Category: English

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Turns, Senior Environment Editor, The Conversation

The Promoter

The promoter of this competition is The Conversation Trust (UK), a non-profit company limited by guarantee (number 08158264), with its registered office at Shropshire House (4th Floor), 11-20 Capper Street, London, WC1E 6JA. For queries about this competition, please contact climatepoetry@theconversation.com.

1. How to enter

1.1. The competition will close on September 1 at 11.59pm BST (the “Closing Date”).

1.2. All submissions to be made via the entry form and must be received no later than the Closing Date. All competition entries received after the Closing Date are automatically disqualified. No changes can be made to poems once they have been submitted.

1.3. We will not accept (a) responsibility for competition entries that are lost, mislaid, damaged or delayed in transit, regardless of cause, including, for example, as a result of any equipment failure, technical malfunction, systems, satellite, network, server, computer hardware or software failure of any kind; or (b) proof of transmission as proof of receipt of entry to the competition; or (c) entries in any language other than English or translations (d) entries that have previously been submitted to any other competition.

1.4. Poems must be a minimum of three lines and maximum of 40 lines and can follow any form. They don’t need to address a specific theme, but should be focused on communicating climate research.

1.5 By submitting a competition entry, you are agreeing to be bound by these terms and conditions.

1.6 The competition entries will be reviewed by the judging panel who will draw up a longlist based on the best entries. Winners will be selected by Helen Mort from a shortlist drawn up by the rest of the panel. The full names and credentials of all judging panel members will be made available on request after the Closing Date. The decision of the panel of judges will be final and no correspondence will be entered into regarding judging decisions

2. Eligibility

2.1 The competition is only open to researchers or academics employed by or affiliated to a university or approved research institution (IRO) in the UK, including PhD candidates under supervision by an academic.

2.2 The competition is not open to Masters students or to employees of The Conversation, their immediate families, nor any other person connected with the competition.

2.3 In entering the competition, you confirm that you are eligible to do so and eligible to claim the prize you may win. The winner must pay costs of travel to the prize themselves. You may be required to provide proof that you are eligible to enter the competition.

2.4 We will not accept competition entries that are: (a) automatically generated by computer or created by artificial intelligence (including but not limited to chatbots such as ChatGPT or similar software applications); (b) completed by third parties or in bulk; (c) illegible, have been altered, reconstructed, forged or tampered with; (d) incomplete; (e) already published or in the public domain.

2.5 There is no limit on entries, but each poem must be submitted individually. Entries on behalf of another person will not be accepted and joint submissions are not allowed.

3. The prize

3.1 The prize is as follows: five days and four nights (arrival 2pm or later on day one, departure by noon on day five) on dates to be mutually agreed, within 12 months of announcement of winner at the Little Goat Barn Writing Retreat, in the Vale of Conwy in North Wales. You’ll be welcomed and fully catered for by husband and-wife Dr Emma Claire Sweeney, author and creative writing lecturer, and Jonathan Ruppin, former literary agent and bookseller. The retreat offered is untaught. All food, non-alcoholic drink, bedding, towels and basic toiletries supplied. The retreat will likely be attended by up to four other writers of the retreat’s choosing.

3.2 There is no cash alternative for the prize and the prize is not negotiable or transferable. Winner must organise and pay for their own travel, though if travelling by rail, free collection and return by car from Chester or Chirk stations will be provided.

3.3 The retreat is provided by the owners of Little Goat Barn Writing Retreat, who hold appropriate public liability insurance and are solely responsible for the day-to-day delivery of the retreat experience. The Conversation will use reasonable endeavours to ensure the prize is awarded as described but accepts no liability for matters outside its reasonable control once the winner has been confirmed and the retreat arrangements have been communicated to the retreat owners

4. The winner

4.1 The decision of the judges is final and no correspondence or discussion will be entered into. The winner will be announced in November 2026.

4.2 We will contact the winner personally as soon as practicable after the judges have reached their decision, using the telephone number or email address provided with the competition entry.

