Category: Academic Reportage

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Public health needs steady budgets – and federal funding uncertainty cause real harms, even if the money is later restored

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Max Crowley, Professor of Human Development, Family Studies and Public Policy, Penn State

Communities rely on vaccination clinics, restaurant inspections and disease surveillance systems run by local and state public health departments. Sean Rayford/Stringer via Getty Images

Since early 2025, several large federal health grants to states have been suspended and then restored after legal challenges. On Feb. 13, 2026, for example, the federal government moved to suspend about US$600 million in public health grants to four states before a federal court temporarily blocked the action. Hundreds of millions of dollars that had already been allocated by Congress were briefly put on hold before the court intervened.

From the outside, these episodes may look like routine disputes between states and the federal government, as such cancellations do happen. But inside state agencies and in communities, they create something more consequential: uncertainty that interrupts crucial public health programs – even if states ultimately get the money.

As a scholar who studies how to build infrastructure for preventing human suffering, I’ve seen how instability – even when temporary – changes how agencies and the communities they serve plan, hire and invest.

Even when funding is eventually restored, repeated cycles in which funding is frozen and then temporarily reinstated, pending lawsuits, can disrupt how public health systems operate. This, in turn, erodes the public health infrastructure that federal funding helps build and maintain.

That infrastructure includes vaccination clinics, restaurant sanitation inspections, opioid response teams, school violence prevention, maternal health programs and disease surveillance systems, to name a few. Programs like this play a critical role in public health, but because they focus on preventing problems before they occur, many people aren’t away of the critical need for them until something goes wrong.

Most disruptions never make headlines, but they affect services communities rely on.

Public health depends on continuity

Despite the heavy media focus on emergency response during crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, most public health work is long-term planning built around multiyear prevention strategies.

Federal grants support epidemiologists, prevention specialists, behavioral health providers and data analysts. They fund disease surveillance systems, maternal and child health initiatives, substance use prevention programs and partnerships with community organizations. These efforts operate on multiyear timelines. Each one requires hiring staff, bringing on outside contractors and service providers, and setting up systems to track outcomes.

Senior public health doctor talking to patient at temporary free outdoor clinic
Public health is less about emergency response and more about long-term planning and multiyear prevention strategies.
SDI Productions/E+ via Getty Images

When funding is suddenly paused or regulatory environments change, agencies cannot simply wait for clarity. Hiring slows. Leaders draft contingency plans in case the suspension becomes permanent. Many state and local employees begin exploring more stable employment opportunities.

National workforce surveys show that roughly 1 in 4 state public health employees report considering leaving their job within a year. In 2023, local health departments lost an average of 19% of their staff, reflecting how the COVID-19 pandemic strained the public health workforce. In a small county health department, where the entire staff may consist of only four to seven people, losing even a single nurse or disease investigator can significantly disrupt services.

If funding is later restored, as has occurred in several cases in 2025 and early 2026, agencies must reverse course. They reissue guidance, renegotiate contracts and reassure partners. But the disruption has already consumed time and public resources.

Some projects and communities may not fully recover. Volatility creates costs even when the money returns.

The financial and administrative cost of legal battles

Suing the federal government over funding suspensions is expensive. When states challenge federal decisions, state attorneys general devote staff time and legal resources. Health departments must coordinate with lawyers, compile documentation and model alternative budget scenarios. Senior leaders shift attention from program oversight to legal and fiscal risk management.

Those administrative hours are funded by taxpayers. They represent real expenditures, though they rarely appear in public debate. And while litigation proceeds – often for months – agencies must prepare for multiple possible outcomes.

The uncertainty itself shapes planning. Agencies may hesitate to launch new initiatives if funding could disappear midstream. They may shorten contracts, delay hiring or scale back expansion plans to reduce exposure. Over time, that caution can slow implementation and limit innovation.

The federal government in February 2026 moved to pull back $600 million in public health funding to four states, which quickly sued to get the money reinstated.

Instability extends beyond grant dollars

Suspended funding is not the only source of instability. The federal government has also announced structural changes within some health agencies, starting with a major reorganization of the Department of Health and Human Services in March 2025. These changes, too, inject uncertainty into how public health systems operate.

For example, federal health officials recently indicated they plan to significantly scale back the Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation within the Administration for Children and Families.

Since 1995, that office has studied the impact of programs serving families and children, including Head Start, the foster care system and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Independent research and policy organizations, including the Data Foundation and Results for America, warn that interrupting those studies could undermine states’ ability to assess and improve these programs.

Similarly, recent grant terminations and restructuring within the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which administers major behavioral health grants to states, have introduced uncertainty. When staff supported by grants are cut or funding terms shift abruptly, payments can be delayed, reporting guidance becomes unclear, and local treatment providers may struggle to plan. For communities trying to prevent opioid overdoses or rising mental health needs, even short-term disruption can be a matter of life or death.

Pausing or reorganizing such studies midstream disrupts the ability to understand what works and what doesn’t. Experienced staff may leave. Rebuilding that expertise can take years.

Prevention is especially vulnerable

Almost by definition, people take prevention for granted. If programs focused on vaccination, substance use treatment and youth mental health are effective, many people never experience the crises that might have occurred without them.

But prevention depends on continuity: sustained staffing, stable partnerships and consistent data collection. The effects of disruption are difficult to measure in a single budget cycle, but they influence how confidently agencies invest in long-term strategies. In that sense, funding instability can become a public health issue of its own.

Policy priorities will always evolve. Courts review executive actions. Congress revisits allocations. Change is part of governance. But if policymakers want stronger, more resilient public health infrastructure, stability is not simply administrative convenience. It is part of the foundation that makes prevention and preparedness possible.

The Conversation

Max Crowley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Public health needs steady budgets – and federal funding uncertainty cause real harms, even if the money is later restored – https://theconversation.com/public-health-needs-steady-budgets-and-federal-funding-uncertainty-cause-real-harms-even-if-the-money-is-later-restored-276500

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How Instagram addictiveness lawsuit could reshape social media – platform design meets product liability

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Carolina Rossini, Professor of Practice and Director for Program, Public Interest Technology Initiative, UMass Amherst

Is the social media platform she’s using, rather than the content she’s viewing, a threat to her well-being? Fiordaliso/Moment via Getty Images

A Los Angeles courtroom is hosting what may become the most consequential legal challenge Big Tech has ever faced.

This is an inflection point in the global debate over Big Tech liability: For the first time, an American jury is being asked to decide whether platform design itself can give rise to product liability – not because of what users post on them, but because of how they were built.

As a technology policy and law scholar, I believe that the decision, whatever the outcome, will likely generate a powerful domino effect in the United States and across jurisdictions worldwide.

The case

The plaintiff is a 20-year-old California woman identified by her initials, K.G.M. She said she began using YouTube around age 6 and created an Instagram account at age 9. Her lawsuit and testimony allege that the platforms’ design features, which include likes, algorithmic recommendation engines, infinite scroll, autoplay and deliberately unpredictable rewards, got her addicted. The suit alleges that her addiction fueled depression, anxiety, body dysmorphia – when someone see themselves as ugly or disfigured when they aren’t – and suicidal thoughts.

TikTok and Snapchat settled with K.G.M. before trial for undisclosed sums, leaving Meta and Google as the remaining defendants. Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before the jury on Feb. 18, 2026.

Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified in court in a lawsuit alleging that Instagram is addictive by design.

The stakes extend far beyond one plaintiff. K.G.M.’s case is a bellwether trial, meaning the court chose it as a representative test case to help determine verdicts across all connected cases. Those cases involve approximately 1,600 plaintiffs, including more than 350 families and over 250 school districts. Their claims have been consolidated in a California Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding, No. 5255.

The California proceeding shares legal teams and evidence pool, including internal Meta documents, with a federal multidistrict litigation that is scheduled to advance in court later this year, bringing together thousands of federal lawsuits.

