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July 31, 2025

Why Donald Trump has stopped some conflicts but is failing with Ukraine and Gaza

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

In yet another twist in his unpredictable decision making, US president Donald Trump has dramatically shortened his original 50-day ultimatum to Vladimir Putin to call a ceasefire in Ukraine to a mere ten days. It’s an unmistakable sign of Trump’s frustration with the Russian leader who he now appears to view as the main obstacle to ending the war.

Progress has been similarly limited on another of Trump’s flagship foreign policy projects: ending the war in Gaza. As a humanitarian catastrophe engulfs the territory, Trump and some of his Maga base are finally challenging Israel’s denials that, after almost two years of war, many Gazans now face a real risk of starvation.

In neither case have his efforts to mediate and bring an end to the violence borne any fruit. But not all of Trump’s efforts to stop violence in conflicts elsewhere in the world have been similarly futile. The administration brokered a ceasefire between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which the two countries’ foreign ministers signed in Washington on June 27.

The US president has also claimed to be behind the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May after the two sides had engaged in several days of fierce combat following a terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir by a Pakistan-backed rebel group. And, drawing a clear parallel between this conflict and the border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand in July, Trump announced he had pushed both countries’ leaders to negotiate a ceasefire.

All of these ceasefires, so far, have held. By contrast, the ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, to which Trump contributed in January, even before he was inaugurated for his second term, broke down in March and fighting has escalated ever since. A short-lived ceasefire in Ukraine in April was barely worth its name given the countless violations.

Mixed record

Three factors can explain Trump’s mixed record of peacemaking to date. First, the US president is more likely to succeed in stopping the fighting where he has leverage and is willing to use it to force foreign leaders to bend to his will. For example, Trump was very clear that there would be no trade negotiations with Thailand or Cambodia “until such time as the fighting STOPS”.

The crucial difference, so far, with the situation in the war against Ukraine is that Trump has, and has used, similar leverage only with the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. This led to a US-Ukraine agreement on a 30-day ceasefire proposal just two weeks after the now-notorious row between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office.

The mere threat of sanctions against Russia, by contrast, has done little to persuade Putin to accept whatever deal might Trump offer him. Trump’s threats – which he has never followed through on – did not work in January or May. The Kremlin’s initial reactions to the latest ultimatum from the White House do not indicate a change in Putin’s attitude.

A second factor that may explain why Trump has had peacemaking success in some cases but not others is the level of complexity of US interests involved. When it comes to US relations with Russia and Israel, there is a lot more at stake for Trump.

The US president still appears keen to strike a grand bargain with Russia and China under which Washington, Beijing and Moscow would agree to recognise, and not interfere in, their respective spheres of influence. This could explains his hesitation so far to follow through on his threats to Putin.

Similarly, US interests in the Middle East – whether it’s over Iran’s nuclear programme or relations with America’s Gulf allies – have put strains on the alliance with Israel. Trump also needs to weigh carefully the impact of any move against, or in support of, Israel on his domestic support base.

In the deal Trump brokered between Rwanda and the DRC, the issues at stake were much simpler: access for US investors to the mineral riches of the eastern DRC. Just days into his second term, Trump acknowledged that the conflict was a “very serious problem”. Congo’s president, Felix Tshisekedi, responded by offering the US access to minerals in exchange for pushing Rwanda to a deal to end the invasion and stop supporting proxy forces in the DRC.

This leads to the third factor that has enabled Trump’s peace-making success so far: simpler solutions are easier to achieve. Thailand and Cambodia and India and Pakistan can go back to the situation before their recent fighting. That does not resolve any of the underlying issues in their conflicts, but returns their relations to some form of non-violent stability.

It is ultimately also in the interests of the conflict parties. They have had a chance to make their violent statements and reinforce what they will and won’t tolerate from the other side. The required investment by an external mediator to end battles that have achieved what the warring sides want anyway – to avoid further escalation – is consequently quite limited.

Complex conflicts

Getting to any kind of stability in Ukraine or the Middle East by contrast requires prolonged engagement and attention to detail. These conflicts are at a stage in which a return to how things were before is not in the interests of the parties or their external backers. Nudging warring parties along on the path to agreement under such conditions requires a well-designed process, which is absent in Ukraine and failing in Gaza.

Thanks to funding and personnel cuts, the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is now required to perform multiple roles. Trump relies on personal envoys with at best limited foreign policy expertise, while insisting he makes all the decisions. This ultimately suggests that the White House simply may not have the bandwidth for the level of engagement that would be necessary to get to a deal in Ukraine and the Middle East.

This is a self-inflicted opportunity lost, not only for the United States but also for the long-suffering people of Ukraine and the Middle East.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

– ref. Why Donald Trump has stopped some conflicts but is failing with Ukraine and Gaza – https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-has-stopped-some-conflicts-but-is-failing-with-ukraine-and-gaza-262241

July 31, 2025

Flawed notions of objectivity are hampering Canadian newsrooms when it comes to Gaza

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gabriela Perdomo, Assistant Professor, Mount Royal University

The response of Canada’s legacy news media to the Israeli government’s military action in Gaza for more than 640 days points to a problem within major Canadian news organizations, according to a new Canadian book, When Genocide Wasn’t News.

In the book, journalists — some writing under pseudonyms — say their newsrooms have been severely hampered by a culture of fear and an adherence to a notion of objectivity that no longer serves the public.

Israel’s relentless military actions in the Gaza Strip following the Oct. 7, 2023 attack and taking of 251 hostages by Hamas should be prominently featured news. The Israeli Defence Forces’ illegal attacks on children, hospitals and aid workers should also be making constant headlines. But news coverage on these attacks is scarce or misleading.

I research and teach media, monitor the news and edit an online publication about journalism in Canada. My PhD thesis focused on Latin America and examined how the mandate to be objective can be confusing in times of war. I also explored questions about how journalists understand and apply objectivity in different contexts.

I found journalists who support peace efforts can easily be accused of being “biased” in favour of those promoting peace.

Not all wars covered equally

Not all wars are covered the same. Noureddine Miladi, a media and communications professor at Qatar University, found Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 received far greater coverage in mainstream media than the war in Gaza. Part of this difference in coverage lies in the ability to send reporters to cover events first hand, which is impossible in the Gaza Strip, where outside journalists are banned from entry.

Another major factor affecting coverage is how newsrooms understand and apply their norms, including objectivity. Journalism production is influenced and impacted by the dynamics of place and power that surround it.

As Carleton University journalism professor Duncan McCue argues, an unexamined adherence to objectivity can perpetuate colonial points of view. University of British Columbia journalism professors Candis Callison and Mary Lynn Young, authors of a book about journalism’s racial reckoning in Canada, also make this argument.

Accusations of antisemitism

Accusations of bias can have an outsized impact on reporting and be used to silence journalists.

According to some journalists, there is an atmosphere of fear when it comes to reporting on the Middle East in mainstream newsrooms in Canada. Some have self-censored in response to threats.

Not only do journalists say they are facing threats, they also face a context in which governments, such as the province of Ontario, are adhering to definitions of antisemitism that equate it to criticism of Israel.

