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March 6, 2026

Telehealth is widely used by older adults insured by Medicare, new research shows

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Terrence Liu, Assistant Professor, University of Utah

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government expanded access to telehealth for older adults insured by Medicare. FatCamera/E+ via Getty Images

Americans age 65 and older who are insured by Medicare logged about 60 million telehealth visits annually between 2021 and 2023 – about 31 million for mental health and 29 million for other health issues. That’s the key finding in a new study I co-authored in the journal Annals of Internal Medicine.

We also found that people with Medicare coverage who used telehealth services were generally in poorer health and faced more physical and functional limitations in their daily life, compared with their counterparts who only had medical appointments in person.

To get at these numbers, we analyzed a national survey called the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, which provides a nationally representative snapshot of how different groups of Americans use and receive health care. Based on our analysis, we generated national estimates of telehealth visits that reflect care patterns for everyone insured through Medicare, a federal health insurance program primarily for people age 65 and older as well as some younger people with disabilities.

Why it matters

In just a few years, telehealth has become a central part of how health care is delivered in the United States – and it is likely to continue to play an important role in the health care system.

Before 2020, patients rarely got their health care virtually. About 1.7% of Medicare patients – 910,490 people – used telehealth for medical appointments in 2019. These were mostly patients in rural areas, and only certain clinics were authorized to offer it.

But during the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government expanded telehealth coverage for people insured by Medicare to make it easier for patients to maintain access to health care. Many insurance companies did, too. The number of Medicare patients using telehealth services jumped to 53% in 2021, corresponding to nearly 28.3 million telehealth users at the peak of the pandemic.

Telehealth has become widely used by all age groups for medical services since the COVID-19 pandemic.

While telehealth appointments overall – not just for people with Medicare coverage – have dropped since the height of the pandemic, they remain much higher than pre-pandemic levels, according to data from Epic, the largest electronic medical record company in the U.S.

Legislation passed in 2021 made Medicare’s coverage of telehealth permanent for mental health services. But coverage for accessing care via telehealth for other types of health conditions, such as respiratory infections or diabetes, is set to expire in 2027 – and policymakers are still deciding whether to continue it.

Our findings underscore the important role that telehealth has come to serve in enabling older adults to access health care for all types of acute and chronic medical conditions. Emerging research suggests it can help them see their providers more consistently without compromising the quality of care compared to in-person visits.

Limiting access to telehealth services could reverse recent gains in access for older adults – particularly for patients who have geographical or health limitations that can make getting to in-person appointments challenging.

What still isn’t known

While our study sheds light on who used telehealth and for what medical conditions, several important questions remain.

First, we did not explicitly examine quality of care. More research is needed to pin down whether telehealth visits are comparable to in-person visits for treating different conditions. My colleagues and I plan to explore this issue for specific conditions, such as diabetes.

Second, our analysis focused on people who have Medicare coverage. Patterns may differ for younger patients or those with other kinds of health insurance.

However, our study aligns with others that have examined telehealth use since the pandemic.

While no single study or report is perfect, the overall evidence suggests that telehealth can help improve access to care and appears to be a reasonable alternative – either by itself or as a complement to in-person care for certain medical conditions.

Terrence Liu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Telehealth is widely used by older adults insured by Medicare, new research shows – https://theconversation.com/telehealth-is-widely-used-by-older-adults-insured-by-medicare-new-research-shows-276566

March 6, 2026

Public health needs steady budgets – and federal funding uncertainty cause real harms, even if the money is later restored

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Max Crowley, Professor of Human Development, Family Studies and Public Policy, Penn State

Communities rely on vaccination clinics, restaurant inspections and disease surveillance systems run by local and state public health departments. Sean Rayford/Stringer via Getty Images

Since early 2025, several large federal health grants to states have been suspended and then restored after legal challenges. On Feb. 13, 2026, for example, the federal government moved to suspend about US$600 million in public health grants to four states before a federal court temporarily blocked the action. Hundreds of millions of dollars that had already been allocated by Congress were briefly put on hold before the court intervened.

From the outside, these episodes may look like routine disputes between states and the federal government, as such cancellations do happen. But inside state agencies and in communities, they create something more consequential: uncertainty that interrupts crucial public health programs – even if states ultimately get the money.

As a scholar who studies how to build infrastructure for preventing human suffering, I’ve seen how instability – even when temporary – changes how agencies and the communities they serve plan, hire and invest.

Even when funding is eventually restored, repeated cycles in which funding is frozen and then temporarily reinstated, pending lawsuits, can disrupt how public health systems operate. This, in turn, erodes the public health infrastructure that federal funding helps build and maintain.

That infrastructure includes vaccination clinics, restaurant sanitation inspections, opioid response teams, school violence prevention, maternal health programs and disease surveillance systems, to name a few. Programs like this play a critical role in public health, but because they focus on preventing problems before they occur, many people aren’t away of the critical need for them until something goes wrong.

Most disruptions never make headlines, but they affect services communities rely on.

Public health depends on continuity

Despite the heavy media focus on emergency response during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, most public health work is long-term planning built around multiyear prevention strategies.

Federal grants support epidemiologists, prevention specialists, behavioral health providers and data analysts. They fund disease surveillance systems, maternal and child health initiatives, substance use prevention programs and partnerships with community organizations. These efforts operate on multiyear timelines. Each one requires hiring staff, bringing on outside contractors and service providers, and setting up systems to track outcomes.

Senior public health doctor talking to patient at temporary free outdoor clinic — Public health is less about emergency response and more about long-term planning and multiyear prevention strategies.
SDI Productions/E+ via Getty Images

When funding is suddenly paused or regulatory environments change, agencies cannot simply wait for clarity. Hiring slows. Leaders draft contingency plans in case the suspension becomes permanent. Many state and local employees begin exploring more stable employment opportunities.

National workforce surveys show that roughly 1 in 4 state public health employees report considering leaving their job within a year. In 2023, local health departments lost an average of 19% of their staff, reflecting how the COVID-19 pandemic strained the public health workforce. In a small county health department, where the entire staff may consist of only four to seven people, losing even a single nurse or disease investigator can significantly disrupt services.

If funding is later restored, as has occurred in several cases in 2025 and early 2026, agencies must reverse course. They reissue guidance, renegotiate contracts and reassure partners. But the disruption has already consumed time and public resources.

Some projects and communities may not fully recover. Volatility creates costs even when the money returns.

The financial and administrative cost of legal battles

Suing the federal government over funding suspensions is expensive. When states challenge federal decisions, state attorneys general devote staff time and legal resources. Health departments must coordinate with lawyers, compile documentation and model alternative budget scenarios. Senior leaders shift attention from program oversight to legal and fiscal risk management.

Those administrative hours are funded by taxpayers. They represent real expenditures, though they rarely appear in public debate. And while litigation proceeds – often for months – agencies must prepare for multiple possible outcomes.

The uncertainty itself shapes planning. Agencies may hesitate to launch new initiatives if funding could disappear midstream. They may shorten contracts, delay hiring or scale back expansion plans to reduce exposure. Over time, that caution can slow implementation and limit innovation.

The federal government in February 2026 moved to pull back $600 million in public health funding to four states, which quickly sued to get the money reinstated.

