Biological age tests reveal what slows or hastens aging – but they’re useful only for researchers, not consumers

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Idan Shalev, Associate Professor of Biobehavioral Health, Penn State

Imagine receiving a test result that tells you your body is biologically five years older than your chronological age. You exercise regularly, get good sleep, eat healthy meals and have a happy personal life. What have you been doing wrong? Can this test be trusted?

Dozens of companies are marketing products that promise to reveal a person’s “true” biological age – that is, how well your body is functioning – for a price ranging from around US$30 to over $1,000. These products are based on epigenetic aging clocks, which are research tools that estimate age based on a person’s DNA. These clocks are reshaping how scientists study aging and how the public thinks about it.

But while epigenetic clocks are highly effective research tools to study aging at the population level, they aren’t designed to make claims about the health of individuals.

We are biobehavioral health scientists who study how early development and environmental factors across the lifespan shape biological aging, influencing health and disease decades later. As researchers who use epigenetic clocks in our work, we have found them to be highly informative tools when studying large numbers of people. But these clocks can provide faulty results at the individual level, and they do not meet the standards required of common medical tests.

What are epigenetic clocks?

Measuring reversible chemical changes to DNA, known as epigenetic marks, can provide information about how your body is aging.

Using DNA obtained from routine blood draws, researchers can measure millions of these epigenetic marks in an individual. Running statistical algorithms on this information can produce a single value that represents that person’s epigenetic age, analogous to chronological age.

Epigenetic clocks work because the chemical marks on DNA can shift over time and are influenced by lifestyle, stress and the environment. These changes capture aspects of aging that chronological age alone may not reflect.

In this way, epigenetic clocks help scientists identify the experiences, exposures and behaviors that may accelerate or slow biological aging.

Your experiences and environment change your DNA.

Not for individual health decisions

Why can’t epigenetic clocks provide reliable results about biological age for individual people?

First, there are dozens of different types of epigenetic clocks, each designed for a specific purpose. Some are used to predict a person’s age, while others are used to predict how fast someone is aging or how many years until they die. These different clocks do not always agree with one another, even when used on the same person.

Second, epigenetic changes are dynamic, making age predictions sensitive to short-term fluctuations in diet, environmental exposures, illness, time of day and other transient factors. As a result, estimated age could vary substantially depending on when someone is tested.

Third, constructing epigenetic clocks is technically challenging, and there is no established gold-standard method for generating clocks across laboratories. For example, testing epigenetic age in saliva versus blood samples can yield substantially different results for the same person. The technologies used to measure epigenetic marks have also evolved over time and will likely continue to improve. As these methods change, the original algorithms designed for specific measurement platforms may not perform the same way.

Fourth, scientists do not universally agree on what aging means, in part because it is a very complex process. Reducing that complexity to a single number, such as an epigenetic age, can be misleading.

Finally, epigenetic clocks are influenced by a person’s history of trauma, discrimination and early life adversity. This makes their use at the individual level potentially problematic. On average, marginalized communities tend to show signs of accelerated aging when assessed with epigenetic clocks. If insurance companies began using epigenetic age estimates to set premiums, many people could face higher costs for biological differences shaped by circumstances beyond their control, potentially deepening existing health disparities.

Crowd of people milling around a downtown area
Epigenetic aging clocks are best used to study populations, not individual people.
Jakub Zerdzicki/iStock via Getty Images

Studying how aging unfolds over time

While epigenetic clocks are not appropriate tools for individual health decisions, this does not mean they lack value.

Researchers have used epigenetic clocks to discover lifestyle habits that can, on average, slow down aging. Some examples include reducing daily calorie intake, exercising regularly, maintaining a healthy diet, getting enough sleep and avoiding smoking.

Epigenetic clocks can also help test new drug therapies aimed at slowing down specific aging processes. For example, researchers have shown that rapamycin, a drug connected to various aging processes, can reduce the epigenetic age of human skin cells. There is also some evidence that a treatment designed to regenerate the thymus may slow or even reverse epigenetic aging after one year of treatment. However, researchers have seen these effects only when looking at groups rather than individuals.

Epigenetic clocks are helping scientists advance scientific research on the aging processes, but they aren’t medical tests to measure individual health. In the future, epigenetic measurements may play a useful role in guiding personal health decisions. But for now, epigenetic clocks sold as biological age tests are best used and refined by researchers who are studying populations rather than individual people.

The Conversation

Idan Shalev receives funding from The National Institutes of Health.

Abner Apsley receives funding from the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.

ref. Biological age tests reveal what slows or hastens aging – but they’re useful only for researchers, not consumers – https://theconversation.com/biological-age-tests-reveal-what-slows-or-hastens-aging-but-theyre-useful-only-for-researchers-not-consumers-275974

What is hantavirus, the disease that has killed 3 cruise ship passengers?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Thomas Jeffries, Senior Lecturer in Microbiology, Western Sydney University

CFOTO/Getty

Three people have died after a suspected outbreak of hantavirus on a cruise ship in the middle of the Atlantic ocean. At least one other passenger is in intensive care in South Africa.

The World Health Organization announced the deaths in a social media statement on Monday, along with one confirmed case of the rare disease. Authorities are investigating another five suspected cases among passengers travelling on the MV Hondius.

So, what is hantavirus? And why can it be so deadly?

As the investigation unfolds, here’s what we know.

What is hantavirus?

Hantavirus is a rare but severe respiratory illness that can cause severe bleeding, fever and even death.

The virus is spread by rodents, such as mice and rats, mainly through the urine and droppings of infected animals.

Hantavirus does not typically spread from person to person. However, in rare cases it may spread between people.

Globally, there are an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 cases of hantavirus each year.

It is less contagious than airborne viruses such as COVID and influenza, as it typically does not spread from person to person.




Read more:
What is a virus? How do they spread? How do they make us sick?


What makes it so deadly?

There are two main types of hantavirus, each with different symptoms.

Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which affects the lungs, is mainly found in the United States. If a person becomes infected with this type of hantavirus, within days they will likely experience coughing and shortness of breath.

As the illness progresses, they can develop symptoms such as fatigue, fever and muscle aches. They may also get headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. This is the most deadly kind of hantavirus. Tragically, about 38% of people who develop these symptoms die from the disease.

Hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome is mainly found in Europe and Asia, but the strain known as the Seoul virus has spread around the world. This form of hantavirus mainly affects the kidneys.




