Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Martin Farr, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary British History, Newcastle University

No man more embodied Thatcherism in the eyes of the public in the 1980s than Norman Tebbit, who died on July 7, aged 94.

Though certainly no yuppie, Lord Tebbit entitled his memoirs Upwardly Mobile. Margaret’s Thatcher’s triumph was also his. She saw in the Essex MP just the uncompromising approach to transforming Britain to which she too was committed.

Both had been disgusted by the Conservative government of Edward Heath blinking when it sought to face down trade unions in the early 1970s. The experience was elemental to their plan for government.

Others were more important to the New Right/neoliberal project elected in 1979: Conservative minister Keith Joseph, and Thatcher’s two chancellors, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson.

But Tebbit provided something no one else in Thatcher’s cabinet could: an innate connection with white, working-class voters, who may once have been Labour – Tebbit lauded Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin – but whose values were held to have been washed away in the postwar tide of union militancy, social permissiveness, European integration, and mass immigration.


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He became a Conservative almost because, rather than in spite, of his background. “Essex man” was a presiding personification of the period.

Unlike almost all of Thatcher’s ministers, Tebbit did not go to university, but left school at 16 to encounter the “closed shop”: that one had to be a member of a particular union to work in a particular workplace. He became determined at that moment to end this practice, and with it so much else of postwar social democracy.

Thirty years later he did, as Thatcher’s secretary of state for employment. Tebbit’s 1982 Employment Act avenged the unions’ defeat of Heath. Union rights were weakened, never to be restored, and those of employers emboldened. It was a significant contribution to Thatcherism’s ledger.

As secretary of state for trade and industry, Tebbit pursued privatisation – the return (as its proponents, simply, put it) of nationalised industries to the private sector – with passion. The postwar settlement in Britain was being upended.

Public image

In an age before the televising of parliament (much less 24-hour news and social media), Tebbit cut through in a way few politicians did.

At at a time of inner-city violence, the public knew Tebbit’s unemployed father, decades earlier, didn’t riot but “got on his bike and looked for work”. No one else could have been called – in the words of Labour’s Michael Foot – a “semi-house-trained polecat”. TV’s puppet satire Spitting Image portrayed him as the “Chingford Strangler”, dressed in biker leathers.

Tebbit felt no need for his contempt for socialism to be leavened by charm or humour. There was invariably a slight sense of menace. He had no interest in ingratiating or propitiating. And so he was as loved by Conservative party members as he was hated by the left. He welcomed their hatred.

Tebbit in particular despised the swinging 60s – fittingly, he entered parliament in the election in which Harold Wilson’s government was unexpectedly ejected – and its legacy of “insufferable, smug, sanctimonious, naive, guilt-ridden, wet, pink orthodoxy”. Thus his trenchancy on immigration, overseas aid (a “sink of iniquity, corruption and violence”), sexuality (he was one of the few still to use the word “sodomite”) and Europe (he was a Eurosceptic before Euroscepticism).

In 1990 Tebbit asked of British-born people of Asian heritage: “Which side do they cheer for? Are you still harking back to where you came from or where you are?”. Tebbit’s “cricket test” is second only to Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech in the annals of inflammatory – they and their supporters would say candid – rhetoric relating to immigration. Neither would mind the association.




Read more:
Tory humiliation down to campaign length and cult of May – Norman Tebbit Q&A


What silenced most – if not quite all – of his critics, was Tebbit at his most vulnerable. Following the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel Brighton in 1984, live television footage of him, only partially clad in his pyjamas, covered in dust, being stretchered out of the rubble, became the defining image of the atrocity.

The following year Thatcher moved him from trade and industry to, less happily, chairman of the Conservative party. It was a job that required a lighter touch than Tebbit’s.

Nevertheless, as chairman, he delivered the Conservatives’ third election victory, of 1987 – ensuring the permanence of the transformation – only to immediately retire to the backbenches. Margaret, his wife, had been paralysed by the bomb, and he devoted himself to her care for more than 30 years until her death.

As warranted as his departure from government may have been, Thatcher “bitterly regretted” losing him, a feeling she felt for few. Her defenestration in November 1990 is much harder to imagine had Tebbit still been in the cabinet.

Norman Tebbit’s conservatism and nationalism harked back to an earlier age, yet presaged the populism of the 2020s. In his remarks following the news of Tebbit’s death, Nigel Farage said he thought him “a great man”.

Tebbit’s values endure in public discourse, in more ways than he might have expected even a few years ago. But in his last months he was either unable, or unwilling, to say whether those values were those of the Conservatives, the traditional party of the right, or of another project. That may be a final Tebbit “test”.

The Conversation

Martin Farr does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Norman Tebbit, Conservative minister known as Thatcher’s enforcer, dies at 94 – https://theconversation.com/norman-tebbit-conservative-minister-known-as-thatchers-enforcer-dies-at-94-260716

The Edwardians: Age of Elegance – a glimpse into royal patronage of the arts in the early 20th century

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jane Hamlett, Professor of Modern British History, Royal Holloway University of London

King Edward VII, the son of Queen Victoria, ascended the throne upon her death in 1901, but unlike his mother, he ruled for a very short period and died in 1910. His reign, along with the years immediately before the outbreak of the first world war in 1914, are known as the Edwardian period.

Taking in this particular era, The Edwardians: Age of Elegance at the King’s Gallery in Buckingham Palace, focuses on the artistic patronage of Edward VII and his wife Alexandra of Denmark, and their son George V and his wife Mary of Teck.


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Edward and Alexandra were married in 1863, and as Prince and Princess of Wales the pair were leading tastemakers in Victorian upper-class society in the years before Edward came to the throne at the beginning of the 20th century.

This is often regarded as a golden age before the carnage and disruption of the great war saw the world indelibly change. However, the exhibition is not confined to these years and also reaches back into the Victorian period (1837-1901).

Those hoping to experience some of the glamour of the royal family won’t be disappointed. The first room takes visitors into the heady atmosphere of the Marlborough House set which centred around Edward and Alexandra’s residence in St James’s. One case commemorates the 1871 Waverley Ball which marked the centenary of popular Scottish novelist Sir Walter Scott. Alexandra’s elaborate Mary Queen of Scots costume – a silk dress with gold lacings – is on display.

