Category: Analysis

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Garret Martin, Hurst Senior Professorial Lecturer, Co-Director Transatlantic Policy Center, American University School of International Service

The U.S. bombing of three Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, 2025, sent shock waves around the world. It marked a dramatic reversal for the Trump administration, which had just initiated negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. Dispensing with diplomacy, the U.S. opted for the first time for direct military involvement in the then-ongoing Israeli-Iranian conflict.

European governments have long pushed for a diplomatic solution to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Yet, the reaction in the capitals of Europe to the U.S. bombing of the nuclear facilities was surprisingly subdued.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted Israel’s “right to defend itself and protect its people.” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was equally supportive, arguing that “this is dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us.” And a joint statement by the E3 – France, the U.K. and Germany – tacitly justified the U.S. bombing as necessary to prevent the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons.

Europe’s responses to the Israeli and American strikes were noteworthy because of how little they discussed the legality of the attacks. There was no such hesitation when Russia targeted civilian nuclear energy infrastructure in Ukraine in 2022.

But the timid reaction also underscored Europe’s bystander role, contrasting with its past approach on that topic. Iran’s nuclear program had been a key focal point of European diplomacy for years. The E3 nations initiated negotiations with Tehran back in 2003. They also helped to facilitate the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which also included Russia, the European Union, China, the U.S. and Iran. And the Europeans sought to preserve the agreement, even after the unilateral U.S. withdrawal in 2018 during President Donald Trump’s first term.

As a scholar of transatlantic relations and security, I believe Europe faces long odds to once again play an impactful role in strengthening the cause of nuclear nonproliferation with Iran. Indeed, contributing to a new nuclear agreement with Iran would require Europe to fix a major rift with Tehran, overcome its internal divisions over the Middle East and manage a Trump administration that seems less intent on being a reliable ally for Europe.

Growing rift between Iran and Europe

For European diplomats, the 2015 deal was built on very pragmatic assumptions. It only covered the nuclear dossier, as opposed to including other areas of contention such as human rights or Iran’s ballistic missile program. And it offered a clear bargain: In exchange for greater restrictions on its nuclear program, Iran could expect the lifting of some existing sanctions and a reintegration into the world economy.

As a result, the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018 posed a fundamental challenge to the status quo. Besides exiting, the Trump White House reimposed heavy secondary sanctions on Iran, which effectively forced foreign companies to choose between investing in the U.S. and Iranian markets. European efforts to mitigate the impact of these U.S. sanctions failed, thus undermining the key benefit of the deal for Iran: helping its battered economy. It also weakened Tehran’s faith in the value of Europe as a partner, as it revealed an inability to carve real independence from the U.S.

After 2018, relations between Europe and Iran deteriorated significantly. Evidence of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism and Iran-linked plots on European soil hardly helped. Moreover, Europeans strongly objected to Iran supplying Russia with drones in support of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine – and later on, ballistic missiles as well. On the flip side, Iran deeply objected to European support for Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks.

These deep tensions remain a significant impediment to constructive negotiations on the nuclear front. Neither side currently has much to offer to the other, nor can Europe count on any meaningful leverage to influence Iran. And Europe’s wider challenges in its Middle East policy only compound this problem.

Internal divisions

In 2015, Europe could present a united front on the Iranian nuclear deal in part because of its limited nature. But with the nonproliferation regime now in tatters amid Trump’s unilateral actions and the spread of war across the region, it is now far harder for European diplomats to put the genie back in the bottle. That is particularly true given the present fissures over increasingly divisive Middle East policy questions and the nature of EU diplomacy.

Europe remains very concerned about stability in the Middle East, including how conflicts might launch new migratory waves like in 2015-16, when hundreds of thousands of Syrians fled to mainland Europe. The EU also remains very active economically in the region and is the largest funder of the Palestinian Authority. But it has been more of a “payer than player” in the region, struggling to translate economic investment into political influence.

In part, this follows from the longer-term tendency to rely on U.S. leadership in the region, letting Washington take the lead in trying to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But it also reflects the deeper divisions between EU member nations.

