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August 17, 2025

Ghana’s war on illegal mining has failed – we set out to find out why

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Gordon Crawford, Professor of Global Development, Coventry University

Early in his eight-year tenure, in 2017, then Ghanaian president Nana Akufo-Addo declared a moratorium on all small-scale gold mining. He established an inter-ministerial committee on illegal mining and a joint military-police taskforce – Operation Vanguard – to enforce the ban.

The tough measures aimed to reduce the severe environmental degradation caused by illegal small-scale gold mining, known as “galamsey”. Initially for six months, the ban lasted for 20 months until December 2018, when it was lifted for newly registered miners.

But illegal mining continued unabated. A statement made in Ghana’s parliament by the country’s lands minister outlined the scale and gold production from small-scale mining increased during the period of its ban.

As political scientists, we investigated why the government-declared “war” on illegal small-scale gold mining and associated environmental degradation failed so spectacularly.

We conducted our investigations through field visits to communities in mining areas in the western and central regions of Ghana. We interviewed small-scale miners, community residents and people affected by illegal mining. We followed this up with a review of official reports, published scientific research and media reports.

We concluded from findings that the involvement of government officials and business elites in illegal mining practices was behind the failure of the interventions. We describe this as “democracy capture”. We argue that, despite Ghana’s much-vaunted electoral democracy, the country’s democratic processes and institutions have been captured by political and economic elites for their own personal enrichment.

Scandals

By mid-2023 a series of corruption scandals had emerged around Ghana’s attempt to curb illegal mining. These included the release of an undercover investigation by journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas. Machinery seized by the military from illegal mining sites went missing under mysterious circumstances. Also, military personnel assigned to protect forest reserves were accused of becoming a protection racket for illegal miners.

In April 2023, the scandals peaked. A report on the work of the inter-ministerial committee by its former chair, Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng, was leaked. It detailed the involvement of high-level government and ruling party officials in illegal and environmentally destructive mining at a time when all mining was banned.

The report was submitted to government in 2021 but didn’t become public until it was leaked. No clear official statement was issued about the report, but some government officials attempted to discredit and challenge its findings.

The scandals brought fresh attention to the fact that the government’s policies to curb illegal mining had failed. This failure is indicated by the official gold production figures from small-scale mining during the moratorium period. In 2017, production held steady at almost 1.5 million ounces and then in 2018 increased to its highest level ever at almost 2 million ounces, precisely when the ban was in place. Small-scale output in 2018 was 41.4% of total gold production, higher than any previous year. These figures question the extent to which the moratorium on mining was enforced. It indicates that mining continued throughout the purported ban.

Democracy capture and elite enrichment

The objective of democracy capture is to appropriate the benefits of state control for purposes of personal enrichment. It goes beyond individual acts of opportunistic corruption. It entails systematic processes of capture by political elites organised in established political parties who act alongside associated business elites. Importantly, the benefits go beyond the appropriation of state resources. It include private financial gains from illicit activities with state protection.

Although we focus on the government under Akufo-Addo (2017-2024), our contention is that “democracy capture” in Ghana extends to the two main political parties.

We analyse how this has come about. We also set out the implications for democracy in Ghana, and what can be done to reverse the trend.

Elements of democracy capture are evident in the various scandals and corrupt practices that were exposed during the government’s ostensible campaign against illegal mining. The scandals expose an organised network at the highest level of government. It includes politicians, officials and senior ruling party members.

How democracy capture works

First, the presidency and its chief of staff appear to have played a role in controlling operations and protecting those exposed. The chief of staff as a political appointee from the ruling party, rather than a career civil servant, is crucial to strengthening the link between the executive and the ruling party. Additionally, senior party members are appointed to key roles within the presidency.

Second, there is tight party control over relevant state agencies. For example, a former general secretary of the governing party was appointed as CEO of the Forestry Commission (a key regulator in the issuance of mining licences).

Third, the loyalty between members of the party elite has been highlighted by the high-level protection from prosecution and conviction when criminal activities are exposed. The case of Charles Bissue is an example. A top official of the inter-ministerial committee on illegal mining and prominent member of the governing party, he was caught on camera in the undercover investigation. He was charged with corruption but six years later the case still hasn’t been concluded.

Fourth, the military and law-enforcement agencies are allowed to benefit from illicit activities. They can sell confiscated equipment and take bribes to protect illegal mining sites. An official investigation found that the police also habitually did this.

What next?

Ghanaians value political stability and civil liberties. However, the capture of democracy has become a path to personal wealth for the political elite and their business associates.

Elites have been able to act outside the law with relative impunity. The consequence of democracy capture is that socio-economic development is sidelined. Wealth cascades upwards and inequalities intensify. Our study clearly identifies these elements.

Combating democracy capture will require a major effort from civil society organisations and the media, to expose government and state involvement in these illegal activities. This must go hand in hand with a stronger legal and judicial regime committed to prosecutions.

The current attorney general has ordered an investigation into Frimpong-Boateng’s report, but we await to see what action, if any, will be taken.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Ghana’s war on illegal mining has failed – we set out to find out why – https://theconversation.com/ghanas-war-on-illegal-mining-has-failed-we-set-out-to-find-out-why-262644

August 17, 2025

La technologie, carburant du surtourisme… et possible frein ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Adrian Palmer, Professor of Marketing, University of Reading

C’est un facteur qu’on oublie souvent pour expliquer le développement du tourisme de masse. Plutôt que de pointer des groupes sociaux, il peut être intéressant d’analyser l’influence du progrès technologique sur le développement du voyage pour tous – ou presque. Quel impact la technologie pourrait-elle avoir dans les années à venir~ ?

Le touriste n’est plus toujours le bienvenu parmi les habitants des lieux que beaucoup d’entre nous rêvent de visiter. Si un nombre important de visiteur peut apporter des avantages économiques, il peut aussi avoir un coût pour les locaux et causer des dommages environnementaux.

Airbnb est visé du doigt par certains. D’autres accusent les opérateurs de navires de croisière, les « baby-boomers » désormais à la retraite ou les classes moyennes en pleine croissance à travers le monde, avec leurs revenus disponibles et leur appétit insatiable pour les selfies. Reste un élément souvent négligé : le rôle de la technologie.

Déjà à Bournemouth ou Blackpool

En effet, historiquement, les nouveaux modes de transport ont été un moteur important de l’industrie du tourisme. Au Royaume-Uni, par exemple, l’expansion des chemins de fer au XIX^e siècle a produit le tourisme de masse dans les villes côtières, notamment dans les villes de Bournemouth et de Blackpool. Dans les années 1960, les voyages aériens moins chers ont fait de même pour les destinations à l’étranger. Des endroits comme Majorque et la Costa del Sol espagnole sont alors devenus accessibles à des masses de nouveaux visiteurs.

À lire aussi :
Un tourisme durable est-il possible ?

Mais les nouveaux modes de transport ne sont plus le principal facteur pour expliquer la croissance actuelle et future du tourisme de masse. À court terme, de nouvelles façons de voyager par terre, air ou mer qui alimenteraient la croissance comme le firent le train ou l’avion, ne sont pas anticipées.

Un impact plus subtil

Aujourd’hui, les effets de la technologie sont plus subtils : le monde en ligne transforme la façon dont nous voyageons dans le monde réel. Ainsi, Internet a rendu plus floue la distinction entre résidents et touristes. L’essor du télétravail, rendu possible par Internet, permet à certaines personnes de vivre là où elles aiment passer leur temps libre, plutôt que de privilégier la proximité de leur lieu de travail ou des transports en commun.