Instability extends beyond grant dollars

Suspended funding is not the only source of instability. The federal government has also announced structural changes within some health agencies, starting with a major reorganization of the Department of Health and Human Services in March 2025. These changes, too, inject uncertainty into how public health systems operate.

For example, federal health officials recently indicated they plan to significantly scale back the Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation within the Administration for Children and Families.

Since 1995, that office has studied the impact of programs serving families and children, including Head Start, the foster care system and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Independent research and policy organizations, including the Data Foundation and Results for America, warn that interrupting those studies could undermine states’ ability to assess and improve these programs.

Similarly, recent grant terminations and restructuring within the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which administers major behavioral health grants to states, have introduced uncertainty. When staff supported by grants are cut or funding terms shift abruptly, payments can be delayed, reporting guidance becomes unclear, and local treatment providers may struggle to plan. For communities trying to prevent opioid overdoses or rising mental health needs, even short-term disruption can be a matter of life or death.

Pausing or reorganizing such studies midstream disrupts the ability to understand what works and what doesn’t. Experienced staff may leave. Rebuilding that expertise can take years.

Prevention is especially vulnerable

Almost by definition, people take prevention for granted. If programs focused on vaccination, substance use treatment and youth mental health are effective, many people never experience the crises that might have occurred without them.

But prevention depends on continuity: sustained staffing, stable partnerships and consistent data collection. The effects of disruption are difficult to measure in a single budget cycle, but they influence how confidently agencies invest in long-term strategies. In that sense, funding instability can become a public health issue of its own.

Policy priorities will always evolve. Courts review executive actions. Congress revisits allocations. Change is part of governance. But if policymakers want stronger, more resilient public health infrastructure, stability is not simply administrative convenience. It is part of the foundation that makes prevention and preparedness possible.

Max Crowley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Public health needs steady budgets – and federal funding uncertainty cause real harms, even if the money is later restored – https://theconversation.com/public-health-needs-steady-budgets-and-federal-funding-uncertainty-cause-real-harms-even-if-the-money-is-later-restored-276500

March 6, 2026

How Instagram addictiveness lawsuit could reshape social media – platform design meets product liability

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Carolina Rossini, Professor of Practice and Director for Program, Public Interest Technology Initiative, UMass Amherst

Is the social media platform she’s using, rather than the content she’s viewing, a threat to her well-being? Fiordaliso/Moment via Getty Images

A Los Angeles courtroom is hosting what may become the most consequential legal challenge Big Tech has ever faced.

This is an inflection point in the global debate over Big Tech liability: For the first time, an American jury is being asked to decide whether platform design itself can give rise to product liability – not because of what users post on them, but because of how they were built.

As a technology policy and law scholar, I believe that the decision, whatever the outcome, will likely generate a powerful domino effect in the United States and across jurisdictions worldwide.

The case

The plaintiff is a 20-year-old California woman identified by her initials, K.G.M. She said she began using YouTube around age 6 and created an Instagram account at age 9. Her lawsuit and testimony allege that the platforms’ design features, which include likes, algorithmic recommendation engines, infinite scroll, autoplay and deliberately unpredictable rewards, got her addicted. The suit alleges that her addiction fueled depression, anxiety, body dysmorphia – when someone see themselves as ugly or disfigured when they aren’t – and suicidal thoughts.

TikTok and Snapchat settled with K.G.M. before trial for undisclosed sums, leaving Meta and Google as the remaining defendants. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before the jury on Feb. 18, 2026.

Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified in court in a lawsuit alleging that Instagram is addictive by design.

The stakes extend far beyond one plaintiff. K.G.M.’s case is a bellwether trial, meaning the court chose it as a representative test case to help determine verdicts across all connected cases. Those cases involve approximately 1,600 plaintiffs, including more than 350 families and over 250 school districts. Their claims have been consolidated in a California Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding, No. 5255.

The California proceeding shares legal teams and evidence pool, including internal Meta documents, with a federal multidistrict litigation that is scheduled to advance in court later this year, bringing together thousands of federal lawsuits.

Legal innovation: Design as defect

For decades, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded technology companies from liability for content that their users post. Whenever people sued over harms linked to social media, companies invoked Section 230, and the cases typically died early.

The K.G.M. litigation uses a different legal strategy: negligence-based product liability. The plaintiffs argue that the harm arises not from third-party content but from the platforms’ own engineering and design decisions, the “informational architecture” and features that shape users’ experience of content. Infinite scrolling, autoplay, notifications calibrated to heighten anxiety and variable-reward systems operate on the same behavioral principles as slot machines.

These are conscious product design choices, and the plaintiffs contend they should be subject to the same safety obligations as any other manufactured product, thereby holding their makers accountable for negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty of fitness.

Judge Carolyn Kuhl of the California Superior Court agreed that these claims warranted a jury trial. In her Nov. 5, 2025, ruling denying Meta’s motion for summary judgment, she distinguished between features related to content publishing, which Section 230 might protect, and features like notification timing, engagement loops and the absence of meaningful parental controls, which it might not.

Here, Kuhl established that the conduct-versus-content distinction – treating algorithmic design choices as the company’s own conduct rather than as the protected publication of third-party speech – was a viable legal theory for a jury to evaluate. This fine-grained approach, evaluating each design feature individually and recognizing the increased complexities of technology products’ design, represents a potential road map for courts nationwide.

What the companies knew

The product liability theory depends partly on what companies knew about the risks of their designs. The 2021 leak of internal Meta documents, widely known as the “Facebook Papers,” revealed that the company’s own researchers had flagged concerns about Instagram’s effects on adolescent body image and mental health.

Internal communications disclosed in the K.G.M. proceedings have included exchanges among Meta employees comparing the platform’s effects to pushing drugs and gambling. Whether this internal awareness constitutes the kind of corporate knowledge that supports liability is a central factual question for the jury to decide.

black-and-white photo of eight men in business suits standing behind a table with their right hands raised — Tobacco companies were eventually held to account because what they knew – and hid – about the addictiveness of their products came to light.
Ray Lustig/The Washington Post via Getty Images

There is a clear analogy to tobacco litigation. In the 1990s, plaintiffs succeeded against tobacco companies by proving they had concealed evidence about the addictive and deadly nature of their products. In K.G.M., the plaintiffs here are making the same core argument: Where there is corporate knowledge, deliberate targeting and public denial, liability follows.

K.G.M.’s lead trial attorney, Mark Lanier, is the same lawyer who won multibillion-dollar verdicts in the Johnson & Johnson baby powder litigation, signaling the scale of accountability they are pursuing.

The science: Contested but consequential

The scientific evidence on social media and youth mental health is real but genuinely complex. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) does not classify social media use as an addictive disorder. Researchers like Amy Orben have found that large-scale studies show small average associations between social media use and reduced well-being.

Yet Orben herself has cautioned that these averages might mask severe harms experienced by a subset of vulnerable young users, particularly girls ages 12 to 15. The legal question under the negligence theory is not whether social media harms everyone equally, but whether platform designers had an obligation to account for foreseeable interactions between their design features and the vulnerabilities of developing minds, especially when internal evidence suggested they were aware of the risks.

First, a manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing its product, and that duty extends to harms that are reasonably foreseeable. Second, the plaintiff must show that the type of injury suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the design choice. The manufacturer doesn’t need to have foreseen the exact injury to the exact plaintiff, but the general category of harm must have been within the range of what a reasonable designer would anticipate.