In Canada, news organizations and individual journalists attempting to report on the violence in the Gaza Strip are being accused of antisemitism by groups such as Honest Reporting, according to the Canadian Press Freedom Project. This means almost anyone reporting on the Israeli government’s actions in Gaza will receive hundreds of messages claiming the report is antisemitic.

Since many scholars and the United Nations Special Committee to investigate Israeli practices have called the Israeli government’s methods “consistent with genocide, including use of starvation as weapon of war,” urgent reporting is needed — and it’s not antisemitism to call out what experts have labelled global injustices.

Left-wing bias?

The culmination of decades of this type of criticism of news media has included a right-wing narrative that accuses media of a liberal bias. The trope of the liberal media as a threat has had a steady hold of the public imagination across North America since the Cold War.

Reporters who focused on stories about human rights, questioned the tactics and budgets of the military industrial complex or challenged the mistreatment of socialist activists as being unpatriotic were accused of having a liberal, left-wing, even communist, slant.

This isn’t a phemomenon limited to North America. Latin American politicians have a long history of using “left-wing bias” labels as a powerful tool to intimidate journalists.

What do journalists owe peace?

Research shows that audiences value objective journalism, or reporting that they deem non-partisan and keeps opinions at bay. But consumers also increasingly value journalism that is empathetic and emotionally resonant.

After United States President Donald Trump was first elected in 2016, journalism scholars recognized that a major failure of news coverage during the presidential campaign was not calling things what they were. For example, journalists used euphemisms such as “he misspoke” instead of reporting that Trump was lying, contributing to a crisis of relevance in journalism.

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Israel-Gaza war has killed more journalistsr than in any other conflict it’s documented. But the allegedly deliberate targeting of journalists in Gaza, of whom at least 225 have been killed, has garnered little attention in newsrooms, despite calls by dozens of independent journalists to make the issue more visible.

This is another unprecedented set of events that should be reported on for Canadian audiences.

How will Canadian newsrooms do better? One idea could be that newsrooms join forces to fend off accusations of bias and antisemitism. They could start with reclaiming objectivity as a practice of information-gathering and moving away from objectivity as an ideal of dispassionate reporting.

They could also embrace, instead of fear, journalism’s liberal roots and reclaim journalism from a standpoint of clarity where actions against the rule of law, abuses of power, war profiteering, crimes against humanity — any illiberal acts — clearly fall on the wrong side of the liberal-democratic balance and therefore demand to be denounced. As veteran CBC journalist Carol Off has said, we need to denounce illiberal acts as anti-democratic ideology.

Every inhabitant of Gaza remains in imminent peril today, and the media have a responsibility to inform us about it.

Gabriela Perdomo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Flawed notions of objectivity are hampering Canadian newsrooms when it comes to Gaza – https://theconversation.com/flawed-notions-of-objectivity-are-hampering-canadian-newsrooms-when-it-comes-to-gaza-260552

July 31, 2025

From ‘God Emperor Trump’ to ‘St. Luigi,’ memes power the politics of feeling

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Stuart J. Murray, Professor of Rhetoric and Ethics | Professeur titulaire en rhétorique et éthique, Carleton University

Why do images of Donald Trump as a galactic emperor or Luigi Mangione as a Catholic saint resonate so deeply with some people? Memes don’t just entertain — they shape how we identify with power, grievance and justice in the digital age.

A meme is a decontextualized video or image — often captioned — that circulates an idea, behaviour or style, primarily through social media. As they spread, memes are adapted, remixed and transformed, helping to solidify the communities around them.

Trump, the meme pope

Days after Pope Francis’s death in April 2025, Trump posted an AI-generated image of himself in papal regalia on Truth Social. The White House’s official X account then shared it, amplifying its reach.

Trump quickly dismissed it as a joke, but the image lingered.

Two days later, another emerged: Trump as galactic emperor, blending Star Wars aesthetics with the visual rhetoric of Warhammer 40,000, a popular dystopian sci-fi franchise featuring authoritarian rulers, imperial armies and endless war.

Trump memes like these once circulated semi-ironically in social media subcultures like Reddit and 4chan under the banner “God Emperor Trump.”

But what might previously have seemed like absurdist cosplay now carries the symbolic weight of executive power, blending religious and imperial imagery to project Trump as a mythical figure, not just a politician.

In-jokes

As I’ve argued in an article on MAGA and empathy, these memes draw on cultural codes not to parody power but to usurp it as instruments of official political communication.

Fact-checking can’t stop them. We know they are factually untrue, but they feel true and consolidate a shared sentiment among Trump’s base.

The meme is not a joke — it’s an in-joke only the in-group understands.

And that’s the point.

A meme is an accelerant, delivering compressed emotional payloads, short-circuiting debate and reinforcing people’s political identifications. Propelled by algorithms and designed to go viral, memes solicit immediate responses — outrage, loyalty, disgust, amusement.

Memes don’t ask what’s true or what’s just.

Instead, they curate — and encode — emotional alignment, replacing liberalism’s democratic ideal of reasoned public discourse with viral attachment: grievance recoded as identity.

Elon Musk and weaponizing empathy

On Feb. 20, 2025, days after Trump appointed Elon Musk to head his new Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), the Tesla founder appeared at the Conservative Political Action Conference, an annual gathering of conservative activists and officials from across the U.S.

At the conference, Musk brandished a chainsaw, declaring: “I have become the meme!.” An image of him holding the chainsaw later actually became a meme.

The image projects libertarian efficiency and masculine bravado, but it more than just mocks bureaucracy — it glorifies cutting ties to domestic, global and humanitarian responsibilities.

Far from being merely a meme, it advances a policy of neglect that intentionally lets others die.

Experts estimate that DOGE’s purge of USAID could result in 14 million preventable deaths over the next five years, disproportionately affecting marginalized populations whose historical exploitation helped generate the wealth now wielded as power.

Individuals vs. the collective

But we are not meant to feel empathy. In early 2025, Musk called empathy “the fundamental weakness of western civilization,” claiming it is “weaponized by the left.”

Yet Musk doesn’t reject empathy entirely — only empathy for individuals, which he said risks “civilizational suicide.”

Instead, Musk believes we must have empathy for “civilization as a whole.” Such rhetoric — sacrificing individuals for the collective — recalls a chilling Nazi-era slogan: Du bist nichts, dein Volk ist alles (“You are nothing, your people are everything”). Musk has also drawn criticism for making public Nazi salutes and ethno-nationalist statements advocating for white people.

Mangione, the meme martyr

If Trump and Musk memes stage fantasies of absolute power, Mangione memes reply with fantasies of redemptive rupture.

Accused of killing UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, Mangione has been lionized in memes that champion vulnerability and social justice, opposing the billionaire class — figures like Trump and Musk — who put profits over people.

These memes appear to oppose the MAGA meme machine, encoding class struggle as quiet defiance and anti-authoritarianism. Unlike Musk’s chainsaw-wielding bravado, which seems to mask a fragile ego, Mangione memes project a humble, rebellious heartthrob.

Yet, like Trump and Musk, Mangione has become a brand. His face adorns T-shirts and “St. Luigi” prayer candles, capitalizing on the popular meme that emerged soon after his arrest. This commodification mirrors right-wing meme economies, even if the message differs.

Emotional saturation

Mangione memes have helped raise over $1.2 million for his legal defence.

