Qué pistas ofrece la literatura sobre la infidelidad y el revuelo que provoca

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Jason Wang, Postdoctoral Fellow, Modern Literature and Culture Research Centre, Toronto Metropolitan University

La escena en el estadio Gillette de Massachusetts el 16 de julio estaba llena de ironía.

Durante el segmento del concierto de Coldplay en el que las cámaras recorren el público, la pantalla gigante enfocó a Andy Byron, entonces director ejecutivo de la empresa de datos Astronomer, abrazando a Kristin Cabot, directora de recursos humanos de la empresa. Ambos están casados con otras personas.

El momento, capturado en vídeo y ampliamente difundido en las redes sociales, muestra a la pareja retrocediendo bruscamente cuando el cantante de Coldplay, Chris Martin, dice: “O están teniendo una aventura o son muy tímidos”.

El comentario de Martin, aparentemente ligero en ese momento, rápidamente adquirió un tono diferente cuando los detectives de Internet identificaron a la pareja y descubrieron sus funciones en la empresa y su estado civil. En cuestión de días, tanto Byron como Cabot han dimitido de sus puestos.

Este hecho plantea una pregunta más profunda: ¿por qué la infidelidad, especialmente entre los poderosos, provoca tal revuelo público? La tradición literaria ofrece algunas pistas: la traición íntima nunca es realmente privada. Rompe un contrato social implícito y exige el escrutinio de la comunidad para restaurar la confianza.

Cuando la confianza se desmorona públicamente

La noción de “identidad narrativa” del filósofo francés Paul Ricoeur sugiere que damos sentido a nuestras vidas percibiéndolas como si fueran historias. Las promesas que hacemos (y rompemos) se convierten en capítulos de nuestra identidad y en la base sobre la que los demás depositan su confianza. La traición rompe el marco que une los votos privados con los roles públicos; sin ese vínculo, la confianza se desmorona.

La exposición de Byron en el estadio convirtió un voto matrimonial en un símbolo de integridad profesional. La traición pública magnifica la indignación pública porque los líderes simbolizan la estabilidad; sus fallos personales se reflejan inevitablemente en sus instituciones.

Cuando la junta directiva de Astronomer declaró que “no había estado a la altura” del nivel esperado, lamentaba el colapso de la integridad narrativa de Byron y, por extensión, la de su empresa.

Esta idea, que la moralidad privada sustenta el orden público, no es nueva. En Las Leyes, el filósofo griego Platón describió el adulterio como un desorden que socava la familia y el Estado. El filósofo romano Séneca lo calificó de traición a la naturaleza, mientras que el estadista Cicerón advirtió que romper la fides (confianza) corroe los lazos cívicos.

El coste social de la infidelidad en la literatura

La literatura rara vez limita la infidelidad al dormitorio; sus ondas expansivas fracturan comunidades.

La idea de la “consciencia colectiva” sostiene que las normas morales compartidas crean “solidaridad social”. Como demuestra la literatura, las violaciones de estas normas socavan inevitablemente la confianza comunitaria.

Portada del libro _Anna Karénina_, de Lev Tolstói.
Portada del libro Anna Karénina, de Lev Tolstói.
Penguin Libros

Anna Karénina, de León Tolstói (1875-77), dramatiza la fractura social que provoca la traición. La aventura de Anna con el conde Vronsky no solo desafía las convenciones morales, sino que desestabiliza las normas aristocráticas que antes sustentaban su estatus.

A medida que el escándalo la lleva al ostracismo, Anna llora la pérdida de su mundo, dándose cuenta demasiado tarde de que “la posición que disfrutaba en la sociedad… era muy valiosa para ella… [y] no podía ser más fuerte de lo que era”.

En Madame Bovary (1857), las aventuras extramatrimoniales de Emma Bovary desentrañan las redes de su pueblo provinciano, convirtiendo el anhelo privado de lujo y romance en un contagio público.

Nathaniel Hawthorne, en La letra escarlata (1850), lo deja claro: la “A” escarlata de su protagonista Hester Prynne convierte su pecado en un drama cívico. La humillación pública en el cadalso, sugiere la novela, delimita los límites morales y busca restaurar el orden social, un proceso que prefigura los actuales “censores digitales”, donde los momentos virales someten a los individuos al juicio masivo en línea y a la condena pública.

Migajas domésticas y patibulos digitales

Las narrativas contemporáneas cambian el escenario, pero mantienen el mismo principio: la traición devasta los rituales mundanos que construyen la confianza.

Portada de _Se acabó el pastel_, de Nora Ephron.
Portada de Se acabó el pastel, de Nora Ephron.
Anagrama

La novela autobiográfica de Nora Ephron Se acabó el pastel (1983), basada en el fracaso de su propio matrimonio con el periodista de investigación Carl Bernstein, convierte la vida doméstica en un arma.

La protagonista de Se acabó el pastel, Rachel Samstat, expresa sus emociones a través de recetas: la “vinagreta”, como símbolo de intimidad y traición; el “estofado de Lillian Hellman”, como intento de alcanzar la estabilidad doméstica, y la “tarta de lima”, que lanza a su marido, se convierten en símbolos de una vida destrozada por la infidelidad pública.

La sátira de Ephron, posteriormente adaptada al cine, anticipa nuestra era digital de exposición, en la que el dolor privado alimenta el consumo y el juicio públicos.

Portada de _Departamento de especulaciones_, de Jenny Offill.
Portada de Departamento de especulaciones, de Jenny Offill.
Libros del Asteroide

Departamento de especulaciones, de Jenny Offill (2014), que se inspira en su propia vida, muestra otra perspectiva: la traición como una erosión silenciosa.

Offill nunca describe la infidelidad de forma directa; en su lugar, las ausencias del marido, sus silencios y una referencia casual a “otra persona” crean un temor sofocante. Esta indirecta muestra que el poder de la traición reside en su potencial latente, que desmantela lentamente una vida construida sobre la confianza antes de que se produzca ningún acto manifiesto.

Ambas obras subrayan el impacto de la traición en la conciencia colectiva: una mentira fractura una familia tan profundamente como la indiscreción de un director ejecutivo erosiona la confianza institucional. El poder magnifica las consecuencias al convertir los fracasos privados en símbolos públicos de fragilidad. Incluso la traición oculta envenena los rituales compartidos que unen a cualquier grupo, haciendo insostenible la noción de “privado” mucho antes de que se revele públicamente.

Los límites del poder

La literatura reconoce el barniz protector del poder frente a las consecuencias, así como sus límites.

La Trilogía del deseo, de Theodore Dreiser, inspirada en el magnate Charles Yerkes durante la Edad Dorada de Estados Unidos, narra el ascenso del financiero Frank Cowperwood, cuyo poder lo protege… hasta que deja de hacerlo. Incluso su vasto imperio se muestra vulnerable cuando su adulterio sale a la luz. Las mismas redes que lo custodiaban comienzan a desconfiar de él.

Aunque muchos críticos de la élite están ellos mismos comprometidos moralmente en la trilogía, la transgresión de Cowperwood se convierte en un arma para desacreditarlo. Su breve exilio demuestra que el poder puede aplazar, pero no borrar, el precio de la traición. Una vez que se rompe la confianza, incluso los poderosos se convierten en un lastre. No caen con menos frecuencia, solo de forma más llamativa.

El género también influye en la configuración de estas narrativas. Los protagonistas masculinos como Cowperwood resurgen como trágicos antihéroes, y sus fallos morales se reconvierten en defectos de carácter. Por el contrario, las mujeres –pensemos en Emma Bovary, de Flaubert, o Hester Prynne, de Hawthorne– son tachadas de figuras aleccionadoras, y sus transgresiones son estigmatizadas en lugar de mitificadas.

Este desequilibrio en la asignación de consecuencias revela un juicio social más profundo: aunque la confianza rota exige reparación, el camino hacia la restauración suele depender del género del transgresor.

El ojo que todo lo ve

Desde los salones de Tolstói hasta el scroll de TikTok, la literatura no ofrece refugio alguno frente a las repercusiones de la traición. Cuando la confianza privada se fractura de forma visible, se activan los reflejos comunitarios.

Las letras escarlatas, el exilio o la dimisión de un director ejecutivo tienen como objetivo sanar la confianza colectiva. La pantalla gigante, como el cadalso de Hester, es el último instrumento de este antiguo teatro de la exposición.

Pantallas gigantes. Andamios. El mismo sistema operativo. La misma vergüenza.

The Conversation

Jason Wang no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Qué pistas ofrece la literatura sobre la infidelidad y el revuelo que provoca – https://theconversation.com/que-pistas-ofrece-la-literatura-sobre-la-infidelidad-y-el-revuelo-que-provoca-261979

Avec Machiavel, penser la liberté politique dans un monde en guerre

Source: The Conversation – France in French (3) – By Jérôme Roudier, Professeur de philosophie politique, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

_Portrait posthume de Nicolas Machiavel_ (1500), par le peintre florentin Santi di Tito (1536-1603), huile sur toile, Palazzo Vecchio, Florence (Toscane).