Read more:
5 virus families that could cause the next pandemic, according to the experts


People usually develop symptoms within two weeks of being exposed to this virus. Early symptoms include severe headaches, abdominal pain, nausea and blurred vision. More advanced symptoms include low blood pressure, internal bleeding and even acute kidney failure. This disease can be caused by different viruses and some are more deadly than others, meaning between 1% and 15% of cases can be fatal.

Unfortunately, there is no specific treatment or cure for either type of hantavirus. However, early medical treatment may increase a person’s chance of survival. This can include using respirators, oxygen therapy and dialysis.

Authorities are still investigating which type of hantavirus the passengers were exposed to.

How did it get on a cruise ship?

In a closed environment such as a cruise ship, there are two possible ways passengers could have contracted hantavirus.

One is being exposed to the virus while on a shore excursion.

The other possibility is that rodents may have entered the ship on cargo, and then spread the disease to passengers through their infected urine or droppings. Other factors such as hygiene standards and food storage practices may have caused the infection to spread more quickly.




Read more:
How do viruses mutate and jump species? And why are ‘spillovers’ becoming more common?


To contain this suspected outbreak, authorities must first ensure any rodents are safely contained and removed from the ship. They should then monitor all passengers for hantavirus symptoms. The virus is diagnosed with a PCR test, similar to those used to diagnose viruses such as COVID.

Given there is no specific treatment for the disease, authorities must help any infected passengers manage their symptoms. This involves checking that they are breathing normally and their kidneys are functioning properly.

So, how worried should we be?

Although alarming, cases of hantavirus remain are extremely rare. But it can look similar to other respiratory illness, so you should always get symptoms checked. If you’ve been in regions where the virus is found and experience shortness of breath, fever or any other flu-like symptoms, see your GP.

The Conversation

Thomas Jeffries does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. What is hantavirus, the disease that has killed 3 cruise ship passengers? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-hantavirus-the-disease-that-has-killed-3-cruise-ship-passengers-282044

How should schools teach AI? 3 models to consider

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Hugo G. Lapierre, Professeur adjoint en technologies éducatives, Université de Montréal

Students across Canada are exposed to artificial intelligence (AI) whether through search engines, writing assistants, automated recommendation systems or social media.

That everyday exposure raises a first, fundamental question: What should students should learn about AI? This goal is often described as AI literacy, which combines conceptual understanding with responsible use and critical judgment about AI.

A second, more practical, question is: Where should learning about AI sit in the curriculum? Since education is a provincial responsibility, Canada has no single approach.

Teaching AI literacy in schools builds on what provinces already require students to learn about digital technologies. How provinces do this determines how much time students get, what can be assessed and how teachers must be prepared.

In practice, these different curriculum models, plus the supports to ensure teachers can effectively teach them, will shape whether AI education becomes a set of tips for using apps — or a form of digital citizenship grounded in concepts, ethics and critical thinking.

What AI literacy implies for schools

Several provinces and educator associations have or are developing frameworks pertaining to AI in K-12 education. Several organizations have proposed similar frameworks that specify the concepts and competencies students should develop, or that guide what meaningful AI education would require in schools.

The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization sees AI literacy spanning technical understanding and ethical awareness, and names a vision of students as AI co-creators and responsible citizens.

A U.S.-based framework, AI4K12, outlines what students should learn about AI across grade levels, and identifies five “big ideas” about AI: perception, representation and reasoning, learning, natural interaction and societal impact.

Two students work on a robot.
AI frameworks guide what meaningful AI education might look like in schools.
(Allison Shelley/The Verbatim Agency/EDUimages), CC BY-NC

The U.S.-based International Society for Technology in Education (ISTE) proposes standards that engage students as empowered learners, computational thinkers, innovative designers and digital citizens.

Digital learning in provincial curricula

Across Canada, provinces integrate digital learning through different models — but note that these models are ideal types. Several provinces combine them. Each model can support AI literacy, but each creates different conditions for time, assessment and teacher preparation.

1. A dedicated subject or domain, where digital skills or computer science have their own courses. In many systems, teachers have been specifically trained for the subject. This configuration typically supports clearer sequencing across grades and more consistent assessment.

For example, between kindergarten to Grade 9, British Columbia teaches technological learning within applied design, skills and technologies curriculum, with Grade 8 requiring the equivalent of a full-year course that schools can deliver through modules.

Newfoundland and Labrador frames technology education as a hands-on area that can include programming and controlling physical devices through two dedicated courses about computer science in Grades 9 and 10.

Ontario’s computer studies curriculum creates dedicated course space for learning computing concepts. Ontario also illustrates how systems can shift emphasis over time: coding and digital competencies can be embedded within compulsory subjects, while a separate computer studies curriculum expands opportunities for sustained progression.

A dedicated subject provides protected classroom time to teach related core ideas (for example, data, algorithms and modelling) and to assess learning beyond using tools, while still making possible cross-curriculum learning.

It also creates clearer conditions for implementing ambitious AI literacy frameworks such as AIK12 and UNESCO’s guidance. This is because a teacher trained to translate specialized concepts for non-specialists leads instruction and can support sustained, project-based learning.

However, in many provinces, this “dedicated subject” exposure remains intermittent across K–12, often concentrated in a small number of courses, or sometimes a single year-long course with limited weekly time. This constrains cumulative progression and makes outcomes sensitive to local staffing capacity and teacher qualification.

2. Digital learning embedded in existing subjects. In New Brunswick, digital learning in Grades 6 to 8 is organized through the Middle Block, where Technology is one learning area among others. Teachers must address digital learning alongside a much wider set of practical and developmental goals, rather than teaching it as a fully separate subject with protected time.

Two teachers at a table in discussion.
How AI-related professional development will help teachers depends partly on learning expectations relevant to their work.
(Allison Shelley/The Verbatim Agency/ EDUimages), CC BY-NC

This approach can make learning more connected to real problems and other learning. But it can also limit how much time can be devoted to AI-related concepts, and whether this learning is effective, when many other objectives must be covered within the same program structure. The trade-off is generally capacity: teachers are asked to carry new conceptual content without necessarily having time, training or materials.

3. A “transversal” framework, where competencies that underpin digital technology are meant to be integrated across subjects.

For example, Manitoba teaches literacy with information communication technology (ICT) across curriculum, related to thinking critically and creatively about information and about communication, “as citizens of the global community, while using ICT safely, responsibly and ethically.” Alberta’s information and communication technology program of studies states that it is “not intended to stand alone” but should be infused within core courses.

