto “democratizador” desapareció. No obstante, su salida fue insuficiente para los inmovilistas, que siguieron a la contra. El presidente conservaba el respaldo de Franco, que era el más importante, pero su posición era cada vez más débil. Necesitaba un golpe de efecto.

Durante 1975, los terroristas causaron un total de 33 víctimas mortales. El 25 de abril de ese año, el Gobierno decretó el estado de excepción en Vizcaya y Guipúzcoa para potenciar la actuación policial contra ETA. En una de las publicaciones de la banda se podía leer: “La acción de [el pueblo de] Euskadi ha sido clave en el proceso que ha llevado al Régimen del Espíritu del 12 de febrero a las mayores brutalidades de signo ultra”.

En agosto y septiembre se celebraron cuatro consejos de guerra (dos ordinarios y dos sumarísimos). Se ajustaron a la legislación vigente en aquel momento, pero estamos hablando de una dictadura: no contaban con las garantías exigibles en un Estado de derecho, por lo que no pueden ser considerados juicios justos desde la perspectiva actual.

Con todo, no debemos olvidar que los procesados eran miembros activos de organizaciones terroristas. Había algunos indicios sobre su responsabilidad en los cargos que se les imputaban. Por ejemplo, Txiki fue reconocido por seis testigos. Uno de ellos aseguró que “la cara del asaltante que le encañonó no la olvidaría en mucho tiempo”.

A la postre se condenó a la pena capital a ocho miembros del FRAP y a tres de ETApm por su participación en el asesinato de cuatro funcionarios.

Presión internacional sin efecto

Ni las movilizaciones en España, ni las presiones internacionales de entidades como la ONU, la Comunidad Europea y el Vaticano, influyeron en el ánimo de Arias Navarro. Tampoco las voces críticas que, dentro del propio régimen, recomendaron clemencia. El 26 de septiembre de 1975 el Gobierno conmutó seis de las sentencias de muerte, pero dio el “enterado” a las cinco restantes. Los fusilamientos se produjeron al día siguiente.

La imagen de prosperidad, normalidad institucional y modernidad occidental que el régimen había pretendido proyectar al mundo se evaporó. Era evidente que fue una dictadura hasta el final.

Las ejecuciones no neutralizaron el terrorismo: la semana después se produjeron 9 asesinatos. Tampoco sirvieron para traer de vuelta al redil a la ultraderecha, ni para fortalecer la posición de Arias Navarro, ni para dar un balón de oxígeno a la moribunda dictadura, que no sobreviviría al fallecimiento de Franco el 20 de noviembre. En palabras del abogado Marc Palmés Giró, se trató de “sangre inútil”.

También fue inútil la sangre derramada por los terroristas, que no consiguieron sustituir una dictadura por otra. Causaron casi 500 víctimas mortales entre 1976 y 1982. A pesar de la violencia de uno u otro signo, la transición democrática saldría adelante.

The Conversation

Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. 50 años de las últimas ejecuciones del franquismo: ¿por qué fue “inútil” la sangre derramada? – https://theconversation.com/50-anos-de-las-ultimas-ejecuciones-del-franquismo-por-que-fue-inutil-la-sangre-derramada-264648

Dieta con amplitud de miras: los alimentos que protegen a los más pequeños contra la miopía

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Ana Belén Ropero Lara, Profesora Titular de Nutrición y Bromatología – Directora del proyecto BADALI, web de Nutrición. Instituto de Bioingeniería, Universidad Miguel Hernández

Ver niños con gafas es bastante habitual, pero tal vez nos sorprenda saber que uno de cada tres menores en el mundo sufre miopía. Si no se trata, puede contribuir a un bajo rendimiento académico. Ante esta situación, ¿podemos hacer algo para prevenirla? ¿Ayuda la dieta más allá de las consabidas zanahorias? Recientes estudios, por ejemplo, apuntan al papel protector del omega-3 y otros nutrientes.

Una pandemia de miopía en ascenso

No es un asunto para tomárselo a la ligera. Aunque parezca benigna, las personas con miopía tienen más posibilidades de desarrollar complicaciones oculares como cataratas, glaucoma o desprendimiento de retina. Estos son los riesgos que correrán los más de 3 300 millones de personas que se verán afectadas por esta alteración visual en 2030.

Además, la manifestación más grave, cuando la graduación supera las 5-6 dioptrías, puede degenerar en ceguera irreversible.




Leer más:
Vivimos una pandemia galopante de miopía: ¿qué consecuencias puede tener?


Si bien es cierto que los hijos de padres con miopía tienen más posibilidades de sufrirla, no es ni mucho menos la única causa. Uno de los factores de riesgo más importantes radica en dedicar mucho tiempo a actividades en las que miramos de cerca, como el uso de pantallas. Los estudios realizados en diferentes países muestran que pasar poco tiempo al aire libre influye mucho en el riesgo de padecerla.

