Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Rizqy Amelia Zein, Lecturer in Social Psychology, Universitas Airlangga

Science and Nature, two leading science journals, have revealed a growing problem: an alarming rise in fraudulent research papers produced by shady paper mill companies. This wave of fake studies is creating a major headache for the academic world, putting the integrity of global academic research at risk.

Paper mill companies offer authorship services to researchers, academics, and students who want their names listed as an author of a scientific article published in reputable scientific journals.

By paying around €180 to €5000 (approximately US$197 – $5472), a person can have their name listed as the author of research paper, without having to painstakingly do research and write the results. No doubt, some experts refer to these paper mills as illegal and criminal organizations.

A 2023 research highlights a dramatic increase in fraudulent scientific articles traced back to paper mills. In just five years, the numbers of retractions soared jumped from 10 in 2019 to 2,099 in 2023.

Paper mills have also extremely overwhelmed major scientific journal publishers. Hindawi and Wiley, publishers of open access journals in the UK, for example, retracted around 1,200 paper mill articles in 2023. SAGE, a global publisher of books, journals and academic library resources and Elsevier, a scholarly publisher in the Netherlands also retracted hundreds of paper mill articles in 2022.

Paper mills are found operating in countries whose research policies incentivise researchers to produce as many scientific articles as possible, such as China, Russia, India and Iran.

However, their customer profile is quite diverse, from both developed and developing countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Germany, and the United States (US).

Based on research data and investigative journalist reports from the last five years, I summarise how these paper mills operate and how to detect them.

The paper mill playbook: tactics and oddities

1. Problematic articles

Paper mills generally manipulate the process of publishing scientific articles. These articles usually plagiarise other published articles, contain false and stolen data, or include engineered and duplicated images.

They also offer to rewrite scientific articles using generative artificial intelligence tools, such as ChatGPT and Quillbot, or to translate published articles from other languages into English.

2. A promised path to publication

In some cases, paper mills offer authorship slots before an article is accepted for publication.

In other cases, they offer authorship slots after the article is ready to be published by the journal.

Therefore, it is not uncommon for paper mills to sell authorship slots with a guarantee that the article will definitely be published. In fact, according to the conventions generally accepted in the academic community, no well-run journal can give such a guarantee.

Publishing decisions are normally made only after editors have considered the feedback from peer reviewers. This means, there is no possibility for a manuscript to secure acceptance before passing the peer review process.

3. Fake reviews and corrupt deals

Paper mills also offer a wide range of additional services. For example, they offer fake peer review services to convince potential buyers that the offered articles have passed rigorous review.

To smooth the way for their operations, some paper mills even operate like a cartel, bribing rogue journal editors to ensure publication. A 2024 investigation by a Science journalist revealed that some scientific journal editors were offered as much as $20,000 to cooperate with these schemes. This investigation resulted in more than 30 editors of reputable international journals identified as involved in paper mill activities.

4. Unusual collaboration patterns

One of the peculiarities of paper mill articles is its strange mix of authors. An article on the activity of ground beetles attacking crops in Kazakhstan, for example, is written by authors who are neither affiliated with institutions in Kazakhstan nor experts in insects or agriculture. The authors’ backgrounds are suspiciously heterogeneous, ranging from anaesthesia, dentistry, to biomedical engineering.

5. Anonymous co-authors

Prospective customers of paper mill services usually have to agree to the rules of confidentiality. By agreeing to this rule, buyers have no idea which journal their article will target or who their co-authors will be. Often, the authors listed on the same paper don’t even know each other.

Spotting the red flags: how to detect paper mills articles

Detecting scientific articles produced by paper mills often begins with analyzing retraction patterns carried out by journals.

This can be done in two ways: by tracking post-publication peer reviews on platforms like PubPeer, or by checking the Retraction Watch database, a website that documents retractions of problematic scientific articles.

However, journals rarely state outright that a retraction is due to paper mill fraud. Instead, articles are typically pulled for reasons like improper inclusion of the name and order of authors, inclusion of many irrelevant citations or references, plagiarism, or inclusion of manipulated or duplicated images.

The proportion of scientific articles retracted for being associated with paper mills is much smaller than the estimated total number of paper mill articles currently in circulation.

Retraction Watch data, as of May 2024, only recorded 7,275 retractions of articles related to the paper mill out of a total of 44,000 retractions recorded. In fact, it is estimated that up to 400,000 paper mill articles have infiltrated scientific literature over the past two decades.