The pageantry of the court is communicated through a series of stunning narrative paintings including the Danish artist Laurits Tuxen’s The Garden Party at Buckingham Palace (1897-1900) and The Family of Queen Victoria in 1887 (1887) painted for her golden jubilee in 1887.

This theme is picked up in the second large room, which focuses on the lavish world of the court. Here, the opulent 1911 coronation robes of George and Mary and a case of necklaces and jewellery take centre stage. This exhibit is the star of the show with plenty of visitors posing for photographs in front of it.

Royals as art collectors

But beneath all the glitz and glamour there’s a subtler story about how the royal family worked as collectors and their wider role in Britain and beyond. One of the most interesting things about the exhibition is that it reveals the personal taste of the royals, through what they chose to collect.

Horses, dogs and yachts are prominent. Edward’s dog Caesar, the wire-haired fox terrier who famously followed his funeral procession in 1910, appears in several images, and his race horse Persimmon is also represented.

Edward and Alexandra were patrons of leading artists of the day – he owned a number of works by the popular Victorian painter Frederic Leighton, while she collected art by the Pre-Raphaelite artist Edward Burne Jones. Alexandra also supported Minton’s pottery studio in the 1870s, which employed many women artists.

The exhibition also reveals Alexandra’s personal artistic activities. Like many upper-class Victorian women, she was a keen photographer and creator of photo albums. In the second half of the 19th century, album-making offered women an outlet for creativity and emotional expression. An album of designs made by Alexandra in the 1860s features photos arranged in a spiders web, with family and friends transformed into butterflies and insects.

Royal patronage was often about international connections. Alexandra’s Danish heritage is expressed through pieces from the Royal Copenhagen porcelain manufacturing company, including a massive porcelain cabinet, featuring an ornamental roof topped by a group of dancing monkeys surrounding a large swan.

A larger room is devoted to objects amassed on visits and through diplomatic exchange with the colonies which at the time included India, part of Africa, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Increasingly speedy travel networks brought the world closer in the late 19th century and the royal family were able to travel further and more frequently than ever before. These visits played an important role in Britain’s imperial identity, and underlined the nation’s global power.

Between 1875 and 1876 Edward toured India. This trip produced a dazzling array of diplomatic gifts, such as a case filled with ornately decorated Indian weapons. After the visit Edward created a special Indian room for them at Marlborough House. Today, they sparkle in their cabinet for the exhibition’s visitors.

The exhibition does a good job of revealing the importance of imperial connections to the royal collections and the role of the royals in the larger colonial project, but in places I would have liked to know more about the stories behind these objects.

There’s a tension between the precise attribution of the work of British and European artists and the objects that have been gifted from the colonies – almost all labelled “unidentified maker”.

The absence of such information is the product of longstanding curatorial habits that shaped these collections in the past and continue to determine what we know about them today. This does mean that there are some absences about the origins and makers of these things, which could have been acknowledged more in some of the exhibition text.

This was particularly evident when looking at a large portrait of the Maori dancer Terewai Horomona by Gottfried Lindauer. The image has an elaborate frame with a plaque declaring it was presented to the Prince of Wales by the New Zealand commissioner for the Colonial and India Exhibition, 1886.

The commentary states that Edward was “enchanted” with the portrait which was “promptly gifted” to him. But this might have been better used as an opportunity to give some thought to the woman whose image was framed, presented and exchanged.

Overall, though, this is an enjoyable exhibition that reveals the royal social world, patronage and imperial connections, and tells a fascinating story about the artistic taste and activities of the lesser-known monarchs of the early 20th century.

The Conversation

Jane Hamlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The Edwardians: Age of Elegance – a glimpse into royal patronage of the arts in the early 20th century – https://theconversation.com/the-edwardians-age-of-elegance-a-glimpse-into-royal-patronage-of-the-arts-in-the-early-20th-century-259909

La selección: los retos de implantar (bien) las energías renovables

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Lucía Caballero, Coordinadora internacional / Editora de Medio Ambiente y Energía

dee Karen/Shutterstock

Las energías renovables son una de las principales herramientas con las que contamos para reducir la quema de combustibles fósiles y, con ello, disminuir las emisiones de los gases causantes del cambio climático. Sin embargo, aunque no cabe duda del valor de estas tecnologías, su implantación presenta todavía algunos desafíos.

Por un lado, tanto la construcción de parques eólicos y solares como la fabricación de coches eléctricos requiere el empleo de minerales críticos –como el cobalto, el silicio y el litio–, llamados así porque no resulta fácil conseguirlos o su minería tiene graves consecuencias ambientales. No obstante, el impacto minero de la extracción de estos materiales es menor que el del carbón y se están desarrollando métodos para facilitar su obtención y reutilización.

En el caso de elementos como el platino y el iridio, necesarios para la fabricación de pilas de hidrógeno, se están buscando materiales alternativos. Además, se estudia el uso de agua de mar o de aguas residuales para reducir el consumo de agua dulce de esta tecnología.

Por otro lado, la instalación de estas infraestructuras tiene efectos significativos en el medio ambiente y la biodiversidad. Precisamente, la modificación y fragmentación del paisaje y la destrucción de hábitats son dos de los factores que favorecen la pérdida de especies.

La eólica marina, además, tiene un impacto directo en la fauna al generar ruidos, vibraciones y colisiones. Y precisamente las áreas de alto potencial energético (con mucho viento u oleaje) a menudo coinciden con zonas de alto valor ecológico. Así, los objetivos de implantación de aerogeneradores podrían chocar frontalmente con la meta marcada por el Marco Mundial de la Diversidad Biológica Kunming-Montreal: proteger el 30 % de los océanos para 2030.

La única manera de hacer compatibles las energías renovables y la conservación de la biodiversidad es con una minuciosa planificación del territorio que minimice los posibles daños y prevea la mitigación y restauración de los efectos negativos.

Por último, otro de los retos a enfrentar es tecnológico: estas instalaciones producen electricidad de manera intermitente (se detienen cuando no hay viento o sol) y presentan una peor respuesta ante incidencias en la red. De ahí que se necesite implantar nuevas tecnologías de soporte, aumentar las instalaciones de almacenamiento de energía, como el almacenamiento térmico a altas temperaturas, e incrementar la generación eléctrica para garantizar la estabilidad del sistema.