This is why the Facebook Papers and internal Meta research are so legally significant in K.G.M.’s case: They go directly to establishing that the company’s own researchers identified the specific categories of harm – depression, body dysmorphia, compulsive use patterns among adolescent girls – that the plaintiff alleges she suffered. If the company’s own data flagged these risks and leadership continued on the same design trajectory, that would considerably strengthen the foreseeability element.

Why it matters

Even if the science is unsettled, the legal and policy landscape is shifting fast. In 2025 alone, 20 states in the U.S. enacted new laws governing children’s social media use. And this wave is not only in the U.S.; countries such as the U.K., Australia, Denmark, France and Brazil are also moving forward with specific legislation, including mandates banning social media for those under 16.

The K.G.M. trial represents something more fundamental: the proposition that algorithmic design decisions are product decisions, carrying real obligations of safety and accountability. If this framework takes hold, every platform will need to reconsider not just what content appears, but why and how it is delivered.

I was staff at organizations including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, and the Harvard Berkman Klein Center, which were funded by various foundations and companies. Refer to their websites for disclosures. I was a staff member in the connectivity policy team at Facebook (2016-2018). I am an advisory board member of non-profits, including Internet Lab (Brazil) and Derechos Digitales (Chile). I am a senior advisor (without any honorarium) at the Datasphere Initiative and Portulans Institute. More details at https://www.carolinarossini.net/bio

– ref. How Instagram addictiveness lawsuit could reshape social media – platform design meets product liability – https://theconversation.com/how-instagram-addictiveness-lawsuit-could-reshape-social-media-platform-design-meets-product-liability-277066

March 6, 2026

Comment la Russie s’approche des satellites européens pour capter leurs communications

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Aleix Nadal, Analyst, Defence, Security and Justice team, RAND Europe

Les infrastructures européennes de télécommunications figurent parmi les cibles potentielles des opérations d’interception menées par certains satellites russes. wikicommon, Fourni par l’auteur

Les activités de satellites russes près d’appareils européens inquiètent les autorités. Entre espionnage orbital et démonstration de force, ces opérations pourraient annoncer une nouvelle phase de compétition stratégique dans l’espace.

Les autorités européennes ont récemment tiré la sonnette d’alarme après l’interception par la Russie de communications transitant par des satellites européens. Mais le problème ne date pas d’hier.

Ainsi depuis la première invasion de l’Ukraine en 2014, deux satellites russes suivent discrètement des engins spatiaux européens. Ils ont manœuvré suffisamment près pour faire craindre qu’il ne s’agisse pas seulement d’opérations d’observation.

En 2018, Florence Parly, alors ministre de la Défense avait accusé la Russie d’espionnage après que l’un de ces engins avait été repéré à proximité d’un satellite militaire franco-italien de télécommunications. Deux satellites d’Intelsat avaient été visés de manière similaire auparavant.

Ces opérations dites de « proximité et de rendez-vous » (RPO), au cours desquelles un engin spatial manœuvre délibérément pour s’approcher d’un autre objet ou opérer à proximité de lui dans l’espace, deviennent de plus en plus courantes en orbite géostationnaire (GEO), où les satellites restent pratiquement immobiles au-dessus d’un même point de la Terre.

Les opérations RPO ne sont pas intrinsèquement malveillantes. Elles peuvent par exemple servir à ravitailler un satellite afin d’en prolonger la durée de vie, ou à retirer des satellites hors service et des débris pour maintenir les orbites dégagées en vue de futures missions.

Mais la technologie qui permet d’améliorer la manœuvrabilité des satellites est à double usage — elle peut avoir des applications à la fois civiles et militaires. Toute la difficulté consiste donc à déterminer l’intention derrière ces manœuvres et, le cas échéant, à y répondre de manière appropriée.

Inspection de satellites

Lancés respectivement en 2014 et en 2023, les deux « inspecteurs » russes Luch/Olymp 1 et 2, des satellites très secrets, s’inscrivent dans les efforts de Moscou pour identifier d’éventuelles vulnérabilités techniques dans les satellites des pays de l’Otan.

Si tel avait été leur seul objectif, les responsables européens auraient eu peu de raisons de s’en inquiéter ou de protester. S’approcher d’un satellite pour en analyser les caractéristiques n’a rien de nouveau et ce type de mission n’est pas propre à la Russie.

Par le passé, les satellites d’inspection du programme américain Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) se sont approchés à moins de dix kilomètres d’autres satellites dans certaines missions. Même des entreprises commerciales commencent désormais à proposer des services d’inspection.

Une entreprise australienne appelée HEO a récemment survolé un satellite chinois classifié afin d’en révéler certaines caractéristiques techniques. En théorie, ce type d’informations pourrait, à l’avenir, être utilisé pour perturber le fonctionnement de satellites.

Cependant, les satellites russes ont souvent suivi le même engin spatial pendant des mois, s’approchant parfois à moins de cinq kilomètres de leur cible. Un comportement qui ne correspond pas vraiment au profil d’une mission d’inspection de satellites, laquelle consiste normalement à simplement passer à proximité, prendre des images puis repartir rapidement sur une autre trajectoire.

Les satellites GSSAP, par exemple, opèrent généralement par paires, selon une approche en tenaille : l’un évolue au-dessus de l’orbite géostationnaire (GEO) pour inspecter l’arrière du satellite ciblé, tandis que l’autre se place légèrement en dessous afin d’en observer l’avant.

Les satellites Luch, eux sont essentiellement des plateformes de « renseignement d’origine électromagnétique » (ce qu’on appelle plus communément « Sigint »). En les positionnant entre un satellite cible et sa station au sol, la Russie peut intercepter le signal et espionner les communications de satellites européens, comme ceux exploités par Eutelsat, une entreprise française, ou par Intelsat, une société luxembourgo-américaine. Ces satellites européens fournissent notamment de la bande passante aux armées européennes pour leurs communications sécurisées.

Pris isolément, ces satellites doivent donc être considérés comme des outils de surveillance plutôt que comme des armes antisatellites — c’est-à-dire des engins capables de perturber ou de neutraliser un autre satellite. Les satellites russes se contentent ici de collecter des informations. À ce titre, ils ne constituent pas, en eux-mêmes, une menace majeure pour la sécurité.

Mais l’espace reste étroitement lié aux dynamiques géopolitiques qui se jouent sur Terre. Toute opération spatiale russe doit ainsi être comprise comme s’inscrivant dans une stratégie plus large visant à engranger des avantages stratégiques — qu’il s’agisse d’obtenir un avantage militaire face à l’Ukraine ou de contraindre les pays européens à retirer leur soutien à Kiev.

Menace future

Dans cette perspective, les opérations menées par les satellites Luch pourraient être interprétées non seulement comme un effort « Sigint », mais aussi comme un avertissement adressé aux pays européens : leurs satellites restent vulnérables à d’éventuelles perturbations.

Comme l’a souligné le général de division Michael Traut, commandant du Commandement spatial allemand, les satellites Luch ont probablement aussi intercepté les liaisons de commande de leurs cibles. Ces liaisons correspondent à des transmissions supposées sécurisées envoyées depuis les stations au sol vers les satellites afin de leur transmettre des instructions opérationnelles.

