After a year of Reform UK in local government, the cracks are starting to show

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Vladimir Bortun, Lecturer in Politics, University of Oxford

Reform UK is expected to expand its foothold in local government in England this week. More than 5,000 seats across 136 councils are being contested, making this one of the largest electoral tests in recent years. It builds on Reform’s breakthrough in 2025, when the party took control of ten local authorities – its first real experience of power.

For scholars of populism, this moment could be revealing. Years of research have focused heavily on the rhetoric of populism, its voter base, and the interaction between the two.

But far less attention has been paid to what populists actually do once in office. Where such research exists, it tends to focus on national governments, with only a small body examining local politics. Local government, however, is where political promises get a quick reality check.

The gap between Reform’s “pro-workers” rhetoric and its party elite’s relatively privileged and pro-business backgrounds has been noted. But the party’s first year in local government provides an opportunity to see whether the social groups it claims to represent also tend to benefit from its exercise of power.

While systematic data on the Reform-led councils is yet to be collected, their track record so far has revealed signs of where this party’s interests might lie – and of what a UK government led by Reform might look like.

Energy: big donors or local interests?

According to a recent report, climate commitments have been scaled back across Reform-run councils. Net-zero targets have been scrapped and climate language removed from policy documents. These decisions align with the party’s broader critique of climate policy as economically burdensome.

It also aligns with the party’s fossil fuel donors, who account for more than two-thirds of Reform’s financial backing. However, it does not necessarily align with the interests of the communities in the councils that it runs.

A good case in point is fracking. Despite its well-known risks to water and air quality, as well as concerns over earthquakes and warming effects, Reform’s leadership has endorsed fracking. The party has pledged to legalise it if it comes into government.

The country, however, is not as keen. According to the most recent polling, only 28% of people in Britain support fracking, compared to 46% opposing it. A survey last year found that nothing puts off Reform supporters more than the party’s ties to the fossil fuel industry. Farmers – 40% of whom now support Reform – have a longstanding scepticism about fracking due to its potential impact on their crops.

In fact, in two other Reform council areas – Lancashire and Scarborough, local representatives have broken from the national party line on fracking. This reflects a broader tension between the interests of its elite backers and those of its popular base.

Social care: when ‘populism’ meets the welfare state

Those contradictions also become visible in the field of social care. In Derbyshire, the Reform-led council’s plan to shut eight care homes was called a “betrayal of local people”. Similar plans in Lancashire entailed the closure of five public care homes as well as five day centres, with residents moved to the private sector.

What is striking is not just the direction of policy, but also the political reaction to it. The privatisation plans in Lancashire were eventually abandoned due to strong local opposition, which came not only from rival parties, but also from Reform grassroots members.

This underlines an insight often missing from populism research: the category of “ordinary people” is not a unified social group. It also indicates the unpopularity of an economic agenda that, with its emphasis on further deregulation, privatisation and tax cuts, might seem to be Thatcherism’s unfinished business.

Taxation: from promises to practice

Reform’s neoliberal outlook on the economy is reflected in the range of tax cuts pledged in its 2024 manifesto. Ahead of the local elections last year, several Reform candidates reiterated these pledges, vowing either to freeze or cut council tax.

The opposite has happened, though. As reported recently, nine Reform councils raised Band D council tax for 2026-27 by an average of 3.94%. And while that was lower than the overall average increase of 4.86%, it shows that – when confronted with budgetary constraints – Reform is willing to follow the same fiscal patterns as other mainstream parties. In other words, by increasing what is ultimately a regressive tax that disproportionately affects poorer households.

This dynamic echoes once again the discrepancy between the party’s “populist” image and its neoliberal, austerity-prone policy agenda.

council tax bill with credit cards and bank notes.
Householders in Reform-led councils may have been handed a council tax rise they were not expecting.
Yau Ming Low/Shutterstock

Reform’s track record in these areas of policymaking points to a broader conclusion. Much of the existing literature treats populism primarily as a discursive phenomenon – a way of framing politics in terms of “the people” versus “the elite”.

But Reform’s experience in local government shows that its actual politics might in fact tilt towards the interest of the latter. This is precisely where current research remains scant.

On the eve of a new round of local elections, Reform is likely to extend its presence across councils in England. But its first year in power already suggests that “the people” it claims to represent are not necessarily the same people who benefit from its rise to power.

The Conversation

Vladimir Bortun does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. After a year of Reform UK in local government, the cracks are starting to show – https://theconversation.com/after-a-year-of-reform-uk-in-local-government-the-cracks-are-starting-to-show-282035

Biological invasions can cause severe animal suffering

Source: The Conversation – France – By Thomas George Evans, Principal Investigator, Freie Universität Berlin

Yellow crazy ants (_Anoplolepis gracilipes_), or Maldive ants, are among the world’s 100 most invasive species. Roman Prokhorov/iNaturalist, CC BY-NC

Biological invasions occur when organisms such as animals and plants are introduced by people to regions of the world where they do not naturally occur. In these new locations, these organisms are referred to as “alien species”.

Biodiversity is the variety of all living organisms on earth. It is the interconnected web of life that is a wonder to behold – it is also vital for people, providing the foundation for happy, healthy lives.

Biological invasions can be severely damaging to biodiversity. Alien species interact with native species in many different ways. For example, they often compete with native species for resources such as food.

This can cause declines in the abundance of native wildlife and, in some cases, the permanent loss of native species (their global extinction).

The European fox has been introduced to Australia, where it preys on native animals. It has caused the extinction of several small mammal species.
Fourni par l’auteur

The number of alien species being introduced to new regions continues to rise. Hence, identifying and managing their impacts on native biodiversity is a global conservation priority. A great deal of research has been published on this topic.

However, biological invasions can cause another type of impact that is far less comprehensively studied and managed. These are impacts that cause the suffering of animals.

Animal welfare and sentience

Animal welfare is defined by the World Organisation for Animal Health as

“the physical and mental state of an animal in relation to the conditions in which it lives and dies”.

Sentience is the ability to experience feelings and sensations, such as pain, fear and anxiety. It is now widely recognised that many different types of animals are sentient. In the United Kingdom, the welfare of these sentient animals is protected under the Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022.