Por esta razón, algunos consejos para ayudar a cuidar nuestra vista son dedicar al menos 90 minutos al día a actividades al aire libre y reducir el tiempo con pantallas y otras actividades de cerca.

La influencia de la dieta en la visión

A veces tratamos de convencer a los niños de que las zanahorias son buenas para la vista y así animarlos a comerlas. No nos falta razón, ya que tanto la zanahoria como el boniato o las espinacas contienen muchos carotenos. En el ojo, estas sustancias naturales se convierten en retinal, que forma parte de la rodopsina, uno de los pigmentos que nos permiten ver.

El retinal también se puede obtener a partir de la vitamina A, que podemos encontrar en el huevo, el hígado o los quesos maduros. En esta conversión interviene el zinc, presente en carne, huevos, cereales integrales, frutos secos y legumbres. Por lo tanto, un déficit de vitamina A o de zinc pueden producir alteraciones en la visión. Además, de ninguno de los dos solemos tomar suficiente cantidad.

La ausencia de otras vitaminas también puede provocar alteraciones en la visión. Debemos prestar especial atención a aquellas de las que es habitual tener deficiencia, como las vitaminas B9 (ácido fólico), E y C. Estos nutrientes los encontraremos, de nuevo, en fruta, verdura, frutos secos, legumbres, huevos y cereales integrales.

Un completo menú antimiopía

Parte de las investigaciones sobre el efecto de la alimentación en la vista se han centrado más específicamente en la miopía. Así, acaba de publicarse un estudio en el que la ingesta de ácidos grasos omega-3 era menor en niños (6-8 años) con esa afección. Además, los resultados apuntan a que otro tipo de grasas, las saturadas, tienen el efecto contrario: son un factor de riesgo.

Resultados similares se habían obtenido anteriormente en otra investigación con adolescentes (12-19 años). En ese caso, una ingesta diaria elevada del ácido graso omega-3 llamado EPA podría estar asociada con un menor riesgo del tipo de miopía más grave.

Los ácidos grasos omega 3, incluido el EPA, los encontramos en mayor cantidad en pescado graso, y por eso se recomienda que una de las 3-4 raciones de pescado a la semana sea de este tipo. Eso sí, los niños deben evitar el atún rojo, el emperador o pez espada por su alto contenido en mercurio. Por su parte, las evitables grasas saturadas las encontramos en la carne, la bollería, el chocolate y los aceites de coco y palma.

Otros trabajos analizan el impacto del tipo de dieta en general. Los resultados apuntan a que una alimentación rica en vitaminas, minerales, fibra y baja en grasas saturadas, a la vez que se modera la ingesta de energía, podría ralentizar la progresión de la miopía.

En cuanto a otros nutrientes, se ha visto que los niños con miopía toman menos vitamina A, mientras que la vitamina C también se ha relacionado con menor riesgo en adolescentes. Además, tanto tomar mucha proteína como mucha sal se ha asociado con más posibilidades de sufrirla tanto en niños como en adolescentes.

Un factor muy relacionado con la alimentación es el exceso de peso. Un gran estudio de más de 1,3 millones de adolescentes en Estados Unidos mostró una relación positiva entre el índice de masa corporal y la incidencia de miopía. Esta era mayor en chicos y chicas con sobrepeso u obesidad, pero también en aquellos con peso insuficiente.

La conclusión principal de todo esto es que sí podemos hacer algo para que los más pequeños tengan menos posibilidades de sufrir miopía. Aunque lo primordial es reducir el tiempo de pantalla y aumentar el que pasan en actividades al aire libre, la dieta también puede ser de ayuda. Por eso es fundamental basarla en alimentos naturales como el pescado, la fruta, la verdura y las hortalizas, las legumbres, los cereales integrales, los frutos secos y los huevos.

A la postre, se trata en buena medida de seguir una dieta saludable.

The Conversation

Ana Belén Ropero Lara no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Dieta con amplitud de miras: los alimentos que protegen a los más pequeños contra la miopía – https://theconversation.com/dieta-con-amplitud-de-miras-los-alimentos-que-protegen-a-los-mas-pequenos-contra-la-miopia-265299

UK, France and other Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Pro-Palestinian Americans gather in New York at a march to the U.N. on Sept. 18, 2025. Selcuk Acar/Anadolu via Getty Images

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 152 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, France, Canada and the United Kingdom became the latest to add their names. That number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

A man gives a speech before a crowd.
‘I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun,’ PLO leader Yasser Arafat said before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.
Bettmann / Contributor

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

A man throws out his arms to make a point while he stands at a lectern.
Yasser Arafat addresses the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.
Bettmann / Contributor

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

Two men shake hands.
The Palestinian delegation at the U.N. General Assembly before the vote to upgrade Palestinian status to a nonmember observer state in 2012.
Stan Honda/AFP via Getty Images

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

The Conversation

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. UK, France and other Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/uk-france-and-other-western-nations-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Maha Nassar, Associate Professor in the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Arizona

Pro-Palestinian Americans gather in New York at a march to the U.N. on Sept. 18, 2025. Selcuk Acar/Anadolu via Getty Images

Recognition of a Palestinian state is likely to dominate proceedings at the U.N. beginning Sept 23, 2025, when world leaders will gather for the annual general assembly.