Legal innovation: Design as defect

For decades, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded technology companies from liability for content that their users post. Whenever people sued over harms linked to social media, companies invoked Section 230, and the cases typically died early.

The K.G.M. litigation uses a different legal strategy: negligence-based product liability. The plaintiffs argue that the harm arises not from third-party content but from the platforms’ own engineering and design decisions, the “informational architecture” and features that shape users’ experience of content. Infinite scrolling, autoplay, notifications calibrated to heighten anxiety and variable-reward systems operate on the same behavioral principles as slot machines.

These are conscious product design choices, and the plaintiffs contend they should be subject to the same safety obligations as any other manufactured product, thereby holding their makers accountable for negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty of fitness.

Judge Carolyn Kuhl of the California Superior Court agreed that these claims warranted a jury trial. In her Nov. 5, 2025, ruling denying Meta’s motion for summary judgment, she distinguished between features related to content publishing, which Section 230 might protect, and features like notification timing, engagement loops and the absence of meaningful parental controls, which it might not.

Here, Kuhl established that the conduct-versus-content distinction – treating algorithmic design choices as the company’s own conduct rather than as the protected publication of third-party speech – was a viable legal theory for a jury to evaluate. This fine-grained approach, evaluating each design feature individually and recognizing the increased complexities of technology products’ design, represents a potential road map for courts nationwide.

What the companies knew

The product liability theory depends partly on what companies knew about the risks of their designs. The 2021 leak of internal Meta documents, widely known as the “Facebook Papers,” revealed that the company’s own researchers had flagged concerns about Instagram’s effects on adolescent body image and mental health.

Internal communications disclosed in the K.G.M. proceedings have included exchanges among Meta employees comparing the platform’s effects to pushing drugs and gambling. Whether this internal awareness constitutes the kind of corporate knowledge that supports liability is a central factual question for the jury to decide.

black-and-white photo of eight men in business suits standing behind a table with their right hands raised
Tobacco companies were eventually held to account because what they knew – and hid – about the addictiveness of their products came to light.
Ray Lustig/The Washington Post via Getty Images

There is a clear analogy to tobacco litigation. In the 1990s, plaintiffs succeeded against tobacco companies by proving they had concealed evidence about the addictive and deadly nature of their products. In K.G.M., the plaintiffs here are making the same core argument: Where there is corporate knowledge, deliberate targeting and public denial, liability follows.

K.G.M.’s lead trial attorney, Mark Lanier, is the same lawyer who won multibillion-dollar verdicts in the Johnson & Johnson baby powder litigation, signaling the scale of accountability they are pursuing.

The science: Contested but consequential

The scientific evidence on social media and youth mental health is real but genuinely complex. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) does not classify social media use as an addictive disorder. Researchers like Amy Orben have found that large-scale studies show small average associations between social media use and reduced well-being.

Yet Orben herself has cautioned that these averages might mask severe harms experienced by a subset of vulnerable young users, particularly girls ages 12 to 15. The legal question under the negligence theory is not whether social media harms everyone equally, but whether platform designers had an obligation to account for foreseeable interactions between their design features and the vulnerabilities of developing minds, especially when internal evidence suggested they were aware of the risks.

First, a manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in designing its product, and that duty extends to harms that are reasonably foreseeable. Second, the plaintiff must show that the type of injury suffered was a foreseeable consequence of the design choice. The manufacturer doesn’t need to have foreseen the exact injury to the exact plaintiff, but the general category of harm must have been within the range of what a reasonable designer would anticipate.

This is why the Facebook Papers and internal Meta research are so legally significant in K.G.M.’s case: They go directly to establishing that the company’s own researchers identified the specific categories of harm – depression, body dysmorphia, compulsive use patterns among adolescent girls – that the plaintiff alleges she suffered. If the company’s own data flagged these risks and leadership continued on the same design trajectory, that would considerably strengthen the foreseeability element.

Why it matters

Even if the science is unsettled, the legal and policy landscape is shifting fast. In 2025 alone, 20 states in the U.S. enacted new laws governing children’s social media use. And this wave is not only in the U.S.; countries such as the U.K., Australia, Denmark, France and Brazil are also moving forward with specific legislation, including mandates banning social media for those under 16.

The K.G.M. trial represents something more fundamental: the proposition that algorithmic design decisions are product decisions, carrying real obligations of safety and accountability. If this framework takes hold, every platform will need to reconsider not just what content appears, but why and how it is delivered.

The Conversation

I was staff at organizations including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge, and the Harvard Berkman Klein Center, which were funded by various foundations and companies. Refer to their websites for disclosures. I was a staff member in the connectivity policy team at Facebook (2016-2018). I am an advisory board member of non-profits, including Internet Lab (Brazil) and Derechos Digitales (Chile). I am a senior advisor (without any honorarium) at the Datasphere Initiative and Portulans Institute. More details at https://www.carolinarossini.net/bio

– ref. How Instagram addictiveness lawsuit could reshape social media – platform design meets product liability – https://theconversation.com/how-instagram-addictiveness-lawsuit-could-reshape-social-media-platform-design-meets-product-liability-277066

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Comment la Russie s’approche des satellites européens pour capter leurs communications

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Aleix Nadal, Analyst, Defence, Security and Justice team, RAND Europe

Les infrastructures européennes de télécommunications figurent parmi les cibles potentielles des opérations d’interception menées par certains satellites russes. wikicommon, Fourni par l’auteur

Les activités de satellites russes près d’appareils européens inquiètent les autorités. Entre espionnage orbital et démonstration de force, ces opérations pourraient annoncer une nouvelle phase de compétition stratégique dans l’espace.

Les autorités européennes ont récemment tiré la sonnette d’alarme après l’interception par la Russie de communications transitant par des satellites européens. Mais le problème ne date pas d’hier.

Ainsi depuis la première invasion de l’Ukraine en 2014, deux satellites russes suivent discrètement des engins spatiaux européens. Ils ont manœuvré suffisamment près pour faire craindre qu’il ne s’agisse pas seulement d’opérations d’observation.

En 2018, Florence Parly, alors ministre de la Défense avait accusé la Russie d’espionnage après que l’un de ces engins avait été repéré à proximité d’un satellite militaire franco-italien de télécommunications. Deux satellites d’Intelsat avaient été visés de manière similaire auparavant.

Ces opérations dites de « proximité et de rendez-vous » (RPO), au cours desquelles un engin spatial manœuvre délibérément pour s’approcher d’un autre objet ou opérer à proximité de lui dans l’espace, deviennent de plus en plus courantes en orbite géostationnaire (GEO), où les satellites restent pratiquement immobiles au-dessus d’un même point de la Terre.

Les opérations RPO ne sont pas intrinsèquement malveillantes. Elles peuvent par exemple servir à ravitailler un satellite afin d’en prolonger la durée de vie, ou à retirer des satellites hors service et des débris pour maintenir les orbites dégagées en vue de futures missions.

Mais la technologie qui permet d’améliorer la manœuvrabilité des satellites est à double usage — elle peut avoir des applications à la fois civiles et militaires. Toute la difficulté consiste donc à déterminer l’intention derrière ces manœuvres et, le cas échéant, à y répondre de manière appropriée.

Inspection de satellites

Lancés respectivement en 2014 et en 2023, les deux « inspecteurs » russes Luch/Olymp 1 et 2, des satellites très secrets, s’inscrivent dans les efforts de Moscou pour identifier d’éventuelles vulnérabilités techniques dans les satellites des pays de l’Otan.

Si tel avait été leur seul objectif, les responsables européens auraient eu peu de raisons de s’en inquiéter ou de protester. S’approcher d’un satellite pour en analyser les caractéristiques n’a rien de nouveau et ce type de mission n’est pas propre à la Russie.

