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January 14, 2026

Why people believe misinformation even when they’re told the facts

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kelly Fincham, Programme director, BA Global Media, Lecturer media and communications, University of Galway

When you spot false or misleading information online, or in a family group chat, how do you respond? For many people, their first impulse is to factcheck – reply with statistics, make a debunking post on social media or point people towards trustworthy sources.

Factchecking is seen as a go-to method for tackling the spread of false information. But it is notoriously difficult to correct misinformation.

Evidence shows readers trust journalists less when they debunk, rather than confirm, claims. Factchecking can also result in repeating the original lie to a whole new audience, amplifying its reach.

The work of media scholar Alice Marwick can help explain why factchecking often fails when used in isolation. Her research suggests that misinformation is not just a content problem, but an emotional and structural one.

She argues that it thrives through three mutually reinforcing pillars: the content of the message, the personal context of those sharing it, and the technological infrastructure that amplifies it.

1. The message

People find it cognitively easier to accept information than to reject it, which helps explain why misleading content spreads so readily.

Misinformation, whether in the form of a fake video or misleading headline, is problematic only when it finds a receptive audience willing to believe, endorse or share it. It does so by invoking what American sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls “deep stories”. These are emotionally resonant narratives that can explain people’s political beliefs.

The most influential misinformation or disinformation plays into existing beliefs, emotions and social identities, often reducing complex issues to familiar emotional narratives. For example, disinformation about migration might use tropes of “the dangerous outsider”, “the overwhelmed state” or “the undeserving newcomer”.

2. Personal context

When fabricated claims align with a person’s existing values, beliefs and ideologies, they can quickly harden into a kind of “knowledge”. This makes them difficult to debunk.

Marwick researched the spread of fake news during the 2016 US presidential election. One source described how her strongly conservative mother continued to share false stories about Hillary Clinton, even after she (the daughter) repeatedly debunked the claims.

The mother eventually said: “I don’t care if it’s false, I care that I hate Hillary Clinton, and I want everyone to know that!” This neatly encapsulates how sharing or posting misinformation can be an identity-signalling mechanism.

A woman angrily shouting at an ipad — What’s driving you to share that post?
Ekateryna Zubal/Shutterstock

People share false claims to signal in-group allegiance, a phenomenon researchers describe as “identity-based motivation”. The value of sharing lies not in providing accurate information, but in serving as social currency that reinforces group identity and cohesion.

The increase in the availability of AI-generated images will escalate the spread further. We know that people are willing to share images that they know are fake, when they believe they have an “emotional truth”. Visual content carries an inherent credibility and emotional force – “a picture is worth a thousand words” – that can override scepticism.

3. Technical structures

All of the above is supported by the technical structures of social media platforms, which are engineered to reward engagement. These platforms create revenue by capturing and selling users’ attention to advertisers. The longer and more intensively people engage with content, the more valuable that engagement becomes for advertisers and platform revenue.

Metrics such as time spent, likes, shares and comments are central to this business model. Recommendation algorithms are therefore explicitly optimised to maximise user engagement. Research shows that emotionally charged content – especially content that evokes anger, fear or outrage – generates significantly more engagement than neutral or positive content.

While misinformation clearly thrives in this environment, the sharing function of messaging and social media apps enables it to spread further. In 2020, the BBC reported that a single message sent to a WhatsApp group of 20 people could ultimately reach more than 3 million people, if each member shared it with another 20 people and the process was repeated five times.

By prioritising content likely to be shared and making sharing effortless, every like, comment or forward feeds the system. The platforms themselves act as a multiplier, enabling misinformation to spread faster, farther and more persistently than it could offline.

Factchecking fails not because it is inherently flawed, but because it is often deployed as a short-term solution to the structural problem of misinformation.

Meaningfully addressing it therefore requires a response that addresses all three of these pillars. It must involve long-term changes to incentives and accountability for tech platforms and publishers. And it requires shifts in social norms and awareness of our own motivations for sharing information.

If we continue to treat misinformation as a simple contest between truth and lies, we will keep losing. Disinformation thrives not just on falsehoods, but on the social and structural conditions that make them meaningful to share.

Kelly Fincham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why people believe misinformation even when they’re told the facts – https://theconversation.com/why-people-believe-misinformation-even-when-theyre-told-the-facts-271236

January 14, 2026

Heated Rivalry matters in a sporting culture that still sidelines queer men

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Joe Sheldon, Postgraduate Researcher, Department of Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology, University of Liverpool

Heated Rivalry, the HBO TV adaptation of the second book in Rachel Reid’s Game Changers series, rounded out 2025 as a surprise, word-of-mouth success. It captures the relationship between Shane (Hudson Williams) and Ilya (Connor Storrie), two professional male hockey players, over the course of almost a decade. Along the way the pair negotiate their feelings for each other against the backdrop of internal conflict, homophobia and a manufactured public-facing rivalry.

Heated Rivalry’s unexpected success has helped it to become discussed in mainstream media, including US talk shows and sports podcasts, and has earned it a much-anticipated release in the UK (via Sky and Now TV).

Heated Rivalry is not the first gay male love story to see critical success on TV in recent years. Though other successes (including the Netflix Originals Heartstopper and Young Royals) have been less explicit and tended to be aimed at younger audiences. What is particularly unique about Heated Rivalry’s story, however, is its setting within the popular but hyper-masculine space of a men’s professional sporting league.

My PhD research focuses on the experience of football fandom in the face of oppressive and difficult conditions. The project is a passion of mine, and I adore the chance I get to speak with supporters from all backgrounds. However, despite loving football (soccer) to my bones, I – like many other queer sports fans – often feel that the experiences of sports fandom can be unrepresentative of my own community.

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Despite much stronger LGBTQ+ representation across women’s sports, male professional leagues still frequently remain dogged by homophobia, both in the stands and the changing rooms. As a result, in the imaginaries of fans – the way that fans interpret their role and experiences in the complex social, economic and cultural life of sport – queer fans can so frequently feel “othered” (actively treated as alien to a social group).

Social imaginaries are a shared (sometimes unconscious) set of beliefs, values and symbols that help a community to understand itself in the world. They often form the basis of laws or institutions. Critical research, including my own, uses imaginaries of how people understand their place in the modern economy to analyse people navigating the complexities of modern economic life.

These imaginaries are important – they help researchers make sense of how fans understand who sport is for and why they may feel this way. The manner in which people see their own place in their world tells us just as much as an analysis of the systems of capital, social relations and prejudice they are experiencing.

