Ethiopian women and safety: why some switch their ethnic identity when they start working

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Monica Beeder, Lecturer, University of Southampton

For women entering the formal labour market in Ethiopia, taking a job can expose them to new public spaces and risks. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

For many women in Ethiopia, getting their first formal job doesn’t just change their income; it can change how they describe who they are in everyday public interactions.

In a country where ethnicity shapes access to opportunities, safety and political rights, this shift is far from small.

That is the provocative finding of our recent study: formal employment can cause women to switch their self-reported ethnicity. We are a team of political scientists and development economists who study labour markets, gender and ethnic identity in Ethiopia. We studied this issue in a recent research project.

We used data from a unique field experiment with 27 firms across five Ethiopian regions, where job offers were randomised among qualified female applicants. This means the firms had more qualified applicants than positions, so eligible women were selected through a lottery system for job offers. We then tracked both women who received a job offer and those who didn’t over multiple survey rounds spanning roughly three years, collecting information on their employment status, earnings, working conditions, daily mobility and commuting patterns, household characteristics, and how they reported their ethnic identity.

What we found was striking. In our full sample of 891 women, around 8% changed their stated ethnicity at some point over the time we followed them. While this may sound like a small share, switching ethnic identity is rare and socially consequential, making this level of change substantial in context.

Women who received a job offer were 4.3 percentage points more likely to switch their stated ethnicity than those who did not. In the comparison group – women who were not offered a job – about 6% changed their stated ethnicity over time. Among women offered a job, this figure rose to around 10%. When we account for who actually took up the job, the effect is even larger.

To some readers, this may sound like a technical result. But in a country where ethnicity shapes politics, social opportunity and daily survival, it is explosive.

Changing one’s ethnic label is not a trivial act. It carries implications for family, community and belonging.

So, why would a job make someone change something so fundamental?

For women entering the formal labour market in Ethiopia, even at low wages, taking a job can reshape their daily routines and expose them to new public spaces and risks. These shifts in mobility and visibility create pressures that women who stay at home may never face.

As they navigate these new environments, some find themselves adjusting not just their schedules, but also how they present and even report their ethnic identity.

By showing that formal employment can lead to ethnic reidentification, our study reveals identity as a living, shifting facet of social life rather than a fixed badge.

As Ethiopia and other African countries pursue industrialisation, labour-market expansion and social mobility, we must pay attention: economic transformation may come with unexpected, and deeply personal, consequences.

Being vulnerable

Our in-depth interviews with women in the two cities with the highest switching in our sample – Dire Dawa in east-central Ethiopia and Hawassa in the southern region – reveal a striking mechanism.

Employment meant commuting through areas where ethnic and, in some cases, ethno-religious tensions were high.

Women told us they felt far more vulnerable on the road than at home, especially if their own ethnicity placed them on the “wrong” side of a local conflict.

As one respondent explained, the decision to switch was driven by practical concerns about personal safety rather than a deeper change in how they saw themselves.

Some women did not adopt the local majority’s identity but switched to a third, more neutral group, one not involved in conflict.

Whether this was possible depended on their appearance, religion and language skills. As several women explained, speaking the correct language allowed them to “pass”, meaning they were perceived as belonging to a safer group while out in public. We cannot say how common this strategy was across all women in our study, but the interviews confirm patterns we also observe in our quantitative data of women switching to a third, neutral ethnicity to navigate local conflicts.

This makes sense in a country experiencing repeated waves of violence. In 2022, more than 40% of all conflict-related deaths worldwide occurred in Ethiopia.

In this kind of context, identity is not static; it becomes a resource.

Our findings challenge common assumptions across economics, the social sciences, and policy. While scholars have long recognised that ethnic identity can be fluid, it is often still treated as something relatively stable in practice, rooted in ancestry or birth.

What our evidence shows is the strategic side of this fluidity. Ethnicity can be consciously adjusted in response to economic conditions, mobility and the risks women face in public spaces.

In other words, identity is not only socially constructed. It can also shift in response to the pressures and incentives created by the work environment.

The protections needed

This raises uncomfortable questions about the global garment industry, which has progressively shifted production from Europe to Asia and is now beginning to extend manufacturing activities to parts of Africa as global value chains are reconfigured in search of lower production costs. Ethiopia has encouraged this growth by developing large industrial parks.

But unlike in long-established manufacturing hubs, there are few safety nets, transport protections or policies designed around local ethnic dynamics.

When women must alter their identity to feel safe on the commute to a low-wage job, something is clearly missing.

Our findings show that when these global industries arrive without adapting to local realities, the burden falls disproportionately on women.

It is not a sign of progress when a woman has to change her identity, even temporarily, to commute safely to a low-paid job. If anything, it calls for a more honest debate about what industrialisation should look like, and what protections are needed for the workers it relies on.

This also raises more profound questions about belonging and dignity. Is changing your ethnic identity an act of personal agency – or a sign of social pressure and insecurity? What does it say about everyday life when your safety depends on how you present yourself while travelling to work?

Imagine having to change the language you speak on the bus – or even the surname you give when introducing yourself – just to avoid trouble on your way to work.

While not all women faced situations this extreme, the very possibility of needing such strategies illustrates the pressures created by moving through tense public spaces.

The Conversation

The research team received funding from the Norwegian Research Council to collect data for this study.

ref. Ethiopian women and safety: why some switch their ethnic identity when they start working – https://theconversation.com/ethiopian-women-and-safety-why-some-switch-their-ethnic-identity-when-they-start-working-271325

Getting into university is only the first hurdle for students from rural South Africa. Here’s what comes next

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hellen Agumba, Senior lecturer, University of Johannesburg

As universities in South Africa prepare to admit a new group of students, thousands of young people from rural parts of the country hope for a life-changing opportunity.

In 2023, public universities enrolled 258,778 first-time students. Demand is intense; for example, the University of Johannesburg received 358,992 applications for just 10,500 first-year spaces in 2025.

A substantial proportion of these new students come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. The National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) is often the only key to unlocking post-school education. The scheme supports students from families earning less than R350,000 a year (about US$21,000) and has a target of 850,000 students. It is supposed to cover fees, accommodation, a living allowance, transport and learning materials.

Yet for many rural students, this key fails to turn the lock.

The number of students from rural areas who secure university placements cannot be determined. Neither the Council on Higher Education nor the Department of Higher Education systematically tracks students’ geographic origins. But what research does show is that students from rural areas face challenges beyond financial constraints.




Read more:
How place of birth shapes chances of going to university: evidence from 7 African countries


My research on higher education access and learning experiences, particularly among marginalised students, has explored the reasons and consequences.

The conversation around financial aid rightly focuses on administrative crises: devastating payment delays and operational failures that erode trust. These are human catastrophes. But I’ve found that for rural students, these problems are only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath lies a deeper web of challenges.

Financial aid is crucial but it cannot compensate for systemic disadvantages that begin long before students reach campus and persist throughout their studies.

My research, involving in-depth interviews with rural students, shows the “hidden costs” they bear. Their struggle begins with limited access to information. This constrains their educational choices. Then they may not feel really comfortable to participate in the classroom and make social connections. And their financial situation influences both academic performance and social belonging.