À cette catégorie s’ajoutent les « nomades numériques » qui poussent plus loin le concept de télétravail : dès lors qu’ils ont une connexion Internet décente, ils peuvent vivre (et travailler) n’importe où dans le monde.

Quand TikTok nuit à la tranquillité d’un lieu

L’essor des réseaux sociaux a également eu un impact considérable sur le tourisme, en diffusant des récits et des images sur des attractions jusqu’alors peu connues. Quelques vidéos virales peuvent rapidement transformer des coins perdus en destinations touristiques très prisées. Il suffit de demander aux habitants de la station de ski italienne de Roccaraso, autrefois tranquille. Depuis janvier 2025, ils ont été submergés par un afflux de visiteurs, à la suite de vidéos TikTok de l’influenceuse italienne Rita De Crescenzo.

Le monde en ligne a également comblé un fossé qui existait auparavant entre les destinations touristiques et leurs clients éloignés. Avant l’avènement d’Internet, l’industrie mondiale du tourisme dépendait des agences de voyage et de la presse écrite. Aujourd’hui, tous les hôtels et complexes touristiques sont accessibles en quelques clics, avec des plates-formes comme Airbnb (qui a accueilli 5 millions de locations en 2024) transformant en profondeur le secteur.

Des vacances virtuelles ?

Les effets de l’intelligence artificielle sur le tourisme sont moins certains pour le moment. Mais elle pourrait peut-être faire partie de la solution. L’IA pourrait être utilisée pour aider à créer des expériences touristiques personnalisées dans des endroits qui ont vraiment besoin de touristes, réduisant ainsi les dommages causés aux sites surpeuplés ou aux écosystèmes fragiles.

L’industrie du voyage pourrait également l’utiliser pour faire des prédictions plus précises sur les habitudes de voyage, aidant ainsi des villes comme Barcelone et Venise à gérer leur nombre de visiteurs.

La réalité virtuelle améliorée par l’IA a également le potentiel de permettre aux gens de vivre des expériences de destinations touristiques à distance. Des études suggérent que les « vacances virtuelles » pourraient bouleverser le secteur du tourisme.

France 24 – 2025.

Après tout, nous sommes nombreux à avoir troqué d’autres expériences réelles, comme le shopping ou les réunions de travail, contre des activités que nous pratiquons désormais sur un écran. Il y a même des preuves d’une préférence émergente pour la pratique de sports en ligne par rapport aux versions réelles.

Quelle attractivité pour le tourisme virtuel ?

Mais le tourisme virtuel pourrait-il devenir assez attrayant pour réduire sensiblement le tourisme réel ? Les touristes du futur se contenteront-ils vraiment d’une version virtuelle d’un chef d’œuvre ou d’un lieu exceptionnel, au lieu de faire la queue pendant des heures pour une expérience au sein d’une foule ?

La question a été posée dans des termes assez similaires lorsque la télévision couleur s’est développée dans les années 1960. Par exemple, certains estimaient que la représentation vivante de la faune sauvage dans les réserves africaines réduirait la nécessité pour les touristes de s’y rendre. Qui se donnerait la peine de dépenser de l’argent pour aller au Kenya ou au Botswana, alors qu’il est possible de voir ces animaux de près, en restant confortablement assis dans son canapé ?

Le résultat a toutefois été exactement le contraire. Il est prouvé que les programmes consacrés à la faune sauvage ont en fait stimulé la demande pour voir les animaux « en vrai ». De même, les films et les séries télévisions populaires tournés dans des lieux magnifiques donnent envie aux gens de les visiter. L’anticipation et l’attente de la « vraie » visite ajoutent même de la valeur à l’expérience touristique finale.

Ainsi, bien que nous puissions être à peu près sûrs que l’IA affectera le tourisme – comme elle le fera pour toutes les industries – nous ne savons pas encore si son impact global sera de réduire la pression sur les lieux les plus populaires du monde ou de stimuler davantage la demande. Et ce n’est peut-être pas la technologie qui aura le dernier mot. Les préoccupations concernant le changement climatique et les pressions économiques pourraient influencer les habitudes de voyage mondiales avant tout. Mais une chose est sûre : la fin du surtourisme n’est pas pour demain.

Adrian Palmer a reçu un financement de la British Academy pour une étude sur le rôle des médias sociaux dans les visites touristiques. Il est membre non rémunéré du Collège d’experts du ministère britannique de la Culture, des Médias et des Sports, un organisme de recherche consultatif non politique.

– ref. La technologie, carburant du surtourisme… et possible frein ? – https://theconversation.com/la-technologie-carburant-du-surtourisme-et-possible-frein-263212

August 16, 2025

La technologie, carburant du sourtourisme… et possible frein ?

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Adrian Palmer, Professor of Marketing, University of Reading

Déjà à Bournemouth ou Blackpool

À lire aussi :
Un tourisme durable est-il possible ?

Un impact plus subtil

Quand TikTok nuit à la tranquillité d’un lieu

Des vacances virtuelles ?

France 24 – 2025.

Quelle attractivité pour le tourisme virtuel ?

– ref. La technologie, carburant du sourtourisme… et possible frein ? – https://theconversation.com/la-technologie-carburant-du-sourtourisme-et-possible-frein-263212

August 15, 2025

Air Canada flight attendants have issued a strike notice: Here’s what you need to know

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By John Gradek, Faculty Lecturer and Academic Program Co-ordinator, Supply Network and Aviation Management, McGill University

The union representing Air Canada flight attendants issued a 72-hour strike notice to the company, setting the stage for a potential work stoppage on Aug. 16.

In response, the airline issued a 72-hour lock-out notice to Air Canada flight attendants, stating it had begun preparations to suspend flights in anticipation of the strike.

Taken together, these actions have effectively set the stage for the first complete shutdown of Air Canada due to labour strife since Air Canada pilots held an 11-day strike in 1998.

A shutdown would have a significant impact on Air Canada’s passenger travel plans during the height of the summer travel season.

Impact on passengers during peak travel

Air Canada and Air Canada Rouge carry approximately 130,00 passengers a day, and about 25,000 of these travellers include those returning to Canada from abroad.

All of these passengers are covered by Canada’s Air Passenger Protection Rights, which airlines are obligated to implement in the event of flight cancellations. These regulations are intended to ensure passengers are treated fairly and have recourse when things go wrong.

The concern during this peak travel season is the availability of seats on other carriers that Air Canada is obligated to secure for passengers on its cancelled flights.

The resulting shortage of capacity will undoubtedly result in cancelled vacations or family gatherings, with Air Canada offering refunds to those passengers for whom it will be unable to find acceptable travel arrangements.

Negotiations at an impasse

The airline and the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) have been negotiating a new collective agreement since March. Air Canada said recently negotiations have reached an “impasse” over issues like wages and labour conditions.

The wages issue has been highlighted as a major negotiation item by CUPE, with examples of junior flight-attendant salaries that are substantially below the Canadian minimum wage.

Based on my analysis of collective agreement wage rates for Air Canada CUPE flight attendants, I estimate current wages would need to rise by about 32 to 34 per cent to match the 2025 purchasing power of what flight attendants earned in 2014, after adjusting for inflation.

According to CUPE, Air Canada only pays flight attendants when the aircraft’s brakes are released at departure until the brakes are applied on arrival, meaning any work they do before boarding and after deplaning isn’t compensated.