Par le passé, les satellites d’inspection du programme américain Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) se sont approchés à moins de dix kilomètres d’autres satellites dans certaines missions. Même des entreprises commerciales commencent désormais à proposer des services d’inspection.

Une entreprise australienne appelée HEO a récemment survolé un satellite chinois classifié afin d’en révéler certaines caractéristiques techniques. En théorie, ce type d’informations pourrait, à l’avenir, être utilisé pour perturber le fonctionnement de satellites.

Cependant, les satellites russes ont souvent suivi le même engin spatial pendant des mois, s’approchant parfois à moins de cinq kilomètres de leur cible. Un comportement qui ne correspond pas vraiment au profil d’une mission d’inspection de satellites, laquelle consiste normalement à simplement passer à proximité, prendre des images puis repartir rapidement sur une autre trajectoire.

Les satellites GSSAP, par exemple, opèrent généralement par paires, selon une approche en tenaille : l’un évolue au-dessus de l’orbite géostationnaire (GEO) pour inspecter l’arrière du satellite ciblé, tandis que l’autre se place légèrement en dessous afin d’en observer l’avant.

Les satellites Luch, eux sont essentiellement des plateformes de « renseignement d’origine électromagnétique » (ce qu’on appelle plus communément « Sigint »). En les positionnant entre un satellite cible et sa station au sol, la Russie peut intercepter le signal et espionner les communications de satellites européens, comme ceux exploités par Eutelsat, une entreprise française, ou par Intelsat, une société luxembourgo-américaine. Ces satellites européens fournissent notamment de la bande passante aux armées européennes pour leurs communications sécurisées.

Pris isolément, ces satellites doivent donc être considérés comme des outils de surveillance plutôt que comme des armes antisatellites — c’est-à-dire des engins capables de perturber ou de neutraliser un autre satellite. Les satellites russes se contentent ici de collecter des informations. À ce titre, ils ne constituent pas, en eux-mêmes, une menace majeure pour la sécurité.

Mais l’espace reste étroitement lié aux dynamiques géopolitiques qui se jouent sur Terre. Toute opération spatiale russe doit ainsi être comprise comme s’inscrivant dans une stratégie plus large visant à engranger des avantages stratégiques — qu’il s’agisse d’obtenir un avantage militaire face à l’Ukraine ou de contraindre les pays européens à retirer leur soutien à Kiev.

Menace future

Dans cette perspective, les opérations menées par les satellites Luch pourraient être interprétées non seulement comme un effort « Sigint », mais aussi comme un avertissement adressé aux pays européens : leurs satellites restent vulnérables à d’éventuelles perturbations.

Comme l’a souligné le général de division Michael Traut, commandant du Commandement spatial allemand, les satellites Luch ont probablement aussi intercepté les liaisons de commande de leurs cibles. Ces liaisons correspondent à des transmissions supposées sécurisées envoyées depuis les stations au sol vers les satellites afin de leur transmettre des instructions opérationnelles.

Si cela se confirme, la Russie pourrait potentiellement reproduire les signaux de liaison montante utilisés par les stations au sol pour contrôler les satellites, ce qui lui permettrait de perturber à l’avenir les opérations spatiales européennes.

Antennes satellites
Les satellites russes pourraient avoir intercepté des transmissions en provenance de stations au sol, ce qui leur donnerait la capacité de perturber le fonctionnement d’engins spatiaux européens.
Trisna.id

Si ce scénario vous semble familier, c’est qu’il rappelle la campagne hybride menée par la Russie contre les câbles sous-marins européens. Celle-ci s’est traduite par des années de cartographie clandestine des infrastructures occidentales et, plus récemment, par une série d’actions visant à sectionner des câbles à fibre optique.

Les opérations de proximité menées ces dernières années par les deux satellites Luch pourraient ainsi annoncer des actions plus lourdes à l’avenir, si la Russie échoue à dissuader l’Europe de poursuivre son soutien à l’Ukraine.

Que peut faire l’Europe dans ce scénario ? Une première étape bienvenue a été de rendre publiques des informations sur les activités russes en orbite géostationnaire. Jusqu’ici, les opérations spatiales étaient le plus souvent enveloppées de secret.

Davantage de transparence pourrait permettre de délégitimer ces pratiques aux yeux de la communauté internationale, tout en justifiant le développement par l’Europe de ses propres capacités de contre-espace à des fins de défense.

De fait, plusieurs pays européens, dont le Royaume-Uni et l’Allemagne, plaident désormais plus ouvertement pour le déploiement de leurs propres capacités de défense spatiale. La Russie a par ailleurs déjà démontré d’autres moyens d’action en orbite reposant sur des opérations de proximité et pouvant être utilisées comme armes antisatellites.

Sans un éventail complet d’outils, incluant des moyens d’autodéfense, l’Europe pourrait se retrouver exposée à des actions spatiales plus agressives et auxquelles elle n’est pas suffisamment préparée. Protéger sa dépendance aux services spatiaux — des communications militaires à la connectivité indispensable pour l’économie — implique donc de faire de la sécurité en orbite un élément central de sa stratégie.

The Conversation

Aleix Nadal ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Comment la Russie s’approche des satellites européens pour capter leurs communications – https://theconversation.com/comment-la-russie-sapproche-des-satellites-europeens-pour-capter-leurs-communications-277532

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La Russie, l’autre perdante de l’opération « Epic Fury » ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Cyrille Bret, Géopoliticien, Sciences Po

L’attaque contre l’Iran affaiblit un allié capital de Moscou. Il y a un an déjà, ce dernier n’avait pas sauvé son autre partenaire régional, Bachar Al-Assad. La prudence russe sur l’Iran démonétise le Kremlin dans le « Sud global ». Pour autant, la Russie peut aussi tirer des bénéfices de la déstabilisation du Moyen-Orient : l’attention mondiale se détourne de l’Ukraine ; les prix des hydrocarbures augmentent ; un changement de régime à Téhéran créerait un précédent justifiant les attaques contre Volodymyr Zelensky à Kiev…

La Fédération de Russie est-elle d’ores et déjà, après la République islamique d’Iran, la grande perdante de la guerre aéronavale menée par Israël et les États-Unis tout à la fois contre le régime des mollahs, contre le programme nucléaire iranien, contre l’appareil sécuritaire et contre le réseau international de cette puissance régionale ?

Le partenariat global russo-iranien signé en janvier 2025 n’assurera pas la défense de l’Iran, hormis les protestations formulées publiquement par les autorités russes quelques heures après le début des frappes.

Après la chute de la famille Al-Assad en Syrie, la Russie semble privée d’un relais essentiel dans la région et, plus largement, sur la scène mondiale. Pour autant, il est sans doute très prématuré d’annoncer la fin de l’influence russe au Moyen-Orient.

Des revers indiscutables

Même si Moscou a enregistré, ces dernières années, certains succès diplomatiques sur le continent africain, ses réseaux d’alliances s’effritent : renversement du régime syrien en décembre 2024, enlèvement spectaculaire du président vénézuélien Nicolas Maduro en janvier 2026, mort du guide suprême iranien Ali Khamenei et possible effondrement de la République islamique… La Russie a perdu des soutiens de poids sur la scène internationale pour sa lutte d’influence contre l’Occident et pour son invasion de l’Ukraine. D’évidence, le soutien de Moscou ne donne pas d’assurance-vie aux dirigeants alliés — et cette conclusion est d’ores et déjà tirée dans le « Sud global ».

Même si la République islamique d’Iran reste en place, la Russie perd, du fait de son durable affaiblissement, un levier d’influence dans la région. Surtout, la crédibilité internationale de Moscou est plus qu’écornée : le partenariat stratégique signé en janvier 2025 avec l’Iran n’est manifestement que d’une aide limitée, malgré l’excellence reconnue des systèmes russes des systèmes de défense anti-aérienne.