With foreign policy decisions requiring unanimity, EU members have often struggled to speak with one voice on the Middle East. Most recently, the debates over whether to suspend the economic association agreement with Israel over its actions in Gaza or whether to recognize a Palestinian state clearly underscored the existing EU internal disagreements.

Unless Europe can develop a common approach toward the Middle East, it is hard to see it having enough regional influence to matter in future negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. This, in turn, would also affect how it manages its crucial, but thorny, relations with the U.S.

Europe in the shadow of Trump

The EU was particularly proud of the 2015 nuclear deal because it represented a strong symbol of multilateral diplomacy. It brought together great powers in the spirit of bolstering the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Ten years on, the prospects of replicating such international cooperation seem rather remote. Europe’s relations with China and Russia – two key signers of the original nuclear deal – have soured dramatically in recent years. And ties with the United States under Trump have also been particularly challenging.

Dealing with Washington, in the context of the Iran nuclear program, presents a very sharp dilemma for Europe.

Trying to carve a distinct path may be appealing, but it lacks credibility at this stage. Recent direct talks with Iranian negotiators produced little, and Europe is not in a position to give Iran guarantees that it would not face new strikes from Israel.

And pursuing an independent path could easily provoke the ire of Trump, which Europeans are keen to avoid. There has already been a long list of transatlantic disputes, whether over trade, Ukraine or defense spending. European policymakers would be understandably reticent to invest time and resources in any deal that Trump could again scuttle at a moment’s notice.

Trump, too, is scornful of what European diplomacy could achieve, declaring recently that Iran doesn’t want to talk to Europe. He has instead prioritized bilateral negotiations with Tehran. Alignment with the U.S., therefore, may not translate into any great influence. Trump’s decision to bomb Iran, after all, happened without forewarning for his allies.

Thus, Europe will continue to pay close attention to Iran’s nuclear program. But, constrained by poor relations with Tehran and its internal divisions on the Middle East, it is unlikely that it will carve out a major role on the nuclear dossier as long as Trump is in office.

Garret Martin receives funding from the European Union for the organization, the Transatlantic Policy Center, that he co-directs.

– ref. Europe is stuck in a bystander role over Iran’s nuclear program after US, Israeli bombs establish facts on the ground – https://theconversation.com/europe-is-stuck-in-a-bystander-role-over-irans-nuclear-program-after-us-israeli-bombs-establish-facts-on-the-ground-260740

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Pintu Kumar Mahla, Research Associate at the Water Resources Research Institute, University of Arizona

With the future of a crucial water-sharing treaty between India and Pakistan up in the air, one outside party is looking on with keen interest: China.

For 65 years, the Indus Waters Treaty has seen the two South Asian rivals share access and use of the Indus Basin, a vast area covered by the Indus River and its tributaries that also stretches into Afghanistan and China.

For much of that history, there has been widespread praise for the agreement as a successful demonstration of cooperation between adversarial states over a key shared resource. But experts have noted the treaty has long held the potential for conflict. Drafters failed to factor in the effects of climate change, and the Himalayan glaciers that feed the rivers are now melting at record rates, ultimately putting at risk the long-term sustainability of water supply. Meanwhile, the ongoing conflict over Kashmir, where much of the basin is situated, puts cooperation at risk.

With treaty on ice, China steps in

That latest provocation threatening the treaty was a terrorist attack in the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025. In response to that attack, which India blamed on Pakistan and precipitated a four-day confrontation, New Delhi temporarily suspended the treaty.

But even before that attack, India and Pakistan had been locked in negotiation over the future of the treaty – the status of which has been in the hands of international arbitrators since 2016. In the latest development, on June 27, 2025, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a supplementary award in favor of Pakistan, arguing that India’s holding of the treaty in abeyance did not affect its jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, the treaty does not allow for either party to unilaterally suspend the treaty, the ruling suggested.

Amid the wrangling over the treaty’s future, Pakistan has turned to China for diplomatic and strategic support. Such support was evident during the conflict that took place following April’s terrorist attack, during which Pakistan employed Chinese-made fighter jets and other military equipment against its neighbor.