Gay and bisexual players in these leagues certainly exist. German footballer Thomas Hitzlsperger, for example, made his sexuality public following his retirement. Moreover, in 2020, an anonymous gay Premier League player penned a public letter explaining his hesitancy to share his sexuality, describing his day-to-day existence as an “absolute nightmare”.

These experiences, and the lack of subsequent representation within professional male sporting spaces, can frequently lead to fans feeling excluded from this arena of social life. The lack of openly gay players may be both caused and exacerbated by the prejudice experienced by supporters, with one 2018 study of football supporters finding that 63% of LGBTQ+ fans experienced homophobia and transphobia at games.

The trailer for Heated Rivalry.

The cultural success of Heated Rivalry helps demonstrate it is not that people from LGBTQ+ communities are naturally averse to wanting to participate in these spaces. There is something incredibly important about a story so confident in its masculinity, so assured of its legitimacy as a sports romance story, taking off in the way that this adaptation has.

Hudson Williams, one of Heated Rivalry’s lead actors, has revealed that he has been contacted by closeted male professional players from different sports following the show’s release. The significance of such an impact is not to be understated. Emboldening LGBTQ+ professionals to feel represented will be good for male sports, players and fans.

Already renewed for a second season, which will cover Reid’s follow-up book, The Long Game, Heated Rivalry demonstrates that the imaginaries of queer fans in male sports can be changed.

Leagues and clubs have an imperative to ensure that the work of real cultural change is undertaken to begin this process, learning from the success of the show.

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Joe Sheldon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Heated Rivalry matters in a sporting culture that still sidelines queer men – https://theconversation.com/heated-rivalry-matters-in-a-sporting-culture-that-still-sidelines-queer-men-273143

January 14, 2026

Whether or not US acquires Greenland, the island will be at the centre of a massive military build-up in the Arctic

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Professor of War Studies, Loughborough University

Donald Trump is clearly in a hurry to dominate the political narrative in his second term of office. He began 2026 with strikes in Syria against Islamic State groups, the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, threats to intervene in Iran and the declaration that the US would take control of Greenland – by hook or by crook.

Of all these the plan to add Greenland to the US either by negotiation or by force is easily the most controversial as it could lead to the break-up of the Nato alliance.

Greenland, the world’s largest island and a part of the kingdom of Denmark, has an abundance of critical minerals offering wealth and business opportunities. But the US president is also making a big deal out of the need to secure Greenland for US national security. He has repeatedly stated the danger from Russia and China, whose ships, he says, stalk the island’s waters.

Publicly, at least, Russia has no problems with Trump’s ambitions in Greenland. Vladimir Putin has declined to criticise the Trump administration’s acquisitive comments, saying that the US has long had plans to incorporate Greenland and that the island’s future has “nothing to do with us”.

Russia’s vision doesn’t rule out the possibility of economic cooperation with America in the Arctic. After Putin and Trump met in August 2025 in Alaska, Russia mooted the idea of a “Putin-Trump tunnel” across the Bering Sea, a vision to which Trump responded favourably.

The Chinese, meanwhile, are not happy about Trump’s designs on Greenland. They tend to see the Arctic as a global commons in which non-Arctic states have an equal stake. So they are unhappy at the notion of any sort of arrangement that involves US or Russian spheres of influence in the Arctic.

The US has been trying to acquire Greenland since 1867 when, fresh from buying Alaska from Russia, the secretary of state William Seward unsuccessfully raised the idea of purchasing Greenland and Iceland from Denmark. Harry Truman offered US$100 million (£74 million) for Greenland in 1946, but Denmark refused. Instead the two countries agreed a treaty in 1951 giving the US considerable latitude to deploy thousands of US troops and install the weather stations and early warning systems that characterised cold war politics.

But when the Soviet Union collapsed, heralding an end to the cold war, Greenland was relegated in importance. The US presence in Greenland went from more than 10,000 personnel on 50 bases to a single settlement at Pituffik space base (formerly Thule air base) with about 150-200 people.

But the Ukraine war, increased assertiveness from Russia and China in the region and the steady melt caused by climate change have reinvigorated US interest in the Arctic region. And in the US president’s view, Greenland is a strategic vulnerability.

Russia’s threat

Greenland sits at the western perimeter of what is called the GIUK (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) gap, which is vital to Nato defence of Europe. From here, submarines from Russia’s Northern Fleet in Murmansk can traverse into the North Atlantic, threatening targets on America’s east coast. In a crisis, Russian naval forces would move into both the GIUK gap and Norwegian waters, deterring American vessels from pushing north and effectively isolating Nato allies in the region.

Map of the GIUK gap. — Th GIUK gap is a strategically vital waterway protected by Green;and to the west, the UK to the south and Scandinavia to the northeast.
Wikimedia Commons

Many of Russia’s missile sites and nuclear air bases in the region are sited on the Kola peninsula, on the eastern edge of Scandinavia, which is also home to its Northern Fleet navy and submarines. From the Kola peninsula, the shortest direct flights route from Russia to targets on the American East Coast lies across Greenland.

Russia’s Arctic facilities have been significantly upgraded over the past decade, even as the bulk of its defence budget has been directed towards its war in Ukraine. Seasonal air bases have been coverted for all-year-round operations and extended to allow the use of even the heaviest of its nuclear bomber fleet at locations in the Far North such as Nagurskoye in Alexandra Land which is part of the Franz Josef Land and Temp on Kotelny Island in the New Siberian Islands.

At present, Russian combat aircraft and strategic bombers, such as the Mikoyan Mig-31, Sukhoi Su-35, and the Tupolev Tu-95, can operate from these bases and potentially neutralise Pituffik. The space base is at present the key US defence establishment in the region, able to detect enemy ballistic missiles as soon as they take off.

Joint Russian and Chinese air patrols now regularly operate in the region, raising concerns about the defence readiness of Alaska. Many of their weapons are what is called “stand-off”, which means they can operate out of the range of the defensive weapons arrayed against them.

Map of the Arctic region showing Greenland (Denmark), Svalbard (Norway) and Franz Josef Land (Russia).
PeterHermesFurian/Shutterstock

If Russia (or for that matter, China) did occupy parts of Greenland, it could mean foreign stand-off weapons sitting just 1,300 miles from the US. Whoever is in the White House, this would be considered as unthinkable for US security.

US response

In June 2025, US Northern Command took over responsibility for Greenland, integrating it into homeland defence. This, said Sean Parnell, chief spokesperson for the Pentagon, would be contributing to a “more robust defense of the western hemisphere and deepening relationships with Arctic allies and partners”.