Ni sur le plan stratégique (accord de défense), ni sur le plan diplomatique (actions au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations unies), ni sur le plan capacitaire (exportations de matériels de défense), l’alliance russe ne paraît efficace ou protectrice. Engagées dans des opérations militaires de grande ampleur et de haute intensité sur des théâtres disjoints, la Fédération de Russie et la République islamique d’Iran ne peuvent s’épauler car les matériels militaires de chacun des partenaires vont à leurs fronts respectifs. Cet enseignement sera tiré cette fois-ci à Delhi et à Pékin, destinations privilégiées des matériels de défense russe en vertu d’accords de défense anciens.

Ultime revers, la Russie perd, avec l’opération israélo-américaine, son rôle de médiateur pour négocier des accords de non-prolifération avec l’Iran. Après une série de discussions purement bilatérales entre États-Unis et Iran puis après les frappes lourdes contre les sites iraniens, l’Iran n’a plus besoin d’avocat sur la scène internationale et la Russie ne peut plus se poser en intermédiaire entre Téhéran et le reste de la communauté internationale. Cette évidence est manifeste aux États-Unis comme en Europe.

Impuissante, décrédibilisée, marginalisée et inutile dans les affaires iraniennes, la Russie subit en ce moment une série de revers indiscutables dans la région et dans le monde.

Des risques ambivalents

Certaines conséquences de la guerre actuelle contre l’Iran sont plus difficiles à évaluer et peuvent présenter des avantages conditionnels et inattendus pour Moscou.

Sur le plan politique, un changement de régime (hypothétique en l’état actuel) à Téhéran serait en soi une mauvaise nouvelle pour le Kremlin : la lutte constante de la présidence Poutine contre les « révolutions de couleur » des années 2000, les protestations de Moscou contre la chute de Milosevic en Serbie en 2000, celle de Kadhafi en Libye en 2011 et, plus récemment, celle de Ianoukovitch en Ukraine en 2014, constituent un axe directeur de sa diplomatie. Toutefois, le renversement de dirigeants par la force militaire à Caracas comme à Téhéran donne indiscutablement un précédent objectif pour justifier des attaques contre la présidence Zelensky en Ukraine et contre tel ou tel autre dirigeant de l’ancien espace soviétique. En d’autres termes, Donald Trump essaie de faire à Téhéran ce que Vladimir Poutine aurait voulu réaliser à Kiev.

Sur le plan des matériels de défense, Moscou avait importé des drones Shahed d’Iran dans la première phase du conflit contre l’Ukraine. Mais, à la faveur des destructions réalisées en Iran, la Russie, qui désormais produit les Shahed elle-même, peut s’imposer sur les anciennes « parts de marché » iraniennes de ce secteur en croissance — à condition toutefois de ne pas consommer tous ses matériels sur le front ukrainien.

La plus grande inconnue concerne l’inflexion que cette guerre donnera au rapprochement entre Poutine et Trump médiatisée par la rencontre en Alaska le 15 août 2025. D’un côté, Moscou est engagé diplomatiquement et militairement aux côtés de l’Iran, ciblé par les États-Unis. Mais, d’un autre côté, Moscou peut aussi instaurer avec Washington une forme de troc, qui verrait le Kremlin réagir avec modération à la chute de la République islamique en contrepartie de concessions notables de la Maison-Blanche sur le dossier ukrainien.

Des opportunités de court et moyen terme pour Moscou

Dans la crise actuelle, la Russie peut toutefois exploiter plusieurs opportunités.

À brève échéance, la hausse des prix des hydrocarbures peut augmenter les recettes des sociétés russes et, indirectement, les recettes fiscales de l’État fédéral russe. La Chine et l’Inde sont en effet déjà des clients importants pour la Russie. Elles seront tentées de solliciter encore davantage leurs fournisseurs russes en cas de blocage durable du détroit d’Ormuz. Ce bénéfice de court terme doit être tempéré : d’une part, les hausses de prix ne peuvent être répercutées que sur les achats réalisés au jour le jour, pas sur les contrats de fourniture de long terme ; d’autre part, la hausse des prix des matières énergétiques peut être enrayée par une hausse de production de la part d’acteurs majeurs des marchés du gaz (Algérie, Russie elle-même) et du pétrole.

Toujours dans l’immédiat, Moscou peut exploiter le report de l’attention internationale du théâtre ukrainien au Moyen-Orient afin de renforcer encore ses actions contre les populations et les infrastructures dans la profondeur en Ukraine. Et cela, d’autant plus que les armements utilisés par les Européens et les Américains au Moyen-Orient ne pourront pas prendre la direction de l’Ukraine (même si le soutien américain en matériels s’amenuise de toute façon pour l’Ukraine).

À la faveur de la confusion actuelle (le trop fameux brouillard de la guerre), la Russie peut également saisir l’occasion de multiplier les actions en dessous du seuil (cyberattaques, subversion, etc.) contre des États européens fortement mobilisés en faveur de l’Ukraine.

Enfin, à moyen terme, la Russie peut mettre à profit les conséquences de l’opération israélo-palestinienne pour revoir sa stratégie au Moyen-Orient. À l’égard des régimes égyptien et saoudien, elle peut se poser en alternative de stabilisation face à la suprématie militaire de la « Sparte » israélienne et à l’aventurisme guerrier de l’administration Trump. À une Turquie échaudée par la désorganisation durable des équilibres régionaux (spécialement en cas de crise des réfugiés en provenance d’Iran), elle peut proposer de renforcer les coopérations alternatives à l’Otan. Enfin, à l’allié chiite laissé seul face à l’attaque militaire massive, elle peut proposer un soutien pour la reconstruction de ses dispositifs de défense.

À court terme, la Russie a tout à perdre de l’opération contre l’Iran. Mais il convient de ne pas sous-estimer sa résilience dans la région.

The Conversation

Cyrille Bret ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. La Russie, l’autre perdante de l’opération « Epic Fury » ? – https://theconversation.com/la-russie-lautre-perdante-de-loperation-epic-fury-277541

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Parir en silencio y soledad: la violencia obstétrica que sufren las mujeres sordas

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Desirée Mena-Tudela, Enfermera. Titular de Universitat, Universitat Jaume I

christinarosepix/Shutterstock

El 28 de febrero de 2026, en la 40.ª edición de los Premios Goya, Miriam Garlo recogió el galardón a Mejor Actriz Revelación por su papel en Sorda. Su discurso de agradecimiento, pronunciado también en lengua de signos española, incluyó una frase que resonó con fuerza en redes sociales y medios de comunicación:

“Este premio es para las mujeres sordas que han sido madres y para las que no, porque a la violencia obstétrica hay que añadirle la violencia de la invisibilidad”.

El impacto mediático de sus palabras abrió un debate que las profesionales de la salud, las académicas y las propias mujeres sordas llevamos años intentando situar en la agenda pública y política: existen barreras comunicativas estructurales durante el embarazo, el parto y el puerperio. Y esas barreras comprometen tanto la seguridad clínica como el ejercicio efectivo de los derechos sexuales y reproductivos de las mujeres sordas.

La pregunta es inevitable: ¿cuánto sabemos realmente sobre esta realidad y qué estamos haciendo para cambiarla?

Sorda como posicionamiento artístico y político

La película Sorda, dirigida por Eva Libertad, sigue a Ángela, una mujer sorda que atraviesa el embarazo, el parto y la crianza de su hija. Su entorno no habla su lengua, no entiende sus silencios y, con demasiada frecuencia, toma decisiones por ella. Más que narrar una historia individual, la película construye una retórica de incomodidad permanente frente a un mundo diseñado para oyentes.

