Stirling prize 2025: Appleby Blue pioneers affordable social housing tackling elderly loneliness

Source: The Conversation – UK – By John Flint, Professor of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield

The winner of the 2025 RIBA Stirling prize offers an inspiring blueprint for addressing some of our current housing crises. It is also an opportunity to reflect on long-standing dilemmas in providing appropriate accommodation for all.

Architects Witherford Watson and Mann won the prize, for the second time, for the Appleby Blue development. Run by the United St Saviours Charity in Bermondsey, South London, it provides 57 units of one and two bedroom apartments for residents aged over 65, with 11 units fully wheelchair accessible.

It is explicitly a new take on urban almshouses, which date back to the Middle Ages. Throughout their history, almshouses have primarily provided accommodation for the elderly.




Read more:
How the high-rise tower block came to symbolise the contradictions of modern Britain


The almshouse was historically called a “hospital for the poor”. One of the architect’s behind Appleby Blue, Stephen Witherford, points out the intersections between housing and health crises. Often hospital beds are occupied by elderly people because of a lack of appropriate accommodations that fit their needs, paired with a wider lack of mechanisms enabling elderly residents to downsize from their existing homes, Witherford notes.

United St Saviours Charity can be traced back to 1541. The charity’s modern day specialist staff carry a lineage going back to the initial wardens charged with managing the estate and looking after the poor of the parish.

Appleby Blue attempts to address two intersecting crises: the lack of accessible and affordable housing, especially in London and growing levels of loneliness among older people. We face a paradox, while cities like London become more densely populated social connections between us are seen to have reduced, particularly since COVID-19.

The development was partly funded through Section 106 agreements between Southwark Council and the developer JTRE. These legal agreements ensure infrastructure, services, or affordable housing to mitigate the impact of a new development. This is an important agreement when developers are challenging the financial viability of providing affordable social housing or infrastructure as part of new development programmes.

In addition to a design focused on light and space and technical adaptions enabling residents to live as independently as possible, its principal aim is to foster connections – both between residents and with the wider community.

The new development retains the courtyard that has often been a feature of almshouses. As well as the shared courtyard there is a rooftop garden, and spacious balconies, which are provided as spaces for interaction. Britain has a somewhat chequered history of attempts to engineer sociability through the architecture of public housing, including the use of wide deck access in high rise developments.

However, the development seeks, in the words of the judges, to “combine function and community”. This mission recognises that the cohesive design needs to be complemented by shaping daily practices in a way that reduces isolation. The communal kitchen is at the heart of this and while the development includes resident-only spaces, it also emphasises public communal areas, a welcome contrast to “poor door” mechanisms to segregate social and private homes in some other London developments.

There is a deliberate attempt to promote interactions with the wider local community, including shared cooking and dance classes and singing groups. Intergenerational engagement is particularly emphasised, with a toddler’s group and local school children involved in the social activities. This offers an innovative take on a longstanding dilemma in social housing about whether to aim for allocations that mixed generations and household types or to provide more specialist, but separate, accommodation.




Read more:
Stirling Prize 2024: a welcome turn towards reuse and retrofit but too safe to represent the UK’s ‘best’ architecture


Encouraging residents to engage in communal activities has been a constant feature, for example of the housing cooperative movement, with mixed results. But here, the focus is on shared interests and mutual skills development, for example cooking, rather than on volunteering or involvement in the management of the development.

Appleby Blue is also deliberately an ongoing site of research. It includes accommodation spaces for researchers. A study by the University of Bournemouth has evaluated the impact of the development on its residents and other studies are ongoing. This is a welcome reminder about how important robust scientific evidence is in understanding what works in housing for the elderly.

There is much to admire, architecturally and socially, about Appleby Blue. An obvious challenge is the extent to which its specific elements, from affordability to design and specialist support, could be scaled up or replicated more widely given the extent of the crises we face. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t celebrate and learn from its pioneering features, including its lessons for tackling loneliness, which is certainly not confined to the elderly.


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The Conversation

John Flint is not currently receiving funding from an organisation. He has previously received research funding from the UKRI, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Nuffield Foundation, a number of UK Government Departments, the Scottish Executive/ Government, the Welsh Assembly Government and local authorities He is a Trustee of the Housing Studies Charitable Trust.

ref. Stirling prize 2025: Appleby Blue pioneers affordable social housing tackling elderly loneliness – https://theconversation.com/stirling-prize-2025-appleby-blue-pioneers-affordable-social-housing-tackling-elderly-loneliness-268017

The maps of Ursula K Le Guin reveal a fascinating insight into world-building in fantasy fiction

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mike Duggan, Lecturer in Digital Culture and Technology, King’s College London

One of the most prolific science-fiction writers of the last century, Ursula K. Le Guin was revered for her inventive, genre-defying novels. Exploring humanity through philosophy, gender, race and society, her stories were rooted in fantasy worlds for which she often created original maps. Now a new exhibition in London is celebrating the cartographic imagination of this groundbreaking American author.

The Word for World: The Maps of Ursula K. Le Guin reveals how maps were central to the other-world building she was so famous for. Fans will find much to enjoy here, including the opportunity to walk around enlarged screenprints of well-known maps from books such as Earthsea and Always Coming Home. They will also have the chance to pore over unpublished maps and artworks from the Le Guin Foundation archive.

Thanks to the accompanying book of the same name, readers will be be able to absorb a deeper sense of maps as world-making and storytelling devices, as scholars and commentators discuss their significance in Le Guin’s oeuvre.

Much has been said about the ways Le Guin began her writing process by drawing a map, where she would place characters and narratives in the bounded space of an world etched out in cartographic form. This was as much a way for her to imagine a world as it was a technique to structure a story about it.

There is now an established field of maps studies called literary cartography that explores the way writers of fiction, poetry and folklore use maps in storytelling. It also examines how literary maps, printed alongside the stories they shape, are used by the reader as a way into a world and a device for understanding it.

It is here that maps take on a life of their own as they seep into the imagination of the reader, becoming a well-loved and remembered part of the story.

How literary maps circulate

The exhibition tells us about the context in which maps are understood and how maps circulate in society, creating new meanings along the way.

In the gallery space, Le Guin’s maps are looked at in isolation rather than relating directly to a text. They demand a different kind of attention, for there is a different form of visual connection between a viewer and a gallery object than between a reader and a book. So the maps are taken out of their original context and placed in another. But this isn’t to say this new context is any less significant.

My research has shown that the circulation of maps in a society is as important as what’s on the maps themselves. The context of where a map is used, and who it is used by, matters. Those with the power to shape a narrative with a map can have more impact than those that do not.