Trump has derided the exiting European defence effort in Greenland, insisting that only the US can defend the US. His perspective can only have been emboldened the success of the recent Operation Absolute Resolve, the raid which snatched Maduro from Caracas. US combined forces demonstrated effective suppression of enemy air defences, knocking out both the Chinese JY-27A radar system and the Russian S-300 and Buk-M2 air defence systems.

Whether or not Trump gets his wish to actually acquire Greenland for the US, there seems little doubt that Greenland will once again play host to a strong American presence on the island and that the Arctic in general will become a showcase for the latest military technology they have in their armouries.

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Whether or not US acquires Greenland, the island will be at the centre of a massive military build-up in the Arctic – https://theconversation.com/whether-or-not-us-acquires-greenland-the-island-will-be-at-the-centre-of-a-massive-military-build-up-in-the-arctic-273301

January 14, 2026

Evidence for link between digital technology use and teenage mental health problems is weak, our large study suggests

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Qiqi Cheng, Quantitative Research Associate, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester

For years, the narrative surrounding teenagers’ use of digital technology has been one of alarm.

Time spent scrolling through TikTok or playing video games is widely seen to be driving the current crisis in youth mental health, fuelling rising rates of anxiety and depression.

But our recent study suggests that this simple story of cause and effect is not supported by the evidence.

After following more than 25,000 young people in Greater Manchester over three school years, we found little evidence that self-reported time spent on social media or frequent gaming causes mental health problems in early-to-mid adolescence. Instead, the relationship between digital technology use and teenagers’ wellbeing is far more nuanced than simple cause and effect.

While many previous studies have looked at a single snapshot in time, we used a longitudinal approach: observing the same young people over an extended period of time. We did this through the #BeeWell programme, which surveys young people annually. We tracked the same pupils across three annual waves, from year eight (when they were aged 12-13) to year nine (aged 13-14) to year ten (aged 14-15).

Another crucial point is that our analysis separated “between-person” effects from “within-person” effects. In other words, rather than just comparing the mental health of heavy users of social media or gaming to that of light users, we looked at whether a specific teenager’s mental health worsened after they started spending more time on social media (or gaming) than they usually did.

Child alone on swing with phone — It’s easy to assume that social media causes low mood.
caseyjadew/Shutterstock

When we applied this rigorous method, the supposed link between digital technology use and later “internalising symptoms” – worry, low mood – largely vanished. For both boys and girls, an increase in time on social media or gaming frequency did not predict a later rise in symptoms.

How teens use social media

A common theory is that how we use social media matters more than how long we spend on it. Some argue that “active” use, like posting photos and chatting, is better than “passive” use, such as endless scrolling.

However, our sensitivity analyses found that even when we distinguished between these two types of online behaviour, the results remained the same. Neither active nor passive social media use was a significant driver of later mental health problems in our sample.

While we found no evidence of digital technology use causing later mental health issues, we did find some interesting differences in how boys and girls navigate their digital lives over time.

Girls who spent more time gaming in one year tended to spend less time on social media the following year. This suggests that for girls, gaming and social media may compete for the same limited free time.

Boys who reported higher levels of internalising symptoms (like low mood) in one year went on to reduce their gaming frequency the next. This suggests boys may lose interest in hobbies they previously enjoyed when their mental health declines. This is known as “anhedonia”.

The gap between headlines and research

If the evidence is so weak, why is the concern so strong? Part of the issue is a reliance on simple correlations. If you find that anxious or depressed teens use more social media, it is easy to assume the social media caused their difficulties.

But it is just as likely that the mental health problems came first, or that a third factor, such as school stress or family difficulties, is driving both. By using a large, diverse sample and controlling for factors like socio-economic background and special educational needs, our study provides a clearer view of the real-world impact (or lack thereof) of teenagers’ digital technology use.

Our findings do not mean that the digital world is without risks. Our study looked at year-on year trends, so it does not rule out the possibility of negative effects of social media or gaming in the shorter-term – such as immediately after use. Furthermore, issues like cyberbullying, sleep disruption or exposure to harmful content remain serious concerns.

However, our findings suggest that limiting the hours spent on consoles and apps or measures such as banning social media for under 16s is unlikely to have an effect on teenagers’ mental health in the long term. Policymakers should take note. Worse, such blanket bans may obscure the real risk factors by offering a simple solution to a complex problem.

Instead, it’s important to look at the broader context of a young person’s life, including the factors that may lead to both increased digital technology use and internalising symptoms. If a teenager is struggling, technology use is rarely the sole culprit. By moving away from the predominant “digital harm” narrative, we can focus on the real, complex factors that drive adolescent wellbeing.

Neil Humphrey receives funding from various bodies including The National Lottery Community Fund to conduct research on young people’s wellbeing

Qiqi Cheng does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Evidence for link between digital technology use and teenage mental health problems is weak, our large study suggests – https://theconversation.com/evidence-for-link-between-digital-technology-use-and-teenage-mental-health-problems-is-weak-our-large-study-suggests-273386

January 14, 2026

Why the world’s central bankers had to speak up against Trump’s attacks on the Fed

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By John Hawkins, Head, Canberra School of Government, University of Canberra

Central bankers from around the world have issued a joint statement of support for US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, as he faces a criminal probe on top of mounting pressure from US President Donald Trump to resign early.

It is very unusual for the world’s central bank governors to issue such a statement. But these are very unusual times.

The reason so many senior central bankers – from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe, New Zealand, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom and other countries, as well as the central banks’ club the Bank for International Settlements – have spoken up is simple. US interest rate decisions have an impact around the world. They don’t want a dangerous precedent set.

Over the course of my career as an economist, much of it at the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank for International Settlements, I have seen independent central banks become the global norm in recent decades.

Allowing central banks to set interest rates to achieve inflation targets has avoided a repeat of the sustained high inflation which broke out in the 1970s.

Returning the setting of monetary policy to a politician, especially one as unpredictable as Trump, is an unwelcome prospect.

What’s happened

Trump has repeatedly attacked the US Federal Reserve (known as the Fed) over many years. He has expressed his desire to remove Powell before his term as chair runs out in May. But legislation says the president can only fire the Fed chair “for cause”, not on a whim. This is generally taken to mean some illegal act.

The Supreme Court is currently hearing a case about whether the president has the power to remove another Fed board member, Lisa Cook.

And this week, Powell revealed he had been served with a subpoena by the US Department of Justice, threatening a criminal indictment relating to his testimony to the Senate banking committee about the US$2.5 billion renovations to the Fed’s historic office buildings.