Si cela se confirme, la Russie pourrait potentiellement reproduire les signaux de liaison montante utilisés par les stations au sol pour contrôler les satellites, ce qui lui permettrait de perturber à l’avenir les opérations spatiales européennes.

Antennes satellites — Les satellites russes pourraient avoir intercepté des transmissions en provenance de stations au sol, ce qui leur donnerait la capacité de perturber le fonctionnement d’engins spatiaux européens.
Trisna.id

Si ce scénario vous semble familier, c’est qu’il rappelle la campagne hybride menée par la Russie contre les câbles sous-marins européens. Celle-ci s’est traduite par des années de cartographie clandestine des infrastructures occidentales et, plus récemment, par une série d’actions visant à sectionner des câbles à fibre optique.

Les opérations de proximité menées ces dernières années par les deux satellites Luch pourraient ainsi annoncer des actions plus lourdes à l’avenir, si la Russie échoue à dissuader l’Europe de poursuivre son soutien à l’Ukraine.

Que peut faire l’Europe dans ce scénario ? Une première étape bienvenue a été de rendre publiques des informations sur les activités russes en orbite géostationnaire. Jusqu’ici, les opérations spatiales étaient le plus souvent enveloppées de secret.

Davantage de transparence pourrait permettre de délégitimer ces pratiques aux yeux de la communauté internationale, tout en justifiant le développement par l’Europe de ses propres capacités de contre-espace à des fins de défense.

De fait, plusieurs pays européens, dont le Royaume-Uni et l’Allemagne, plaident désormais plus ouvertement pour le déploiement de leurs propres capacités de défense spatiale. La Russie a par ailleurs déjà démontré d’autres moyens d’action en orbite reposant sur des opérations de proximité et pouvant être utilisées comme armes antisatellites.

Sans un éventail complet d’outils, incluant des moyens d’autodéfense, l’Europe pourrait se retrouver exposée à des actions spatiales plus agressives et auxquelles elle n’est pas suffisamment préparée. Protéger sa dépendance aux services spatiaux — des communications militaires à la connectivité indispensable pour l’économie — implique donc de faire de la sécurité en orbite un élément central de sa stratégie.

Aleix Nadal ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Comment la Russie s’approche des satellites européens pour capter leurs communications – https://theconversation.com/comment-la-russie-sapproche-des-satellites-europeens-pour-capter-leurs-communications-277532

March 6, 2026

La Russie, l’autre perdante de l’opération « Epic Fury » ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Cyrille Bret, Géopoliticien, Sciences Po

L’attaque contre l’Iran affaiblit un allié capital de Moscou. Il y a un an déjà, ce dernier n’avait pas sauvé son autre partenaire régional, Bachar Al-Assad. La prudence russe sur l’Iran démonétise le Kremlin dans le « Sud global ». Pour autant, la Russie peut aussi tirer des bénéfices de la déstabilisation du Moyen-Orient : l’attention mondiale se détourne de l’Ukraine ; les prix des hydrocarbures augmentent ; un changement de régime à Téhéran créerait un précédent justifiant les attaques contre Volodymyr Zelensky à Kiev…

La Fédération de Russie est-elle d’ores et déjà, après la République islamique d’Iran, la grande perdante de la guerre aéronavale menée par Israël et les États-Unis tout à la fois contre le régime des mollahs, contre le programme nucléaire iranien, contre l’appareil sécuritaire et contre le réseau international de cette puissance régionale ?

Le partenariat global russo-iranien signé en janvier 2025 n’assurera pas la défense de l’Iran, hormis les protestations formulées publiquement par les autorités russes quelques heures après le début des frappes.

Après la chute de la famille Al-Assad en Syrie, la Russie semble privée d’un relais essentiel dans la région et, plus largement, sur la scène mondiale. Pour autant, il est sans doute très prématuré d’annoncer la fin de l’influence russe au Moyen-Orient.

Des revers indiscutables

Même si Moscou a enregistré, ces dernières années, certains succès diplomatiques sur le continent africain, ses réseaux d’alliances s’effritent : renversement du régime syrien en décembre 2024, enlèvement spectaculaire du président vénézuélien Nicolas Maduro en janvier 2026, mort du guide suprême iranien Ali Khamenei et possible effondrement de la République islamique… La Russie a perdu des soutiens de poids sur la scène internationale pour sa lutte d’influence contre l’Occident et pour son invasion de l’Ukraine. D’évidence, le soutien de Moscou ne donne pas d’assurance-vie aux dirigeants alliés — et cette conclusion est d’ores et déjà tirée dans le « Sud global ».

Même si la République islamique d’Iran reste en place, la Russie perd, du fait de son durable affaiblissement, un levier d’influence dans la région. Surtout, la crédibilité internationale de Moscou est plus qu’écornée : le partenariat stratégique signé en janvier 2025 avec l’Iran n’est manifestement que d’une aide limitée, malgré l’excellence reconnue des systèmes russes des systèmes de défense anti-aérienne.

Ni sur le plan stratégique (accord de défense), ni sur le plan diplomatique (actions au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies), ni sur le plan capacitaire (exportations de matériels de défense), l’alliance russe ne paraît efficace ou protectrice. Engagées dans des opérations militaires de grande ampleur et de haute intensité sur des théâtres disjoints, la Fédération de Russie et la République islamique d’Iran ne peuvent s’épauler car les matériels militaires de chacun des partenaires vont à leurs fronts respectifs. Cet enseignement sera tiré cette fois-ci à Delhi et à Pékin, destinations privilégiées des matériels de défense russe en vertu d’accords de défense anciens.

Ultime revers, la Russie perd, avec l’opération israélo-américaine, son rôle de médiateur pour négocier des accords de non-prolifération avec l’Iran. Après une série de discussions purement bilatérales entre États-Unis et Iran puis après les frappes lourdes contre les sites iraniens, l’Iran n’a plus besoin d’avocat sur la scène internationale et la Russie ne peut plus se poser en intermédiaire entre Téhéran et le reste de la communauté internationale. Cette évidence est manifeste aux États-Unis comme en Europe.

Impuissante, décrédibilisée, marginalisée et inutile dans les affaires iraniennes, la Russie subit en ce moment une série de revers indiscutables dans la région et dans le monde.

Des risques ambivalents

Certaines conséquences de la guerre actuelle contre l’Iran sont plus difficiles à évaluer et peuvent présenter des avantages conditionnels et inattendus pour Moscou.

Sur le plan politique, un changement de régime (hypothétique en l’état actuel) à Téhéran serait en soi une mauvaise nouvelle pour le Kremlin : la lutte constante de la présidence Poutine contre les « révolutions de couleur » des années 2000, les protestations de Moscou contre la chute de Milosevic en Serbie en 2000, celle de Kadhafi en Libye en 2011 et, plus récemment, celle de Ianoukovitch en Ukraine en 2014, constituent un axe directeur de sa diplomatie. Toutefois, le renversement de dirigeants par la force militaire à Caracas comme à Téhéran donne indiscutablement un précédent objectif pour justifier des attaques contre la présidence Zelensky en Ukraine et contre tel ou tel autre dirigeant de l’ancien espace soviétique. En d’autres termes, Donald Trump essaie de faire à Téhéran ce que Vladimir Poutine aurait voulu réaliser à Kiev.