Descarbonizar la economía, es decir, reducir o evitar las emisiones de dióxido de carbono, principal responsable del cambio climático, no tiene por qué estar reñido con la seguridad energética ni la conservación de la biodiversidad. Con una planificación y evaluación adecuadas, y la aplicación de políticas que aseguren su cumplimiento, los proyectos de tecnologías renovables podrán superar los retos que plantean.

The Conversation

ref. La selección: los retos de implantar (bien) las energías renovables – https://theconversation.com/la-seleccion-los-retos-de-implantar-bien-las-energias-renovables-260760

Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

Total sales looked stable

We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

This diagram shows how beer sales declined while other beverage sales increased from 2004 to 2022. Total alcohol sales remained roughly constant.
Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
(Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

Some liquor stores sold cannabis

When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

This diagram shows that after October 2018, alcohol sales rose gradually at liquor stores that sold cannabis but fell quickly at stores selling only alcohol.
Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
(Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

Switching substances or stores?

My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

Looking ahead

My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

The Conversation

Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

New therapy teplizumab could delay type 1 diabetes by years – if caught early

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Oram, Professor of Diabetes and Nephrology, University of Exeter

Dorde Krstic/Shutterstock.com

For more than a century, type 1 diabetes has meant one thing: a lifetime administering insulin. But for the first time, science is breaking that paradigm – not by managing the disease, but by intercepting it before symptoms even appear.

As the first patients in the UK begin receiving the groundbreaking new therapy, teplizumab, we are developing ways to identify who might benefit from a drug that only works if given before any symptoms appear. At the Royal Devon NHS, we are currently treating the first UK adult, Hannah Robinson, who was found to have early type 1 diabetes by chance during routine pregnancy screening.

About 10% of people with diabetes have type 1, while the remaining 90% have type 2, a condition linked to lifestyle factors where insulin is still produced but does not work properly. Type 1 diabetes is an autoimmune condition that leads to complete loss of insulin production from the pancreas. Without insulin, blood sugar levels rise dangerously, increasing the risk of blindness, kidney failure and early death.

Although type 1 is often thought of as a disease of childhood, research from the University of Exeter has highlighted that more than half of all new cases occur in adults.

For millions around the world living with type 1 diabetes, treatment to keep blood sugar in check means lifelong daily insulin. However, using insulin comes with its own risks.

If blood sugar drops too low, it can cause hypoglycaemia, or “hypos”, which in severe cases may lead to seizures or even death. It is no surprise that constantly balancing between high and low blood sugars takes a heavy toll on both physical and mental health. During her pregnancy, Robinson needed insulin and saw firsthand how “life completely revolves around balancing your blood glucose”.

Teplizumab offers a completely different approach. Instead of simply replacing insulin, it targets the immune attack that causes type 1 diabetes.

Our immune system is usually remarkably good at telling friend from foe, protecting us from infections and cancer while leaving our own organs alone. But sometimes, for reasons still not fully understood, this balance breaks down in a process known as autoimmunity. In type 1 diabetes, the immune system mistakenly attacks the pancreas, destroying insulin-producing cells.

Diabetes symptoms.

Teplizumab works by retraining the immune system and dialling down the specific cells that target the pancreas. Studies show it can delay the disease and the need for insulin therapy by two to three years, with generally mild side-effects. For Robinson, who knows all too well from pregnancy and the full-time job that is living with type 1 diabetes, the possibility of a few extra years without insulin really mattered.

The drug is already approved in the US and is under review for routine NHS use, although a few children and teenagers in the UK have also received it through special access programmes.

Finding people early

There is a catch. By the time people develop symptoms of type 1 diabetes, such as thirst, weight loss and fatigue, more than three-quarters of their insulin-producing capacity is already destroyed.

For teplizumab and similar therapies to work, they need to be given before symptoms appear, while blood sugar levels are still normal. This means these treatments are not an option for people who already have established type 1 diabetes.

So how do we find people at this early stage? Fortunately, it is possible to detect the beginnings of the autoimmune attack many years before symptoms show using simple blood tests that measure immune markers called pancreatic autoantibodies.

Just a few drops from a finger prick can reveal whether the immune system has started to target the pancreas. Finding people early not only offers the chance to delay disease progression, it can also help avoid the life-threatening emergencies that sometimes come with a first diagnosis – such as diabetic ketoacidosis.

With type 1 diabetes affecting roughly one in 200 people, there is still the question of who to test. Not everyone’s risk is the same. When we think of inherited diseases, we often imagine conditions caused by a single gene change, such as cystic fibrosis.

Type 1 diabetes does have a genetic component, but it involves many different genes, each nudging a person’s risk up or down. Having genetic risk alone is not enough, with unknown environmental factors also needed to tip the balance.

Nine in ten people who develop type 1 diabetes have no family history. While testing relatives of people with type 1 is a logical first step, research at the University of Exeter suggests that combining all these genetic factors into a single risk score could help predict who might develop the disease and identify babies who should be monitored more closely. This could become an important tool as we move towards wider genomic screening.

It is still early days, but we are seeing a fundamental shift in how we approach type 1 diabetes. For more than a century, treatment has meant patients taking on the daily burden of replacing the insulin their bodies can no longer make. Now, the focus is turning to therapies that tackle the immune problem at its source, with the hope of stopping the disease before it fully develops and opening the door to an insulin-free future.

The Conversation

Richard Oram has received research grants or contracts from Randox and Sanofi. He has also received royalties and license from Randox, consulting fees from Sanofi, Provention Bio, and Janssen and payment or honoraria from Sanofi and Novo Nordisk. He has served on data safety monitory board or advisory board for Sanofi.

Nicholas Thomas serves on an advisory boards for Sanof (manafacturer of Teplizumab) guiding the technical delivery of therapy within the NHS. He is currently employed by Exeter University as an NIHR Academic Clinical Fellow.

ref. New therapy teplizumab could delay type 1 diabetes by years – if caught early – https://theconversation.com/new-therapy-teplizumab-could-delay-type-1-diabetes-by-years-if-caught-early-259814

Nearly two-thirds of voters think Starmer doesn’t respect them – new poll

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Marc Stears, Director of UCL Policy Lab and Professor of Political Science, UCL

Simon Dawson/Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

Exhausted from a long campaign but buoyed by an extraordinary victory, Keir Starmer stood on the steps of Downing Street just over one year ago to deliver his victory speech. “Your government,” the new prime minister said, “should treat every single person in this country with respect.”