Of the 193 existing U.N member states, some 152 now recognize a Palestinian state. Ahead of the U.N. gathering in New York, Australia, France, Canada and the United Kingdom became the latest to add their names. That number is expected to increase in the coming days, with several more countries expected to officially announce similar recognition.

That a host of Western nations are adding their names to the near-universal list of Global South countries that already recognize a Palestinian state is a major diplomatic win for the cause of an independent, sovereign and self-governed nation for Palestinians. Conversely, it is a massive diplomatic loss for Israel – especially coming just two years after the West stood shoulder to shoulder with Israel following the Oct. 7 attack by Palestinian militant group Hamas.

As a scholar of modern Palestinian history, I know that this diplomatic moment is decades in the making. But I am also aware that symbolic diplomatic breakthroughs on the issue of Palestinian statehood have occurred before, only to prove meaningless in the face of events that make statehood less likely.

A man gives a speech before a crowd.
‘I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun,’ PLO leader Yasser Arafat said before the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.
Bettmann / Contributor

The non-state reality

The fight for Palestinian statehood can be traced back to at least 1967. Over the course of a six-day war against a coalition of Arab states, Israel conquered and expanded its military control over the remainder of what was historic Palestine – a stretch of land that extends from the Jordan River in the east to the Mediterranean Sea in the west.

At the war’s conclusion, Israel had taken control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

Unlike after the 1948 war that led to its independence, Israel opted not to extend Israeli citizenship to Palestinians living in the newly conquered areas. Instead, the Israeli government began to rule over Palestinians in these occupied territories through a series of military orders.

These orders controlled nearly every aspect of Palestinian life – and many remain in effect today. For example, if a Palestinian farmer wants to harvest his olive trees near a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, they need a permit. Or
if a Gazan worker wants to work inside Israel, they need Israeli permission. Even praying in a mosque or church in East Jerusalem is dependent on obtaining a permit.

This permit system served as a constant reminder to Palestinians living in the occupied territories that they lacked control over their own daily lives. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities tried to squash the idea of Palestinian nationhood through policies such as outlawing public displays of the Palestinian flag. That, and other expressions of Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories, could result in up to 10 years in prison.

Such policies fit a belief, expressed in 1969 by then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, that there was “no such thing in this area as Palestinians.”

The rise of Palestinian nationalism

Around the same time that Meir made that comment, Palestinians started organizing around the idea of statehood.

Although the idea had been floated before, statehood was codified into official doctrine in a resolution in February 1969 in Egypt. It occurred during a session of the Palestine National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formed in 1964 as the official representative of Palestinians in the occupied territories.

That resolution called for a free, secular democratic state in Palestine – including all of the State of Israel – in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would all have equal rights.

From that moment on, the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation took twin paths: diplomatic pressure and armed resistance.

But events on the ground undermined the idea of a single state for all along the lines envisioned by the Cairo resolution.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s inconclusive ending opened the door to greater diplomacy between Israel and the Arab states. Egypt and Israel decided that diplomacy would help them achieve their aims, culminating in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. But the treaty also left the Palestinians without unified Arab support.

Meanwhile, throughout the 1970s, the Israeli occupation deepened and entrenched with the building of Israeli settlements, especially in the West Bank.

A man throws out his arms to make a point while he stands at a lectern.
Yasser Arafat addresses the United Nations General Assembly in 1974.
Bettmann / Contributor

The PLO responded in 1974 by issuing what became known as the 10-Point Plan, where they pivoted to seeking the establishment of a national authority in any part of historic Palestine that could be liberated.

It was, in effect, a way of threading the needle: It signaled to moderates that the PLO was adopting a more gradualist position, while also telling the group’s rejectionist front – which opposed peace negotiations with Israel – that they were not giving up completely on the idea of liberating all of Palestine.

Then in 1988 – a year into the first Palestinian intifada, or uprising – the PLO unilaterally declared Palestinian independence on the territories occupied in 1967.

The move was largely symbolic – the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem were still under occupation, and the PLO was then in exile in Tunisia.

But it was nonetheless significant. It represented the bringing together of Palestinians in exile – most of whom were from towns and villages that were now part of the State of Israel – with Palestinians in the occupied territories.

The declaration itself was written by Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, who grew up inside Israel, and declared by Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader in exile.

It was also a moment of tremendous hope and possibility for Palestinians. What most Palestinians wanted was for the international community to recognize them as a national body, deserving of a seat at the table with other nation-states.