Desde esa perspectiva, Sorda funciona no sólo como obra cinematográfica, sino también como una intervención política: revela cómo la autonomía puede verse sistemáticamente fracturada cuando la comunicación no está garantizada.

La barrera comunicativa también es violencia obstétrica

La historia expone una forma de violencia obstétrica que rara vez se nombra: la que ocurre cuando el sistema y el personal sanitario no asegura una comunicación accesible.

Aunque las mujeres sordas no constituyen un grupo homogéneo, muchas comparten experiencias similares dentro de los sistemas de salud convencionales: consultas sin intérprete, explicaciones incompletas o inexistentes, decisiones clínicas comunicadas de manera fragmentaria o asumidas sin mediación lingüística.

A ello se suman factores recientes, como el uso generalizado de mascarillas, que dificultan aún más la lectura de los labios y la interpretación de expresiones faciales.

Las consecuencias no son menores. En el contexto obstétrico, la comunicación es una herramienta clínica fundamental. Permite evaluar síntomas, comprender sensaciones corporales y tomar decisiones informadas durante el proceso del parto.

Por ejemplo, la evaluación del dolor —considerado el quinto signo vital— es un indicador clave para garantizar la seguridad de la atención. Cuando esta evaluación no se realiza adecuadamente por falta de comunicación, no estamos ante un simple descuido: estamos ante una vulneración que puede tener consecuencias clínicas reales.

Pero el problema no se limita a la falta de información. Lo que está en juego es la autonomía.

Consecuencias evidenciadas

La violencia obstétrica incluye prácticas como realizar intervenciones sin consentimiento informado, ignorar las necesidades de la mujer, negar respuestas a sus solicitudes de ayuda o aplicar procedimientos que no están basados en evidencia. Estas experiencias tienen consecuencias que se han documentado en la literatura científica. Algunas de ellas son el trauma relacionado con el parto, la depresión posparto, el trastorno de estrés postraumático y la desconfianza hacia el sistema sanitario.

Para las mujeres sordas, estos riesgos se amplifican cuando los canales de comunicación no están garantizados. La discriminación de género se entrelaza con el capacitismo institucional, produciendo una doble forma de exclusión.

A ello se suma un problema estructural: muchos servicios de salud continúan funcionando bajo la premisa implícita de que todas las personas oyen, hablan y comprenden de la misma manera.

Cuando una mujer sorda llega a una institución de salud, con frecuencia se produce una escena repetida: el personal sanitario duda sobre quién la atenderá porque nadie sabe cómo comunicarse con ella. Aparecen el miedo, la inseguridad y la improvisación. La respuesta institucional suele ser la misma: desorientación, delegación y soluciones improvisadas.

No se trata de una anécdota o experiencia aislada. Es el resultado de un sistema que aún no ha incorporado la diversidad comunicativa como parte del estándar de cuidado.

Cuando la violencia obstétrica se vuelve una experiencia cotidiana

Los testimonios de mujeres sordas ayudan a comprender la dimensión real de esta problemática. En nuestra investigación hemos recogido múltiples ejemplos. Los nombres y procedencia de estas mujeres son ficticios para proteger su privacidad:

Elsa (Burgos). Mujer sorda de 49 años:

Después del parto todo cambió. Tuve cesárea por riesgo de pérdida del bienestar fetal. Comunicación con la cesárea cero. Todo con mascarillas. No supe por qué fue la cesárea. Después me lo contaron. Se llevaron al bebé. No me dijeron si estaba bien. Después de 5 horas desde la cesárea, el padre de mi hijo me dijo que estaba bien. Me puse a llorar por todo lo que tenía acumulado. Era como que yo no importaba. No tengo buena experiencia ni en el parto, ni el postparto, ni en la lactancia.

Marina (Comunidad Valenciana). Mujer sorda de 40 años:

La experiencia con el primero fue horrible. Con el segundo, fue mejor. Mi primer parto fue muy largo. Me dijeron que empujara, pero no sabía cómo. Lloré mucho en el hospital. No sabía qué hacer. No me sentía una buena madre. No me sentía preparada. A veces se oye que la gente tiene información, pero en nuestro caso… ¿qué información tenemos? Creo que es importante hablar sobre la maternidad de las madres sordas. En la comunidad sorda, no solemos hablar sobre la maternidad. En cuanto a la lactancia materna, a veces recibimos información contradictoria.

Estos relatos dan cuenta de lo que ocurre cuando una intervención médica se realiza sin explicación. También de cuando una mujer no puede acceder a la información necesaria para participar en las decisiones sobre su propio cuerpo. Esta forma de violencia obstétrica ha sido descrita por la literatura científica como violencia obstétrica capacitista.

¿Qué cambios son necesarios?

La película Sorda cierra con una dimensión política clara: solo un sistema que asume que todas las mujeres viven la maternidad de la misma manera puede producir este tipo de daño de forma sistemática.

Desde la perspectiva de la salud pública, ese reconocimiento debería ser el punto de partida para la transformación. Algunas medidas simples, pero que requieren voluntad institucional, serían garantizar intérpretes de lengua de signos en los servicios de salud, incorporar formación básica en comunicación accesible para los equipos sanitarios o reconocer la diversidad lingüística como parte fundamental de la calidad asistencial.

La pregunta de fondo no es si el sistema sanitario puede adaptarse. La pregunta es: ¿cómo puede considerarse ética una atención de salud que asume como aceptable que una mujer no entienda lo que ocurre durante su propio proceso de embarazo, parto y postparto? ¿De qué derechos a la salud hablamos cuando las mujeres sordas no pueden tener y acceder a una atención de salud mínimamente digna?

Sin comunicación accesible no hay consentimiento informado ni autonomía reproductiva posible. Cuando la autonomía desaparece, los derechos sexuales y reproductivos dejan de ser derechos y se transforman en una promesa vacía.

The Conversation

Las personas firmantes no son asalariadas, ni consultoras, ni poseen acciones, ni reciben financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y han declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado anteriormente.

– ref. Parir en silencio y soledad: la violencia obstétrica que sufren las mujeres sordas – https://theconversation.com/parir-en-silencio-y-soledad-la-violencia-obstetrica-que-sufren-las-mujeres-sordas-277657

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When Washington and the states are in conflict, the ultimate winner is not always certain

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Kenneth Michael White, Associate Professor of Political Science & Criminal Justice, Kennesaw State University

Trump administration immigration policies have received pushback from leaders of sanctuary jurisdictions, as well as protesters. AP Photo/Ryan Murphy

The Trump administration’s aggressive policies on immigration are receiving pushback not just on Capitol Hill but across the country. Democratic leaders in multiple states are refusing to cooperate with immigration arrests.

In response, the federal government is refusing to share evidence with state investigators in the deaths of Renee Good and Alex Pretti, who were killed by federal officers while protesting immigration enforcement in Minneapolis.

Throughout U.S. history, there have been many moments of conflict between the federal and state governments, such as on slavery, racial segregation, school testing requirements, health care, abortion and climate change. Conversely, there has also been a long history of cooperation between the different levels of government in matters such as disaster relief, law enforcement and antiterrorism efforts.

But what happens when the various states and the federal government see the same legal issue differently? Which side wins in a dispute? This is an ongoing and open question, as evidenced by the frequent lawsuits being filed against Trump administration policies by state attorneys general.

As a legal scholar, I study issues related to constitutional law, including federalism, or the division of power between the various levels of government in the U.S. system. Ultimately, the question of who prevails when there’s a dispute depends on whether the issue is more national or local in scope. It may also matter whether the issue affects fundamental rights, which no government may justly infringe.

Layers of authority

The framers of the Constitution saw the division of power between the states and federal government as part of the U.S. system of checks and balances. Just as the judicial, executive and legislative branches check each other, so do the different levels of government. “The true barriers of our liberty in this country are our state governments,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1811.