This message of respect resonated strongly in the year leading up to the campaign, coming as close as anything to providing a central argument to Labour’s case for government. And, according to polling and focus groups that my team at UCL Policy Lab designed along with polling company More in Common, it seemed to work.

As our research at the time showed, voters felt that “respecting ordinary people” was the most important attribute that any politician could have, more important than having ideas for the future, managing effectively or having real experience. And they thought Starmer was the leader who displayed that respect most.

A year later, the picture looks quite different. In new polling, we asked a representative sample of over 7,000 people to evaluate the government one year on. On respect, the judgement has not been good.


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During the general election campaign, 41% of the electorate said that they believed that Starmer “respected people like them”. One year on, that stands at only 24%. At the same time, the number who say that he does not respect them has risen from 32% to 63%. Starmer is now outstripped on that question by Nigel Farage – 33% say the Reform UK leader respects people like them.

Losing support

This view has had crucial political consequences. Of those who voted for Labour in the general election, only 60% of our respondents say they would vote for the party in an election held tomorrow.

And that is not because some other political party is suddenly swooping in for their supporters. Labour’s voters are defecting in a host of different directions: 11% say they would vote Reform; 8% would vote Liberal Democrat; 4% would vote Green and 4% would vote Conservative. A further one in ten say they simply don’t know how they would vote.

Labour’s losses have been most dramatic among their first-time voters. Of those who voted for Labour in 2024 but not in any other general election since 2010, barely a third still support the party, while a fifth would vote for Reform UK.

These political failures, our report contends, are directly related to the declining sense of respect. The top reason voters gave for turning away from Labour are the broken promises and U-turns made by Labour in government, followed by the party’s failure to reduce the cost of living and changes to the winter fuel payment.

The idea of “respect” being key to the public’s sense of whether a government is on their side or not has been growing for many years now, both in academia and in politics itself. Since at least the 2007/8 financial crisis there has been a sense that large swathes of the public feel neglected, overlooked and even disdained by those who govern them.

When people talk about wanting to see “change” in Britain, this is often what they mean. It was a theme I touched on recently in two books, Out of the Ordinary and, with my co-author Tom Baldwin, England.

A smiling Keir Starmer delivers his victory speech, with a crowd of supporters behind him
Just over a year ago, a happier Starmer delivers his victory speech.
Shutterstock

But respect is not just an abstract idea. People appear to judge whether they are respected by those who govern them or not primarily on the basis of whether the government stands up for them against powerful vested interests.

Our earlier research demonstrated that there is a widespread sense among the British public that certain groups have had it too easy for too long. This is either because they have been able to intimidate the government, or because government ministers and advisers have themselves been recruited from among these groups.

In our new report, therefore, we see that the new government’s most popular act was their willingness to raise the minimum wage by £1,400 in April, against the objections of some in business who suggested that such a move was too burdensome on them.

Changes to the winter fuel allowance and proposed changes to the disability benefits system, on the other hand, registered poorly. They suggest that the interests of ordinary and vulnerable people count for too little in decision-making.

These judgements currently shape the mood of the country and probably top the list of issues that the government now needs to address. There is still time for the government to rebuild its appeal, of course. Indeed, our respondents who said they would vote for Labour said they would do so because the party needs more time to fix the problems they inherited.

But as it seeks to do so, voters will want to know who this government stands for. Whose interests does it put first? What kind of people does it respect?

Much of the electorate thought they knew the answer to these questions one year ago. Now they’re not so sure.

The Conversation

Marc Stears directs the UCL Policy Lab, a non-partisan think tank based at University College London. He was previously chief speechwriter to the UK Labour Party.

ref. Nearly two-thirds of voters think Starmer doesn’t respect them – new poll – https://theconversation.com/nearly-two-thirds-of-voters-think-starmer-doesnt-respect-them-new-poll-260606

Cancellations at Canadian film festivals raise questions about accountability

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Dorit Naaman, Alliance Atlantis Professor of Film and Media, Queen’s University, Ontario

Film festivals are unique cultural institutions, spaces to see diverse films by local and global filmmakers and an important market for distributors. These films are often difficult to see, or even know about, outside of festival circuits.

Festivals are also answerable to funders and to different stakeholders’ interests. Cancellations of planned films raise questions about festivals’ roles and accountability to community groups who find certain films objectionable, the wider public, politicians, festival sponsors, audiences, filmmakers and the films themselves.

In September 2024, The Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) faced a backlash from pro-Ukrainian groups — and former deputy prime minister Chrystia Freeland, who is of Ukrainian descent — when the documentary Russians at War was included in the program.




Read more:
‘Russians at War’ documentary: From the Crimean to the Iraq War, soldier images pose questions about propaganda


The Ukrainian Canadian Congress and other advocates called on TIFF to cancel the film, directed by Russian Canadian Anastasia Trofimova, which they accused of being Russian propaganda.

TIFF did cancel festival screenings after it was “made aware of significant threats to festival operations and public safety,” but once the festival was over, showed Russians at the TIFF Lightbox Theatre.

In November, the Montréal International Documentary Festival (RIDM) cancelled the Canadian premiere of Rule of Stone, directed by Israeli Canadian director Danae Elon. As a film and media professor, I supervised Elon’s research for the film while she pursued a master’s degree at Queen’s University.

RIDM acknowledged Elon’s “personal commitment to criticizing and questioning the state of Israel” through her story about the stone that, by Israeli law, has to be used on the exterior of every new building in Jerusalem.

In the film, Elon examines how, in post-1967 Jerusalem, “architecture and stone are the main weapons in a silent, but extraordinarily effective colonization and dispossession process” of Palestinians.

As a documentarist and a researcher in Israeli and Palestinian media representations of fighters, I have analyzed both films and followed the controversies. Each focuses on contemporary political issues relevant to our understanding of current affairs.

While the reasons for the cancellations are different, in both cases the festivals responded to pressures from community groups, placing the public right to a robust debate at the festival and beyond as secondary.

‘Russians at War’

Director Anastasia Trifamova embedded herself in a Russian supply unit, and later a medical team, eventually making her way to the front lines in occupied Ukraine.

Trifamova comes across as a naive filmmaker, using an observational, non-judgmental form of filmmaking common in 21st-century war documentaries, as seen in films like Armadillo and Restrepo (respectively following Danish and U.S. troops in Afghanistan).