Even when rural students graduate, many describe feeling they have survived higher education rather than thrived in it.

The experiences they shared with me reveal how these challenges interconnect throughout their university journey. Their stories also point to ways of improving rural students’ participation in higher education.

Listening to rural students

My qualitative study consisted of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with 18 rural students (10 of them female), aged 19-25 at a university in Johannesburg. All participants came from former homeland areas across four provinces – the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Mpumalanga – a pattern reflecting apartheid’s enduring geographic legacy. They were studying fields ranging from education to engineering; 13 of the 18 were first-generation university students, and all were Black African. Their demographic profile was typical of deeply rural students accessing higher education through programmes like NSFAS.

The deliberate selection criteria and consistency of their experiences reveals systemic patterns.

One of the participants, Philip (all names have been changed) from Limpopo, described the sheer physical distance of his home from university:

I pass Polokwane (a city 320km from Johannesburg) and go deep to the rural villages until Giyani (a small town over 150km further on) … then from Giyani I have to catch a taxi to my village … you are far away from universities.

While urban students attend open days to learn about the courses on offer and careers, those in remote villages are left in the dark. As one participant, Terry, observed:

During open day for UJ (University of Johannesburg) … it’s mostly model C schools.“ (These are better resourced high schools which were reserved for white learners during apartheid.) I have never seen someone (there) from rural background.

This isolation limits career awareness to visible rural professions like teaching and nursing.

Sef’s story is telling:

I didn’t know anything about the courses offered … I only know teaching and these professions that you see in the village.

After a costly false start, she found her path to engineering only through a chance family conversation.

In South Africa, many students scrape together a registration fee, gambling that full funding will materialise. And without guidance on accommodation deadlines, they might arrive in the city to find university residences full and be forced into expensive or unsafe private housing.

Jane explained:

We will come and look for accommodation in February … When we get there, we find that the residence is already full.

While universities technically provide accommodation information, it is often buried in lengthy online registration documents that assume students have reliable internet access and familiarity with university processes.




Read more:
South African students still don’t feel safe on campus: how protection can be stepped up


The result is a financial strain from day one. For students like Kate, who was mugged commuting from distant, off-campus housing, the consequences are academic and psychological:

At the end of the year, I didn’t pass that well and as a result I lost my sponsor.

Upon arrival, they face a second battle: cultural and geographic alienation. They enter a space privileging urban, middle-class norms. Participants spoke of being teased for their accents and dress.




Read more:
How class and social capital affect university students


As Ann from the Eastern Cape put it:

Nobody cares … you get to know people from other tribes, people from other races … some of things they do you don’t understand.

Language becomes a profound barrier to participation. Philip shared:

I would want to participate … but eish! English … I’m not confident enough.

The curriculum itself can feel alienating, with examples drawn from unfamiliar urban contexts. Terry, an engineering student, noted:

Sometimes they teach about some events you have never heard of … that’s where they kill us.




Read more:
Universities need to take note of the gap between expectations and experience


It takes more than cash

This brings us back to NSFAS. Its administrative failures hit rural students hardest.

For a student who barely registered, a delayed allowance is a crisis. It means missing lectures, relying on food parcels, and impossible choices between education and supporting families.




Read more:
South Africa’s university students face a crisis: nearly a third go hungry


Ann described the strain:

Since January we’re still waiting … Sometimes I don’t have money to come to school. I have to miss lectures.

The funding, when it comes, doesn’t cover the true cost. It ignores higher travel costs, expensive data to compensate for remoteness, and the burden of unexpected private accommodation.




Read more:
Distance learning changes lives, but comes with its own challenges


The higher education system has focused too long on the narrow goal of access: getting students through the gate. True equity is about ensuring they can thrive as peers inside. The current student financing model is a blunt remedy: it provides cash but leaves the underlying structures of exclusion untouched.

How to change it

My research suggests some steps that could help rural students.

Fix the fundamentals with rural students in mind: Students need a competent, reliable financial aid scheme. Payment timelines must be guaranteed, with emergency support for rural students during delays.




Read more:
South Africa’s student debt trap: two options that could help resolve the problem


Early outreach: Universities and government must take information to deep rural areas through mobile career services and application support long before final high school exams that determine university entrance.

Fund the full experience: Bursary calculations must be nuanced to cover the real, higher costs borne by rural students, including travel, data and safe accommodation.

Create culturally inclusive campuses: Universities must actively combat assumptions that rural students are “underprepared” or “lacking” essential skills. They can do this through staff training, peer mentorship, and curricula that value different kinds of knowledge.




Read more:
We asked university students to tell their own stories in photos: here’s why


The dreams of rural students are stifled by a system blind to their reality. Ensuring timely funding is the bare minimum. They need a system that doesn’t just let them in but truly welcomes them and sets them up for success.

The Conversation

Hellen Agumba received funding from the National Research Fund (NRF). The grant was awarded for her PhD Studies.

ref. Getting into university is only the first hurdle for students from rural South Africa. Here’s what comes next – https://theconversation.com/getting-into-university-is-only-the-first-hurdle-for-students-from-rural-south-africa-heres-what-comes-next-271532

Humans returned to British Isles earlier than previously thought at the end of the last ice age

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adrian Palmer, Senior Lecturer, Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London

The return of humans to the British Isles after the end of the last ice sheet, which covered much of the northern hemisphere, happened around 15,200 years ago – nearly 500 years earlier than previous estimates.

This movement of people coincided with a sharp rise in summer temperatures in southern Britain, research by our group shows.

These environmental conditions allowed humans to migrate back up into Britain – then still connected to the European mainland. They were hunting herds of reindeer and horses, which were migrating northwards into ecosystems that supported their preferred food for grazing.

After the end of the last ice age, the climate in north-west Europe shifted from cold to warm conditions on at least two occasions, with changes in temperature thought to have occurred over decades.

Our latest research addresses the first of these transitions in the Late Upper Palaeolithic period (14,000 to 11,000 years ago). In areas such as north-west Europe, including where the British Isles are today, humans successively abandoned and then returned to areas at the abrupt transitions between cold and warm periods.

Broadly, evidence of humans from fossil records showed them migrating to where the environmental conditions supported their survival.

Reasons for repopulation

The repopulation of the British Isles after the last ice age is an excellent period to explore the relationships between climate and environment, and the reappearance of humans in this region.

In previous studies, the evidence has been somewhat difficult to read due to uncertainty of the dating methods and incomplete records of environmental and climate conditions. The traditional view had been that the north-west European climate warmed from ice-age temperatures around 14,700 years ago, and humans reoccupied Britain at that time.

However, revised preparation techniques in the early 2000s for the dating of human remains and associated artefacts showed the earliest appearance of humans occurred prior to the warming of 14,700 years ago.

This finding was difficult to understand, as it coincided with what were then considered cold glacial climates that would have been unlikely to support the resources people needed to survive in Britain.