Trump has denied any involvement in the investigation.

But Powell released a strong statement in defence of himself. He said the reference to the building works was a “pretext” and that the real issue was:

whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions – or whether monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation.

US Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell’s statement addressing the investigation.

On Tuesday, more than a dozen of the world’s leading central bankers put out a statement of support:

We stand in full solidarity with the Federal Reserve System and its Chair Jerome H Powell. The independence of central banks is a cornerstone of price, financial and economic stability in the interest of the citizens that we serve. It is therefore critical to preserve that independence, with full respect for the rule of law and democratic accountability.

Another statement of support came from leading US economists – including all the living past chairs of the Fed. This included the legendary central bank “maestro” Alan Greenspan, appointed by Ronald Reagan and reappointed by George HW Bush, Bill Clinton and George W Bush.

This statement warned undermining the independence of the Fed could have “highly negative consequences” for inflation and the functioning of the economy.

Why it matters for global inflation

Trump has said he wants the Fed to lower interest rates dramatically, from the current target range of 3.5–3.75% down to 1%. Most economists think this would lead to a large increase in inflation.

At 2.8% in the US, inflation is already above the Fed’s 2% target. The Fed’s interest rate would normally only drop to 1% during a serious recession.

A clear example of the dangers of politicised central banks was when the Fed lowered interest rates before the 1972 presidential election. Many commentators attribute this to pressure from then president Richard Nixon to improve his chances of re-election. This easing of monetary policy contributed to the high inflation of the mid-1970s.

A more recent example comes from Turkey. In the early 2020s, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leaned on the country’s central bank to cut interest rates. The result was very high inflation, eventually followed by very high interest rates to try to get inflation back under control.

Trump should be careful what he wishes for

What will happen if Trump is able to appoint a compliant Fed chair, and other board members, and if they actually lower the short-term interest rates they control to 1%? Expected inflation and then actual inflation would rise.

This would lead to higher long-term interest rates.

If Trump gets his way, US voters may face a greater affordability problem in the run-up to the mid-term elections in November. This could then be followed by a recession, as interest rates need to rise markedly to get inflation back down.

And as over a dozen global central bank leaders have just warned us, what happens in the US matters worldwide.

John Hawkins was formerly a senior economist at the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank for International Settlements.

– ref. Why the world’s central bankers had to speak up against Trump’s attacks on the Fed – https://theconversation.com/why-the-worlds-central-bankers-had-to-speak-up-against-trumps-attacks-on-the-fed-273450

January 14, 2026

Why Iran can’t afford to shut down the internet forever – even if the world doesn’t act

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Dara Conduit, ARC DECRA Fellow, The University of Melbourne

As citizens around the world prepared to welcome the new year, Iranians began taking to the streets to protest their country’s deepening economic crisis. Spurred by the continued devaluation of the Iranian currency against the US dollar, as well as crippling inflation, the unrest is the latest in years of economic pain and protest.

The Iranian regime initially acknowledged the legitimacy of the protesters’ concerns, distributing hopelessly inadequate cash vouchers worth only US$7 to help with the cost of living.

But it’s since taken a much heavier hand. According to the regime’s own figures, as of today, at least 2,000 people have been killed. Protesters bravely continue to take to the streets.

Like clockwork last Thursday, the regime rolled out one of its most potent tools of population control: internet shutdowns. In the six days since, Iranians have been almost entirely cut off from the internet, with alternative means of access, such as smuggled Starlink terminals, proving unreliable because of satellite jamming.

As the world waits to see if US President Donald Trump follows through on his threats of “very strong action” if Iran hangs protesters, the truth is that even without international action, the regime can’t afford to keep Iran’s internet offline indefinitely.

Why the regime blocks the internet

The Iranian regime has used internet shutdowns since the Green Movement protests following the disputed 2009 presidential election. They’re a powerful tool that stops citizens from communicating with the outside world and each another.

This limits opposition organising, because people can’t join protests if they don’t know where they are. It also isolates individuals, preventing them from seeing violent crackdowns outside their neighbourhood. Internet shutdowns also obscure the international gaze, allowing the regime to crack down on protesters in the dark.

Shutdowns have become so synonymous with political unrest that the non-government digital rights organisation Article 19 declared in 2020 “protests beget Internet shutdowns in Iran”.

Internet shutdowns are costly

But it would be a mistake to think the Iranian regime has an endless capacity to shut down the internet. Each shutdown comes at a high economic and political cost.

As well as blocking instant messengers and social media sites, internet shutdowns in Iran have often blocked work applications such as Slack, Skype, Google Meet and Jira. These are central to ordinary businesses’ operations.

Similarly, the regime’s efforts to block virtual private networks (VPNs) and secure HTTPS connections can wreak havoc on corporate payment systems, multi-factor authentication and even corporate email.

Global internet monitor Netblocks estimates internet shutdowns cost the Iranian economy more than US$37 million a day. That’s more than US$224 million in the past six days alone.

As I wrote in a recent journal article, we’ve already seen how bad the economic impacts of internet shutdowns can be in Iran.

During the 2022-23 protests following the death-in-custody of the Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa “Jina” Amini, internet shutdowns had far-reaching implications.

One source claimed the volume of online payments inside Iran halved in the first two weeks of the protests alone.

Iran has a vibrant e-commerce sector. An estimated 83% of its online businesses use social media platforms such as Instagram, WhatsApp and Telegram to generate sales. All three were blocked during the 2022-23 unrest. A report later found Instagram blocking and periodic internet disruptions in the 17 months after the protests cost the Iranian economy US$1.6 billion.

The regime has been working hard for decades to build a domestic internet that could alleviate some of this damage, but so far it has failed.

The regime’s enormous technology needs – for surveillance, but also to power a modern economy for around 92 million people – has led to the emergence of a large semi-private information and communications (ICT) sector in Iran. This includes internet service providers, cell network operators and a large IT sector.

Just six weeks into the 2022 protests, the cellphone operator RighTel’s chief executive penned an open letter to the ICT minister, Issa Zarepour, complaining the digital crackdown was crippling his business. He noted RighTel had upheld the regime’s “security priorities and requirements” during the shutdowns, and demanded compensation or RighTel may be forced to withdraw from the market.

These demands were echoed in letters privately written (but later leaked) by other communications providers.

These were not natural regime critics. Indeed, internet shutdowns were creating a dangerous dynamic in which even those close to the regime were being alienated, generating a new class of potential protesters who could one day join those marching in the streets.