As noted by TIFF, Russians was “an official Canada-France co-production with funding from several Canadian agencies,” and Trifamova said she did not seek or receive official permission from the Russian army to film.

The film documents the machination of war, where soldiers are both perpetrators of violence and its victims. It humanizes the soldiers, which understandably can be upsetting to Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian publics. But should emotions of one group, outraged and incensed as they may be, prevent the public from having the difficult conversations promoted by the film?

Early in the film, Trifamova confronts the soldiers about why they are fighting and they respond with Russian propaganda (fighting Nazism, defending the borders).

Later, soldiers approach Trifamova — on camera — to express doubts about the justification of the war and their presence in Ukraine. The film provides an unflattering view of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, emphasizing the futility of the war and the incredible toll on soldiers and civilians (including some Ukrainian civilians). Russian troops appear untrained and poorly equipped to fight in chaotically managed battles.

Like Armadillo and Restrepo, Russians at War represents the soldiers without judgment and contributes to necessary conversations about war. In my analysis, while Trifamova refrains — in her sporadic voice-over — from condemning the war outright, it is difficult to read the film as Russian propaganda.

While TIFF cited security concerns as the reason for cancellation, security was in place for another film that attracted controversy, Bliss.

A cancellation from such an established festival likely has an effect on how a film is able to circulate. For example, TVO, one of the funders of Russians at War, cancelled its scheduled broadcast days after the TIFF cancellation.

‘Rule of Stone’

Rule of Stone, as noted by RDIM, “critically examines the colonialist project of East Jerusalem following its conquest by Israeli forces in 1967.”

The title references a colonial bylaw to clad building with stone, first introduced by the British, which still exists today.

The film, which examines architecture’s role in creating modern Jerusalem, is led by Elon’s voice-over. It mixes her memories of growing up in 1970s Jerusalem and her reckoning with the “frenzy of building,” which included projects by architect Moshe Safdie, a citizen of Israel, Canada and the United States. Elon recounts that her father, journalist and author Amos Elon, was a close friend of Safdie, as well as legendary Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kolek.

Safdie is among the Israeli architects, architectural historians and planners who Elon interviews. The expansion of Jewish neighbourhoods is contrasted with the restrictions on and disposession of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Multiple scenes show the demolition of Palestinian homes or the aftermath. In intervwoven segments, Izzat Ziadah, a Palestinian stonemason who lives in a stone quarry, gives a tour of what is left of his destroyed home.

Viewers hear how the planning, expansion and building of Jewish neighbourhoods, post-1967, were designed to evoke biblical times. As architectural historian Zvi Efrat notes, the new neighbourhoods look like, or attempt to look like, they were there forever.

‘Rule of Stone’ trailer.

As reported by La Presse, the RIDM cancellation came after the festival received information about the documentary’s partial Israeli financing, something that “embarrassed” them with some of the festival’s partners. Funding for the development of the film came from the Makor Foundation for Israeli Films, which receives support from Israel’s Ministry of Culture and Sport.

Two organizations, the Palestinian Film Institute and Regards Palestiniens, opposed the film’s showing on the basis of their commitment to the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI).

In the organizations’ logic, Israel state funding means a film should be subject to boycott as “PACBI specifically targets Israeli institutional funding in the arts which serves to culturally whitewash and legitimize the Israeli state.”

In my view, this position differs from the PACBI guidelines, which state:

“As a general overriding rule, Israeli cultural institutions, unless proven otherwise, are complicit in maintaining the Israeli occupation and denial of basic Palestinian rights, whether through their silence or actual involvement in justifying, whitewashing or otherwise deliberately diverting attention from Israel’s violations of international law and human rights.”

Makor should be exempted since it regularly funds films that draw attention to Israel’s violations of Palestinian human rights. In 2024 alone, the list includes The Governor, The Village League and Death in Um al hiran.

RIDM’s website does not disclose support for a boycott. In the end, RIDM announced that Elon withdrew her film. She stated: “Screening my film at RIDM does not serve the long-term purpose of the festival, nor is it possible now to address the nuances in our common fight for justice for Palestine. I am deeply saddened and distressed by [what] has brought it to this point.”

To date, the film has not found a cinema in Montréal willing to screen it.

Provoking important conversations

The two festivals’ mission statements promise high-quality films that transform or renew audiences’ relationships to the world.

It is clear why programmers chose both films, since they’re cinematically innovative and provoke important conversations.

However, both festivals silenced these films and signalled to other filmmakers that these festivals are not brave spaces to have difficult and necessary conversations.

The Conversation

Dorit Naaman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Cancellations at Canadian film festivals raise questions about accountability – https://theconversation.com/cancellations-at-canadian-film-festivals-raise-questions-about-accountability-250892

La multiplication des satellites pose des risques de sécurité. Voici comment mieux gérer le « far west » spatial

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Wael Jaafar, Associate Professor, École de technologie supérieure (ÉTS)

Depuis quelques années, la conquête de l’espace connaît une accélération sans précédent.

À l’ère des constellations de satellites, où des milliers d’engins gravitent autour de la Terre à des vitesses vertigineuses, de nouveaux défis apparaissent. Ils ne sont pas seulement techniques ou scientifiques : ils sont aussi géopolitiques.

Longtemps dominée par les États-Unis et la Russie, l’exploration spatiale est désormais multipolaire. L’Inde, la Chine, l’Europe et plusieurs acteurs privés, comme SpaceX avec Starlink, se livrent une compétition acharnée pour lancer des satellites et créer des réseaux de communication couvrant toute la planète – et bientôt, la Lune ou Mars. L’objectif n’est plus seulement scientifique : il est aussi stratégique.

Ces constellations de satellites sont devenues indispensables. Elles permettent d’offrir un accès à Internet dans des régions mal desservies, d’améliorer la localisation basée sur GPS, de surveiller l’environnement, ou encore de gérer les services d’urgence. Mais elles soulèvent aussi de sérieuses questions de sécurité.

Avant de rejoindre en 2022 l’École de technologie supérieure (ÉTS), j’ai travaillé plusieurs années dans l’industrie des télécommunications, tant au Canada qu’à l’international. Mes recherches actuelles portent sur l’intégration des réseaux terrestres et non terrestres, l’allocation de ressources, l’informatique en périphérie (edge computing) et quantique, et l’intelligence artificielle appliquée aux réseaux.