Compromise and rejection

Yet at the same time, many Palestinians saw the declaration as a huge compromise. The West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem comprise about 22% of historic Palestine. So the declaration effectively meant that Palestinians were giving up on the other 78% of what they saw as their land.

Reaction from the international community to the PLO’s declaration was split. Many formerly colonized countries of the Global South recognized Palestinian independence right away. By the end of the year, some 78 countries had issued statements recognizing Palestine as a state.

Israel rejected it outright, as did United States and most Western nations.

Such was Washington’s opposition that the U.S. denied Arafat a visa ahead of his planned address to the United Nations at its New York City headquarters. As a result, the December 1988 meeting had to be moved to Geneva.

While refusing to accept Palestinian statehood, the U.S. and Israel did begin to recognize the PLO as a representative body of the Palestinian people. This was part of the Oslo Accords – a diplomatic process that many believed would outline a road map for an eventual two-state solution.

While some Palestinians saw the Oslo Accords as a diplomatic breakthrough, others were more skeptical. Prominent Palestinians, including Darwish and Palestinian-American professor Edward Said, believed that Oslo was a poison pill: While framed as a step toward a two-state solution, the agreement said nothing about a Palestinian state in the interim. It only said that Israel would recognize the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In reality, the Oslo Accords have not lead to statehood. Rather, they created a system of fragmented autonomy under the newly created Palestinian Authority that, though meant to be interim, has in effect become permanent.

The Palestinian Authority was allowed only limited powers and deprived of real independence. While it had some say over schooling, health care and municipal services, Israel maintained control of Palestinian land, resources, borders and the economy. That remains true today.

Renewed push for statehood recognition

Disillusionment over the Oslo Accords contributed to the second, far more violent, intifada from 2000 to 2005.

Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority after Arafat, responded by pushing again for international recognition for statehood.

And in 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status, elevating it from a “nonmember observer” to a “nonmember observer state.”

Two men shake hands.
The Palestinian delegation at the U.N. General Assembly before the vote to upgrade Palestinian status to a nonmember observer state in 2012.
Stan Honda/AFP via Getty Images

In theory, this meant Palestinians now had access to international bodies, like the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

But any meaningful change in the status of Palestinian sovereignty would need to come through the U.N. Security Council, not the U.N. General Assembly.

The U.S. remains opposed to Palestinians gaining statehood independent of the Oslo process. So long as the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, achieving a truly sovereign Palestinian state will likewise be off the table. And that remains the case, regardless of what individual members – even fellow Security Council members like France and the U.K – do.

In fact, many Palestinians and other critics of the status quo say Western nations are using the issue of Palestinian statehood to absolve them from the far more challenging diplomatic task of holding Israel accountable for what a U.N. body just described as a genocide in Gaza.

This article is based on a conversation between Maha Nassar and Gemma Ware for The Conversation Weekly podcast.

The Conversation

Maha Nassar does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Western nations recognize Palestinian state ahead of UN meetings – but symbolic action won’t make statehood happen – https://theconversation.com/western-nations-recognize-palestinian-state-ahead-of-un-meetings-but-symbolic-action-wont-make-statehood-happen-265534

A Paramount–Warner Bros. Discovery merger could give Trump even more influence over US media – shaping the news and culture Americans watch and stream

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Pawel Popiel, Assistant Professor of Journalism, Washington State University

A fundamental restructuring of U.S. media is underway, with potentially huge consequences. Giuliano Benzin, iStock/Getty Images Plus

Following unprecedented threats from Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr, major affiliate station owners Nexstar and Sinclair Broadcasting pressured Disney’s ABC to pull Jimmy Kimmel’s show off the air over his comments related to Charlie Kirk’s killing.

The cancellation is a harbinger of what could happen under a fundamental restructuring of U.S. media that will take place if the proposed Paramount Skydance and Warner Bros. Discovery merger is approved by the Trump administration.

The deal, first revealed on September 11, 2025, would erase one of the five remaining movie studios and concentrate oversight of two of the country’s most prominent newsrooms – CNN and CBS, both targets of the Trump administration’s ire – under one owner with strong ties to Donald Trump.

Based on research from the Global Media & Internet Concentration Project, our analysis shows that Paramount Skydance-Warner Bros. Discovery would gain control of more than a quarter of the US$223 billion U.S. media market, along with influence over film, television, streaming and the cloud infrastructure upon which digital media increasingly depends.

The combined entity would acquire nearly half of the cable television market, including HBO and CNN. The merger would nearly double Paramount’s share of the video streaming market, uniting HBO Max, Paramount+ and Discovery.

By combining two major Hollywood film studios, it would also capture nearly one-third of the film production market.

This is exactly the type of merger that U.S. antitrust agencies have historically scrutinized because of concerns that excessive market concentration gives too much power to a few companies.

In media markets, such concerns are pronounced: Concentration threatens media diversity and increases the risk of media bias and ideological manipulation.