Summer climate record from Llangorse Lake, Wales

A graphic showing showing summer temperatures in the British Isles after the last Ice Age.
Graph shows the timing of returns to British Isles of reindeer and humans after the last ice age, and related temperatures in Llangrose Lake.
Author’s own illustration

Our study used new calibrations of radiocarbon ages that confirmed the age of those human remains to between 15,200 and 15,000 years ago. So, if humans really were present in the British Isles, could they have survived in cold climates – or was our picture of past environments at this time incorrect?

Clearer insight came from Llangorse Lake (Lake Syffadan) in south Wales, where the lake sediments spanning the last 19,000 years record the abrupt climate change in detail. In addition, the lake’s location lies close to the cave in the Wye Valley where the earliest British evidence for human remains after the ice age were found.

By extracting fossil pollen, chironomids (non-biting midges) and chemical analysis of the lake sediments, an unexpected picture of the climate emerged – one that showed previous climate reconstructions for the region were incorrect.

The chironomids were used to reconstruct summer temperature, and this showed the climate warmed in a different pattern than has been identified in other parts of north-west Europe and Greenland. An abrupt temperature shift from 5–7°C to 10–14°C occurred at 15,200 years in Britain – 500 years earlier than previous evidence had suggested.

Just prior to this climate warming, the presence of human prey, such as reindeer and horses, is more consistently detected in southern Britain around 15,500 years ago. These animals were exploiting the newly available grazing grounds, with people tracking the herds northwards and enduring the moderately warmer summer climatic conditions.

Examining archaeological records along with environmental and climatic archives allows more precise reconstructions of when humans were able to repopulate previously inhospitable regions. This is helped by re-evaluating old radiocarbon dates of human evidence in the landscape, and by generating more precise environmental records from the time – including more precise timings of the transitions from cold to warm periods.

This provided us with a fuller picture of human responses to changes in temperature (and their impact on the environment) in the Late Upper Palaeolithic period. Human survival was the driver of these movements, and following prey into new areas was important. But only a relatively small change in summer temperatures was required to enable this migration.

Our research provides better understanding of human behaviour and resilience to climate change after the last ice age around 15,000 years ago. But understanding these environmental triggers from the past helps create new perspectives on human responses to them even now.

These basic factors have not gone away. The response observed in this study might provide clues on future human behaviour as our polar regions warm and glaciers melt, showing how the potential for human migration could be increased.

The Conversation

Adrian Palmer receives funding from Natural Environment Research Council. He is affiliated with Royal Holloway, University of London and Quaternary Research Association.

ref. Humans returned to British Isles earlier than previously thought at the end of the last ice age – https://theconversation.com/humans-returned-to-british-isles-earlier-than-previously-thought-at-the-end-of-the-last-ice-age-271242

Can you really lose weight by cutting gluten from your diet, as Matt Damon claims?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Guy Guppy, Lecturer in Performance Nutrition and Exercise Physiology, Kingston University

When Matt Damon recently credited his weight loss to going gluten-free, it reignited a familiar debate about this divisive dietary approach. But while The Odyssey star’s claims have sparked discussion, the science behind weight loss tells a far more nuanced story than simply cutting out a single protein.

Gluten is a naturally occurring protein found in grains such as wheat, barley and rye, which means it’s commonly consumed in everyday foods like bread, pasta and cereal. For most people, gluten doesn’t cause any health problems.

But for those with coeliac disease – which affects about 1% of people – avoiding it is essential. This autoimmune condition triggers an immune response to gluten, damaging the small intestine’s lining, impairing nutrient absorption.

Then there’s gluten intolerance, or non-coeliac gluten sensitivity, a condition associated with symptoms like bloating and reflux. People with this condition also commonly experience problems beyond the digestive system, including headaches and skin rashes.

Despite growing numbers of people reporting such symptoms, gluten intolerance remains hotly debated in terms of its causes and management. Currently, the only recommended approach is to adopt a gluten-free diet.

For everyone else – those without coeliac disease or gluten intolerance – avoiding gluten-rich foods may be unnecessary and potentially problematic.

Foods high in gluten, such as bread, pasta and cereal, don’t just provide carbohydrates, they’re also excellent sources of fibre and B vitamins.

Removing these foods may inadvertently contribute towards nutrient deficiencies. Yet the market for gluten-free products continues to surge, with projections suggesting it will reach US$13.7 billion (£10.2 billion) by 2030.

Given that Damon didn’t disclose any medical condition when discussing his weight loss goals, the likely explanation for his results lies in his overall diet and behaviour rather than gluten itself. Research published in Nutrients found no significant differences between gluten-free and gluten-rich diets in body fat or body weight among healthy adults.

Mechanics, not magic

The weight loss many people experience on gluten-free diets often comes down to mechanics rather than magic. Because gluten is in many energy-dense, carbohydrate-based foods, people eliminating it typically cut out items like pizza, fast food and pasta.

This carbohydrate restriction leads to a reduction in glycogen – the stored form of carbohydrate in the human body. When glycogen is stored, water is stored alongside it.

So when glycogen levels drop, water weight follows, creating the illusion of rapid fat loss. This phenomenon explains why people often see dramatic results in the first week or two of any new diet or exercise programme.

Beyond reduced carbohydrate intake, people following gluten-free diets often shift towards consuming more naturally gluten-free whole foods. This dietary restructuring often results in fewer calories being consumed overall.

A small preliminary study, published in Frontiers of Sports and Active Living, found that adhering to a gluten-free diet for six weeks led to significant reductions in body weight compared to a control diet. But these changes were probably the result of a calorie deficit and fluid loss, rather than any metabolic advantage from removing gluten.

There’s another factor at play. Wheat-based carbohydrates contain fermentable sugars called fructans, which are broken down by bacteria in the large intestine. This fermentation produces gas that can cause bloating, pain and changes in bowel movements. When these foods are removed, symptoms subside and the stomach can appear flatter – an aesthetic change that people may mistake for fat loss.

Gluten may have health benefits

Adopting a gluten-free diet that isn’t medically necessary could actually increase health risks. A large study published in the BMJ found an association between higher gluten intake and reduced heart disease risk.

Similarly, research has revealed a link between low gluten intake and increased type 2 diabetes risk.

The culprit behind these concerning links may well be the gluten-free products lining supermarket shelves. When gluten is removed from a product, it changes the texture and palatability of the food. To compensate, manufacturers add other ingredients to improve taste and consistency.

The result? Gluten-free products have been shown to contain significantly less protein, higher saturated fat, lower fibre and higher sugar than their conventional counterparts. Over time, this nutritional profile may lead to poor diets and hence poor health.

So while people may believe that going gluten-free causes weight loss, the reality is usually different. Subtle changes in diet structure and composition, alongside behavioural modifications, are typically the real reason.

The Conversation

Guy Guppy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Can you really lose weight by cutting gluten from your diet, as Matt Damon claims? – https://theconversation.com/can-you-really-lose-weight-by-cutting-gluten-from-your-diet-as-matt-damon-claims-273392

‘We got lazy and complacent’: Swedish pensioners explain how abolishing the wealth tax changed their country

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Miranda Sheild Johansson, Senior Research Fellow in Social Anthropology, UCL

‘A country of rich people’: a superyacht with helicopter on board heads into Stockholm’s harbour. M-Production/Shutterstock

For much of the 20th century, Sweden enjoyed a justifiable reputation as one of Europe’s most egalitarian countries. Yet over the past two decades, it has transformed into what journalist and author Andreas Cervenka calls a “paradise for the super-rich”.