Biological invasions affect the welfare of sentient animals

Biological invasions result in interactions between organisms (including plants and animals) that can severely harm the welfare of the animals involved. For example, the avian vampire fly (Philornis downsi) was accidentally introduced to the Galápagos Islands from South America several decades ago.

It lays its eggs in the eyes of fledgling native birds. When they hatch, the larvae feed on the soft tissue around the eyes and nares (nostrils) of the birds. This causes wounds, infection and death.

There are no native insects that cause these welfare impacts on the Galápagos archipelago.

A dead nestling bird with enlarged nares (nostrils) caused by larvae of the avian vampire fly, which crawl inside the nares to feed on soft tissue.
Andrew Katsis/Wikipedia, CC BY

Cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum) is a highly flammable grass species that has been introduced to western USA from Eurasia.

Across the Great Basin, it increases the frequency, size and intensity of wildfires, and the number of individual animals that they kill. These animals include greater sage-grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus).

Greater sage-grouse are burnt by wildfires caused by cheatgrass, which is a flammable alien plant species.
Joegrzybowski/iNaturalist, CC BY-NC

House mice (Mus musculus) were accidentally introduced to Gough Island in the South Atlantic Ocean by sailors in the 19th century.

They attack and eat ground-nesting Tristan albatrosses (Diomedea dabbenena). Having evolved on the island in the absence of predators, the albatrosses are naive to the threat posed by the predatory mice – hence, they do not evade predation.

While this is a biodiversity impact (the mice have caused the albatross population to decrease), it is also an animal welfare impact, as demonstrated by these images. House mice have also recently been recorded attacking albatrosses on Midway Atoll.

Welfare impacts are poorly understood

The animal welfare impacts of biological invasions are a neglected research topic. Few studies have explicitly attempted to identify and describe them.

Hence, we do not have a good understanding of the extent and severity of the animal suffering they cause. Furthermore, we do not understand how this suffering occurs, which animals are most severely affected, and how best to protect them.

Frameworks for biological invasions

Frameworks are conceptual tools that provide standardised systems and rules which can be applied to make sense of complex processes. They can be useful for structuring data on wildlife, including data on the impacts of biological invasions.

Several frameworks have been developed that assess the biodiversity impacts of biological invasions. However, no frameworks have been developed to explicitly assess their animal welfare impacts.

Our research, recently published in the journal Nature Communications, introduces a new framework to assess the animal welfare impacts of biological invasions. This framework is called the Animal Welfare Impact Classification for Invasion Science (AWICIS).

The AWICIS framework

AWICIS assesses impacts on animals that are sentient and protected by UK animal welfare legislation. These are mainly vertebrate animals, although some invertebrate animals are also protected, including Cephalopods (octopuses, cuttlefish and squid).

AWICIS assesses welfare impacts affecting both native and alien animals. This is significant, as research on biological invasions tends to focus on impacts affecting native animals. Our framework recognises that alien animals can also suffer from welfare impacts caused by biological invasions.

While biodiversity research focuses on impacts affecting the survival of species, AWICIS focuses on impacts affecting individual animals.

It identifies “relative changes to the welfare of an individual animal” that are caused by a biological invasion.

To do this, the framework uses five “impact severity” categories (i – v) to quantify the harm caused by a biological invasion on a given animal. It also categorises welfare impacts by type using 11 impact categories. For example, these categories include the “transmission of disease” from one animal to another, and “predation” of one animal by another.

House finches have been introduced from the west coast of the USA to the east coast. They suffer from avian conjunctivitis, which they have spread to other garden birds in the state of New York, including purple martins. Avian conjunctivitis causes blindness, starvation and death.
Coleen Lawlor/iNaturalist, CC BY-NC

Indicators are used in animal welfare science to provide evidence of impacts affecting the welfare of animals.

AWICIS uses three different indicators:

  • The physical appearance of an animal (e.g., dead or injured animals)

  • The behaviour of an animal (e.g., lethargic animals suffering from diseases)

  • Measurable physiological functions that provide insights into the welfare of an animal (e.g., elevated levels of stress hormones produced by an animal).

The welfare impacts of ant invasions

We used AWICIS to assess the welfare impacts of ant invasions. Many different ant species have been introduced to regions of the world where they would not naturally occur. Some use acid to attack and kill animals.

Red imported fire ants attacking an insect in Texas, USA. These ants are capable of killing much larger animals, including fledgling birds and hatchling turtles.
evvobevvo/iNaturalist, CC BY-NC

Using AWICIS we found several of these ant species to cause the most severe category of welfare impact on many types of animals. Ground nesting animals were often affected, including fledgling birds and hatchling alligators and turtles.

Ants can take a long time to kill an animal, so they can cause a great deal of suffering in the process. Unfortunately, these ant species have been introduced by humans to many locations worldwide, including numerous islands and several regions of the USA.

This means that their severe welfare impacts are an ongoing, global phenomenon. Hence, many animals have suffered, and many more will do so in the future as a result of our actions (introducing ants to places where they do not belong).

Preventing the introduction of ants (and other organisms) to new environments is crucial if we are to stop biological invasions from causing unnecessary and severe animal welfare impacts.

A more complete picture of the impacts of biological invasions

It is well known that biological invasions are problematic for biodiversity – they threaten the survival of native species. The socio-economic impacts of biological invasions have also been well studied – these are impacts that affect human health and wellbeing.

In our study, we shed light on a third major type of impact caused by biological invasions – animal welfare. Hence, our study provides evidence for the impacts of biological invasions on “One Health”, which is a term used to recognise that the health of the environment, people and animals is interconnected.

AWICIS is available online

Researchers wishing to report and assess the animal welfare impacts of biological invasions can use the AWICIS Assessment Template.

Observations by researchers studying the biodiversity impacts of biological invasions will also be useful to establish the extent and severity of these animal welfare impacts. Hence, they are encouraged to report these observations using the AWICIS Assessment Template.


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The Conversation

Thomas George Evans a reçu des financements de Animal Welfare Initiative et German Research Foundation (DFG).

ref. Biological invasions can cause severe animal suffering – https://theconversation.com/biological-invasions-can-cause-severe-animal-suffering-281845

To lead in global innovation, Canada must prioritize basic science

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Shay M. Freger, PhD Candidate and Clinical Researcher, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, McMaster University

A healthy Canadian research ecosystem cannot survive on the final stages of innovation alone. (Unsplash)

Canada’s National Research Council boldly advertises itself as “advancing mission-driven science and innovation” — to strengthen national security, economic resilience and global competitiveness.