Notre démocratie est en crise, comment la réinventer ? Que nous enseignent ceux qui, au cours des âges, furent ses concepteurs ? Troisième volet de notre série consacrée aux philosophes et à la démocratie avec Nicolas Machiavel (1469-1527). Pour le Florentin, la conflictualité est un horizon politique indépassable : le « peuple » doit être armé pour ne pas subir la tyrannie des « Grands » et les républiques doivent être puissantes pour ne pas subir l’impérialisme des États voisins.


Machiavel est un penseur qui fait de la survie et de la fondation des États un enjeu fondamental. Pour celui qui exerça les fonctions de haut fonctionnaire de la République florentine, la question du régime politique est donc subordonnée à celle de la survie dans un contexte toujours marqué par l’horizon de la guerre.

Le meilleur régime est forcément celui qui assure à la fois la liberté et la puissance et qui permet de fonder l’État dans la durée. La science politique qu’il inaugure ainsi n’est plus une réflexion théorique, mais bien un programme politique articulant l’idéal au pragmatisme.

Un républicanisme originel et fondateur

Machiavel n’est pas à proprement parler un penseur de la démocratie. C’est un républicain convaincu. Les républicains de son époque entendent élargir la base du gouvernement et intégrer cette classe moyenne dans une vie politique qui, traditionnellement, est réservée aux aristocrates. Le choix, par Machiavel et par ses contemporains voire par la tradition florentine de parler de « République », indique un régime où, comme sous Rome, tout le monde n’est pas forcément citoyen.

Pour les républicains, jusqu’au milieu du XIXe siècle, l’élargissement voire l’universalisation de la citoyenneté constituera une question essentielle. Étant donné que la classe moyenne augmente peu à peu dans le temps pour atteindre une proportion très importante, voire majoritaire, de la population européenne, le républicanisme, dans ces conditions, s’articule avec une citoyenneté universellement attribuée aux membres de la société et peut alors se proposer comme le fondement théorique des démocraties modernes puis contemporaines.

L’horizon de la puissance

Du point de vue intérieur, Machiavel estime que la division sociale est inévitable et que le rôle d’un système légal consiste à la laisser s’exprimer tout en l’arrêtant dans ses manifestations les plus extrêmes. Comme il le souligne, les Grands veulent naturellement dominer, il faut donc les arrêter pour qu’ils ne tyrannisent pas. Le « peuple » (entendre les « classes moyennes ») veut seulement ne pas être dominé, par conséquent, il faut lui donner les armes qui lui permettront de constituer un contre-pouvoir envers la tyrannie potentielle des Grands.

Le monde de Machiavel est belliciste, la puissance est à la fois le gage de la survie et l’outil pour conquérir. Si le peuple peut se contenter de n’être pas asservi, une société, dans un monde instable, se doit d’être puissante. La politique se constitue dans l’articulation bien pensée à la fois de ce qu’elle est sur le fond, la recherche d’un vivre-ensemble viable, et de sa situation dans le monde, composée par ses interactions inévitables avec les autres entités politiques.

Pour Machiavel, le monde politique n’est pas chrétien : son fondement, celui de toute société, reste l’appétit de chacun. Si nous étions tous des saints chrétiens, la politique n’existerait tout simplement pas. Or, le désir de dominer, parfaitement naturel et donc inévitable, structure toute collectivité et la divise en trois : ceux qui veulent dominer (les Grands), ceux qui accepteraient cette domination par nécessité de survie (la populace, la plèbe) et ceux qui ne veulent ni l’un ni l’autre (le peuple, la « classe moyenne »). Ce point de départ, le système politique républicain l’assume. Il accepte l’inégalité fondamentale des conditions et des désirs, dans sa tripartition même.

Dès lors, Machiavel place au centre du dispositif à la fois la loi, que chacun doit avant tout respecter, mais aussi les armes. Le Florentin n’imagine pas une seconde que les Grands arrêteront d’eux-mêmes leur soif de domination et de reconnaissance. Il anticipe ainsi les libéraux, en particulier Montesquieu sur ce point, en estimant que seul le pouvoir arrête le pouvoir. Dans la vision machiavélienne et pragmatique des choses, l’arrêt d’une domination qui risquerait d’être tyrannique ne peut se faire par la Loi seule. Il convient que le peuple de citoyens soit armé pour imposer le respect de la Loi aux Grands.

Pour le Florentin, cette dynamique initiale ne débouche pas sur la guerre civile mais sur l’évolution de la soif de domination des Grands qui vont, par la force des choses, tourner leurs désirs vers l’extérieur. Plutôt que tyrans, ils vont avoir un double intérêt à devenir généraux et hommes d’État. Ce point est très visible à travers le plan des Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, livre méconnu du grand public mais très lu par les républicains ultérieurs. Pour Machiavel, le système politique républicain, dans ses turbulences et son instabilité fondamentale, offre la possibilité de la puissance à l’extérieur et d’une certaine forme d’impérialisme.

« Si vis pacem… »

Pour Machiavel, toute situation de paix correspond à ce moment qui précède une nouvelle guerre. Par conséquent, il faut préparer la guerre, au mieux pour ne pas avoir à la faire. La vie du Secrétaire se déroula pendant les guerres d’Italie où la guerre était omniprésente et inévitable. De son point de vue, un pacifisme qui pourrait présider à une compétition aux armements pour défendre les démocraties en assumant le risque de guerre est toujours préférable à un désarmement qui ne pourrait qu’augurer d’une invasion à venir.

La question de la paix, pour Machiavel, nous est ainsi restituée comme celle d’une tension très difficile à atteindre et non comme d’un projet idéal rationnel. Ainsi, l’effort kantien pour promouvoir la paix perpétuelle via une extension de l’État de droit à toutes les entités politiques est à l’opposé de la pensée machiavélienne. Selon le Florentin, pour obtenir la paix, il convient qu’une puissance impériale républicaine soit limitée par une autre puissance impériale équivalente. Nous pourrions dire que, dans notre monde contemporain, ce fut le cas en Europe depuis 1945, sous la domination de la puissance impériale américaine face à l’URSS. Dès lors que la première puissance n’est plus, il convient de lui substituer une puissance suffisante pour dissuader toute agression extérieure.

Mourir pour la liberté ?

Machiavel lierait sans doute cette question à une autre, plus essentielle pour lui et qui fonderait sans doute, à ses yeux, l’ensemble du problème démocratique : sommes-nous prêts à mourir pour la liberté, c’est-à-dire pour ce qui la permet, à savoir la patrie et son régime politique ?

Cette question simple et cruciale, pour Machiavel, ne devrait jamais sortir de l’horizon d’une société qui souhaite perdurer. La liberté, pour Machiavel, c’est la puissance : seul un peuple en armes est libre et capable de maintenir sa liberté face aux Grands comme face à l’ambition des voisins, en imposant la crainte.

Nombre de voix se font entendre, aujourd’hui, sur le caractère sacré de la vie. Dans une perspective machiavélienne, qui retrouve les pensées philosophiques antiques préchrétiennes, en particulier stoïcienne, la vie ne saurait être sacrée. Elle n’est pas le don ineffable du Créateur, mais un fait qui nous projette dans un univers collectif au sein duquel nous devons faire des choix et apporter un sens qui n’est pas donné d’avance et qui n’est pas extérieur à ce monde. Il y a ici tout un questionnement à approfondir, un sens à donner au politique dans nos sociétés, à la fois christianisées et désenchantées, pour reprendre le terme de Max Weber.

Machiavel apporte une réponse républicaine sans aucune ambiguïté, impliquant une réponse radicale à la question de savoir si nous voulons vivre à tout prix, y compris sous une tyrannie. Ce premier penseur de la modernité écartait clairement toute perspective chrétienne pour privilégier, d’une manière très singulière à son époque, une « religion civique » sur le modèle romain pré-chrétien. La réflexion que suscite la lecture de Machiavel pour nos démocraties libérales, renvoie à la place de la politique dans nos vies. Pour le Florentin, la vie ne vaut que si elle est politiquement libre.


Jérôme Roudier est l’auteur de Machiavel par lui-même (PUF, 2025).

The Conversation

Jérôme Roudier ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Avec Machiavel, penser la liberté politique dans un monde en guerre – https://theconversation.com/avec-machiavel-penser-la-liberte-politique-dans-un-monde-en-guerre-259122

Neanderthals likely ate fermented meat with a side of maggots

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Melanie Beasley, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Purdue University

Black soldier fly maggots can feed on decomposing animals. Melanie M. Beasley

Scientists long thought that Neanderthals were avid meat eaters. Based on chemical analysis of Neanderthal remains, it seemed like they’d been feasting on as much meat as apex predators such as lions and hyenas. But as a group, hominins – that’s Neanderthals, our species and other extinct close relatives – aren’t specialized flesh eaters. Rather, they’re more omnivorous, eating plenty of plant foods, too.

It is possible for humans to subsist on a very carnivorous diet. In fact, many traditional northern hunter–gatherers such as the Inuit subsisted mostly on animal foods. But hominins simply cannot tolerate consuming the high levels of protein that large predators can. If humans eat as much protein as hypercarnivores do over long periods without consuming enough other nutrients, it can lead to protein poisoning – a debilitating, even lethal condition historically known as “rabbit starvation.”