They don’t just reflect feeling — they organize it, channelling it into cultural, political and literal currency, including a Luigi crypto coin ($LUIGI) and a musical.

These memes share MAGA meme tactics: relentless repetition and emotional saturation. Instead of encouraging thoughtful debate, they rally communities around shared grievances, acts of defiance and collective faith.

Feeling our way through the feed

From MAGA to Mangione, meme-mythologies often function as rationalizations of violence — whether framed as righteous, purifying or revolutionary. But what unites Trump’s papal cosplay, Musk’s chainsaw and Mangione’s martyrdom isn’t their message but their form.

Whether cloaked in MAGA nostalgia or social justice sentiments, memes that appear to resist power often reproduce the structures that made that power so intoxicating in the first place.

We’ve seen how official White House and Department of Homeland Security social media memes have become increasingly cruel, sinister, polarizing and even radicalizing.

Meanwhile, some liberals on the left continue to promote what is known as the “marketplace of ideas” — the belief that truth will prevail if all ideas are allowed to circulate freely. But reason doesn’t always triumph over power. And memes aren’t just ideas: they’re technologies that bypass deliberation to shape our feelings, identities and ways of communicating.

Consumed by media

We no longer “consume” media: we’re a function of the algorithms and AI powering today’s platforms. Like memes, AI tools like large language models can churn out plausible content that is nonetheless hateful, divisive and patently untrue.

Musk’s “I have become the meme” therefore reveals a paradox: he claims to master the meme, but no one can control its circulation or uptake. Trump and Mangione, too, are less individuals than avatars — produced by a digital culture that pre-shapes our perceptions of them.

The violence, however, is very real. If one violent act doesn’t justify counter-violence, it nonetheless structures and occasions it. Each side claims it is just.

Memes don’t ask: can we intentionally let others die and still be just? Answering this question is nearly impossible in a meme world. The answer will be a meme. And it will be a joke.

Stuart J. Murray receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

– ref. From ‘God Emperor Trump’ to ‘St. Luigi,’ memes power the politics of feeling – https://theconversation.com/from-god-emperor-trump-to-st-luigi-memes-power-the-politics-of-feeling-260388

July 31, 2025

Sénégal : réformer l’enseignement, un acte de souveraineté intellectuelle vital

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Laurent Bonardi, Professeur associé, Directeur du département MBA. Spécialiste en management et en éducation., Groupe Supdeco Dakar

Alors que l’État du Sénégal annonce une réforme curriculaire d’envergure, touchant l’ensemble des cycles de l’enseignement primaire et secondaire, la question de la qualité, de l’inclusivité et de la pertinence des contenus éducatifs revient au cœur des débats. Le chercheur Laurent Bonardi auteur d’un ouvrage critique sur le système éducatif sénégalais explique à The Conversation Africa les enjeux de cette réforme, les défis structurels de l’école sénégalaise et les leviers pour bâtir une éducation plus équitable et adaptée aux réalités locales.

Pourquoi changer les programmes d’enseignement au Sénégal ?

Au Sénégal, comme ailleurs en Afrique, l’école reste fortement marquée par les héritages de la colonisation, dans ses structures, ses langues, ses références et ses finalités. À la faveur des débats actuels sur la souveraineté et la place de la jeunesse, la question des contenus enseignés à l’école revient avec force. Et il s’agit à n’en pas douter d’une question politique qui interroge la manière dont une société pense sa transmission, son histoire et son avenir.

Le système éducatif sénégalais s’est construit sur les fondations du modèle français hérité de la période coloniale. Cette continuité historique se manifeste dans la structure même des programmes, la langue d’enseignement, les finalités implicites de l’école et l’organisation des examens. L’élève modèle, dans ce système, est celui qui maîtrise des savoirs considérés comme universels, mais dont les références culturelles, historiques ou géographiques sont souvent exogènes.

L’histoire enseignée accorde ainsi une place centrale aux conflits européens du XXe siècle. A l’inverse, les résistances africaines à la colonisation, les empires ouest-africains, ou encore les penseurs africains contemporains restent peu valorisés. En littérature aussi, le déséquilibre est patent : les élèves étudient les écrivains français Molière, Victor Hugo ou Albert Camus, mais moins en profondeur les Sénégalais comme Cheikh Hamidou Kane, Aminata Sow Fall ou Birago Diop.

En philosophie, les programmes du baccalauréat continuent de privilégier René Descartes, Emmanuel Kant ou Jean-Jacques Rousseau, avec peu de place accordée aux traditions philosophiques africaines ou aux penseurs contemporains du continent.

Outre le contenu des disciplines, les formes mêmes de savoir valorisées posent question. Les savoirs endogènes – ceux transmis par l’oralité, par l’expérience, par les pratiques sociales – sont largement absents des curricula. L’école les ignore, parfois les stigmatise, comme si seule la connaissance académique, écrite et codifiée à l’occidentale méritait d’être transmise.

Au-delà de la marginalisation des savoirs africains, ce modèle renforce le fossé entre l’école et la société. Il prépare à des trajectoires d’expatriation ou à des concours formatés, plutôt qu’à des engagements locaux, citoyens et productifs. Ce décalage nuit à l’utilité même de l’école, qui ne répond plus aux besoins économiques, sociaux et culturels du pays. D’où l’urgence d’une réforme qui ne soit pas simplement pédagogique mais aussi politique, identitaire, économique et civilisationnelle.

Réformer les programmes d’enseignement est donc une question majeure de souveraineté intellectuelle. Dans un contexte mondial marqué par les recompositions géopolitiques et les tensions identitaires, une nation qui n’enseigne pas son histoire, sa géographie, ses savoirs, se condamne à rester en marge du récit mondial. Enseigner l’Afrique à l’Afrique, le Sénégal au Sénégal, c’est faire le choix d’une école qui ne reproduit plus des modèles importés, mais qui construit ses propres repères, en lien avec son territoire, son histoire et ses aspirations.

Qu’est-ce qui doit changer concrètement ?

La réforme doit porter à la fois sur les contenus, les langues, les méthodes et les finalités de l’enseignement.

Sur les contenus, il s’agit d’équilibrer les curricula en intégrant les savoirs africains, les figures historiques du continent, les littératures africaines, les traditions philosophiques endogènes et les expériences sociales locales. Il ne s’agit pas de rejeter les savoirs dits universels, mais de les recontextualiser.

Enseigner l’écologie à partir des pratiques agricoles locales, mobiliser les contes africains pour développer le langage, ou introduire les résistants sénégalais dans les manuels d’histoire ne sont pas des options folkloriques. Ce sont de puissantes voies d’ancrage culturel et de pertinence pédagogique.

Concernant la langue d’apprentissage, une évolution est également nécessaire car la recherche montre que les apprentissages fondamentaux se construisent plus solidement lorsque l’enfant reçoit un enseignement dans sa langue maternelle. Le maintien du français comme unique langue d’enseignement dès les premières années crée ainsi une barrière linguistique et cognitive, empêchant les élèves de penser le monde avec les mots de leur culture.

L’intégration progressive des langues nationales – wolof, sérère, pulaar, etc. – dans l’enseignement fondamental apparaît donc non seulement comme souhaitable, mais véritablement essentielle pour une meilleure appropriation des apprentissages.