4.3 The winner consents to their story being published on The Conversation as per its publishing terms & conditions, including a profile being created on The Conversation to accompany the work, including their first name, surname, institution and country. By winning, the winner grants The Conversation a non-exclusive licence to publish their poem under the terms described. The competition organisers must provide the surname and country of the winner to the Advertising Standards Authority on request.

5. Claiming the prize

5.1 The prize may not be claimed by a third party on your behalf.

5.2 We will make all reasonable efforts to contact the winner. If the winner cannot be contacted or is not available or has not claimed their prize within 30 of days of the Announcement Date, we reserve the right to offer the prize to the next eligible entrant selected from the shortlisted entries that were received before the Closing Date.

5.3 We do not accept any responsibility if you are not able to take up the prize.

6. Ownership of competition entries and intellectual property rights

6.1 All competition entries and any accompanying material submitted remain the property of the entrant. The winning entry will be published under the general terms and conditions of The Conversation, including under a creative commons licence. The Conversation reserves the right to make additions or deletions to the text or graphics prior to publication, or to refuse publication.

6.2 Non-winning competition entries will not be published or used by The Conversation without the express written consent of the entrant. All non-winning entries and associated personal data will be deleted within 90 days of the Announcement Date. The Conversation reserves the right to use anonymized, non-attributable excerpts or statistics about entries received (e.g. “We received over 200 entries from 50 institutions”) for promotional purposes relating to future competitions.

7. Data protection and publicity

7.1 The Promoter will process your personal data (name, email address, telephone number, and institutional affiliation) solely for the purposes of administering this competition, selecting winners, and publishing the winning entry as described in these terms and conditions. Your data will be retained until the prize has been claimed and delivered. Under UK GDPR, you have the right to access, rectify, erase, or restrict processing of your personal data. To exercise these rights or for data protection queries, please contact uk-privacy@theconversation.com. We will not use your data for marketing purposes without your separate consent

8. General

8.1 If there is any reason to believe that there has been a breach of these terms and conditions, the Promoter may, at its sole discretion, reserve the right to exclude you from participating in the competition.

8.2 We reserve the right to hold void, suspend, cancel, or amend the prize competition where it becomes necessary to do so.

8.3 These terms and conditions are governed by English law.

– ref. The Conversation UK Climate Poetry Award Terms & Conditions 2026 – https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-uk-climate-poetry-award-terms-and-conditions-2026-281957

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Fraser McMillan, Lecturer in Scottish Electoral Politics, University of Edinburgh

Barring a last-minute surprise, the Holyrood election will probably return the Scottish National Party (SNP) to government for the fifth time in a row. The nationalists have been in office for so long that thousands of Scots who weren’t even born when the party entered office in 2007 are now going to the polls for the first time.

But just 23% of respondents think the Scottish government is doing a good job, according to the Scottish Election Study’s final pre-election Scoop poll in February. This is down from 44% immediately before the 2021 election. And according to the latest opinion polls, the party is on track to drop at least 10 percentage points of the 47.7% constituency vote share it recorded back then.

It was always going to be challenging for the SNP to sustain such high levels of support given the economic climate. As our public opinion tracking data demonstrates, it didn’t take long after 2021 for the public mood to sour as the second-order impacts of the COVID pandemic and longer-running economic woes sank in.

Issues such as inflation, a creaking health service, chronic housing shortages and high street stagnation dented voters’ faith in governing parties at both Westminster and Holyrood. The share of Scots who thought the country was heading in the right direction dropped from just over 40% in 2021 to under 20% by 2025.

Pro-independence voters, who had loyally voted SNP as a bloc since the 2014 referendum, began to point the finger at the party even before long-time first minister Nicola Sturgeon resigned.

The nationalists dropped in the opinion polls after enduring a year of scandal and two fraught changes of leadership, losing most of their Westminster MPs at the 2024 general election. This was their first popular vote loss to Labour since 2010.