Despite significant efforts from publishers and the academic community through organizations such as United2Act, a global alliance initiated by Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and STM, these attempts are barely enough.

How paper mills hurt the public

The UK Research Integrity Office—an independent UK charity that offers support to the public, researchers and organisations to promote good academic research practice—estimates that the paper mill industry has gained around $10 million globally.

For example, a Russian paper mill could earn $6.5 million if they sold all the authorship of scientific articles it produced from 2019 to 2021.

In Indonesia, this financial loss directly impacts the public. Public universities rely on the state budget, funded largely by taxpayers, and tuition fees from students to cover operational expenses, including research grants and publication incentives.

Though the exact financial toll of these paper mills is hard to pin down, it is clear that the public are footing the bill for fraudulent research practices, siphoning resources away from enuin academic advancements.

Rizqy Amelia Zein tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.

– ref. Paper mills: the ‘cartel-like’ companies behind fraudulent scientific journals – https://theconversation.com/paper-mills-the-cartel-like-companies-behind-fraudulent-scientific-journals-230124

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Tessa Toumbourou, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Environmental Social Science, The University of Melbourne

Our analysis of Indonesia’s social forestry permits shows that women remain underrepresented in forest management bodies despite efforts to boost their presence, leaving them out of decisions about their forests.

Social forestry redistributes forest management rights to local communities to advance sustainability and local livelihoods. In 2021, the country revised its social forestry regulations to allow one family representative to participate in social forestry management bodies, ‘giving equal opportunity to both men and women.’

However, our analysis of 400 most recent social forestry permit documents, combined with extended, multi-method field research at four sites, shows that women are often excluded from management bodies but are more involved in social forestry business groups (Kelompok Usaha Perhutanan Sosial or KUPS). These groups focus on the processing and sale of forest products.

This low level of participation in management excludes women from decisions about who receives benefits such as land for cultivation, seedlings, equipment, extension training, and technical information provided by the government and NGOs. The absence of women’s presence may deepen local inequalities and hamper effective forest management.

Gender gaps in social forestry

We reviewed the 400 most recent decree letters issued in 2024 that granted forestry management rights. These included 100 permits each for the managements of Village Forests (Hutan Desa) and Community Forests (Hutan Kemasyarakatan) and their respective KUPS (Table 1). Village Forests are rights collectively held and managed by village administrations, while Community Forests are issued to specific farmer or community groups.

Our analysis found that across Indonesia women are often underrepresented in management groups. On average, only 19.54% of members in Village Forest’s management bodies were women, with participation ranging from none to 80%. This number was even lower in Community Forests, averaging 13.95% women, with some groups having no female members and others up to 56.52%.

However, the available data often lacked details about gender in KUPS-related decrees. Only 19 of 100 Village Forests’ KUPS decrees and 23 of 100 Community Forests’ KUPS decrees included this information.

When gender data was included, women were more involved in KUPS of Village Forests, with an average of 46.32% participation. In contrast, their participation in Community Forests’ KUPS was just 13.06%.

These numbers show that progress in gender representation in Indonesia’s social forestry is mixed. While women are more active in economic activities linked to KUPS, they are still sidelined in formal management roles and decision-making.

Understanding uneven participation

Our field research also highlighted how women and men are participating in, and deriving benefits from, social forestry in Indonesia, while exploring factors influencing women’s (and men’s) involvement.

We focused on four social forestry sites — two Village Forests (Sintang; West Kalimantan province, and Muara Enim; South Sumatra province) and two Community Forests (Gunungkidul; Special Region of Yogyakarta, and Enrekang; South Sulawesi province). We selected sites that reflect different levels of women’s participation.

Table 2 highlights a disparity: while women actively engage in forest land use — such as collecting and processing non-timber forest products and cultivating social forestry land — in two sites (Enrekang and Muara Enim) they are not involved in management bodies where decisions about land use, forest resources and benefit distribution are made.

For example, Masna (pseudonym), a farmer and forest user from Enrekang, shared that her involvement in her village’s forest management body (Kelompok Tani Hutan) was limited to preparing snacks while men made decisions.

Why does this happen?

Deeply rooted gender norms significantly limit women’s involvement in social forestry in some sites. These norms often designate unpaid household and care-giving duties to women, positioning men as the primary decision-makers. This affects women’s confidence and participation in village meetings, where forest management decisions are made reduce women’s participation.