Québec has a province-wide digital competency framework describing 12 dimensions of confident, critical and creative uses of digital technology.

When competencies related to digital learning are integrated across subjects, every student can be reached, not only those who choose electives.

However, without clear accountability tying underlying competencies to particular digital media uses, this approach can potentially yield uneven learning experiences from school to school. Every teacher must also receive sufficient professional development on the subject.

What ‘AI-ready’ could mean

Each model requires different policy supports. Dedicated subjects need staffing and teacher preparation pipelines. Embedded approaches need sustained professional learning and realistic expectations for non-specialist teachers. Transversal frameworks need clear markers for student progression and assessment strategies, otherwise implementation depends on local enthusiasm.

For many provinces, the path forward is likely not choosing one model, but combining the strengths of all three.

Two students work on robot models.
The path forward for teaching AI literacy is likely combining the strengths of different curricular models.
(Allison Shelley/The Verbatim Agency/EDUimages), CC BY-NC

This requires grounding in foundational knowledge of AI, as well as developing both discipline-specific and transdisciplinary competencies. UNESCO’s AI competency framework for teachers makes a similar point: governments should anchor AI learning in curriculum policy, build collaboratively with educators and invest in teacher preparation and resources.

Canada’s provincial diversity creates conditions for comparative analysis. If researchers study student learning associated with different models, this could help identify which policy arrangements, supports and implementation strategies are associated with stronger and more equitable forms of AI education.

Comparison may become even more salient with the OECD’s planned PISA 2029 media and artificial intelligence literacy assessment, which will be designed to examine whether students have had opportunities to learn to engage critically and responsibly with digital and AI systems.

The Conversation

Hugo G. Lapierre receives funding from the Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQSC), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and IVADO.

Normand Roy receives funding from Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQ), le ministère de l’Éducation du Québec (MÉQ), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

Patrick Charland receives funding from the Fonds de recherche du Québec (FRQSC), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and UNESCO.

ref. How should schools teach AI? 3 models to consider – https://theconversation.com/how-should-schools-teach-ai-3-models-to-consider-278041

Your browsing history could soon set your grocery bill — and Canada isn’t ready for it

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jake Okechukwu Effoduh, Assistant Professor, School of Law, Toronto Metropolitan University

Parliament voted down a motion on April 15 to ban a practice most Canadians have never heard of, but that retailers are already rolling out: surveillance pricing.

Also called algorithmic personalized pricing, the practice uses personal data to estimate how much consumers are willing to pay, then adjusts the price accordingly. Two shoppers, same store, same item: two different prices, generated by data neither of them can see.

The NDP motion urges the government to prohibit surveillance pricing both in stores and online. The Liberals and Conservatives voted it down. NDP leader Avi Lewis had called the practice “unfair” and “downright creepy” at a news conference days earlier.

A poll by Abacus Data conducted in March found that while most Canadians are not familiar with the term, when the practice was explained to them, 52 per cent said it should be banned. Another 31 per cent of the Canadians surveyed said it should be allowed but more strictly regulated.

For Canadians struggling with cost-of-living pressure, the practice is spreading among retailers, and the laws meant to protect consumers were not designed to catch it.

Not the same as surge pricing

A useful distinction first. Dynamic pricing, the kind used by airlines, hotels and rideshare companies, adjusts based on conditions like demand, the time of day or weather, and applies the same algorithm to every customer equally.

Uber’s surge pricing is the textbook example of dynamic pricing: every rider in the same area at the same moment sees the same multiplier. Annoying? Perhaps. Personalized? No.

Surveillance pricing is different. Where dynamic pricing responds to market conditions, surveillance pricing responds to the individual. It draws on browsing history, device, postal code, purchase frequency and inferred income to predict a person’s willingness to pay.

Dynamic pricing seems to ask: “What are the conditions right now?” Surveillance pricing asks: “Who are you, and how much can we extract from you?”

How much is happening in Canada?

It’s difficult to know how much surveillance pricing is happening in Canada, if at all. So far, there has been no confirmed Canadian case, and the practice is opaque by design.

The Competition Bureau’s discussion paper, published in 2025, reported that more than 60 companies in Canada offer services that use algorithms to optimize pricing across retail, hospitality, transportation and ticketing.

The bureau’s What We Heard report, published in January after a public consultation on algorithmic pricing, identified transparency as Canadians’ chief concern. Shoppers do not know whether the price in front of them has been personalized to them specifically.

The most prominent real-world example came from south of the border. An investigation by Consumer Reports and Groundwork Collaborative documented Instacart customers in the U.S. being charged up to 23 per cent more than other shoppers for the same items, at the same store, at the same time.

Nearly three-quarters of grocery items tested were offered to shoppers at multiple price points simultaneously.

Instacart disputed the characterization, but halted the program in December 2025 following public backlash. New York Attorney General Letitia James has since demanded that Instacart share information about its price-testing experiments.

Canadian retailers, meanwhile, are assembling the same underlying toolkit: digital shelf labels that allow prices to be changed remotely in seconds, AI-driven pricing engines and the loyalty card data that feeds them.

Where Canadian law runs out

Most Canadians assume that if something feels deceptive at checkout, the law catches it. For some familiar problems, that is true.

Recent amendments to the Competition Act introduced an explicit ban on drip pricing — the practice of advertising a low price and then adding unavoidable fees at checkout.

The Cineplex case is the most prominent recent example of that law in action. The Competition Tribunal levied a record $38.9 million penalty against the cinema chain for concealing online booking fees, a ruling the Federal Court of Appeal upheld in January. Cineplex has since sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.




Read more:
Cineplex’s $38.9 million fine is a wake-up call about corporate sustainability practices


But surveillance pricing slips past this framework entirely. The price displayed is technically accurate. No fee is buried and no phantom “regular price” is invented. What is hidden is the process.

Deceptive marketing rules assume everyone is offered the same price and someone is misrepresenting it. Surveillance pricing inverts the premise: everyone is offered a different price, and almost no one knows it’s happening.

The Competition Bureau’s mandate is to protect and promote competition, not consumer fairness. Its tools were built to catch anti-competitive behaviour between companies, not price discrimination between individual shoppers.

Similarly, provincial consumer protection laws like Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act are designed to deal with misleading or unfair practices in one-on-one transactions — not large-scale, automated differences in how millions of consumers are treated.