Consider, for example, the way maps are used in migration debates to show clear delineation of who belongs and who does not. Those with the ability to enforce and debate the border lines shown on the map have far greater power than the migrants that might use the same maps to try and cross them.

Bruno Latour’s immutable mobiles theory resonates here – the idea that what’s on a map remains stable, but the map itself is mobile as it circulates amongst different people with different interests.

Who maps are seen by, how they are understood, and where they end up are key considerations for map scholars. The Word for World exhibition is a good example of where literary cartographies circulate in society, and where new meanings emerge.

Much of Le Guin’s work is grounded in a belief that humans and other species are completely entangled with their natural environments. When read within the context of the story, Le Guin’s maps illustrate these entanglements by showing how the landscapes of her fictional worlds shape the actions of the characters.

When read outside of the book, in the context of the gallery, the role of the map changes despite it showing the exact same thing. It makes me wonder how Le Guin would understand the new ways that her maps are being read here.

This is even more the case when we think about the function of the maps in her stories – creating other-worlds that tell fictional, but no less real, narratives about racial, gendered and environmental politics. What does it mean to extract a map from the thorny issues of these politics, to be recontextualised as an aesthetic gallery object?

There will forever be a tension between the map exhibition and the ways that maps are encountered in books. By definition they are being “exhibited” and put at the centre. And there’s no doubt Le Guin’s maps look impressive here, masterfully hung, printed on deep blue cotton, bathed in warm lighting.

Draped thoughtfully in rows throughout the space is perhaps a nod to being immersed in the cartographic imagination of Le Guin. They are certainly a spectacle that encourages a closer look. But is that enough?

There is a common fascination with maps, partly to do with their complexity and invitation to view one’s self in them, which makes them popular objects to exhibit. It’s no surprise then, that the maps do the heavy lifting here, but they are only half the story of the show.

Understanding them more fully means viewing them alongside reading Le Guin’s books, and the show’s accompanying book, which is so much more than an exhibition glossary. It puts the maps into conversation with critical texts on what they meant to Le Guin, but also how they fit into broader discussions about what maps do in the worlds of our imagination.

The Word for World: Maps of Ursula K Le Guin is showing in the Architectural Association Gallery, London until December 6


Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


The Conversation

Mike Duggan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The maps of Ursula K Le Guin reveal a fascinating insight into world-building in fantasy fiction – https://theconversation.com/the-maps-of-ursula-k-le-guin-reveal-a-fascinating-insight-into-world-building-in-fantasy-fiction-267561

Why Canada’s next big infrastructure investment should be in biomanufacturing

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Megan Levings, Professor of Surgery and Biomedical Engineering, University of British Columbia

While Canada invests billions in infrastructure projects and national defence, a critical area of investment remains overlooked:
biomanufacturing.

Biomanufacturing is the production of biological products like vaccines and cell therapies at the scale and quality needed for human use. It encompasses everything needed to reliably produce and deliver safe, effective biological products from development to commercial-scale production.

This sector requires not only physical infrastructure like bioreactors, clean rooms and equipment, but also the availability of skilled personnel, robust supply chains and quality control — all operating under strict regulatory requirements.

Amid Canada’s ongoing tariff tensions with the United States, investing in domestic biomanufacturing is a way for Canada to strengthen its economic independence while securing critical health infrastructure.

A wake-up call for Canada

Canada once boasted world-class biomanufacturing capacity, particularly in vaccine production. Over the past few decades, however, domestic investment in this sector withered away.

Funding for research, training and infrastructure declined, and as a result, much of the industry migrated to the United States, where more start-up capital, larger markets and more extensive infrastructure supported its growth.

The COVID-19 pandemic made the consequences of this decline painfully clear. Billions of dollars were spent importing life-saving vaccines and therapeutics that could have been made here. While Canada’s dependence on foreign manufacturing predates the pandemic, the crisis highlighted the urgent need for domestic capacity.

Future pandemics are unpredictable, and new Canadian manufacturing infrastructure needs to be poised to act. This is especially important given ongoing vaccine skepticism and hesitancy.

If Canadians need a new vaccine, the country must be able to produce it domestically and support other countries lacking access.

Missed opportunities

Biomanufacturing has expanded beyond vaccines and monoclonal antibodies to include cell and gene therapies and new drug types, such as those based on RNA.

These advanced therapeutic products are highly innovative, but don’t fit neatly into traditional developmental pipelines or regulatory frameworks. Without the necessary manufacturing processes and infrastructure, countries can miss out on economic and health benefits and are vulnerable to future pandemics.

For example, the research to develop the lipid nanoparticle component of an mRNA vaccine was conducted in Canada. Yet when it came time to manufacture, test and distribute the vaccine, Canada lacked the infrastructure and had to rely on foreign suppliers.

Historically, Canada has excelled at research but has struggled to translate breakthroughs into domestic production. With the right investment, Canada could actually reap the benefits of its own innovations.

Recognizing this gap, the federal government has invested $2.3 billion since 2023 to build new facilities capable of manufacturing biologics at the speed and scale for future pandemic responses. These investments also aim to revitalize Canada’s capacity for producing other, more conventional drugs.




Read more:
Canada needs to invest more money into science innovation to help prevent the next global crisis


But more sustained investments are needed — ones on par with funding for other infrastructure projects and national defence. The biomanufacturing sector offers tremendous opportunity for economic growth, significant health benefits for Canadians, and pandemic-preparedness.

The biotech boom

Gaps in Canada’s biomanufacturing capacity spurred the creation of a new coalition led by the University of British Columbia. Known as Canada’s ImmunoEngineering and Biomanufacturing Hub, it brings together more than 50 organizations from the private, public, not-for-profit and academic sectors to strengthen life sciences and biomanufacturing capacity in B.C.

It aims to accelerate applied biomedical research, train highly skilled workers and expand domestic infrastructure.

It’s part of a broader $574 million federal commitment supporting 19 projects at 14 research institutions across Canada. Investing in new infrastructure is an important step toward rebuilding and bolstering domestic biomanufacturing in Canada.

We are part of the coalition’s research leadership group and the leads on its flagship infrastructure project, the Advanced Therapeutics Manufacturing Facility, which is being built on the UBC campus. This facility, spanning approximately 20,000 square feet, will support the production of advanced therapeutic products like vaccines, cell therapies and regenerative medicines.

It will accelerate the commercialization of Canadian innovations, enhance patient care and position Canada as a global epicentre of biomanufacturing while leveraging Vancouver’s biotech boom.

Construction of the facility has begun, with an estimate of March 2028 for opening operations. Projects will include modifying immune cells to fight cancer and protect against autoimmune disease and transplant rejection, as well as turning stem cells into therapies that heal or replace terminally damaged organs.