Quant aux formes de savoir, il faut reconnaître la valeur éducative des savoirs endogènes telles que les pharmacopées traditionnelles, les mathématiques présentes dans l’artisanat, les formes orales de transmission ou les savoir-faire locaux. Ces contenus doivent sortir de la marginalité pour devenir matière à réflexion, à recherche et à transmission.

Enfin, l’école doit valoriser les compétences utiles au développement du pays, à savoir l’esprit d’analyse avec une grille de lecture locale, la culture entrepreneuriale, les capacités à travailler dans l’agriculture, les services ou l’artisanat, souvent plus représentatifs du tissu socio-économique réel que les filières généralistes surreprésentées.

Comment réussir une telle réforme ?

La réforme curriculaire ne peut être pensée comme une série d’initiatives isolées ou de projets pilotes, comme cela a été trop souvent le cas par le passé. Elle doit être globale, cohérente et structurelle.

Elle suppose d’abord une volonté politique forte, car toucher aux programmes, c’est toucher au cœur du projet de société. Il faut oser remettre en cause les héritages coloniaux, réécrire les programmes à partir des réalités sénégalaises, repenser les finalités de l’éducation non plus comme une sortie vers l’ailleurs, mais comme une insertion et une transformation de l’ici.

Cette réforme, pour être à la hauteur de ses ambitions, demande aussi un investissement massif dans la formation des enseignants. On ne peut exiger d’eux qu’ils valorisent des savoirs endogènes ou enseignent dans les langues nationales sans les y avoir formés. Parler une langue ou connaître un domaine n’est pas le seul pré-requis pour pouvoir l’enseigner. Il faut donc revoir la formation initiale, les concours, les manuels scolaires, les outils pédagogiques et les critères d’évaluation des compétences des élèves.

Il convient également de mobiliser la recherche et les ressources nationales. Les universités, les instituts de pédagogie, les conteurs ou encore les artisans doivent être mis à contribution pour reconstruire un patrimoine éducatif national. Il faut éditer de nouveaux manuels, concevoir des outils ancrés dans le territoire afin de permettre aux enseignants de s’appuyer sur des contenus légitimes, validés, accessibles.

Enfin, il faudra affronter les freins au changement car les résistances à une réforme curriculaire n’ont pas disparu. Elles tiennent à des raisons historiques, institutionnelles, mais aussi symboliques. L’école est encore perçue, dans de nombreuses familles, comme un moyen de sortir du local, de rejoindre un univers de réussite associé à l’Occident et à l’expatriation.

Modifier les programmes en faveur de contenus africains peut alors apparaître, à tort, comme un renoncement à cette ambition. Autre aspect à ne pas négliger, les financements de l’aide internationale en matière d’éducation s’accompagnent souvent de prescriptions implicites ou explicites sur les modèles pédagogiques à adopter.

Laurent Bonardi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Sénégal : réformer l’enseignement, un acte de souveraineté intellectuelle vital – https://theconversation.com/senegal-reformer-lenseignement-un-acte-de-souverainete-intellectuelle-vital-262138

July 31, 2025

Le succès des groupes de K-pop en Europe, la consécration d’un long travail du gouvernement sud-coréen

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Sarah A. Son, Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies, University of Sheffield

Le « girl group » sud-coréen Blackpink se produira les 2 et 3 août 2025 au Stade de France, confirmant l’ampleur prise par la K-pop en France. Ce double concert illustre non seulement l’essor fulgurant du genre à l’échelle mondiale, mais aussi son implantation croissante sur la scène musicale hexagonale, portée par une stratégie culturelle coréenne ambitieuse et une communauté de fans en pleine expansion.

L’occasion pour nous de vous présenter cet article paru sur The Conversation en anglais en mars 2024, trois mois avant que le groupe de K-pop SEVENTEEN joue à Glastonbury (Angleterre).

La K-pop a atteint de nouveaux sommets internationaux au cours de la dernière décennie. Le groupe féminin Blackpink a marqué l’histoire en 2024 en rejoignant le « Billions Club » de Spotify avec leur single de 2020 How You Like That, dépassant le milliard d’écoutes. Le groupe de K-pop le plus célèbre, BTS, fait également partie de ce club grâce à ses titres Dynamite (2020) et Butter (2022).

Le succès mondial de la K-pop est le résultat d’une stratégie de marketing culturel habile, déployée par le gouvernement coréen en collaboration avec les industries créatives. Cette stratégie a coïncidé avec la généralisation de l’accès aux contenus culturels via les plates-formes de streaming et les réseaux sociaux, permettant de constituer une base de fans mondiale comptant plusieurs centaines de millions de personnes.

L’histoire du succès de la K-pop

Tout a commencé lorsque le gouvernement coréen a reconnu le potentiel économique du contenu créatif dans les années 1990. La Corée du Sud cherchait alors des moyens de se relever des ravages de la crise financière asiatique de 1997.

Même lorsque la libéralisation et la dérégulation imposées par le Fonds monétaire international ont été mises en œuvre dans les années 2000, le gouvernement a continué à soutenir les industries du cinéma, de la télévision et de la musique en gardant un contrôle ferme sur leur développement et leur exportation. Cela comprenait des incitations financières pour les sociétés de production et le développement d’infrastructures, notamment l’accès à Internet haut débit dans tout le pays, afin de soutenir la production et la consommation de contenus.

Cette stratégie a porté ses fruits. La popularité d’un flux constant de séries télévisées coréennes a commencé à croître au Japon et en Chine. Le gouvernement coréen a investi davantage encore dans les infrastructures pour faire croître l’industrie et diffuser les contenus au-delà de la région. Aujourd’hui, 60 % des abonnés de Netflix dans le monde ont déjà visionné un programme coréen sur la plateforme.

Le succès de la culture populaire coréenne se ressent également dans d’autres secteurs de l’économie. Les stars de la K-pop et du cinéma signent des contrats publicitaires avec des entreprises coréennes, faisant la promotion de cosmétiques, de machines à laver ou de smartphones auprès d’un public mondial.

Le marché des contenus culturels coréens est désormais l’un des plus importants au monde, évalué à environ 80 milliards de dollars US (environ 70 milliards d’euros) en 2024, soit un niveau proche de celui de la France et du Royaume-Uni. Sa croissance continue repose sur une politique multifacettes mêlant investissements financiers, allègements fiscaux et soutien institutionnel, tant dans le pays qu’à travers des centres culturels coréens implantés à l’étranger. Le gouvernement offre également des incitations financières pour encourager la coopération entre sociétés de production et conglomérats (par exemple LG ou Samsung), qui bénéficient eux-mêmes du rayonnement de la culture populaire coréenne à l’international.

Ce succès contribue également à la diplomatie publique de la Corée du Sud. La stratégie concertée de « nation branding » mise en place à la fin des années 2000 et dans les années 2010 par l’administration de Lee Myung-Bak visait à améliorer la position du pays dans les différents classements d’image de marque des nations. Lee reconnaissait le rôle que pouvait jouer le soft power pour asseoir la position de la Corée du Sud comme puissance d’influence modérée sur la scène internationale.

Depuis lors, les stars de la K-pop ont été impliquées dans la diplomatie publique du pays sur la scène internationale, notamment à l’ONU ou lors de la COP 26.

Un groupe de K-pop pas comme les autres ?

