Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tessa Devereaux, Assistant Professor in Politics, SOAS, University of London
Mali’s military regime is coming under increasing pressure from Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), an armed group linked to al-Qaida that now controls large swathes of territory across the Sahel region of western and north-central Africa. The group is blockading major highways in Mali and torching tanker lorries, with dwindling fuel supplies threatening to suffocate the country economically.
Expert observers have described JNIM as one of “Africa’s deadliest jihadist groups”, with the insurgency responsible for an estimated 64% of violent events in the Sahel area since 2017. It is rapidly expanding its territorial reach, and has launched a series of coordinated attacks across Mali in recent months.
The group has seized army infrastructure, carried out strikes on convoys of fuel tankers, and assaulted foreign-owned factories and mines. It has also kidnapped foreign nationals for ransom. Some experts anticipate that the group may soon start a full siege on the Malian capital, Bamako.
So what is behind JNIM’s success? On the surface, the explanations are clear. Mali’s government has struggled for decades to assert control over the northern and central regions of the country. Decades of neglect, corruption and state brutality have eroded public trust in state institutions, while human rights abuses perpetrated by the military have deepened these grievances.
A wave of military coups across the Sahel in recent years has been met with cautious optimism in some quarters, raising anticipation of a more effective counterinsurgency strategy against JNIM forces. Yet the group’s recent successes in Mali suggest a militarised approach has done little to increase the region’s stability.
Critical Threats Project
Explaining JNIM’s success
JNIM has provided security and justice in a context where state efforts have failed. As an amalgamation of several preexisting armed groups, the group has deep local roots across the Sahel – encompassing people from the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, Songhai and Bambara ethnic communities.
This has allowed it to intervene effectively in communal conflicts, from tackling banditry to solving disputes over resource access. With some parts of Mali having been governed exclusively by the group for 11 years, it is clear that JNIM is providing an attractive offer to much of the civilian population.
Research shows that JNIM also appeals to local populations in other, more unexpected, ways. One overlooked factor is the group’s emphasis on social mobility. Its leaders have criticised and attacked local elites for neglecting social welfare provisions and employment opportunities, while maintaining rigid social hierarchies.
This social justice message means the group appeals especially to formerly enslaved populations and marginalised pastoralists, some of whom have reported seeing recruitment as “an opportunity for social liberation”.
As a nomadic herder from central Mali’s Mopti region described in a 2016 interview with Leiden University researcher Boukary Sangaré: “The only feeling that animates us is that we can free ourselves from the yoke of the domination of our elites. We have long been subjected to all forms of exploitation by the administration in complicity with our elites … This is why many of us are in the bush with weapons.”
Rigid gender norms are another piece of the puzzle, with access to marriage being at the heart of the group’s appeal to disenfranchised youth. Marriage is a key social institution in Mali. Yet soaring bride prices – payments made to a bride’s family that are almost universal across Mali – mean marriage is largely out of reach for young men.
Islamist groups have offered practical solutions to this gendered grievance. In one survey from 2020, carried out by the NGO International Alert, 100% of women and 90% of men surveyed in the Mopti region said JNIM affiliates had improved access to marriage.
As one man described in an interview in 2022: “The jihadists have helped to reduce the celibacy of women. Now everyone finds someone … They reduce all the expenses of the ceremonies that prevented young people from getting married, so they get married more easily.”
Focus groups conducted in central Mali demonstrate similar findings. One respondent in the village of Siniré reported in 2020 that “high bride prices are now prohibited; they have to be reasonable … Nowadays you’re free to marry without money being demanded from you.”
These strategies have even boosted support for JNIM among women. Known for enforcing strict dress codes and curbs on freedom of movement, Islamist groups like JNIM are often assumed to be straightforwardly oppressive to women – yet evidence suggests the story is more complicated.
By appealing directly to them and capitalising on gender grievances in Mali, the group is able to undermine powerful local elites and establish social control over large areas of territory.
In the context of widespread gendered discrimination, Islamist courts are sometimes seen as more likely to rule in favour of women. In focus groups held in the central Malian villages of Sampara, Siniré and Torodi, one woman described how “if a girl is forced into marriage, she may now appeal to the armed extremists to uphold her right to consent”.
Other women see Islamist governance as a worthwhile trade-off, noting that the group offers protection from sexual violence. A survey conducted across Mali in 2019 identified physical protection as a primary motivation for Malian women to support Islamist groups.
In 2020, during an interview with International Alert, a female public figure in Mopti compared the jihadists favourably to other armed groups, as well as state actors. She explained: “The jihadists are responsible for less sexual abuse compared with the others … and any of their people who are found guilty of these kinds of acts are executed.”
The rapid recent expansion of JNIM across the Sahel, and the increasing threat it poses to the city of Bamako, make it clear the group should not be underestimated. Meanwhile, the scorched-earth campaign pursued by Mali’s military government has done little but exacerbate resentment.
JNIM has proved adept at navigating the social and political fault lines which the Malian state and international community have long ignored. Unless these root causes are addressed, the group is unlikely to be defeated.
Tessa Devereaux has received funding from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, United States Institute of Peace and the International Studies Association. She is an Assistant Professor in Politics at SOAS, University of London.
– ref. Why an armed group linked to al-Qaida is gaining ground in Mali – https://theconversation.com/why-an-armed-group-linked-to-al-qaida-is-gaining-ground-in-mali-268787