Meanwhile, in an apparent move to counter India’s suspension of the treaty, China and Pakistan have ramped up construction of a major dam project that would provide water supply and electricity to parts of Pakistan.

So, why is China getting involved? In part, it reflects the strong relationship between Pakistan and China, developed over six decades.

But as an expert in hydro politics, I believe Beijing’s involvement raises concerns: China is not a neutral observer in the dispute. Rather, Beijing has long harbored a desire to increase its influence in the region and to counter an India long seen as a rival. Given the at-times fraught relationship between China and India – the two countries went to war in 1962 and continue to engage in sporadic border skirmishes – there are concerns in New Delhi that Beijing may respond by disrupting the flow of rivers in its territory that feed into India.

In short, any intervention by Beijing over the Indus Waters Treaty risks stirring up regional tensions.

Wrangling over waters

The Indus Waters Treaty has already endured three armed conflicts between Pakistan and India, and until recently it served as an exemplar of how to forge a successful bilateral agreement between two rival neighbors.

Under the initial terms of the treaty, which each country signed in 1960, India was granted control over three eastern rivers the countries share – Ravi, Beas and Satluj – with an average annual flow of 40.4 billion cubic meters. Meanwhile, Pakistan was given access to almost 167.2 billion cubic meters of water from the western rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

In India, the relatively smaller distribution has long been the source of contention, with many believing the treaty’s terms are overly generous to Pakistan. India’s initial demand was for 25% of the Indus waters.

For Pakistan, the terms of the division of the Indus Waters Treaty are painful because they concretized unresolved land disputes tied to the partition of India in 1947. In particular, the division of the rivers is framed within the broader political context of Kashmir. The three major rivers – Indus, Jhelum and Chenab – flow through Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir before entering the Pakistan-controlled western part of the Kashmir region.

But the instability of the Kashmir region – disputes around the Line of Control separating the Indian- and Pakistan-controlled areas are common – underscores Pakistan’s water vulnerability.

Nearly 65% of Pakistanis live in the Indus Basin region, compared with 14% for India. It is therefore not surprising that Pakistan has warned that any attempt to cut off the water supply, as India has threatened, would be considered an act of war.

It also helps to explain Pakistan’s desire to develop hydropower on the rivers it controls. One-fifth of Pakistan’s electricity comes from hydropower, and nearly 21 hydroelectric power plants are located in the Indus Basin region.

Since Pakistan’s economy relies heavily on agriculture and the water needed to maintain agricultural land, the fate of the Indus Waters Treaty is of the utmost importance to Pakistan’s leaders.

Such conditions have driven Islamabad to be a willing partner with China in a bid to shore up its water supply.

China provides technical expertise and financial support to Pakistan for numerous hydropower projects in Pakistan, including the Diamer Bhasha Dam and Kohala Hydropower Project. These projects play a significant role in addressing Pakistan’s energy requirements and have been a key aspect of the transboundary water relationship between the two nations.

Using water as a weapon?

With it’s rivalry with India and its desire to simultaneously work with Pakistan on numerous issues, China increasingly sees itself as a stakeholder in the Indus Waters Treaty, too. Chinese media narratives have framed India as the aggressor in the dispute, warning of the danger of using “water as a weapon” and noting that the source of the Indus River lies in China’s Western Tibet region.

Doing so fits Beijing’ s greater strategic presence in South Asian politics. After the terrorist attack, China Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s support for Pakistan, showcasing the relationship as an “all-weather strategic” partnership and referring to Pakistan as an “ironclad friend.”

And in response to India’s suspension of the treaty, China announced it was to accelerate work on the significant Mohmand hydropower project on the tributary of the Indus River in Pakistan.

Chinese investment in Pakistan’s hydropower sector presents substantial opportunities for both countries in regards to energy security and promoting economic growth.

The Indus cascade project under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative, for example, promises to provide cumulative hydropower generation capacity of around 22,000 megawatts. Yet the fact that project broke ground in Gilgit-Baltistan, a disputed area in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, underscores the delicacy of the situation.

Beijing’s backing of Pakistan is largely motivated by a mix of economic and geopolitical interests, particularly in legitimizing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. But it comes at the cost of stirring up regional tensions.