Why the current shutdown can’t last forever

This is why the current internet shutdown is a risky strategy. While the regime is succeeding in concealing the worst of its bloody crackdown, it risks further provoking the country’s already struggling economic class.

In 2022-23, the shutdowns were implemented in a targeted manner, taking place for the most part in certain cities, or at specific times of day when protests were expected. In contrast, the current shutdown is countrywide.

Only 1% of internet connections in Iran are online today (which is how the supreme leader is still able to freely use X to spout propaganda). This means the economic and political impacts of this current shutdown, if it continues, could easily dwarf those of 2022-23.

Given Iran’s economic woes are the driving force of the current unrest, a sustained internet blackout could motivate more people to take to the streets. The regime is only too aware of this risk.

Dara Conduit receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

– ref. Why Iran can’t afford to shut down the internet forever – even if the world doesn’t act – https://theconversation.com/why-iran-cant-afford-to-shut-down-the-internet-forever-even-if-the-world-doesnt-act-273454

January 14, 2026

The World Trade Organization is on life support. Will Trump’s new rules finish it off?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jane Kelsey, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Auckland, Waipapa Taumata Rau

The United States has now withdrawn from 66 international organisations, conventions and treaties, illegally invaded Venezuela, and promoted an “America First” agenda in its new National Security Strategy.

This all signals the collapse of a global system that has operated for the past 60 years. The old world order – driven by hyper-globalisation and US hegemonic power – is in its death throes, but a new era is yet to be born.

We now face a deepening ideological, strategic and military conflict over what shape it will take. The global “free trade” regime, overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO), is one such battleground.

Largely designed to serve its strategic and corporate interests, the US now sees the WTO as a liability because of the economic ascendancy of China and a domestic populist backlash against globalisation and free trade.

But US antipathy to the current multilateral trade regime is not exclusive to the Trump administration. America has long resisted binding itself to the trade rules it demands other countries obey.

Congress reserved the power to review US membership when it authorised joining the WTO in 1994. Since then, both Republican and Democrat administrations have undermined its operation by:

calling for an end to the Doha Round of negotiations launched in 2001
breaking the WTO dispute mechanism by defying rulings that go against it, and refusing to appoint judges to the WTO Appellate Body so it is now moribund (effectively allowing rules to be breached)
and starving the WTO’s budget during the latest US review of international organisation memberships.

To date, Trump has not withdrawn the US from the WTO. But his administration seeks instead to reinvent it in a form it believes will restore US geostrategic and economic ascendancy.

Rewriting the rulebook

In December 2025, the newly-arrived US Ambassador to the WTO warned its General Council:

If the WTO does not reform by making tangible improvements in those areas that are central to its mission, it will continue its path toward irrelevancy.

“Reform” in this context means abandoning the cornerstone most-favoured-nation rule that requires all WTO members to be treated equally well, which is the bedrock of multilateralism.

The US wants to reinterpret the WTO’s “security exceptions” (which apply to arms trade, war and United Nations obligations to maintain peace and security) to allow countries absolute sovereignty to decide when the exception applies – effectively neutralising the rules at will.

The WTO would also cease to address issues of “oversupply” and “overcapacity”, “economic security” and “supply chain resilience”, which the US believes have enabled China’s growing economic dominance, leaving the way open for unilateral action outside the WTO.

In the stripped-down WTO, decision-making by consensus would be abandoned and multilateral negotiations replaced by deals that are driven by more powerful players on cherry-picked topics.

Unilateral action is not an idle threat. Trump has imposed arbitrary and erratic tariffs on more than 90 countries for a variety of “national and economic security” reasons, demanding concessions for reducing (not removing) them.

Those demands extend way beyond matters of trade, and impinge deeply on those countries’ own sovereignty. There is nothing the WTO can do.

Weaponising tariffs is also not a new strategy. President Joe Biden maintained the tariffs imposed on China during the first Trump presidency, triggering WTO disputes which remain unresolved.

But Trump’s embrace of raw coercive power strips away any chimera of commitment to multilateralism and the model that has prevailed since the 1980s, or to the development of Third World countries that have been rule-takers in that regime.

Where now for the WTO?

Some more powerful countries have bargained with Trump to reduce the new tariffs. China’s retaliation generated an uneasy one-year truce. Brazil held firm against Trump’s politically-motivated tariffs at considerable economic cost. Australia made a side-deal on critical minerals.

The European Union remains in a standoff over pharmaceutical patents and regulating big tech. India has diversified to survive relatively unscathed, ironically forging closer ties with China.

Less powerful countries are much more vulnerable. Among other obligations, the full texts of “reciprocal trade agreements” with Malaysia and Cambodia, signed in October, require them to:

replicate US foreign policy and sanctions on other countries
consult the US before negotiating a new free trade agreement with a country that “jeopardises US essential security interests”
promise to make potentially crippling investments in and purchases from the US
involve the US in regulating inward investment and development of Malaysia’s rare earth elements and critical minerals (Malaysia has large unmined repositories, an alternative to China)
and not tax US tech giants, regulate their monopolies or restrict data flows.

If implemented, these agreements risk creating economic, fiscal, social and political chaos in targeted countries, disrupting their deeply integrated supply chains, and requiring they make impossible choices between the US and China.

In return, the 2025 tariffs will be reduced, not reversed, and the US can terminate the deals pretty much at will.

This poses an existential question for WTO members, including New Zealand and Australia, at the 14th ministerial conference in Cameroon in late March: will members submit to US demands in an attempt to keep the WTO on life support?

Or can they use this interregnum to explore alternatives to the hyper-globalisation model whose era has passed?

Jane Kelsey is affiliated with a number of international NGOs that monitor and advise on developments in international trade law and the WTO.

– ref. The World Trade Organization is on life support. Will Trump’s new rules finish it off? – https://theconversation.com/the-world-trade-organization-is-on-life-support-will-trumps-new-rules-finish-it-off-273216

January 13, 2026

Iran’s protests have spread across provinces, despite skepticism and concern among ethnic groups

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Shukriya Bradost, Ph.D. Researcher, International Security and Foreign Policy, Virginia Tech

Protester in Punak, Tehran on Jan. 10, 2026. Author-obtained image., CC BY

When Iran’s ongoing protests began in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar on Dec. 28 2025, the government initially treated them as manageable and temporary.

Bazaar merchants have historically been among the most conservative social groups in Iran, deeply embedded in the state’s economic structure and closely connected to political authority. Within the Iranian government itself, there was apparent confidence that their protests were not revolutionary in nature but transactional – a short-lived pressure campaign aimed at stabilizing the collapsing currency and curbing inflation that directly threatened merchants’ livelihoods.