L’espace, un milieu ouvert… et vulnérable

Contrairement aux câbles terrestres ou à la fibre optique, les communications spatiales s’effectuent dans un environnement ouvert. Cela signifie qu’elles peuvent potentiellement être interceptées. Lorsqu’un satellite transmet des données à un autre ou à une station au sol, tout acteur malveillant équipé des bons outils peut tenter d’intercepter et de décrypter ces échanges.


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Cela pose des risques pour la confidentialité des données personnelles, mais aussi pour des informations sensibles d’origine militaire ou gouvernementale. Des pays pourraient utiliser leurs propres satellites pour espionner ceux des autres. D’autant plus que les satellites n’obéissent pas à des frontières terrestres : ils survolent tous les pays sans distinction.

Aujourd’hui, il n’existe pas de normes internationales strictes pour encadrer le comportement des satellites en orbite. On ne peut pas interdire à un satellite de passer au-dessus d’un territoire ou d’observer un espace donné. C’est le Far West spatial !

Le défi de la cryptographie quantique

Pour sécuriser les communications spatiales, on utilise actuellement des algorithmes de chiffrement classiques. Ces systèmes sont basés sur la complexité mathématique de certains problèmes, qui prennent des milliers d’années à résoudre avec les ordinateurs actuels. Mais cela pourrait changer radicalement avec l’arrivée de l’informatique quantique.

Le fameux « Q-Day », jour hypothétique où les ordinateurs quantiques seront capables de casser la plupart des systèmes de chiffrement existants, est redouté par de nombreux experts en cybersécurité. Il suffirait qu’un pays ou une entreprise dispose d’un tel ordinateur pour compromettre des décennies d’échanges confidentiels.

Heureusement, la cryptographie quantique, qui repose sur les principes de la physique quantique, offre des pistes prometteuses. Par exemple, en générant des clés de chiffrement parfaitement aléatoires et en rendant toute interception détectable (puisqu’une observation modifie l’état quantique du signal), on pourrait créer des systèmes de communication pratiquement inviolables.

Mais transposer ces technologies quantiques à l’espace n’est pas simple. Sur la fibre optique, elles fonctionnent bien, car l’environnement est stable et contrôlé. En espace libre, avec des communications laser, les perturbations (ou bruits) sont beaucoup plus difficiles à contrôler.

Vers une cybersécurité spatiale intelligente

Outre la quantique, d’autres technologies sont explorées pour sécuriser les communications satellitaires. L’une d’elles concerne les antennes radio, est appelée le « beamforming », ou la formation de faisceaux directionnels. Le beamforming consiste à concentrer le signal radio dans une direction très précise. Cela limiterait le risque d’interception, puisqu’il faut être sur la trajectoire du signal pour capter la transmission.

L’intelligence artificielle (IA) joue également un rôle croissant. Elle peut être utilisée pour corriger les erreurs dues au bruit ambiant, pour détecter des tentatives d’intrusion ou pour améliorer la gestion des clés de chiffrement. Certaines approches combinent d’ailleurs IA et technologies quantiques pour renforcer la sécurité.

Un espace surchargé et sans réglementation claire

La multiplication des constellations de satellites, comme celle de Starlink (qui prévoit à terme plus de 40 000 satellites en orbite basse), rend l’espace très encombré. À ces satellites s’ajoutent des débris spatiaux, dont certains, même de quelques centimètres, peuvent endommager sérieusement un satellite en raison de leur vitesse.

Pour éviter les collisions, certaines entreprises offrent des services de surveillance. Les satellites peuvent alors ajuster leur trajectoire pour éviter les objets menaçants. Mais ce système est encore rudimentaire : les échanges de données entre satellites ne sont pas automatisés et ne se font pas en temps réel. L’information est transmise à la Terre, traitée dans des centres de données, puis renvoyée.

Il devient urgent d’harmoniser les pratiques. L’IEEE (l’Institut des ingénieurs électriciens et électroniciens) travaille actuellement à l’élaboration d’un cadre réglementaire international pour améliorer la « space data awareness », c’est-à-dire la connaissance partagée de l’environnement spatial immédiat des satellites. Cette initiative de standardisation est désignée par IEEE P1964. L’objectif est que les satellites puissent coopérer pour signaler les dangers, partager des données critiques… tout en respectant la confidentialité.

Reprendre le contrôle de notre souveraineté spatiale

Enfin, un enjeu fondamental est celui de la souveraineté. Faut-il confier nos communications à des infrastructures étrangères comme Starlink, contrôlées par des intérêts privés et étatiques hors de notre juridiction, alors que leurs capacités de surveillance pourraient croître dans un avenir rapproché ? Même si ces systèmes ne peuvent pas encore intercepter ou décrypter nos communications sensibles, cela pourrait changer avec l’avènement de l’informatique quantique.

Pour garantir une véritable autonomie numérique et spatiale, il devient crucial de développer des alternatives locales, sécurisées, et résilientes, que ce soit par la fibre optique ou par des réseaux satellitaires indépendants. Cela nécessitera des investissements soutenus, une volonté politique affirmée et une coopération internationale renforcée.

La sécurité de nos satellites ne se résume pas à de la haute technologie. Elle est au cœur de tensions géopolitiques, de choix stratégiques, et d’une transformation majeure des communications mondiales.

Alors que les enjeux se déplacent de la Terre vers l’orbite, il devient impératif d’anticiper les risques, de développer des technologies résilientes et surtout, de mettre en place des règles du jeu claires. Sans cela, l’espace pourrait devenir le nouveau théâtre d’affrontements invisibles… mais aux conséquences bien réelles.