As such, the alignment of Chinese and Pakistani interests in developing hydro projects can pose a further challenge to the stability of South Asia’s water-sharing agreements, especially in the Indus Basin. Recently, the chief minister of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which borders China, warned that Beijing’s hydro projects in the Western Tibet region amount to a ticking “water bomb.”

To diffuse such tensions – and to get the Indus Waters Treaty back on track – it behooves India, China and Pakistan to engage in diplomacy and dialogue. Such engagement is, I believe, essential in addressing the ongoing water-related challenges in South Asia.

Pintu Kumar Mahla is affiliated with the Water Resources Research Center, the University of Arizona. He is also a member of the International Association of Water Law (AIDA).

Pintu Kumar Mahla has not received funding related to this article.

– ref. China’s insertion into India-Pakistan waters dispute adds a further ripple in South Asia – https://theconversation.com/chinas-insertion-into-india-pakistan-waters-dispute-adds-a-further-ripple-in-south-asia-258891

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

Conflict in Syria has escalated with Israel launching bombing raids against its northern neighbour.

It follows months of fluctuating tensions in southern Syria between the Druze minority and forces aligned with the new government in Damascus. Clashes erupted in the last few days, prompting Israeli airstrikes in defence of the Druze by targeting government bases, tanks, and heavy weaponry.

Israel Minister Amichai Chikli has called the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa –

a terrorist, a barbaric murderer who should be eliminated without delay.

Despite the incendiary language, a ceasefire has been reached, halting the fighting – for now.

Syrian forces have begun withdrawing heavy military equipment from the region, while Druze fighters have agreed to suspend armed resistance, allowing government troops to regain control of the main Druze city of Suwayda.

What do the Druze want?

The Druze are a small religious minority estimated at over one million people, primarily concentrated in the mountainous regions of Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan.

In Syria, their population is estimated at around 700,000 (of around 23 million total Syrian population), with the majority residing in the southern As-Suwayda Governorate – or province – which serves as their traditional stronghold.

Since the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime, the Druze have maintained a degree of autonomy, successfully defending their territory from various threats, including ISIS and other jihadist groups.

Following Assad’s fall late last year, the Druze — along with other minority groups such as the Kurds in the east and Alawites in the west — have called for the country to be federalized.

They advocate for a decentralised model that would grant greater autonomy to regional communities.

However, the transitional government in Damascus is pushing for a centralised state and seeking to reassert full control over the entire Syrian territory. This fundamental disagreement has led to periodic clashes between Druze forces and government-aligned troops.

Despite the temporary ceasefire, tensions remain high. Given the core political dispute remains unresolved, many expect renewed conflict to erupt in the near future.

Why is Israel involved?

The ousting of the Assad regime created a strategic opening for Israel to expand its influence in southern Syria. Israel’s involvement is driven by two primary concerns:

1. Securing its northern border

Israel views the power vacuum in Syria’s south as a potential threat, particularly the risk of anti-Israeli militias establishing a foothold near its northern border.

During the recent clashes, the Israeli military declared

The Israeli Defence Forces will not allow a military threat to exist in southern Syria and will act against it.

Likewise, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has stated he will not allow Syrian forces south of Damascus:

We are acting to prevent the Syrian regime from harming them [the Druze] and to ensure the demilitarisation of the area adjacent to our border with Syria.

In line with these warnings, the Israeli Air Force has conducted extensive strikes against Syrian military infrastructure, targeting bases, aircraft, tanks, and heavy weaponry.

These operations are intended to prevent any future buildup of military capacity that could be used against Israel from the Syrian side of the border.

2. Supporting a federated Syria

Israel is backing the two prominent allied minorities in Syria — the Kurds in the northeast and the Druze in the south — in their push for a federal governance model.

A fragmented Syria, divided along ethnic and religious lines, is seen by some Israeli policymakers as a way to maintain Israeli domination in the region.

This vision is part of what some Israeli officials have referred to as a “New Middle East” — one where regional stability and normalisation emerge through reshaped borders and alliances.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar recently echoed this strategy, stating:

A single Syrian state with effective control and sovereignty over all its territory is unrealistic.