This ambition is difficult to reconcile with a national research system that has, for years, placed too little value on the basic, exploratory, investigator-led science that makes those outcomes possible.

In 2017, Canada’s Fundamental Science Review found that federal funding had shifted too far toward priority-driven and partnership-oriented research. In 2023, the Advisory Panel on the Federal Research Support System made a similar point: mission-driven research depends on the strength of the broader research ecosystem, including curiosity-driven work.

Recent federal investments in research infrastructure, including more than $552 million through the Canada Foundation for Innovation, are important. They help universities, hospitals and research institutions acquire laboratories, equipment and facilities to conduct world-class research.

However, a healthy research ecosystem also needs stable and sustained operating support for investigator-led work. This includes the early, uncertain studies that identify tomorrow’s neglected problems before they become today’s policy priorities.

A nation’s ‘scientific capital’

Health research shows why this distinction matters. We celebrate new treatment advances such as CAR T-cell therapy, which genetically engineers a patient’s immune cells to attack cancer. We welcome CRISPR-based therapies such as Casgevy, a gene-edited cell therapy for sickle cell disease and transfusion-dependent beta-thalassemia.

But these advances did not appear fully formed. They were built through years of work in molecular biology, immunology, genetics, chemistry, engineering and clinical science, much of it conducted before anyone could promise a product, a company or a clinical payoff.

That foundation is fragile when it is treated as optional. As American science adviser Vannevar Bush said back in 1945, basic research is the source of a nation’s “scientific capital.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) continues to make this case clearly today: public support is essential for research and innovation.

A healthy Canadian research ecosystem cannot survive on the final stages of innovation alone. Of course, it needs applied research, commercialization and measurable impact. But it also requires the earlier, “high-risk” discovery work that expands the horizon of what is possible.

Special calls are not enough

Endometriosis makes the problem concrete: it affects many people in Canada, is associated with pain, infertility and reduced quality of life. Canadian research has reported an average diagnostic delay of 5.4 years.

In fields like this, upstream science is not a luxury. Before better diagnostics and treatments can exist, researchers have to ask basic questions about inflammation, pain, immune function, hormones, nerves, genetics, imaging and disease progression.

As researchers working in reproductive health, we have seen how targeted federal grant calls can elevate under-researched conditions. The National Women’s Health Research Initiative, for example, was designed to address high-priority areas of women’s health and improve care for women, girls and gender-diverse people.

This kind of targeted funding matters. It can create momentum and build networks. But it cannot carry a research system on its own. Targeted calls are often time-limited, theme-specific and shaped by priorities that are already visible enough to attract policy attention.

The case of mRNA vaccines

During the COVID-19 pandemic, mRNA vaccines looked to many people like a scientific miracle delivered at unprecedented speed. But that apparent speed was misleading. The vaccines did not emerge from nowhere.

The 2023 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine recognized Katalin Karikó and Drew Weissman for discoveries that enabled effective mRNA vaccines against COVID-19. Their work helped solve a central problem: how to make mRNA useful as a medical tool without having the body immediately recognize and destroy it as a threat.

Even that breakthrough rested on a much wider scientific history, involving around 50 years of public and private research. Scientists had to understand how mRNA carries genetic instructions, how cells translate those instructions into proteins, how immune systems detect foreign RNA and how fragile mRNA could be delivered safely into cells. None of that work was a vaccine when it began. Yet without it, the vaccine could not have arrived when it was needed.

This is why short-term thinking in science policy is so risky. If research is valued only when it can explain its payoff in advance, systems will gradually favour projects that are safer, narrower and more immediately tangible. That may produce useful results in the short term, but it weakens the broader discovery pipeline over time.

Reliance on other nations

There is a strong economic case for paying attention. A 2024 study of 15 OECD countries found that public investment in research and development had positive and persistent effects on GDP and also stimulated business research and development investment.

Public support for long-term research is not separate from economic strategy. It is part of how countries build it. But the deeper issue is not only economic. It’s whether Canada wants to remain a producer of knowledge or become increasingly dependent on knowledge produced elsewhere.

A country that under-invests in basic research does not stop benefiting from science. It becomes more reliant on other systems to take the early risks, generate the foundational knowledge and shape the next generation of medical, technological and industrial advances. Canada’s Fundamental Science Review warned that continued imbalance in funding would leave the country increasingly dependent on discoveries and ideas generated abroad.

This impacts our health, climate science, energy and emerging technologies. It’s important in terms of how well Canada can respond to future crises. And it matters whether neglected areas of health and science ever receive the depth of inquiry required to produce real change.

Canada must protect upstream research

Canada should not have to choose between useful and ambitious science. These are not opposing goals. They are different points along the same continuum. Today’s basic research becomes tomorrow’s applied science. Today’s obscure mechanism becomes tomorrow’s therapy.

Today’s difficult question may become tomorrow’s platform technology. But only if someone is allowed to ask it.

Canada needs targeted programs. It needs research infrastructure. It needs commercialization possibilities that help discoveries reach patients, communities and markets. It needs sustained investment in investigator-led research.

That means protecting operating grants from erosion, funding trainees and early-career researchers, supporting high-risk work in neglected fields and evaluating scientific value by more than immediate commercial readiness.

This is not indulgence. It is foresight.

The Conversation

Shay M. Freger receives funding from the Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR) and Health Canada. He writes and conducts research on endometriosis, health equity, and health systems reform. The views expressed are his own.

Mathew Leonardi works for McMaster University (Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology), Hamilton Health Sciences, and SUGO – Specialized Ultrasound in Gynecology and Obstetrics. He receives funding from CanSAGE, CIHR, Hamilton Health Sciences, Health Canada, SOPHIE, MITACS, and Medical Research Future Fund.

ref. To lead in global innovation, Canada must prioritize basic science – https://theconversation.com/to-lead-in-global-innovation-canada-must-prioritize-basic-science-279713

Europe’s dilemma – to use China’s turbines to meet its renewable targets or not

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chee Meng Tan, Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of Nottingham

Europe’s wind turbines have become part of a wider struggle over energy security, industrial power and the west’s dependence on China.