The union says flight attendants in Canada perform about 35 hours of unpaid duties every month.

Efforts to address unpaid work

Several attempts have been made by labour groups over the years to address the practice of unpaid duties for flight attendants. This culminated with the introduction of private member’s Bill C-415 in October 2024 by NDP MP Bonita Zarrillo.

The bill proposed amending the Canada Labour Code to require employers to pay flight attendants for all time spent on pre-flight and post-flight duties, as well as for mandatory training programs at their full rate of pay.

Bill C-415 received First Reading in Parliament, but did not progress beyond, expiring at the end of the parliamentary session in January 2025.

But support for such legislation remains strong, as demonstrated by a letter sent by the Leader of the Opposition to the Minister of Labour on Aug. 5.

A February 2025 article in The Conversation Canada noted the efforts of organized labour in obtaining ground pay for flight attendants and concluded:

“With contract negotiations underway, CUPE’s airline division has an opportunity to push for better working conditions and pay structures that reflect all hours worked. Canadian airlines must address the issue of unpaid labour and, ultimately, implement more equitable workplace standards for flight attendants.”

A number of airlines have implemented flight attendant pay that goes beyond the traditional “flight pay.” Delta Airlines was the first carrier to introduce the practice in 2022, followed by American Airlines in 2024.

United Airlines has included a similar provision in a proposed contract now awaiting ratification. In Canada, both Porter Airlines and Pascan Aviation offer flight attendants pay for work performed during the boarding process.

High stakes for both sides

It is worth noting the collective agreement negotiation strategies of both CUPE and Air Canada. CUPE has been quite transparent in its goals for its Air Canada members, citing wage increases needed to return to a living wage — for junior flight attendants, in particular — and the need to obtain pay for currently uncompensated work.

These goals have remained steadfast through the eight months of dialogue with Air Canada, and have been supported by a 99.7 per cent vote in favour of a strike if negotiations fail.

Air Canada’s negotiation strategy mirrors its 2024 negotiations with pilots, when it relied on government intervention to pressure them to reach an agreement, but ultimately yielded late in the process to most of the pilots’ demands.

This may yet be Air Canada’s plan this time as well, with a strike deadline looming in the early hours of Saturday, Aug. 16.

Is is worth noting that previous collective agreement negotiations with Air Canada and its flight attendants have been characterized by significant political intrigue, which many in the industry had believed to be a thing of the past. It remains interesting reading.

If a strike does proceed, Air Canada could face financial losses in the range of $50 to $60 million a day — a sum that will undoubtedly have Air Canada back at the negotiation table within the week.

John Gradek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Air Canada flight attendants have issued a strike notice: Here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/air-canada-flight-attendants-have-issued-a-strike-notice-heres-what-you-need-to-know-263171

August 15, 2025

George P. Marsh, pionnier de la protection de l’environnement au XIXᵉ siècle

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Hans Schlierer, Professeur et coordinateur RSE, EM Lyon Business School

Cet été, « The Conversation » vous emmène à la rencontre de figures de pionnières, mais souvent méconnues, en matière d’écologie. Aujourd’hui, redécouvrons la figure de l’Américain George Perkins Marsh, diplomate, savant du XIX^e siècle et précurseur du concept de durabilité.

Pionnier de l’écologie oublié des universitaires comme du grand public, George Perkins Marsh (1801–1882) est un diplomate et savant américain du XIX^e siècle, mais aussi l’un des premiers environnementalistes, qui a marqué le début de la réflexion moderne sur l’impact de l’industrialisation.

Bien avant que le terme de durabilité ne s’impose, George P. Marsh a reconnu les effets destructeurs des actions humaines sur la Terre. Il est un des premiers à avoir identifié les menaces que le développement du capitalisme faisait peser sur les dynamiques écologiques. Son livre Man and Nature, publié en 1864, a été l’un des premiers à discuter de la gestion des ressources naturelles et de la conservation.

Initialement philologue, c’est-à-dire spécialiste des langues, Marsh parlait couramment une vingtaine de langues, dont le suédois, l’allemand ou encore l’italien. Ce polymathe a été membre de l’Académie américaine des arts et des sciences, de la Royal Society, de l’American Antiquarian Society et de l’Académie américaine des sciences. Il a également enseigné à l’Université Columbia (New York) et écrit de nombreux articles pour des encyclopédies et des revues scientifiques.

Des forêts du Vermont à la Méditerranée

Né en 1801 dans le Vermont rural, le jeune George P. Marsh se révèle vite grand lecteur, autodidacte et intéressé par de nombreux sujets. À l’âge de six ans, il apprend tout seul le grec ancien et le latin pour devenir, plus tard, spécialiste de l’islandais. Contraint cependant d’abandonner la lecture durant plusieurs années à cause de problèmes de vue – il devient presque aveugle –, George P. Marsh se réfugie dans la nature.

George Perkins Marsh entre 1843 et 1849.
Library of Congress

Très jeune, il apprend de son père à distinguer les essences d’arbres et à comprendre la dynamique des eaux dans les montagnes du Vermont. Lui-même se déclare « porté sur les forêts ». Tous ses souvenirs montrent à quel point ce contact direct, sensible et accompagné a été fondateur pour toute sa pensée environnementale.

Ces observations précoces du paysage serviront de socle à sa future et riche réflexion sur les relations entre l’humain et la nature, notamment lorsqu’il constate que la déforestation dans le Vermont entraîne une érosion des sols, une perte de biodiversité et conduit à une désertification du paysage en seulement quelques années.

Il complète plus tard ses propres observations par la lecture d’ouvrages scientifiques et historiques. Ce sont ses années en tant qu’ambassadeur des États-Unis dans l’Empire ottoman (1849–1854) et en Italie (de 1861 jusqu’à sa mort) qui lui permettent de lier observations et analyse historique du bassin méditerranéen.

Il constate en particulier que la perte de productivité agricole des sols érodés peut rendre la terre infertile pendant des siècles, entraînant maladies et famines pour les populations et l’affaiblissement du pouvoir des nations. C’est d’ailleurs ce problème qui aurait contribué, selon lui, à mettre l’Empire romain à genoux – une hypothèse qui figure aujourd’hui parmi celles retenues par les historiens comme élément déterminant de la chute de Rome.

Dans son livre Man and Nature, il ne cesse de multiplier les exemples historiques pour renforcer sa thèse centrale : l’avenir du monde dépend des décisions que prendra l’humanité quant à l’utilisation et à la conservation de ses ressources naturelles. L’essentiel du livre illustre la dégradation environnementale, avec quatre chapitres principaux consacrés à des exemples spécifiques parmi les plantes et les animaux, les forêts, les eaux et les sables.

George P. Marsh s’intéresse, d’abord et avant tout, aux forêts, car, pour lui, leur destruction est la « première violation par l’humanité des harmonies de la nature inanimée », non seulement dans le temps, mais aussi en termes d’importance.

Déjà, au XIXᵉ siècle, un lien entre forêts et climat

Le chapitre sur les forêts commence par une description méticuleuse de l’influence de la forêt sur l’ensemble de l’environnement, des variations de température locales aux propriétés électriques et chimiques de l’air, en passant par les schémas climatiques régionaux. Mais le plus important, ce sont ses effets sur les précipitations et l’humidité du sol.