La Conversation Canada

Wael Jaafar est membre de l’OIQ (Ordre des Ingénieurs du Québec). Il est également membre sénior de l’IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) et membre de l’ACM (Association for Computing Machinery). Dans le cadre de ses recherches, il a reçu des financements d’organisations gouvernementales, incluant le CRSNG (Conseil de recherches en sciences naturelles et en génie du Canada), le FRQ (Fonds de recherche du Québec), et la FCI (La Fondation canadienne pour l’innovation). Prof. Jaafar fait partie de l’équipe de mise en place de l’initiative de standardisation IEEE P1964 “Standards for Collaborative Orbital Data Sharing”.

ref. La multiplication des satellites pose des risques de sécurité. Voici comment mieux gérer le « far west » spatial – https://theconversation.com/la-multiplication-des-satellites-pose-des-risques-de-securite-voici-comment-mieux-gerer-le-far-west-spatial-259859

Accès aux soins en Afrique : pourquoi cartographier les établissements de santé peut sauver des vies

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Peter M Macharia, Senior postdoctoral research fellow, Institute of Tropical Medicine Antwerp

Le manque d’informations fiables sur les établissements de santé en Afrique subsaharienne etait très manisfeste pendant la pandémie de COVID-19. Au moment où les besoins en soins d’urgence augmentaient, il était difficile de savoir où se trouvaient les établissements, combien de lits ou de bouteilles d’oxygène ils avaient, ou encore quels spécialistes y travaillaient. Ces données manquantes auraient permis d’évaluer avec précision la capacité d’accueil supplémentaire des hôpitaux et l’accès aux soins intensifs selon les régions.

Ces données auraient permis d’évaluer avec précision la capacité d’accueil supplémentaire des hôpitaux et l’accès géographique aux soins intensifs. Peter Macharia et Emelda Okiro, dont les recherches portent sur la santé publique et l’équité dans l’accès aux services de santé dans les milieux défavorisés, partagent les conclusions de leur récente étude, réalisée avec plusieurs collègues.

Que sont les bases de données ouvertes sur les établissements de santé ?

Un établissement de santé est un lieu où sont fournis des services de santé. Il peut s’agir de petites cliniques ou de cabinets médicaux, mais aussi de grands hôpitaux universitaires ou de référence.

Une base de données sur les établissements de santé est une liste de tous les établissements de santé d’un pays ou d’une zone géographique, telle qu’un district. Une base de données type doit attribuer à chaque établissement de santé un code unique, un nom, une taille, un type (soins primaires, secondaires ou tertiaires), un statut de propriété (public ou privé), un statut opérationnel (en activité ou fermé), un emplacement et une localisation administrative (district, commune). Elle doit également mentionner les services (soins obstétricaux d’urgence, par exemple), la capacité (nombre de lits, par exemple), les infrastructures (disponibilité de l’électricité, par exemple), les coordonnées (adresse et courriel) et la date de la dernière mise à jour de ces informations.

La méthode idéale pour établir cette liste consiste à mener un recensement, comme l’a fait le Kenya en 2023. Mais cela nécessite des ressources. Certains pays ont compilé des listes à partir de données existantes bien qu’incomplètes. Le Sénégal l’a fait, tout comme le Kenya en 2003 et 2008.

Cette base de données doit être accessible à tous les acteurs concernés : autorités publiques, partenaires au développement, chercheurs. Elle doit être partagée dans un cadre clair, qui protège à la fois la vie privée des individus et le travail des personnes qui ont produit les données. Dans certains pays, tels que le Kenya et le Malawi, ces listes sont accessibles via des portails web sans besoin d’autorisation. Dans d’autres, ces listes n’existent pas ou nécessitent une autorisation supplémentaire.

Pourquoi sont-elles utiles ?

Les listes d’établissements peuvent répondre aux besoins des individus et des communautés. Elles contribuent également à la réalisation des objectifs sanitaires à l’échelle régionale, nationale et continentale.

Pour les individus, ces listes permettent de connaître les options disponibles pour se faire soigner. Pour les communautés, ces données aident à mieux organiser les services. Par exemple, elles permettent de décider où déployer les agents de santé communautaires. C’est ce qui a été fait au Mali et en Sierra Leone.

Les listes de services de santé sont utiles pour distribuer des produits tels que des moustiquaires et allouer les ressources en fonction des besoins sanitaires des zones desservies. Elles aident à planifier les campagnes de vaccination en créant des microplans détaillés de vaccination.

Quand on tient compte du type de maladies présentes, des conditions sociales ou de l’environnement, les services peuvent être mieux adaptés aux réalités locales.

Des cartes détaillées des ressources sanitaires permettent d’intervenir plus rapidement en cas d’urgence en localisant précisément les établissements équipés pour faire face à des crises spécifiques. Les systèmes de surveillance des maladies dépendent de la collecte continue de données auprès des établissements de santé.

Au niveau continental, les listes sont essentielles pour coordonner la réponse du système de santé en cas de pandémie ou d’épidémie. Elles peuvent faciliter la planification transfrontalière, la préparation aux pandémies et la collaboration.

Pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, ces listes ont permis de déterminer où affecter des ressources supplémentaires, telles que des hôpitaux de fortune ou des programmes de transport pour les personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans.

Les listes sont utilisées pour identifier les populations vulnérables exposées à des agents pathogènes émergents et les populations qui peuvent bénéficier de nouvelles infrastructures sanitaires.

Elles sont importantes pour rendre accessibles les soins obstétricaux et néonataux d’urgence.

Que se passe-t-il si ces listes n’existent pas ?

De nombreux problèmes surviennent si nous ne savons pas où se trouvent les établissements de santé ni ce qu’ils offrent. La planification des soins de santé devient inefficace. Cela peut entraîner la duplication des listes d’établissements et une mauvaise allocation des ressources, ce qui conduit à du gaspillage et à des inégalités.

Nous ne pouvons pas identifier les populations qui manquent de services. Les interventions d’urgence sont affaiblies par l’incertitude quant au meilleur endroit où transporter les patients atteints de pathologies spécifiques.

Les ressources sont gaspillées lorsqu’il existe des listes de structures en double. Par exemple, entre 2010 et 2016, six ministères ont collaboré avec des organisations de développement, ce qui a donné lieu à dix listes de structures de santé au Nigeria.

En Tanzanie, il existait plus de 10 listes différentes d’établissements de santé en 2009. Tenues par des bailleurs de fonds et des agences gouvernementales, ces listes spécifiques à chaque fonction ne permettaient pas de partager facilement et précisément les informations. Cela a rendu nécessaire la création d’une liste nationale des établissements.

Que faut-il faire pour en créer une ?

Une liste complète des établissements de santé peut être établie en faisant une cartographie ou en rassemblant des listes existantes. C’est le ministère de la Santé qui doit en être responsable. Il doit créer, développer et mettre à jour cette base de données.