Today, Sweden has one of the world’s highest ratios of dollar billionaires, and is home to numerous “unicorn” startup companies worth at least US$1 billion (£742 million), including the payment platform Klarna and audio streaming service Spotify.

The abolition of the wealth tax (förmögenhetsskatten) 20 years ago is part of this story – along with, in the same year, the introduction of generous tax deductions for housework and home improvement projects. Two decades on, the number of Swedish homes that employ cleaners is one marker of it being an increasingly two-tier country.

As part of my anthropological research into the social relationships that different tax systems produce, I have been working with pensioners in the southern suburbs of Sweden’s capital, Stockholm, to learn how they feel about the decreasing levels of taxation in their later lives.

This trend has been coupled with a gradual shrinking of the welfare state. Many of my interviewees regret that Sweden no longer has a collective project to build a more cohesive society.

“Us pensioners can see the destruction of what we built, what was started when we were small children,” Kjerstin, 74, explained. “I was born after the end of the war and built this society through my life, together with my fellow citizens. [But] with taxes being lowered and the taking away of our social security … we’re not building anything together now.”

Sweden’s gini coefficient, the most common way to measure inequality, has reached 0.3 in recent years (with 0 reflecting total equality and 1 total inequality), up from around 0.2 in the 1980s. The EU as a whole is at 0.29. “There are now 42 billionaires in Sweden – it’s gone up a lot,” Bengt, 70, told me. “Where did they come from? This didn’t used to be a country where people could easily become this rich.”

But like other pensioners I met, Bengt acknowledged his peer group’s role in this shift. “I belong to a generation that remembers how we built Sweden to become a welfare state, but so much has changed. The thing is, we didn’t protest this. We didn’t realise we were becoming this country of rich people.”

Opposite of the American dream

Wealth taxation was introduced in Sweden in 1911, with the amount due based initially on a combination of wealth and income. Around the same time, some of the first moves towards the Swedish welfare state were made – notably, the introduction of the state pension in 1913.

The term used to describe this, folkemmet (“the people’s home”), denoted comfort and security for all in equal measure. It was arguably the ideological opposite of the American dream – its aims not exceptionalism but reasonable living standards and universal services.

After the second world war, the wealth tax – now separated from income – was raised again in several steps up to a historical high of a 4% marginal rate for wealthy individuals in the 1980s, although actual tax burden is is less clear due to complex exemption rules. But total revenues generated from the tax were still relatively low. As a share of Sweden’s annual GDP, it never exceeded 0.4% in the postwar period.

By the end of the 1980s, the political winds were starting to change in Sweden, in line with the shift to privatisation of public services and deregulation of financial markets in several European countries, including the UK under Margaret Thatcher, and the US.

One recurrent criticism of Sweden’s wealth tax was that it was regressive, taxing middle-class wealth (mainly housing and financial assets) while exempting the wealthiest people who owned large firms or held high-up positions in listed companies. Another criticism was that the wealth tax drove tax avoidance, especially in the form of capital flight to offshore tax havens.

While a wealth tax might appear to signal their country’s commitment to socioeconomic equality, my interviewees said it wasn’t something they really thought about much until it was abolished in 2006 by Sweden’s then-rightwing government, following the axing of inheritance tax a year earlier by the previous social democratic government.

“When the wealth tax was abolished,” Marianne, 77, told me, “I wasn’t thinking about millionaires being given a handout, because … we didn’t have lots of rich aristocrats who owned everything. Abolishing the wealth and inheritance tax seemed like a practical thing, not so political.”

Marianne and other pensioners I talked to all told a story of the welfare state having been built through communal effort, as opposed to it being a Robin Hood project – of taking from the rich to give to the poor. This notion of the Swedish welfare state as having been built by equals, by an initial largely rural and poor population, arguably distracted these pensioners from questions of wealth accumulation.

While Sweden still taxes property and various forms of capital income, in hindsight, many of my elderly interviewees now regard the abolition of the wealth tax “on their watch” as a crucial step in reshaping Swedish society away from a social democracy welfare state towards something new – a place of billionaires and increased social disintegration.

“I think about my children, my two daughters who are working and have young families,” Jan, 72, told me. “As children, they were provided for by the welfare state, they went to good schools and had access to football and drama class and the dentist – but now I worry that society is going to get worse for them.”

As with others I spoke to, Jan showed regret at his own role in this change. “I now think that is partly my fault,” he said. “We got lazy and complacent, thought the Swedish welfare state was secure, didn’t worry about abolishing the wealth tax, didn’t think it was going to change anything … but I think it has.”

‘A society that is more humane’

My research suggests the impacts of wealth taxes, or absence of them, are not only about fiscal revenue streams and wealth redistribution. They have wider social ramifications, and can be foundational to people’s vision of society.

Only three European countries currently levy a whole wealth tax: Norway, Spain and Switzerland. In addition, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands impose wealth taxes on selected assets, but not on an person’s overall wealth.

In Sweden at least, the question today isn’t just whether wealth taxes work or not, but about what kind of society they project – one of folkhemmet, or a paradise for the rich.

“Tax was just natural [when] I grew up in the 1950s,” Kjerstin recalled. “I remember thinking when I was in second grade, that I will always be taken care of, that I didn’t ever have to worry.”

Reflecting on how different living in Sweden feels today, she said: “Now people don’t want to pay tax – sometimes even I don’t want to pay tax. Everyone is thinking about what they get back and how to get rich, instead of about building something together.”

“I don’t think you can say: ‘I pay this much in taxes and therefore I should get the same back.’ Instead, you should pay attention to the fact that you live in a society that is more humane, where everyone knows from second grade they’ll be taken care of.”

Names of research participants have been changed.

The Conversation

Miranda Sheild Johansson receives funding from UK Research And Innovation.

ref. ‘We got lazy and complacent’: Swedish pensioners explain how abolishing the wealth tax changed their country – https://theconversation.com/we-got-lazy-and-complacent-swedish-pensioners-explain-how-abolishing-the-wealth-tax-changed-their-country-272041

Why we love literary anniversaries

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amy Wilcockson, Research Fellow, English Literature, Queen Mary University of London

Last year marked 250 years since the birth of the English novelist Jane Austen. The Conversation celebrated this important literary milestone with a series of articles and a dedicated podcast, Jane Austen’s Paper Trail. This special year saw a variety of high-profile celebratory events across the country, from regency balls and film screenings, to special tours and literary talks.

But literary anniversaries are not just limited to famous and well-loved authors, however significant. Many dates pass us by unmarked, despite the fact that we are in the midst of a golden era of key dates of literary significance.

The 2020s has been a decade of major Romantic-period milestones, including the bicentenaries of the deaths of the poets John Keats (2021), Percy Bysshe Shelley (2022), and Byron (2024). Last year’s Austen anniversary was particularly notable because the writer was so widely and enthusiastically celebrated.