Privacy law, in turn, governs consent to data collection, not consent to how that data is used to shape what you pay. Three legal regimes circle the problem; none quite covers it.

What other jurisdictions have done

In November 2025, New York’s Algorithmic Pricing Disclosure Act took effect, requiring any business that uses personalized pricing to display a notice reading “this price was set by an algorithm using your personal data,” with civil penalties of up to US$1,000 per violation.

The European Union has required disclosure of personalized pricing since its 2019 consumer rights overhaul. Manitoba’s Bill 49, introduced March 17 by the NDP government of Premier Wab Kinew, would go further than either of those measures and prohibit surveillance pricing outright, making it an unfair business practice.

When asked if he would follow suit, Ontario Premier Doug Ford said he would not, telling reporters he believes in a “free market” and a “capitalist society.”

Federal AI Minister Evan Solomon said the federal government is “looking into” the issue, but that it would fall under the purview of the Competition Bureau.

What real protection would require

In the short term, shoppers can use private browsing mode, turn off location services and log out of loyalty apps before they shop.

These, however, are only workarounds. They place the burden of navigating an opaque system on the least-informed party in the transaction and they require a level of digital awareness some shoppers don’t have.

Real protection means either a federal disclosure mandate along New York’s lines, or an outright prohibition like the one Manitoba is pursuing. The Competition Bureau can keep monitoring, but monitoring is not enforcement, and competition law wasn’t designed to police unfairness on its own.

Until Parliament or the provinces close the gap, Canadian consumers have no reliable way of knowing whether the price they see is the price everyone else sees.

The Conversation

Jake Okechukwu Effoduh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Your browsing history could soon set your grocery bill — and Canada isn’t ready for it – https://theconversation.com/your-browsing-history-could-soon-set-your-grocery-bill-and-canada-isnt-ready-for-it-281618

How wildlife conservancies perpetuate green colonialism in Kenya

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Kariũki Kĩrigia, Assistant Professor, School of the Environment and African Studies Centre, University of Toronto

The story of wildlife conservation in East Africa is often told through spectacular images of beautiful scenery and the region’s charismatic animals. But seldom asked is the question about how those efforts include and impact the communities that live alongside wildlife.

At the core of Africa’s rich biodiversity are Indigenous communities, which include pastoralists and forest peoples whose ways of life and knowledge are critical to conservation.

a giraffe standing in a grassy area
A giraffe in the Maasai Mara National Reserve in southern Kenya.
(Kariũki Kĩrigia)

However, these communities have historically been blamed for biodiversity loss. Pastoralists such as the Maasai are often blamed for keeping “excessive” amounts of livestock, overgrazing and land degradation.

Such tropes against African Indigenous communities linger and continue to shape conservation, which has led to strict and often punitive regulations.

My ongoing research in the Maasai Mara region of southern Kenya looks into wildlife conservancies. The region is home to the Maasai, as well as other Indigenous Peoples, and rich biodiversity. My research examines how conservancies impact local communities on whose land conservation is practised.




Read more:
Tanzania’s Maasai are being forced off their ancestral land – the tactics the government uses


What are wildlife conservancies?

The decline in wildlife in Kenya led to the birth of wildlife conservancies on both community and private lands. Kenya’s 2013 Wildlife Conservation and Management Act defines a wildlife conservancy as “land set aside by an individual landowner, body corporate, group of owners or a community for purposes of wildlife conservation.”

Organizations like the Kenya Wildlife Conservation Association (KWCA) view them differently. They see conservancies as land that is not set aside, but rather managed for the well-being of wildlife and communities.

In essence, the government maintains the view of fortress conservation that entails separating humans from nature, while the KWCA imagines communities co-existing with wildlife.

At the core of wildlife conservancies is land. Land ownership largely determines the type of conservancy that is established, which are either private, community, group or co-managed conservancies.

Private conservancies

Kariũki Kĩrigia explains his research into wildlife conservancies in Kenya. (University of Toronto Black Research Network)

In northern Kenya, private conservancies have largely been established in the highlands that were settled by white farmers during the colonial period.
These private conservancies have been criticized as “settler ecologies” built on a “big conservation lie” because they obscure the history of violent, colonial land dispossession, the criminalization of Indigenous pastoralist livelihoods and the exploitation of land and biodiversity to profit from conservation.

Additionally, the normalization of militarized violence in conservation, appropriation and control of conservation revenues meant for communities, and restriction of access to scarce water and pasture from pastoralists even during droughts, amounts to what is known as green colonialism.

The contradiction is that it was British colonial rule in Kenya that created the need for wildlife conservation starting in the 1940s. Extensive devastation of wildlife through sport hunting, wildlife trade and culling meant animals needed greater protection from humans, primarily through state-protected national parks and reserves.




Read more:
Operation Legacy: How Britain covered up its colonial crimes


Group conservancies

Group conservancies are mostly found in southern Kenya, where individual plots are amalgamated through long-term land leases to conservation investors who, in turn, establish wildlife conservancies.

In the Maasai Mara, local communities typically lease their land for conservancies in exchange for lease payments, regular access to pasture and investment in initiatives such as school bursaries and infrastructure development.

One such example is the Nashulai Maasai Conservancy, established in July 2016. It’s the first Maasai conservancy in the Maasai Mara created by Maasai peoples.

Wildlife conservancies in Kenya are an important way to enhance land security and conservation built around communities. Community and group conservancies are based on the idea of using the land, water and pastures in ways that support humans, livestock and wildlife.

As part of my research, I interviewed community members who told me about some benefits brought by the conservancy. These included access to post-secondary education through a community college, women empowerment projects such as soap made from elephant dung, river restoration for household water access and food aid during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Challenges faced by group conservancies

Many group conservancies employ strict access rules and hefty fines against human and livestock presence. These practices often agitate communities as they echo fortress conservation’s tactics of separating humans and wildlife.

Land lease agreements between conservancies and landowners are often crafted in complex legal language that only a few community members can comprehend. It is critical that communities are provided with a detailed explanation of what leasing land to a conservancy entails beyond the benefits promised.

In addition, community benefits are undermined through land dispossession by local elites during land subdivision, who, in turn, benefit unfairly from leasing the unjustly acquired land to conservancies.