Any other unpopular, long-in-the-tooth incumbent would be staring down the barrel of a decisive defeat. And the party’s vote share will undoubtedly decline. But two big factors will combine to buoy the SNP’s seat count at this election and likely propel the party back to power. First, the continued polarisation of the Scottish electorate on the question of independence. And second, an ever-more fragmented opposition.

Crossing the divide on independence

Although the salience of Scottish independence has declined since 2021, the SNP retains the support of two thirds of pro-independence voters. At the same time, the only other pro-independence party, the Scottish Greens, has withdrawn from all but a handful of constituencies.

Voters appear to be more willing to cross the constitutional divide than they did five years ago. But attitudes to independence continue to structure voting behaviour and views on the governments at Holyrood and Westminster. Enough voters still trust the SNP to “stand up for Scotland” within the union to stick with the party, even if they’re less enthusiastic on this occasion.

What’s more, the opposition is now even more divided. Both Labour and the Conservatives also look likely to lose support compared to peaks in recent elections. The Conservatives, the second-largest party in the previous parliament, are set to shed around half their vote from 2021. And Labour look likely to lose much of the ground they had made up by 2024 due to a faltering first two years in power at Westminster.

Combined, these parties and the SNP secured 91% of constituency votes in 2021 – this figure could drop to somewhere between 60% and 70% this time. Reform UK is competing with Labour for second place from a standing start, while the Liberal Democrats are also likely to advance. Voters hoping to unseat the SNP may agree on that, but little else.

When this is fed into the electoral system, with 73 of the parliament’s 129 seats decided by first-past-the-post constituencies, the SNP can afford to lose a sizeable chunk of support and live to fight another day. Its vote is evenly spread around the country, and the splintering opposition (not to mention changing constituency boundaries) make it difficult to unseat when there is no consensus challenger of the kind Labour looked like being two years ago.

There are, however, substantial risks here for the nationalists (assuming they remain in charge). Instead of running a “big tent” campaign resembling the pre-indyref years – and with a two-decade record to defend – the SNP has been forced to pursue a core vote strategy, hoping to maximise turnout of the left-leaning, socially progressive “Yes” base.

To this end, the Scottish Greens have done the party a big favour by retreating in most constituencies and will expect to be rewarded. A Swinney government may find itself with some very difficult budgetary choices in a tightening fiscal environment which are at odds with an expansionary manifesto.

And the so-called “scunner factor” at this election, with low turnout expected and Reform UK and Green gains virtually guaranteed, suggests that patience is running thin with mainstream parties.

While it’s unlikely to bottom out as quickly as backing for Keir Starmer’s Labour government, continued stagnation in living standards could see SNP support erode further. Then again, the nationalists’ superpower has always been to use the political weather to their advantage – and the wide-open 2029 UK general election could provide another such opportunity.

If the nationalists can hang on to power, analysts looking back in another 20 years might regard Swinney’s own “loveless landslide” as the most important SNP victory of them all.

Fraser McMillan receives funding from UKRI/ESRC as part of the Scottish Election Study.

– ref. There’s little love for the SNP – so why does the party look set to win in Scotland? – https://theconversation.com/theres-little-love-for-the-snp-so-why-does-the-party-look-set-to-win-in-scotland-282280

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Hannah Bunting, Senior Lecturer in Quantitative British Politics and Co-director of The Elections Centre, University of Exeter

Voters are casting their ballots in elections to 136 English local authorities, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Senedd. For most, it’s the first opportunity to cast a ballot since the 2024 general election. This set of elections is complex, taking place in multiple locations with ballots being counted over several days and across three electoral systems.

In England, local elections run on a four-year cycle, which means different sets of seats in various locations are contested in any given year. This is a bumper year, with around 5,000 councillors – predominantly in urban local authorities – being elected in nearly 3,000 wards. There are more than 25,000 candidates contesting them.

There is added complexity in terms of baseline comparisons, which determine what is considered a loss, gain or hold. While most seats will have been last contested in 2022, various changes mean around a fifth of wards don’t have a directly comparable year. Instead, they have been assigned an estimated notional seat winner.