Sur le plan des matériels de défense, Moscou avait importé des drones Shahed d’Iran dans la première phase du conflit contre l’Ukraine. Mais, à la faveur des destructions réalisées en Iran, la Russie, qui désormais produit les Shahed elle-même, peut s’imposer sur les anciennes « parts de marché » iraniennes de ce secteur en croissance — à condition toutefois de ne pas consommer tous ses matériels sur le front ukrainien.

La plus grande inconnue concerne l’inflexion que cette guerre donnera au rapprochement entre Poutine et Trump médiatisée par la rencontre en Alaska le 15 août 2025. D’un côté, Moscou est engagé diplomatiquement et militairement aux côtés de l’Iran, ciblé par les États-Unis. Mais, d’un autre côté, Moscou peut aussi instaurer avec Washington une forme de troc, qui verrait le Kremlin réagir avec modération à la chute de la République islamique en contrepartie de concessions notables de la Maison-Blanche sur le dossier ukrainien.

Des opportunités de court et moyen terme pour Moscou

Dans la crise actuelle, la Russie peut toutefois exploiter plusieurs opportunités.

À brève échéance, la hausse des prix des hydrocarbures peut augmenter les recettes des sociétés russes et, indirectement, les recettes fiscales de l’État fédéral russe. La Chine et l’Inde sont en effet déjà des clients importants pour la Russie. Elles seront tentées de solliciter encore davantage leurs fournisseurs russes en cas de blocage durable du détroit d’Ormuz. Ce bénéfice de court terme doit être tempéré : d’une part, les hausses de prix ne peuvent être répercutées que sur les achats réalisés au jour le jour, pas sur les contrats de fourniture de long terme ; d’autre part, la hausse des prix des matières énergétiques peut être enrayée par une hausse de production de la part d’acteurs majeurs des marchés du gaz (Algérie, Russie elle-même) et du pétrole.

Toujours dans l’immédiat, Moscou peut exploiter le report de l’attention internationale du théâtre ukrainien au Moyen-Orient afin de renforcer encore ses actions contre les populations et les infrastructures dans la profondeur en Ukraine. Et cela, d’autant plus que les armements utilisés par les Européens et les Américains au Moyen-Orient ne pourront pas prendre la direction de l’Ukraine (même si le soutien américain en matériels s’amenuise de toute façon pour l’Ukraine).

À la faveur de la confusion actuelle (le trop fameux brouillard de la guerre), la Russie peut également saisir l’occasion de multiplier les actions en dessous du seuil (cyberattaques, subversion, etc.) contre des États européens fortement mobilisés en faveur de l’Ukraine.

Enfin, à moyen terme, la Russie peut mettre à profit les conséquences de l’opération israélo-palestinienne pour revoir sa stratégie au Moyen-Orient. À l’égard des régimes égyptien et saoudien, elle peut se poser en alternative de stabilisation face à la suprématie militaire de la « Sparte » israélienne et à l’aventurisme guerrier de l’administration Trump. À une Turquie échaudée par la désorganisation durable des équilibres régionaux (spécialement en cas de crise des réfugiés en provenance d’Iran), elle peut proposer de renforcer les coopérations alternatives à l’Otan. Enfin, à l’allié chiite laissé seul face à l’attaque militaire massive, elle peut proposer un soutien pour la reconstruction de ses dispositifs de défense.

À court terme, la Russie a tout à perdre de l’opération contre l’Iran. Mais il convient de ne pas sous-estimer sa résilience dans la région.

Cyrille Bret ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. La Russie, l’autre perdante de l’opération « Epic Fury » ? – https://theconversation.com/la-russie-lautre-perdante-de-loperation-epic-fury-277541

March 6, 2026

Parir en silencio y soledad: la violencia obstétrica que sufren las mujeres sordas

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Desirée Mena-Tudela, Enfermera. Titular de Universitat, Universitat Jaume I

El 28 de febrero de 2026, en la 40.ª edición de los Premios Goya, Miriam Garlo recogió el galardón a Mejor Actriz Revelación por su papel en Sorda. Su discurso de agradecimiento, pronunciado también en lengua de signos española, incluyó una frase que resonó con fuerza en redes sociales y medios de comunicación:

“Este premio es para las mujeres sordas que han sido madres y para las que no, porque a la violencia obstétrica hay que añadirle la violencia de la invisibilidad”.

El impacto mediático de sus palabras abrió un debate que las profesionales de la salud, las académicas y las propias mujeres sordas llevamos años intentando situar en la agenda pública y política: existen barreras comunicativas estructurales durante el embarazo, el parto y el puerperio. Y esas barreras comprometen tanto la seguridad clínica como el ejercicio efectivo de los derechos sexuales y reproductivos de las mujeres sordas.

La pregunta es inevitable: ¿cuánto sabemos realmente sobre esta realidad y qué estamos haciendo para cambiarla?

Sorda como posicionamiento artístico y político

La película Sorda, dirigida por Eva Libertad, sigue a Ángela, una mujer sorda que atraviesa el embarazo, el parto y la crianza de su hija. Su entorno no habla su lengua, no entiende sus silencios y, con demasiada frecuencia, toma decisiones por ella. Más que narrar una historia individual, la película construye una retórica de incomodidad permanente frente a un mundo diseñado para oyentes.

Desde esa perspectiva, Sorda funciona no sólo como obra cinematográfica, sino también como una intervención política: revela cómo la autonomía puede verse sistemáticamente fracturada cuando la comunicación no está garantizada.

La barrera comunicativa también es violencia obstétrica

La historia expone una forma de violencia obstétrica que rara vez se nombra: la que ocurre cuando el sistema y el personal sanitario no asegura una comunicación accesible.

Aunque las mujeres sordas no constituyen un grupo homogéneo, muchas comparten experiencias similares dentro de los sistemas de salud convencionales: consultas sin intérprete, explicaciones incompletas o inexistentes, decisiones clínicas comunicadas de manera fragmentaria o asumidas sin mediación lingüística.

A ello se suman factores recientes, como el uso generalizado de mascarillas, que dificultan aún más la lectura de los labios y la interpretación de expresiones faciales.

Las consecuencias no son menores. En el contexto obstétrico, la comunicación es una herramienta clínica fundamental. Permite evaluar síntomas, comprender sensaciones corporales y tomar decisiones informadas durante el proceso del parto.

Por ejemplo, la evaluación del dolor —considerado el quinto signo vital— es un indicador clave para garantizar la seguridad de la atención. Cuando esta evaluación no se realiza adecuadamente por falta de comunicación, no estamos ante un simple descuido: estamos ante una vulneración que puede tener consecuencias clínicas reales.

Pero el problema no se limita a la falta de información. Lo que está en juego es la autonomía.

Consecuencias evidenciadas

La violencia obstétrica incluye prácticas como realizar intervenciones sin consentimiento informado, ignorar las necesidades de la mujer, negar respuestas a sus solicitudes de ayuda o aplicar procedimientos que no están basados en evidencia. Estas experiencias tienen consecuencias que se han documentado en la literatura científica. Algunas de ellas son el trauma relacionado con el parto, la depresión posparto, el trastorno de estrés postraumático y la desconfianza hacia el sistema sanitario.