This perception led to an unprecedented development. In his first public response, Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei openly acknowledged the merchants’ protests – the first time he had ever accepted the legitimacy of any demonstration.

He characterized them as part of the traditional alliance between the state and the bazaar, indicating that the government still viewed the unrest as controllable.

But authorities did not anticipate what happened next: The protests spread to over 25 provinces and developed into a nationwide challenge to the government’s survival, met by a violent crackdown in which more than 6,000 protesters have reportedly been killed.

As an expert on Iran’s ethnic groups, I have watched as the unrest has expanded to include minority groups – despite skepticism among these communities over the possible outcome of the unrest and concerns over the plans of some central opposition figures.

As reports emerge of government forces killing thousands, the central question has now shifted from whether the state can suppress the protests to how different regions of Iran interpreted the concept of change – whether it is something achievable within the government or necessitates regime change itself.

Ethnic minorities join the protest

Iran is a country of about 93 million people whose modern state was built around a centralized national identity rather than ethnic pluralism.

But that masks a large and politically significant ethnic minority population. While 51% form the Persian majority, 24% of the country identify as Azeri. Kurds number some 7 million to 15 million, composing roughly 8% to 17% of the total population. And Arabs and Baluch minorities represent 3% and 2% of the population, respectively.

A map highlights different regions — A map of the distribution of Iran’s ethnic groups.
Wikimedia Commons

Since the Pahlavi monarchy’s nation-building project began in 1925, successive governments, both monarchical and then the Islamic Republic, have treated ethnic diversity as a security challenge and repeatedly suppressed demands for political inclusion, language rights and local governance.

The role of Iran’s ethnic minority groups in the current protests has evolved. Initially, minority regions were less prominent than in the last serious wave of protests: the 2022–23 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising sparked by the death of a Kurdish-Iranian woman named Jina Mahsa Amini.

The Kurdish involvement in the current protests began in the small city of Malekshahi in Ilam province on Jan. 3. A subsequent violent raid by security forces on wounded protesters inside Ilam hospital provoked outrage beyond the local community and attracted international attention.

Protests continued in Ilam, while in nearby Kermanshah province, particularly the impoverished area of Daradrezh, they erupted over economic deprivation and political discrimination.

A strategic approach to protest

Shiite Kurdish communities in Ilam and Kermanshah continue to experience exclusion rooted in their Kurdish identity. That’s despite sharing a Shiite identity with Iran’s ruling establishment in Tehran – a factor that has historically afforded greater access to government than for the Sunni Kurdish population.

Following the killing of protesters in Ilam and Kermanshah, Kurdish political parties issued a joint statement calling for a region-wide strike.

Notably, Kurdish leaders did not call for protests but for strikes alone. During the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, the government treated Kurdish cities as security zones – framing the protests as a threat to Iran’s territorial integrity and using that justification to carry out mass killings and executions.

By opting for strikes this time, Kurdish leaders sought to demonstrate solidarity while reducing the risk of large-scale violence and another massacre.

A protester in Tehran on Jan. 10, 2026.
Author-obtained image., CC BY

The result was decisive: Nearly all Kurdish cities shut down.

Baluchestan, in Iran’s southeast, followed Kurdistan a day after. Beginning with Friday prayers on Jan. 9, protests erupted, also driven by long-standing ethnic and religious marginalization there.

Iranian Azerbaijan, an area in the country’s northwest, joined later and more cautiously. This delayed, small protest reflects Azerbaijanis’ current favorable position within Iran’s political, military and economic institutions.

Historically, from the 16th century to 1925, Shiite Azari-Turks dominated the Iranian state, with Azerbaijani functioning as a court language.

The Pahlavi monarchy marked a rupture, banning the Azerbaijani language and curtailing local autonomy. But since 1979, the Islamic Republic has partially restored Azerbaijani influence, allowing clerics to address constituents in their native language and reintegrating Azerbaijan into central government in Tehran. The current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is of Azerbaijani descent.

A history of repression

Ethnically based political movements emerged across Iran immediately after the 1979 revolution, which many minority groups had supported in hopes of greater inclusion and rights.

But these movements were quickly suppressed as the Islamic Republic crushed uprisings across Iranian Azerbaijan, Baluchestan, Khuzestan and other peripheral regions.

Kurdistan was the exception, where resistance, military confrontation and state violence, including massacres, continued for several years.

This repression and the impact of the Iran–Iraq War, during which wartime mobilization overshadowed internal grievances, muted ethnic minority demands throughout the 1980s.

But these demands resurfaced in the 1990s, especially sparked by a sense of cultural revival and cross-border identity formation after the Soviet Union’s collapse. In Iranian Kurdistan, a large part of the armed struggle was transformed into a civil struggle, while Peshmerga forces maintained arms and military training across the border in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

The Iranian government has increasingly viewed this awakening as a strategic threat and has responded by decentralizing security and military authority to enable rapid crackdowns on protests without awaiting approval from Tehran.

Diverging protest demands

This history of repression explains why the protests in Iran now were at least initially more centralized than previous uprisings. Ethnic minority regions are not indifferent to change; they are skeptical of its outcome.

Many Persian-majority urban protesters seek social freedoms, economic recovery and normalization with the West, particularly the United States. But ethnic communities carry additional demands: decentralization of power, recognition of linguistic and cultural rights, and genuine power-sharing within the state.

For over four decades, ethnic minority demands have been labeled as separatist or “terrorist” and met with arrests and executions by the Islamic Republic.

This rhetoric has also influenced major Persian-dominated opposition groups – spanning the ideological spectrum from left to right and operating largely in exile – that perceive ethnic minority demands as a threat to Iran’s territorial integrity.

Fears of the shah’s return

Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last shah of Iran, is positioning himself as the leader of the opposition and a transitional figure. But ethnic communities have reason for concern.

Pahlavi’s office has published a road map for a transitional government that sharply contrasts with his public claims of not seeking to monopolize power. The document envisions Pahlavi as a leader with extraordinary authority. In practice, the concentration of power he proposes under his leadership closely resembles the authority currently exercised by Iran’s supreme leader.

A protester holds aloft a photo of a man with 'King Reza Pahlavi' written above. — Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late ruler Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, has seen his support surge among protesters, such as those seen here in Germany on Jan. 12, 2026.
John MAcDougall/AFP via Getty Images

For ethnic communities, these implications are particularly troubling. The road map characterizes ethnic-based demands and parties as threats to national security, reinforcing long-standing state narratives rather than departing from them. This explicit stance has deepened skepticism in peripheral regions.