Labour is defending more than half of the seats up for election and control 65 of the local authorities. This includes 21 of the 32 in London and more than two-thirds of the metropolitan boroughs. They are also fielding the most candidates, a title that went to Reform UK last year.

The Conservatives are defending another quarter of the seats but only have control of 18 local authorities with elections this year. This includes five of the six county councils, whose elections were postponed last year.

The remaining fifth of seats are being defended by the Liberal Democrats (13.6%), independents and others (5.3%) and Greens (2.8%). Reform UK did not start contesting most seats until after the 2024 general election, which means they are defending only three seats this year. However, they’re fielding the second largest number of candidates after Labour.

Scotland and Wales

Scotland elects its devolved parliament every five years under what is known as the additional member system (AMS). This combines first-past-the-post constituency winners with a proportional regional top-up. There are 129 MSP seats up for grabs, 73 of which are elected from the constituencies and the remaining 56 allocated proportionally from the regional list.

The SNP is looking to win its fifth successive term in office. In 2021, it won 64 seats in total, and only two of those were from the proportional top-ups. The parties that gained most from the regional lists were the Conservatives (who came second with a total of 31 seats), Labour which won 22 MSPs and the Greens who achieved eight. The Liberal Democrats won all four of their seats via constituencies.

This election is being fought on new boundaries, affecting 42 of the constituencies and all but one of the regions.

Wales has a new voting system for these elections. The Senedd previously used the AMS to elect 60 representatives, but is now moving to a purely proportional closed-list system. Under this, six members are elected for each of the 16 geographies – first-past-the-post is gone and voters get one vote each. As such, it will be more difficult for any single party to win an overall majority.

Beneath all the logistics are thousands of interesting stories. Around 30% of councillors for all principal local authorities in England are being elected, along with all devolved members.

The extent of change that’s anticipated means there will be a swathe of new representatives taking office. That matters for governance. They will almost certainly win on much smaller winning vote shares, making many seats a very close race. In this context, each person’s vote matters more than ever.

But will this motivate electors to the polls? There could be a moderate but noticeable increase in turnout that is somewhat uncharacteristic of these elections.

When will we know the results?

Ballots are being counted over three days, with the closing results not being announced until Saturday afternoon. Around 46 English local authorities are expected to be counting votes overnight – this is about a quarter of all seats.

This means we should have a clear sense of how the elections are going by Friday morning – watch for Labour losing seats to the Greens and Reform, and for London councils shifting to “no overall control”. It will also be interesting to see which places have voted Reform or Liberal Democrat to the detriment of the Conservatives.

Scotland and Wales both count on Friday, along with all but four of the remaining English local authorities. The earliest devolved results could be announced by lunchtime, but we should know for certain who has come out on top before your Friday chippy tea. Birmingham is an all-out election where all seats are being contested. It looks like it will be a real test for Labour, and counting there may not finish until after 6pm on Friday.

What we can be sure of is that the fragmentation of party support at British elections will continue. Labour and the Conservatives could record their worst results in some areas; the Greens and Reform may branch out to places they’ve never won before. But until every vote has been cast, it’s still in the electorate’s hands.

Hannah Bunting receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

– ref. Election day in the UK: what to look out for – and when we’ll know the results – https://theconversation.com/election-day-in-the-uk-what-to-look-out-for-and-when-well-know-the-results-282179

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

Operation Epic Fury is over. Or at least, that’s what the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, announced on May 5, describing any further US action in the Gulf as purely “defensive”.

Rubio’s insistence that the conflict the US and Israel launched on February 28 achieved its objectives is open for debate. But this change of tone and terminology is likely to reflect arguments that raged in the US Congress as the war approached the two-month mark at the end of April, about whether the Trump administration must seek congressional approval for the conflict as required by US law.

