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Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Emma Beckett, Adjunct Senior Lecturer, Nutrition, Dietetics & Food Innovation – School of Health Sciences, UNSW Sydney

If you’ve been supermarket shopping lately, you might have noticed more foods with big, bold protein claims on black packaging – from powders and bars to yoghurt, bread and even coffee.

International surveys show people are shopping for more protein because they think it’ll help their fitness and health. But clever marketing can sway our judgement too.

Before your next shop, here’s what you should know about how protein is allowed to be sold to us. And as a food and nutrition scientist, I’ll offer some tips for choosing the best value meat or plant-based protein for every $1 you spend – and no, protein bars aren’t the winner.

‘Protein’ vs ‘increased protein’ claims

Let’s start with those “high protein” or “increased protein” claims we’re seeing more of on the shelves.

In Australia and New Zealand, there are actually rules and nuances about how and when companies can use those phrases.

Under those rules, labelling a product as a “protein” product implies it’s a “source” of protein. That means it has at least 5 grams of protein per serving.

“High protein” doesn’t have a specific meaning in the food regulations, but is taken to mean “good source”. Under the rules, a “good source” should have at least 10 grams of protein per serving.

Then there is the “increased protein” claim, which means it has at least 25% more protein than the standard version of the same food.

If you see a product labelled as a “protein” version, you might assume it has significantly more protein than the standard version. But this might not be the case.

Take, for example, a “protein”-branded, black-wrapped cheese: Mini Babybel Protein. It meets the Australian and New Zealand rules of being labelled as a “source” of protein, because it has 5 grams of protein per serving (in this case, in a 20 gram serve of cheese).

But what about the original red-wrapped Mini Babybel cheese? That has 4.6g of protein per 20 gram serving.

The difference between the original vs “protein” cheese is not even a 10% bump in protein content.

Black packaging by design

Food marketers use colours to give us signals about what’s in a package.

Green signals natural and environmentally friendly, reds and yellows are often linked to energy, and blue goes with coolness and hydration.

These days, black is often used as a visual shorthand for products containing protein.

But it’s more than that. Research also suggests black conveys high-quality or “premium” products. This makes it the perfect match for foods marketed as “functional” or “performance-boosting”.

The ‘health halo’ effect

When one attribute of a food is seen as positive, it can make us assume the whole product is health-promoting, even if that’s not the case. This is called a “health halo”.

For protein, the glow of the protein halo can make us blind to the other attributes of the food, such as added fats or sugars. We might be willing to pay more too.

It’s important to know protein deficiency is rare in countries like Australia. You can even have too much protein.

How to spend less to get more protein

If you do have good reason to think you need more protein, here’s how to get better value for your money.

Animal-based core foods are nutritionally dense and high-quality protein foods. Meats, fish, poultry, eggs, fish, and cheese will have between 11 to 32 grams of protein per 100 grams.

That could give you 60g in a chicken breast, 22g in a can of tuna, 17g in a 170g tub of Greek yoghurt, or 12g in 2 eggs.

In the animal foods, chicken is economical, delivering more than 30g of protein for each $1 spent.

But you don’t need to eat animal products to get enough protein.

In fact, once you factor in costs – and I made the following calculations based on recent supermarket prices – plant-based protein sources become even more attractive.

Legumes (such as beans, lentils and soybeans) have about 9g of protein per 100g, which is about half a cup. Legumes are in the range of 20g of protein per dollar spent, which is a similar cost ratio to a protein powder.

Nuts and seeds like sunflower seeds can have 7g in one 30g handful. Even one cup of simple frozen peas will provide about 7g of protein.

Peanuts at $6 per kilogram supply 42g of protein for each $1 spent.

Dry oats, at $3/kg have 13g of protein per 100g (or 5g in a half cup serve), that’s 33g of protein per dollar spent.

In contrast, processed protein bars are typically poor value, coming in at between 6-8g of protein per $1 spent, depending on if you buy them in a single serve, or in a box of five bars.

Fresh often beats processed on price and protein

Packaged products offer convenience and certainty. But if you rely on convenience, colours and keywords alone, you might not get the best deals or the most nutritious choices.

Choosing a variety of fresh and whole foods for your protein will provide a diversity of vitamins and minerals, while reducing risks associated with consuming too much of any one thing. And it can be done without breaking the bank.