Para las mujeres sordas, estos riesgos se amplifican cuando los canales de comunicación no están garantizados. La discriminación de género se entrelaza con el capacitismo institucional, produciendo una doble forma de exclusión.

A ello se suma un problema estructural: muchos servicios de salud continúan funcionando bajo la premisa implícita de que todas las personas oyen, hablan y comprenden de la misma manera.

Cuando una mujer sorda llega a una institución de salud, con frecuencia se produce una escena repetida: el personal sanitario duda sobre quién la atenderá porque nadie sabe cómo comunicarse con ella. Aparecen el miedo, la inseguridad y la improvisación. La respuesta institucional suele ser la misma: desorientación, delegación y soluciones improvisadas.

No se trata de una anécdota o experiencia aislada. Es el resultado de un sistema que aún no ha incorporado la diversidad comunicativa como parte del estándar de cuidado.

Cuando la violencia obstétrica se vuelve una experiencia cotidiana

Los testimonios de mujeres sordas ayudan a comprender la dimensión real de esta problemática. En nuestra investigación hemos recogido múltiples ejemplos. Los nombres y procedencia de estas mujeres son ficticios para proteger su privacidad:

Elsa (Burgos). Mujer sorda de 49 años:

Después del parto todo cambió. Tuve cesárea por riesgo de pérdida del bienestar fetal. Comunicación con la cesárea cero. Todo con mascarillas. No supe por qué fue la cesárea. Después me lo contaron. Se llevaron al bebé. No me dijeron si estaba bien. Después de 5 horas desde la cesárea, el padre de mi hijo me dijo que estaba bien. Me puse a llorar por todo lo que tenía acumulado. Era como que yo no importaba. No tengo buena experiencia ni en el parto, ni el postparto, ni en la lactancia.

Marina (Comunidad Valenciana). Mujer sorda de 40 años:

La experiencia con el primero fue horrible. Con el segundo, fue mejor. Mi primer parto fue muy largo. Me dijeron que empujara, pero no sabía cómo. Lloré mucho en el hospital. No sabía qué hacer. No me sentía una buena madre. No me sentía preparada. A veces se oye que la gente tiene información, pero en nuestro caso… ¿qué información tenemos? Creo que es importante hablar sobre la maternidad de las madres sordas. En la comunidad sorda, no solemos hablar sobre la maternidad. En cuanto a la lactancia materna, a veces recibimos información contradictoria.

Estos relatos dan cuenta de lo que ocurre cuando una intervención médica se realiza sin explicación. También de cuando una mujer no puede acceder a la información necesaria para participar en las decisiones sobre su propio cuerpo. Esta forma de violencia obstétrica ha sido descrita por la literatura científica como violencia obstétrica capacitista.

¿Qué cambios son necesarios?

La película Sorda cierra con una dimensión política clara: solo un sistema que asume que todas las mujeres viven la maternidad de la misma manera puede producir este tipo de daño de forma sistemática.

Desde la perspectiva de la salud pública, ese reconocimiento debería ser el punto de partida para la transformación. Algunas medidas simples, pero que requieren voluntad institucional, serían garantizar intérpretes de lengua de signos en los servicios de salud, incorporar formación básica en comunicación accesible para los equipos sanitarios o reconocer la diversidad lingüística como parte fundamental de la calidad asistencial.

La pregunta de fondo no es si el sistema sanitario puede adaptarse. La pregunta es: ¿cómo puede considerarse ética una atención de salud que asume como aceptable que una mujer no entienda lo que ocurre durante su propio proceso de embarazo, parto y postparto? ¿De qué derechos a la salud hablamos cuando las mujeres sordas no pueden tener y acceder a una atención de salud mínimamente digna?

Sin comunicación accesible no hay consentimiento informado ni autonomía reproductiva posible. Cuando la autonomía desaparece, los derechos sexuales y reproductivos dejan de ser derechos y se transforman en una promesa vacía.

Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.

– ref. Parir en silencio y soledad: la violencia obstétrica que sufren las mujeres sordas – https://theconversation.com/parir-en-silencio-y-soledad-la-violencia-obstetrica-que-sufren-las-mujeres-sordas-277657

March 6, 2026

When Washington and the states are in conflict, the ultimate winner is not always certain

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kenneth Michael White, Associate Professor of Political Science & Criminal Justice, Kennesaw State University

Trump administration immigration policies have received pushback from leaders of sanctuary jurisdictions, as well as protesters. AP Photo/Ryan Murphy

The Trump administration’s aggressive policies on immigration are receiving pushback not just on Capitol Hill but across the country. Democratic leaders in multiple states are refusing to cooperate with immigration arrests.

In response, the federal government is refusing to share evidence with state investigators in the deaths of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, who were killed by federal officers while protesting immigration enforcement in Minneapolis.

Throughout U.S. history, there have been many moments of conflict between the federal and state governments, such as on slavery, racial segregation, school testing requirements, health care, abortion and climate change. Conversely, there has also been a long history of cooperation between the different levels of government in matters such as disaster relief, law enforcement and antiterrorism efforts.

But what happens when the various states and the federal government see the same legal issue differently? Which side wins in a dispute? This is an ongoing and open question, as evidenced by the frequent lawsuits being filed against Trump administration policies by state attorneys general.

As a legal scholar, I study issues related to constitutional law, including federalism, or the division of power between the various levels of government in the U.S. system. Ultimately, the question of who prevails when there’s a dispute depends on whether the issue is more national or local in scope. It may also matter whether the issue affects fundamental rights, which no government may justly infringe.

Layers of authority

The framers of the Constitution saw the division of power between the states and federal government as part of the U.S. system of checks and balances. Just as the judicial, executive and legislative branches check each other, so do the different levels of government. “The true barriers of our liberty in this country are our state governments,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1811.

Still, it’s easy to assume that the federal government has greater power. The U.S. Constitution states that federal laws are “the supreme Law of the Land.” This is a model known as vertical federalism – in essence, putting the federal government above the states and localities.

Texas Sen. John Cornyn gestures with his left hand while speaking at a committee hearing. — U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, speaks at a Senate hearing investigating fraud in the Medicaid program in Minnesota. Medicaid is a joint federal-state program.
AP Photo/Nathan Howard

There are areas of law where that framework clearly prevails. For example, immigration is an issue that the Constitution places squarely under the authority of the federal government. States cannot nullify, or invalidate, federal law. That is vertical federalism.

But the 10th Amendment says “powers not delegated to the United States … are reserved to the States respectively.” There are areas where states retain authority and the relationship between the levels of government is more horizontal, or flat or equal.

Consider cannabis. In 1996, California voters approved a ballot initiative making their state the first to allow the medical use of marijuana since prohibition started in the early 1900s. This was despite the fact that federal law viewed all cannabis as contraband. But California determines its own criminal code.

Californians could not stop the federal government from enforcing a valid federal law in their state, but that did not mean that California – or the vast majority of other states that have since passed their own medical or recreational marijuana measures – have to participate in a federal policy choice.

Federal agencies have continued occasional cannabis raids in California. But for state law enforcement officials, failing to punish a person for the medical use of cannabis is not a federal crime. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government cannot force a state “to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.” That is horizontal federalism.

Constraints on all governments

The federal government is limited to its enumerated powers – which is to say, the powers spelled out directly by the U.S. Constitution. But states possess “police powers,” which is a broader authority to regulate health, safety and morality.