So, what could explain the chemical signatures found in Neanderthal bones that seem to suggest they were healthily eating tons of meat?

I am an anthropologist who uses elements such as nitrogen to study the diets of our very ancient ancestors. New research my colleagues and I conducted suggests a secret ingredient in the Neanderthal diet that might explain what was going on: maggots.

A close-up photograph of a black-colored fly with green and brown patterned eyes
A black soldier fly adult. The larvae of this fly are one of the species of maggots studied.
GordZam/iStock via Getty Images Plus

Isotope ratios reveal what an animal ate

The ratios of various elements in the bones of animals can provide insights into what they ate while alive. Isotopes are alternate forms of the same element that have slightly different masses. Nitrogen has two stable isotopes: nitrogen-14, the more abundant form, and nitrogen-15, the heavier, less common form. Scientists denote the ratio of nitrogen-15 to nitrogen-14 as δ¹⁵N and measure it in a unit called permil.

As you go higher up the food chain, organisms have relatively more of the isotope nitrogen-15. Grass, for example, has a very low δ¹⁵N value. An herbivore accumulates the nitrogen-15 that it consumes eating grass, so its own body has a slightly higher δ¹⁵N value. Meat-eating animals have the highest nitrogen ratio in a food web; the nitrogen-15 from their prey concentrates in their bodies.

By analyzing stable nitrogen isotope ratios, we can reconstruct the diets of Neanderthals and early Homo sapiens during the late Pleistocene, which ran from 11,700 to 129,000 years ago. Fossils from various sites tell the same story – these hominins have high δ¹⁵N values. High δ¹⁵N values would typically place them at the top of the food web, together with hypercarnivores such as cave lions and hyenas, whose diet is more than 70% meat.

But maybe something else about their diet was inflating Neanderthals’ δ¹⁵N values.

Uncovering the Neanderthal menu

We suspected that maggots could have been a different potential source of enriched nitrogen-15 in the Neanderthal diet. Maggots, which are fly larvae, can be a fat-rich source of food. They are unavoidable after you kill another animal, easily collectible in large numbers and nutritionally beneficial.

To investigate this possibility, we used a dataset that was originally created for a very different purpose: a forensic anthropology project focused on how nitrogen might help estimate time since death.

I had originally collected modern muscle tissue samples and associated maggots at the Forensic Anthropology Center at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, to understand how nitrogen values change during decomposition after death.

A photo of an animal carcass with maggots covering it
Maggots feeding on and decomposing an animal carcass.
Hari Sucahyo/iStock via Getty Images Plus

While the data can assist modern forensic death investigations, in our current study we repurposed it to test a very different hypothesis. We found that stable nitrogen isotope values increase modestly as muscle tissue decomposes, ranging from -0.6 permil to 7.7 permil.

This increase is more dramatic in maggots feeding on decomposing tissue: from 5.4 permil to 43.2 permil. To put the maggot values in perspective, scientists estimate δ¹⁵N values for Pleistocene herbivores to range between 0.9 permil to 11.2 permil. Maggots are measuring up to almost four times higher.

Our research suggests that the high δ¹⁵N values observed in Late Pleistocene hominins may be inflated by year-round consumption of ¹⁵N-enriched maggots found in dried, frozen or cached animal foods.

Cultural practices shape diet

In 2017, my collaborator John Speth proposed that the high δ¹⁵N values in Neanderthals were due to the consumption of putrid or rotting meat, based on historical and cultural evidence of diets in northern Arctic foragers.

Traditionally, Indigenous peoples almost universally viewed thoroughly putrefied, maggot-infested animal foods as highly desirable fare, not starvation rations. In fact, many such peoples routinely and often intentionally allowed animal foods to decompose to the point where they were crawling with maggots, in some cases even beginning to liquefy.

This rotting food would inevitably emit a stench so overpowering that early European explorers, fur trappers and missionaries were sickened by it. Yet Indigenous peoples viewed such foods as good to eat, even a delicacy. When asked how they could tolerate the nauseating stench, they simply responded, “We don’t eat the smell.”

A Neanderthal wearing animal fur butchering a goat with a stone tool
Reconstruction of a Neanderthal man butchering a goat at the Neanderthal Museum in Mettman, Germany.
Pressebilder Neanderthal Museum, Mettmann/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Neanderthals’ cultural practices, similar to those of Indigenous peoples, might be the answer to the mystery of their high δ¹⁵N values. Ancient hominins were butchering, storing, preserving, cooking and cultivating a variety of items. All these practices enriched their paleo menu with foods in forms that nonhominin carnivores do not consume. Research shows that δ¹⁵N values are higher for cooked foods, putrid muscle tissue from terrestrial and aquatic species, and, with our study, for fly larvae feeding on decaying tissue.

The high δ¹⁵N values of maggots associated with putrid animal foods help explain how Neanderthals could have included plenty of other nutritious foods beyond only meat while still registering δ¹⁵N values we’re used to seeing in hypercarnivores.

We suspect the high δ¹⁵N values seen in Neanderthals reflect routine consumption of fatty animal tissues and fermented stomach contents, much of it in a semi-putrid or putrid state, together with the inevitable bonus of both living and dead ¹⁵N-enriched maggots.

What still isn’t known

Fly larvae are a fat-rich, nutrient-dense, ubiquitous and easily procured insect resource, and both Neanderthals and early Homo sapiens, much like recent foragers, would have benefited from taking full advantage of them. But we cannot say that maggots alone explain why Neanderthals have such high δ¹⁵N values in their remains.

Several questions about this ancient diet remain unanswered. How many maggots would someone need to consume to account for an increase in δ¹⁵N values above the expected values due to meat eating alone? How do the nutritional benefits of consuming maggots change the longer a food item is stored? More experimental studies on changes in δ¹⁵N values of foods processed, stored and cooked following Indigenous traditional practices can help us better understand the dietary practices of our ancient relatives.

The Conversation

Melanie Beasley received funding from the Haslam Foundation for this research.

ref. Neanderthals likely ate fermented meat with a side of maggots – https://theconversation.com/neanderthals-likely-ate-fermented-meat-with-a-side-of-maggots-261628

¿Qué es la dermatosis nodular contagiosa qué ha obligado a modificar el recorrido del Tour de Francia?

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Raúl Rivas González, Catedrático de Microbiología. Miembro de la Sociedad Española de Microbiología., Universidad de Salamanca

Pavel1964/Shutterstock

La organización del Tour de Francia 2025 ha decidido modificar el recorrido de la etapa 19, entre Albertville y La Plagne para evitar la subida al Col des Saisies, considerado como un puerto de primera categoría y que podría haber sido clave en la clasificación final de la carrera ciclista. La razón ha sido un brote de dermatosis nodular contagiosa que afecta al ganado vacuno de un rebaño ubicado en el Col des Saisies que ha obligado a sacrificar a los animales enfermos.

La dermatosis nodular contagiosa es una enfermedad vírica transfronteriza emergente altamente infecciosa. Está causada por un virus miembro de la familia Poxviridae y del género Capripoxvirus. Afecta principalmente al ganado bovino y, en menor medida, a otros rumiantes como órices, jirafas, ñus, antílopes e impalas. Tiene gran importancia económica en ganadería debido a las pérdidas productivas que ocasiona, especialmente al disminuir la producción de leche de las vacas lecheras y la producción de carne.

A esto se le suma que puede dar lugar a pérdida de peso, esterilidad temporal o permanente en toros y vacas, abortos, daños en las pieles y muerte. Afortunadamente, la mortalidad no supera el 10 % en el ganado infectado.

Afecta a vacas y búfalos, pero no a seres humanos

Las especies bovinas (Bos taurus y Bos indicus) y el búfalo de agua (Bubalus bubalis) son los principales huéspedes de esta enfermedad, que la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (WOAH) ha incluido en la lista de enfermedades de declaración obligatoria debido a su importancia clínica y económica.

Ahora bien, es importante destacar que la enfermedad no representa un riesgo para la salud pública, porque no afecta a los seres humanos. Es decir, no es una zoonosis, lo que significa que el virus no se transmite de los animales a las personas.

De Zambia a Francia, sin pasar por España

La enfermedad fue descrita por primera vez en 1929 en Zambia y, desde entonces, se consideró confinada a varias áreas de África, donde se registraron brotes periódicos hasta 1986.

En el año 2014 se notificó por primera vez en la Unión Europea, concretamente en Chipre. Al año siguiente apareció en Grecia y en el año 2016 continuó extendiéndose hacia el oeste de Europa.

La enfermedad apareció por primera vez en Francia el 29 de junio de 2025. El brote inicial se confirmó en una explotación bovina en el departamento de Saboya. Desde entonces, se han notificado varios focos en territorio francés. Por su parte, Italia confirmó el primer foco de enfermedad en el país el 21 de junio.

Los casos en Francia e Italia marcan un hito preocupante. En España, hasta la fecha, no se han declarado nunca focos de la enfermedad.