European wind power capacity has surged dramatically in recent years. Wind energy now supplies 17% of EU electricity up from 13% in 2019. Offshore wind has expanded particularly rapidly, with installed capacity growing strongly over the past decade.

But Brussels wants renewables to provide at least 42.5% of the EU’s total energy mix by 2030. Wind is “pivotal” to this strategy, according to the European Commission’s wind power action plan. The challenge for Europe is to meet its 2030 target, it needs to build 33 gigawatts (GW) of new wind turbines annually.

So far, data from 2022, 2023 and 2024 indicates that Europe has averaged only around 16-19 GW of new installations per year. This leaves a significant gap between Europe’s target and its implementation.

Across the Atlantic, the picture is just as uncertain. The US Inflation Reduction Act introduced during Joe Biden’s presidency promised a surge in renewable energy investment, including wind. But growing political opposition to turbines, especially from Donald Trump and his political allies, has cast doubt over how far that momentum can go.

Cheap turbines and fast delivery

Europe’s installation shortfall and the US’s retreat from wind energy create a strategic opening for China. Chinese manufacturers dominate the global wind industry, with six of the top ten turbine makers and producing over 70% of the world’s new wind turbines in 2024. Companies like Goldwind, Envision and Mingyang offer turbines that are 30-40% cheaper than western equivalents and promise faster delivery.

This puts the west in a bind: accept Chinese help to meet climate targets quickly and cheaply, or reject it and risk falling further behind.

Europe could certainly rely on Chinese wind power to close its gap in renewable energy. The same could be said about the US, although its desire to push forward with wind power is not clear. US wind deployment fell to 5.2 GW in 2024, the lowest level in a decade, and turbine orders dropped 50% in the first half of 2025.

However, allowing Chinese firms greater market access creates a real policy dilemma. While purchases of Chinese turbines would speed up Europe’s energy transition and is cost effective, the EU sees China as an economic rival and security risk that potentially undermines the union’s industrial and strategic autonomy.

The US appetite for Chinese wind tech is much lower than Europe’s. Aside from permit delays, grid connection bottlenecks and rising costs, Trump’s return to office in 2025 is an important factor in the US’s renewable slowdown. The US president has publicly labelled wind power “a joke”, and has frozen federal permits for offshore and onshore wind projects, in addition to eliminating renewable energy tax credits.

But that’s not all. Washington views China’s dominance in wind turbine technology as a security threat requiring protectionist barriers, and has effectively blocked Chinese wind technology through various measures. This includes
national security probes into wind turbine imports, 50% tariffs on wind turbines and parts, and tax credit restrictions that bar companies using Chinese-manufactured components from accessing federal clean energy incentives.

Western tariffs haven’t slowed China’s wind industry but have redirected it. Chinese wind turbine exports surged 50% in 2025. By the end of 2025, cumulative exports had exceeded 28 GW, a thirteenfold increase from 2015. Chinese manufacturers are now selling wind turbines to more than 60 countries, and have established production or research operations in more than 20.

The UK’s largest wind farm is off the east coast.

Targeting new markets

The pattern is clear: China is targeting developing markets where western competition is weak and renewable energy demand is surging. The biggest purchasers of turbines from China in 2024 were Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Brazil, Egypt and Kazakhstan. All are participants in China’s economic development plan, the Belt and Road Initiative.

But China’s wind momentum shows no signs of slowing. Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are expected to add 120 GW of wind and solar capacity over the next decade, requiring US$73 billion (£53.5 billion) in investment. Chinese firms already captured over 60% of renewable energy capacity in these markets since 2024, and is set to expand further.

While China’s wind turbine sales to the US and Europe may be uncertain, Beijing has secured a different prize. Since 2013, Chinese companies have installed 156 GW of power capacity across Belt and Road Initiative countries, 70% in Asia and 15% in Africa.

The west may be protecting its own energy independence, but may also be handing the control of Africa and Latin America’s energy future and security to China, if things don’t change.

The Conversation

Chee Meng Tan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Europe’s dilemma – to use China’s turbines to meet its renewable targets or not – https://theconversation.com/europes-dilemma-to-use-chinas-turbines-to-meet-its-renewable-targets-or-not-281475

Massive marine heatwave caused Caribbean coral reefs to collapse much faster than predicted – new research

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chris Perry, Professor in Tropical Coastal Geoscience, University of Exeter

For decades, coral reefs throughout the Caribbean have been suffering from disease, pollution, overfishing and rising sea temperatures, yet most have continued to grow – until now.

In 2023 and 2024, surface temperatures climbed to record highs in the world’s oceans, and a marine heatwave of unprecedented length and intensity spread across the tropics. Satellites from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration detected heat stress that could cause corals to bleach across more than 80% of the planet’s reef areas.

During these periods of extreme stress, corals expel the symbiotic algae that give them their colour and most of their food – turning them stark white and leaving them vulnerable to starvation, diseases and eventually death.

Across the North Atlantic, including the Caribbean, the heat stayed for months, with heat stress two-to-three times higher than reefs had ever experienced. Heat stress, the phenomena of high temperatures putting fragile ecosystems under pressure, can permanently alter their ability to function.

This triggered what is now recognised as the fourth global coral bleaching event, the most severe one that has been documented.

Widespread coral bleaching during the 2023 marine heatwave.

Coral reefs are among the most productive ecosystems on Earth, and their importance to people is fundamental. They feed hundreds of millions through small-scale fisheries, underpin tourism across the Caribbean, and serve as natural breakwaters that protect the coast from storms and reduce flooding events.

Caribbean reefs are eroding fast

In a new study, we found that across the Caribbean, the 2023 marine heatwave – combined with a deadly disease known as stony coral tissue loss disease – has pushed reefs over a threshold scientists thought was a decade or more away. They are now eroding faster than corals can rebuild them.

We studied reefs in the Mexican Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, comparing data collected before the heatwave (2018–2022) with surveys after it (2023–24). At each reef, we counted live corals and organisms that break down the reef, like parrotfish and sea urchins. From those counts, we estimated how much reef-building (carbonate production) and reef-breaking (bioerosion) was happening, then calculated the net result – whether the reef was gaining or losing material.

The results were stark: between 70% and 75% of our Caribbean sites had tipped from net growth into net erosion. They are now losing calcium carbonate faster than corals can add it. The threshold that earlier models had suggested might be crossed over during the next decade or so has already arrived.