A mega-conglomerate like Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery would control a vast share of U.S. viewership. Subject to pressure from or, worse, alignment with the Trump administration, the merged company could promote and protect the administration’s interests.

A social media post by Donald Trump saying 'Great News for America' that Jimmy Kimmel's show was 'cancelled,' which is not correct; it was suspended.
Donald Trump has made no secret of his distaste for Jimmy Kimmel.
Donald Trump account, Truth Social

Cloud control

By combining media production and valuable brands such as Harry Potter, DC Comics and Barbie, the merged giant would gain great negotiating power with competing streaming companies, advertisers and distributors. The merged companies could also secure more lucrative streaming deals, better licensing windows and higher per subscriber and ad rates with cable providers.

The 2023 Hollywood writers and actors strikes opposed the exploitative impact of streaming and AI on creative workers’ compensation. The new media giant would wield significant bargaining power over those media workers.

The merger’s potential detrimental impact extends beyond film and television industries.

Paramount is helmed by David Ellison, and the merger is backed by his father, Larry Ellison. Ellison senior owns the world’s fifth-largest cloud provider, Oracle.

Cloud providers are the critical infrastructure for streaming platforms, ferrying digital content from streamers to viewers. As streaming becomes the dominant mode of media consumption, the Ellison family’s control over this infrastructure could give Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery another lever of power over its competitors.

Diversity denied

With potential size and reach to rival Disney and Comcast’s NBC Universal, Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery could become another massive media outlet with right-wing ties.

The proposed deal follows the Trump administration’s $1.1 billion cuts in public media funding. These cuts – affecting PBS, NPR and more than 1,500 affiliated local news stations across the country, all accused by Trump of “partisan bias” – effectively accelerate the ongoing demise of local, independent news.

Concurrently, Rupert Murdoch’s Fox Corp. has settled its dynastic succession, ensuring Fox remains a core channel for the American right.

If the merger is approved, Fox Corporation, the conservative Sinclair Broadcasting and Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery would control one-third of all U.S. media.

This consolidation would further cement the partisan media model driving deepening political polarization in the U.S., as public and local news media lose funding. The deal also would undermine already declining media independence, fundamental to holding the powerful – whether corporations or politicians – to account.

Wielding regulation

The Trump administration has not shied away from using antitrust law and communications regulation to exercise political control over media.

Before initiating its merger with Warner Bros. Discovery, Paramount was acquired by David Ellison’s Skydance Media. Ahead of the government’s merger review, amid regulatory signals it could affect the review process, Paramount-owned CBS paid $16.5 million dollars to Donald Trump to settle a lawsuit Trump filed based on allegations of “deceptive” editing of an interview with his political opponent Kamala Harris. Editing of interviews is a standard editorial practice.

Shortly after, the merger was approved by the FCC with strict political conditions: hiring an ombudsman to oversee CBS’s reporting and eliminating all of the network’s diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives.

David Ellison accepted these conditions, promising to eliminate all of Paramount’s U.S.-based DEI programs. For the ombudsman role, he hired Kenneth Weinstein, former CEO of the conservative Hudson Institute and ambassador to Japan under the first Trump administration.

Since then, the Paramount CEO also has pursued Bari Weiss, a prominent conservative voice, to guide “the editorial direction” of the CBS news division. Ellison’s moves signal that editorial independence at CBS, and soon perhaps CNN, may be subject to ideological oversight.

Two men, one with his arm around the shoulder of the other.
Oracle’s Larry Ellison and son David Ellison, head of Skydance, attend a Los Angeles film premiere on May 14, 2013.
Eric Charbonneau/Invision/AP

Meanwhile, Ellison’s father, Larry Ellison, has ties to Donald Trump going back to the first Trump administration. The New York Times in an April 2025 profile said that Ellison “may be closer to Mr. Trump than any mogul this side of” Elon Musk.

The senior Ellison has been playing a key role in negotiations over the future ownership of TikTok. His ties to Trump run deep enough to likely make him one of the main beneficiaries of the TikTok deal currently in negotiation between the United States and China.

Trump has shown an appetite for coercing media companies. For instance, ABC settled a Trump lawsuit in late 2024 with a $15 million donation to the as-yet-unbuilt Trump Library.

By placing two major news outlets in the hands of a family with ties to Trump, the Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery merger would facilitate such control.




Read more:
ABC’s and CBS’s settlements with Trump are a dangerous step toward the commander in chief becoming the editor-in-chief


What Orbán did – but faster

This is the “Hungarian model” on speed.

Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s authoritarian leader, spent a decade asserting increasing control over that nation’s media.

The Trump administration is poised to accomplish the same in less than a year – and at greater scale.