Declaración urgente de la OMSA

Ante la situación, la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal ha emitido una declaración urgente, instando a los países a reforzar la vigilancia y las medidas de control. Tanto Italia como Francia están aplicando medidas conforme al Reglamento Delegado (UE) 2020/687 de la Comisión Europea, que incluyen inmovilización y control de movimientos en las zonas afectadas, sacrificio de los animales, eliminación adecuada de cadáveres y productos potencialmente contaminados, investigación epidemiológica para identificar el origen y los contactos de riesgo, vacunación estratégica de emergencia de las poblaciones de bovinos en las zonas de riesgo y desinsectación de animales, instalaciones y vehículos.

La dermatosis nodular contagiosa se caracteriza por fiebre alta, emaciación, ganglios linfáticos superficiales agrandados, lagrimeo, conjuntivitis y nódulos notables en la piel y las membranas mucosas de la boca y órganos internos, el tracto respiratorio y los genitales. Se transmite por vectores artrópodos hematófagos, cómo mosquitos (Culex mirificens y Aedes natrionus), moscas picadoras (Stomoxys calcitrans y Biomyia fasciata) y garrapatas (Riphicephalus appendiculatus y Amblyomma hebraeum).

Actualmente no existe tratamiento para la dermatosis nodular contagiosa. La vacunación y la serovigilancia activa siguen siendo las medidas más efectivas para controlar la propagación del virus. Las vacunas disponibles comercialmente para la inmunización profiláctica del ganado son, en su mayoría, vacunas vivas atenuadas fabricadas con la cepa Neethling o sus derivados, que proporcionan la mejor herramienta para el control de la enfermedad.

The Conversation

Raúl Rivas González no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. ¿Qué es la dermatosis nodular contagiosa qué ha obligado a modificar el recorrido del Tour de Francia? – https://theconversation.com/que-es-la-dermatosis-nodular-contagiosa-que-ha-obligado-a-modificar-el-recorrido-del-tour-de-francia-261997

Trump’s push for more deportations could boost demand for foreign farmworkers with ‘guest worker’ visas

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Scott Morgenstern, Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh

Mexican farmworkers with H-2A visas weed a North Carolina tobacco field in 2016. Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis via Getty Images

The U.S. has an important choice to make regarding agriculture.

It can import more people to pick crops and do other kinds of agricultural labor, it can raise wages enough to lure more U.S. citizens and immigrants with legal status to take these jobs, or it can import more food. All three options contradict key Trump administration priorities: reducing immigration, keeping prices low and importing fewer goods and services.

The big tax-and-spending bill President Donald Trump signed into law on July 4, 2025, included US$170 billion to fund the detention and deportation of those living in the U.S. without authorization. And about 1 million of them work in agriculture, accounting for more than 40% of all farmworkers.

As the detention and deportation of undocumented immigrants ramps up, one emerging solution is to replace at least some deported farmworkers with foreigners who are given special visas that allow them to help with the harvest but require them to go home after their visas expire.

Such “guest worker” programs have existed for decades, leading to today’s H-2A visa program. As of 2023, more than 310,000 foreigners, around 13% of the nation’s 2.4 million farmworkers, were employed through this program. About 90% of the foreign workers with these visas come from Mexico, and nearly all are men. The states where the largest numbers of them go are California, Florida, Georgia and Washington.

As a professor of Latin American politics and U.S.-Latin American relations, I teach my students to consider the difficult trade-offs that governments face. If the Trump administration removes a significant share of the immigrants living in the U.S. without legal permission from the agricultural labor force to try to meet its deportation goals, farm owners will have few options.

Few options available

First, farm owners could raise wages and improve working conditions enough to attract U.S. citizens and immigrants who are legal permanent residents or otherwise in the U.S. with legal status.

But many agricultural employers say they can’t find enough people to hire who can legally work – at least without higher wages and much-improved job requirements. Without any undocumented immigrant farmworkers, the prices of U.S.-sourced crops and other agricultural products would spike, creating an incentive for more food to be imported.

Second, farm owners could employ fewer people. That would require either growing different crops that require less labor or becoming more reliant on machinery to plant and harvest. But that would mean the U.S. could have to import more food. And automation for some crops is very expensive. For others, such as for berries, it’s currently impossible.

It’s also possible that some farm owners could put their land to other uses, ceasing production, but that would also necessitate more imported food.

Trump administration’s suggested fixes

U.S. Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins has predicted that farm owners will soon find plenty of U.S. citizens to employ.

She declared on July 8 that the new Medicaid work requirements included in the same legislative package as the immigration enforcement funds would encourage huge numbers of U.S. citizens to start working in the fields instead of losing their health insurance through that government program.

Farm trade groups say this scenario is far-fetched.

For one thing, most adults enrolled in the Medicaid program who can work already do. Many others are unable to do so due to disabilities or caregiving obligations.

Few people enrolled in Medicaid live close enough to a farm to work at one, and even those who do aren’t capable of doing farmwork. When farm owners tried putting people enrolled in a welfare program to work in the fields in the 1990s, it failed. Another experiment in the 1960s, which deployed teenagers, didn’t pan out either because the teens found the work too hard.

It seems more likely that farm owners will try to hire many more foreign farmworkers to do temporary but legal jobs through the H-2A program.

Although he has not made it an official policy, Trump seems to be moving toward this same conclusion.

In June, for example, Trump said his administration was working on “some kind of a temporary pass” for immigrants lacking authorization to be in the U.S. who are working on farms and in hotels.

People wearing masks are seen in a dorm with bunk beds.
Farmworkers with H-2A visas spend time in their employer-provided dormitory on April 28, 2020, in King City, Calif.
Brent Stirton/Getty Images

Established in 1952, numbers now rising quickly

The guest worker system, established in 1952 and revised significantly in 1986, has become a mainstay of U.S. agriculture because it offers important benefits to both the farm owners who need workers and the foreign workers they hire.

There is no cap on the number of potential workers. The number of H-2A visas issued is based only on how many employers request them. Farm owners may apply for visas after verifying that they are unable to locate enough workers who are U.S. citizens or present in the U.S. with authorization.

To protect U.S. workers, the government mandates that H-2A workers earn an “adverse effect wage rate.” The Labor Department sets that hourly wage, which ranges from $10.36 in Puerto Rico to about $15 in several southern states, to more than $20 in California, Alaska and Hawaii. These wages are set at relatively high levels to avoid putting downward pressure on what other U.S. workers are paid for the same jobs.

After certification, farm owners recruit workers in a foreign country who are offered a contract that includes transportation from their home country and a trip back – assuming they complete the contract.

The program provides farm owners with a short-term labor force. It guarantees the foreign workers who obtain H-2A visas relatively high wages, as well as housing in the U.S. That combination has proven increasingly popular in recent years: The annual number of H-2A visas rose to 310,700 in 2023, a more than fivefold increase since 2010.

Possible downsides

Boosting the number of agricultural guest workers would help fill some gaps in the agricultural labor force and reduce the risk of crops going unharvested. But it seems clear to me that a sudden change would pose risks for workers and farm owners alike.

Workers would be at risk because oversight of the H-2A program has historically been weak. Despite that lax track record, some unscrupulous farmers have been fined or barred from participating in the H-2A program because of unpaid wages and other abuses.

Relying even more on guest farmworkers than the U.S. does today would also swap workers who have built lives and families north of the border with people who are in the U.S. on a temporary basis. Immigration opponents are unlikely to object to this trade-off, but to immigrant rights groups, this arrangement would be cruel and unfair to workers with years of service behind them.

What’s more, the workers with guest visas can be at risk of exploitation and abuse. In 2022, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Georgia described conditions for H-2A workers at an onion farm the government had investigated as “modern-day slavery.”

The U.S. Government Accountability Office has researched the H-2A visa program and observed many problems it recommends be fixed.

For farm owners, the downside of ramping up guest worker programs is that it could increase costs and make production less efficient and more costly. That’s because transporting Mexican farmworkers back and forth each year is complicated and expensive. Farm groups say that compliance with H-2A visa requirements is cumbersome. It can be particularly difficult for small farms to participate in this program.

Some farm owners have objected to the costs of employing H-2A workers. Rollins has said that the Trump administration believes that the mandatory wages are too high.

To be sure, these problems aren’t limited to agriculture. Hotels, restaurants and other hospitality businesses, which rely heavily on undocumented workers, can also temporarily employ some foreigners through the H-2B visa program – which is smaller than the H-2A program, limits the number of visas issued and is available only for jobs considered seasonal.

Home health care providers and many other kinds of employers who rely on people who can’t legally work for them could also struggle. But so far, there is no temporary visa program available to help them fill those gaps.

If the U.S. does deport millions of workers, the price of tomatoes, elder care, restaurant meals and roof repairs would probably rise substantially. A vast increase in the number of guest workers is a potential but partial solution, but it would multiply problems that are inherent in these temporary visa programs.