In contrast to Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, whose revolutionary vision was deliberately vague regarding the future status of ethnic groups, the current opposition leadership project articulates a centralized political order that excludes ethnic inclusion and power-sharing.

For communities whose languages were banned and whose regions were systematically underdeveloped during the Pahlavi monarchy, the resurgence of monarchist slogans in central cities only reinforces fears that any transition driven by centralized narratives will again marginalize Iran’s peripheral regions.

The risk of ignoring provinces

Iran’s protests, therefore, reveal more than resistance to authoritarian rule. They expose a fundamental divide over what political change means – and for whom.

In a country as ethnically diverse as Iran, where millions belong to non-Persian ethnic communities, a durable political order cannot, I believe, be built on centralized power dominated by a single ethnic identity.

Any future transition, whether through reform within the current system or through regime change, will have a better chance of success if it incorporates a political framework that acknowledges and incorporates the demands of all regions and communities. Without such inclusion, trust in the process of change will remain elusive – and hopes for a better future dimmed.

Shukriya Bradost is affiliated with the Middle East Institute.

– ref. Iran’s protests have spread across provinces, despite skepticism and concern among ethnic groups – https://theconversation.com/irans-protests-have-spread-across-provinces-despite-skepticism-and-concern-among-ethnic-groups-273276

January 13, 2026

Why unlocking Venezuelan oil won’t mean much for US energy prices

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Amy Myers Jaffe, Director, Energy, Climate Justice, and Sustainability Lab, and Research Professor, New York University; Tufts University

A sculpture of a hand holding an oil rig stands outside the headquarters of Venezuela’s national oil company. Pedro Mattey/AFP via Getty Images

In the wake of U.S. forces’ arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, U.S. President Donald Trump has said the U.S. is taking over Venezuelan oil production.

In addition, the U.S. has blockaded Venezuelan oil exports for a few weeks and seized tankers that reportedly escaped from the blockade.

To understand what’s happening and what it means for U.S. consumers and the American energy industry, The Conversation U.S. checked in with Amy Myers Jaffe, a research professor at New York University and senior fellow at Tufts University who studies global energy markets and the geopolitics of oil.

What is the state of Venezuela’s oil industry and how did it get to this point?

Venezuela’s oil industry has experienced profound turmoil over its history, including a steady downward spiral beginning in 1998. That’s when a worldwide economic downturn took global oil prices below $10 per barrel at the same time as the Venezuelan public’s growing interest in reasserting local control of the country’s oil industry ushered in populist President Hugo Chávez.

In April 2002, Venezuelans took to the streets to protest the appointment of Chávez loyalists to replace the top brass of the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela. The chaos culminated in an attempted coup against Chavez, who managed to retake power in a matter of days. Petróleos de Venezuela’s workers then went out on strike, prompting Chávez to purge close to 20,000 top management and oil workers. That began a brain drain that would last for years.

In 2007, Chávez, standing in front of a banner that read “Full Oil Sovereignty, The Road to Socialism,” took over ExxonMobil’s and ConocoPhillips’ oil-producing assets in Venezuela. The companies had declined to accept new oil contracts at radically less profitable terms than they had in previous years.

After Chávez’s death in 2013, national economic chaos accelerated. By 2018, reports began to surface that roving gangs, as well as some oil workers struggling to survive, were stripping the industry of its valuable materials – computers, copper wiring, and metals and machinery – to sell on the black market.

U.S. sanctions added to the mix over the years, culminating in a drop in Venezuelan oil production to 840,000 barrels a day in 2025, down from the 3.5 million barrels a day it was able to produce in 1997.

A handful of international oil companies remained in the country throughout the turmoil, including U.S.-based Chevron, French-Indonesian firm Maurel and Prom, Spanish firm Repsol, and Italian firm ENI. But the political chaos, sanctions and technical mismanagement of the oil industry have taken a heavy toll.

Some estimates say that the country wouldn’t need a lot of investment to increase production to about 1 million barrels a day by 2027. But other analysts say that immediate investment of as much as $20 billion could only raise Venezuela’s production to 1.5 million barrels a day.

Most of the oil in Venezuela is very heavy oil and requires expensive processing to be able to be refined into usable products. The country’s leaders have claimed to have 300 billion-plus barrels of reserves.

A wide view shows a group of large industrial buildings with a road and other buildings nearby. — The El Palito refinery in Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, is owned by the country’s national oil company.
Jesus Vargas/picture alliance via Getty Images

What effect does Venezuela’s production have on prices that U.S. consumers pay for gasoline, natural gas, gas-fired electricity and other petroleum products?

In general terms, U.S. gasoline prices are influenced by global crude oil market levels. Sudden changes in export rates from major oil-producing countries can alter the trajectory for oil prices.

However, Venezuela’s recent export levels have been relatively small. So the immediate effect of changes in Venezuelan oil export levels is likely to be limited. Overall, the global oil market is oversupplied at the moment, keeping prices relatively low and in danger of falling further, even though China is stockpiling large oil reserves.

Venezuela did not export any natural gas. In the long run, a fuller restoration of Venezuela’s oil and gas industry could mean oil prices will have difficulty rising as high as past peaks in times of volatility and could potentially fall if oil demand begins to peak. And Royal Dutch Shell and Trinidad and Tobago National Gas Company have plans to develop Venezuela’s offshore Dragon natural gas field, adding to an expected glut of liquefied natural gas, often called LNG, in global markets in the coming years.

How much oil is coming to the U.S. now, and how would more imports of Venezuelan oil affect U.S. refiners?

The U.S. Gulf Coast refining center is known for its capability to process heavy, low-quality oil like Venezuela’s into valuable products such as gasoline and diesel. Already, refineries owned by Chevron, Valero and Phillips 66 are bringing in Venezuelan oil.

Before the U.S. seized Maduro, most of Venezuela’s exports were going to China, though about 200,000 barrels a day were coming to the United States under Chevron’s special license.

Two figures watch a large ship move across the water. — An oil tanker approaches a dock in Maracaibo, Venezuela, on Jan. 10, 2026.
Margioni Bermúdez/AFP via Getty Images

Trump has said the U.S. will get between 30 million and 50 million barrels of oil from Venezuela, to be used “to benefit the people” of both countries. That’s about two or three days’ worth of U.S. oil production, and between one and two months’ worth of Venezuelan production. What effects could that have for the U.S. or Venezuela?