Biodiversity conservation in East Africa and the Global South more broadly depends significantly on external funding from organizations in the West, especially non-governmental organizations, which British conservation scholar George Holmes calls “conservation’s friends in high places.”

However, Indigenous communities face onerous requirements and processes to access funding for conservation and climate change initiatives.

In a recent guest lecture at the University of Toronto, Kimaren Ole Riamit, the director of the Indigenous Livelihoods Enhancement Partners (ILEPA), explained how African Indigenous communities experience the negative impacts of climate change despite being the least responsible for global warming, lose land to conservation and carbon projects and face significant hurdles in accessing resources to address climate-related challenges.

Initiatives meant to empower communities are often captured by local elites and corporate interests that appropriate and control resources and benefits expected to flow to communities.

Carbon offsetting

Wildlife conservancies have also gained the attention of carbon offset markets, which are expanding fast in Kenya. The Northern Kenya Rangelands Carbon Project and the One Mara Carbon Project are some of the main carbon projects in the country’s northern and southern rangelands.

Kenya’s rangelands sequester atmospheric carbon dioxide, which is then measured and verified by certification bodies such as Verra, and converted into tradeable carbon credits. These are sold to organizations seeking to offset their carbon emissions.

Carbon projects enter into long-term contracts with landowners, typically around 40 years, and spell out how the landowners should utilize the land to ensure adequate carbon sequestration and storage. Landowners receive expert knowledge that employs technologies and measurements of carbon that are foreign to local communities.

a zebra in a grassland area
A zebra in the Maasai Mara National Reserve in southern Kenya.
(Kariũki Kĩrigia)

On the contrary, the same communities that have long managed lands and ecosystems sustainably are treated as lacking the ecological knowledge necessary for biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration.

The outcome is that the owners of the technologies and what is deemed “expert” knowledge become the owners of the value generated from the land owned by communities.

While such initiatives generate millions of dollars in revenue, it has been shown that less than two per cent of climate finance reaches Indigenous Peoples, smallholder farmers and local communities in developing countries.

To create genuinely sustainable ecological conservation and improved quality of life for local communities, the government must focus on empowering communities through meaningful participation in initiatives.

Organizations like ILEPA and the Nashulai Maasai Conservancy are working to empower Indigenous communities in Kenya. These kinds of community-led efforts exemplify how conservation can, and must, include the people who call East Africa’s rich biodiverse landscapes home.

The Conversation

Kariuki Kirigia has received funding from the Black Research Network at the University of Toronto, the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund, and SSHRC-IDRC through the Institutional Canopy of Conservation research project.

ref. How wildlife conservancies perpetuate green colonialism in Kenya – https://theconversation.com/how-wildlife-conservancies-perpetuate-green-colonialism-in-kenya-278946

Here’s why Canada needs to ditch age-based immigration points

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Christina Clark-Kazak, Professor, Public and International Affairs, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Canada’s Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS) was established in 1967 to respond to historic racism and nationality bias in Canada’s immigration system. Granting points for age, education, official language skills, Canadian work experience and family ties, the CRS ranks applicants for permanent residency.

The federal government recently proposed changes to CRS points, including the elimination of some point categories. While family-related points are proposed for removal, age-based criteria are not.

My research delves into the legal, ethical and policy reasons why Canada should ditch age-based immigration points.

Age-based points are Charter violations

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms explicitly prohibits age discrimination in the equality clause of Section 15(1). According to the Supreme Court’s Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration decision, the Charter applies to anyone who is physically present in Canada, including non-citizens.

Many people who apply for permanent residence do so from within Canada. In fact, the federal government has introduced a two-year initiative — in 2026 and 2027 — to fast-track permanent residence for skilled workers who are already in Canada in specific high-demand sectors.

According to the lawyers I interviewed for my book, Age and Immigration Policy in Canada, such individuals would have solid legal grounds to launch a Charter challenge. They could claim that the points system constitutes age discrimination in violation of Canadian law.

Ageist immigration policies

Age discrimination embedded in the points system also contradicts Canadian values. Currently, a person gets zero points for age if they are under 18 or over 45.

Imagine the public outcry if a person received zero points for being a woman? Or for being a racialized person? Many Canadians would rightly call out such overtly sexist and racist policies.

Similarly, points for age undermine the merit-based foundations of the CRS. They contradict rights-based hiring practices that prohibit asking candidates their age and stereotyping older workers.

My archival research suggests the architect of the CRS, then-Deputy Immigration Minister Tom Kent, did not have a clear policy rationale for the initial age-based points. One historian has argued: “The points system, as it was originally conceived, has as much to do with politics as with labour markets.”

There is also some internal contradiction within the points system between the decreasing points for age and the increasing points for education and work experience. The latter rely on the passage of chronological time, while the former subtracts points for it.

Age-based points are bad policy

Policymakers and public commentators sometimes justify age discrimination in the points system by claiming that older immigrants are likely to take more from Canada than they are to give. But research shows that this is empirically incorrect.

First, Canadian and Québec pension plans are contributory — benefits are calculated by lifetime earnings in Canada. For Old Age Security, people must be residents of Canada for at least 10 years to qualify, and they must have resided here for at least 40 years to receive the maximum benefit.

As a result, immigrants to Canada receive fewer contributions and are more likely to be poor than any other group of Canadians when they retire.

Second, while some may assume older immigrants will be a burden on the health-care system, the “healthy immigrant effect” is well-documented.

Newcomers also tend to under-use health services. What’s more, there’s a waiting period for universal health coverage. Some immigrants actually return to their home countries to access time-sensitive or culturally appropriate care.




Read more:
Why is Canada snubbing internationally trained doctors during a health-care crisis?


Third, people over the age of 45 contribute indirectly to the Canadian economy in ways that are not captured in formal economic data. For example, they undertake unpaid work in family businesses or provide free child care to enable their adult children to work outside the home.

Given these legal, ethical and empirical concerns about age-based points, the time has come to eliminate them altogether. Ongoing public consultations on the CRS are a historic opportunity for Canadians to oppose the age discrimination that has been normalized in our immigration system for too long.

The Conversation

Christina Clark-Kazak receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

ref. Here’s why Canada needs to ditch age-based immigration points – https://theconversation.com/heres-why-canada-needs-to-ditch-age-based-immigration-points-281515

India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

India’s engagement in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin was, until recently, largely limited to UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy patrols.