Yet it also was the centenary year of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s jazz-age classic The Great Gatsby, alongside Virginia Woolf’s modernist favourite Mrs Dalloway. Brideshead Revisited by Evelyn Waugh, George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Nancy Mitford’s The Pursuit of Love all turned 80, while children’s classic The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe by C.S. Lewis celebrated its 75th birthday.

Celebrating in 2026

In 2026 there is another slew of big anniversaries, marking the tercentenary of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and 200 years since the ever-relevant Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (her 1826 novel about the near extinction of humanity after a global plague) was first released.

A.A. Milne’s Winnie-the-Pooh first indulged in his favourite “hunny” in 1926, and it was the start of Agatha Christie’s reign as queen of crime, as the immensely popular The Murder of Roger Ackroyd captured the public imagination.

Fifty years later her last novel, Sleeping Murder, was published posthumously, after her death on January 12 1976. Special re-issues of Christie’s books, new audiobook recordings, lectures, conferences, Netflix adaptations, and even a major British Library exhibition have been organised to celebrate some of these momentous literary milestones.

Anne Rice’s Interview with a Vampire, which reshaped the genre with a more complex, nuanced portrayal of the archetypal character, also celebrates 50 years since its 1976 publication.

But why do we celebrate literary anniversaries? Why do museums, academics and the public rush to commemorate our favourite authors? And why do some authors receive more celebration than others?

First, literary anniversaries are significant as they create a shared sense of heritage and a feeling of unity within communities and cultures. As Shakespeare scholars Monika Smialkowska and Edmund G.C. King observed when considering the Bard’s many anniversary celebrations: “Each event has also been an occasion for the community commemorating him to celebrate itself.”

In 2016, when British and global audiences commemorated the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare’s death, gala concerts, special coins and exhibitions were the tip of the iceberg. Shakespeare represents to many the pinnacle of British culture and many believe his plays are vital as they allow us to examine ourselves and our place in the world.

General historical events don’t seem to capture the public imagination in the same way. And of course, major authors like Shakespeare and Austen become universal. They are not just a symbol of British culture, their fame and embodiment of “Britishness” have gone global. Shakespeare has been recognised by and claimed as a part of American, European, African and wider global contexts.

For instance, the Jane Austen Society of Aotearoa New Zealand celebrated its tenth anniversary last year. Marking anniversaries allow us to build connections not just with the time period or world that the author has built, but with fellow enthusiasts through shared interests in particular genres, texts and authors. We celebrate not just the writers, but our own personal, national and global networks and cultures too.

Nostalgia and literary tourism

Literary anniversaries are also a prime example of nostalgia – of thinking that a place, event or period from the past is preferable to the present. Rituals such as anniversary celebrations are the physical embodiment of this feeling.

This is why enthusiasts dress up in the costumes of the Regency period or in military attire – to transport themselves back to a less complex time, perhaps. By reading an author’s books, visiting their house, and seeing the quills and pens with which they wrote, visitors are similarly invited to step back into the past and into the writer’s world.

It is no surprise then that literary museums put on huge events to mark particularly important author milestones. Literary tourism is growing, with Travel Weekly noting that Austen tourism in particular is – obviously – popular at the moment.

While final visitor figures have not yet been released, a spokesperson for the Jane Austen’s House museum stated that they expected to have surpassed their usual annual 40,000 visitors in 2025.

These anniversaries are of course a global draw, with entire marketing campaigns built around significant dates. For example, 2017 was not only coined by Visit Britain as a Year of Literary Heroes, but an interactive Magical Britain campaign and map were also launched to celebrate 20 years since the the first Harry Potter book.

Anniversaries of popular books and authors boost the local and national economy as visitors flood to visit locations from the author’s writings, as well as their birthplaces, homes and graves.

But why do some authors stick in the public imagination more than others? Author and academic H.J. Jackson notes in her book on Romantic reputations that recognition usually begins with a collected edition of the author’s work, before interest develops into biographies, translations and adaptations. The texts become taught in schools, societies are named in the author’s honour, and then finally anniversary celebrations commence to celebrate their great achievements.

According to Jackson, authors need to win over different audiences to be successful and gain worldwide renown. Given their solid and wide-reaching appeal, I have little doubt we will still be celebrating Keats, Austen, Orwell and Christie in a hundred years’ time.


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The Conversation

Amy Wilcockson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Why we love literary anniversaries – https://theconversation.com/why-we-love-literary-anniversaries-273375

The Ukraine war has given rise to an ‘exorcism economy’ in Russia

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Santa Kravcenko, Lecturer in Management, University of Lancashire

“Please tell me where to go? A 14-year-old teenager has been possessed by a demon … we tried healers, but they couldn’t help … has anyone encountered this? Moscow region.” This is one of many similar pleas that have been circulating in Russia’s online communities in recent years.

According to reports in Russian media outlets such as Gazeta.ru, thousands of people in Russia are actively discussing exorcisms on social media. This is a spiritual ritual performed by a handful of Russian priests to expel spirits or demons from a person who is believed to be possessed.

Some people are travelling to well-known “exorcism destinations” such as Oryol Oblast about 400km south of Moscow. A priest there called Father Igor, the official exorcist of the local diocese, performs a ritual called otchitka. The ritual involves the priest reciting a set of prayers to help those deemed to be under the influence of spirits.

Other people are turning to the informal “exorcism economy”, which is offered by local mediums. Some have reported paying between 10,000 rubles (£98) and 20,000 rubles (£196) just for an initial consultation to determine whether they are truly possessed. Russia’s Orthodox Church warns that exorcism attempts should be left to members of the clergy.

An elderly woman prays in a Russian Orthodox church.
A woman prays in a Russian Orthodox church in Sochi, a city on Russia’s Black Sea coast, in May 2024.
fortton / Shutterstock

Exorcism is embedded in the Orthodox tradition, with exorcism prayers first brought into Russian religious practice in the 17th century by Archbishop Peter Mogila. However, exorcisms remained rare until the late Soviet period.

The most influential modern exorcist in Russia was Father German, a priest who began practising near Moscow in the 1980s. His reputation spread through word of mouth. Igumen Philaret, a man who knew Father German, described witnessing the following scene at one of his exorcisms:

One little boy was screaming terribly. He ripped away all his clothes and was rolling naked on the floor … ‘Mama, mama! Pull the tail out of my mouth!’ … Father sprinkled him with holy water … Then it became clear – as is often the cause of demonic possession in children – his mother had not repented of her abortions.

But what happened in the 1980s to spur the interest in exorcisms in Russia? According to some researchers, such as Pavel Nosachev of HSE University in Moscow, the emotional strain caused by the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union led people to “search for spirituality”.

As communist ideology waned, underground religious groups flourished and the Orthodox Church revived after decades of repression. Hypnotists and self-proclaimed psychic healers, such as Anatoly Kashpirovsky, also became prominent on television. A crisis in shared meaning produced a boom both in religious ritual and occult experimentation. This included exorcism.