In addition to helping allies buy a growing share of U.S. media, in his first eight months Trump also has managed to score conciliatory overtures from the nation’s tech billionaires, who fired fact-checkers at major social media platforms, curbed moderation of hateful content and asserted rigid editorial control over the op-ed pages at The Washington Post, one of the country’s most prominent newspapers.

If the Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery merger is approved and Larry Ellison joins Andreessen Horowitz as part of the impending TikTok deal, a movie studio, CBS, CNN, Fox, 185 Sinclair-owned TV stations and a major social media platform will have owners with strong ties to Trump.

We believe the promised benefits of a Paramount-Warner Bros. Disovery merger, including lower streaming prices, pale next to the damage it would do to media diversity and pluralism.

By acquiring greater control over film production, TV and streaming, the merger would dramatically reconfigure the very media institutions that shape U.S. culture and politics.

The Trump administration’s review of this merger may further cement the administration’s political control over the U.S. media.

The Conversation

Pawel Popiel receives funding from funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Dwayne Winseck receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Hendrik Theine receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage.

Sydney Forde receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage.

ref. A Paramount–Warner Bros. Discovery merger could give Trump even more influence over US media – shaping the news and culture Americans watch and stream – https://theconversation.com/a-paramount-warner-bros-discovery-merger-could-give-trump-even-more-influence-over-us-media-shaping-the-news-and-culture-americans-watch-and-stream-265699

Gestational diabetes linked to autism and ADHD in new study

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adaikala Antonysunil, Senior Lecturer in Biochemistry, School of Science and Technology, Nottingham Trent University

Nadiia Lapshynska/Shutterstock.com

A major new analysis is drawing fresh attention to the possible links between gestational diabetes and long-term brain health in both mothers and their children. The review, which combined data from 48 studies conducted over nearly 50 years, suggests that diabetes during pregnancy may have effects that extend well beyond childbirth, influencing memory, learning and mental health.

Gestational diabetes occurs when blood sugar rises during pregnancy, usually in the second or third trimester. Unlike type 1 or type 2 diabetes, it usually disappears after the child has been born. However, women who experience it are at greater risk of developing type 2 diabetes later in life.

The condition is also becoming more common worldwide, partly because more women begin pregnancy overweight and are having children at an older age. Current estimates suggest it now affects one in seven pregnancies.

The new research, which is yet to be peer reviewed, found notable differences in outcomes for children exposed to gestational diabetes in the womb.

On average, they were 36% more likely to be diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 56% more likely to develop autism and 45% more likely to have developmental delays compared with those whose mothers had normal blood sugar during pregnancy. They also scored lower on IQ tests – nearly four points less on average – with particular difficulties in verbal skills and accumulated knowledge.

For mothers, the differences were less striking but still measurable. Those who had gestational diabetes scored about 2.5 points lower on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment, a widely used test of memory, attention and problem-solving. While this is only a modest drop, it suggests that even temporary changes in blood sugar during pregnancy could have subtle long-term effects on brain function.

Researchers also identified biological markers that may help explain these outcomes. Children born to mothers with gestational diabetes had lower levels of a protein called brain-derived neurotrophic factor, or BDNF.

This protein supports the growth and repair of brain cells and is vital for learning and memory. Reduced levels could point to slower or less resilient brain development, though the precise effect is still uncertain.

Why these links exist remains an open question. Scientists believe that high blood sugar during pregnancy may lead to inflammation and increased oxidative stress, both of which can damage cells. Changes in how the placenta works may also alter the supply of oxygen and nutrients to the developing baby. In addition, the high insulin levels often seen with gestational diabetes could influence how brain connections are formed.

Another area of focus is epigenetics – the chemical modifications that affect how genes are switched on or off. Diet during pregnancy can trigger such changes, potentially influencing how the baby’s metabolism and brain develop.

Studies suggest that vitamin B12, which plays an epigenetic role in DNA repair and gene regulation, may be especially important. Low levels of B12, often linked to diets high in ultra-processed food, have been associated with poorer outcomes in foetal development, though the evidence is not yet conclusive.

It is important to stress the limits of the research. All of the studies included in the analysis were observational, meaning they can show associations but cannot prove cause and effect. Many other factors – including genetics, family environment and wider health inequalities – also shape outcomes for both mothers and children.

The fact that no major structural brain differences were detected between exposed and non-exposed children suggests that any effects are subtle, perhaps confined to language, attention or memory.

Even so, the findings carry important implications for healthcare. They underline the value of careful glucose monitoring during pregnancy and of lifestyle approaches such as healthy diet and regular physical activity, which are proven ways of managing gestational diabetes. Medical treatment, where required, also plays a crucial role in reducing risks.

For mothers, the research suggests that support should continue after birth, not only to monitor blood sugar but also to keep an eye on cognitive health. For children, early developmental checks could help identify those who might benefit from extra support in learning or behaviour.

Gestational diabetes explained.