Emma Beckett has received funding for research or consulting from Mars Foods, Nutrition Research Australia, NHMRC, ARC, AMP Foundation, Kellogg and the University of Newcastle. She works for FOODiQ Global and is the author of ‘You Are More Than What You Eat’. She is a member of committees/working groups related to nutrition and food, including the Australian Academy of Science, the National Health and Medical Research Council, and is a member of the Nutrition Society of Australia and the Australian Institute of Food Science and Technology.

– ref. Want more protein for less money? Don’t be fooled by the slick black packaging – https://theconversation.com/want-more-protein-for-less-money-dont-be-fooled-by-the-slick-black-packaging-264039

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By DB Subedi, Lecturer, The University of Queensland

Earlier this week, thousands of mainly young people in Nepal took to the streets in mass protests triggered by the government’s decision to ban 26 social media platforms.

Some 22 people died and hundreds were injured within in a few hours in the clashes between protesters and police.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and his cabinet ministers resigned in the face of growing public outrage and widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally, over the protesters’ deaths.

What happened?

Provoked by the deaths of the protesters on September 8, angry, young demonstrators burned down several government buildings across the country, including the parliament and supreme court.

Several politicians’ residences were also set on fire, while leaders of major political parties went into hiding.

The Nepal Army is currently mobilising troops on the streets to take control of the situation, but power has not yet been officially transferred to a new government.

Unrest leads to protests

Political protests and public uprisings are not new in Nepal. The country’s first mass uprising in 1990 (labelled “Jana Andolan I”) and the second in 2006 (“Jana Andolan II”) both called for major changes in the political system.

The governments that followed failed to meet the public’s hopes for real reforms.

For the first time in the country’s history, a protest of this size has been entirely led by young people from Generation Z (born roughly between 1997 and 2012). Out of nearly 30 million people in Nepal, about 40% belong to this generation.

Growing up in a digital culture shaped by internet and social media platforms, this generation has lived through Nepal’s worst years of political instability and frequent government changes. There have been 14 governments in the past 15 years.

In 2008, Nepal declared a shift from its constitutional monarchical system to a federal republic system, but the new federal constitution was only passed in 2015. But this massive change has delivered few improvements for everyday people. Despite some improvements in roads, electricity and the internet, inequality, political corruption, elitism and nepotism continue.

Making the situation even worse is an unemployment rate that exceeds 10% overall – and more than 20% for young people.

The social media ban that sparked action

In a country where more than 73% of households own a mobile phone and about 55% of the population uses the internet, social media platforms are not only a source of entertainment and networking, but also a way of amplifying political voices – especially when traditional media is perceived as being biased towards political interests.

Nepal’s Gen Z is using social media both as a social and political space. #Nepobaby is often trending on TikTok, while Instagram posts detail the lavish lifestyle that politicians and their children enjoy compared to the hard reality of many young people, who work low-wage jobs or have to leave the country just to survive.

On September 3, the government banned these social media platforms, citing a directive requiring companies to register in Nepal. The government justified the move as necessary to control fake news, misinformation and disinformation.

But Gen Z saw the ban as censorship. The frustration spreading on social media quickly turned into a nationwide uprising.

The government lifted the ban on September 8, but it could not save the coalition government.

Similarities in other countries

The protests in Nepal mirror similar movements led recently by young people elsewhere in Asia, especially Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

Like Bangladesh in 2024, the young protesters in Nepal were frustrated with corruption and joblessness.

Similar to Sri Lanka’s “Aragalaya” movement in 2022, Nepal’s protesters fought against inequality and nepotism, resulting in the collapse of the government.

And like Indonesia’s student protests in recent weeks, the Nepali protesters relied on memes, hashtags and digital networks, rather than party machines to organise.

Where to from here?

What comes next for Nepal is unclear. The army chief is now coordinating with Gen Z activists to set up an interim civilian government that will prepare for fresh elections.

This is a remarkable shift: the youth who shook the streets are being asked to help shape the country’s political future.

Yet, challenges remain.

The young protesters are still a loose, leaderless network lacking the experience to run a state system. After an online meeting September 10, the protesters reportedly agreed to propose former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, now in her 70s, as a leader of the interim civilian government.