Our findings align with earlier studies showing how gender roles, influenced by discourse promoted by the New Order regime, continue to shape these practices of recognising men as breadwinners and landowners, reinforcing their dominance in formal discussions and decision-making bodies.

Although there are no educational requirements for joining social forestry, research shows that those with more education tend to have more influence. In our study, women in social forestry households averaged fewer years of education (6.6 years) compared to men (8.1 years). Lower education levels, socio-economic challenges, and low confidence in public forums, where education often boosts credibility, can further exclude women.

Geographic barriers such as remote forest locations, rough terrain, and poor roads also hinder women’s participation, making travel difficult and limiting their ability to be involved.

Assistance helps, as do local women leaders

In the Sintang and Gunungkidul sites, women have taken on greater roles in forest management bodies.

In Sintang, support from the Indonesian NGO PUPUK (Association for the Improvement of Small Business) significantly boosted women’s participation in the village forest management body. PUPUK facilitated discussions, provided training at convenient times for women, and encouraged male leaders to back greater female involvement. The number of female members increased from just one in 2018 to 12 women and nine men in a newly formed management body in 2022.

The social forestry group in Gunungkidul – initially a male-dominated, government-led reforestation project – evolved into a community-driven initiative with strong female leadership. Support from both government and NGOs enabled women to take more active roles in forestry and agriculture, especially as many men (and some women) left to seek work elsewhere.

A university-educated woman now leads this group and has inspired younger women to join forest management and KUPS activities. These include producing traditional herbal drinks (wedang uwuh) and making snacks from taro, cassava, and arrowroot grown on forest land.

Across the study sites, women involved in KUPS have developed skills in forest management, financial planning, product processing, and marketing, earning modest incomes. These activities have also shifted gender roles. For example, in Sintang, when Mirna (pseudonym) became head of the KUPS, her husband started taking on domestic chores like cooking and childcare to support her work.

What’s next?

Tackling gender disparities in social forestry requires targeted policies to ensure women’s voices, especially from marginalised groups, are heard in decision-making processes that affect their livelihoods and access to resources.

Introducing quotas or affirmative measures for forest management bodies can help close the gender gap and ensure more equitable benefit distribution. Evidence from other Global South regions suggests that at least 30% female representation in forest management bodies is necessary for meaningful participation, enabling women to influence decisions more effectively.

Inclusive governance also depends on fair representation of different ethnic and socio-economic groups, particularly poorer households. When disadvantaged groups are poorly represented, the distribution of benefits suffers, limiting the equitable flow of resources and opportunities.

Partnerships with NGOs and civil society groups skilled in addressing gender differences can empower women and marginalized men with the skills and confidence needed to engage in decision-making bodies.

Creating safe spaces is also vital. This includes holding gender-specific discussions in local languages at times that fit with both women’s and men’s schedules.

The government must also commit to regularly monitoring women’s participation by collecting and publishing accurate gender-disaggregated data, specific to each site and region.

A decree issued by Ministry of Environment and Forestry in August introduces a policy shift that allows individuals — not just groups — to apply for social forestry. This could boost women’s participation, provided targeted support helps them step into leadership roles. Without this backing, the risk remains that social forestry will continue to be dominated by elite men.

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Rahpriyanto Alam Surya Putra, the director of The Asia Foundation’s Environmental Governance program in Indonesia, and Ike Sulistiowati, Director of PUPUK Indonesia, contributed to this study.

Tessa Toumbourou received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Andrea received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Gutomo received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Ilmiawan received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Lilis received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Rumayya received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

Yulia received funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade through KONEKSI (Knowledge Partnership Platform Australia-Indonesia). The views expressed in this publication do not represent the views of the Australian Government.

– ref. Indonesian social forestry often excludes women from decisions, risking greater inequality – https://theconversation.com/indonesian-social-forestry-often-excludes-women-from-decisions-risking-greater-inequality-238904

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Zulfakriza Z., Associate Professor, Global Geophysics Research Group, Institut Teknologi Bandung

20 years have passed since the Aceh tsunami, which left deep scars on Indonesia, especially for those directly affected. Aceh was also recovering from a three-decade armed conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the national government

Throughout December 2024, The Conversation Indonesia, in collaboration with academics, is publishing a special edition honouring the 20 years of efforts to rebuild Aceh. We hope this series of articles preserves our collective memory while inspiring reflection on the journey of recovery and peace in the land of ‘Serambi Makkah.’