Media reporting suggests that the business of “banishing demons” seen in present-day Russia is also reflective of a society under strain – but, in this case, one grappling with the effects of the war in Ukraine.

According to research on how humans cope with awareness of their death, religion works as a shield against existential anxieties. This can intensify during times of crisis, such as war. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, for example, church attendance increased worldwide and Bible sales soared.

The Russian Orthodox Church’s appointment of Vladimir Putin as “chief exorcist” in 2022 could also help explain why some Russians have been drawn into a fight with their inner demons. The Russian president’s appointment came after the Kremlin called for Ukraine to be “desatanised”.

‘Exorcism tourism’

The renewed interest in exorcism within Russia may represent a broader cultural response to political and personal instability – echoing the turbulence of the 1980s. But the country has also long nurtured an appetite for the paranormal.

Russian audiences have spent nearly two decades watching the popular television show, Battle of the Psychics. This show showcases the supposed paranormal abilities of self-proclaimed healers, witches and mediums in various competitive challenges. A recent episode even featured a live exorcism.

Just as Battle of Psychics spawned a multimillion-ruble industry of celebrity healers, Russia’s wartime exorcism surge reveals a similar monetisation of fear and uncertainty. What was once a localised ritual appears to be evolving into a structured commercial service – a phenomenon I call “exorcism tourism”.

As Nosachev observed in 2023: “Largely due to the connection with business – tours for otchitkas or donations for an exorcism session – this practice is now perceived as a commodity in a spiritual supermarket, which is characteristic of the consumer culture that has become a basis of the New Age.”

This commercialisation is visible in organised trips. Among the many adverts I have seen in recent years, a tour encouraging people “facing difficult life circumstances or physical and spiritual illnesses” to travel from Belarus to Russia “for exorcism” stands out.

The itinerary includes a consultation and private conversation with well-known “media exorcist” Father Gusev, as well as an application for an exorcism. Father Gusev fronts a rock band called “The Exorcist”, with the tour’s website claiming he has performed more than 15,000 exorcisms in 26 years.

In a country unsettled by war, uncertainty and spiritual volatility, Russia’s exorcism economy looks to be advancing. For some Russians, it seems that exorcisms offer not just a ritual but a sense of control amid everyday chaos.

The Conversation

Santa Kravcenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The Ukraine war has given rise to an ‘exorcism economy’ in Russia – https://theconversation.com/the-ukraine-war-has-given-rise-to-an-exorcism-economy-in-russia-271037

La conversación docente: enseñar a estudiar eficazmente

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Eva Catalán, Editora de Educación, The Conversation

Kyryk Ivan/shutterstock, CC BY

Una de las frases más escuchadas en un aula podría ser: “¿Esto entra en el examen?”. La mayor preocupación de los estudiantes, desde el día “uno”, son las notas. Pero mientras los docentes y las clases se orientan a dar el contenido que “entra” en el examen, pocas veces se dedica tiempo a enseñar cómo aprenderlo.

Esto deja a muchos estudiantes perdidos, dedicando horas a tareas poco útiles o sencillamente contraproducentes. ¿Cuántas veces hemos sentido, o hemos oído aquello de “es que no me entra”? ¿Por qué a veces por más que lo intentemos no podemos aprendernos algo? La capacidad de concentración, por desgracia, no se enciende con un interruptor ni depende solo de la voluntad.

Noelia Valle, experta y divulgadora de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, lo explica con el siguiente ejemplo: “Imagine intentar llenar una botella de agua con una manguera de bomberos a máxima potencia. La mayor parte del agua se derramaría y la botella seguiría medio vacía. Algo muy similar ocurre en nuestro cerebro cuando intentamos aprender por acumulación y por eso todos nos hemos descubierto alguna vez leyendo un texto una y otra vez sin ser capaz de retener nada.”

La frustración de hacer mal un examen, después de pasar muchas horas delante de unos apuntes o un libro, con la falsa impresión de haberlo “entendido” y aprendido todo, es una experiencia común a muchos estudiantes. Para enseñarles a estudiar, necesitamos entender cómo funciona el cerebro, cómo conseguimos acceder a contenido que hemos memorizado, de qué manera lograr que ese contenido no se olvide inmediatamente y esté accesible no sólo en el momento de “vomitarlo” en una hoja de examen, sino mucho después.

No se trata de pasar muchas horas delante de los apuntes. “El cerebro humano no aprende por acumulación, sino por integración”, nos explica esta investigadora y docente, en su interesantísimo artículo sobre la “carga cognitiva” y su papel en el funcionamiento de la memoria de trabajo, verdadera clave del éxito académico. Los docentes tienen un papel fundamental tanto en el material que presentan a sus alumnos como en la manera de ofrecérselo.

Otro fallo común es la “ilusión de conocimiento”: ese exceso de confianza que nos convence de que nos sabemos algo porque lo hemos escuchado en clase o lo hemos leído y lo hemos entendido. ¿A quién no le ha pasado alguna vez? ¿Y quién no ha escuchado a un docente desesperarse porque sus alumnos lo miran explicar pero no apuntan nada? “Total, está en los apuntes virtuales o en el libro”, ¿no?“ Pues no: tomar apuntes, especialmente a mano, es la base fundamental sobre la que construir ese estudio eficaz. No de cualquier forma, claro: la toma de apuntes también es una ciencia.

Otros factores influyen en la eficacia a la hora de estudiar: cuestiones fisiológicas (la disciplina, los descansos, la alimentación y el sueño) y emocionales: la sensación de autoeficiencia, la motivación, la perseverancia… Pero casi nada de esto se explica en clase. Dejamos que espontáneamente los estudiantes vayan descubriendo qué métodos les funcionan mejor, con el resultado que a menudo hasta en la educación superior muchos están todavía dedicando horas y horas a “hincar los codos” cuando podrían usar su cerebro de manera más eficiente.

The Conversation

ref. La conversación docente: enseñar a estudiar eficazmente – https://theconversation.com/la-conversacion-docente-ensenar-a-estudiar-eficazmente-273824

Trump 2.1 : quel bilan économique réel ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Thérèse Rebière, Professeur des Universités en économie, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (CNAM)

Derrière les annonces tonitruantes sur les « prix qui baissent énormément » et « les emplois et les usines » qui « vont revenir en force », la réalité de l’économie états-unienne un an après l’investiture de Donald Trump n’est pas si flamboyante.


Alors que le président Trump se félicite de son bilan annuel, et assure sortir l’économie des États-Unis du désastre hérité de son prédécesseur tout en promettant que le meilleur est à venir, la réalité est bien plus contrastée. Qu’il s’agisse du marché du travail ou des prix à la consommation, quel bilan économique peut-on véritablement faire de cette première année de mandat ?

Les investissements concentrés dans le domaine de l’intelligence artificielle (IA) et les bons résultats de Wall Street ne semblent pas bénéficier à l’emploi. L’augmentation chaotique des droits de douane s’est traduite par une forte incertitude qui provoque l’attentisme des entreprises et inquiète les consommateurs, alors même que la vie n’est pas moins chère qu’avant. Et plusieurs des secteurs d’activités mis en avant par Donald Trump au cours de sa campagne (manufacturier, pétro-gazier et agricole) sont à la peine.