Les partenariats jouent un rôle clé dans ce processus. Plusieurs acteurs peuvent contribuer : bailleurs de fonds, ONG humanitaires, partenaires techniques, instituts de recherche. Beaucoup d’entre eux ont déjà leurs propres listes, créées pour des projets spécifiques. Ces listes devraient être réunies dans une base centralisée, gérée par le ministère.

Les partenariats sont essentiels pour élaborer des listes d’établissements. Les parties prenantes comprennent les bailleurs de fonds, les partenaires humanitaires et chargés de la mise en œuvre, les conseillers techniques et les instituts de recherche. Beaucoup d’entre eux disposent de leurs propres listes basées sur des projets, qui devraient être intégrées dans une liste centralisée gérée par le ministère. Le ministère de la Santé doit favoriser un climat de transparence, en encourageant les citoyens et les parties prenantes à contribuer à l’amélioration des données sur les établissements de santé.

Les gouvernements doivent s’engager sur le plan politique et financier. Créer et actualiser une bonne liste des centres de santé demande de l’argent, du personnel formé et des moyens adaptés.

Il est important de s’engager à rendre ces données accessibles à tous. Quand les listes sont en libre accès, elles deviennent plus complètes, plus fiables et plus utiles pour tout le monde.

The Conversation

Peter Macharia bénéficie d’un financement du Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- Belgique (FWO, numéro 1201925N) pour sa bourse postdoctorale senior.

Emelda Okiro bénéficie d’un financement pour ses recherches de la part du Wellcome Trust dans le cadre d’une bourse senior Wellcome Trust (n° 224272).

ref. Accès aux soins en Afrique : pourquoi cartographier les établissements de santé peut sauver des vies – https://theconversation.com/acces-aux-soins-en-afrique-pourquoi-cartographier-les-etablissements-de-sante-peut-sauver-des-vies-260441

Calls to designate the Bishnoi gang a terrorist group shine a spotlight on Canada’s security laws

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Basema Al-Alami, SJD Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto

British Columbia Premier David Eby recently called on Prime Minister Mark Carney to designate the India-based Bishnoi gang a terrorist organization.

Brampton Mayor Patrick Brown echoed the request days later. The RCMP has also alleged the gang may be targeting pro-Khalistan activists in Canada.

These claims follow a series of high-profile incidents in India linked to the Bishnoi network, including the murder of a Punjabi rapper in New Delhi, threats against a Bollywood actor and the killing of a Mumbai politician in late 2024.

How terrorism designations work

Eby’s request raises broader legal questions. What does it mean to label a group a terrorist organization in Canada and what happens once that label is applied?

Under Section 83.05 of the Criminal Code, the federal government can designate an entity a terrorist organization if there are “reasonable grounds to believe” it has engaged in, supported or facilitated terrorist activity. The term “entity” is defined broadly, covering individuals, groups, partnerships and unincorporated associations.

The process begins with intelligence and law enforcement reports submitted to the public safety minister, who may then recommend listing the group to cabinet if it’s believed the legal threshold is met. If cabinet agrees, the group is officially designated a terrorist organization.

A designation carries serious consequences: assets can be frozen and financial dealings become criminalized. Banks and other institutions are protected from liability if they refuse to engage with the group. Essentially, the designation cuts the group off from economic and civic life, often without prior notice or public hearing.

As of July 2025, Canada has listed 86 entities, from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to far-right and nationalist organizations. In February, the government added seven violent criminal groups from Latin America, including the Sinaloa cartel and La Mara Salvatrucha, known as the MS-13.

This marked a turning point: for the first time, Canada extended terrorism designations beyond ideological or political movements to include transnational criminal networks.

Why the shift matters

This shift reflects a deeper redefinition of what Canada considers a national security threat. For much of the post-9/11 era, counterterrorism efforts in Canada have concentrated on groups tied to ideological, religious or political agendas — most often framed through the lens of Islamic terrorism.

This has determined not only who is targeted, but also what forms of violence are taken seriously as national security concerns.

That is why the recent expansion of terrorism designations — first with the listing of Mexican cartels in early 2025, and now potentially with the Bishnoi gang — feels so significant.

It signals a shift away from targeting ideology alone and toward labelling profit-driven organized crime as terrorism. While transnational gangs may pose serious public safety risks, designating them terrorist organizations could erode the legal and political boundaries that once separated counterterrorism initiatives from criminal law.

Canada’s terrorism listing process only adds to these concerns. The decision is made by cabinet, based on secret intelligence, with no obligation to inform the group or offer a chance to respond. Most of the evidence remains hidden, even from the courts.

While judicial review is technically possible, it is limited, opaque and rarely successful.

In effect, the label becomes final. It brings serious legal consequences like asset freezes, criminal charges and immigration bans. But the informal fallout can be just as harsh: banks shut down accounts, landlords back out of leases, employers cut ties. Even without a trial or conviction, the stigma of being associated with a listed group can dramatically change someone’s life.

What’s at stake

Using terrorism laws to go after violent criminal networks like the Bishnoi gang may seem justified. But it quietly expands powers that were originally designed for specific types of threats. It also stretches a national security framework already tainted by racial and political bias.




Read more:
Canadian law enforcement agencies continue to target Muslims


For more than two decades, Canada’s counterterrorism laws have disproportionately targeted Muslim and racialized communities under a logic of pre-emptive suspicion. Applying those same powers to organized crime, especially when it impacts immigrant and diaspora communities, risks reproducing that harm under a different label.

Canadians should be asking: what happens when tools built for exceptional threats become the default response to complex criminal violence?

As the federal government considers whether to label the Bishnoi gang a terrorist organization, the real question goes beyond whether the group meets the legal test. It’s about what kind of legal logic Canada is endorsing.

Terrorism designations carry sweeping powers, with little oversight and lasting consequences. Extending those powers to organized crime might appear pragmatic, but it risks normalizing a process that has long operated in the shadows, shaped by secrecy and executive discretion.

As national security law expands, Canadians should ask not just who gets listed, but how those decisions are made and what broader political agendas they might serve.

The Conversation

Basema Al-Alami does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Calls to designate the Bishnoi gang a terrorist group shine a spotlight on Canada’s security laws – https://theconversation.com/calls-to-designate-the-bishnoi-gang-a-terrorist-group-shine-a-spotlight-on-canadas-security-laws-259844