Some 20 million to 50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude oil is currently piled up in Venezuela’s storage tanks and ships in the aftermath of the U.S. blockade. Exports needed to resume quickly before storage ran out to prevent oil production facilities from needing to shut down, which could then require lengthy and expensive restart procedures.

The United States has been a major exporter of petroleum products in recent years, reaching 7.7 million barrels a day at the end of 2025.

Processing more Venezuelan oil might help make U.S. Gulf Coast refineries a bit more profitable by making more money on their refined products exports. But since there was no shortage of products in the U.S. market, I don’t expect consumers to see much savings.

But U.S. refineries only have so much capacity to refine heavy oil like Venezuela’s. And they have long-term contracts for oil from other suppliers. So they won’t be able to handle all of those 30 million to 50 million barrels. Some of it will either have to be sold abroad or put in the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve.

How does a potential increase in Venezuelan oil production affect U.S. domestic oil producers?

Over time, the impact of the restoration of Venezuelan oil production on oil prices is hard to predict. That’s because it will likely take a decade or more before Venezuela’s oil production levels could be fully restored. Long-term oil prices are notoriously tricky to forecast.

Generally speaking, U.S. shale production rates and profitability benefit when oil prices are above $50 a barrel, as they have been since 2021. U.S. oil production rose to 13.8 million barrels per day for the week ending Dec. 26, 2025, up slightly from the end of 2024. Forecasts suggest a slight increase in 2026 as well, if oil prices stay relatively flat.

Longer term, all bets are off, since the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC – a group of countries that coordinate global petroleum production and sales – has a history of telling members not to increase production when they add new oil fields, which sometimes leads to so much disagreement that a price war erupts.

The last time Venezuela moved to increase its production significantly, in the 1990s, oil prices sank below $10 a barrel. Major OPEC members like the United Arab Emirates have been expanding capacity in recent years, and others with large reserves like Libya and Iraq aspire to do the same in the coming decade as well. The UAE has been asking the group for permission to increase its production, causing difficulties in the group’s efforts to agree on what their total production and target oil price should be. That could be good news for consumers, if OPEC disunity leads to higher supplies and falling prices.

Some commentators have suggested China could be the biggest loser if shipments of Venezuelan oil shift West and away from discounted sales to China. How does the current situation affect China’s energy security and geostrategic considerations?

China’s oil imports have been averaging about 11 million barrels per day, with about 500,000 to 600,000 of that coming from Venezuela. Iran and Russia are among China’s largest oil suppliers, and both countries’ industries face tightening U.S. sanctions. There is enough oil available on the global market to provide China with what it wants, even if it doesn’t come from Venezuela.

The real question is about China’s overall response to the U.S. intervention in Venezuela. Beijing’s initial reaction to Maduro’s removal was fairly muted. In a Dec. 31, 2025, speech, however, China’s President Xi Jinping said China’s defense capabilities and national strength had “reached new heights” and called for the “reunification of our motherland.” In light of the U.S. intervention in the Americas, China may see a justification to move more aggressively toward Taiwan.

Amy Myers Jaffe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why unlocking Venezuelan oil won’t mean much for US energy prices – https://theconversation.com/why-unlocking-venezuelan-oil-wont-mean-much-for-us-energy-prices-273194

January 13, 2026

AI could be your next line manager

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Kirk Chang, Professor of Management and Technology, University of East London

AI is already doing a pretty good job at taking on some of the world’s workload. It has produced academic papers, enhanced space exploration and developed medical treatments.

And AI could soon be used in a managerial role too, making decisions that effect the working lives of human colleagues.

In some ways, this is an expected development. After all, AI is capable of learning, analysing, integrating and producing information.

It outperforms human intelligence in cognition (AI thinks more deeply and more quickly), reasoning (it has a wider scope of analysis and better accuracy) and coordination (it can handle highly complex tasks and process huge amounts of data).

As a result of these professional strengths, AI already has a pretty impressive CV. It has carried out repetitive manual work, intensive tasks on assembly lines and makes risk evaluations in space.

Meanwhile, research confirms that for many of us, AI is already a colleague of sorts, supporting businesses and human workers as they go about their daily tasks.

There are of course also jobs that have been lost, and people who feel justifiably threatened by AI’s increasing presence.

But for many organisations, AI has already proved invaluable. Recent research has shown that AI has increased the efficiency of marketing strategies, improved energy saving, and enhanced problem solving abilities – skills that take humans years of training and experience to match.

AI can also work 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It does not complain and never goes on strike.

Meet the new boss?

But can AI replace human managers? Recent research I was involved in suggests that it can.

We took one of the most important tasks a business can engage in – recruiting the members of its workforce – and entrusted it to an AI system that my colleague and I had developed.

Generally speaking, recruitment is a managerial task, carried out by senior employees or outsourced to specialist firms. But for our project, AI handled the whole recruitment process independently and competently, from selecting candidates to drafting contracts. Using online interviews, questionnaires and filters, over 100 people were offered jobs at an electronic manufacturing plant in China.

Overall, we showed that AI is capable of implementing managerial tasks, at least in the field of recruitment. The success of our project suggests to us that AI could carry out managerial tasks on a much larger scale within the next ten years, supervising, leading and managing human employees.

We also think that AI working at managerial level will first emerge in the tech industry, where it has already been extensively used in operational roles.

People power

But other industries will surely follow. Other research has shown that AI offers businesses much in terms of better performance, financial gain and competitive advantage.

There are downsides too, of course. For all its benefits, AI poses an existential threat to many people’s jobs and careers. And human managers may not be keen to work with technology which impedes on their own decision making freedom – or their status.

Robotic hand pointing. — ‘You’re hired.’
Willyam Bradberry/Shutterstock

Nor is AI yet skilled in the kind of relationship building, camaraderie or team spirit which can drive successful organisations.

So while the competition between AI and human colleagues will probably continue to grow in some sectors, people still have valuable strengths which make them attractive as line managers. First, they are are capable of vision, passion and hopes for the future, which provide momentum for social and economic progress and development. AI does not operate in this manner.

Second, AI always needs external – human – power to direct its tasks. For the moment, it cannot manage or reason without the involvement of people.

But some form of AI management is probably heading for many of our offices and work places. It could enhance these places, through pre-programmed reliability and efficiency.

But we need to be ready for it, and to be familiar with its characteristics and functions, rather than fearing or belittling its existence. The more we understand AI, the better we can learn to live with it, even if it is one day tasked with managing our own working lives.

Kirk Chang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. AI could be your next line manager – https://theconversation.com/ai-could-be-your-next-line-manager-199937