Nepal’s key institutions, such such as the courts, bureaucracy and security forces, are still largely dominated by older elites, as well. Any attempt to shift power may face resistance.

Perhaps Nepal can take a lesson from Bangladesh’s recent experience, where young protesters stepped in to help form an interim government, under the leadership of Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus.

Despite the challenges ahead, the uprising has provided a historic opportunity to fix Nepal’s broken government system. But real change depends on how power shifts from the old guard to new leaders, and whether they can address the structural and systemic issues that drove young people to the streets.

DB Subedi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Deadly Nepal protests reflect a wider pattern of Gen Z political activism across Asia – https://theconversation.com/deadly-nepal-protests-reflect-a-wider-pattern-of-gen-z-political-activism-across-asia-264968

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By John Deni, Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies, US Army War College

NATO fighter jets shot down multiple Russian drones in Polish airspace on Sept. 10, 2025, sparking fears of an expanding Russia-Ukraine war.

The incident represented the first such incursion by unmanned Russian aircraft into the territory of a NATO member since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Moscow said it did not target Poland, raising the possibility of the drones unintentionally straying off course. But several European leaders indicated that they believed the incursion to be intentional.

Poland responded with a rare move, invoking Article 4 of the NATO treaty. The Conversation turned to John R. Deni, a nonresident Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and author of “NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense,” to explain what invoking these articles means – and what might happen next.

What is Article 4 of the NATO Treaty?

Article 4 can be invoked by any NATO member that feels threatened. Under its terms, a member state can request a consultation of the North Atlantic Council, or NAC – the highest political decision-making body in the NATO alliance.

A NAC meeting in itself isn’t unusual. Every NATO summit is a NAC meeting at the level of heads of states. And a NAC meeting takes place every Wednesday at ambassadorial level in Brussels.

But what Article 4 does is open the way for a special meeting of the NAC to consult over the next steps that the alliance should take.

While invoking Article 4 is a big deal, it doesn’t carry the same weight as invoking Article 5.

What is Article 5?

Article 5 really is the heart and soul of the NATO alliance. It is the part of the treaty that says that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will treat it as an attack on them all. In effect, it calls for a collective response once requested by any of the current 32 members of NATO.

The NATO treaty was signed in April 1949, and Article 5 is central to it. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Western European countries sought a way to defend themselves in the event Germany again arose as a security challenge. By the late 1940s, concerns shifted toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which stationed large military forces across Eastern Europe, staged a coup in Czechoslovakia and blockaded Berlin.

Initially, the United States was skeptical of joining any kind of postwar alliance in Europe, but Soviet actions convinced American leaders to sign on as a way of maintaining Western Europe as free and open.

Article 5 doesn’t automatically get triggered once a NATO member is attacked; the country attacked needs to request that the alliance invoke it. In this case, that would mean Poland, should Polish officials conclude that Russian missiles were sent deliberately.

What does triggering either require of the US?

Under Article 4, all NATO members, including the U.S., are required to join discussions at the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main decision-making body. That could be followed by a joint declaration or plan of action.

Invoking Article 5, however, has more serious consequences. It means that the United States would be called upon to help defend any European ally, or Canada, if attacked.

But there is an important caveat. Article 5 was written in such a way that it allows each ally to decide for itself the best course of action to take – there is no prescribed response once the article is invoked.

In the case of the U.S., the executive branch – that is, the president – would need to consider the views and responsibilities of Congress. If the president were to decide on direct military action, then Congress would likely be involved in some capacity – and, of course, only Congress has the power to declare war.

But Article 5 doesn’t necessarily require a military response. In fact, there is enough flexibility in the language of the treaty for a more nuanced response.

This is vital. Each member of NATO remains a sovereign state and can’t be compelled into military action. Decision-making over the use of force remains at the national level; such choices are not simply handed over to a supranational organization.

When have articles 4 and 5 been triggered in the past?

Article 4 has been invoked several times over NATO’s lifetime. It was invoked by Turkey amid concerns over cross-border terrorism as a result of the Syrian War. More recently, it was invoked by eight NATO members in Eastern Europe after the Feb. 24 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Article 5 has been triggered only once before in the seven decades of NATO’s existence. That was on Sept. 12, 2001 – the day after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

The European allies came to the U.S.’s defense on that occasion. They did this by deploying patrol aircraft in U.S. airspace. Additionally, when the decision was made to invade Afghanistan, several NATO countries in which American troops are based – especially Germany – provided guards for U.S. military bases overseas so that American soldiers could deploy.