Cela ne signifie pas que le groupe SEVENTEEN, par exemple, ne soit qu’un rouage d’une vaste machine de production et d’exportation de contenus culturels coréens. Contrairement à de nombreux autres groupes de leur génération, les membres produisent une grande partie de leur propre travail, écrivent des chansons et des raps et chorégraphient eux-mêmes leurs danses.

Particularité inhabituelle, SEVENTEEN est composé de plusieurs sous-groupes. Il arrive que ces sous-groupes enregistrent séparément afin de mettre en valeur leurs compétences respectives en rap, danse et chant. Comme c’est souvent le cas dans la culture populaire coréenne, le groupe cherche à multiplier les points de connexion avec son public.

On peut citer en exemple la série de téléréalité du groupe, Going SEVENTEEN, mélange de jeux, de défis et de coulisses diffusé chaque semaine sur YouTube et V Live, une application coréenne de streaming en direct pour les célébrités.

Autre caractéristique commune à de nombreux groupes de K-pop, SEVENTEEN compte des membres originaires de différents pays, dont la Chine et les États-Unis. Cela les aide à se connecter avec leurs fans étrangers et garantit qu’il y a toujours un membre capable de participer aux médias internationaux dans d’autres langues que le coréen.

Sarah A. Son ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Le succès des groupes de K-pop en Europe, la consécration d’un long travail du gouvernement sud-coréen – https://theconversation.com/le-succes-des-groupes-de-k-pop-en-europe-la-consecration-dun-long-travail-du-gouvernement-sud-coreen-262277

July 31, 2025

Donald Trump à l’assaut des médias publics aux États-Unis

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Anaïs Le Fèvre-Berthelot, Maîtresse de conférences en civilisation des États-Unis, Université Rennes 2

Pris pour cible par Donald Trump et le camp conservateur, l’audiovisuel public américain fait face à des coupes budgétaires inédites. Derrière la dénonciation d’un prétendu biais gauchiste, c’est l’existence même des réseaux de radio et de télévision publiques qui est menacée, dans un paysage médiatique déjà dominé par les grands conglomérats privés.

Depuis l’accession au pouvoir de Donald Trump, les auditrices et auditeurs des stations de radio affiliées au réseau de la National Public Radio (NPR) reçoivent des e-mails de plus en plus nombreux et de plus en plus pressants de leurs stations favorites leur demandant de les soutenir, notamment financièrement, face aux attaques croissantes de l’administration fédérale.

Les réseaux de radio et de télévision publiques, NPR et PBS, figurent en effet parmi les premières cibles des décisions prises par le président des États-Unis qui, à la suite de la droite conservative, dénonce ce qu’il considère comme un gaspillage d’argent public au service d’une propagande gauchiste. Le Parti républicain multiplie ainsi les décrets présidentiels, les convocations mettant en scène l’intimidation des responsables des réseaux publics par les élus populistes, les propositions de loi et les coupes budgétaires pour affaiblir cet ennemi désigné.

Pour saisir la portée de ces attaques, qui s’inscrivent dans la droite ligne du projet autoritaire mené par Donald Trump et ses soutiens, il est nécessaire de comprendre la spécificité de l’audiovisuel dit « public » aux États-Unis. S’il existe bien des stations de radio et des chaînes de télévision qui reçoivent des fonds publics, elles s’inscrivent dans un modèle très différent des modèles européens, comme France Télévisions, Radio France ou la BBC.

Tout d’abord parce que, contrairement à ces dernières, elles occupent un statut relativement marginal dans un paysage audiovisuel états-unien très largement dominé par les conglomérats privés. Mais surtout parce qu’elles sont loin d’être intégralement financées par l’argent des contribuables et dépendent surtout de fonds privés, qu’il s’agisse de mécénat d’entreprises ou de dons provenant de particuliers ou d’organismes de philanthropie.

Des médias publics récents et faiblement financés par l’État fédéral

Dès qu’elle devient accessible au plus grand nombre dans les années 1920 et 1930, la radio aux États-Unis se structure autour d’un modèle économique commercial s’appuyant sur la publicité dans lequel ni l’État fédéral ni les États fédérés ne s’impliquent au-delà de la régulation des ondes et l’attribution des fréquences. Ce modèle s’impose ensuite à la télévision.

Ainsi, bien que les radioamateurs et quelques stations financées par des universités publiques ou par des municipalités s’efforcent dans la première moitié du XX^e siècle de défendre une autre idée de la radiodiffusion, ancrée dans un idéal démocratique et de bien commun, avec des programmes éducatifs et de création artistique notamment, ce modèle reste marginal et essentiellement local jusqu’à l’adoption du Public Broadcasting Act en 1967 après des années d’activisme de la part de réformistes convaincus qui contribuent ainsi à la Great Society de Lyndon Johnson.

Cette loi crée la Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), une entité de droit privé dont la mission est de redistribuer les fonds alloués par le gouvernement fédéral à des chaînes de télévision et des stations de radio locales qui s’affilient à des réseaux nationaux, dont le Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) pour la télévision et NPR pour les stations de radio. Ce fonctionnement vise à garantir l’indépendance des médias publics vis-à-vis du gouvernement fédéral, qui ne finance ainsi jamais directement la production de programmes.

Par ailleurs, les fonds distribués par la CPB, s’ils constituent une part importante du budget de certaines stations et chaînes, sont complétés par d’autres sources de financement qui proviennent des États, mais aussi et surtout du mécénat et des dons privés. Ainsi, en 2025, pendant que le gouvernement fédéral allouait 535 millions de dollars à la CPB (soit environ 1,50 dollar par habitant, alors que, ces dernières années, la Suisse en dépensait environ 150, le Royaume-Uni environ 75 et la France environ 60), les médias publics recevaient plus d’un milliard de dollars de dons privés.

Au-delà des déclarations de principe, le souci de préserver l’indépendance des chaînes et stations par rapport au pouvoir politique, mais aussi aux intérêts commerciaux, se lit donc dans la structure même des médias publics et de leur financement. Ainsi, PBS ne produit pas directement de programmes et n’est propriétaire d’aucune chaîne de télévision, l’entité sert simplement de point de connexion entre les producteurs et un réseau de chaînes membres qui parfois produisent elles-mêmes des émissions qui peuvent être distribuées à travers le pays via l’entremise de PBS ou d’autres réseaux, comme American Public Television, The Independent Television Service ou la National Educational Telecommunications Association. Ainsi, même l’émission d’information phare du réseau, PBS Newshour, est produite par une chaîne locale, WETA-TV, située à Washington, en collaboration avec des chaînes de New York, San Francisco, Saint-Louis et Chicago.

Du côté de la radio, les fonds alloués par la CPB représentent environ 10 % du budget des stations, mais moins de 1 % du budget annuel de NPR. De fait, la majorité des fonds fédéraux alloués aux médias audiovisuels publics sert en réalité à assurer les moyens techniques d’enregistrement et de diffusion des stations et chaînes locales. Parce que le budget alloué à la CPB n’est pas pérenne et doit être voté tous les ans par le Congrès, les médias publics se sont souvent retrouvés au centre de querelles politiciennes.