From research to market

Pandemic-prepared facilities have the potential to generate wide-ranging health benefits for Canada. A critical function of facilities like the Advanced Therapeutics Manufacturing Facility is moving innovative therapies from early-stage research to clinical trials and, ultimately, market approval.

In addition to their health benefits, advanced therapeutics can have significant economic impact. Their curative potential allows companies to benefit from premium pricing, with high upfront costs justified by reduced long-term health-care costs.

Subsequent generic versions of these biological products, termed biosimilars, can provide safe, effective and economical alternatives. Ultimately, domestic manufacturing allows greater pricing control and allows health-care dollars to stay in Canada.

The biomanufacturing industry also creates high-quality jobs, boosts national innovation ecosystems, attracts large-scale venture capital funding and supports pharmaceutical partnerships.

Canada’s bioeconomy is expected to need approximately 65,000 jobs by 2029, making workforce training a critical priority. State-of-the-art training facilities will produce a highly qualified workforce and ensure these skilled personnel remain in Canada.

Investing in domestic infrastructure also strengthens Canada’s export potential. Adding advanced therapeutic products into the country’s export portfolio will give it an important trade advantage and allow Canada to become a global player in biomanufacturing.

The Conversation

Megan Levings receives funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation and BC Knowledge Development Fund for the ATMF Project.

Robert A. Holt receives funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation and BC Knowledge Development Fund for the ATMF Project.

ref. Why Canada’s next big infrastructure investment should be in biomanufacturing – https://theconversation.com/why-canadas-next-big-infrastructure-investment-should-be-in-biomanufacturing-254377

Madagascar protests: how ousted president Andry Rajoelina’s urban agenda backfired

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fanny Voélin, PhD candidate in geography, University of Bern

The youth-led protests that eventually brought down Madagascar’s President Andry Rajoelina were sparked, in part, by his attempt to use large-scale urban infrastructure projects as a means of consolidating power.

Rajoelina’s government placed urban mega-projects at the centre of its strategy to assert power and legitimacy. These projects enabled him to create and channel rents to key allies, while anchoring his rule in Malagasy history and territory. They were also meant to transform the spatial and political imaginaries of the state through monumental visions of modernity and development. By spatial and political imaginaries, I mean the contested ways leaders and citizens imagine space and power, and what a modern city and a legitimate government should look like.

Yet these projects did little to meet the needs of most Malagasy citizens. Those that might have done so, such as social housing schemes, were left unfinished or poorly realised.

By the time Rajoelina, who came into power via a coup in 2009, was re-elected for a third term in late 2023, his legitimacy was already deeply contested. Months of daily power and water cuts in the capital city, Antananarivo, combined with the launch of a highly energy-consuming cable car, sparked protests that ultimately led to his overthrow.

After three weeks of intense protests in major cities, Rajoelina fled the country. The army seized power, suspended the constitution, and dissolved key political and judicial institutions. It announced a transitional period.

It is not the first time since independence in 1960 that the military has intervened. Rajoelina was ousted by the same elite unit, the CAPSAT, that helped him seize power in 2009.

For the past four years, I have conducted doctoral research on the politics of urban planning and urban development in Antananarivo. Drawing on this work, this article shows how the very urban strategies through which Rajoelina sought to consolidate power contributed to his downfall. Once it became clear that urban infrastructure projects weren’t going to meet pressing social needs, they quickly generated disillusionment and anger.




Read more:
Megaprojects in Addis Ababa raise questions about spatial justice


Both my research and the regime’s collapse highlight the pitfalls of relying on large-scale infrastructure projects to gain political authority in a highly unstable and competitive political system.

Building power and legitimacy through the capital

Tapping into youth disillusioned with the approach of his predecessor, President Marc Ravalomanana, Rajoelina rose to power in 2009 through a coup.

At only 35, Rajoelina, a former DJ and head of print and media companies, embodied renewal and the hopes of the Malagasy youth. He led a transitional government until 2013. He was then elected into office in 2018. The opposition boycotted the 2023 elections amid growing popular discontent.




Read more:
Madagascar’s next president must put public safety and job creation first


From the outset, Rajoelina placed large-scale infrastructure construction at the centre of his political agenda.

In Antananarivo, numerous “presidential projects” were launched. These included a cable car, an urban train, a new city, colosseums, stadiums and social housing. Most of them were painted in the regime’s orange colours. They were strategically located in highly visible areas of the capital and its periphery. In parallel, Rajoelina reworked the national history and territory by renaming key sites in the city.

As I have argued elsewhere, these initiatives played a crucial role in Rajoelina’s attempts to build political authority. Infrastructure development served as an important source of rents he used to secure the loyalty of key allies and further centralise power in the presidency.

The projects were also symbolic, combining elements of tradition and modernity. They were an opportunity for staging state spectacles that aimed at legitimising his increasingly authoritarian rule.

When symbols of power backfire

Yet the spectacle turned against its orchestrator. While some projects had long been contested, the disillusionment reached its peak in 2025. Presidential projects crystallised growing popular anger over the corruption of the regime and the deteriorating living conditions.

In February 2025, in the municipality of Imerintsiatosika, 30km west of the capital city, demonstrations erupted in response to the threat of land seizure and eviction. It is here that the new city of Tanamasoandro was planned to serve as a potential new capital.

In late August 2025, the cable car, finally put into operation for a few hours a day more than a year after its completion, reignited controversy over government spending priorities. The vast majority of the population can’t afford the cable car – 80% of the people live below the poverty line.

The cable car costs an estimated €162,000 (US$188,725) per month in electricity bills. This in a city where power cuts have become a daily occurrence.

Far from serving as a symbol of progress and modernity, the “longest cable car in Africa” came to embody Rajoelina’s disconnection from the needs of the population and the corruption of a regime perceived as serving only its elites.

The battle for urban space

The spark that ignited the current crisis was the violent arrest of opposition municipal councillors on 19 September. The councillors had demanded that the Senate address the water and electricity shortages and their severe impact on the population.

More than 50% of businesses reported electricity outages, with
6.3 outages in a typical month lasting an average of 3.9 hours each, costing firms an average of 24% of annual sales, according to a February 2025 World bank review of the country’s economy. About 20.5% of firms experienced an average of two water shortages a month. Power cuts lasted up to 12 hours a day over the weeks preceding the coup. Students, poor families, and street traders were hit hard as they could not afford generators.

Inspired by Gen Z uprisings around the globe, Malagasy youth took to the streets on 25 September. What began as protests over basic utilities quickly expanded into a broader contestation of Rajoelina’s regime. Artists, trade unions, civil society organisations and politicians joined the movement.