Since the second half of the 1990s, India has participated in nearly all peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Anti-piracy efforts emerged between 2008 and 2014 as piracy off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden spread across a vast maritime space. This spanned east Africa and the wider Indian Ocean, bringing threats close to India’s shores.

Indian trade routes were exposed to new security risks, so a more sustained maritime posture was needed.

From the mid-2010s, therefore, India expanded its engagement in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin to secure shipping lanes linking it to global markets. At the same time, it sought to counter China’s growing naval presence along the western Indian Ocean coast, protect its diaspora and investments, and position itself as a regional security provider.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, this shift accelerated. India placed greater emphasis on proactive diplomacy, expanding high-level engagement, and trade and infrastructure links. It also pursued strategic coordination through bilateral agreements and naval exercises across west Asia and the adjoining African coastline.

India, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin

This evolution reflects India’s transition from a post-colonial, non-aligned actor to a more assertive power with ambitions outside the region. It is now Africa’s third-largest trading partner. Economic interdependence is growing alongside geostrategic interests.

Drawing on our work on international security in the western Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan Africa, we argue that over the past decade New Delhi has redefined the Indian Ocean as a protective buffer and a primary theatre of influence linking the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa lies at the heart of this connective space.

In 2023, India declared itself the Indian Ocean’s “net security provider”. It introduced a framework to strengthen regional security, deepen economic cooperation and address shared maritime challenges.

Today, with shipping routes being recalculated and governments reconsidering their strategic partnerships, India’s position is being put to an operational test.

The Horn is a space where legitimacy, delivery and endurance determine who remains relevant after the headlines fade. For the first time, India’s quiet advance is visible. Next, it will have to solidify its presence.

Why the Horn of Africa is important for India

An initiative called the 2025 Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement, co-hosted with Tanzania, positions India as a security partner for African nations, particularly those along the Indian Ocean rim.

India is also involved in development and investment projects in the region. These include agricultural efforts to improve food security, infrastructure projects, and technical assistance in education and health. It also provides humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.

What distinguishes the past decade is the effort to align these activities within a broader strategic narrative – one that presents India as a partner offering technology and development without debt concerns or political conditions.

This narrative is attractive to local governments in the Horn. But it also creates a test: India must show that it can deliver consistently.

Ethiopia has an important role for India. It hosts the African Union, functions as a diplomatic centre and offers an entry point into African multilateral politics.

Somalia also matters. It sits close to critical sea lanes and is central to the security of the Gulf of Aden. External actors there can convert security assistance into political access.




Read more:
China’s military support for Somalia is on the rise – what Taiwan and Somaliland have to do with it


India’s interest in Somalia and Somaliland has taken on a geo-economic dimension. Indian firms are focusing on gold and mineral resources, particularly in eastern Somaliland.

Although still limited in scale, this shift signals that India’s footprint in the Horn is no longer confined to security and development assistance. It is intersecting with resource access and supply chain strategies.

The competition

The corridor of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has become a crowded arena for external powers over the past two decades.

Great powers have seen countries in the region as a platform for counterterrorism and naval reach. Small and middle powers (like Turkey, Iran and Gulf states) have sought to secure influence through ports, training missions, arms transfers, commercial access and selective mediation.

The result is a dense environment. Almost every external actor offers a package of security, finance, technology and diplomacy. Fragile local governments hedge among them.

India’s challenge is to deliver consistently through:

  • creating defence and security training pipelines

  • project delivery

  • stable financing instruments

  • sustained bureaucratic attention.

If India’s Africa policy is maritime-led, then things like naval exercises, information-sharing, coast guard cooperation and institutional training must become regular and visible.

If the strategy is also developmental and technological, then India must deliver flagship projects in digital infrastructure, health and agriculture.

From quiet influence to lasting power

India faces three constraints in growing its influence in the Horn of Africa.

1. Limited military capacity

India’s naval capabilities do not match the scale of China’s fleet or America’s technological edge and operational depth. This gap is not fatal if India’s aim is durable influence through partnership. It does mean that India’s leverage will depend on institutional cooperation and coalition-building.

2. Competitive density

The Horn’s architecture is made of foreign bases, port diplomacy and overlapping rivalries. India’s advantage is that it’s not overwhelmingly intrusive. But it could become just one more actor among many.

3. Institutionalisation

If India’s engagement depends too heavily on leader-level attention, it will remain vulnerable to distraction. Durable influence requires bureaucratic routines and financing mechanisms. It must survive political cycles and shifting crises. Ethiopia is a test case. High-level roadmaps will have to turn into visible digital infrastructure, health systems and agricultural support.

The broader point is that the Horn is not an empty theatre waiting for India to arrive.

The Conversation

Federico Donelli is affiliated with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), and the Orion Policy Institute (OPI).

Riccardo Gasco is affiliated with IstanPol Institute.

Chiara Boldrini does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work – https://theconversation.com/indias-horn-of-africa-strategy-has-shifted-what-its-trying-to-do-and-how-it-could-work-281252

Why postal codes shouldn’t determine RSV protection in Canada

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Sophie Webb, Postdoctoral Fellow,  Bridge Research Consortium, Simon Fraser University

Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) is a familiar seasonal illness, but the tools to prevent it are new. Canada has recently approved vaccines for older adults and pregnant people, along with a long-acting monoclonal antibody that can protect infants through their first RSV season.

These innovations offer new ways to reduce hospitalizations and severe illness. Yet whether Canadians can access them still depends largely on where they live.

Across the country, provincial RSV programs vary widely in eligibility, scope and public funding — see, for example, Ontario RSV program updates and Alberta immunization program information.




Read more:
RSV FAQ: What is RSV? Who is at risk? When should I seek emergency care for my child?


An infant eligible for publicly funded protection in one province may not be eligible in another. Seniors with similar health risks may face different access depending on their province. These differences are often dismissed as routine features of federalism.

But with World Immunization Week upon us, RSV provides the opportunity to ask a broader question: who’s responsible for delivering equitable access to vaccines in Canada?


Immunity and Society is a new series from The Conversation Canada that presents new vaccine discoveries and immune-based innovations that are changing how we understand and protect human health. Through a partnership with the Bridge Research Consortium, these articles — written by experts in Canada at the forefront of immunology, biomanufacturing, social science and humanities — explore the latest developments and their impacts.


New tools, uneven access

RSV prevention now includes vaccines for older adults and pregnant people, and a monoclonal antibody (nirsevimab) that offers season-long protection for infants with a single dose.