Still, it’s easy to assume that the federal government has greater power. The U.S. Constitution states that federal laws are “the supreme Law of the Land.” This is a model known as vertical federalism – in essence, putting the federal government above the states and localities.

Texas Sen. John Cornyn gestures with his left hand while speaking at a committee hearing.
U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, speaks at a Senate hearing investigating fraud in the Medicaid program in Minnesota. Medicaid is a joint federal-state program.
AP Photo/Nathan Howard

There are areas of law where that framework clearly prevails. For example, immigration is an issue that the Constitution places squarely under the authority of the federal government. States cannot nullify, or invalidate, federal law. That is vertical federalism.

But the 10th Amendment says “powers not delegated to the United States … are reserved to the States respectively.” There are areas where states retain authority and the relationship between the levels of government is more horizontal, or flat or equal.

Consider cannabis. In 1996, California voters approved a ballot initiative making their state the first to allow the medical use of marijuana since prohibition started in the early 1900s. This was despite the fact that federal law viewed all cannabis as contraband. But California determines its own criminal code.

Californians could not stop the federal government from enforcing a valid federal law in their state, but that did not mean that California – or the vast majority of other states that have since passed their own medical or recreational marijuana measures – have to participate in a federal policy choice.

Federal agencies have continued occasional cannabis raids in California. But for state law enforcement officials, failing to punish a person for the medical use of cannabis is not a federal crime. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal government cannot force a state “to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program.” That is horizontal federalism.

Constraints on all governments

The federal government is limited to its enumerated powers – which is to say, the powers spelled out directly by the U.S. Constitution. But states possess “police powers,” which is a broader authority to regulate health, safety and morality.

The federal government is responsible for foreign policy and regulating interstate commerce. But states and localities regulate vaccine mandates, police and fire services, and operate or oversee water and sewer systems, as well as taking stances on moral issues, including alcohol and gambling, due to their potential to cause harm.

Three bags of cannabis, seized by law enforcement, are on display on a table.
Most states have passed laws legalizing marijuana for recreational or medical use, but the drug remains illegal under federal law.
AP Photo/Thomas Peipert

But both the federal government and the states are limited by the Constitution. Neither can justly violate the freedom of the press, for example, under the First Amendment.

And the reality is that, at least at this point in history, there is no neat division between federal and state authority on a broad range of issues. The federal government, for example, pays for the bulk of interstate highway construction. But those roads are actually paved by states.

When the federal government is paying a share of the cost of carrying out its policies, the Supreme Court has ruled that it can, in fact, tell states what to do, such as enforcing a legal drinking age of 21 or risk a share of federal highway funds. But it has also found that federal demands on states can be unconstitutionally excessive or “coercive,” as with a mandate under the Affordable Care Act to expand Medicaid, which the court struck down, even though Washington was paying most of the bill.

Federalism and the question of which level of government has the ultimate say is often complex and messy. But for that reason, as the framers foresaw, it remains an important safeguard of liberty, preventing too much power from residing in one place.

The Conversation

Kenneth Michael White does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. When Washington and the states are in conflict, the ultimate winner is not always certain – https://theconversation.com/when-washington-and-the-states-are-in-conflict-the-ultimate-winner-is-not-always-certain-276485

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Tension de liquidité ou insolvabilité ? Pourquoi la restructuration de la dette du Sénégal serait une erreur stratégique

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Souleymane Gueye, Professor of Economics and Statistics, City College of San Francisco

Même si le ministre des Finances du Sénégal, Cheikh Diba, a réaffirmé son opposition à une restructuration, les appels en ce sens se multiplient. Beaucoup la présentent comme une nécessité technique. Les arguments avancés : répondre à la hausse rapide de l’endettement et à l’augmentation du service de la dette dans les recettes fiscales.

En effet, en 2026, le pays devra mobiliser 6 050 milliards de francs CFA pour ses besoins de financement et rembourser 747 milliards de francs pour satisfaire le service de la dette. De surcroît, les coûts d’emprunt ne cessent d’augmenter, atteignant 7 % en moyenne au moment où les maturités se raccourcissent entraînant une forte demande des bons du Trésor à un an.

Pourtant, cette évidence frappante mérite d’être examinée de près pour avoir une lecture non biaisée et factuelle de la situation du pays avant de recommander une restructuration immédiate de la dette.

En tant que chercheur ayant étudié les dynamiques de la dette souveraine du Sénégal et les prescriptions du FMI, j’estime que le débat doit distinguer clairement liquidité et solvabilité. Comme dans de nombreuses économies en développement, particulièrement en Afrique subsaharienne, le vrai défi du Sénégal n’est pas l’insolvabilité. Le défi réside dans la gestion des tensions de liquidité sans compromettre la souveraineté économique à long terme déclinée dans l’Agenda national de transformation, Sénégal 2050.

Cette Vision Sénégal 2050 doit être formalisée le plus rapidement possible sous forme de plan d’investissement sectoriel décennal avec des objectifs quantifiés par filière — hydrocarbures, agro-industrie, logistique, numérique — et des mécanismes de financement mixtes public-privé qui transforment la rente hydrocarbures en capacité productive diversifiée.



Read more:
Crise de la dette sénégalaise : une boussole pour s’orienter

Une telle stratégie d’allocation de financement des projets identifiés dans le Plan de redressement économique et social (PRES) étalée sur une longue période pourrait constituer un signal très fort en direction des bailleurs de fonds.

Ce que révèlent les récentes adjudications

Les récentes adjudications ou ventes de titres publics de 2026, plus particulièrement celles du 16 janvier, du 30 janvier et du 6 février, ont révélé un changement structurel dans le comportement des investisseurs.

Bien que la demande de titres émis par le Sénégal soit soutenue, elle reste concentrée de plus en plus sur les instruments de court terme tels que les Bons Assimilables du Trésor – titres de dette à court terme émis par l’État pour financer ses besoins de trésorerie. – avec maturité de 6 à 12 mois, un taux d’absorption de 70 %, et un taux de couverture à plus de 100 %. De leur côté, les obligations à long terme (Obligations Assimilables du Trésor, 3 ans) ne sont absorbées qu’à un taux de 19 %) et suscitent peu d’intérêt malgré des rendements très élevés.

L’adjudication de titres publics du Sénégal, organisée le 20 février 2026, confirme cette tendance et la prudence des investisseurs. Même si le Sénégal est parvenu à lever un total d’environ 158 millions de dollars, la structure de la demande révèle une nette aversion au risque sur le long terme. Les investisseurs affichent leurs préférences au court terme face aux incertitudes économiques auxquelles le pays est confronté.

Beaucoup d’économistes interprètent ce phénomène comme un verdict du marché anticipant une restructuration inévitable. À mon humble avis, cette conclusion est prématurée et injustifiée, car s’appuyant sur plusieurs confusions analytiques, malgré le récent classement du Sénégal en catégorie de risque 7 (le niveau de risque le plus élevé) par l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE).



Read more:
Crise de la dette: les quatre leviers qui peuvent aider le Sénégal à éviter la restructuration

Conséquences économiques d’une restructuration

La restructuration de la dette publique est un outil extrême, conçu pour les situations où un État souverain n’est plus solvable, et non pour traiter des tensions intertemporelles de liquidité dans un contexte d’incertitude économique, le FMI refusant de se prononcer sur toute responsabilité sur la situation de la dette sénégalaise.

Contrairement au Ghana qui faisait face à une insolvabilité manifeste et à un défaut de paiement externe, le Sénégal reste confronté à une tension de liquidité -dans un marché régional dominé par les banques commerciales – due à l’inaccessibilité des marchés financiers internationaux.