L’audiovisuel public au centre des affrontements partisans

La place occupée par l’audiovisuel public dans les débats politiques aux États-Unis est sans commune mesure avec son coût, mais elle peut s’expliquer par l’influence des stations de radio publiques même dans un paysage fragmenté et polarisé. NPR touche en effet 43 millions d’auditeurs et auditrices chaque semaine, et ses programmes témoignent d’un niveau d’exigence journalistique qui en fait une cible de choix pour les adeptes de la désinformation et autres faits alternatifs.

Depuis les années 1970, les médias publics sont critiqués, car ils s’adresseraient de manière prioritaire à un public blanc, éduqué et plutôt aisé financièrement. Ce biais nourrit les critiques venues de deux pôles du spectre politique : pour les conservateurs populistes, les médias publics par nature élitistes ne s’adressent pas au « pauvre petit blanc » ; pour le camp progressiste, les médias publics, dont on peut être en droit d’attendre une représentativité exemplaire en raison de leur statut, ne rendent pas suffisamment compte ni à l’antenne ni dans les coulisses, de la diversité ethnique, raciale et de genre, notamment de la population états-unienne.

Les affinités partisanes sont essentielles dans la perception que les Étatsuniennes et Étatsuniens ont des médias publics. Ainsi, en 2011, alors que 37 % des auditeurs démocrates faisaient confiance à NPR, ils n’étaient que 16 % parmi les auditeurs proches du Parti républicain, ces derniers, et notamment les plus conservateurs parmi eux, préférant écouter des talk-shows qui participent à la radicalisation des débats.

Des attaques conservatrices de plus en plus virulentes

Ce sont les conservateurs qui adressent à l’audiovisuel public les critiques les plus virulentes. Tous les présidents républicains, à l’exception de Gerald Ford, ont essayé de réduire le financement fédéral des médias publics (même si celui-ci ne représente que 0,01 % du budget fédéral). Les attaques s’intensifient à partir des années 1990, en même temps que se renforcent des médias privés partisans (comme les talk-shows radiophoniques conservateurs et Fox News) et que différentes branches du conservatisme s’allient pour dénoncer les médias audiovisuels publics pour des raisons à la fois sociales (les médias publics auraient un « biais libéral ») et fiscales (l’État devrait limiter ses dépenses au strict nécessaire). Ces attaques n’épargnent même pas la très populaire émission pour enfants Sesame Street.

Donald Trump avait déjà appelé à couper les financements de la CPB en 2017 et les attaques, qu’elles viennent du pouvoir exécutif ou de la sphère conservatrice plus largement, se sont accentuées avec son retour à la Maison-Blanche : en février, Elon Musk, encore à la tête du DOGE, a publié sur le réseau social dont il est propriétaire un message appelant à ne plus financer NPR (« Defund NPR. It should survive on its own. ») ; le sénateur républicain de la Louisiane, John Kennedy, a déposé début mars un projet de loi intitulé le « No Propaganda Act », qu’il défend en affirmant que l’audiovisuel public n’offre pas une programmation indépendante et qu’il n’y a plus besoin des médias publics aujourd’hui, car l’offre serait suffisamment diversifiée (90 % des médias aux États-Unis appartiennent à 6 grands conglomérats) ; le 1^er mai 2025, Donald Trump a signé un décret présidentiel ordonnant à la CPB de ne plus financer PBS et NPR, au prétexte que le traitement de l’actualité y serait biaisé et, le Congrès a accepté le 16 juillet une demande de la Maison-Blanche de révoquer 1,1 milliard de dollars précédemment alloués à la CPB pour les deux prochaines années. Cette décision menace l’existence de plusieurs dizaines de stations de radio et de chaînes de télévision locales.

Une menace pour la démocratie

Au-delà des cas de NPR et PBS qui ont été érigés en symboles à abattre par les conservateurs, ces attaques constituent des menaces sérieuses pour la démocratie états-unienne. En effet, une étude de 2021 menée par Timothy Neff et Victor Pickard suggère qu’un financement élevé et stable des médias publics est un signe de bonne santé pour une démocratie. Lors de la signature du Public Broadcasting Act, le président Lyndon B. Johnson insistait sur l’importance de l’enrichissement intellectuel des citoyennes et citoyens états-uniens et définissait l’information et la connaissance comme des biens publics. Les attaques de l’administration Trump contre les médias publics s’inscrivent contre cette logique et participent d’un mouvement plus large de délégitimation des faits qui se manifeste aussi dans les menaces contre la liberté de la presse de manière générale et contre la science.

Non seulement les médias publics peuvent contribuer à la liberté et à l’indépendance de la presse, mais, dans le contexte états-unien, ils comblent aussi un vide dans un paysage audiovisuel où la concentration économique et la polarisation politique font loi. Les stations et chaînes locales aux États-Unis donnent accès à l’information à des communautés trop isolées pour être rentables pour le système commercial ; elles produisent et diffusent des programmes éducatifs ; elles permettent d’entendre des voix minorisées souvent absentes des médias commerciaux et elles permettent d’assurer la communication dans des situations d’urgence (comme lors des inondations en Caroline du Nord en 2024, des incendies en Californie de janvier 2025 ou d’un tremblement de terre en Alaska). Les médias publics relient les citoyennes et citoyens avec les communautés locale et nationale, ils jouent donc un rôle essentiel dans le renforcement de liens démocratiques aujourd’hui malmenés.

Anaïs Le Fèvre-Berthelot ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Donald Trump à l’assaut des médias publics aux États-Unis – https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-a-lassaut-des-medias-publics-aux-etats-unis-261790

July 31, 2025

New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

A new vision for Middle East peace emerged this week which proposes the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and the West Bank, the disarming and disbanding of Hamas and the creation of a unified Palestinian state. The plan emerged from a “high-level conference” in New York on July 29, which assembled representatives of 17 states, the European Union and the Arab League.

The resulting proposal is “a comprehensive and actionable framework for the implementation of the two-state solution and the achievement of peace and security for all”.

Signatories include Turkey and the Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Jordan. Europe was represented by France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK. Indonesia was there for Asia, Senegal for Africa, and Brazil, Canada and Mexico for the Americas. Neither the US nor Israel were present.

Significantly, it is the first time the Arab states have called for Hamas to disarm and disband. But, while condemning Hamas’s attack on Israel of October 7 2023 and recalling that the taking of hostages is a violation of international law, the document is unsparing in its connection between a state of Palestine and an end to Israel’s assault on Gaza’s civilians.

It says: “Absent decisive measures toward the two-state solution and robust international guarantees, the conflict will deepen and regional peace will remain elusive.”

A plan for the reconstruction of Gaza will be developed by the Arab states and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation – a Jeddah-based group which aims to be the collective voice of the Muslim world – supported by an international fund. The details will be hammered out at a Gaza Reconstruction and Recovery Conference, to be held in Cairo.

It is a bold initiative. In theory, it could end the Israeli mass killing in Gaza, remove Hamas from power and begin the implementation of a process for a state of Palestine. The question is whether it has any chance of success.

First, there appears to be growing momentum to press ahead with recognition of the state of Palestine as part of a comprehensive peace plan leading to a two-state solution. France, the UK and, most recently, Canada have announced they would take that step at the UN general assembly in September. The UK stated that it would do so unless Israel agreed to a ceasefire and the commencement of a substantive peace process.