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Sunday, December 26, 2004, 7:58:53 AM (WIB, GMT+7): A 9.1 moment magnitude (Mw) earthquake occurred off the west coast of Aceh. The quake, originating from a depth of 30 kilometers below the sea, triggered a tsunami that devastated the province.

Research in 2021 suggested the earthquake’s magnitude was actually greater than what was previously recorded — 9.2 Mw. Scientists came to this conclusion after recalculating tsunami data using Green’s Function, a mathematical method that analyses how tsunami waves are formed and spread. This gave them a more accurate estimate of how strong the earthquake was.

From December 26, 2004, to February 26, 2005, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) documented about 2,050 aftershocks, a series of aftershock caused by the mainshock.

The effects of the 2004 Aceh earthquake and tsunami extended beyond Indonesia, affecting coastlines in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and possibly Africa. More than 227,000 people were killed, with Aceh alone accounting for approximately 167,000.

The 2004 Aceh Earthquake and Tsunami is known as one of the most devastating natural disasters in history. While it left deep wounds, it also demonstrated the fundamental need for disaster preparedness.

Tectonic map, megathrust zones, and seismic gaps

Indonesia is prone to disasters due to its location in a tectonically active zone where four major plates — Indo-Australian, Eurasian, Pacific, and Philippine — with convergence movement.

Comprising Earth’s rigid outer layer or lithosphere, a tectonic plate is a large, irregularly shaped sheet of solid rock that moves and interacts with other plates to sculpt the surface of the planet over geological time. These plate clashes have the potential to trigger massive earthquakes, particularly in western Sumatra, southern Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, the Banda Sea, Maluku, Papua, and Sulawesi.

A shift between two tectonic plates in the Indian Ocean resulted in a thrust fault, causing the 2004 Aceh earthquake. The fault stretched 500 kilometers – roughly the distance between Jakarta and Yogyakarta – with a breadth of about 150 kilometers. Known as a “megathrust earthquake,” the plates shifted by more than 20 meters, releasing enormous energy and causing tsunami waves up to 35 meters high – the height of a 10-story building.

Aside from earthquakes and tsunamis, tectonic movements can also trigger volcanic activity. Indonesia, which is part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, has 127 active volcanoes, making it the world’s most seismically and volcanically active region.

Between 1900 and 2023, Indonesia recorded 14,820 earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 5 Mw. Among these, 15 were more than 8 Mw, including the 2004 Aceh earthquake. Other big earthquakes, like those in Sumba (1977), Biak (1996), Nias (2005), and Bengkulu (2007), also triggered tsunamis, causing substantial casualties and damage.

Indonesia also has several megathrust zones – areas along tectonic plate boundaries prone to generating large earthquakes like the 2004 Aceh event. There are 13 identified megathrust zones near the waters off western Sumatra, southern Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, northern Sulawesi, Halmahera, and Papua. These zones are prone to generate quakes of magnitudes ranging from 7.8 to 9.2 Mw, capable of delivering major destruction and tsunamis.

Over the last 30 years, some of Indonesia’s megathrust zones have been releasing seismic energy. These zones were the source of major earthquakes such as 1996 Biak, 1994 Banyuwangi, 2004 Aceh, 2005 Nias, 2006 Pangandaran, and 2007 Bengkulu.

However, data from the past 123 years show that some parts of the megathrust zones rarely experience large earthquakes. This could be because tectonic movements in these locations are stuck, causing stress to build up over time. These “seismic gaps” indicate high-risk zones for future big earthquakes.

A seismic gap, for example, exists between the megathrust zones off the western and eastern coasts of Java. For instance, in western Java’s subduction zone, the slip deficit — or plate movement locked in place — has reached 40-60 mm per year. If this energy is eventually released, it might result in a significant earthquake and possibly a tsunami.

Advances in disaster research

Indonesia’s high disaster risk has attracted scholars from all around the world, particularly following the 2004 Aceh Tsunami. From 2005 to 2024, Google Scholar recorded approximately 1,000 scientific works on Indonesian earthquakes and tsunamis.

These studies have improved our understanding of earthquake causes and trends. For example, research on the 2018 Palu and Sunda Strait tsunamis revealed that neither was directly caused by earthquakes. The Palu tsunami resulted from an undersea landslide triggered by a 7.5 Mw earthquake on September 28, 2018. Meanwhile, the Sunda Strait tsunami was caused by the fall of Mount Anak Krakatau’s volcanic side.