For Israel, the logical path forward is autonomy for the various minorities in Syria within a federal structure.

The United States’ role?

According to unconfirmed reports, Washington has privately urged Israel to scale back its military strikes on Syria in order to prevent further escalation and preserve regional stability.

The US is promoting increased support for Syria’s new regime in an effort to help it reassert control and stabilise the country.

There are also indications the US and its allies are encouraging the Syrian government to move toward normalisation with Israel. Reports suggest Tel Aviv has held talks with the new Sharaa-led regime about the possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords (diplomatic agreements between Israel and several Arab states), which the regime in Damascus appears open to.

US Special Envoy Tom Barrack has described the recent clashes as “worrisome”, calling for de-escalation and emphasising the need for

a peaceful, inclusive outcome for all stakeholders – including the Druze, Bedouin tribes, the Syrian government, and Israeli forces.

Given the deep-rooted political divisions, competing regional agendas, and unresolved demands from minority groups, the unrest in southern Syria is unlikely to end soon.

Despite another temporary ceasefire, underlying tensions remain. Further clashes are not only possible but highly probable.

Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why is Israel bombing Syria? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-israel-bombing-syria-261259

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Andrew Latham, Professor of Political Science, Macalester College

Many column inches have been dedicated to dissecting the “great power rivalry” currently playing out between China and the U.S.

But what makes a power “great” in the realm of international relations?

Unlike other states, great powers possess a capacity to shape not only their immediate surroundings but the global order itself – defining the rules, norms and structures that govern international politics. Historically, they have been seen as the architects of world systems, exercising influence far beyond their neighborhoods.

The notion of great powers came about to distinguish between the most and least powerful states. The concept gained currency after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 – events in Europe that helped establish the notion of sovereign states and the international laws governing them.

Whereas the great powers of the previous eras – for example, the Roman Empire – sought to expand their territory at almost every turn and relied on military power to do so, the modern great power utilizes a complex tapestry of diplomatic pressure, economic leverage and the assertions of international law. The order emerging out of Westphalia enshrined the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which allowed these powers to pursue a balance of power as codified by the Congress of Vienna based on negotiation as opposed to domination.

This transformation represented a momentous development in world politics: At least some portion of the legitimacy of a state’s control was now realized through its relationships and capacity to keep the peace, rather than resting solely on its ability to use force.

From great to ‘super’

Using their material capabilities – economic strength, military might and political influence – great powers have been able to project power across multiple regions and dictate the terms of international order.

In the 19th-century Concert of Europe, the great powers – Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia – collectively managed European politics, balancing power to maintain stability. Their influence extended globally through imperial expansion, trade and the establishment of norms that reflected their priorities.

During the 20th century, the Cold War brought a stark distinction between great powers and other states. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, as the era’s two “superpowers,” dominated the international system, shaping it through a rivalry that encompassed military alliances, ideological competition and economic systems. Great powers in this context were not merely powerful states but the central actors defining the structure of global politics.

Toward a multipolar world

The post-Cold War period briefly ushered in a unipolar moment, with the U.S. as the sole great power capable of shaping the international system on a global scale.

This era was marked by the expansion of liberal internationalism, economic globalization and U.S.-led-and-constructed multilateralism.

However, the emergence of new centers of power, particularly China and to a lesser extent Russia, has brought the unipolar era to a close, ushering in a multipolar world where the distinctive nature of great powers is once again reshaped.

In this system, great powers are states with the material capabilities and strategic ambition to influence the global order as a whole.

And here they differ from regional powers, whose influence is largely confined to specific areas. Nations such as Turkey, India, Australia, Brazil and Japan are influential within their neighborhoods. But they lack the global reach of the U.S. or China to fundamentally alter the international system.

Instead, the roles of these regional powers is often defined by stabilizing their regions, addressing local challenges or acting as intermediaries in great power competition.

Challenging greatness

Yet the multipolar world presents unique challenges for today’s great powers. The diffusion of power means that no single great power can dominate the system as the U.S. did in the post-Cold War unipolar era.