These announcements follow those made in May 2024 by Spain, Ireland and Norway, three of the other European signatories. By the end of September at least 150 of the UN’s 193 members will recognise Palestinian statehood. Recognition is largely symbolic without a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from both Gaza and the West Bank. But it is essential symbolism.

For years, many European countries, Canada, Australia and the US have said that recognition could not be declared if there was the prospect of Israel-Palestine negotiations. Now the sequence is reversed: recognition is necessary as pressure for a ceasefire and the necessary talks to ensure the security of both Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel accelerated that reversal at the start of March, when it rejected the scheduled move to phase two of the six-week ceasefire negotiated with the help of the US, and imposed a blockade on aid coming into the Strip.

The Netanyahu government continues to hold out against the ceasefire. But its loud blame of Hamas is becoming harder to accept. The images of the starvation in Gaza and warnings by doctors, humanitarian organisations and the UN of an effective famine with the deaths of thousands can no longer be denied.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar, behind the scenes and through their embassies, have been encouraging European countries to make the jump to recognition. Their efforts at the UN conference in New York this week are another front of that campaign.

Israel and the Trump administration

But in the short term, there is little prospect of the Netanyahu government giving way with its mass killing, let alone entering talks for two states. Notably neither Israel nor the US took part in the conference.

Trump has criticised the scenes of starvation in Gaza. But his administration has joined Netanyahu in vitriolic denunciation of France and the UK over their intentions to recognise Palestine. And the US president has warned the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, that recognition of Palestinian statehood would threaten Canada’s trade deal with the US.

In response to Trump’s concern over the images of starving children and his exhortation “We’ve got to get the kids fed,” Israel has airdropped a few pallets of aid – less than a truck’s worth. Yet this appears more of a public relations exercise directed at Washington than a genuine attempt to ease the terrible condition on the Strip.

A small number of lorries with supplies from UN and humanitarian organisations have also crossed the border, but only after lengthy delays and with half still held up. There is no security for transport and delivery of the aid inside Gaza.

A sacrifice for a state?

So the conference declaration is not relief for Gaza. Instead, it is yet another marker of Israel’s increasing isolation.

After France’s announcement, the Netanyahu government thundered: “Such a move rewards terror and risks creating another Iranian proxy … A Palestinian state in these conditions would be a launch pad to annihilate Israel.”

But while recognising Hamas’s mass killing of October 7 2023, most governments and their populations do not perceive Israel as attacking Hamas and its fighters. They see the Netanyahu government and Israeli military slaying and starving civilians.

Even in the US, where the Trump administration is trying to crush sympathy for Palestine and Gazans in universities, non-governmental organisations and the public sphere, opinion is shifting.

In a Gallup poll taken in the US and released on July 29, only 32% of respondents supported Israel’s actions in Gaza – an all-time low – and 60% opposed them. Netanyahu was viewed unfavourably by 52% and favourably by only 29%.

Israel has lost its moment of “normalisation” with Arab states. Its economic links are strained and its oft-repeated claim to being the “Middle East’s only democracy” is bloodstained beyond recognition.

This will be of no comfort to the people of Gaza facing death. But in the longer term, there is the prospect that this sacrifice will be the catalyst to recognise Palestine that disappeared in 1948.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. New peace plan increases pressure on Israel and US as momentum grows for Palestinian statehood – https://theconversation.com/new-peace-plan-increases-pressure-on-israel-and-us-as-momentum-grows-for-palestinian-statehood-262259

July 31, 2025

English universities now have a duty to uphold freedom of speech – here’s how it might affect students’ sense of belonging

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Bale, Director of Academic Development and Research, Associate Professor, The University of Law

The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act, which comes into force on August 1 2025, means universities in England now have a new duty to uphold “robust” strategies to ensure freedom of speech on campus.

To support universities in navigating the boundaries of lawful and unlawful speech, universities regulator the Office for Students appointed its first director for freedom of speech and academic freedom in 2023. Arif Ahmed, who is also a professor of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, has reportedly said that coming across views students might find offensive is part of a university education.

It’s possible, though, that feeling offended comes up against the important concept of “belonging” at university. In the context of higher education, belonging is often defined as feeling at home, included and valued. It is linked to more students staying in their courses, having enhanced wellbeing, and being able to learn well at university.

But feeling offended and feeling you belong at university don’t have to be contradictory. Some of our research has found that belonging can also mean being able to challenge the dominant culture at a university, which may exclude students who don’t fit a particular mould.

Students in lecture hall — Being able to challenge opinions is important.
Matej Kastelic/Shutterstock

Some students explained that they proactively resist the prevalent image of the “typical” student. For example, in highly selective universities, students are often extremely competitive and industrious with a tendency to overwork. But this culture may not align with the work-life balance prioritised by some students.

This form of “positive not-belonging” often takes the form of friendship groups and communities that cultivate an alternative kind of belonging. These groups may well enable greater freedom of self-expression, without fear of being judged or feeling pressured to conform to pre-existing academic cultures.

While some students are able to carve out these collective and alternative communities for belonging, many others feel their presence and sense of belonging is conditional – especially minority ethnic students. Clearer advocacy for free speech might help these students feel more comfortable speaking up and building a stronger sense of belonging.

We must not forget that the idea of belonging carries power dynamics, and often has implications for what is perceived as up for debate – and what is not.

Existing free speech

What’s more, the views of students suggest that free speech is already part of their experience at university. In 2023, the Office for Students added a question about freedom of expression to the annual National Student Survey, which gathers final-year undergraduates’ opinions on their higher education experience. The question, added for students at English universities only, asked how “free” students felt to express their ideas, opinions and beliefs.

The results showed that 86% did feel they had this freedom. This has remained stable in the latest survey, with a slight increase to just over 88% in the 2025 results.

The Office for Students also commissioned YouGov to poll research and teaching staff at English universities about their perceptions of free speech in higher education in 2024.

Some positive results mirrored the student data. For example, 89% of academics reported that they are confident they understand what free speech means in higher education. But the polling also found that 21% did not feel free to discuss controversial topics in their teaching.

This lack of perceived freedom of expression does not only have a negative impact on staff. It is widely understood that a key purpose of higher education is to nurture students’ independent thinking and self-awareness. A key step toward this goal is not to be afraid of engaging in difficult conversations, including asking questions.

However, this does not happen automatically. Universities need to provide clear scaffolding, guidance and practical steps to protect freedom of speech. It is also important to normalise and promote conversations about topics such as cultural differences and intercultural competence, which refers to the ability to interact with people from different cultural backgrounds effectively and appropriately.

If addressed, these discussions can help to foster inclusion, and promote diversity of thought and expression.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. English universities now have a duty to uphold freedom of speech – here’s how it might affect students’ sense of belonging – https://theconversation.com/english-universities-now-have-a-duty-to-uphold-freedom-of-speech-heres-how-it-might-affect-students-sense-of-belonging-260867

July 31, 2025

England’s new free speech law comes into force – what it means for universities

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eric Heinze, Professor of Law and Humanities, Queen Mary University of London

The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 comes into force throughout England on August 1 2025. Designed to stop universities from censoring controversial or unpopular ideas, the law gives the Office for Students responsibility for ensuring institutions comply.

This law will mean that many universities will have to change the way they approach free speech.

When it comes to adopting campus speech policies, educational establishments have always had three choices.