Les forêts, selon lui, rendent des services inestimables à l’humanité par leur effet modérateur sur le cycle hydrologique. Elles protègent le sol des pluies violentes, réduisant ainsi l’érosion. Les feuilles et les végétaux morts permettent au sol d’absorber d’énormes quantités d’humidité et de les libérer lentement, ce qui non seulement réduit les inondations, mais maintient également le débit des cours d’eau et des sources pendant les saisons sèches. Leur évapotranspiration, enfin, rafraîchit l’air et apporte la pluie à des terres qui en seraient autrement dépourvues.

Mais lorsque les êtres humains font disparaître les forêts, ces avantages cessent. Le sol est emporté par les pluies, des rivières placides se transforment en torrents dévastateurs et les terres s’assèchent lorsque les pluies disparaissent. Les coûts humains, poursuit-il, pourraient être énormes.

Son travail a influencé de nombreux penseurs et décideurs dans le domaine de la conservation et de la protection environnementales. Il a notamment inspiré Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), un des pères philosophiques et politiques du mouvement environnementaliste aux États-Unis, qui a joué un grand rôle dans la protection des forêts et, plus généralement, des ressources naturelles.

Il a été aussi une référence importante pour John Muir (1838–1914), le chef de file d’un courant qui vise à préserver une nature non affectée par l’activité humaine (« wilderness »). Ce mouvement a aussi initié la création des parcs nationaux aux États-Unis. George P. Marsh lui-même a joué un rôle clé dans la création de l’Adirondack Park (dans l’État de New York), l’un des premiers parcs forestiers aux États-Unis.

Des analyses visionnaires

Au-delà de la réception historique de ses travaux, les constats de George P. Marsh sont d’une actualité brûlante.

Les feux de forêt récurrents l’été, en France et ailleurs dans le monde, causés par des sécheresses elles-mêmes amplifiées par l’activité humaine, le rappellent encore. De même la déforestation en Amazonie et en Indonésie entraîne-t-elle aujourd’hui une érosion massive des sols, affectant la productivité agricole et les écosystèmes locaux.

Bien que Marsh n’ait pas utilisé le terme de « changement climatique », il a compris que la disparition des forêts pouvait modifier les régimes climatiques locaux.

Aujourd’hui, nous savons que la déforestation contribue au réchauffement climatique en libérant le carbone stocké dans les arbres et en réduisant la capacité des forêts à absorber le CO₂. La réduction des émissions provenant du déboisement et de la dégradation des forêts, ainsi que la gestion durable des forêts, la conservation et l’amélioration des stocks de carbone forestier sont des éléments essentiels des efforts mondiaux visant à atténuer le changement du climat.

Avec ses observations et ses conclusions, Marsh s’est forgé la conviction que l’humanité dépend de son environnement, et non l’inverse. Une position qui ébranle la certitude de la suprématie de l’être humain sur la nature, très répandue à son époque. Il arrive finalement à la conclusion que l’être humain « possède un pouvoir bien plus important sur ce monde que n’importe quel autre être vivant », position qui s’apparente à celle plus moderne qui fonde le concept d’anthropocène.

Un héritage toujours d’actualité

La modernité de son approche se manifeste aussi dans sa conception globale des phénomènes naturels. George P. Marsh combine une véritable géographie environnementale à une vue historique et à une approche déambulatoire et paysagère. Cela lui permet de relier entre eux des phénomènes épars afin d’aboutir à une compréhension globale des relations entre l’être humain et la nature.

Au moment de la première industrialisation, Marsh a le mérite de débuter la réflexion sur les dépassements et les limites d’une modernité balbutiante. Les sujets de ses observations que sont le sable, la déforestation, l’utilisation des sols ou la question de l’eau font tous partie des neuf limites planétaires que l’humanité a dépassées depuis.

Alors que la conférence des Nations unies sur les océans à Nice, en juin 2025, ne s’est pas conclue par des déclarations suffisamment fortes en faveur de leur protection et que le retard sur la décarbonation nous approche dangereusement du seuil de +1,5 °C par rapport à l’ère préindustrielle, il est urgent de reconsidérer les analyses de George P. Marsh.

Hans Schlierer ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. George P. Marsh, pionnier de la protection de l’environnement au XIXᵉ siècle – https://theconversation.com/george-p-marsh-pionnier-de-la-protection-de-lenvironnement-au-xix-siecle-261189

August 15, 2025

Nouvelle-Calédonie : les indépendantistes du FLNKS rejettent l’accord de Bougival. Et maintenant ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Pierre-Christophe Pantz, Enseignant-chercheur à l’Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (UNC), Université de Nouvelle Calédonie

Le FLNKS, le principal regroupement de mouvements indépendantistes, a officiellement désavoué le 13 août dernier l’accord de Bougival, qui devait renouer le dialogue avec l’État et permettre à la Nouvelle-Calédonie d’accéder à davantage d’autonomie. Qu’adviendra-t-il de ce texte, toujours soutenu par une partie du camp indépendantiste ?

Quelques semaines à peine après la ratification inespérée d’un accord politique entre l’État et dix-huit représentants politiques néocalédoniens – indépendantistes et non-indépendantistes – les voix dissonantes s’amplifient et contestent parfois avec virulence un compromis politique qu’elles considèrent comme « mort-né ».

Dans un premier temps, l’Union Calédonienne (UC), l’un des principaux partis indépendantistes de l’archipel, a vivement réagi en reniant la signature de ses trois représentants. Logiquement, le Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS) – coalition de 7 groupes de pression dont l’UC est le principal membre – a suivi, en actant le 13 août son rejet de ce projet d’accord en raison de son « incompatibilité avec les fondements et acquis de sa lutte ». Il réclame par ailleurs des élections provinciales en novembre 2025. Face à cette levée de boucliers, l’accord de Bougival, qualifié d’« historique » par le ministre des Outre-mer Manuel Valls, a-t-il encore des chances d’aboutir ?

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Le rejet de l’UC et du FLNKS condamne-t-il l’accord ?

Dans ce contexte tendu, certains signataires – notamment ceux du FLNKS – se retrouvent désormais contestés par leur propre parti politique et leurs militants. Quelques jours après les signatures et la publication in extenso de l’accord, l’Union Calédonienne et le FLNKS avaient rapidement précisé que la délégation de signataires ne disposait pas du mandat politique pour signer un tel document au nom de leur parti. Sous la pression des militants, ce sont essentiellement de nouveaux responsables politiques qui ont contribué à l’ampleur de la contestation contre l’accord, puis à sa remise en cause. Rappelons tout de même que les trois signataires de l’UC occupent des rôles fondamentaux dans la gouvernance du parti, ce qui les rendait a priori légitimes à le représenter.

Après le rejet formel de l’Union Calédonienne (UC), principale composante du Front, l’organisation a précisé lors de son comité directeur que « le mandat des signataires et des équipes tombe de fait » : une nouvelle équipe devrait donc prendre le relais. Dans la continuité, le congrès extraordinaire du FLNKS du 9 août dernier a entériné cette position. L’organisation annonce désormais une mobilisation active contre le projet : « Nous utiliserons toutes nos forces et toutes les formes de lutte à notre disposition pour que ce texte n’aille pas au vote », affirme ainsi le président du FLNKS, Christian Tein.

Si le FLNKS considère désormais comme acté la mort de l’Accord de Bougival, il se positionne néanmoins pour la poursuite du dialogue, à condition toutefois de n’aborder que « les modalités d’accession à la pleine souveraineté » avec « le colonisateur ».