Not about blame

Researchers emphasise that these findings are not about blame. Gestational diabetes arises from a complex mix of biological, genetic and environmental factors, many of which are outside individual control. Rather, the analysis points to the need for broader public health strategies and improved support systems during and after pregnancy.

As one of the most comprehensive reviews of its kind, the study adds weight to the idea that gestational diabetes may have lasting consequences that extend beyond pregnancy itself. With prevalence rising worldwide, better understanding of these links is vital for protecting the wellbeing of both mothers and their children.

Future studies may help refine dietary and lifestyle recommendations, exploring how nutrients such as vitamin B12 interact with gestational diabetes. By deepening our understanding of these processes, researchers hope to develop more targeted ways to safeguard brain health across generations.

The findings suggest that gestational diabetes is not only a temporary disruption of blood sugar but may also be linked to subtle, lasting changes in cognitive outcomes. As awareness grows, so too does the importance of early care and sustained support for families affected by this increasingly common condition.

The Conversation

Adaikala Antonysunil receives funding from Diabetes Research Wellness Foundation, BBSRC, Rosetrees Trust and Society of Endocrinology.

ref. Gestational diabetes linked to autism and ADHD in new study – https://theconversation.com/gestational-diabetes-linked-to-autism-and-adhd-in-new-study-265525

AI use by UK justice system risks papering over the cracks caused by years of underfunding

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Morgan Currie, Lecturer in Data & Society, University of Edinburgh

SuPatMaN / Shutterstock

More than a decade of underfunding by successive governments has left the UK’s justice system in crisis. There is now a significant backlog in cases and court dates are being cancelled due to logistical problems.

Powerful voices in UK politics, including the Tony Blair Institute and Policy Exchange think tanks, have put their weight behind artificial intelligence (AI) as a potential solution to problems being experienced across the public sector. Some of those voices believe that AI could liberate staff from bureaucratic workloads and give them more time to concentrate on the human aspects of justice, such as face-to-face engagement with clients.

In January, the Labour government announced a plan to “unleash” AI across the UK in a bid to “turbocharge” growth, boost living standards and revolutionise public services.

So how might AI affect the UK’s justice system?

The current focus on AI has been largely driven by developments in large language models (LLMs). This is the technology behind AI chatbots such as ChatGPT. But automation, machine learning, and other AI tools are not novel features of the justice system.

Older tools such as Technology Assisted Review used a form of AI to help lawyers predict the probable relevance of documents to a particular case or matter. More controversially, risk-scoring algorithms have been used in probation and immigration cases.

Critics of the last example have warned that these systems entrench inequalities and affect people in life altering ways without their knowledge.

However, these automated risk scoring systems are substantially different in nature to the productivity tools based on LLMs that are aimed at streamlining administrative processes. The latter can draft statements as well as scheduling and transcribing meetings.

They can also retrieve and summarise sources for document reviews and case law. Apparent success stories include the Old Bailey saving £50,000 by using AI to process evidence overviews for court cases.

How and why these tools are implemented – the institutional context – matters enormously. When digital tools are used not to provide more space for the human aspects of justice, but instead to cut costs, the harms fall especially heavily on vulnerable clients.

This is because even these seemingly routine administrative uses of AI require human reviewers to catch plausible, but wrong, information produced by these tools and to exercise expert judgment.

Evidence from a small scale Home Office pilot scheme shows why this is important. The pilot scheme used LLMs to summarise asylum case documents and transcripts to support asylum decisions.

Some 9% of the results were found to be inaccurate and missing interview references. Another 23% of users testing the scheme did not feel fully confident in the summaries, despite significant time savings.

Justice and digitisation

In July 2025, the Ministry of Justice published its AI Action Plan for Justice. While Microsoft’s Copilot Chat is already available for judicial office holders, the strategy document promised to roll out AI tools to 95,000 justice staff by December.

The plan acknowledges the many limitations of AI. It also establishes a chief AI officer, creates AI guidelines and emphasises that AI should “support, not substitute” human judgment.

It emphasises a cautious method towards roll-out, including an effort to gather feedback from trade unions and the public. It also stresses transparency through a new website and ethics framework.

The plan continues to promote more controversial uses of the technology, including assessing a person’s risk of violence in custody. Nevertheless, it focuses more heavily on LLMs for time saving tasks in administration.

However, could the new strategy lead to the adoption of LLM tools by the justice system before there is a mature understanding of how they are best applied? Decisions based in part on AI generated evidence are likely to offer new grounds for complaints and challenges. This could add to, rather than reduce, the backlog in cases.

In June 2025, a senior UK judge warned lawyers against the use of LLM tools because of the potential for those tools to “hallucinate” – generate fictitious information. There have been a number of cases elsewhere in the world where fictitious AI-generated material has apparently been filed in court cases.

Given their limitations, any benefits of these tools will generally be seen in those parts of the system where resources and time for human oversight are at their highest. The risks will hit hardest where human time and resources are low and where clients have less money and time to challenge decisions.