One option has been to follow the law, permitting whichever messages the law already allows, while banning whichever messages the law already forbids. UK law prohibits, for example, certain core expressions of racism, anti-LGBTQ+ hatred, Islamophobia, antisemitism, or glorification of terrorism. I’ll call this the “legalist” option.

Another approach is to allow more speech than the law allows. This would, for example, permit guest lecturers to advocate white supremacy or the belief that only heterosexual relationships and behaviour are normal. I’ll call this the “libertarian” option. It treats free speech as sacrosanct.

But this option would never be adopted. Few institutions would welcome the torrent of parental complaints, media publicity, donor withdrawals, police investigations, or full-blown litigation that would follow.

A third option is to permit less speech than the law allows. This would mean, for example, banning sexist speech, which is otherwise still permitted under UK law. We can call this the “communitarian” option. It views educational institutions as more than just places for exchanging ideas: they must also promote civic values, aiming to build an empathic society.

Changing approaches

In the past, British universities could choose option three, cancelling or avoiding events featuring messages that, although legal, risk stoking campus divisions.

Some institutions have stopped controversial speakers through decisions by senior leadership. For example, in 2013 UCL’s senior administrators banned a group that advocated sex segregation. Other times, efforts to cancel events have been made by students or staff. In 2015, the University of York cancelled events for International Men’s Day after complaints from students and staff.

The effect of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act will be to shift universities from the communitarian to the legalist model. Campus members wishing to stage events will still have to comply with routine guidelines on reserving campus venues, ticketing participants, ensuring security controls, and the like. However, under the act, universities may no longer impede the communication of otherwise legal messages solely on the grounds of their provocative content.

For advocates of free speech, this act may still not go far enough since it keeps an escape hatch. Management can still cancel controversial events if the institution lacks the means to ensure adequate security, and such claims are often difficult to verify.

Yet for others, the act will go too far. Some would argue that existing law in Britain does not adequately protect vulnerable groups, and that universities should stick to the communitarian ideal, creating a refuge that the law often fails to provide.

These anxieties become ever greater in our internet era, when misinformation can proliferate. Some may fear that abandoning the communitarian ethos will turn the campus into a wild west of free speech, disproportionately affecting its most vulnerable members.

Group of talking students — The act aims to preserve free speech on university campuses.
Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

However, online communications have also proved to be powerful mobilising tools for staff and students, so online power hierarchies may work in more complex ways than meets the eye.

Note also that nothing in the act abolishes student welfare services. Individually targeted acts of bullying, threats, stalking and harassment will remain under the aegis of campus oversight as well as UK law. Staff or students exhibiting racist, sexist, homophobic, or transphobic conduct will remain as subject as they were before to disciplinary proceedings and even dismissal or expulsion.

Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that the act’s most salient ingredients are procedural, placing considerable burdens on institutions to facilitate free speech and deal transparently with accusations of censorship. Yet whether this will lead to an explosion of complaints, and whether ideas exchanged on campus will really differ so much from those we already hear today, remains to be seen.

Eric Heinze has received funding for submitting a report to the UK Commission for Countering Extremism.

– ref. England’s new free speech law comes into force – what it means for universities – https://theconversation.com/englands-new-free-speech-law-comes-into-force-what-it-means-for-universities-262080

July 31, 2025

Who is Odysseus, hero of Christopher Nolan’s new epic?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephan Blum, Research associate, Institute for Prehistory and Early History and Medieval Archaeology, University of Tübingen

Somewhere between hero and hustler, family man and philanderer, king and con artist, Odysseus is one of ancient literature’s most complex figures. In the Iliad, he is the mastermind behind the Trojan horse.

In Homer’s Odyssey, he is the protagonist of a ten-year journey home – one that sees him encounter gods, monsters, temptations and profound moral dilemmas. Next year, he will be the hero of a new Christopher Nolan epic, and played by Matt Damon.

Odysseus’s journey from Troy to Ithaca in the Odyssey is anything but a straight line. It’s an epic zigzag through storms, temptations, divine grudges and existential threats. Instead of returning in weeks, he spends a decade adrift.

He is stranded by nymphs, resists sirens and watches his crew perish one by one. Every stop tests not only his wit but his very sense of self.

The Odyssey isn’t a tale of noble perseverance. It’s a study in survival. Odysseus deceives, disguises and entangles himself in morally grey romantic liaisons with a sorceress (Circe), nymph (Calypso) and princess (Nausicaa). He does so often as strategist and sometimes as willing participant.

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In Homer’s world, infidelity is a tool of survival. Odysseus survives not through moral clarity, but through his moral agility. His loyalty to his wife Penelope (reportedly played by Anne Hathaway in the new adaptation) is longitudinal, not linear. His compass is always aimed at returning to Ithaca, if not always in a straight line.

Would this flexibility pass modern ethical scrutiny? Probably not. But what made him successful wasn’t moral integrity – it was his ability to navigate each situation, even if that meant bending the rules.

While Odysseus adapts, Penelope endures with strategic resilience. For 20 years, she fends off suitors with deft delay tactics. She avoids them by weaving and unweaving a funeral shroud for her husband’s father, Laertes. It’s a defiant, slow motion resistance campaign, waged with thread and silence.

Painting of Penelope weaving and ignoring suitors — Penelope and the Suitors by John William Waterhouse (1912).
Aberdeen Art Gallery

If Odysseus navigates external monsters, Penelope masters the domestic battlefield. Her fidelity in her husband’s absence is deliberate, political and astute. In a patriarchal world, her power lies in pause. Her story is one of emotional labour and strategic survival.

Narrative loops and non-linear journeys

The Odyssey is an ancient masterpiece of non-linear storytelling. It begins in the middle of the action and uses nested narratives, flashbacks and shifting voices. Odysseus tells much of his own story, reframing events from his point of view and reshaping himself in hindsight. Memory becomes montage. Truth bends to necessity. Fact and fiction bleed into one another.

Homer doesn’t just tell a story – he constructs a labyrinth. The Odyssey anticipates the fractured forms of modernist literature and cinema, where identity is unstable and time itself is malleable.

Penelope sitting with Odysseus — Odysseus and Penelope by Johann Heinrich Wilhelm Tischbein (1802).
Wiki Commons

When Odysseus finally returns to Ithaca, disguised as a beggar and quietly assessing his ship’s wreckage, it’s no romantic climax. It’s a calculated risk. Penelope doesn’t swoon; she tests. Only when he passes her intimate knowledge test – he reacts with outrage when she suggests moving their bed, which he built around a living olive tree – does she relent. Their reunion is not a Hollywood embrace but a wary negotiation.

It signals restoration, yes. But also mistrust, trauma and mutual testing. Homecoming, like survival, is complicated.

Odysseus is not a flawless hero. He is a survivor who negotiates with monsters, debates with gods and crawls home disguised as a beggar. A man shaped as much by cunning as by consequence.

Would Odysseus pass a modern ethics exam? Certainly not. Would he charm the professor, flip the question and still walk out with an A? Absolutely. Some stories endure not because they are true, but because they were told by survivors.

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

– ref. Who is Odysseus, hero of Christopher Nolan’s new epic? – https://theconversation.com/who-is-odysseus-hero-of-christopher-nolans-new-epic-261781