The Conversation

Scott Morgenstern does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Trump’s push for more deportations could boost demand for foreign farmworkers with ‘guest worker’ visas – https://theconversation.com/trumps-push-for-more-deportations-could-boost-demand-for-foreign-farmworkers-with-guest-worker-visas-259868

How bachata rose from Dominican Republic’s brothels and shantytowns to become a global sensation

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Wilfredo José Burgos Matos, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Latin American and Latino Studies, Lehman College, CUNY

Once viewed by elites with disdain, bachata has become popular worldwide. Erika Santelices/AFP via Getty Images

What began as songs about heartbreak in the brothels and barrios of the Dominican Republic in the 1960s has become a worldwide sensation.

Even the Bee Gees have gotten a bachata spin. Prince Royce’s bilingual take on the 1977 hit “How Deep Is Your Love” has topped the Latin music charts this summer and proves bachata is no longer chasing the mainstream but reimagining the pop canon.

Bachata dance classes, parties and festivals have sprung up across the U.S. in recent years, everywhere from Philadelphia to Los Angeles, and Omaha, Nebraska, to Oklahoma City.

It’s easy to find abroad as well. Upcoming bachata festivals are happening in cities in Austria, Egypt, Australia and China.

Couple leads a large crowd in a partner dance lesson
Instructors teach a bachata class in Warsaw, Poland, in July 2025.
Neil Milton/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

I’m a scholar of Dominican culture and the senior researcher for the History of Dominican Music in the U.S. project at the City University of New York’s Dominican Studies Institute. I see bachata as a revealing window into modern post-1960s Dominican history – and one that spotlights the emotional truths and everyday experiences of poor and Black Dominicans in particular.

Music from the margins

Bachata was born in the Dominican countryside and later developed in the shantytowns of Santo Domingo, the capital. In most Latin American dictionaries, the word “bachata” is loosely defined as “revelry” or “a spree.”

The distinctive sound is formed from guitars, bongos, bass and the güira – a percussion instrument also used in merengue music – and accompanied by typically romantic or bittersweet lyrics.

The music was long associated with the lower classes and Black Dominicans.

The genre’s first recording came in 1962, just over a year after Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, a brutal dictator who ruled the island for 31 years, was assassinated. Trujillo’s death marked the beginning of a new cultural and political era in the Dominican Republic, although democratic hopes were soon shattered by a military coup, civil war and a second U.S. intervention following an earlier one between 1916-1924.

Urban and middle-class Dominicans looked down on bachata as the music played in brothels and favored by poor, rural people who started to migrate to urban areas in large numbers in the 1960s. It was played almost exclusively on Radio Guarachita, a Santo Domingo station run by Radhamés Aracena, a key promoter of the genre.

Amid a country reeling from political upheaval, bachata emerged as a soundtrack to working-class survival. The guitar-based rhythms were shaped by Cuban bolero and son and Mexican ranchera music, while the lyrics chronicled daily struggles, grief and marginalization.

Group of friends at a social gathering, posing for a camera
In most Latin American dictionaries, the word ‘bachata’ is loosely defined as ‘revelry’ or ‘a spree.’ This reflects its early development in informal social spaces where friends gathered to sing their hearts out, share drinks and escape daily hardships.
CUNY Dominican Studies Institute Library, The Deborah Pacini Hernández Bachata Music Collection

Bachata’s shifting language

In the 1960s, bachata lyrics centered on heartache and were often directed at a romantic partner.

“Understand me, you know I love only you. Don’t deny me the hope of kissing you again,” Rafael Encarnación sang in Spanish in his 1964 song “Muero Contigo,” or “I Die With You.”

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, sexual innuendos were common, adding to the genre’s low standing among Dominican elites.

“I gave you everything you ever wanted, but it was all useless because you went looking for another man,” Blas Durán sang in 1985. “I was left like the orange vendor – peeling so someone else could suck the fruit.”

To reclaim respect for bachata, some artists, such as Luis Segura and Leonardo Paniagua, in the mid-1980s began calling their music música de amargue, or “music of romantic bitterness.”

What began as a genre label gradually transformed into a sensibility. “Amargue” came to name a feeling marked by longing, loss and quiet introspection – akin to “feeling the blues” in the U.S.

American blues similarly emerged from the hardships faced by Black Americans in the South and expressed themes of sorrow, resilience and reflection.

By the 1990s, the stigma surrounding bachata began to fade, partly due to the international success of Dominican star Juan Luis Guerra and his album Bachata Rosa. The album sold more than 5 million copies worldwide by 1994, earned Guerra a Grammy Award for best tropical Latin album, and was certified platinum in the U.S.

As acceptance of the genre grew, traditional bachateros in the Dominican Republic continued releasing bachata albums. However, Dominican pop, rock and other artists also began recording bachatas – such as 1990’s “Yo Quiero Andar” by Sonia Silvestre and 1998’s “Bufeo” by Luis “El Terror” Días.

Fans cheer and wave at concert as video of artists plays on giant screens above
Aventura performs for a crowd in Madrid in 2024. It was the group’s first tour since their split in 2011.
Ricardo Rubio/Europa Press via Getty Images

Bachata goes mainstream

Migration to the U.S. is a pivotal chapter in Dominican history after the 1960s. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1965 functioned as a de facto immigration policy and encouraged a large-scale exodus from the Dominican Republic.

By the mid-1990s, a strong and vibrant Dominican diaspora was firmly established in New York City. The Bronx became the birthplace of Grupo Aventura, a group that revolutionized bachata by blending its traditional rhythms with urban genres such as hip-hop.

“Obsesión,” released in 2002, was an international hit.

Their music reflected the bicultural diaspora, often torn between nostalgia for their homeland and everyday challenges of urban American life. Against the backdrop of city life, bachata found a new voice that mirrored the immigrant experience. The genre shifted from a shared feeling of loss and longing to a celebration of cultural community.

In 2002, the song “Obsesión” by Aventura and featuring Judy Santos topped music charts in France, Germany, Italy, the U.S. and elsewhere. The group Aventura and, later, lead singer Romeo Santos as a solo artist sold out Madison Square Garden and Yankee Stadium, respectively.

As they rose in fame, Aventura became global ambassadors for Dominican culture and made bachata mainstream.

Man wearing suit and sunglasses sings into microphone with American flag hanging in background
Puerto Rican bachatero Toby Love performs during an event held by Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton on April 9, 2016, in New York City.
Andrew Renneisen via Getty Images

Global spin on bachata

Bachata’s popularity has also spread to other countries in Latin America, and especially among working-class and Afro-descendant communities in Central America that see their own realities reflected in the music.

At the same time, Dominican diasporic communities in countries such as Spain and Italy carried the genre with them, where it continued to evolve.

In Spain, for example, bachata experienced a creative transformation. By the mid-2000s, bachata sensual had emerged as a dance style influenced by zouk and tango, emphasizing smooth, body-led movements and close partner connection.

Around the same time, modern bachata also developed between Spain and New York City. This style is a departure from traditional bachata, which focuses on the box step and fast footwork, and incorporates more turns and other elements from salsa.

In 2019 bachata was added to UNESCO’s Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, which also lists Jamaican reggae and Mexican mariachi.

Today, bachata’s influence is truly global. International conferences dedicated to the genre attract dancers, musicians and scholars from around the world. Puerto Rican, Colombian and other artists from diverse cultural and racial backgrounds continue to nurture and reinvent bachata.

At the same time, more women, such as Andre Veloz, Judy Santos and Leslie Grace, are building careers as bachata performers and challenging a traditionally male-dominated genre.

Woman in red and blue plais miniskirt, crop top and leather jacket sings into microphone
Natti Natasha performs at an album release party for ‘En Amargue,’ her 2025 album produced by bachata icon and former Aventura singer Romeo Santos.
John Parra/WireImage via Getty Images

Bachata holds a place not only on the world stage but in the hearts of Latino, Black, Asian and many other communities in the U.S. that recognize the genre’s power to tell stories of love, loss, migration and resilience.

The Conversation

Wilfredo José Burgos Matos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. How bachata rose from Dominican Republic’s brothels and shantytowns to become a global sensation – https://theconversation.com/how-bachata-rose-from-dominican-republics-brothels-and-shantytowns-to-become-a-global-sensation-260886

The 3 worst things you can say after a pet dies, and what to say instead

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Brian N. Chin, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Trinity College

Loss of a pet falls into what researchers call disenfranchised grief in which the pain is often minimized or discounted. Claudia Luna/iStock via Getty Images Plus

I saw it firsthand after my cat Murphy died earlier this year. She’d been diagnosed with cancer just weeks before.

She was a small gray tabby with delicate paws who, even during chemotherapy, climbed her favorite dresser perch – Mount Murphy – with steady determination.

The day after she died, a colleague said with a shrug: “It’s just part of life.”

That phrase stayed with me – not because it was wrong, but because of how quickly it dismissed something real.

Murphy wasn’t just a cat. She was my eldest daughter – by bond, if not by blood. My shadow.

Why pet grief doesn’t count

More than two-thirds of U.S. households include pets. Americans tend to treat them like family with birthday cakes, shared beds and names on holiday cards.

But when someone grieves them like family, the cultural script flips. Grief gets minimized. Support gets awkward. And when no one acknowledges your loss, it starts to feel like you weren’t even supposed to love them that much in the first place.