The federal government is responsible for foreign policy and regulating interstate commerce. But states and localities regulate vaccine mandates, police and fire services, and operate or oversee water and sewer systems, as well as taking stances on moral issues, including alcohol and gambling, due to their potential to cause harm.

Three bags of cannabis, seized by law enforcement, are on display on a table. — Most states have passed laws legalizing marijuana for recreational or medical use, but the drug remains illegal under federal law.
AP Photo/Thomas Peipert

But both the federal government and the states are limited by the Constitution. Neither can justly violate the freedom of the press, for example, under the First Amendment.

And the reality is that, at least at this point in history, there is no neat division between federal and state authority on a broad range of issues. The federal government, for example, pays for the bulk of interstate highway construction. But those roads are actually paved by states.

When the federal government is paying a share of the cost of carrying out its policies, the Supreme Court has ruled that it can, in fact, tell states what to do, such as enforcing a legal drinking age of 21 or risk a share of federal highway funds. But it has also found that federal demands on states can be unconstitutionally excessive or “coercive,” as with a mandate under the Affordable Care Act to expand Medicaid, which the court struck down, even though Washington was paying most of the bill.

Federalism and the question of which level of government has the ultimate say is often complex and messy. But for that reason, as the framers foresaw, it remains an important safeguard of liberty, preventing too much power from residing in one place.

Kenneth Michael White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When Washington and the states are in conflict, the ultimate winner is not always certain – https://theconversation.com/when-washington-and-the-states-are-in-conflict-the-ultimate-winner-is-not-always-certain-276485

March 6, 2026

Why women have to queue for the toilet – and what it says about how cities are designed

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Belen Martinez, Research Fellow, Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University

Do you remember the last time you had to queue for a toilet? If several examples spring to mind, the chances are you were standing in the women’s line. Whether at theatres, airports, shopping centres or festivals, the pattern is the same: men breeze in and out with barely a wait, while women stand in line.

In most public buildings, toilet space is divided by floor area, giving men and women roughly equal space. While this might appear fair, research on gender and toilet design has shown that equal floor area does not result in equal access. It assumes that men and women use toilets in the same way and for the same length of time, an assumption built directly into most public toilet designs.

Men’s toilets usually combine cubicles with urinals, which take up less space and can be used more quickly. Women’s toilets rely entirely on cubicles, so even when both sides occupy the same area, men’s facilities can serve more users.

Time matters too. Women generally take longer because they need to sit rather than stand, often wear more complex clothing, and are more likely to be menstruating, pregnant or managing conditions such as incontinence or urinary tract infections.

Many design standards are still based on a “default male body”, assuming a fast pace, standing and minimal time spent in the toilet. When spaces are organised around men’s bodies and routines, delays are easily blamed on women’s behaviour – that women “take too long” – rather than on how toilets are designed.

The most visible consequence of these design standards is the queue outside the women’s toilets. But, as my research shows, there can also be economic and health consequences. For mobile workers like taxi drivers, time spent standing in line is time not spent earning.

The cost of toilet disparity

And it’s not just about the queue – availability of toilets at all is a design decision that affects women more than men, who are more likely to be able to go wherever they’d like.

For most women, queuing for the toilet is a minor irritation that they absorb into the day without much thought. Yet the more serious costs of toilet disparity became clear to me while researching women who work as taxi drivers in Spain.

When I asked about the frustrations of the job, their first answer was rarely traffic, difficult passengers or long shifts, but toilets. Finding a toilet while on shift often required careful planning and long waits, leading to lost income. Their male colleagues, meanwhile, seemed to come and go in minutes.

Rosario, a 26-year-old Uber driver, described needing the toilet while working as “the drama of the job!” Like many other drivers who participated in my research, she explained that she planned her route around known toilet facilities. Others reported avoiding drinking water so they would not need to stop “all the time”, while some linked recurrent urinary infections to “holding it for too long”.

These strategies become redundant when menstruating. As Juana explained: “You have to get organised and force yourself to stop. So after a service, you don’t just go to the nearby taxi rank to get a new client. Instead, you have to drive to a petrol station so you can go to the toilet first.”

An all-gender restroom sign — Gender-neutral restrooms and other designs can make public toilets more equitable.
Heidi Besen/Shutterstock

Research has long shown that public toilets are not neutral pieces of infrastructure, but reflect deeper assumptions about whose bodies and behaviours are taken as the norm. In particular, norms of modesty and privacy mean that women are expected to use enclosed cubicles, while men’s facilities prioritise speed and efficiency through open urinals.

It is also anatomically easier – and often socially accepted – for men to urinate at the side of a road or elsewhere when there are no public toilets available.

Women’s privacy is carefully designed for, but their time is not. Research on “toilet parity” shows that increasing the number of cubicles or creating gender neutral cubicles can significantly cut women’s queues with little impact on men. Experiments at large events, such as the use of urinals for women, show how rethinking capacity can virtually eliminate waiting.

For the women in my research, the frustrating quest for a toilet is not just about waiting, but about dignity and the right to occupy the city on equal terms. Toilets, in this sense, become a quiet but powerful indicator of who public space is really designed for, and whose bodies are still expected to adapt.

Belen Martinez receives funding from Economic and Social Research Council (ES/P00072X/1).

– ref. Why women have to queue for the toilet – and what it says about how cities are designed – https://theconversation.com/why-women-have-to-queue-for-the-toilet-and-what-it-says-about-how-cities-are-designed-273536

March 6, 2026

The Capture season three: experts in facial recognition and AI decipher the fact from the fiction

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Eilidh Noyes, Lecturer in Cognitive Psychology, University of Leeds

The BBC’s conspiracy thriller drama The Capture is back for a third season. The first two series had viewers hooked with a story that intertwined police investigations, facial recognition and deepfake AI technology.

As experts in facial recognition and AI, we’re separating the fact from the fiction ahead of the new season.

Fans of The Capture will be familiar with scenes of investigators using facial recognition software to identify the people they are tracking around London – the soldier Shaun Emery (Callum Turner) in season one and the Russian mercenary Nikolai Mirsky (Jack Sandle) in season two.

Real facial recognition

Real facial recognition work involves several steps. An operator first uploads an image into facial recognition software, which searches for the presence of a face. Features are then extracted from each detected face and compared against the features of faces from a stored database. Features are things that the algorithm has identified as important for recognition decisions and are probably not describable attributes of a face as we know it (such as eyes, nose, mouth).

It is not feasible, nor indeed ethical, to run a facial recognition system against all images on the internet. Not least because of the technical limitations of searching for, storing and processing such a staggering amount of data. In police or intelligence settings faces are searched against specific databases and a human almost always reviews the output because algorithms are not perfect. It is crucial that human operators are trained on the strengths and limitations of these systems and have the necessary skills to review the output.

In season two of The Capture, the fictional facial recognition software company “Xanda” claims their system can “recognise a face with up to 100% accuracy … from every corner of the world with equal precision”. But they are opposed to independent testing.

The trailer for season three of The Capture.

The best facial recognition systems are now extremely accurate, under increasingly difficult image scenarios. However, accuracy and demographic differences vary widely across different systems and testing parameters. Racial bias is a genuine concern and independent testing is of paramount importance.