The conflict has become the latest episode in a long struggle between the US Congress and the presidency over which branch of government can legitimately start wars. And, in a surprising way, Donald Trump’s actions seem to be pushing power back towards Congress.

The US constitution splits war powers between the presidency and Congress. It gives Congress the power to raise armies and declare war but makes the president the commander-in-chief of the military. That means that, in theory, you need to get Congress to agree to fund and start a war and the president to agree to wage it.

Since the second world war, this system has been changing. The last time the US formally declared war was in 1942 against Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania – having already declared war on Japan and Germany in December 1941. Since then, presidents have often plunged the country into hostilities on their own authority without getting a declaration of war from Congress.

Congress still needs to fund the military – but, with very few exceptions, the legislature has always done so. Individual members of Congress have generally been happy to let presidents take on the blame for starting wars. After conflicts have started, legislators have been unwilling to cut off funds for the troops in the field. As a result, Congress has given up much of its influence over decisions of war and peace.

Read more:
Trump sidelined Congress’ authority over war on Iran – and lawmakers allowed it, extending a 75-year trend

But not entirely. The high point of Congressional pushback was in 1973, during the tail end of the Vietnam war, which by then had become extremely unpopular. In this context, Congress challenged the executive branch by passing the 1973 War Powers Resolution (also known as the War Powers Act). It’s this law that is shaping the debate over Iran today.

The War Powers Resolution basically repeats what the constitution says: that Congress has to start wars, but it allows for some flexibility. If there is a surprise attack on US forces, the president can act to repel that attack for 60 days before getting a declaration of war from Congress.

As reasonable as this may sound, every administration since the War Powers Resolution was passed has questioned its constitutionality and refused to be bound by it.

To be sure, some presidents have asked Congress for a statement of political support before launching a major war, as they also had done before the War Powers Resolution was passed. For instance, George H.W. Bush did so before the Gulf war of 1990-91. But when doing so, presidents have generally maintained that they did so purely to ensure national unity, and not because the War Powers Resolution required it of them.

Presidents have also launched many interventions in which they ignored the resolution entirely – as Bush himself did in Panama in 1989.

Unpopular war

As a result, the resolution has never acted as a meaningful constraint on presidential war-making power. But things may be changing. The war in Iran is so unpopular that Congress asserting its authority over war powers more strongly than any time since the War Powers Resolution was passed. In the process, it is turning the resolution into something that might meaningfully affect the course of the war.

One reason for this is that even Trump’s Republican supporters in Congress are aware of how unpopular this war is. Many are worried about losing their seats in the midterms later this year. As a result, Congress is stirring. Even senior Republican figures are treating the War Powers Resolution and its 60-day clock as an important constraint on the administration and demanding that the war stop or be authorised by Congress after it passes that mark.

In response to this political pressure, the Trump administration seems to be paying more attention to the requirements of the War Powers Resolution than most administrations before it.

The White House is too afraid of Republican opposition to ignore the resolution entirely, particularly when it knows that it may soon have to ask Congress for more funding for the war. Even the argument it made that the 60-day clock has paused during the ceasefire is an indication that it sees the clock as a legitimate thing in the first place.

If the war starts up again, Republicans will clamour for the administration to come to Congress for a declaration. This would probably trigger a major debate over the conditions that Congress wants to attach regarding strategy, goals and funding.

What this shows is that many of the checks and balances of the constitution only work when there is the political will to make them work.

Andrew Gawthorpe is affiliated with the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

– ref. US declares war in Iran ‘over’ to avoid row with Congress over whether it was legal – https://theconversation.com/us-declares-war-in-iran-over-to-avoid-row-with-congress-over-whether-it-was-legal-282159

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Joel Busher, Professor of Political Sociology, Coventry University

Following recent antisemitic violence and aggression, calls from some quarters for a temporary ban on pro-Palestine marches have gained traction. Conservative party leader Kemi Badenoch has firmly supported a ban, while
Keir Starmer, the prime minister, has suggested that some protests may need to be stopped. The government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has called for a moratorium on such marches.