At the spatial heart of the protests were two of Antananarivo’s most politically symbolic squares. The garden of Ambohijatovo, renamed Democracy Square (Kianjan’ny demokrasia) by Rajoelina himself in 2009, had previously hosted 35,000 of his supporters against Ravalomanana. On 1 October, demonstrators managed to gain access to the square after confronting the police, marking an important symbolic victory for the movement.

Ten days later, on 11 October, protesters, now joined by elements of the army, took over 13 May Square (Kianjan’ny 13 mai), the symbolic centre of Malagasy political protests since the 1970s.

Rajoelina attempted to counter the movement. He called his supporters to gather at the Colosseum Antsonjombe, built during the transition (2009-2013). It was presented at the time as the “biggest socio-cultural venue in the Indian Ocean and in Africa”.

However, the colosseum, which was full at its inauguration in 2012, was now empty, illustrating the president’s isolation.

Protesters also targeted key symbols of the presidency. The headquarters of Rajoelina’s printing company was burned down. So were the cable car and the urban train stations. The urban trains had never been put into service.

What Rajoelina had intended as symbols of power and modernity had thus become symbols of failure. They exposed Rajoelina’s vanished legitimacy and the fragile foundations of a power largely built on representation.

The afterlife of urban infrastructures

Rajoelina’s case illustrates that infrastructure construction can be a double-edged strategy. It can be used to assert power in authoritarian contexts, but it risks backfiring when a regime lacks the means to realise its ambitions. Rajoelina’s urban projects initially captured the imagination of the youth and the wider population. But as they failed to meet pressing social needs, they quickly generated disillusionment and anger.

An official from the Antananarivo municipality told me in late 2022 the cable car, unilaterally imposed by the presidency, was a “thorn in the side” of municipal authorities and “risks becoming a white elephant”. The same could be said of all presidential infrastructure projects, inseparable from a regime that had fallen out of favour.

The case of Madagascar raises broader questions about the afterlife of urban infrastructure projects closely associated with fallen leaders. How will they be maintained, repurposed, or abandoned? What consequences will they have for urban and national governance, residents’ lives and hopes, and the imaginaries of power in the years ahead?

The Conversation

Fanny Voélin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Madagascar protests: how ousted president Andry Rajoelina’s urban agenda backfired – https://theconversation.com/madagascar-protests-how-ousted-president-andry-rajoelinas-urban-agenda-backfired-267654

Madagascar coup: why turning a blind eye to an unpopular president weakens regional bodies

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Powell, Visiting assistant professor, University of Kentucky

What began in late September as Madagascar’s student demonstrations over crippling electricity outages and water shortages quickly evolved into broader demands for political reform. It became a call to dismantle a system widely seen as corrupt and unaccountable, and for President Andry Rajoelina to resign.

As demonstrations swelled across the country, the embattled president sought to restore order through curfews, the dismissal of his energy minister, and ultimately the dissolution of his government. To no avail.

Eventually, the elite CAPSAT unit – the same corps that had propelled Rajoelina to power during the 2009 coup – overthrew him. Once CAPSAT soldiers joined protesters, seized control of the armed forces and exchanged fire with loyalist troops, Rajoelina fled the country.

From abroad, he attempted to dissolve parliament in a bid to block impeachment proceedings. Mere hours later, CAPSAT announced it had seized power, dissolved most state institutions, and assumed control of the government.

Yet while Rajoelina’s domestic legitimacy faced severe challenges, he continued to enjoy regional recognition, most notably as the current chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This suggests that leaders whose authority is widely contested at home can still receive regional and international validation.

Even as Malagasy citizens mobilised to demand accountability, institutions like the SADC repeatedly conferred legitimacy on a president with dubious democratic credentials. That’s despite their ostensible commitment to democratic governance and constitutional order.

As scholars who have published extensively on coups and political instability in Africa, we contend that this disconnect between regional endorsement and domestic opposition undermines the credibility of such organisations.

In turn, this limits their ability to deter antidemocratic behaviour, including coups, executive overreach, and the erosion of institutional checks and balances.

Elected, but illegitimate?

Questions over Rajoelina’s democratic legitimacy were far from new. In February 2009, then the mayor of Antananarivo, he attempted to declare himself president in the midst of mass demonstrations against the Marc Ravalomanana regime. He didn’t succeed but a subsequent military coup installed him as the interim leader.

That was widely condemned as an unconstitutional takeover. Madagascar was suspended from both the African Union and the SADC. His unwillingness to step down contributed to a stalled transition process that took nearly five years.

Rajoelina prevailed in the 2018 vote. While that election was widely regarded as legitimate, despite some irregularities, the 2023 electoral cycle was not. There were accusations of a pre-determined process, protests, a legal challenge to Rajoelina’s eligibility, limitations on opposition rallies and calls to delay until a more credible process could be organised.

In an especially revealing act, National Assembly president Christine Razanamahasoa – a prominent member of Rajoelina’s own party – made a public request for the SADC to push for a delay in the election and for pressure on Rajoelina to allow a freer process.

Such calls went unheeded. Rajoelina prevailed in a vote boycotted by the opposition and accompanied by historically low turnout.

Competing legitimacies

Though public confidence in the political system had plummeted, and frustration skyrocketed, international bodies that purport to defend democratic norms in the region welcomed Rajoelina.

Rajoelina was actively serving as chair of the SADC at the time of his removal. This was a shift from his previous status as a thorn in the organisation’s side in the 2009-2013 transition period.

The SADC refrained from criticising the flawed 2023 election and, in spite of the electoral issues, selected Rajoelina to serve as its chair.

Rajoelina’s case isn’t an exception. It illustrates a tendency in which leaders with dubious domestic credentials are welcomed internationally by supposedly democracy-promoting organisations. There’s also Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, who rose to Zimbabwe’s presidency following the 2017 coup against Robert Mugabe.

Unlike Rajoelina, the SADC did not require Mnangagwa to take a sabbatical and he has retained power via flawed processes. Neither consistent allegations of electoral malpractice, nor rampant repression, deterred the regional body from selecting Mnangagwa as chair. Nor have such issues deterred the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, which has selected Mnangagwa as its next chair.

Rajoelina’s ouster is the first time an SADC chair has been forced from power. If the organisation continues to endorse leaders who hold power through illegitimate means, it will not be the last.

The cost of legitimising illegitimacy

Accepting leaders with questionable democratic credentials deepens the damage on multiple fronts. Most directly, regional organisations can act as clubs of incumbents, with long-term negative consequences.

The 2023 Africa Governance Report on unconstitutional changes of government warned – in bold lettering – “instability may result if elections are not considered credible”.

Inconsistency on this front sends a clear signal to entrenched incumbents and would-be authoritarians: external validation may serve as a substitute for genuine domestic legitimacy. If leaders expect regional recognition despite their violations of constitutional order at home, they may feel they can ignore democratic norms, suppress dissent, or manipulate institutions.