This shift was driven by the loss of fast‑growing, branching and plate‑forming corals, especially the Acropora species, which have very high growth rates and disproportionately contribute to reef building.

One of our most unsettling findings is that the Caribbean reef sites that still had high coral cover and high carbonate production before the disease and heatwave were the ones that lost the most. Some lost up to 8 kilograms of calcium carbonate per square metre per year.

A tale of two seas

Our survey also revealed a striking contrast. While Caribbean reefs collapsed, reefs in the Gulf of Mexico largely held their ground. The great majority of Gulf sites remained net positive after the heatwave.

The difference comes down to which corals are pre-eminent in each region. In the Gulf of Mexico, reefs are dominated by slow-growing, mound-shaped corals. They grow more slowly, but they are tougher when the heat kicks in. They bleached during the heatwave but mostly survived, keeping the reef’s carbonate budget positive.

This is the balance between the constructing and eroding processes. When more is added than removed, the coral reef can grow. When that balance flips, the reef stops growing and may even erode.

Moreover, sites in the Gulf of Mexico have not yet been affected by stony coral tissue loss disease, which preferentially kills the same massive, long-lived species that are keeping Gulf reefs alive. By the time the heat arrived, large parts of the Caribbean had already lost their most resilient corals because of the disease outbreak. What it started, the heatwave finished.

Why reef erosion matters

All the benefits reefs provide rely on a delicate balance between reef construction and erosion.

Tropical reefs are essentially vast limestone structures, built slowly over centuries as corals deposit calcium carbonate skeletons. At the same time, waves and various reef organisms like parrotfish, sea urchins and boring sponges chip away at them.

An eroding, flattening reef begins to lose its capacity to provide benefits to other species, and people.

We did not expect to be documenting the moment at which a major region of the ocean crossed from growing to eroding. The fact that it happened this quickly, and at some of the most iconic and well-studied reefs in the Caribbean, suggests the timelines scientists have been using may be too optimistic.

Main reef-builders in the Caribbean died as heat stress increased.

Our findings may also force a rethink of how to approach coral restoration. Programmes across the Caribbean have invested heavily in replanting fast-growing branching species of coral, such as Acropora, because they rebuild structural complexity quickly. The 2023–24 heatwave wiped out many of these restored populations, along with wild ones.

Restoration will have to diversify. Exploring approaches such as moving heat-tolerant genes between populations (assisted gene flow) and breeding corals that survive heat better (selective breeding) might be a promising path.

But restoration alone will not be enough. Reversing the decline requires rapid cuts in greenhouse gas emissions to slow the frequency and intensity of marine heatwaves, alongside serious local action on pollution, nutrient runoff, sedimentation and disease – the stressors that weaken corals before the heat arrives.

The Conversation

Chris Perry receives funding from the UK Natural Environment Research Council.

Lorenzo Alvarez-Filip does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Massive marine heatwave caused Caribbean coral reefs to collapse much faster than predicted – new research – https://theconversation.com/massive-marine-heatwave-caused-caribbean-coral-reefs-to-collapse-much-faster-than-predicted-new-research-281478

Probiotics: what are we swallowing?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Berenice Langdon, Senior Lecturer and Honorary Consultant, St George’s, University of London

BearFotos/Shutterstock.com

Standing by the counter at the pharmacist waiting to pick up my prescription, I couldn’t help noticing the prominent display of probiotics on the counter. It was two years ago, and I was reading everything I could find on microbiomes and probiotics – whether in books, journals or in shops – in preparation for writing my book The Microbiome: What Everyone Needs to Know.

For days I had focused just on probiotics and here they were, temptingly in front of me, ready for me to buy. The packaging was so glossy and it’s claims so intriguing, I found myself picking up the box to see what they were saying.

“Supporting gut health.” “Friendly bacteria.”

I was about to get antibiotics for my tonsillitis. Should I get some probiotics? I’d heard they might help replace the “good” gut bacteria that antibiotics can wipe out.

The pharmacist knew me by sight, partly because he had just looked down my throat and prescribed them for me and partly because I’m a local GP. He nodded encouragingly and pointed at the display. “These are very popular,” he said.

I turned the box over. The packaging did best when describing what it contained. Thirty capsules to be taken every day, each containing 5 billion live cultures. I compared it with the others on the shelf. Some contained 2 billion, some 10 billion. One contained 25 billion bacteria per capsule. It was a huge number and a huge dosage range. Were these dosages safe?

It wasn’t so clear on what live cultures were exactly, describing them variously as “trusted” or “friendly”. Higher-dose brands described themselves as “diverse” or “powerful”, sounding more like the boardroom of a Fortune 500 company than a dietary supplement.

When it came to what they did, things became vague. Apparently, probiotics are there to “complement your natural gut bacteria” or alternatively to “complement your everyday life”.

It took a bit of time for the pharmacist to package up my medication and label it, so I carried on and read the small print. Each brand was very confident its ability to survive the stomach acid: they were also confident on the research. “Most researched live culture.” “Highly researched strains.” I had no difficulty in believing this, it was the lack of claims to efficacy that baffled me.

Finally, I found the actual ingredients. Each listed their various combinations of bacteria, some containing up to 15 different sorts, but always including several versions of lactobacilli and bifidobactera.

Lactobacillus acidophilus I knew as a bacteria needed to make yogurt. Bifidobacteria are also often used in the food industry. Both are typical residents of our guts, known to account for about 12% of our usual gut bacteria.

So why do probiotic products all seem to contain the same bacterial species? And why are their claims always so deliberately vague?

Almost one in 20 adults are taking probiotics: typically those of us with higher educational levels, higher incomes and better diets. If we just knew a bit more about microbes, would we still want to take them?

Stomach acid – the great destroyer

It is normal to consume a lot of bacteria on our food. Even with freshly washed or cooked food, on a typical day we consume 1.3 billion bacteria a day either on or in our food.

As soon as our food hits the stomach, our high levels of stomach acid kill or injure almost all the bacteria we consume. Only a few ever reach the colon and those few probiotic bacteria that survive usually only ever stay a few days.

But to swallow a probiotic capsule containing 25 billion, is 20 times the number of bacteria our body is used to handling: a huge microbial load. Even “friendly” probiotic bacteria can cause a serious infection if they get in the wrong place, such as the blood stream. It’s true that most people can manage this huge microbial load fine because of our innate gut defence systems. But probiotics should be avoided by those with weak immune systems, who may be less able to keep these bacteria contained and are at higher risk of them spreading and causing infection.