Those who have made such calls do so on the grounds that pro-Palestine marches, whatever their intent, are contributing to a “tone of Jew hatred within our country”, in the words of Chief Rabbi Sir Ephraim Mirvis. Starmer has also expressed concern about the “cumulative” effect of the marches on Jewish communities.

This is an understandable position in some ways. There can be little denying that some participants in pro-Palestine events have articulated antisemitic positions. And in a period where more clearly needs to be done to address antisemitic violence and aggression, a ban appears to provide a way for authorities to send a clear message that there is no place for antisemitism in Britain today.

Yet there are also problems with such proposals. As policymakers consider their options, it is important that these problems are taken seriously.

Evidence on the relationship between protest activity and targeted violence outside of the protest arena is limited. The available evidence points to a complex and context-dependent relationship.

Some studies have found that when protests increase, extremism and extremist violence can also rise, especially when society is more divided. Such a pattern has been observed, for example, in the US, where the bipartisan thinktank the Center for Strategic and International Studies identified heightened protest activity and rising domestic terrorism during the early 2020s.

However, many studies of nonviolent protest show that it reduces political violence, by providing nonviolent means of pursuing social and political objectives.

Where heightened protest activity coincides with increased extremist violence, it is often unclear whether protests or marches themselves are the cause. Today, people participating in social movements are likely to access and share information through a range of (often unregulated) spaces both offline and online. It is difficult to assess how important protests themselves might be in influencing people to go on to engage in targeted violence.

This is not simply academic nitpicking. It means that it is possible that a ban on marches would have little to no effect on the use of targeted violence against Jewish communities.

In fact, there is a distinct possibility that banning pro-Palestine marches, even if only temporarily, might actually increase violence.

Studies show that violence is less likely to escalate when moderate groups within protest movements are present and have influence. This has been observed, for example, in research into the escalation or inhibition of violence during waves of far-right protest.

Expanded state repression – such as bans on certain forms of previously legal protest – can weaken the position of moderate factions. When this happens, calls for restraint and advocacy of non- or less-violent strategies can lose credibility within the movement, weakening the “internal brakes” on violence.

Practicalities of enforcement

A moratorium on pro-Palestine marches would also raise many questions about the practicalities of any restrictions. For one, calls on the police to ban other contentious demonstrations that risk hostility towards different groups would increase.

What particular types of action would be banned? Marches? Demonstrations? Would size be a factor? Would it cover a protest against the ban on the protest? What about other forms of action such as sit-ins, information stands or coordinated online action? And what sanctions would be imposed on those who did not comply?

Attempting to enforce such bans could become a significant drain on already stretched public resources, not least because activists would probably seek to increase pressure on authorities because of those costs. This is one of the most obvious lessons to draw from responses to the government’s attempts to ban the group Palestine Action.

Read more:
Labour wants to restrict repeat protests – but that’s what makes campaigns successful

In addition to this, police have also recently been authorised to consider the “cumulative impact” of protests on local areas when policing. They have had to grapple with how and when to incorporate this in addition to their usual powers.

Before introducing a ban, it’s important to think about the example it would set and how it could influence future decisions about the right to protest. The UK would be less able to criticise authoritarian countries and illiberal democracies that misuse counterextremism and counter-terrorism powers that limit people’s freedom.

None of this is to deny the urgency of confronting antisemitic violence and aggression in the UK. This requires sustained political commitment, effective policing and community protection. But restricting the right to protest is a blunt and risky instrument.

The available evidence suggests it may do little to reduce harm and could, in some circumstances, make matters worse. Politicians should therefore be cautious before treating bans on marches as a solution to complex and deeply rooted problems.

Joel Busher has received funding from the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) for his work on the escalation and inhibition of political violence.

Tufyal Choudhury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why banning pro-Palestine marches is a risky response to antisemitic violence – https://theconversation.com/why-banning-pro-palestine-marches-is-a-risky-response-to-antisemitic-violence-282168

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Emily Roberts-Tyler, Lecturer in Education, Bangor University

The upcoming Senedd elections may shift the balance of power in Wales. Any new government must immediately grapple with the significant ongoing challenges of embedding educational reforms across the additional learning needs system.