But as Rajoelina’s fall from power shows, acceptance by regional and international bodies offers little protection when internal pressures finally erupt.

Beyond undermining domestic politics, such acts also undermine the credibility of regional organisations. When these same bodies later attempt to mediate political disputes or condemn unconstitutional actions, domestic audiences will be far less likely to see them as impartial or legitimate.

Recent developments in west Africa show how deeply this disillusionment can take root. Mass publics in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have rallied behind coup leaders while denouncing the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas).

Seen in this light, the SADC’s condemnation of the coup against Rajoelina and its decision to send a fact-finding mission will likely ring hollow to many Malagasy.

The organisation’s refusal to speak up during the 2023 electoral crisis, despite a direct appeal from the National Assembly president, exposed its reluctance to challenge incumbents. Its sudden defence of constitutional order now seems reactive rather than principled.

Until such bodies apply their standards consistently, their efforts will do little to deter future power grabs – or to restore public confidence in the regional project of democratic governance.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Madagascar coup: why turning a blind eye to an unpopular president weakens regional bodies – https://theconversation.com/madagascar-coup-why-turning-a-blind-eye-to-an-unpopular-president-weakens-regional-bodies-267897

Turkey’s charm offensive in Senegal: migration scholar unpacks the relationship

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Papa Sow, Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Turkey has been trying to establish a stronghold in Africa, using the “Opening up to Africa” policy it adopted in 1998.

Its Africa Action Plan, based on humanitarian aid, politics and economic cooperation, has turned toward west Africa.

As a scholar of migration studies, I’ve analysed the forms of agencies, social networks and transnational e-commerce between Dakar and Istanbul. I also look at the people involved, including migrants, networks of traders and “gratis passengers” – people who use their baggage allowance to transport small packages between Istanbul and Dakar.

My study highlights active transnational trade and a circular, yet strategic, migration that is less visible. The interviews focused primarily on the back-and-forth of traders between Dakar and Istanbul, the gratis passengers (mainly Senegalese), and other Senegalese businessmen. Using the power of social media such as WhatsApp, TikTok, and Facebook, some of them regularly trade with Turkey while residing in Senegal. Others go back and forth between the two countries.

I conclude that the ease of people’s movement between Senegal and Turkey has enabled growth in the circulation of goods between Turkey and Senegal.

A number of factors have been responsible for this success. They include ease of getting Turkish visas and airline travel (and the discounts Turkish Airlines offers to the so-called gratis passengers). There are also historically rooted Muslim networks (Muridiyya and Tijaniya Sufi Muslims) in both countries.

In 2021, the volume of commercial, industrial and investment exchanges between the two countries reached more than US$540 million, compared with more than US$91 million in 2008. During the last visit of Senegalese prime minister Ousmane Sonko to Turkey in August 2025, both countries said they wanted to increase the bilateral trade to more than US$1 billion.

Historical ties

Cooperation and diplomatic relations between Senegal and Turkey go back to the early 1900s when an honorary consulate was opened in Dakar to preserve the contacts established with Istanbul. These early contacts are the beginnings of a Turkish diplomacy aimed at exploring the economic prospects of west Africa.

The first Turkish ambassador was posted to Senegal in 1963. The first Senegalese embassy opened in Turkey in 2006.

Senegal’s exports to Turkey include cotton, fishery resources, cereals, fruits and skins. It imports steel, furniture and spare parts.

This cooperation also extends to defence, security and culture. In 2020, the construction of a Turkish cultural centre was planned for Senegal in the coming years.

In 2017, Turkey regularised more than 1,400 Senegalese living in the country. The numbers of Senegalese in Turkey varies according to different sources. We estimate that several thousand Senegalese live in or have passed through Turkish territory since the mid-2000s.

Many Senegalese traders and social network entrepreneurs, especially women, have seized the opportunity in the last 15 years to take business trips to Istanbul and to promote trade exchanges without even leaving Senegal. This has changed the landscape of Senegalese migration to Europe and also allowed certain types of traders to specialise in Turkish imports.

These imports, and specifically the Turkish products, are commonly known as bagassu Turkii in Senegal. They include cosmetics, household accessories, clothing and technology.

Round-trip dynamics between Dakar and Istanbul

The traders interviewed said they had chosen İstanbul as a wholesale supply centre because of the high cost of travel to China and visa problems with China. In Istanbul, most of the Senegalese work as freight “shippers” or gratis passengers and, by extension, carriers of tax-free parcels to Senegal and other west African countries.

We differentiate them from the “kargo” migrants, who transport large quantities of goods and products from Turkey by sea freight to reach Senegal.

Gratis passengers, carrying smaller quantities, travel by plane. But they also often send the rest of their goods by boat or overland through kargo migrants.

The round-trip dynamics they have developed between Dakar and Istanbul rely on the fact that they benefit from preferential rates for plane tickets. They have set up a paid parcel transport system based on their baggage allowance.

Unlike normal passengers who cannot exceed the authorised 46kg, gratis passengers can carry up to 100kg per trip. This is often with 50% reductions on their fares because of travel offers and loyalty cards with companies such as Turkish Airlines and Air Algérie. Due to the often excessive luggage, it is still not possible for them to benefit from a normal import agreement, hence the use of preferential tariffs.

Gratis passengers also have the option of carrying additional baggage to be charged as cargo. They regularly take two or three return flights per month.

Steps forward

This work opens four avenues for further analysis.

Firstly, studies on the volume of goods shipped from Senegal to Turkey, and vice versa, who transports them, and how much they earn. Both states would then be better able to support them in various ways (data collection, access to appropriate services, platforms for exchange, skills and experience) in the creation of new jobs.

Secondly, the e-commerce sector deserves greater consideration. It has not only contributed to lowering the cost of goods in local markets for consumers but has also made bagassu Turkii more widely available in Senegal.

Thirdly, local artisans accuse the bagassu Turkii of undermining local textile production and creative skills. Several Senegalese artisans – shoemakers, jewelers, tailors – told us, for example, that Turkish products – shoes, leather bags and clothes, above all – are serious competition for certain local products. The more elaborate and refined bagassu Turkii sell easily in the Senegalese market because of their affordable prices, unlike local products that are handmade and often require many hours of work.

Fourthly, short-term circular migration can boost the economies of low-income countries and gradually allay the concerns that currently dominate the political debate over international migration.