The reason that out of all the millions of bacteria available in the world, probiotic brands always home in on exactly the same microbes is because these are all bacteria that are known to be safe or used in the food industry since before 1958. If a microbe is officially designated “Generally Recognized As Safe”, then the producer need undertake no further research. And if the producer then sticks to general claims of efficacy – what’s known as a “qualified health claim”, they don’t even have to prove it works.

Generally Recognized as Safe explained.

But even with no efficacy claims at all, the probiotic industry still seems to get its message across – and, as I handled the box of probiotics, I still had a strong feeling that this product was good for me, would make me healthier and that I should buy it.

I held the box uncertainly. “Do you want these as well?” the pharmacist asked.
I checked the price: £17.99 for 30 probiotic capsules (low dose) for something I already had inside me from eating ordinary food. I decided to stick to the antibiotic prescription only, for £9.90.

So, do probiotics work? I have learned to equivocate when asked this, because people who ask me – usually enthusiastically and with a smile – are invested in the concept of probiotics and have often already been taking them. To avoid upsetting people I now usually say: “Well, they probably haven’t done you any harm.” Apart from the cost.

The Conversation

Berenice Langdon is the author of: The microbiome: What Everyone Needs to Know, published by Oxford University Press.

ref. Probiotics: what are we swallowing? – https://theconversation.com/probiotics-what-are-we-swallowing-280999

School dinners are changing: the strong emotions and memories around these meals reflect their social, economical and cultural importance

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Heather Ellis, Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow, School of Education, University of Sheffield

The UK government has launched its first review of school food standards in over a decade, alongside plans to extend free school meals to an additional 500,000 children in families receiving universal credit.

Much of the coverage has focused on specific menu changes, including the possible removal of sugary desserts such as steamed sponge. The focus on such changes might be reflective of how school food has never been only about nutrition for those who have experienced it. It is also about welfare, discipline, pleasure, stigma and care.

The School Meals Service: Past, Present – and Future? is a project I worked on that brings together archival research, oral histories and ethnographic work in schools across the UK. We were also the principal academic partner for the Food Museum’s ongoing School Dinners exhibition near Ipswich, which explores the changing history of school meals through objects, menus, memories and tastes – from semolina and sponge pudding to Turkey Twizzlers.

Since school meals were first introduced in legislation in 1906, they have changed repeatedly. Early provision was patchy and often associated with charity. After the 1944 Education Act, school meals became part of the postwar welfare settlement, intended to provide children with a nutritious meal during the school day.

For decades, the classic image of the school dinner was “meat and two veg”, followed by puddings such as sponge, semolina, rice pudding, jam roly-poly or custard.

From the 1980s, the provision of school meals became more fragmented. Nutritional standards were removed, local authorities had more freedom, and commercial catering reshaped menus. Later debates around Turkey Twizzlers and processed food, driven by people like celebrity chef Jamie Oliver, were part of this longer story. Today’s government review of school food standards is another chapter in that history.

What children remember

When people recall school dinners, they rarely talk about calories or guidelines. They remember texture, smell and noise.

Joanne, who attended school in Surrey and East Yorkshire from the late 1960s to 1980, described being served vegetables she could not eat: “Mush. Cold … you can’t have that unless you eat your beans … it put me off for life.”

The dining hall mattered as much as the food. Ella, who went to school in Rotherham from 1996 to 2010, remembered the anxiety of a space where “someone would puke and I would freak out … I can’t be in here”. Lauren, who attended schools in Northumbria and Merseyside from 1998 to 2012, recalled mashed potato that “you could pick up with a fork and it would just stick”.

Stigma, inequality and school food

School meals could also expose inequality. Free school meals have long been a vital safety net, but they have also carried stigma.

Joyce, who went to school in Glasgow in the 1960s, remembered the teacher calling children forward with the phrase “come out the frees”. She described it as “the walk of shame”.

Naomi, who attended school in Birmingham in the 1980s, showed how this could intersect with racism. Her mother paid for school meals despite financial strain because she worried Naomi might be singled out: “there weren’t many Black kids in my school”.

Yet school dinners were also remembered with affection. For many people, puddings such as sponge and custard were the best part of the day. For others they evoke control, compulsion or, like for Joyce and Naomi, embarrassment. That is why the removal of steamed sponge resonates. It is not just dessert. It is part of a shared national memory.

Beyond the menu

The Food Museum exhibition captures this complexity. Visitors encounter the familiar foods, but also the people behind them: pupils, parents, cooks, dinner staff, teachers and policymakers.

The exhibition, which has been shortlisted for a 2026 Museums and Heritage Award, draws directly on our research into how school meals changed over time and why those changes mattered socially, economically and culturally.

Today’s reforms emphasise healthier ingredients, more fruit and vegetables, fewer fried foods and less sugar. These aims matter. History and our research suggests what is served matters. So do the dining hall, the queue, the noise, the payment system, the stigma, the pleasure and the memories children carry into adulthood.

School dinners are one of the most widely shared experiences of British childhood. As they continue to evolve it is worth considering not just what is on the plate, but how it feels to eat it.

The School Dinners Exhibition is on at the Food Museum in Suffolk until February 21 2027

The Conversation

Heather Ellis received ESRC funding for The School Meals Service: Past, Present – and Future? project

ref. School dinners are changing: the strong emotions and memories around these meals reflect their social, economical and cultural importance – https://theconversation.com/school-dinners-are-changing-the-strong-emotions-and-memories-around-these-meals-reflect-their-social-economical-and-cultural-importance-281917

Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sam Jones, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University

Mozambique is not in total crisis – but it is faltering. There has been no currency crash, no hyperinflation, no bank run. But over the past decade the main indicators of the country’s economic health have severely eroded.

An IMF assessment in early 2026 was remarkably blunt: public debt is unsustainably high, the external balance of payments is weak, and policy makers have limited options. Since then, tensions in the Middle East have further disrupted supply chains and dramatically raised global fuel prices. This is a major shock for small import-dependent economies, like Mozambique.