Instead, today’s great powers must navigate complex dynamics, balancing competition with cooperation. For instance, the rivalry between Washington and Beijing is now a defining feature of global politics, spanning trade, technology, military strategy and ideological influence. Meanwhile, Russia’s efforts to maintain its great power status have resulted in more assertive, though regionally focused, actions that nonetheless have global implications.

Great powers must also contend with the constraints of interdependence. The interconnected nature of the global economy, the proliferation of advanced technologies and the rise of transnational challenges such as climate change and pandemics limit the ability of any one great power to unilaterally dictate outcomes. This reality forces great powers to prioritize their core interests while finding ways to manage global issues through cooperation, even amid intense competition.

As the world continues to adjust to multiple centers of power, the defining feature of great powers remains an unmatched capacity to project influence globally and define the parameters of the international order.

Whether through competition, cooperation or conflict, the actions of great powers will, I believe, continue to shape the trajectory of the global system, making their distinctiveness as central players in international relations more relevant than ever.

This article is part of a series explaining foreign policy terms commonly used but rarely explained.

Andrew Latham does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What makes ‘great powers’ great? And how will they adapt to a multipolar world? – https://theconversation.com/what-makes-great-powers-great-and-how-will-they-adapt-to-a-multipolar-world-260969

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Kester Onor, Senior Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

Nigeria’s former president, Muhammadu Buhari, who died in London on 13 July aged 82, was one of two former military heads of state who were later elected as civilian presidents. Buhari was the military head of state of Nigeria from 31 December 1983 to 27 August 1985 and president from 2015 to 2023.

The other Nigerian politician to have been in both roles is former president Olusegun Obasanjo . He was a military ruler between 1976 and 1979 and elected president between 1999 and 2007.

Buhari led Nigeria cumulatively for nearly a decade. His time as military head of state was marked with a war against corruption but he couldn’t do as much during his time as president under democratic rule.

As a political scientist who once served in the Nigerian Army, I believe that former president Buhari’s government’s war on terrorism was largely underwhelming, despite promises and early gains.

In his elected role, Buhari maintained a modest personal lifestyle and upheld electoral transitions. Nevertheless his presidency was marred by economic mismanagement, a failure to implement bold structural reforms, ethnic favouritism, and an unfulfilled promise of change.

He did leave tangible infrastructural footprints, a focus on agriculture, and foundational efforts in transparency and anti-corruption.

So his mark on Nigeria’s development trajectory was mixed.

Early years

Buhari was born on 17 December 1942, to Adamu and Zulaiha Buhari in Daura, Katsina State, north-west Nigeria. He was four years old when his father died. He attended Quranic school in Katsina. He was a Fulani, one of the major ethnic nationalities in Nigeria.

After completing his schooling, Buhari joined the army in 1961. He had military training in the UK, India and the United States as well as Nigeria.

In 1975 he was appointed military governor of North Eastern State (now Borno State), after being involved in ousting Yakubu Gowon in a coup that same year. He served as governor for a year.

Buhari later became federal commissioner for petroleum resources, overseeing Nigeria’s petroleum industry under Obasanjo. Obasanjo had become head of state in 1976 when Gowon’s successor, Murtala Muhammed, was assassinated in a failed coup that year.

In September 1979, he returned to regular army duties and commanded the 3rd Armoured division based in Jos, Plateau State, north central. Nigeria’s Second Republic commenced that year after the election of Shehu Shagari as president.

The coup that truncated the Shagari government on 31 December 1983 saw the emergence of Buhari as Nigeria’s head of state.

Buhari’s junta years

Buhari headed the military government for just under two years. He was ousted in another coup on 27 August 1985.

While at the helm he vowed that the government would not tolerate kick-backs, inflation of contracts and over-invoicing of imports. Nor would it condone forgery, fraud, embezzlement, misuse and abuse of office and illegal dealings in foreign exchange and smuggling.

Eighteen state governors were tried by military tribunals. Some of the accused received lengthy prison sentences, while others were acquitted or had their sentences commuted.