The Conversation

Papa Sow does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Turkey’s charm offensive in Senegal: migration scholar unpacks the relationship – https://theconversation.com/turkeys-charm-offensive-in-senegal-migration-scholar-unpacks-the-relationship-264420

Madagascar coup: how turning a blind eye to an unpopular president weakens regional bodies

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Jonathan Powell, Visiting assistant professor, University of Kentucky

What began in late September as Madagascar’s student demonstrations over crippling electricity outages and water shortages quickly evolved into broader demands for political reform. It became a call to dismantle a system widely seen as corrupt and unaccountable, and for President Andry Rajoelina to resign.

As demonstrations swelled across the country, the embattled president sought to restore order through curfews, the dismissal of his energy minister, and ultimately the dissolution of his government. To no avail.

Eventually, the elite CAPSAT unit – the same corps that had propelled Rajoelina to power during the 2009 coup – overthrew him. Once CAPSAT soldiers joined protesters, seized control of the armed forces and exchanged fire with loyalist troops, Rajoelina fled the country.

From abroad, he attempted to dissolve parliament in a bid to block impeachment proceedings. Mere hours later, CAPSAT announced it had seized power, dissolved most state institutions, and assumed control of the government.

Yet while Rajoelina’s domestic legitimacy faced severe challenges, he continued to enjoy regional recognition, most notably as the current chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This suggests that leaders whose authority is widely contested at home can still receive regional and international validation.

Even as Malagasy citizens mobilised to demand accountability, institutions like the SADC repeatedly conferred legitimacy on a president with dubious democratic credentials. That’s despite their ostensible commitment to democratic governance and constitutional order.

As scholars who have published extensively on coups and political instability in Africa, we contend that this disconnect between regional endorsement and domestic opposition undermines the credibility of such organisations.

In turn, this limits their ability to deter antidemocratic behaviour, including coups, executive overreach, and the erosion of institutional checks and balances.

Elected, but illegitimate?

Questions over Rajoelina’s democratic legitimacy were far from new. In February 2009, then the mayor of Antananarivo, he attempted to declare himself president in the midst of mass demonstrations against the Marc Ravalomanana regime. He didn’t succeed but a subsequent military coup installed him as the interim leader.

That was widely condemned as an unconstitutional takeover. Madagascar was suspended from both the African Union and the SADC. His unwillingness to step down contributed to a stalled transition process that took nearly five years.

Rajoelina prevailed in the 2018 vote. While that election was widely regarded as legitimate, despite some irregularities, the 2023 electoral cycle was not. There were accusations of a pre-determined process, protests, a legal challenge to Rajoelina’s eligibility, limitations on opposition rallies and calls to delay until a more credible process could be organised.

In an especially revealing act, National Assembly president Christine Razanamahasoa – a prominent member of Rajoelina’s own party – made a public request for the SADC to push for a delay in the election and for pressure on Rajoelina to allow a freer process.

Such calls went unheeded. Rajoelina prevailed in a vote boycotted by the opposition and accompanied by historically low turnout.

Competing legitimacies

Though public confidence in the political system had plummeted, and frustration skyrocketed, international bodies that purport to defend democratic norms in the region welcomed Rajoelina.

Rajoelina was actively serving as chair of the SADC at the time of his removal. This was a shift from his previous status as a thorn in the organisation’s side in the 2009-2013 transition period.

The SADC refrained from criticising the flawed 2023 election and, in spite of the electoral issues, selected Rajoelina to serve as its chair.

Rajoelina’s case isn’t an exception. It illustrates a tendency in which leaders with dubious domestic credentials are welcomed internationally by supposedly democracy-promoting organisations. There’s also Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, who rose to Zimbabwe’s presidency following the 2017 coup against Robert Mugabe.

Unlike Rajoelina, the SADC did not require Mnangagwa to take a sabbatical and he has retained power via flawed processes. Neither consistent allegations of electoral malpractice, nor rampant repression, deterred the regional body from selecting Mnangagwa as chair. Nor have such issues deterred the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, which has selected Mnangagwa as its next chair.

Rajoelina’s ouster is the first time an SADC chair has been forced from power. If the organisation continues to endorse leaders who hold power through illegitimate means, it will not be the last.

The cost of legitimising illegitimacy

Accepting leaders with questionable democratic credentials deepens the damage on multiple fronts. Most directly, regional organisations can act as clubs of incumbents, with long-term negative consequences.

The 2023 Africa Governance Report on unconstitutional changes of government warned – in bold lettering – “instability may result if elections are not considered credible”.

Inconsistency on this front sends a clear signal to entrenched incumbents and would-be authoritarians: external validation may serve as a substitute for genuine domestic legitimacy. If leaders expect regional recognition despite their violations of constitutional order at home, they may feel they can ignore democratic norms, suppress dissent, or manipulate institutions.

But as Rajoelina’s fall from power shows, acceptance by regional and international bodies offers little protection when internal pressures finally erupt.

Beyond undermining domestic politics, such acts also undermine the credibility of regional organisations. When these same bodies later attempt to mediate political disputes or condemn unconstitutional actions, domestic audiences will be far less likely to see them as impartial or legitimate.

Recent developments in west Africa show how deeply this disillusionment can take root. Mass publics in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have rallied behind coup leaders while denouncing the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas).

Seen in this light, the SADC’s condemnation of the coup against Rajoelina and its decision to send a fact-finding mission will likely ring hollow to many Malagasy.

The organisation’s refusal to speak up during the 2023 electoral crisis, despite a direct appeal from the National Assembly president, exposed its reluctance to challenge incumbents. Its sudden defence of constitutional order now seems reactive rather than principled.

Until such bodies apply their standards consistently, their efforts will do little to deter future power grabs – or to restore public confidence in the regional project of democratic governance.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Madagascar coup: how turning a blind eye to an unpopular president weakens regional bodies – https://theconversation.com/madagascar-coup-how-turning-a-blind-eye-to-an-unpopular-president-weakens-regional-bodies-267897

Agree to disagree: Why we fear conflict and what to do about it

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Leda Stawnychko, Associate Professor of Strategy and Organizational Theory, Mount Royal University

In an era of heightened political polarization, merely longing for civility is no longer enough. Understanding just how to debate and respectfully disagree has become truly imperative, now more than ever and for a couple good reasons.

Humans are wired for connection. Our brains evolved for collaboration.

Sharing experiences with people who see the world as we do feels affirming. It makes collaboration possible. And in prehistoric times, our survival depended on it. Working together meant protection, food and belonging, while conflict risked exclusion or, worse, death.

But civility isn’t about avoiding conflict, it’s about choosing to see the other’s humanity all while fully disagreeing with them.

The weaponization of civility

Avoiding conflict for the sake of civility comes at a cost.

Societies move forward when people are willing to engage in honest disagreement, exposing blind spots and opening paths to progress. Yet too often, calls for civility are used as tools of oppression, privileging those already served by the status quo.

History is full of examples — from women’s suffrage to the civil rights movement — where demands for “politeness” were used to quiet those pushing for change.