I’ve seen this kind of grief up close – in my research and in my own life.
I am a psychologist who studies attachment, loss and the human-animal bond.

And I’ve seen firsthand how often grief following pet loss gets brushed aside – treated as less valid, less serious or less worthy of support than human loss. After a pet dies, people often say the wrong thing – usually trying to help, but often doing the opposite.

A boy holding up a cat, both wearing birthday hats.
Many Americans consider pets family members.
vesi_127/Moment via Getty Images

When loss is minimized or discounted

Psychologists describe this kind of unacknowledged loss as disenfranchised grief: a form of mourning that isn’t fully recognized by social norms or institutions. It happens after miscarriages, breakups, job loss – and especially after the death of a beloved animal companion.

The pain is real for the person grieving, but what’s missing is the social support to mourn that loss.

Even well-meaning people struggle to respond in ways that feel supportive.
And when grief gets dismissed, it doesn’t just hurt – it makes us question whether we’re even allowed to feel it.

Here are three of the most common responses – and what to do instead:

‘Just a pet’

This is one of the most reflexive responses after a loss like this. It sounds harmless. But under the surface is a cultural belief that grieving an animal is excessive – even unprofessional.

That belief shows up in everything from workplace leave policies to everyday conversations. Even from people trying to be kind.

But pet grief isn’t about the species, it’s about the bond. And for many, that bond is irreplaceable.

Pets often become attachment figures; they’re woven into our routines, our emotional lives and our identities. Recent research shows that the quality of the human-pet bond matters deeply – not just for well-being, but for how we grieve when that connection ends.

What’s lost isn’t “just an animal.” It’s the steady presence who greeted you every morning. The one who sat beside you through deadlines, small triumphs and quiet nights. A companion who made the world feel a little less lonely.

But when the world treats that love like it doesn’t count, the loss can cut even deeper.

It may not come with formal recognition or time off, but it still matters. And love isn’t less real just because it came with fur.

If someone you care about loses a pet, acknowledge the bond. Even a simple “I’m so sorry” can offer real comfort.

‘I know how you feel’

“I know how you feel” sounds empathetic, but it quietly shifts the focus from the griever to the speaker. It rushes in with your story before theirs has even had a chance to land.

That instinct comes from a good place. We want to relate, to reassure, to let someone know they’re not alone. But when it comes to grief, that impulse often backfires. Grief doesn’t need to be matched. It needs to be honored and given time, care and space to unfold, whether the loss is of a person or a pet.

Instead of responding with your own story, try simpler, grounding words:

You don’t need to understand someone’s grief to make space for it. What helps isn’t comparison – it’s presence.

Let them name the loss. Let them remember. Let them say what hurts.

Sometimes, simply staying present – without rushing, problem-solving or shifting the focus away – is the most meaningful thing you can do.

Family of four sitting together on a sofa with three dogs surrounding them.
Pets frequently make a showing in family photos and holiday cards.
Klaus Vedfelt/DigitalVision via Getty Images

‘You can always get another one’

“You can always get another one” is the kind of thing people offer reflexively when they don’t know what else to say – a clumsy attempt at reassurance.

Underneath is a desire to soothe, to fix, to make the sadness go away. But that instinct can miss the point: The loss isn’t practical – it’s personal. And grief isn’t a problem to be solved.

This type of comment often lands more like customer service than comfort. It treats the relationship as replaceable, as if love were something you can swap out like a broken phone.

But every pet is one of a kind – not just in how they look or sound, but in how they move through your life. The way they wait for you at the door and watch you as you leave. The small rituals that you didn’t know were rituals until they stopped. You build a life around them without realizing it, until they’re no longer in it.

You wouldn’t tell someone to “just have another child” or “just find a new partner.” And yet, people say the equivalent all the time after pet loss.

Rushing to replace the relationship instead of honoring what was lost overlooks what made that bond irreplaceable. Love isn’t interchangeable – and neither are the ones we lose.

So offer care that endures. Grief doesn’t follow a timeline. A check-in weeks or months later, whether it’s a heart emoji, a shared memory or a gentle reminder that they’re not alone, can remind someone that their grief is seen and their love still matters.

When people say nothing

People often don’t know what to say after a pet dies, so they say nothing. But silence doesn’t just bury grief, it isolates it. It tells the griever that their love was excessive, their sadness inconvenient, their loss unworthy of acknowledgment.

And grief that feels invisible can be the hardest kind to carry.

So if someone you love loses a pet, don’t change the subject. Don’t rush them out of their sadness. Don’t offer solutions.

Instead, here are a few other ways to offer support gently and meaningfully:

  • Say their pet’s name.

  • Ask what they miss most.

  • Tell them you’re sorry.

  • Let them cry.

  • Let them not cry.

  • Let them remember.

Because when someone loses a pet, they’re not “just” mourning an animal. They’re grieving for a relationship, a rhythm and a presence that made the world feel kinder. What they need most is someone willing to treat that loss like it matters.

The Conversation

Brian N. Chin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. The 3 worst things you can say after a pet dies, and what to say instead – https://theconversation.com/the-3-worst-things-you-can-say-after-a-pet-dies-and-what-to-say-instead-258531

Fears that falling birth rates in US could lead to population collapse are based on faulty assumptions

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Leslie Root, Assistant Professor of Research, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado Boulder

Unfortunately for demographers, birth rates are hard to predict far into the future. gremlin/E+ via Getty Images

Pronatalism – the belief that low birth rates are a problem that must be reversed – is having a moment in the U.S.

As birth rates decline in the U.S. and throughout the world, voices from Silicon Valley to the White House are raising concerns about what they say could be the calamitous effects of steep population decline on the economy. The Trump administration has said it is seeking ideas on how to encourage Americans to have more children as the U.S. experiences its lowest total fertility rate in history, down about 25% since 2007.

As demographers who study fertility, family behaviors and childbearing intentions, we can say with certainty that population decline is not imminent, inevitable or necessarily catastrophic.

The population collapse narrative hinges on three key misunderstandings. First, it misrepresents what standard fertility measures tell us about childbearing and makes unrealistic assumptions that fertility rates will follow predictable patterns far into the future. Second, it overstates the impact of low birth rates on future population growth and size. Third, it ignores the role of economic policies and labor market shifts in assessing the impacts of low birth rates.

Fertility fluctuations

Demographers generally gauge births in a population with a measure called the total fertility rate. The total fertility rate for a given year is an estimate of the average number of children that women would have in their lifetime if they experienced current birth rates throughout their childbearing years.

Fertility rates are not fixed – in fact, they have changed considerably over the past century. In the U.S., the total fertility rate rose from about 2 births per woman in the 1930s to a high of 3.7 births per woman around 1960. The rate then dipped below 2 births per woman in the late 1970s and 1980s before returning to 2 births in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Since the Great Recession that lasted from late 2007 until mid-2009, the U.S. total fertility rate has declined almost every year, with the exception of very small post-COVID-19 pandemic increases in 2021 and 2022. In 2024, it hit a record low, falling to 1.6. This drop is primarily driven by declines in births to people in their teens and early 20s – births that are often unintended.

But while the total fertility rate offers a snapshot of the fertility landscape, it is not a perfect indicator of how many children a woman will eventually have if fertility patterns are in flux – for example, if people are delaying having children.

Picture a 20-year-old woman today, in 2025. The total fertility rate assumes she will have the same birth rate as today’s 40-year-olds when she reaches 40. That’s not likely to be the case, because birth rates 20 years from now for 40-year-olds will almost certainly be higher than they are today, as more births occur at older ages and more people are able to overcome infertility through medically assisted reproduction.

A more nuanced picture of childbearing

These problems with the total fertility rate are why demographers also measure how many total births women have had by the end of their reproductive years. In contrast to the total fertility rate, the average number of children ever born to women ages 40 to 44 has remained fairly stable over time, hovering around two.

Americans continue to express favorable views toward childbearing. Ideal family size remains at two or more children, and 9 in 10 adults either have, or would like to have, children. However, many Americans are unable to reach their childbearing goals. This seems to be related to the high cost of raising children and growing uncertainty about the future.

In other words, it doesn’t seem to be the case that birth rates are low because people are uninterested in having children; rather, it’s because they don’t feel it’s feasible for them to become parents or to have as many children as they would like.

The challenge of predicting future population size

Standard demographic projections do not support the idea that population size is set to shrink dramatically.

One billion people lived on Earth 250 years ago. Today there are over 8 billion, and by 2100 the United Nations predicts there will be over 10 billion. That’s 2 billion more, not fewer, people in the foreseeable future. Admittedly, that projection is plus or minus 4 billion. But this range highlights another key point: Population projections get more uncertain the further into the future they extend.

Predicting the population level five years from now is far more reliable than 50 years from now – and beyond 100 years, forget about it. Most population scientists avoid making such long-term projections, for the simple reason that they are usually wrong. That’s because fertility and mortality rates change over time in unpredictable ways.

The U.S. population size is also not declining. Currently, despite fertility below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, there are still more births than deaths. The U.S. population is expected to grow by 22.6 million by 2050 and by 27.5 million by 2100, with immigration playing an important role.