National guidance exists. The National Advisory Committee on Immunization recommends universal infant RSV immunization, but allows provinces to phase this in based on supply and cost. But these recommendations are advisory. Provinces ultimately decide what is publicly funded and for whom.

The result is a patchwork. Some provinces have expanded infant coverage, while others have limited access to those considered high risk. Adult and maternal programs also vary in eligibility, delivery and funding.

Cost plays a key role in these decisions. RSV therapies are expensive, and provinces must weigh them against competing health priorities. Epidemiological differences also matter, as do variations in disease burden and the additional challenges of vaccination in northern and remote communities.

Not all variation is inherently problematic. But together, these factors mean that access to protection is shaped as much by provincial priorities as by medical need.

When equity’s a goal but not a guarantee

In immunization policy, equity generally means ensuring that those at higher risk, or facing barriers to access, are protected first, and financial or geographic differences don’t determine who receives care.

RSV programs often emphasize protecting those at highest clinical risk, such as very young infants and people with underlying conditions. This approach is understandable. But it also narrows how equity operates in practice.

In a system where provinces determine their own budgets and priorities, equity can become something negotiated rather than guaranteed. One province may fund broader access; another may limit eligibility based on cost-effectiveness or capacity. The same intervention is therefore available to some populations and not others.

This shifts responsibility downward. Families must determine eligibility, navigate different rules, and sometimes absorb costs or logistical barriers to access. Equity becomes something people experience unevenly, rather than a guarantee built into the system.

COVID-19 offers a cautionary example. Communities identified as highest risk were often vaccinated later than wealthier neighbourhoods during early rollout phases. This prompted provinces to introduce reactive “hotspot” strategies that in some cases replicated the same effect. Simply naming groups as “equity-deserving” did not ensure timely access.

People in masks are vaccinated by health-care workers in protective gear inside a tent
A pop-up vaccine clinic in a Toronto hotspot neighbourhood in April 2021.
THE CANADIAN PRESS/Cole Burston

Governance and accountability

Canada’s immunization system involves multiple entities. Federal bodies approve products and issue recommendations. Provinces decide what to fund. Public health systems implement programs within local constraints.

While each level plays an essential role, none is clearly responsible for national equity, creating a governance gap.

Equity is widely endorsed, but no single body is accountable for delivering it nationally. RSV demonstrates how this plays out in practice — variation in immunization is accepted as a feature of federalism, rather than treated as a policy problem to be addressed.

Procurement adds another layer. Vaccine pricing and contract terms are not routinely disclosed in Canada, and negotiations with manufacturers are often confidential.

During COVID-19, federal vaccine contracts were released only after parliamentary pressure, with key details heavily redacted. Limited transparency makes it difficult to assess whether differences in access reflect pricing, negotiation leverage or policy choices.




Read more:
Consulting firms are the ‘shadow public service’ managing the response to COVID-19


Why it matters

RSV is one of the first major post-pandemic tests of Canada’s immunization system. It’s unlikely to be the last. New vaccines and antibody-based therapies are increasingly tailored to specific populations, making decisions about access more complex.

As these technologies evolve, governance matters more, not less. Without clearer accountability, innovations risk reinforcing variation rather than reducing it.




Read more:
Flu, RSV and COVID-19: Advice from family doctors on how to get through this winter’s ‘tripledemic’


RSV highlights a broader challenge in Canadian immunization policy — equity is widely invoked, but responsibility for delivering it remains diffuse. Without clearer co-ordination, transparency and shared expectations, access to protection will continue to depend on where people live.

For families of infants and seniors, that distinction is not abstract. It determines whether immunity is treated as a public good, or as a matter of postal code.

The Conversation

Cora Constantinescu receives funding from bioMerieux, GSK, merck, Pfizer, Sanofi, with funds being transferred to her University organisation

Sophie Webb does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why postal codes shouldn’t determine RSV protection in Canada – https://theconversation.com/why-postal-codes-shouldnt-determine-rsv-protection-in-canada-278717

The king’s state visit was a success – but there is still a chasm to bridge between UK and US outlooks

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sam Edwards, Reader in Modern Political History, Loughborough University

As King Charles concludes his transatlantic travels with a visit to Bermuda, a British Overseas Territory, he can take pride in a job well done. His four-day state visit to the US – which concluded with a wreath-laying at Arlington National Cemetery and a block party in Virginia – appears to have been a success.

Amid a period of heightened tension between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the king’s carefully calibrated speech to a joint session of Congress has secured praise on both sides of the Atlantic (and on both sides of the Congressional aisle).

It was a remarkable performance: careful, diplomatic, occasionally pointed and at times both charming and witty. Perhaps we should not be that surprised. The king is a highly experienced diplomat, and while this was his first address to Congress, it was his 20th visit to Washington – as he himself noted.




Read more:
How King Charles charmed the US while taking digs at Trump


But what does the undoubtedly warm American response to the king’s visit mean for the future of the US-UK “special relationship”?

On its own, no act of royal diplomacy, however well executed, can deliver an instant reset in US-UK relations. Nor can it force an American president of any stripe – let alone the current incumbent – to change tack or alter approach.

On this, history offers a salutary lesson. For all the positive impact of King George VI’s June 1939 visit to the US, when war broke out just a few months later, it did not lead to instant American intervention.

The queen’s visit in 1957 was similarly well received. But the work of rebuilding transatlantic trust – so damaged by the Suez crisis – remained ongoing in the months that followed.

This latest state visit will similarly offer no quick fix. But like its predecessors, it might shift the dial on the current US-UK dialogue – and perhaps help to temper the tone, at least for a while.

For the UK, there has already been one immediate win: Trump has decided to remove whisky tariffs in honour of the king’s visit. This will be very much welcomed by the Scottish whisky industry.

The potential long-term impact of the king’s visit is harder to ascertain. Not least because this will be determined by variables well beyond either his or Starmer’s control: contemporary geopolitics, especially as affected by the wars in Iran and Ukraine. Despite this week’s mutual exchange of praise and platitudes, the distance between London and Washington on these matters remains substantive.

Worlds apart

There was a brief glimpse of these differences in two of the speeches: the king’s to Congress and, on the same day, the president’s at the White House.

The king’s speech lingered on the shared ties of history and, especially, on democratic values and ideals. It included references to the importance of compassion and interfaith dialogue, and celebrated the strength of what the king called “our vibrant, diverse and free societies”.