La hausse des prix se poursuit sur un rythme semblable à 2024

Après un pic à 9 % sur un an en juin 2022, l’inflation a été – avec l’immigration – au cœur de la campagne présidentielle de 2024. Les électeurs américains ont été sensibles à la promesse du candidat Trump de faire baisser les prix. Beaucoup s’interrogent désormais.

Après un an de mandat, le président s’est attribué le mérite de quelques baisses ponctuelles, comme sur le prix des œufs ou de l’essence, sans que ces baisses ne puissent lui être clairement attribuées.

Plus généralement, non seulement les prix n’ont pas baissé fin 2025, mais l’inflation (2,7 %), toujours supérieure à l’objectif de 2 % de la Réserve fédérale (Fed), est comparable à celle de fin 2024 (2,9 %). Elle est même nettement plus élevée pour certains postes de dépenses énergétiques qui impactent fortement les plus modestes, comme l’électricité qui augmente de 6,7 % entre décembre 2024 et décembre 2025.

Une guerre commerciale aux effets ambigus

Le 2 avril 2025, jour proclamé « Liberation Day », Donald Trump annonce les droits de douane les plus élevés imposés par les États-Unis à leurs partenaires commerciaux depuis les années 1930.




À lire aussi :
Après l’échec des droits de douane de Trump 1, pourquoi cela serait-il un succès sous Trump 2 ?


Il en retarde l’application quelques jours plus tard face à la chute de la Bourse et à la hausse des taux sur la dette fédérale. Initialement, ce report exclut la Chine qui s’est lancée dans un bras de fer avec les États-Unis, chaque pays répliquant aux hausses de droits de douane de l’autre par de nouvelles hausses. Cette surenchère avec Pékin et les déclarations chaotiques sur les négociations avec d’autres partenaires créent un climat très incertain et entraînent, plusieurs mois durant, un fort attentisme des entreprises américaines en matière d’investissements et de création de nouveaux emplois.

Alors que le président affirmait que le choc tarifaire serait absorbé par les pays étrangers, la plupart des économistes prévoyaient que son poids pèserait sur les entreprises et les consommateurs américains. Même si les faits semblent plutôt leur donner raison, le bilan des droits de douane sur 2025 n’est pas simple à dresser.

Tout d’abord, les importateurs américains se sont empressés de constituer des stocks avant l’application des droits de douane, ce qui a accru les importations en début d’année, puis les a réduits les mois suivants. Mais, d’autres facteurs ont pu contribuer à la baisse spectaculaire du déficit commercial observée fin 2025 : la baisse du dollar relativement à d’autres monnaies, dont l’euro, a amélioré la compétitivité des produits américains ; et la baisse des prix du transport maritime a diminué le coût des produits entrant aux États-Unis.

Ensuite, il est difficile de mesurer les droits de douane effectivement appliqués en 2025 en raison des reports, des négociations bilatérales, des exemptions notamment sur des produits relevant de l’accord de libre-échange entre États-Unis, Mexique et Canada (ACEUM), ou d’autres exemptions ponctuelles sur divers produits essentiels aux consommateurs ou aux entreprises. Un document de travail du National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) publié par deux économistes américains montre que les droits de douane moyens effectivement appliqués étaient de 14,1 % fin septembre 2025, soit environ la moitié de ceux annoncés par l’administration (27,4 %).

Des secteurs traditionnels en difficulté

L’un des principaux arguments de Trump pour augmenter les droits de douane était de sauver le secteur manufacturier américain et les emplois qui y sont liés. Pourtant, ces mesures n’ont pas suffi à enrayer les baisses d’emplois qui s’opèrent dans ce secteur depuis 2023. En 2025, le secteur a perdu autour de 58 000 emplois.

Dans le secteur pétro-gazier cher au président, le taux de chômage a bondi de 1,9 % en novembre 2024 à 9 % un an plus tard. En réalité, l’emploi dans ce secteur est très dépendant de sa rentabilité, qui elle-même dépend des cours mondiaux du pétrole. Autour de 60 à 70 dollars (51 à 60 euros) le baril, la rentabilité de l’extraction des pétroles de schiste est à peine garantie. Or, en novembre 2025, le baril de West Texas Intermediate (WTI, le pétrole de référence sur le marché américain) s’établissait à 60 dollars, du fait de l’augmentation de la production aux États-Unis et plus encore au sein de l’Opep, ce qui a modéré les cours du pétrole. En la matière, les objectifs de Trump sont contradictoires : d’un côté, les prix bas du pétrole réduisent les prix à la pompe pour les consommateurs, mais, de l’autre, ils limitent la réalisation de nouveaux forages parmi les plus coûteux.

Le secteur agricole, important dans beaucoup d’États républicains, pâtit de la guerre commerciale – c’est en particulier le cas des producteurs de soja boycottés par la Chine. Dans le même temps, le secteur voit sa rentabilité affectée par l’augmentation du coût du travail et les difficultés de recrutement liées au durcissement de la politique migratoire alors que l’agriculture est particulièrement dépendante de travailleurs d’origine étrangère (70 %) dont beaucoup sont en situation irrégulière (environ 40 %). En réponse aux difficultés du secteur, Trump a annoncé 12 milliards de dollars (soit 10,3 milliards d’euros) d’aides directes aux agriculteurs, dont 11 milliards de dollars (soit 9,4 milliards d’euros) consacrés aux grandes cultures (soja, maïs, blé, coton, riz, etc.).

Des investissements massifs dans le secteur de l’IA, peu générateur d’emplois

Les droits de douane avaient non seulement pour but de sauver l’industrie américaine, mais ils devaient également conduire à l’implantation d’usines supplémentaires et à la création des emplois associés, en supposant que nombre d’entreprises feraient le choix de venir ou de revenir produire aux États-Unis pour y échapper. Il est trop tôt pour juger des résultats de cette politique.

Certes, le site web de la Maison Blanche communique sur un boom massif d’investissements qui s’établiraient à 9 600 milliards de dollars (8 200 milliards d’euros). Cependant, selon une étude Bloomberg, les véritables promesses d’investissements seraient moindres (7 000 milliards de dollars, soit 6 020 milliards d’euros), dont une partie correspond à des projets déjà existants, et d’autres à des engagements flous ou non contraignants. En fait, 2 900 milliards de dollars (2 494 milliards d’euros) de ces investissements se concentreraient sur le secteur de l’IA et la construction de data centers peu générateurs d’emplois.

Un marché du travail qui patine

Malgré les trois baisses du taux de la Fed opérées en 2025 pour soutenir l’activité économique, le marché du travail montre des signes préoccupants.

Tout d’abord, le taux de chômage a augmenté de 0,4 points de pourcentage, atteignant 4,4 % en fin d’année. La baisse de l’emploi fédéral (277 000 postes détruits, soit environ 10 % des effectifs fédéraux, agences indépendantes incluses) à la suite des coupes décidées par le « département » de l’efficacité gouvernementale (DOGE), piloté par Elon Musk, n’explique qu’une partie de la hausse du chômage.