This unequal access to justice is not solely an AI issue. Previous waves of digitisation used to reduce the bureaucratic load included allowing some guilty pleas to be lodged online and automatic online convictions for some crimes, which would otherwise have required a court hearing.

As Gemma Birkett, lecturer in criminal justice at City St Georges University, argues, these automated systems particularly affect marginalised women, who are far more likely to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit.

Papering over the cracks

There are powerful arguments to be made in favour of using bespoke, carefully developed technology to remove the administrative burden on justice system staff, so that they can concentrate on the aspects of their work best delivered by people.

But when the current system is struggling, adopting LLMs (or other forms of rapid digitisation) will not fix the deep underlying problems caused by years of austerity. Rather than reducing bureaucracy, they risk papering over the cracks in a dysfunctional system.

The Conversation

Ben Collier receives funding from the Scottish Institute for Policing Research and is the Chair of the Foundation for Information Policy Research.

Alexandra Ba-Tin and Morgan Currie do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. AI use by UK justice system risks papering over the cracks caused by years of underfunding – https://theconversation.com/ai-use-by-uk-justice-system-risks-papering-over-the-cracks-caused-by-years-of-underfunding-264749

Running out of wardrobe space? Maybe you should follow the growing trend for clothes you can’t actually wear

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kokho Jason Sit, Senior Lecturer in Marketing; Associate Head (Global), University of Portsmouth

Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

Virtual reality has been fashionable for a while now. So perhaps it was only a matter of time before fashion became virtual.

Instead of spending your money on actual clothes to wear on your actual body, you can now buy garments (and accessories) that you will never touch. Also known as digital fashion, this is a world where clothes are “worn” only in virtual spaces, such as online games or in the metaverse.

Like virtual travel where you never leave your sofa, or a virtual bungee jump without risk of injury, virtual fashion is convenient and accessible. It is also getting more popular, with some sources forecasting that this particular side of the fashion industry could soon be worth tens of billions of dollars every year.

The growth potential predominantly comes from fashion brands using virtual products to advertise and innovate, and ultimately generate more sales. They can use digital clothes to experiment, gauge interest and explore new markets.

Vans, for example, created a virtual skatepark in collaboration with the game developer Roblox where users could practice their online skating skills, and buy exclusive clothing, shoes and other gear. A backpack here would cost 400 Roblox units of online currency, equivalent to around £5.

Meanwhile, the luxury brand Gucci created a virtual gallery (also with Roblox) where visitors could view, “try on” and buy digital items using blank, genderless, humanoid mannequin avatars.

The gallery had different themed rooms from which the avatars would absorb certain visual elements. Users could then screenshots to share on social media.

Zara has collaborated with Zepeto, a South Korean metaverse platform, to do something similar.

All these companies have seen how e-fashion can serve as a useful strategy to engage with consumers and promote imaginative products – and ultimately drive brand awareness and sales.




Read more:
3D printing in fashion promises to be huge – so what’s holding us back?


Elsewhere, some have previously argued that e-fashion could actually help to make the fashion industry more sustainable by eliminating some of the environmental issues associated with the industry like waste and carbon footprints.

The theory was that if people spent most of their working day in the virtual world, then digital fashion could be a more sustainable alternative to real-world fashion. You could effectively wear the same old jeans and hoodie day after day, while dressing in the latest trends online.

But ideas of a fully immersive digital world have so far not materialised, and fashion’s issues with sustainability remain, driven by the widespread impulse to keep up with the latest fashion, dress cheaply and dispose of items quickly.

Huge pile of discarded clothing and fabrics.
Out of fashion.
Sasha Ostapiuk/Shutterstock

The real-world presents digital fashion with further hurdles in its bid to become mainstream.

Some critics would argue that e-fashion lacks “touch authenticity” – the chance to feel and try a design before buying. Others, more simply, would point out that the biggest problem with digital clothes is that you can’t actually wear them.

And our research suggests that the market for e-fashion remains relatively niche. So far, it appeals mostly to hardcore enthusiasts who enjoy exploring new shopping experiences.

These consumers, often passionate about fashion, expression and technology, are the ones most likely to pay for and use e-fashion. They see it as a fun and effective way to combine their interests.

With a few clicks, they can “try on” e-fashion items, personalise them, and then capture and share the results, enjoying a creative outlet for their desire to try new clothes, styles and colours. And it provides brands and designers a way of trying out new ideas, some of which may be impossible to produce in the real world.

The Conversation

Kokho Jason Sit is affiliated with the Chartered Institute of Marketing (UK).

Giovanni Pino and Marco Pichierri do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Running out of wardrobe space? Maybe you should follow the growing trend for clothes you can’t actually wear – https://theconversation.com/running-out-of-wardrobe-space-maybe-you-should-follow-the-growing-trend-for-clothes-you-cant-actually-wear-255338