Recent policy proposals to change the system of support for children with special educational needs in England have brought a heightened focus on how education systems might best support all learners. In Wales, special educational needs and disabilities are referred to as additional learning needs (ALN).

Wales reached a major milestone in August 2025 when the ALN code came fully into effect, four years after its publication.

Despite the devolution of education and increasing divergence in education policy between Wales and England, the ALN code in Wales shares some similar ambitions to England’s recent policy plans.

These reforms in Wales sought to increase the rights and autonomy of children and young people. They provide statutory individual development plans for those needing anything additional to universal learning provision. They also extend support for learners aged up to 25. The intention is to improve consistency and strengthen multi-agency collaboration across education, health and social care.

The progress of reform

The additional learning needs reforms in Wales reflect a commendable shift towards rights-based, person-centred planning and autonomy for children and young people and their families.

This is also a key tenet of the Curriculum for Wales. This has been implemented since 2022 in primary schools, and gradually over subsequent years in secondary schools. The curriculum framework has a focus on learner voice and providing a broad, purpose-led and flexible curriculum. It is designed to ensure that even those from disadvantaged backgrounds or with complex needs are supported to access a meaningful education.

However, a number of challenges remain with embedding the ALN reforms across Wales.

A key issue relates to the identification of learners with ALN. Under the new system, there has been a 53% decrease in the number of learners being identified as having ALN. This is despite a reported increase in children presenting with more complex needs, indicating that learning needs may in fact be increasing. Data also suggests that it is those with low to moderate needs who are much less likely to be formally identified.

It has been suggested that this reduction could be due to children who might previously have been identified with ALN being catered for through an improved universal offering.

However, teachers have reported that the proportion of learners in their classes with ALN has increased over the past five years. A majority – 65% – of teachers in Wales reported that there were learners in their classes who still needed additional support, but were no longer identified as having ALN following changes in identification criteria.

Lacking resources

This has caused hugely increased workloads in attempts to provide adequate learner support. At the same time, the number of in-house specialist staff to advise and support delivery has dramatically reduced. Without the resources to support more learners with additional needs, many teachers have reported that children are often not receiving the education they are entitled to.

There have been significant strides towards developing inclusive schools across Wales. Even in the best cases, though, there is a long way to go. In reality, the overall picture behind the reduction in identification of ALN indicates issues with identification criteria and resources, and whether the current policy encompasses all children in need, rather than a sudden shift to high quality inclusive education.

Schools report an increase in local authorities refusing requests for assessments or access to support for struggling learners. They have suggested the bar is being raised for access to support, without clarity or transparency. There’s also a clear indication from specialist staff in Wales that they have insufficient time to fulfil their ALN duties.

This suggests that processes and resources for identifying learners with ALN are playing a significant part in the reduced identification. Many learners could be slipping through the net, rather than experiencing effective inclusive provision.

This tension between policy intent and practice is familiar territory when it comes to inclusion. There are ongoing concerns that legislative reform has outpaced operational readiness and available resources, leading to a crisis point.

This crisis is exacerbated for Welsh-medium learners. The policy intention is for a fully bilingual system. But finding Welsh-medium specialists and honouring language preference is proving challenging. This has lead to families struggling to find support in their preferred language. Such battles are at odds with both Welsh Language policy and the principles of Person-Centred Planning and autonomy that are central to the reforms.

Whatever the outcome of the Senedd elections, educators and families across Wales will be hoping for an increased sense of momentum and urgency. They’ll also be looking for a commitment to sustained and appropriate levels of funding to ensure learners in Wales can be supported to access their education.

Emily Roberts-Tyler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Additional learning needs present a key challenge for the incoming Senedd – https://theconversation.com/additional-learning-needs-present-a-key-challenge-for-the-incoming-senedd-281048