In season two, Xanda’s technology claims it can literally “unmask” a face. In reality, some algorithms compare masked to unmasked faces with high accuracy, but they cannot recover information from underneath the mask. Attempting to do so would produce inaccurate and dangerous results.

In the show, patrolling officers receive images of targets, and eyewitnesses perform identifications. This reflects a genuine use of human facial recognition in forensic operations. Most humans make errors on facial comparison tasks involving unfamiliar faces. Super-recognisers (people with a naturally high recognition ability) and trained forensic examiners are more accurate. Familiar humans (people who know the target) often make accurate identifications even in low-quality photos.

Real deepfakes

Deepfakes are digitally manipulated videos, images or voices created with AI to make it appear that someone did something that they didn’t. This technology already exists. Real examples of misuse include fake political videos, non-consensual intimate imagery, child exploitation images and fraud.

Characters in The Capture frequently mistake deepfakes as genuine sources of information. In season one, manipulated video footage causes chaos for Emery, and in season two politician Isaac Turner (Paapa Essiedu) is the subject of a rampage of manipulated footage which the public believes is real.

When asked how Turner sounded in a faked call, a character replied “like Isaac Turner”. This acceptance of deepfakes is realistic. Human detection accuracy is around a coin flip: a 50% chance of a correct detection in scientific studies.

Turner’s wife (Charlie Murphy) was confused by the content of her husband’s deepfake speech, but complimented the way he spoke: “You did good though … Not what you said but the way you said it. You sounded … authoritative.” Cloned voices are typically rated positively and as more dominant than real recordings. Though in practice, deepfake videos tend not to be effective for the types of political activity depicted in the show, and manipulated imagery is not a new problem, as it suggests.

Depictions of deepfakes in The Capture involve almost instantaneous video manipulation and live broadcast. This is far from the current state-of-the-art. While the technology has improved, it is prone to producing obviously fake videos. Creating a high quality video requires a large and diverse collection of photos for the target person, along with iterative tweaks to the output. This is time consuming, and impossible to do in real-time.

Moreover, a capability that can hijack any CCTV or live TV feed and instantly play any content does not yet exist. Camera networks exist over a variety of different technical protocols, ownership arrangements, and access models. That complexity is a roadblock for the kind of point-and-click hijacking depicted in the show.

What next?

In season three, detective Rachel Carey (Holliday Grainger) will encounter further deceptive footage. How can she trust what she sees?

Real strategies to detect deepfakes include training humans to detect artifice, familiarity with the person depicted, and liveness checks that measure natural human responses to various changes in the scene.

In season two, Carey recognised genuine footage of Turner because he held the cross on the necklace around his neck, which his deepfake never did – idiosyncratic mannerisms may be missing in a deepfake.

Detection algorithms developed by the media forensics community and digital watermarks (“invisible” codes in imagery detectable by algorithms) are technological countermeasures that also help.

There are new AI techniques, such as the creation of realistic fake faces and agentic AI, where autonomous software systems perform tasks independently of human control. Will we see the face of an identity that does not exist to throw off the investigators? Could AI get out of hand and create deepfakes for its own purposes, providing a dilemma for both the good guys and the bad guys in the show?

These are the challenges we’d like to see Carey tackle, because they’re ones society will probably face in the near future.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The Capture season three: experts in facial recognition and AI decipher the fact from the fiction – https://theconversation.com/the-capture-season-three-experts-in-facial-recognition-and-ai-decipher-the-fact-from-the-fiction-277292

March 6, 2026

The US sank an Iranian warship and didn’t rescue the survivors. Is this legal in war?

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jennifer Parker, Adjunct Professor, Defence and Security Institute, The University of Western Australia; UNSW Sydney

News that a United States submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Iranian warship IRIS Dena about 40 nautical miles off Sri Lanka this week took many observers by surprise. An attack like this so far from the Persian Gulf – and in a key trade route connecting China to the Middle East – suggests the arena of this war may be widening.

But the incident also highlights something rarely well understood outside military and legal circles: the law of naval warfare.

Many have wondered: was this attack lawful? And who was under an obligation to rescue survivors?

When does the law of naval warfare apply?

The law of naval warfare is a subset of the law of armed conflict.

The law of naval warfare sets out permissions and protections for combatants, civilians and neutral actors engaged in conflict at sea.

Importantly, it applies regardless of whether the resort to force was lawful.

In other words, you’re supposed to follow the law of the sea even if your whole justification for war in the first place isn’t legal under international law.

What’s more, the conduct of operations at sea is regulated by the law of naval warfare whether or not war has been formally declared.

The law of naval warfare also takes precedence over the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (where the two come into tension).

This reflects the principle of lex specialis in international law, meaning the more specific body of law applies.

These rules have developed over centuries as states sought to regulate the conduct of conflict at sea while still allowing navies to operate effectively.

So, was it legal for the US to sink the Iranian warship?

Yes, it was a lawful target.

Under the law of naval warfare, warships belonging to a state engaged in an international armed conflict are military objectives by nature. The rules say they may be lawfully targeted.

Such attacks may occur on the high seas or within the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of the states that are party to the international armed conflict (the belligerents). This means, effectively, that such an attack could happen anywhere outside the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of neutral states.

If the Iranian warship was within Sri Lankan waters (that is, within 12 nautical miles of the Sri Lankan coast) at the time, the attack wouldn’t have been lawful.

But in this case, IRIS Dena was reportedly operating outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters and therefore constitutes a lawful military target.

What does the law say about rescue of survivors?

The law of naval warfare also sets out obligations regarding the rescue of survivors.

Under the Second Geneva Convention of 1949, parties to a conflict must – after each engagement – take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick.

These rules apply to naval warfare and require belligerents, so far as military circumstances permit, to assist survivors at sea.

In practice, however, submarines face particular challenges in fulfilling this obligation. Surfacing to rescue survivors may expose them to significant risk. You also can’t usually fit a large number of survivors on a submarine.

If a submarine cannot safely surface to rescue survivors, it may instead facilitate rescue by reporting their location to other vessels or authorities.

This practice has been noted in some key legal commentary on submarine warfare.

The swift response of the Sri Lankan navy, which rescued 32 sailors from IRIS Dena, suggests authorities were informed quickly of the incident. (Sri Lankan officials say 87 bodies were also retrieved).

How Sri Lankan authorities were informed is not yet clear, but it seems likely the US navy transmitted the location of the survivors.

Given the damage suffered by IRIS Dena and the reported casualties, the ship’s crew was unlikely to have been able to transmit their location themselves.

This may also explain why early reports suggested a submarine had sunk the vessel, before the US confirmed its involvement.

It is also unlikely the crew of IRIS Dena would have immediately known they had been struck by a submarine-launched torpedo. Such a torpedo would typically be fired from very far away, beyond the detection range of a ship’s hull-mounted sonar.

A lawful military target

While debate continues over the legal justification for the United States entering the conflict with Iran, the conduct of hostilities at sea is nonetheless governed by the law of naval warfare.

Under that framework, IRIS Dena therefore constitutes a lawful military target, and efforts to facilitate the rescue of survivors are consistent with those obligations.

Jennifer Parker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The US sank an Iranian warship and didn’t rescue the survivors. Is this legal in war? – https://theconversation.com/the-us-sank-an-iranian-warship-and-didnt-rescue-the-survivors-is-this-legal-in-war-277606