La situation du Sénégal n’est pas comparable à celle du Ghana, même si le pays fait face à des finances relativement fragiles, à une marge budgétaire réduite et à des difficultés d’accès aux crédits commerciaux à taux conventionnels. Confondre tension de liquidité et insolvabilité est non seulement une conception erronée de la situation actuelle du pays mais revient aussi àtransformer un problème gérable en crise injustifiée.

Restructurer la dette sénégalaise sans démontrer son insolvabilité serait non seulement une erreur grave d’appréciation de la situation économique et financière du pays, mais aurait aussi des conséquences négatives sur l’activité économique du pays. Le Sénégal doit à tout prix éviter une restructuration immédiate de sa dette.

Déconstruction des arguments pour la restructuration

L’expérience récente du Ghana est souvent citée comme un modèle à suivre. Pourtant, elle illustre plutôt les risques d’une restructuration subie et tardive. Mise en œuvre sous forte pression du marché, elle a entraîné d’importantes pertes pour les banques locales, une contraction du crédit au secteur privé et des coûts sociaux et économiques élevés.

Bien loin de restaurer la souveraineté, elle a soumis la politique budgétaire du Ghana à un contrôle externe renforcé et a imposé en même temps un ajustement économique prolongé avec des conséquences économiques et sociales désastreuses pour les populations les plus vulnérables.



Read more:
Comment le Sénégal peut financer son économie sans s’endetter davantage

La situation du Sénégal est fondamentalement différente. Le pays évolue au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (Uemoa). Son marché de la dette est dominé par les banques commerciales et donc structurellement orienté vers le court terme. Les contraintes réglementaires, les considérations de bilan et l’absence de grands investisseurs institutionnels expliquent cette préférence pour la liquidité.

Dans ce contexte, le rejet des obligations à long terme ne traduit nullement une anticipation de défaut de paiement, mais plutôt les limites structurelles du système financier régional.

Restructurer la dette sénégalaise dans ces conditions comporterait des risques systémiques majeurs. Les titres publics constituent un pilier des bilans bancaires dans toute l’Uemoa. Tout reprofilage contraint ou décote fragiliserait les institutions financières de la zone, restreindrait le crédit aux entreprises et ralentirait l’activité économique du pays. Les coûts sociaux d’une telle option sont souvent sous-estimés dans les débats focalisés principalement sur la seule contrainte budgétaire et financière.

En outre, l’idée selon laquelle la restructuration renforcerait la souveraineté économique doit être nuancée. En réalité, elle la réduit. En effet, elle impose une surveillance extérieure constante, durcit les conditionnalités et limite durablement la marge de manœuvre budgétaire du pays.

Par exemple, les pays qui ont préservé l’accès aux marchés financiers grâce à une stratégie crédible – la Côte d’Ivoire constitue un exemple régional notable – conservent davantage d’autonomie politique que ceux contraints à des renégociations brutales. La souveraineté économique ne se décrète pas par une restructuration. Elle se construit par la crédibilité budgétaire, la transparence et la discipline.



Read more:
Pourquoi la dernière dégradation de la note du Sénégal par Moody’s ne tient pas la route

Choisir sa trajectoire

Il faut donc choisir sa trajectoire et non la subir. Pour cela, il faut s’appuyer sur une stratégie intégrée de reprofilage et de redressement sur fond de crédibilité, de discipline et d’accès aux marchés. C’est ce que le Sénégal est en train de faire avec une réussite palpable grâce à une gestion optimale de la dette.

Cela ne signifie pas que le Sénégal peut se contenter de maintenir le statu quo. Refuser de restructurer n’est pas nier la gravité de la situation. C’est un choix conditionnel qui requiert un ajustement budgétaire crédible (compression des dépenses administratives, rationalisation des dépenses publiques, suppression des charges non prioritaires, consolidation des directions et des agences et collecte efficace des ressources fiscales).

Sur ce dernier point, les autorités sont en train de faire un excellent travail qui doit rassurer les bailleurs de fonds et restaurer la confiance financière car les rentrées fiscales du premier trimestre – plus de 500 milliards de francs CFA en moyenne par mois (838 millions de dollars US) – , s’annoncent particulièrement robustes.

Elles sont portées par l’impôt sur les sociétés, l’impôt sur le revenu, la TVA et les taxes sur les dividendes, qui contribueront directement à couvrir l’échéance de dette souveraine du mois de mars (480 millions de dollars dont un remboursement d’une tranche d’eurobond d’environ 396 millions de dollars US, le 13 mars 2026), une gestion de la dette transparente et un recours accru au financement concessionnel.

Sans ces éléments, le coût du refinancement à court terme pourrait devenir excessif, mais pour le moment les investisseurs se ruent sur les titres sénégalais traduisant un signal de confiance relativement fort malgré une dette cachée de plus de 12 milliards de dollars.

La véritable question n’est donc pas de savoir si le Sénégal doit restructurer sa dette par principe. Elle est de savoir si le pays peut encore choisir sa trajectoire plutôt que de la subir sous la contrainte d’une crise financière. Pour l’instant, ce choix est encore possible si les autorités présentent un plan crédible de compression des dépenses publiques et poursuivent une stratégie intégrée de reprofilage, d’ajustement crédible et de réinvestissement efficace des revenus tirés de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles du pays.

La restructuration doit demeurer un outil de dernier recours, et non une solution par défaut. Pour le Sénégal, comme pour de nombreuses économies en développement, préserver la crédibilité et la stabilité financières reste probablement le moyen le plus efficace de protéger la souveraineté économique.

The Conversation

Souleymane Gueye is affiliated with the American Economic Association

– ref. Tension de liquidité ou insolvabilité ? Pourquoi la restructuration de la dette du Sénégal serait une erreur stratégique – https://theconversation.com/tension-de-liquidite-ou-insolvabilite-pourquoi-la-restructuration-de-la-dette-du-senegal-serait-une-erreur-strategique-276609

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France’s National Health system explained to U.S. citizens in 2026

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Jean de Kervasdoué, Professeur d’économie de la santé, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers (CNAM)

A US citizen spends 12,627 euros on annual medical care compared with 6,249 euros in France. MillaF/Shuttetstock

France’s vision of universal healthcare and America’s health insurance premium-reliant system are worlds apart. On October 1 2025, the US Federal Government shut down after an insufficient number of Democrat votes amid disputes over health policy led to a federal government budget deadlock

The longest shutdown in US history could have had dramatic consequences for part of the population, particularly for millions of Americans who would have lost their health insurance. President Trump is on a mission to dismantle policies introduced by Barack Obama (and maintained under the Biden administration) to improve access to health insurance for the most disadvantaged.

On top of the anticipated decline is the incredibly questionable policy of US Secretary of State for Health, Robert Francis Kennedy Jr, and his highly controversial views on vaccines.

Meanwhile, despite a 17.5 billion deficit and a need for reform, in terms of quality and access to medical care, France’s Assurance Maladie national healthcare system remains a “land of plenty”.

Efficient medical care, ‘à la française’

A good starting point for explaining France’s national health service to Americans would be to step back in time.

In 1939, a US citizen’s life expectancy at birth was seven years higher than for a French citizen. Things have changed since then. In 2024, it was more than three and a half years lower: life expectancy stood at 79 in the United States compared to 82.5 in France. In 2025, however, healthcare expenditure per capita was equivalent to 12,627 euros in the United States (14,885 dollars), and 6,249 euros in France (7,367 dollars).

At national level, this translates into so-called health costs (mainly medical fees), representing 17.2% of GDP in the US and 11.4% in France. While changes in life expectancy are linked to lifestyle and eating habits (leading to obesity and diabetes), the effectiveness of medicine is playing an increasingly important role.

It is likely that the quality of healthcare for the majority of people is both better and more accessible in France.

When it comes to paying for medical care, France has a simple system: it is a country where you are covered by health insurance from birth. All legal residents are automatically registered with the health insurance system and, therefore, receive free healthcare for the most serious conditions, or care that is largely reimbursed within the compulsory health insurance scheme and covered by top-up insurance plans.