What does Poland hope to achieve in invoking Article 4?

Article 4 allows any member country that perceives a serious security threat to bring it to the attention of all the allies. Taking this step allows Poland to make its case to all NATO members and get across its concerns and the level of threat from Russia it perceives.

I would expect Poland to use an Article 4 meeting to highlight the many times Russian military forces have violated the airspace of allies all along the eastern frontier and especially in northeastern Europe.

In some instances, these violations can be chalked up to pilot or operator error, but in recent years the regularity of violations has led many observers in the West to conclude Russia is purposefully violating allied airspace.

The intent of these violations is varied. Sometimes, as in the case of these drones over Poland, it may be to take a circuitous route to the intended target – likely Ukrainian civilians and military facilities in Western Ukraine – so as to avoid Ukrainian air defenses. In other cases, Russia is likely trying to intimidate smaller NATO allies or probing Western defenses to test reaction times and means of response.

Regardless, Poland, like many allies in Eastern Europe, has justifiably lost patience with Moscow’s repeated violations. By invoking Article 4 and bringing this to NATO’s table, Warsaw likely hopes to secure the unequivocal backing of its allies in responding more aggressively, as it did, in coordination with the Dutch, in shooting down these Russian drones.

How might we expect the US to respond?

The United States is likely to stand firmly behind Poland’s efforts to defend itself in the wake of this egregious violation of Polish airspace.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki had what was regarded as a highly successful meeting at the White House in early September, during which President Donald Trump said the U.S. commitment to Poland – both political as well as the military presence – would remain and could in fact grow. The U.S. sees Poland as a staunch ally in a special category of particularly close partners. Beyond that, it’s at least theoretically possible that U.S. air defense assets based in Germany, including Patriot air defense battalions, might be deployed to Poland to beef up defenses there, but it’s unclear whether such a request has been made.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization he may be affiliated with.
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_Sections of this article were originally included in a story published by The Conversation on Nov. 16, 2022.

John Deni does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Poland responds to Russian drones incursion by invoking Article 4 of the NATO treaty − what happens next? – https://theconversation.com/poland-responds-to-russian-drones-incursion-by-invoking-article-4-of-the-nato-treaty-what-happens-next-265051

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East at the Baker Institute, Rice University

The Israeli airstrike targeting senior Hamas political leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, represents the crossing of a number of lines.

Resulting in the deaths of six people but seemingly failing to kill any members of Hamas’ leadership, the strike was the first serious attack on the sovereignty of any of the six Gulf Arab states by Israel to date.

The bombing, which destroyed a building in a busy residential area of the Qatari capital, Doha, was also an act of international aggression under Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. And it marks a major escalation in the post-Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli-involved conflicts across the Middle East.

But it isn’t the first time Israel has targeted individuals being hosted by one of the Gulf States. In 2010, Israeli operatives were successful in killing a senior Hamas operative in the United Arab Emirates.

That operation in Dubai set back Gulf-Israel relations for years. Similarly, the impact of the Doha strike will be consequential for what remains of Israeli ties in the Gulf now, as well as for the web of U.S.-Arab Gulf state defense partnerships that have underpinned regional security for decades.

Indeed, as an expert on Gulf Arab politics, I believe the latest development represents the gravest crisis for Israel’s budding relations in the Gulf.

The tangled history of Israel-Gulf ties

Aside from a Saudi contingent that fought in the 1948 war, the Arab Gulf countries have not been direct military participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, they have deployed resources in other ways, such as providing financial support to states actively involved in fighting Israel and participating in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo.

In addition, the Gulf states maintained the Arab League boycott of Israel until the 1990s, when the secondary and tertiary aspects of the boycott – which targeted outside companies and third countries that did business with Israel – were gradually diluted. Formal ties also emerged in the 1990s, with Qatar and Oman leading the way in hosting Israeli trade offices and the latter receiving visits by two Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 and Shimon Peres in 1996. Gulf Arab countries also hosted multilateral meetings as part of the Oslo peace process that launched in 1993 between Israeli and Palestinian leaders.