A row of pregnant womens' torsos, no heads.
Despite a drop in fertility rates, there are still more births than deaths in the U.S.
andresr/E+ via Getty Images

Will low fertility cause an economic crisis?

A common rationale for concern about low fertility is that it leads to a host of economic and labor market problems. Specifically, pronatalists argue that there will be too few workers to sustain the economy and too many older people for those workers to support. However, that is not necessarily true – and even if it were, increasing birth rates wouldn’t fix the problem.

As fertility rates fall, the age structure of the population shifts. But a higher proportion of older adults does not necessarily mean the proportion of workers to nonworkers falls.

For one thing, the proportion of children under age 18 in the population also declines, so the number of working-age adults – usually defined as ages 18 to 64 – often changes relatively little. And as older adults stay healthier and more active, a growing number of them are contributing to the economy. Labor force participation among Americans ages 65 to 74 increased from 21.4% in 2003 to 26.9% in 2023 — and is expected to increase to 30.4% by 2033. Modest changes in the average age of retirement or in how Social Security is funded would further reduce strains on support programs for older adults.

What’s more, pronatalists’ core argument that a higher birth rate would increase the size of the labor force overlooks some short-term consequences. More babies means more dependents, at least until those children become old enough to enter the labor force. Children not only require expensive services such as education, but also reduce labor force participation, particularly for women. As fertility rates have fallen, women’s labor force participation rates have risen dramatically – from 34% in 1950 to 58% in 2024. Pronatalist policies that discourage women’s employment are at odds with concerns about a diminishing number of workers.

Research shows that economic policies and labor market conditions, not demographic age structures, play the most important role in determining economic growth in advanced economies. And with rapidly changing technologies like automation and artificial intelligence, it is unclear what demand there will be for workers in the future. Moreover, immigration is a powerful – and immediate – tool for addressing labor market needs and concerns over the proportion of workers.

Overall, there’s no evidence for Elon Musk’s assertion that “humanity is dying.” While the changes in population structure that accompany low birth rates are real, in our view the impact of these changes has been dramatically overstated. Strong investments in education and sensible economic policies can help countries successfully adapt to a new demographic reality.

The Conversation

Leslie Root receives funding from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Development (NICHD) for work on fertility rates.

Karen Benjamin Guzzo has received funding from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development in the United States.

Shelley Clark receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

ref. Fears that falling birth rates in US could lead to population collapse are based on faulty assumptions – https://theconversation.com/fears-that-falling-birth-rates-in-us-could-lead-to-population-collapse-are-based-on-faulty-assumptions-261031

Deportation tactics from 4 US presidents have done little to reduce the undocumented immigrant population

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kevin Johnson, Dean and Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies, University of California, Davis

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents escort a detained immigrant into an elevator on June 17, 2025, in New York. AP Photo/Olga Fedorova

All modern U.S. presidents, both Republican and Democratic, have attempted to reduce the population of millions of undocumented immigrants. But their various strategies have not had significant results, with the population hovering around 11 million from 2005 to 2022.

President Donald Trump seeks to change that.

With harsh rhetoric that has sowed fear in immigrant communities, and policies that ignore immigrants’ due process rights, Trump has pursued deportation tactics that differ dramatically from those of any other modern U.S. president.

As a scholar who examines the history of U.S. immigration law and enforcement, I believe that it remains far from clear whether the Trump White House will significantly reduce the undocumented population. But even if the administration’s efforts fail, the fear and damage to the U.S. immigrant community will remain.

Presidents Bush and Obama

To increase deportations, in 2006 President George W. Bush began using workplace raids. Among these sweeps was the then-largest immigration workplace operation in U.S. history at a meat processing plant in Postville, Iowa in 2008.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deployed 900 agents in Postville and arrested 398 employees, 98% of whom were Latino. They were chained together and arraigned in groups of 10 for felony criminal charges of aggravated identity theft, document fraud and use of stolen Social Security numbers. Some 300 were convicted, and 297 of them served jail sentences before being deported.

Several men seated on the ground are seen in a holding cell.
Men wait in a holding cell on June 21, 2006, in Nogales, Arizona.
Spencer Platt/Getty Images

In 2008, Bush also initiated Secure Communities, a policy that sought to deport noncitizens – both lawful permanent residents as well as undocumented immigrants – who had been arrested for crimes. Some 2 million immigrants were deported during Bush’s two terms in office.

The Obama administration limited Secure Communities to focus on the removal of noncitizens convicted of felonies. It deported a record 400,000 noncitizens in fiscal year 2013, which led detractors to refer to President Barack Obama as the “Deporter in Chief.”

Obama also targeted recent entrants and national security threats and pursued criminal prosecutions for illegal reentry to the U.S. Almost all of these policies built on Bush’s, although Obama virtually abandoned workplace raids.

Despite these enforcement measures, Obama also initiated Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, in 2012. The policy provided relief from deportation and gave work authorization to more than 500,000 undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as children.

Obama deported about 3 million noncitizens, but the size of the undocumented population did not decrease dramatically.

The first Trump administration and Biden

Trump’s first administration broke new immigration enforcement ground in several ways.

He began his presidency by issuing what was called a “Muslim ban” to restrict the entry into the U.S. of noncitizens from predominantly Muslim nations.

Early in Trump’s first administration, federal agents expanded immigration operations to include raids at courthouses, which previously had been off-limits.

In 2017, Trump tried to rescind DACA, but the Supreme Court rejected Trump’s effort in 2020.

In 2019, Trump implemented the Remain in Mexico policy that for the first time forced noncitizens who came to the U.S. border seeking asylum to wait in Mexico while their claims were being decided. He also invoked Title 42 in 2020 to close U.S. borders during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Trump succeeded in reducing legal immigration numbers during his first term. However, there is no evidence that his enforcement policies reduced the size of the overall undocumented population.

President Joe Biden sought to relax – although not abandon – some immigration enforcement measures implemented during Trump’s first term.

His administration slowed construction of the border wall championed by Trump. Biden also stopped workplace raids in 2021, and in 2023, he ended Title 42.

In 2023, Biden sought to respond to migration surges in a measured fashion, by temporarily closing ports of entry and increasing arrests.

In attempting to enforce the borders, his administration at times pursued tough measures. Biden continued deportation efforts directed at criminal noncitizens. Immigrant rights groups criticized his administration when armed Border Patrol officers on horseback were videotaped chasing Haitian migrants on the U.S.-Mexico border.

As of 2022, the middle of the Biden’s term, an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants lived in the U.S.

Several people holding signs and an American flag walk in a protest march.
Immigration-rights activists stage a rally outside President Barack Obama’s Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee fundraiser in Los Angeles, after the president signed a bill that tightened security at the Mexico border in August 2010.
Mark Ralston/AFP via Getty Images

A second chance

Since his second inauguration, Trump has pursued a mass deportation campaign through executive orders that are unprecedented in their scope.

In January 2025, he announced an expanded, expedited removal process for any noncitizen apprehended anywhere in the country – not just the border region, as had been U.S. practice since 1996.

In March, Trump issued a presidential proclamation to deport Venezuelan nationals who were members of the Tren de Aragua gang, designated a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department. In doing so, he invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798 – an act used three times in U.S. history during declared wars that empowers presidents to remove foreign nationals from countries at war with the U.S.

Declaring an “invasion” of migrants into the U.S. in June, Trump deployed the military to assist in immigration enforcement in Los Angeles.

Trump also sought to dramatically upend birthright citizenship, the Constitutional provision that guarantees citizenship to any person born in the U.S. He issued an executive order in January that would bar citizenship to people born in the U.S. to undocumented parents.

Several men in military gear stand watch on the steps of a building.
California National Guard members stand in formation during a protest in Los Angeles on June 14, 2025.
David Pashaee/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

The birthright executive order has been challenged in federal court and is mostly likely working its way up to the Supreme Court.

Under the second Trump administration, immigration arrests are up, but actual deportation numbers are in flux.

ICE in June arrested the most people in a month in at least five years, roughly 30,000 immigrants. But deportations of noncitizens – roughly 18,000 – lagged behind those during the Obama administration’s record-setting year of 2013 in which more than 400,000 noncitizens were deported.

The gap between arrests and deportations shows the challenges the Trump administration faces in making good on his promised mass deportation campaign.

Undocumented immigrants often come to the U.S. to work or seek safety from natural disasters and mass violence.

These issues have not been seriously addressed by any modern U.S. president. Until it is, we can expect the undocumented population to remain in the millions.

The Conversation

Kevin Johnson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Deportation tactics from 4 US presidents have done little to reduce the undocumented immigrant population – https://theconversation.com/deportation-tactics-from-4-us-presidents-have-done-little-to-reduce-the-undocumented-immigrant-population-261640

Nana-Benz du Togo : comment les importations chinoises de tissus africains ont nui aux célèbres commerçantes

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Fidele B. Ebia, Postdoctoral fellow, Duke Africa Initiative, Duke University

La fabrication des tissus imprimés africains s’est déplacée vers la Chine au XXIe siècle. Bien qu’ils soient largement consommés dans les pays africains et symbolisent le continent, l’essor du « made in China » a porté un coup dur aux commerçantes africaines qui ont longtemps dominé la vente et la distritbution des ces tissus.