Indonesian academics have also investigated big earthquake origins and aftershocks. Teams from the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG), and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) have looked at aftershock patterns to learn more about where earthquakes come from and how they work. Among those closely studied are 2018 Lombok and 2022 Cianjur. This has led to new ideas for reducing risk and damage.

The Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System (InaTEWS), managed by BMKG, continues to encourage seismic research collaborations. By 2024, the system would have 521 seismic stations spread across Indonesia. This extensive network allows for faster broadcast of earthquake data to the public, notably timely tsunami warnings after major earthquakes.

Mitigation requires collaboration

While scientists continue to investigate tectonic motions, accurately predicting earthquakes and tsunamis remains impossible. Therefore, mitigation and risk reduction are crucial.

Disaster mitigation efforts include public education and the use of earthquake-resistant infrastructure. These require the support of a wide range of stakeholders.

In 2007, three years after the Aceh Tsunami, Indonesia passed a Disaster Management Law, detailing risk reduction activities, including mitigation. This law promotes collaboration among five major elements: government, communities, academics, corporations, and the media — a framework known as the “pentahelix.”

The government acts as a regulator, the media disseminates information, corporations provide financial and technological support, communities serve as field implementers, and academics act as innovators.

Collaboration is essential for successful catastrophe mitigation. However, problems such as sectoral ego frequently impede efforts. For example, a refusal to share data across authorities can jeopardise earthquake research and mitigation efforts.

Finally, disaster risk mitigation is a shared responsibility. Building a more robust and sustainable mitigation system requires improved institutional coordination and communication.

Zulfakriza Z. tidak bekerja, menjadi konsultan, memiliki saham, atau menerima dana dari perusahaan atau organisasi mana pun yang akan mengambil untung dari artikel ini, dan telah mengungkapkan bahwa ia tidak memiliki afiliasi selain yang telah disebut di atas.

– ref. Reflecting on 20 years of the Aceh tsunami: From ‘megathrust’ threat to disaster mitigation – https://theconversation.com/reflecting-on-20-years-of-the-aceh-tsunami-from-megathrust-threat-to-disaster-mitigation-245142

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Saiful Akmal, Chair professor, Universitas Islam Negeri Ar-Raniry

20 years have passed since the Aceh tsunami, leaving deep scars on Indonesia, especially for those directly affected. Aceh was also recovering from a three-decade armed conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the national government

Throughout December 2024, The Conversation Indonesia, in collaboration with academics, is publishing a special edition honouring the 20 years of efforts to rebuild Aceh. We hope this series of articles preserves our collective memory while inspiring reflection on the journey of recovery and peace in the land of ‘Serambi Makkah.’

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In December 2022, the Aceh People’s Representative Council (DPR) officially enacted the 2022 Qanun (regional regulation) on the Acehnese language. This regulation mandates that the use of Indonesian, in any form of communications, from scientific works to public services, must be accompanies by Acehnese translations. This move reflects Aceh’s autonomy in preserving local cultures, a key demand of the now-defunct Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which sought independence from Indonesia.

The Aceh conflict that ended with the signing of a peace agreement in August 2005, less than a year after the Aceh devastating tsunami, stemmed from locals’ dissatisfaction with the central government. The separatist movement was triggered by economic inequality and natural resource exploitation.

The Qanun reaffirms the Indonesian government and GAM’s commitment to peace following three-decade armed conflict, as outlined in the 2005 Helsinki Agreement. Language — as an important element in culture — can aid in resolving conflicts. It can reduce psychological barriers and foster trust. Local languages, in particular, can strenthen nationalism by promoting empathy and cultural appreciation.

Language for political mobilisation

The use of language can excarcebate conflicts. It can be used to agitate and mobilise people, create hostile narratives, and be used as a propaganda tool to assert group identity and define friends and foes.

During Soeharto’s dictatorship era, the government’s nationalism policy emphasised the exclusive use of Indonesian as national language, even in regions with strong local cultures and languages like Aceh. Local languages are considered less important than Indonesian. This has led to a decline in the use and teaching of local languages in schools, which in turn can threaten the survival and development of these languages.

During the conflict, using Acehnese could be risky, especially in areas sympathetic to GAM. Speaking local language could lead to accusation of supporting the movement, often resulting in intimidation and arrests by the Indonesian military.