When discomfort is mistaken for disrespect, dissidence is curtailed and legitimate anger invalidated. At such moments, civility ceases to be a virtue and becomes a mechanism of control.

This helps explain why reactions to “cancel culture” have been so strong — a response to the ways in which demands for consideration can be seen as silencing rather than inviting dialogue. Recent events from cancelled university lectures to the suspension of high-profile comedic television hosts reveal how fear of controversy increasingly constrains open expression.

Maintaining civility is a delicate balance. When disagreement turns uncivil, especially in the public sphere, people tend to withdraw altogether, eroding the very dialogue that civility is meant to protect.

Grounding civility in dignity

True civility begins with a disposition of the heart — a sincere recognition of the dignity of others.

From that foundation flow the actions and skills that make respectful engagement possible: listening with curiosity, showing courtesy and extending respect even in disagreement.

Civility, however, is not simply about being polite; it is about choosing to see others as moral equals, worthy of being heard and understood. In fact, civil disagreement is healthy and necessary.

In workplaces, teams that can debate ideas respectfully tend to be more innovative and make better decisions than those that avoid conflict altogether.

When grounded in dignity rather than deference, civility enables the kind of disagreement that strengthens communities rather than divides them. It reflects the diversity of our experiences, interests and values — fuelling the dialogue, learning and innovation that help societies grow stronger.

Some conversations feel unsafe

Certainly, some engagements feel riskier than others. Part of this comes down to our physiological makeup — factors largely beyond our control.

The balance of hormones and neurotransmitters in our bodies influences whether we are more prone to react impulsively or respond calmly in moments of tension. This biological wiring is continually shaped by our experiences, including how we’ve learned to navigate conflict and connection in the past.

When our bodies and minds are already operating near their stress limits — for example, while caring for a sick child, navigating a divorce or managing financial strain — our capacity to engage thoughtfully shrinks. In those moments, even minor disagreements can feel overwhelming, not because of the issue itself but because our systems are already overtaxed.

These personal limits are magnified by the social environments we inhabit. Social media, for instance, amplifies echo chambers and rewards outrage, reinforcing our tendency to interact only with those who share our views.

In such spaces, argument often becomes interest-driven rather than truth-oriented — more about winning than understanding.

When one or both sides see their position as morally correct, any deviation from it is framed as wrong, leading to emotionally charged, difficult-to-resolve conflicts. As soon as our moral convictions harden into absolutes, compromise becomes nearly impossible.

And without shared moral ground, we begin to justify the dehumanization of the “other,” treating those who disagree not as mistaken, but as immoral — and therefore unworthy of empathy.

How to have tough conversations

Productive disagreement begins with self-awareness.

Start by asking why a certain conversation feels risky. What emotions or experiences might be shaping your reaction? Then pause to decide whether this discussion is worth having, and with whom.

What are your motives for engaging? Are you entering a genuine exchange or simply entertaining debate for debate’s sake? Does this context or person matter to your learning, your work or your advocacy? Or are you engaging in discourse that reinforces division rather than insight?

Communication skills also matter because when we believe in our ability to communicate effectively and influence another person’s perspective, we feel safer and more confident entering a difficult conversation. People who see a disagreement as manageable — and themselves as capable of managing it — are more likely to engage constructively rather than withdraw in frustration or defensiveness.

Cultivating skills in listening, reflection and self-regulation, together with dispositions such as open-mindedness, tact, empathy and courage, creates the conditions for genuine and respectful dialogue — the kind that not only builds understanding but sustains relationships and strengthens communities over time.

Ultimately, civility is about engaging in debates with ethics, humility and humanity.

It asks us to create space for honest conversations — where discomfort signals growth, not danger, and where disagreement strengthens rather than fractures our society.

The Conversation

Leda Stawnychko has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Business Schools Association of Canada (BSAC).

Maryam Ashraf does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Agree to disagree: Why we fear conflict and what to do about it – https://theconversation.com/agree-to-disagree-why-we-fear-conflict-and-what-to-do-about-it-267576

‘Trump said what?!’ — How satire helps us navigate disorienting politics

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Pascal Michelberger, Postdoctoral Scholar, Western Academy for Advanced Research, Western University

In the context of the temporary suspension of Jimmy Kimmel’s late-night show on ABC, commentators have rightfully raised concerns about free speech, First Amendment rights and press freedom, linking them to the larger issue of American democracy in decline.

But it’s also important to consider how political satire helps defend democracy in ways that go beyond speaking truth to power.

For example, political satire can serve as a source of knowledge about current affairs and has even found its way into political-science classrooms. As a storytelling form, it can also equip citizens with the tools to navigate moments of crisis in real time.




Read more:
‘Pax Americana’ in Toronto: How speculative art can help us navigate threats


Multiple facets of political satire

To better understand the multifaceted power of satire in times of political turmoil, we can turn to the work of Sophia A. McClennen, professor of international affairs and comparative literature and an expert on the connections among satire, democracy and the public sphere.

In her 2023 book Trump Was a Joke: How Satire Made Sense of a President Who Didn’t, McClennen argues that while political satire offers citizens ways to critique those in power, it also helps to inform the public, encourages audiences to engage critically with the issues at stake and uses humour to lower audience barriers, especially in difficult or unpleasant contexts.

She also points to studies that suggest political satire can build community and even set the public and political agenda.

Satire in unprecedented times

According to McClennen, this variety of important functions allows satire to serve as an effective tool to make sense of unprecedented political times, such as the first Trump presidency from 2017 to 2021.

Trump and his grotesque public persona, notes McClennen, presented political satire with a considerable challenge when reality itself seemed like a bad joke.

As other commentators also noted, Trump already seemed a caricature of himself and therefore resistant to satire. For some, this problem raised questions about the genre’s effectiveness.




Read more:
How Trump’s America changed political satire – for both liberals and conservatives


The solution, McClennen explained, came in the form of overhauling the way satire works, essentially moving toward producing irony that made “the bizarre real while also revealing how bizarre reality had become.”

Split-screen video from The Washington Post: SNL vs. Reality | Trump emergency declaration vs. Alec Baldwin on SNL

As one particularly effective example of this new approach, McClennen cites Alec Baldwin’s acclaimed portrayal of Trump on Saturday Night Live. The character worked so well, she argues, precisely because it did not go far beyond the original.

Because of that, the portrayal effectively exposed both the performative nature of Trump’s persona and the anti-democratic features of his platform.

Canadian satire

McClennen’s book covers Trump’s first term; as we know, things have turned arguably even more absurd and unprecedented during his ongoing second term.

Faced with a trade war and recurring annexation threats, Canadians have now officially become part of this equation.