Ensuite, les jeunes entrants sont particulièrement affectés, notamment par le développement de l’IA. Le taux de chômage des 16-19 ans s’est accru de plus de 3 points de pourcentage, atteignant les 15,7 %. Enfin, les temps partiels subis ont explosé (+ 980 000).

Une confiance en chute libre

La consommation des ménages s’est maintenue en 2025 à un niveau comparable à celui de 2024, ce qui a largement contribué à porter l’activité économique, et notamment la reprise des deuxième et troisième trimestres après la contraction du produit intérieur brut (PIB) au premier trimestre. Pourtant, l’indice de confiance des consommateurs établi par l’Université du Michigan a chuté de près de 28,5 % sur l’année, traduisant l’inquiétude croissante d’une partie des Américains face à la situation économique, une défiance qui s’est traduite par plusieurs revers électoraux emblématiques pour le camp républicain.

De nombreux citoyens, des plus modestes aux classes moyennes, dont beaucoup ont voté Trump en 2024, s’inquiètent désormais. Alors que l’inflation continue de grever leur pouvoir d’achat, les réductions d’impôt pérennisées par la loi de finance pour 2026, « The Big Beautiful Bill Act », bénéficient avant tout aux plus riches tout en durcissant les conditions d’accès au programme d’aide alimentaire (SNAP) et au programme de santé public Medicaid, qui couvre les frais médicaux des personnes à faibles revenus, soit un Américain sur cinq.

De même, la non-prolongation par le Congrès des subventions à l’assurance santé dite Obamacare fait exploser le prix de l’adhésion à un système de santé pour plus de 20 millions d’Américains début 2026.

Pour éviter que la grogne ne s’installe dans son électorat, Donald Trump met en avant la baisse des prix à venir des médicaments au terme des accords qu’il a passés avec les grands groupes pharmaceutiques, et la perspective de distribuer des chèques de 2 000 dollars (1 720 euros) à une grande partie des ménages américains à partir des 190 milliards de dollars (163 milliards d’euros) de recettes supplémentaires générées par la hausse des droits de douane, oubliant un peu vite que c’est le Congrès et non l’exécutif qui a la main sur les dépenses.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Trump 2.1 : quel bilan économique réel ? – https://theconversation.com/trump-2-1-quel-bilan-economique-reel-273597

The UK spends millions on services for people experiencing homelessness. Housing them could make more economic sense

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anton Roberts, Sociologist and Social Policy Researcher at the Policy Evaluation and Researcher Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester Metropolitan University

Jon C 303/Shutterstock

The government’s recently announced grand plan to end homelessness in England is the latest instalment in a long line of promises (and failures) by governments across the UK. This latest strategy, published in December, promises billions in investment in rough sleeping services, alongside a previous commitment to build 1.5 million new homes by the end of this parliament.

It’s an attempt to address the UK’s acute housing crisis. On the surface, there is plenty to praise in the plan, and these proposals are already receiving support from the wider sector.

For example, the scrapping of the two-child benefit limit will lift many vulnerable children out of poverty. And the strategy hints at more preventative approaches to the problem of homelessness.

But there’s a problem. Can the government achieve this objective within the narrow political window that this parliament offers? If not, perhaps it should consider whether this is the most effective use of public money.

One striking omission in the strategy is the absence of a commitment to the “housing first” model which, as the name suggests, would provide immediate access to housing for a homeless person. This omission is surprising, given the report’s repeated emphasis on housing as a solution.

Housing first combines an unconditional home with range of wraparound services for things like mental health problems or addiction. It’s distinct in being a genuinely long-term housing intervention, catering to those with multiple and complex needs. It is one of the most robustly evidenced homelessness interventions.

There are some isolated case studies of housing first mentioned in the report, but responsibility once again falls to the third sector. Charitable organisations are already forced to compete for insufficent funding pots, while also working alongside cash-strapped local authorities.

The average cost of housing first support per person is highly economical, according to the government’s own cost-and-benefit analysis data. The expected benefits to society have been calculated at £15,880 per person, which is more than double the £7,737 average cost.

According to a recent report from the charity Crisis evaluating housing first trials, a national roll out would cost £226 million per year. But this would be offset by reductions in provision burdens, equivalent to £280 million per year. This equates to total cost of £17,068 per individual per year, with a related saving surplus of £3,313.

The false economy of ‘business as usual’

Moral and human costs aside, homelessness is astoundingly expensive. Temporary accommodation alone costs billions each year. Although exact data on this is sparse, people experiencing rough sleeping are often referred to as “frequent flyers” through public services such as A&E departments, police and the courts.

The most recent calculation from Crisis, which goes back to 2015, estimated the annual cost of rough sleeping to be around £20,000 per person (or £27,872 when adjusted for inflation). This is due to things like use of NHS services, policing and the courts system. As seen with the government’s own rough sleeping snapshot, it continues to rise in the UK.

Arguably, business as usual isn’t working. There is little point in diverting funding to services that don’t work, or funding housing programmes for people with complex needs who may not be ready for a tenancy. If the aim is to reduce or end homelessness sustainably, the answer is not more short-term funding, but significant structural reform.

mobile phone screen showing universal credit login page alongside some pound coins and notes.
Benefit sanctions can hit people who are already at rock-bottom.
AndrewMcKenna/Shutterstock

In my research with my colleague, Joanne Massey, we explored some of these wider structural constraints facing people in poverty. We framed these constraints as forms of intentional and unintentional harms by the state. They include a welfare system where, despite annual rises, the range of benefits remains out of touch with living costs, alongside things like universal credit sanctions that make already difficult lives even more challenging.

Without confronting these, homelessness cannot be prevented or reduced. As such, the report falls short. For this to be a pragmatic and cost-effective strategy, the system must change from one of economically wasteful short-termism. There is no shortage of impactful and evidence-based examples – including housing first.

However, merely increasing funding will not achieve the necessary changes. The government must also commit to a public health approach. This means prioritising prevention through early intervention, as well as tackling the causes of homelessness at their structural root. Homelessness is a problem for all of society to address.

And merely listing poverty as a cause of homelessness does nothing to address it permanently, nor replace what has been lost from hundreds of billions of pounds of cuts to public services. A public health approach to homelessness would address challenges like these at the individual, community and societal levels simultaneously. It would also be a better use of taxpayer funds.

As an example, efforts in Wales to improve health with a prevention strategy produced a £14 return for every £1 invested using a public health approach. There was an annual saving of £9,266 per person when using preventative homelessness programmes. This approach combines the third sector, council services, education, health and the criminal justice system into one coherent strategy.

The government’s homelessness strategy is a positive start, but it will not replace what has been lost. Nor, as it stands, will it address the complex reasons why homelessness persists.

The Conversation

Anton Roberts does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The UK spends millions on services for people experiencing homelessness. Housing them could make more economic sense – https://theconversation.com/the-uk-spends-millions-on-services-for-people-experiencing-homelessness-housing-them-could-make-more-economic-sense-272569