GAM, on the other hand, used Acehnese to raise people’s spirit and gather support during the conflict. Cassettes with songs in local languages played in villages created a sense of solidarity while drawing a stark line between “us” and “them.” This demonstrates how language can be a powerful tool in social and political mobilisation.

Language for conflict resolution

In Aceh, the role of local language in promoting conflict resolution is significant for the following reasons:

1. Reduces psychological barriers

In 2005, Hamid Awaluddin, a Bugis descendant and former Minister of Justice and Human Rights who represented the government in the negotiation of conflict resolution in Aceh, read ‘pantun’, a traditional Malay poem, in Acehnese:

“pat ujeun yang hana pirang, pat prang yang hana reuda,” (is there rain that will not stop? Is there a war that cannot be ended?).

Although his Acehnese was not fluent, Hamid’s efforts were warmly received by Wali Nanggroe, Aceh’s cultural leadership, and other people who represented the local communities. His decision to use the local language had created an intimate atmosphere, which then helped reduce tension and increased mutual trust between the two parties.

Language in such contexts becomes a powerful instrument in a peace negotiation process, serving not only as a technical communication tool, but also as a symbol of empathy and respect. It allows the conflicting parties to feel more valued and share emotions, which then can pave the way for a more constructive and inclusive dialogue.

2. Strengthening the sense of nationalism

Case studies show that the recognition of the Acehnese language, identity and culture by the central government can foster Indonesian nationalism among the local communities. According to a research, building something from within, and respecting local conditions contributes to a more permanent peace-building effort.

The government’s move to acknowledge local languages of Aceh and Gayo as intangible heritages has allowed the people to use them in public spaces. As a result, this strengthened the sense of belonging of Acehnese people to the state

By providing space to local languages, the state shows respect for existing cultural diversity–allowing local communities feel more integrated with the national framework.

An inclusive approach

The establishment of the Acehnese Language Qanun is not without risks. While it is true that the Acehnese Language Qanun can increase nationalism because it makes people feel appreciated and recognised, it may negatively impact other ethnic languages.

Aceh is home to 13 other local languages. Enacting Acehnese as an official regional language can make non-Acehnese groups feel isolated, as evidenced by past protests from the Gayo community and other minorities.

For example, protests arose when being fluent in Acehnese became one of the requirements to become a local leader such as a Wali Nanggroe. Additionally, replacing the Gayo hymn with the Acehnese hymn in ceremonial activities has angered the Gayo people as the majority ethnic group in the area.

Without proper mitigation, this policy risks alienating minority groups, potentially leading to feelings of forced assimilation for minority languages. This will harm the efforts to build sustainable peace in Aceh. Therefore, an inclusive approach to language policy is very important.

The efforts to promote the Acehnese language should be accompanied by similar steps to recognise and preserve the languages and cultural expressions of other ethnic groups in Aceh.

This inclusive approach is crucial to building long-term peace and social cohesion in the region. After all, Aceh’s experience teaches us that language has two sides in conflict resolution: as a tool that strengthens peace, or sharpens differences.

Saiful Akmal received funding from the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia in 2024 for research entitled “Language, Identity, and Conflict Resolution: The Case of Aceh and Patani.”.

Melly Masni menerima dana dari Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia tahun 2024 untuk riset berjudul “Language, Identity, and Conflict resolution: The Case of Aceh and Patani”.

– ref. Lessons from Aceh: How language unites and segregates in conflicts – https://theconversation.com/lessons-from-aceh-how-language-unites-and-segregates-in-conflicts-245481

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Wayne Palmer, Senior Research Fellow, Bielefeld University

Developing countries like Indonesia use foreign high-skilled and high-wage workers to drive economic growth and innovation. However, protection of their legal rights is often neglected, affecting these workers’ productivity and well-being and Indonesia’s reputation as a destination country for employment.

My research delves into the flaws of Indonesia’s labour market institutions, such as the national labour dispute settlement system, revealing that current mechanisms are inadequate in protecting the rights of high-skilled foreign workers.

The study

My findings show the national dispute settlement system exhibits significant systemic shortcomings, such as processing cases slowly and siding with employers, which limit its capacity to protect all workers effectively. But disputes involving foreign workers are further complicated by the fact that immigration law allows employers to cancel residence permits, meaning that the government requires the workers to leave the country even though the workers may have been unfairly dismissed.