His government also enacted the notorious Decree 4 under which two journalists, Nduka Irabor and Dele Thompson, were jailed. The charges stemmed from three articles published on the reorganisation of Nigeria’s diplomatic service.

Buhari also instituted austerity measures and started a “War Against Indiscipline” which sought to promote positive values in the country. Authoritarian methods were sometimes used in its implementation. Soldiers forced Nigerians to queue, to be punctual and to obey traffic laws.

He also instituted restrictions on press and political freedoms. Labour unions were not spared either. Mass retrenchment of Nigerians in the public service was carried out with impunity.

While citizens initially welcomed some of these measures, growing discontent on the economic front made things tougher for the regime.

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Read more:
Why Buhari won even though he had little to show for first term

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Buhari, the democrat

Buhari’s dream to lead Nigeria again through the ballot box failed in 2003, 2007 and 2011. To his credit, he didn’t give up. An alliance of opposition parties succeeded in getting him elected in 2015.

The legacy he left is mixed.

Buhari’s government deepened national disunity.

His appointments, often skewed in favour of the northern region and his Fulani kinsmen, fuelled accusations of tribalism and marginalisation. His perceived affinity with Fulani herdsmen, despite widespread violence linked to some of them, further eroded public trust in his leadership.

His anti-corruption mantra largely did not succeed. While some high-profile recoveries were made, critics argue that his anti-corruption war was selective and heavily politicised.

Currently, his Central Bank governor is on trial for corruption charges.

The performance of the economy was also dismal under his tenure. Not all these problems could be laid at his feet. Nevertheless his inability to tackle the country’s underlying problems, such as insecurity, inflation and rising unemployment, all contributed. He presided over two recessions, rising unemployment, inflation, and a weakened naira.

He did, however, succeed on some fronts.

He tried with infrastructure. The Lagos-Ibadan expressway, a major road, was almost completed and he got the railways working again, completing the Abuja-Kaduna and Lagos-Ibadan lines. He also completed the Second Niger Bridge.

There was an airport revitalisation programme which led to improvements in Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt airports.

Buhari signed the Petroleum Industry Act after nearly 20 years’ delay. This is now attracting more investments into the oil industry.

He also initiated some social investment schemes like N-Power, N-Teach and a school feeding programme. They provided temporary jobs for some and gave some poor people more money in their pockets. N-Power is a youth empowerment programme designed to combat unemployment, improve social development and provide people with relevant skills.

These programmes later became mired in corruption which only became known after he left office.

There was also an Anchor Borrowers Scheme to make the country more sufficient in rice production. Again, it got enmeshed in corruption and some of its officials are currently standing trial.

In the fight against corruption, the Buhari administration made some progress through the Treasury Single Account, which improved financial transparency in public institutions. The Whistle Blower Policy also led to the recovery of looted funds.

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Read more:
Why Buhari’s government is losing the anti-corruption war

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Security failures

Buhari oversaw a deterioration of Nigeria’s security landscape. Banditry, farmer-herder clashes, kidnapping and separatist agitations escalated.

In 2015 Buhari campaigned on a promise to defeat Boko Haram and restore territorial integrity in the north-east. Initially, his administration made some progress. Boko Haram was driven out of several local government areas it once controlled, and major military operations such as Operation Lafiya Dole were launched to reclaim territory.

However, these initial successes were not sustained. Boko Haram splintered, giving rise to more brutal factions like the Islamic State West Africa Province. This group continued to launch deadly attacks.

Buhari’s counter-terrorism strategy was often reactive, lacking a clear long-term doctrine. The military was overstretched and under-equipped. Morale issues and allegations of corruption in the defence sector undermined operations.

Intelligence coordination remained poor, while civil-military relations suffered due to frequent human rights abuses by security forces. Community trust in the government’s ability to provide security dwindled.

Buhari’s second coming as Nigeria’s leader carried high expectations, but he under-delivered.

Kester Onor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Muhammadu Buhari: Nigeria’s military leader turned democratic president leaves a mixed legacy – https://theconversation.com/muhammadu-buhari-nigerias-military-leader-turned-democratic-president-leaves-a-mixed-legacy-261079