My analysis draws on over two decades of experience supporting economic research and policy analysis in the country. Currently, my work under the Inclusive Growth in Mozambique programme involves tracking the country’s economic performance through surveys of firms, students, and households.

The picture that emerges from this evidence is troubling. For ordinary Mozambicans, the deterioration in conditions over the past decade shows up in higher poverty, unreliable public services and a labour market that offers few decent opportunities – especially for the young.

My central argument is that muddling through is not a safe option. Without careful adjustments now and a deliberate shift toward growth and job creation outside extractives – the part of the economy that actually employs most Mozambicans – today’s pressures will keep building until a large economic correction becomes unavoidable and under far worse conditions.

A slow squeeze

The country’s present condition is one of vulnerable stagnation. Since the hidden debt crisis of 2016, real GDP growth outside the extractive sector has hovered around 2%, barely matching population growth. In per capita terms, the non-extractive economy has flatlined for a decade. Average real incomes outside mining and gas (or the public sector) have gone essentially nowhere.

Fiscal deficits of 4%-6% of GDP have been financed increasingly by domestic banks. But as both the IMF and World Bank have warned, that model is now reaching a breaking point. Banks can only absorb so much government debt before they run out of willingness – or capacity – to lend. When that happens, the government faces a choice between defaulting, printing money, or slashing spending abruptly. None is painless.

Evidence of these pressures is plain to see. Over a year ago, the global rating agency S&P classified local-currency debt as “selective default”. This is a formal determination that the government had failed to meet its obligations to domestic creditors on the original terms, even if it continued paying.

By late 2025, arrears had extended to short-term treasury bills – government IOUs that mature within months and are supposed to be the safest instruments in the domestic financial system. When a government struggles to repay even these, it signals serious fiscal distress.

On top of this, a decade of crisis management has displaced any serious thinking about growth. The government’s wage bill and debt service dominate spending, leaving chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Schools and health facilities lack supplies, roads deteriorate, and social protection has weakened sharply.

Payments under the basic social subsidy programme have become highly irregular. Many elderly beneficiaries receive only a fraction of what they are owed. Poverty has increased, with around two thirds of the population now below the poverty line.

Demographic pressures are intensifying. Mozambique needs to absorb roughly 500,000 new labour market entrants annually by 2030, yet the formal sector generates a small fraction of new jobs. Informal work dominates and without a step-change in growth, it will only expand. Each year of stagnation adds another youth cohort to an already strained labour market. Delay does not preserve stability – it makes eventual adjustment larger and more costly.

The exchange rate question

The metical has been held stable against the US dollar since 2021, but in real terms it has appreciated by over 20%, eroding export competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages are now pervasive. The parallel market premium reached around 14% by late 2025. Firms report severe and lengthening delays in accessing foreign exchange through formal channels.

The policy response has been administrative: raising exporter surrender requirements, tightening banks’ foreign exchange position limits, restricting overseas card usage. These measures treat symptoms, but the underlying misalignment only deepens.

The overvalued exchange rate functions as a tax on the non-resource economy. Recent fuel shortages and panic buying – driven in part by importers’ inability to secure foreign exchange and price uncertainty – provide a visible demonstration of the mounting costs.

The politics of adjustment

In practice, public sector employment has come to serve as a form of social protection for the urban middle class. Our research shows roughly half of all university graduates find employment in the public sector, and having a public sector job is one of the best predictors of not being poor.

The public sector wage bill underpins political legitimacy, which is why attempts to cut discretionary 13th-month salary payments were quickly reversed once key workers threatened to strike.

Exchange rate adjustment poses a parallel dilemma. A depreciation would raise the cost of imported food and fuel, hitting urban households directly, and any price increase would spark calls to hike minimum wages. With the memory of popular violence from the 2024 elections still fresh, there is a strong bias toward the status quo.

But as pressures mount, there is a growing risk of compounding distortions. So far the temptation has been to respond with new administrative controls, including import restrictions, tighter capital controls, and preferential credit allocation.

The ongoing handling of the fuel price shock illustrates the pattern. Rather than adjust pump prices promptly, the government has held prices fixed, leaving distributors to manage a mounting shortfall through supply rationing.

Each temporary fix may ease immediate pressures, but tends to deepen the underlying misalignment, push activity into informal channels, and narrow future options.

Feasible pathways

Path 1: Muddle through and wait for the gas. This is the current trajectory. Fiscal adjustment occurs passively, driven by financing constraints rather than strategy. The hope is that LNG revenues could materialise from the early 2030s. Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin holds an estimated 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas – among the largest discoveries globally in the past two decades. But only one offshore platform (Coral South) is currently producing. Even if the 2030 timeline holds, continued stagnation would further erode public services, weaken institutions, and deepen social frustration – and another general election must be managed. By the time resource revenues arrive, the state may lack the capacity and public trust to deploy them effectively.

Path 2: Gradual, growth-first adjustment. The most economically coherent path, though politically demanding. The central premise: restoring non-extractive growth must take priority, even at the cost of short-term macroeconomic discomfort. Key elements would include:

  • a phased depreciation of the metical to restore competitiveness, supported by clear communication and strengthened social protection

  • acceptance of temporarily higher inflation, with policy focused on preventing second-round effects rather than suppressing the initial price shift

  • a fiscal framework centred on spending quality and revenue efficiency

  • wage bill containment through hiring restraint, attrition, and systematic payroll audits to eliminate ghost workers and improper payments

  • re-engagement with external partners under a credible IMF programme framework; and

  • an evidence-based and financially viable medium-term growth strategy targeting agricultural productivity, labour-intensive exports and a predictable regulatory and macroeconomic environment.

Path 3: Forced correction. If external shocks bite deeper, a large adjustment may be imposed suddenly – involving disorderly exchange rate movement, abrupt fiscal contraction, and potential banking sector stress. The longer gradual adjustment is postponed, the higher this probability.

The narrow path

There is no easy option. Every adjustment has visible losers, while the benefits remain uncertain, delayed, and diffuse.

But one priority stands out: boosting growth beyond extractive sectors. Without it, fiscal consolidation is self-defeating, job creation will remain grossly inadequate, and social pressures will only intensify. Stabilisation pursued in isolation, or at the expense of growth, could be bad medicine.

This growth strategy must be grounded in data, evidence and honest debate. Mozambique has not lacked for projects or initiatives, but it has lacked consistent use of rigorous data to identify what drives productivity and job creation.