And yet, Israeli outreach to the Gulf states has always been vulnerable to upswings of violence in the occupied Palestinian territories, which led to the closure of the trade missions in Muscat, the capital of Oman, and Doha in the 2000s. Ties reached their lowest ebb in January 2010 after the Israeli security service Mossad dispatched a 27-strong death squad to Dubai to assassinate Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, a senior weapons procurer for Hamas.

With Israeli operatives traveling into and out of the UAE using forged European and Australian passports, the killing infuriated the Emirati leadership and sent the discreet effort of building bilateral relations into a deep freeze for several years.

Ties only began to thaw in the turbulent aftermath of the Arab uprisings when Israel authorized the sale of sophisticated Pegasus spyware in 2013 as an “olive branch” to the UAE.

The subsequent upward trajectory of relations, which culminated in the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, illustrated how shared interests in regional geopolitics could act as a salve for bilateral antagonism. The accords, initially signed by Bahrain and the UAE, represented the first recognition of Israel by an Arab state since Jordan back in 1994.

The gloomy diplomatic outlook after Doha

But it will be harder to repair ties this time around – not least because the strike on Doha comes after months of Gulf states’ mounting concern at the extensive and open-ended scope of Israeli attacks across the Middle East and the ongoing war in Gaza, which most Arab Gulf leaders have described in genocidal terms.

Over the past year, Israel has hit targets in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Yemen. In the process, Israel has destroyed large areas of southern Lebanon; bombed the ministry of defense in Syria; killed Ismail Haniyeh, a former head of the Hamas political office in Doha; killed the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in Yemen and multiple members of his cabinet; and launched the 12-day war against Iran.

That pattern of behavior caused deep alarm among Gulf officials who have strenuously sought to “de-risk” the region as they focus on large-scale development projects such as Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia.

The war with Iran was particularly emblematic of these regional fears. Indeed, it ended with an Iranian missile strike on Qatar that targeted Al Udeid, the largest U.S. air base in the Middle East and the location of the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command. The June 23 strike appeared to be a choreographed face-saving measure of limited retaliation after President Donald Trump had ordered U.S. airstrikes against three nuclear facilities in Iran the previous day. But the sight of the Qatari night sky lighting up with interceptor fire and missile debris falling in Doha nevertheless caused shock waves in the Gulf.

It was the first time a Gulf capital had came under attack by a state, rather than a militant nonstate group, since Iraq launched Scud missiles during the Gulf War in 1991 following its invasion of Kuwait.

Talk of diplomatic red lines

Iran’s attack on the U.S. air base in Qatar in June generated statements of solidarity with Doha from all other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, reflecting the degree to which the six Gulf Arab countries have come back together after the political rifts that divided them in the 2010s. The GCC has been most cohesive at times that its members perceive a common external threat, such as during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. That has also been evident after Israel’s military engagements since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks.

Over the summer, alarm at Israel’s regional wars led prominent Saudi commentators to describe Israel as a chief spoiler, a routine violator of international norms and a contributor to instability. Such language had previously been reserved primarily for Iranian actions.

Anwar Gargash, a foreign policy advisor to UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan whose name adorns the Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi, described the Sept. 9 Israeli strike on Qatar as “treacherous.” It remains to be seen whether this is a red line which leads the UAE, or Bahrain, to suspend the Abraham Accords or break diplomatic ties with Israel.

Going forward, officials in Doha and other GCC capitals will be urgently assessing the implications of a strike by one U.S. partner and in the vicinity of a U.S. base meant to deter and detect regional aerial threats in the first place. And while the Trump administration has officially denied foreknowledge or involvement in the Israeli attack, even being caught in the dark will invite commentary about the apparent ineffectiveness of American deterrence and further damage Gulf states’ confidence in the U.S. defense and security support.

When Israeli forces killed Haniyeh, another Hamas political leader, in July 2024, they waited until he left Doha to attend the presidential inauguration in Iran before they struck in Tehran. Until now, the assumption had been that Israel would hit targets in states adversarial to the U.S. rather than allies or partners.

That line has been crossed, and across the Gulf there will be concern about what else may happen – for example, to Houthi delegates being hosted in Oman.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Israeli strike in Doha crosses a new line from which relations with Gulf may not recover – https://theconversation.com/israeli-strike-in-doha-crosses-a-new-line-from-which-relations-with-gulf-may-not-recover-264954