Si un consensus global autour de l’accord de Bougival semble désormais s’éloigner, qu’en est-il de la viabilité de cet accord, au regard notamment des 5 autres délégations de signataires – l’Union Nationale pour l’Indépendance (UNI), l’Éveil Océanien (EO) et les partis non indépendantistes – qui continuent de défendre et de soutenir ce compromis politique ? Au regard du paysage politique actuel, dont le Congrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie est l’émanation représentative, et en considérant l’hypothèse d’une unanimité au sein des groupes, ceux en faveur de l’accord de Bougival représenteraient 40 membres sur 54 (12 membres de l’UNI, 3 pour l’EO et 25 pour les non-indépendantistes), contre 13 élus du groupe UC-FLNKS et nationalistes et 1 non-inscrit.

Si ce calcul théorique représente une majorité significative au Congrès de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, il ne tient pas compte d’une crise de légitimité qui frappe les élus territoriaux, dont le mandat de cinq ans a expiré en mai 2024. Il avait à l’époque été prolongé jusqu’en novembre 2025, en raison d’une situation politique particulièrement tendue résultant des émeutes en cours à l’époque.

Un rejet qui clarifie la fragmentation dans le camp indépendantiste

En parallèle du rejet de l’UC et du FLNKS, le soutien renouvelé de l’UNI (rassemblant les partis indépendantistes Palika et UPM – Union progressiste en Mélanésie) à l’accord de Bougival confirme la scission au sein du camp indépendantiste. En effet, durant les émeutes de 2024, l’unité du FLNKS avait déjà été fragilisée avec la mise en retrait des deux partis de l’UNI (Palika et UPM), qui faisaient auparavant partie du Front.

L’une des conséquences de cette fragilisation du Front indépendantiste a été une recomposition institutionnelle : alors que le FLNKS détenait auparavant les présidences des deux principales institutions du Territoire (le Gouvernement et le Congrès), la combinaison des divisions en son sein et de la prise de distance de l’Éveil Océanien, un parti non aligné détenant une position de pivot, a entraîné un recul politique et institutionnel des indépendantistes. Ils ont ainsi perdu successivement la présidence du congrès en août 2024 et celle du gouvernement en décembre 2024.

Au sein du camp indépendantiste, cette recomposition du paysage politique s’apparente à une guerre d’influence entre UC et UNI, notamment sur la question de la stratégie et de la méthode à adopter en vue d’obtenir l’indépendance. L’UNI privilégie ainsi la voie du compromis politique pour parvenir à une souveraineté partagée à moyen terme. L’UC actuelle, quant à elle, se montre plus intransigeante et défend un rapport de force visant une pleine souveraineté immédiate.

Le FLNKS dans sa configuration actuelle se retrouve désormais sous domination de l’UC, marquée depuis août 2024 par la présidence de Christian Tein. Ce dernier s’est d’abord démarqué comme leader de la Cellule de coordination des actions de terrain (CCAT), mise en place par l’UC le 18 novembre 2023 pour lutter contre le projet de dégel du corps électoral. Le FLNKS se revendiquant comme seul mouvement légitime de libération du peuple kanak, son retrait vaudrait donc retrait de ce peuple de l’accord politique, le rendant mécaniquement caduc. L’UNI de son côté assume désormais son soutien au « compromis politique » de Bougival, prévoyant un statut que le parti estime évolutif, et qui permettrait in fine à la Nouvelle-Calédonie d’accéder à une « souveraineté partagée avec la France ».

Cette division risque d’être accélérée par le rejet en bloc de l’accord de Bougival par le FLNKS, qui marginalise en interne une ligne plus consensuelle, incarnée par les trois signataires qui sont désormais désavoués par leur propre camp. Des sanctions disciplinaires sont désormais réclamées par une partie des militants, contribuant à rendre intenable une ligne favorable au compromis politique.

L’État parviendra-t-il à poursuivre le processus tout en maintenant le dialogue ?

Face au rejet catégorique exprimé par une partie du camp indépendantiste, la réaction de l’État, notamment par la voix du ministre des Outre-mer Manuel Valls, n’a pas tardée. Il a insisté sur le fait que l’accord représente un « compromis » et que son rejet risquerait de ramener le territoire au « chaos ». Il précise également qu’un « non-accord » aurait des conséquences sociales et économiques délétères, ce qui a pu être perçu par certains comme un chantage néocolonial.

Le ministre des Outre-mer a également réaffirmé sa disponibilité permanente au dialogue, annonçant se rendre en août une quatrième fois sur le territoire calédonien pour la mise en place d’un comité de rédaction chargé d’affiner les textes, de lever les ambiguïtés et de clarifier l’esprit de l’accord, sans toutefois en altérer l’équilibre. Toutes les forces politiques, y compris l’UC et le FLNKS, sont conviées à ce travail. Mais il y a peu de chances que ces deux organisations, en boycott actif du processus, y participent.

Malgré cette main tendue, Manuel Valls reste déterminé à tenir le calendrier prévisionnel de l’accord : report des élections provinciales à mai-juin 2026, adoption des réformes constitutionnelles et organiques à l’automne 2025, et surtout consultation populaire visant à adopter définitivement l’accord en février 2026.

Interrogé par la chaîne publique Nouvelle-Calédonie la Première peu de temps après le rejet de l’accord par l’UC, Manuel Valls continuait à défendre l’application de ce « compromis politique ».

Deux fragilités majeures pèsent sur ce processus : au plan national, l’instabilité politique et l’incertitude pour le gouvernement d’obtenir la majorité des 3/5^e au Congrès, nécessaire à l’adoption finale de l’accord qui implique une révision constitutionnelle ; au plan local, la contestation de la légitimité des signataires, les divisions internes du camp indépendantiste et la menace d’une mobilisation active de l’UC-FLNKS qui compte fermement bloquer la consultation populaire.

Dans un contexte post-émeutes et marqué par de profondes fractures politiques, cette consultation populaire en forme de nouveau référendum interrogera la capacité des signataires à rallier une large majorité de Calédoniens, et conditionnera la viabilité durable de l’accord de Bougival.

Pierre-Christophe Pantz ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Nouvelle-Calédonie : les indépendantistes du FLNKS rejettent l’accord de Bougival. Et maintenant ? – https://theconversation.com/nouvelle-caledonie-les-independantistes-du-flnks-rejettent-laccord-de-bougival-et-maintenant-263130

August 15, 2025

Is Israel committing genocide in Gaza? International court will take years to decide, but states have a duty to act now

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Magnus Killander, Professor, Centre for Human Rights in the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria

South Africa instituted a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague in late December 2023, claiming Israel was violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide through its actions in Gaza, and requesting provisional measures. Human rights law scholar Magnus Killander explains the process and why it’s so slow. International law, including the ICJ’s provisional measures, are binding on states. However, international law does not enforce itself and all states have an obligation to attend to the situation.

Why could it take until 2028 to get a final decision?

On 5 April 2024, the ICJ set two deadlines. It wanted to receive memorials, that is the full arguments related to the case, from South Africa by 28 October 2024 and counter-memorials from Israel by 28 July 2025. Following a request by Israel, the court on 14 April 2025 extended the time for submission of Israel’s counter-memorials to 12 January 2026.

It is likely that Israel, in a bid to delay the proceedings, will file preliminary objections, such as dealing with the jurisdiction of the ICJ to hear the case. South Africa would then have a few months to respond. Then an oral hearing on preliminary objections would be held, probably towards the end of 2026 or early 2027.