The window for a controlled, policy-driven adjustment is narrowing fast. The alternative is not stability. It is adjustment under far worse conditions, at higher cost.

The Conversation

Sam Jones does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently – https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-economy-is-failing-the-tough-policy-choices-that-need-to-be-made-urgently-281679

What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Irene Appeaning Addo, Associate Professor of African Architecture, University of Ghana

The call to prayer echoes across the neighbourhood as people congregate under the sweeping domes and tall minarets of Ghana’s National Mosque in Accra. For many, it is a place of faith, community and national pride. Yet, few pause to consider that this landmark – now firmly part of Accra’s skyline – was funded and built by Turkey.

This detail points to a bigger story. Some of Ghana’s most important public buildings are shaped by global relationships as much as local needs. And those relationships are not just economic; they are deeply political.

Therefore buildings are not just functional. They are powerful expressions of political power, used to describe and project ideas about hierarchy, state authority, solidarity and modernity.

As a result, architecture can be used to explore the identity and ideology of African states and international partners who choose to finance or donate new buildings to Africa featuring western architectural aesthetics.

I am a scholar of African architecture. I collaborated with scholars from different areas of expertise, including political scientists, on a project that studied the connection between architecture and power in Africa. From Ghana, two projects were used to illustrate international relations in architecture, highlighting the interplay of power and agency. One was the National Mosque and the other was the seat of Ghana’s government, Jubilee House, an edifice funded by the government of India.

Ghana and India’s ties can be traced to their co-founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Ghana and Turkey’s relationship goes as far back as 1957. Turkey is one of the leading investors in Ghana’s economy.

Our work established that when a country finances and constructs a major building abroad, it leaves a visible and lasting imprint on another nation’s landscape. The building becomes part of everyday life while reflecting the influence of its external sponsor. These buildings normalise the presence of the sponsoring nation and are a constant reminder of its political interests.




Read more:
Ghana and India: Narendra Modi’s visit rekindles historical ties


History written in buildings

Foreigners have been shaping Ghana’s built environment for centuries, from colonial forts along the coast to post-independence modernist projects designed by international architects.

Ghana’s architecture tells a layered story of power and exchange. During the colonial era, Europeans constructed forts and castles that dominated coastal landscapes. These were not just military structures; they were symbols of control and gateways to global trade networks, including the transatlantic slave trade. Sections of these buildings were later repurposed as schools, embedding education within spaces marked by violence and coercion.

This dual legacy highlights how architecture can carry multiple, often conflicting meanings over time.

After independence, Ghana sought to project a new national identity through modern architecture.

Foreign architects were commissioned to design housing, universities and civic buildings that would signal progress and global relevance. This moment reflected both aspiration and dependence: a desire to appear modern on the world stage, combined with reliance on external expertise and resources.

‘Soft power’

Today, Ghana continues to engage with global partners through architecture and infrastructure development. The National Mosque is one example. Backed by Turkey with the active involvement of Ghanaian Muslims, it represents both religious solidarity and diplomatic outreach underpinned by local agency.

Its scale, design and prominence make it a visible marker of Turkey’s presence in Ghana. The National Mosque Complex is modelled after the Ottoman-era Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. The national mosque in Accra features domes, semi-domes and arcaded porticos. These are the characteristics of Ottoman architecture, a predominant classical style for mosques in Turkey and the Islamic world.

Another example of political “gift” is Jubilee House, the seat of government. While financed and constructed with support from India, it incorporates the form of the Akan stool, a deeply significant symbol of authority in Ghanaian culture. This blending of external funding with local agency and symbolism shows that these projects are not simply imposed. They are shaped through negotiation.

Across the continent, similar patterns can be seen. China has funded major government buildings, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Zimbabwe parliamentary complex. These projects are often described as “gifts”, but they also reflect strategic relationships and long-term influence. Political scientist Innocent Batsani-Ncube has illustrated how China’s large-scale investment in the Zimbabwe parliament is used as a proxy for its sustained activities in and around African parliamentary institutions.

Ghana’s case

It is easy to view foreign-funded infrastructure as purely beneficial, especially given Ghana’s development needs. But architecture is never neutral. Buildings embody power relationships in terms of the scale, materiality, the architectural features and the location in urban areas.

They reflect who has the resources to design, finance and construct, and whose ideas are ultimately realised in physical form. A mosque, a parliament or a presidential palace is not just a functional space; it is a statement about identity, legitimacy and global belonging of both the sponsor and the recipient country. In this sense, architecture becomes part of diplomacy. It is a way of making relationships visible – and durable.

Describing these projects simply as soft power, however, does not capture the full picture. Soft power theory often assumes that influence flows smoothly from powerful countries to less powerful ones.

Ghana’s experience suggests something more complex. Buildings cannot simply be “exported” like films or fashion. They are rooted in specific places, histories and communities. This creates friction.

For example, Ghana’s engagement with foreign-built projects often involves negotiation over design, symbolism and use. Local government officials, religious leaders and communities play a role in shaping outcomes.

In the case of the National Mosque, Ghanaian Muslim communities were not passive recipients. Their advocacy and social influence were crucial to the project’s realisation. Similarly, the incorporation of the Akan stool in Jubilee House reflects an effort to assert cultural identity. These examples show that foreign influence is most often mediated by local contexts.

Ghanaian actors’ agency in these processes has limits, however. Many decisions about large-scale projects are made by political elites. As a result, the interests reflected in these buildings may not represent the broader population.

These examples point to broader questions. Do foreign-funded buildings contribute to long-term development, or are they primarily symbolic? How can Ghana ensure that such projects reflect local priorities and needs? And what does it mean to build a national identity in a world shaped by global partnerships?

The links among soft power, public and cultural diplomacy, and development across the continent will continue to be subjects of research.

International relations scholars Joanne Tomkinson and Julia Gallagher contributed to the research that this article is derived from.

The Conversation

Julia Gallagher received funding from European Research Council

Lloyd G. Adu Amoah and Mjiba Frehiwot do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships – https://theconversation.com/what-ghanas-foreign-built-landmarks-tell-us-about-its-global-relationships-279603

Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

  • integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions

  • decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level

  • introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace – https://theconversation.com/mali-attacks-tuareg-grievances-hold-the-key-to-peace-281832