Foreign workers are mainly from Northeast Asia (China, Japan and Korea), and their use on investment-tied projects coupled with Indonesia’s downstreaming programme will ensure their numbers continue to grow. In 2023, the Indonesian government issued 168,048 permits for foreigners to work in Indonesia with the top three destinations being Central Sulawesi (18,678), Jakarta (13,862) and West Java (10,807). By July 2024, the government had already issued more than 14% more permits than by the same time the previous year.

My study examined 92 labour disputes involving foreign workers between 2006 (when the new national dispute settlement system was implemented) and 2022, which were settled by the Industrial Relations Court. One additional dispute was filed in 2023, but the Industrial Relations Court has not yet published the settlement despite a legal requirement to do so.

I complemented these court settlements with 98 qualitative interviews with other stakeholders, including policymakers, labour rights activists, legal professionals, and other foreign workers, such as foreign spouses, remote workers and digital nomads.

As in other countries too, the number of registered labour disputes is only the tip of the iceberg, as workers tend to cut their losses and move on rather than invest time, energy and limited financial resources in challenging their better-resourced employers.

Employers were all Indonesian companies, so no foreign workers who filed a lawsuit worked for a multinational company, and those who did so had at least 20 nationalities.

In terms of geographical distribution, the studied disputes were settled in 13 local jurisdictions, and were mostly lodged by workers rather than employers.

The nature of the disputes mostly involved claims that an employment contract had been terminated prematurely (87 cases), while a much smaller number involved resignation (4 cases) or were unknown (1 case). Of the 92 claims, 83 were initiated by workers, and eight by an employer. In one case, the lodging party was not recorded in the final decision.

Hiring a private lawyer

Employers used the Immigration Law to undermine the protective role of the Manpower Law – as it stands foreign workers are only entitled to employment protection if they hold a valid residence permit, which employers can and do shorten. Doing so shows that the Indonesian government prioritizes the flexibility of employers at the expense of employment protection for foreign workers.

In at least 92% cases, foreign workers used paid assistance of a private lawyer to represent themselves at formal meetings and hearings required by the Disputes Settlement Law, the cost of which could be hefty.

As one foreign worker explained:

It’s always in the back of your mind, to do whatever to make employers happy if you want to stay. No matter what the work permit and contract say, they can ask immigration to kick us out within a week!“

A retired government official responsible for designing policy regarding foreign workers was surprised when he heard this, explaining that:

I thought they could look after themselves because they earn such high wages. Well, higher than the average Indonesian worker, that is.

Hiring a private lawyer is the only way to represent themselves throughout the dispute resolution process because they need to leave Indonesia once they are fired. Not having the legal right to remain in Indonesia makes it very difficult – even impossible – to do it without them.

Addressing institutional failures

Engaging a private lawyer served as an ‘institutional fix’ that enabled most foreign workers to engage with Indonesia’s labour dispute settlement system by attending formal meetings and hearings, as well as filling out required paperwork and sending essential letters and replies.

Addressing this institutional failure requires a shift in law and policy. Firstly, legal reforms are essential to ensure that immigration and employment laws are integrated to enable foreign workers to have access to legal processes intended to help protect labour rights. At a minimum, this would involve amending policy to prevent employers from cancelling residence permits so that foreign workers need to leave the country prematurely.

Alternatively, the Directorate-General of Immigration could still permit employers to do so, but then provide the affected foreign workers with a limited-stay visa so that they can remain in Indonesia to engage with the legal process. The Hong Kong Immigration Department does this for Indonesian migrant workers.

Secondly, there is a need for enhanced support systems that provide immediate and effective assistance to foreign workers. Government agencies tasked with settling labour disputes, such as local manpower offices and the Industrial Relations Court, should be equipped with adequate resources and trained personnel to handle migrant labour issues. Doing so would decrease the reliance of foreign workers on private lawyers.

Failure to protect the employment rights of foreign workers has the potential to damage Indonesia’s reputation as a destination country for employment. Such damage could undermine Indonesia’s ambitious plans to build a new capital city (Ibu Kota Nusantara) with the assistance of foreign workers, and undermine the government’s downstreaming programme, which helps Indonesia earn more from the export of raw minerals.

Wayne Palmer has received research funding from the International Labour Organization, the Freedom Fund, and the Australian Research Council.

– ref. High skills, low protection: the legal hurdles for foreign workers in Indonesia – https://theconversation.com/high-skills-low-protection-the-legal-hurdles-for-foreign-workers-in-indonesia-230795