A few months after the hearing, the ICJ would deliver a judgment on the preliminary objections. Preliminary objections are unlikely to be successful, so the ICJ would then set a new deadline for Israel’s counter-memorial on the merits, which might again be extended. When Israel’s counter-memorial has been submitted, there may be a request from South Africa for a reply and from Israel for a rejoinder.

At some point, the court would consider requests from states to intervene, and set timelines for their submissions.

So far, the following states have filed requests to intervene: Nicaragua, Colombia, Libya, Mexico, Palestine, Spain, Türkiye, Chile, the Maldives, Bolivia, Ireland, Cuba and Belize. Nicaragua subsequently revoked its request.

After the written submissions, the ICJ will schedule an oral hearing. Following this the judges will write the final judgement on the merits of the case. The judgment will be hundreds of pages of detailed factual and legal analysis with separate opinions from many of the 16 judges. The court has 15 permanent judges (including South Africa’s Dire Tladi) and an Israeli ad hoc judge in the South Africa v Israel case.

It is this final judgement that will decide whether Israel breached the Genocide Convention through its actions in Gaza.

Given these lengthy procedures, it is unlikely that the final judgement in the case will be handed down before 2028.

Does it usually take this long?

Yes.

The South Africa v Israel case can be compared to the Gambia v Myanmar case. In November 2019 The Gambia brought the case that Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya constituted genocide.

The ICJ handed down a judgment on preliminary objections on 22 July 2022. A hearing on the merits is yet to be scheduled. The case is likely to be concluded in 2026.

The first case brought to the ICJ under the Genocide Convention, Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro, was submitted in 1993. The final judgment was delivered in 2007.

The second case, Croatia v Serbia, was submitted in 1999 and the final judgment was delivered in 2015.

The ICJ has so far held a state accountable for genocide in one case.

In its 2007 case, it held Serbia and Montenegro responsible for the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica. The ICJ case had limited impact. However, it should be noted that Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian Serb military leader, was arrested in Serbia in 2011 and transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as called for in the ICJ judgment. In 2017 he was convicted by the tribunal for the genocide in Srebrenica, a judgment which was confirmed on appeal in 2021, 26 years after the Srebrenica massacre.

In the two cases against Serbia, the court held that, apart from the Srebrenica massacre, the mens rea, the “specific intent” to destroy a group or part of a group, had not been proven. The main difference with the Myanmar and Israel cases is that the state of Serbia did not participate itself directly in the conflict.

In both the Gambia v Myanmar and the South Africa v Israel final judgments, the main discussion will likely be in relation to whether the mens rea requirement has been met.

In my view most of the ICJ judges will find that both acts of genocide and incitement to genocide have taken place.

What’s the point then?

The orders of the ICJ are binding on states, but are often ignored. This is in line with the general difficulty of enforcing international law, in particular international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Only political pressure from outside and inside Israel will bring about change, as it is clear that the Israeli government considers only itself as the judge of its actions. In addition, enforcement measures by the UN security council are not possible given the position of the United States. It is a permanent member of the council, with veto power, but does not want to criticise Israel and is its main supplier of weapons.

The issue of Palestine has also been raised in a case before the ICJ that does not directly involve Israel. In March 2024, Nicaragua instituted a case against Germany in relation to its export of weapons to Israel, which it argued facilitated genocide in Gaza. On 30 April 2024, the court decided not to issue provisional measures against Germany since it had shown the measures it had taken to restrict weapons exports to Israel following the invasion of Gaza.

It was only in August 2025, however, that Germany declared it would suspend the export of weapons that could be used in the war in Gaza.

Another international court based in The Hague is also trying to hold violators of international crimes to account. The International Criminal Court (ICC) deals with international criminal responsibility as opposed to state responsibility – the purview of the ICJ. Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant have been indicted by the ICC. The three Hamas leaders against whom the ICC prosecutor sought indictments have been killed by Israel.

It is unlikely that we will see Netanyahu in the dock in The Hague since he avoids travelling to countries that are parties to the ICC Statute and would thus be obliged to surrender him to the ICC.

Of course, the ICC is not the only possibility in relation to criminal accountability. For example, prosecutors in Sweden are investigating war crimes in Gaza.

The wheels of international justice grind exceedingly slowly and will never be sufficient on their own to bring about lasting change.

And the latest developments?

The provisional measures issued by the ICJ on 26 January 2024, 28 March 2024 and 24 May 2024 remain in force and are binding. These included the provision of

urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance.

Clearly this measure and and others have not been complied with.

South Africa has not requested any additional provisional measures since the last ones were issued in May 2024. However, advisory proceedings provide another way to address the situation.

On 23 December 2024, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on the obligations of Israel in relation to the presence and activities of the United Nations, other international organisations and third states in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Hearings were held from 28 April to 2 May 2025. The advisory opinion is likely to be delivered soon and address the issue of access to humanitarian aid.

This is the third advisory opinion proceedings dealing with Palestine. In December 2003, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on Israel’s construction of a wall separating it from the occupied territories in the West Bank. The advisory opinion of the ICJ was delivered on 9 July 2004, finding that the construction of the wall was in violation of international law. On 19 January 2023, the UN general assembly requested an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The court delivered its advisory opinion on 19 July 2024, confirming its view that the occupation was illegal and that Israel had an obligation to leave the occupied territory.

Magnus Killander does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is Israel committing genocide in Gaza? International court will take years to decide, but states have a duty to act now – https://theconversation.com/is-israel-committing-genocide-in-gaza-international-court-will-take-years-to-decide-but-states-have-a-duty-to-act-now-263076

August 15, 2025

South Africa has chosen a risky approach to global politics: 3 steps it must take to succeed

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Adam Habib, Vice-Chancellor, SOAS, University of London

South Africa finds itself in a dangerous historical moment. The world order is under threat from its own primary architect. The US wants to remain the premier global political power without taking on any of its responsibilities.

This dangerous moment also presents opportunities.

South Africa’s response has been one of strategic autonomy. This involves taking independent and non-aligned positions on global affairs, to navigate between competing world powers. But South African policymakers lack the political acumen and bureaucratic ability required to navigate this complex global order and to exploit the new possibilities.

Strategic autonomy is not the norm in global affairs. It is very rare for small countries to succeed at it without at least some costs.

Drawing from our expertise – as a political scientist and an economist working on the international economy – we conclude that if South Africa is to succeed in its strategic autonomy ambitions the country must do three things. First, its economic and foreign policy priority must be the African continent. Second, it must pursue bureaucratic excellence, especially in its diplomatic and security apparatus. Third, it must prepare for reprisals that are likely to follow its choice of an independent path to global affairs.

Strategic autonomy

A handful of countries have been able to pursue strategic autonomy in navigating the international system. They include Brazil, India and the Republic of Ireland.

These countries have four necessary assets: global economic importance; leverage; bureaucratic capability; and political will and agency manifested in foreign policy cohesiveness and agility.

India’s size – over 1.4 billion people and the fourth largest market in the world – makes it a location of both production and consumption. This has become more important given the US and western desire to create a counter balance to China as a low-cost producer and a market for exports.

Brazil’s assets are its geographic size, its mid-size population (three times South Africa’s), its mineral wealth, and its political importance to South America. It is also the tenth largest economy in the world.