Pendant plusieurs décennies, Vlisco, le groupe textile néerlandais fondé en 1846 et dont les produits étaient fournis à l’Afrique de l’Ouest par des maisons de commerce européennes depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, a dominé la fabrication de ces tissus. Mais au cours des 25 dernières années, des dizaines d’usines chinoises ont commencé à fournir des tissus imprimés africains aux marchés d’Afrique de l’Ouest. Qingdao Phoenix Hitarget Ltd, Sanhe Linqing Textile Group et Waxhaux Ltd sont parmi les plus connues.

Nous avons mené une étude afin de déterminer comment l’essor des tissus fabriqués en Chine a affecté le commerce des tissus imprimés africains. Nous nous sommes concentrés sur le Togo. Bien que ce soit un petit pays avec une population de seulement 9,7 millions d’habitants, la capitale, Lomé, est la plaque tournante du commerce textile en Afrique de l’Ouest.

Nous avons mené plus de 100 entretiens avec des commerçants, des vendeurs de rue, des agents portuaires ou des courtiers, des représentants du gouvernement et des représentants d’entreprises manufacturières afin de comprendre comment leurs activités ont évolué.

Les textiles africains imprimés « Made in China » sont nettement moins chers et plus accessibles à une population plus large que les tissus Vlisco. Nos observations sur le célèbre marché Assigamé de Lomé ont révélé que les textiles africains imprimés chinois coûtent environ 9 000 CFA (16 dollars américains) pour six mètres, soit une tenue complète. Le wax hollandais (50 000 CFA ou 87 dollars américains) coûte plus de cinq fois plus cher.

Les données sont difficiles à obtenir, mais nos estimations suggèrent que 90 % des importations de ces tissus au port de Lomé en 2019 provenaient de Chine.

Un commerçant togolais résume ainsi l’attrait de ces produits :

Qui pourrait résister à un tissu qui ressemble au vrai Vlisco, mais qui coûte beaucoup moins cher ?

Notre étude montre comment l’arrivée des tissus fabriqués en Chine a fait perdre à Vlisco sa position dominante sur le marché. Elle a aussi brisé le monopole qu’avaient les commerçantes togolaises sur le commerce des tissus néerlandais.

Ces commerçantes, surnommés les Nana-Benz en raison des voitures de luxe qu’elles conduisaient, avaient, en dépit de leur petit nombre, un poids économique et politique énorme. Leur influence politique était telle qu’elles étaient les principaux soutiens du premier président du Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, lui-même ancien directeur de la United Africa Company, qui distribuait des tissus néerlandais.

En échange, Olympio et le général Gnassingbé Eyadéma, au pouvoir pendant de longues années, leur accordèrent des avantages politiques, tels que des impôts réduits, afin de soutenir leurs activités commerciales. Dans les années 1970, le commerce des tissus africains imprimés était considéré comme aussi important que l’industrie du phosphate, principal produit d’exportation.

Les Nana-Benz ont depuis été évincées, leur nombre passant de 50 à environ 20. De nouvelles commerçantes togolaises, connues sous le nom de Nanettes ou « petites Nanas », ont pris leur place. Si elles se sont taillé une place dans le commerce du textile avec la Chine, elles ont toutefois un statut économique et politique moins important. À leur tour, elles sont de plus en plus menacées par la concurrence chinoise, notamment dans le domaine du commerce et de la distribution.




Read more:
Wax : les femmes togolaises derrière le succès du tissu


La Chine supplante les Pays-Bas

Depuis l’époque coloniale, les femmes commerçantes africaines ont joué un rôle essentiel dans la vente en gros et la distribution de tissus néerlandais sur les marchés d’Afrique de l’Ouest. À partir des années 1950, lorsque de nombreux pays de la région ont accédé à l’indépendance, le Grand Marché de Lomé – ou Assigamé – est devenu la plaque tournante du commerce des tissus imprimés africains.

Alors que les pays voisins, comme le Ghana, limitaient les importations dans le cadre de leurs efforts pour promouvoir l’industrie locale, les commerçantes togolaises avaient obtenu des conditions très avantageuses : faibles taxes et accès direct au port de Lomé.

Les commerçantes togolaises connaissaient mieux les goûts de la clientèle majoritairement féminine d’Afrique de l’Ouest que les créateurs néerlandais, principalement masculins. Les Nana-Benz ont activement participé au processus de production et de création des textiles imprimés africains. Elles choisissaient les motifs, donnaient des noms aux tissus, et savaient exactement ce qui faisait vendre leurs tissus.

Ce commerce leur a permis d’acquérir une telle richesse qu’elles ont été surnommées les « Nana-Benz » en référence aux voitures qu’elles achetaient pour collecter et transporter leurs marchandises.

L’exclusivité des Nana-Benz sur le commerce et la vente au détail de tissus imprimés africains sur les marchés d’Afrique de l’Ouest a été remise en cause. Alors que Vlisco a réagi à la baisse de ses revenus (plus de 30 % au cours des cinq premières années du XXIe siècle) due à la concurrence chinoise, le rôle des commerçantes togolaises dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement des tissus néerlandais a été réduit.

Le monopole de Nana-Benz a été aussi sur le commerce et la distribution des tissus hollandais. Avec l’arrivée massive des tissus chinois, les ventes de Vlisco ont chuté de plus de 30 % au début du 21e siècle. Cette situation a affaibli le rôle des commerçantes togolaises dans la chaîne d’approvisionnement des tissus néerlandais.

Vlisco a ouvert plusieurs boutiques en Afrique occidentale et centrale, à commencer par Cotonou (2008), Lomé (2008) et Abidjan (2009). Les Nana-Benz qui ont survécu – environ 20 sur les 50 d’origine – sont devenues des revendeuses sous contrat. Elles doivent désormais respecter des règles strictes sur les prix et les ventes.

Si les nouveaux négociantes togolaises, connues sous le nom de Nanettes, sont impliquées dans l’approvisionnement en textiles en provenance de Chine, leur poids économique et politique est moindre. Elles sont environ 60 à exercer cette activité.

Anciennes vendeuses de textiles et d’autres petits articles dans la rue, les Nanettes ont commencé à se rendre en Chine au début des années 2000 pour s’approvisionner en textiles imprimés africains. Elles participent à la commande et au conseil pour la fabrication de textiles imprimés africains en Chine et à leur distribution en Afrique.

Si beaucoup de Nanettes commandent des marques chinoises courantes, certaines possèdent et commercialisent leurs propres marques. Parmi celles-ci figurent des modèles désormais bien connus à Lomé et en Afrique de l’Ouest, tels que « Femme de Caractère », « Binta », « Prestige », « Rebecca Wax », « GMG » et « Homeland ».

Contrairement à leurs prédécesseurs (les Nana-benz), les Nanettes se taillent une plus petite part du marché en vendant des tissus chinois moins chers. Bien que les volumes commercialisés soient importants, les marges sont plus faibles en raison du prix de vente final beaucoup plus bas que celui des tissus néerlandais.

Après s’être approvisionnées en tissus imprimés africains en Chine, les Nanettes vendent en gros à des commerçants locaux indépendants ou « vendeurs », ainsi qu’à des commerçants des pays voisins. Ces derniers divisent leurs stocks et les revendent par petites quantités aux vendeurs de rue.

Tous les tissus imprimés africains provenant de Chine arrivent en Afrique de l’Ouest sous forme de produits incomplets, c’est-à-dire sous forme de rouleaux de tissus de six ou douze mètres. Les tailleurs et couturières locaux confectionnent ensuite des vêtements selon les goûts des consommateurs. Certains créateurs de mode ont également ouvert des boutiques où ils vendent des vêtements prêt-à-porter confectionnés à partir de rouleaux de tissus imprimés africains et adaptés au goût local. Ainsi, même si le monopole des Nana-Benz s’est affrité, une partie de la valeur ajoutée est captée au niveau local.

Depuis la pandémie de COVID-19, les acteurs chinois se sont davantage impliqués dans les activités commerciales, et pas seulement dans la fabrication. Cette évolution pourrait marginaliser des acteurs locaux, déjà exclus de la fabrication, du commerce et de la distribution, qui constituent les maillons de la chaîne de valeur. Le maintien de leur rôle, qui consiste à adapter les produits à la culture et aux tendances locales et à relier l’économie formelle et informelle, est essentiel non seulement pour les commerçants togolais, mais aussi pour l’économie dans son ensemble.

The Conversation

Rory Horner bénéficie d’une bourse de la British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. Il est également chercheur associé au département de géographie, gestion environnementale et études énergétiques de l’université de Johannesburg.

Fidele B. Ebia does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Nana-Benz du Togo : comment les importations chinoises de tissus africains ont nui aux célèbres commerçantes – https://theconversation.com/nana-benz-du-togo-comment-les-importations-chinoises-de-tissus-africains-ont-nui-aux-celebres-commercantes-261813