President Trump’s speech at the White House a few hours earlier similarly featured references to the transatlantic connections born of history. But elsewhere, his tone and intent seemed rather different.

Trump celebrated “the blood and noble spirit of the British” – qualities which had provided American revolutionaries with a “majestic inheritance”. At one point, he even declared that the patriots of the American Revolution had been animated by the “Anglo-Saxon courage” in their veins. This is a claim on American history that one commentator has suggested “walks up to the edge of white nationalism”.

There are indeed echoes here of an early 20th-century diplomatic discourse known as Anglo-Saxonism. Once popular and pervasive among transatlantic writers and diplomats (including those of a nativist bent), it largely fell out of favour in the years between the world wars – its racial assumptions increasingly untenable.

As long ago as December 1918, President Woodrow Wilson explicitly told an audience of British dignitaries – including King Charles’s great-grandfather, George V – that they must not “think of us as Anglo-Saxons, for that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the United States”.

Wilson was the first serving US president to visit Britain, and, like Trump, had a British mother (Trump’s was from Tong on the Isle of Lewis, Scotland). Wil point – made in advance of the Paris Peace Conference – was that the US was a melting pot, not a monoculture.

King Charles’s speech hailed the importance of alliances (Nato), of multilateral institutions (the UN), and of the rule of law. These, he argued, are what has delivered eight decades of transatlantic peace and prosperity.

From the president, meanwhile, came a celebration of Anglo-American blood brotherhood. It was at times reminiscent of thinking (and language) which his predecessor Wilson – no “woke” radical – had called into question well over a century ago.

These two visions of the US-UK relationship, distinct in their underlying assumptions, reflect a broader geopolitical shift – one which has increasingly strained the transatlantic relationship in recent months.

The king’s vision, indicative of widespread sentiment in Europe, represents an affirmation of the post-1945 world order. The other, with its echoes of the early 20th century, is disruptive. Between them lies a chasm of significant proportions, and bridging it will be the task of today’s transatlantic diplomats.

The Conversation

Sam Edwards has previously received funding from the ESRC and the US-UK Fulbright Commission. Sam is a Governor of The American Library (Norwich) and a Trustee of Sulgrave Manor (Northamptonshire).

ref. The king’s state visit was a success – but there is still a chasm to bridge between UK and US outlooks – https://theconversation.com/the-kings-state-visit-was-a-success-but-there-is-still-a-chasm-to-bridge-between-uk-and-us-outlooks-281948

UK terror threat is raised – counter-terror expert explains how official prevention strategies work

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Elisa Orofino, Academic Lead for Extremism and Counter-Terrorism, Anglia Ruskin University

William Barton/Shutterstock

The UK has raised its terror threat level from “substantial” to “severe”, meaning an attack within the next six months is considered highly likely. The change means the threat level is at severe for the first time in four years. It came with a warning from the Home Office of an increased threat from individuals and small groups based in the UK.

Counter-terrorism in the UK centres on a strategy known as Contest – a key part of this is the Prevent programme. The primary objective of Prevent, as the name suggests, is to stop people becoming involved in terrorism or from supporting extremist ideologies.

As such, it is designed to deliver tailored early-intervention aimed at addressing risks of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.

In my experience as a researcher in counter-terrorism studies, I have engaged extensively with Prevent practitioners. I have gained an insight into their work, which is carried out with commitment and dedication despite constraints in funding and resources.

A Prevent referral does not imply that someone has committed, or is suspected of committing, a criminal offence. Rather, it indicates that a professional with a statutory “Prevent duty” has raised concerns about someone’s behaviour, expressions or vulnerabilities. These professionals include teachers, healthcare workers and or social workers.

Recent data illustrates the scale of the programme: between April 2024 and March 2025, 8,778 people were referred to Prevent. This is the highest figure recorded since data collection began in 2015.

Notably, a significant proportion of these referrals involve young people, with 36% (3,192 cases) concerning children aged 11 to 15. A further 1,178 cases involved those aged 16 and 17.

rear view of young person in hoodie facing a chickenwire fence
More than a third of referrals to Prevent involved children.
Aoy_Charin/Shutterstock

The criteria for referral are broad, and they can include observable changes in behaviour, expressing extremist views, or signs of vulnerability that could make someone more susceptible to being radicalised.

Referrals are assessed by a panel that often include representatives from education, social services and law enforcement. In many cases, referrals do not progress beyond this initial stage. Instead, they may be signposted to other teams, such as social services, for more support.

But where there are still concerns, individuals may be offered support through the Channel programme. This is Prevent’s primary de-radicalisation mechanism. Channel is voluntary and confidential, and referrals can come from anyone and from any context. They are often issued by the police and education sector.

The support is tailored to the specific needs in each case and may include mentoring and mental health support. Participation is voluntary, and individuals can refuse to be involved or stop participating at any point.

Stigma and polarisation

Prevent is designed to be pre-emptive – intervening before criminal activity occurs. However, this breadth is also a source of ongoing controversy.

Critics argue that it can result in referrals based on ambiguous or misinterpreted behaviour. As such it has the potential to reinforce polarisation, particularly in relation to specific groups such as Muslims. This can clearly leave people feeling stigmatised, under surveillance or unfairly judged, particularly if they believe the referral was based on cultural, religious or political misunderstandings.

The scheme also has significant structural limitations as it functions as a time-limited intervention rather than a system of ongoing monitoring. Once a case is closed, the person is not subject to continuous oversight. This means that a previous referral does not eliminate the possibility of future risk – it simply means that the threshold for intervention was not met at that time.

It is important to remember that positive stories rarely get widespread attention. Every year, thousands of people in the UK receive early support and successfully disengage from radical and extremist ideologies.

Prevent operates in a difficult space between safeguarding and security, where risk is assessed before an offence occurs. While high-profile cases can amplify perceptions of failure, they do not reflect the full picture. Most referrals do not lead to further action, and many result in early, voluntary support that helps people disengage from harmful pathways.

At the same time, concerns around ambiguity and stigma remain valid. In short, rather than seeing Prevent as a measure of guilt, it’s important to recognise its limitations and its role as an early intervention tool.

The Conversation

Elisa Orofino does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. UK terror threat is raised – counter-terror expert explains how official prevention strategies work – https://theconversation.com/uk-terror-threat-is-raised-counter-terror-expert-explains-how-official-prevention-strategies-work-281996