During these times, McClennen’s assertions about the power of political satire perhaps become even more apparent. In order to understand how, we can turn to Canadian political satire.

Take CBC’s This Hour Has 22 Minutes: in a segment from the show’s Jan. 28, 2025 episode, we witness two Canadian shoppers (played by Mark Critch and Chris Wilson) grappling with the new reality of tariff and annexation threats.

‘There’s only one winner in a trade war…’ ‘This Hour Has 22 Minutes’ sketch.

The skit acknowledges Canadians’ confusion and disorientation in the face of this new conflict, provides them with concrete and useful information that can help them navigate the current situation — and invites them to reflect on their own roles as citizens affected by conflict on a deeper level.

As The Globe and Mail TV critic, J. Kelly Nestruck, noted, the clip resonated with many Canadians and went viral, racking up 11 million Tik Tok views within a week. It’s also among the most popular This Hour YouTube videos uploaded in recent months.

A 22 Minutes segment aired only a few weeks after the grocery store sketch also has Critch in role as Ontario Premier Doug Ford. The sketch shows Critch’s Ford restock American liquor in an Ontario booze store, in the wake of a trade war “pause,” only to frantically remove it again.

‘Doug Ford restocks American booze! Wait… Trump said what?!’ This Hour Has 22 minutes sketch.

The sketch acknowledges the absurdly fast-moving and unpredictable trade war situation, but it also explains Ontario’s particular role in the conflict by pointing to the province’s purchasing power, while also touching on the province’s cancellation of an earlier deal made with Elon Musk’s Starlink.

Another 22 Minutes sketch from May portrays a self-help group where Canadians confess shopping at American chain stores or purchasing American products.

‘Canadians address their American shopping habits…”’ ‘This Hour Has 22 Minutes’ sketch.

The clip can be understood as a logical follow-up to the grocery store sketch, reinforcing how difficult and even confusing it can be to change buying habits during the ongoing trade war. But the sketch also informs viewers about potentially misleading grocery labelling practices, and it invokes a certain sense of community by emphasizing that Canadians are all in this together.

Deeper engagement

All of these examples underline that while satire is often thought of primarily as a stage for critical political commentary, it also has a vital function of informing the public and encouraging deeper engagement with the issues at stake.

In the Canadian context, satirical formats such as 22 Minutes are also part of distinct Canadian cultural and political commentary in a sea of voluminous American media.




Read more:
Should global media giants shape our cultural and media policy? Lessons from satellite radio


Political satire creates opportunities for public action and engagement that go far beyond speaking truth to power. It also enables citizens to navigate disorienting and fast-moving circumstances more effectively, which proves particularly useful in times of political turmoil.

Limiting the reach of satire by way of regulatory action would have consequences far greater than just the silencing of critical voices.

The Conversation

Pascal Michelberger does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. ‘Trump said what?!’ — How satire helps us navigate disorienting politics – https://theconversation.com/trump-said-what-how-satire-helps-us-navigate-disorienting-politics-266557

An Amazon outage has rattled the internet. A computer scientist explains why the ‘cloud’ needs to change

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jongkil Jay Jeong, Senior Fellow, School of Computing and Information System, The University of Melbourne

Noah Berger/Getty Images for Amazon Web Services

The world’s largest cloud computing platform, Amazon Web Services (AWS), has experienced a major outage that has impacted thousands of organisations, including banks, financial software platforms such as Xero, and social media platforms such as Snapchat.

The outage began at roughly 6pm AEDT on Monday. It was caused by a malfunction at one of AWS’ data centres located in Northern Virginia in the United States. AWS says it has fixed the underlying issue but some internet users are still reporting service disruptions.

This incident highlights the vulnerabilities of relying so much on cloud computing – or “the cloud” as it’s often called. But there are ways to mitigate some of the risks.

Renting IT infrastructure

Cloud computing is the on-demand delivery of diverse IT resources such as computing power, database storage, and applications over the internet. In simple terms, it’s renting (not owning) your own IT infrastructure.

Cloud computing came into prevalence with the dot com boom in the late 1990s, wherein digital tech companies started to deliver software over the internet. As companies such as Amazon matured in their own ability to offer what’s known as “software as a service” over the web, they started to offer others the ability to rent their virtual servers for a cost as well.

This was a lucrative value proposition. Cloud computing enables a pay-as-you-go model similar to a utility bill, rather than the huge upfront investment required to purchase, operate and manage your own data centre.

As a result, the latest statistics suggest more than 94% of all enterprises use cloud-based services in some form.

A market dominated by three companies

The global cloud market is dominated by three companies. AWS holds the largest share (roughly 30%). It’s followed by Microsoft Azure (about 20%) and Google Cloud Platform (about 13%).

All three service providers have had recent outages, significantly impacting digital service platforms. For example, in 2024, an issue with third-party software severely impacted Microsoft Azure, causing extensive operational failures for businesses globally.

Google Cloud Platform also experienced a major outage this year due to an internal misconfiguration.

Profound risks

The heavy reliance of the global internet on just a few major providers — AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud — creates profound risks for both businesses and everyday users.

First, this concentration forms a single point of failure. As seen in the latest AWS event, a simple configuration error in one central system can trigger a domino effect that instantly paralyses vast segments of the internet.

Second, these providers often impose vendor lock-in. Companies find it prohibitively difficult and expensive to switch platforms due to complex data architectures and excessively high fees charged for moving large volumes of data out of the cloud (data egress costs). This effectively traps customers, leaving them hostage to a single vendor’s terms.

Finally, the dominance of US-based cloud service providers introduces geopolitical and regulatory risks. Data stored in these massive systems is subject to US laws and government demands, which can complicate compliance with international data sovereignty regulations such as Australia’s Privacy Act.

Furthermore, these companies hold the power to censor or restrict access to services, giving them control over how firms operate.

The current best practice to mitigate these risks is to adopt a multi-cloud approach that enables you to decentralise. This involves running critical applications across multiple vendors to eliminate the single point of failure.

This approach can be complemented by what’s known as “edge computing”, wherein data storage and processing is moved away from large, central data centres, toward smaller, distributed nodes (such as local servers) that firms can control directly.

The combination of edge computing and a multi-cloud approach enhances resilience, improves speed, and helps companies meet strict data regulatory requirements while avoiding dependence on any single entity.

As the old saying goes, don’t put all of your eggs in one basket.

The Conversation

Jongkil Jay Jeong received prior funding from the Cyber Security Cooperative Research Centre and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia.

ref. An Amazon outage has rattled the internet. A computer scientist explains why the ‘cloud’ needs to change – https://theconversation.com/an-amazon-outage-has-rattled-the-internet-a-computer-scientist-explains-why-the-cloud-needs-to-change-267954