Ireland is a small country, but it uses its strategic location in the European Union to influence global affairs.

South Africa is currently lacking on all these fronts. But, with strategic planning and reforms, and in partnership with other African countries, it is possible to enhance the country’s strategic importance to the global economy.

Where to from here?

If South Africa is to succeed as a nation, become globally relevant, and have autonomy in the global economy, it must recognise its challenges, understand their drivers and address them pragmatically.

So what should it do?

First, it’s important to recognise that South Africa is a small country. Its economy is marginal to the rest of the world. The continent of Africa has a population of around 1.5 billion people, which is likely to double by 2070 – the only part of the global economy in which demographic growth will occur.

Purely in terms of population size, Africa will be more important than ever before.

This can only be a strategic lever if countries across the continent integrate their economies more strongly. Thus, South Africa’s economic and foreign policy should focus on Africa and on building the African Continental Free Trade Area. Without this, its long-term economic development is in danger and it can’t develop the political leverage that enables independence in global affairs.

With its African partners, South Africa should be rebalancing its international trade. It should shift from being an exporter of raw materials to being a manufacturing and service economy.

Many countries across Africa have deposits of minerals that are strategically important to the global economy, especially as the climate transition shapes relations. This must be used to build integration across the continent so the region engages with powerful economies as a regional bloc.

Second, professional excellence must be taken seriously. South Africa’s political stewardship of the economy has been poor, and driven by narrow political objectives of the ruling party-linked elite. For example, policy in the important mining sector has been chaotic, at best. It has not served as a developmental stimulant or as a political lever for strategic autonomy.

Specific to international affairs, South Africa has to professionalise the diplomatic corps. It has been significantly weakened and its professional capability eroded through political appointments. These make up the vast majority of ambassadorial deployments.

There should be limits to the political appointments of ambassadors from the cohort of former African National Congress politicians and their family members.

In addition, South Africa should have fewer embassies, located in more strategic countries, with appropriate budgets to their job. It is embarrassing that embassies in places like London don’t have enough budget to market the country, undertake advocacy and advance the country’s national agenda.

But professional excellence needs to be extended far beyond the diplomatic corps.

South Africa cannot continue to be compromised by incompetent municipal and national governance. And this is not solely the result of corruption and cadre deployment. It’s also tied to a transformation agenda that eschews academic and professional excellence.

In addition, South Africa cannot pretend to be leading an independent path in global affairs without having the security apparatus that goes with such leadership. On this score, the country is sadly lacking.

Its security apparatus – the South African National Defence Force, police and intelligence service – needs attention. The defence force is poorly funded and, like the police and intelligence, largely a “social service” for former ANC operatives combatants.

Third, South Africa needs to prepare for the reprisals that are likely to follow if it charts an independent path in global affairs, such as the current response from the Trump administration to discipline South Africa for taking an autonomous position on Gaza.

This requires understanding the form that such reprisals could take and their consequences and being prepared for them. This would require diplomatic agility to proactively seek new markets, alternative sources of investment and additional political allies.

In contrast, South Africa’s responses have largely been reactive.

Dangers, as well as opportunities

While it’s a dangerous and uncertain world, it is also full of new possibilities. A new bipolar or multipolar world could enable South Africa and Africa to play off global powers against each other, to maximise opportunities for national economic development and independence.

This will only happen if South Africans collectively become agents of their own change. It will require developing leverage which others take seriously, and a government and public administration that works for the people of the country.

Imraan Valodia receives funding from foundations that support independent academic research.

Adam Habib does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. South Africa has chosen a risky approach to global politics: 3 steps it must take to succeed – https://theconversation.com/south-africa-has-chosen-a-risky-approach-to-global-politics-3-steps-it-must-take-to-succeed-262370

August 15, 2025

Afghans in US face uncertainty after the cancellation of their humanitarian relief

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mitra Naseh, Assistant Professor of Migration, Washington University in St. Louis

Members of the Afghanistan community and their supporters take part in a demonstration calling for an ‘open door’ policy for Afghanistan refugees on Aug. 28, 2021, in Los Angeles. AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu

Thousands of Afghans living in the United States face an uncertain future after a federal appeals court ruled on July 21, 2025, that the Trump administration can end a humanitarian relief program that provided them work permits and protection from deportation.

The program, temporary protected status, known as TPS, grants legal status to people from certain foreign countries who are already in the U.S. and have fled armed conflict or natural disasters. It’s usually granted for 18 months, with an option of an extension.

About 8,000 Afghans and 7,900 Cameroonians benefiting from this humanitarian protection were affected by the May 2025 decision from the administration to terminate TPS.

Afghans in the U.S. first received TPS in 2022, after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in late 2021.

The Taliban enforce a repressive interpretation of Islamic law that includes banning women and girls from attending school or working outside their home. The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s and controlled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. They were overthrown after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 but regained control in 2021 after the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces.

In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security extended TPS for Afghans through 2025, as the conditions that triggered the initial designation – namely, armed conflict in Afghanistan – were deemed to be ongoing.

In May 2025, however, Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced the termination of TPS for Afghans, stating that Afghanistan no longer poses a threat to the safety of its nationals abroad and that Afghan nationals can safely return to their country.

“We’ve reviewed the conditions in Afghanistan with our interagency partners, and they do not meet the requirements for a TPS designation,” Noem said in May 2025. “Afghanistan has had an improved security situation, and its stabilizing economy no longer prevent them from returning to their home country.”

Most Afghans who have arrived in the U.S. since 2021 share a fear of persecution by the Taliban. That includes people who worked for the former government, advocated for women’s rights or worked with the U.S. military in Afghanistan.

As a migration policy scholar, I believe the cancellation of TPS for these Afghans won’t lead to voluntary repatriation, as the fear of persecution by the Taliban remains a serious concern for many. Instead, it will likely force thousands of people into unlawful residency in the U.S. That, in turn, would not only leave thousands at risk of deportation but limit their employment opportunities in the U.S. and keep them from financially supporting the families they left behind in Afghanistan.

US asylum process

Unlawful U.S. residency can disqualify Afghans from accessing benefits such as Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, a federal program that provides cash assistance and support services to low-income families with children.

For Afghan TPS holders without any other pending legal status – such as asylum claims, for example – the termination also means the loss of work authorization, as their employment authorization document was tied to having TPS. This can cut off thousands of Afghans from financial stability, according to the nonprofit group Global Refuge.

Many Afghans are likely to seek alternative legal pathways to remain in the U.S., most commonly through the already underresourced asylum process. For these people, the outlook looks daunting. Filing an asylum application with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services means joining an unprecedented backlog.

Several masked security personnel walk alongside a burqa-clad woman on a street. — Taliban security personnel stand guard as an Afghan woman walks along a street in the Baharak district of Badakhshan province on Feb. 26, 2024.
Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

At the end of 2024, nearly 1.5 million asylum applications were pending with USCIS, according to the American Immigration Council, a nonprofit advocacy organization. Most applicants faced estimated wait times of up to six years for a decision.

Asylum applicants are allowed to remain in the U.S. while their application is pending. And they can apply for work authorization, but only after the asylum application has been pending for at least 150 days. However, the work authorization is not issued until a minimum of 180 days has passed since filing for asylum.

So Afghan nationals applying for asylum following the TPS termination face a mandatory six-month period without legal work authorization. This period can stretch even longer, depending on how long it takes applicants to retain an attorney and complete the complex application process.

Financial lifelines

Like many forcibly displaced populations, Afghans often arrive in the U.S. with extremely limited financial resources.

Forced migration is typically abrupt and unplanned, leaving little opportunity to liquidate assets or withdraw funds. The small amount of cash or valuables that this population manages to carry is often just enough to reach immediate safety.

Against this background, the ability to work is a critical issue for Afghans in the U.S. Most Afghans in the U.S. are also supporting older parents and immediate or extended family members in Afghanistan, according to unpublished research I’m conducting with my colleagues, Proscovia Nabunya and Nhial Tutlam. This makes timely access to legal employment not only a matter of survival for themselves but also a lifeline for loved ones left behind.

TPS was never intended as a long-term solution. And the number of Afghan nationals who held it as their sole legal status in the U.S. was relatively small – estimated at around 8,000 – compared with the over 180,000 Afghans who have arrived in the U.S. since 2021.

What is more concerning for Afghans in the U.S., however, are the government’s assertions surrounding the termination of TPS for this group. If the U.S. government now maintains that Afghanistan is safe for return, it raises concerns about how this stance may influence the adjudication of Afghan asylum claims.

Although most Afghan asylum applications are grounded in a combination of factors – fears based on nationality, ethnicity, religion and political opinion – labeling Afghanistan as safe for return could undermine claims that rely on nationality as a central basis for protection.

Mitra Naseh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Afghans in US face uncertainty after the cancellation of their humanitarian relief – https://theconversation.com/afghans-in-us-face-uncertainty-after-the-cancellation-of-their-humanitarian-relief-261627

August 15, 2025

Sanctuary cities in the US were born in the 1980s as Central American refugees fled civil wars

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Laura Madokoro, Associate Professor of History, Carleton University

Protesters outside the federal courthouse in San Antonio, Texas, rally to oppose a Texas ‘anti-sanctuary cities’ bill on June 26, 2017. AP Photo/Eric Gay

Sanctuary cities in the United States, which limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, have drawn the ire of President Donald Trump during both of his administrations.

Border czar Tom Homan said in July 2025 that the Trump administration would target sanctuary cities across the country and “flood the zone” with agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to pursue deportation goals.

I am a historian of migration. I have found that the concept of sanctuary takes many forms, from gestures of kindness and advocacy to more formal approaches such as churches protecting migrants at risk of arrest and deportation.

In the U.S., sanctuary city policies have historically been designed to support undocumented immigrants and refugees, especially those facing deportation. Ordinances based on these policies are often used by local authorities to signal the need for substantive immigration reform.

New public sanctuary policies

Today’s sanctuary practices, and the federal targeting of sanctuary cities, are largely the result of the way sanctuary took shape across the U.S. in the 1980s.

During this period, churches, city officials and activists assisted migrants fleeing the violent conditions created by U.S. proxy wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.

In the early 1980s, migrants arriving in the U.S. confronted restrictive asylum processes. To a large extent, this was the result of the Reagan administration’s refusal to acknowledge the extent of human rights violations perpetrated by U.S.-supported regimes in Central America.

In 1984, the federal government approved less than 3% of U.S. asylum claims by applicants who had fled El Salvador and Guatemala. By comparison, asylum claims were approved for over 30% – and in some cases, 60% – of refugees from Iran, Afghanistan and Poland.

In response, U.S. activists and church and city leaders began to advocate on behalf of refugees from Central America. They sought to effect change at home and abroad, eventually coalescing into what became known as the Sanctuary Movement.

This largely decentralized coalition focused on protecting refugees by providing safe housing, often in churches, and advocating for their right to seek asylum. And they engaged in public outreach to raise awareness about the conditions in Central America and the U.S. government’s role in conflicts there.

The goal was to change U.S. policy. As one sanctuary worker in Texas said in 1985, according to accounts compiled at the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin: “Sanctuary offers a way, by which folks can, number one, be safe from the fear of death, and, number two, speak out as to what is really going on in Central America.”

Three men lay down inside a makeshift shelter. — Father Richard Sinner, left, and Salvadoran hunger strikers sit outside the Immigration and Naturalization Service processing center to protest immigration measures on Feb. 21, 1989, in Brownsville, Texas.
Walt Frerck/AFP/Getty Images

The Sanctuary Movement also led to organized visits to the U.S.-Mexico border to witness the ways in which migrants were being treated by U.S. immigration officials. In Texas between 1983 and 1985, for instance, people were invited to document the activities of immigration officials at Port Isabel Detention Center.

Members of the Sanctuary Movement also shared some of the horrors they learned about from missionaries and refugees arriving from Central America, according to accounts in the Benson Latin American Collection.

As a member of the Rio Grande Border Witness group conveyed, according to records preserved in the Benson Latin American Collection, there were repeated stories out of Central America “of women being raped and stabbed” and “of fathers being murdered in front of their families.”

As awareness about violence in Central America increased, more people and congregations in the U.S. became involved in the Sanctuary Movement. At its peak in 1986, the movement included 300 churches that endorsed sanctuary for Central American migrants and the principles underpinning the Sanctuary Movement.

Public and symbolic

It was during this peak that U.S. cities first began making sanctuary declarations and later passed binding ordinances.

In 1985, Berkeley, California, which had previously declared itself a sanctuary city for conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War, made one of the first sanctuary city declarations on behalf of refugees from Central America. Its resolution reaffirmed the city’s “support for the principle of sanctuary and for those groups which engage in this time-honored tradition of humanitarian assistance.”

City officials said that no city employee would “violate the established sanctuaries by assisting in investigations, public or clandestine, by engaging in or assisting with arrests for alleged violation of immigration laws by the refugees in the sanctuaries or by those offering sanctuary.”

A priest walks inside a crowded hallway. — A member of the clergy with New Sanctuary Coalition enters an immigration courtroom as federal agents wait outside on July 8, 2025, in New York.
AP Photo/Olga Fedorova

Cities such as San Francisco and Santa Fe, New Mexico, followed with declarations or binding ordinances. These initiatives were often specifically crafted for migrants from Central America and contained critiques of U.S. foreign policy and asylum policy.

A 1989 San Francisco ordinance, which is still in effect, was inspired by the notion that the U.S. had special obligations to the citizens of El Salvador and Guatemala because of its role in the conflicts there.

There was powerful rhetoric and symbolism in the sanctuary city resolutions passed in the 1980s. This holds true for the present, as sanctuary declarations and policies have become increasingly polarizing in today’s political climate.

Moreover, as I note in my own work, public acts of sanctuary can come at a cost, often at the expense of the very people they are meant to help. In an effort to raise public awareness and sympathy, those in need of refuge often have their most harrowing moments laid bare for public consumption.

The Sanctuary Movement that began in the 1980s, in part to protest U.S. support for repressive governments, has endured for more than 40 years as an expression of concern for and solidarity with immigrants who come to the U.S.

The question now is how the movement will evolve in the face of the Trump administration’s threats.

Some sanctuary city leaders, such as Boston Mayor Michelle Wu, have responded by pointing to the value of policies that foster community trust and help keep all residents safe. How other leaders and communities respond remains to be seen.

Laura Madokoro receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Fonds de Recherches de Québec Société et Culture (FRQSC).

– ref. Sanctuary cities in the US were born in the 1980s as Central American refugees fled civil wars – https://theconversation.com/sanctuary-cities-in-the-us-were-born-in-the-1980s-as-central-american-refugees-fled-civil-wars-257718