In the US, there is a three-tier social security system: Medicare for the over 65s and people with disabilities, Medicaid for the poorest, and the Veterans Health Administration for veterans.

Breakdown of health expenditure in the United States.
Healthsystemtracker

7.8% out-of-pocket expenses for French citizens

Thirty long-term serious conditions such as cancer, type 1 or 2 diabetes or psychiatric illnesses are fully covered (treatment is fully reimbursed) by the compulsory state health cover that is offered to all French citizens.

If we add top-up health insurance – now almost universal – patients in France actually only end up paying 7.8% of their healthcare costs. Admittedly, French citizens or their employers will have contributed in financing compulsory or top-up health insurance.

For most French people, there are few or no financial barriers to entry. These barriers have been further reduced for dental care, optical care and hearing care thanks to a universal policy implemented by Emmanuel Macron called “100% healthcare”.

On the whole the French system is more generous than those of comparable countries.

Patients are encouraged to register with a general practitioner with whom visits are then fully reimbursed. If they choose to consult a different health professional, it will only cost them a few euros more. Patients are can make same day appointments to see several specialists whose fees are largely reimbursed, that is unless they don’t charge rates higher than those set by the National Health Service (known as “excess fees”), a common practice in certain medical specialities.

France: a predominantly state-run health service

Like in the United States, France has public hospitals, private clinics and private non-profit clinics. All 31 of France’s university hospitals are state-funded.

France does, however have a higher percentage of private (for-profit) hospitals than the United States. In 2024, 33% of clinics in France were private compared to 20% in the US.

In France, private practice physicians are free to set up practice wherever they wish and are paid on a fee-for-service basis. In the majority of cases, doctors’ fees are set by the national health insurance system and are much lower than in the United States: 30 euros for a visit with a general practitioner in France, $150 in the United States, or 127 euros.

Strong French state regulation

It goes without saying that in France, the State is heavily involved in regulating its national health service.

Opening a pharmacy is impossible without administrative authorisation, for instance. The State, through its regional health agencies, controls all hospitals – public or private. It manages the register for all medical procedures, pricing and reimbursement rates for each medicine, X-ray or biological test a doctor prescribes. At national level, the State is responsible for appointing all directors and doctors in public hospitals, which employed nearly 1.1 million people at the end of 2021.

High-quality private establishments are present in France (they employed 315,000 people in 2022 and, I would again lay emphasis on how private doctors are free to set up their own practices and prescribe care as they see fit.

Despite everything, the French system is one of the most expensive in the Western world. Hospital stays account for a large proportion of expenditure. France has many specialists, and medication consumption is high.

TheAmerican system is is even more expensive, and, in reality, more inefficient because competition between private insurers does not lead to a reduction in the cost of services – as is often the case in a market economy – it results in inflation in insurance premiums. Backed firmly by their belief in the absolute and systematic benefits of all forms of competition, wealthy individuals in the United States take out insurance policies to cover the fees of renowned doctors and stays in luxury hospitals. In doing so, they ramp up the costs of medical goods and services.

The US healthcare system is, in essence, ‘inflationary’

Over time, US healthcare providers’ tariffs (having been made solvent by part of the demand) have increased, leading to inflation. The high expenditure of the US health service, which is an inherently inflationary system, compared to other Western countries, is mainly due to a difference in the pricing of medical goods and healthcare professionals’ fees.

The reforms during Barack Obama’s term in office did nothing to curb this inflation. Donald Trump says he wants to tackle this by putting pressure on drug prices in particular.

It is plain to see that universal health insurance allows for operational control over medical and hospital fees and the price of prescription drugs. This is the norm in OECD countries, such as France. This does not mean that doctors or nurses are poorly paid, or that there is no access to medical breakthroughs, but rather that regulation is safeguarded, i.e. not left to a market which, in the specific case of healthcare, mainly produces inflation.

Are the United States more socialist?

To conclude with a brief arithmetic demonstration: public health expenditure, financed by taxes and compulsory contributions, represents 43% of healthcare expenditure in the US, or 4,532 euros per capita per year (43% of the 10,517 euros in current healthcare expenses). In France, these expenses represent 79.4% or 4,195 euros or 4,863 dollars – 79.4% of 5,273 euros in current healthcare expenses per person per year, with the remainder being covered by patients themselves or their top-up health insurance plans.

In other words, US taxes provide more funding for the healthcare system in absolute terms! Can we safely say that this makes the United States more “socialist” in its approach? Obviously, there is no supporting evidence to suggest this, but it is clear that Americans pay twice for their healthcare: once through their taxes and a second time via their insurance premiums.

People in the US have long been aware of this and have become staunch supporters of universal health insurance, introduced by the late Senator Ted Kennedy, the youngest of the Kennedy brothers. The chances of such a reform making it onto the political agenda in the short term are nil because, to conclude with a quote from Marcel Proust’s Swann’s Way:

“The facts of life do not penetrate the sphere in which our beliefs are cherished; as it was not they that engendered those beliefs, so they are powerless to destroy them.”

Beliefs in the universal efficiency of the market are therefore as firm as they are costly, and are now more alive than ever.

The Conversation

Jean de Kervasdoué ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. France’s National Health system explained to U.S. citizens in 2026 – https://theconversation.com/frances-national-health-system-explained-to-u-s-citizens-in-2026-277289

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How does Iran go about selecting a new supreme leader? And who is in the running?

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Eric Lob, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Feb. 28, 2026, set off the process of selecting a new supreme leader. It is only the second such transition in the Islamic Republic’s 47-year history and the first since the ailing Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini transferred power to Khamenei in June 1989.

As stipulated in Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution, a three-person Interim Leadership Council was created on March 1, 2026. It consists of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, who is also a candidate for supreme leader.

The council has temporarily assumed the duties of the supreme leader until a new one is appointed by the Assembly of Experts – an elected body of 88 clerics. The assembly is expected to swiftly elect the next supreme leader, especially with Iran being in a state of war.

A group of clerics wearing traditional head coverings and long beards sit on seats arranged in concentric rows.
Members of Iran’s Assembly of Experts attend a session of the assembly in Tehran on Sept. 4, 2007.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Assuming it can be carried out, a swift succession is meant to signal to domestic dissidents and external enemies alike that the regime – or ruling system, nezam – remains in place. During the assembly’s first meeting to select a new supreme leader on March 3, Israel bombed its building in the city of Qom. The building was evacuated before the strike, and no casualties were reported.

Some media reports have portrayed Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, as a top contender, even though he lacks the status of a senior cleric. Although his is just one of a number of names that has been talked of as a potential successor.

Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, said that Israel would kill any successor to Khamenei that is selected. Nevertheless, the Assembly of Experts appears determined to carry out its constitutional duty and appoint a new supreme leader.

As a scholar of Iranian politics, I argue that the succession process, irrespective of its outcome, has never been free or transparent.

The history of succession

The Iranian supreme leader serves for life and is the highest religious and political authority in the Islamic Republic.

He is the commander in chief of the armed forces and oversees other key institutions, such as the judicial branch and state media.

He also supervises the Guardian Council, which has the power to vet electoral candidates and veto parliamentary legislation.

In this capacity, the supreme leader has the final say on foreign policy and different areas of domestic policy.

The first leader of the Islamic Republic – Khomeini – ruled between 1979 and 1989. In addition to being a revolutionary and charismatic figure, Khomeini was a grand ayatollah and a “source of emulation,” or marja’ al-taqlid.

A grand ayatollah and source of emulation is among a select few of the highest-ranking clerics. He is considered a “sign of God” in Twelver Shiism, the largest branch of Shiism and the state religion of Iran. A grand ayatollah and source of emulation has the authority to make legal decisions for his lay followers and for lower-ranking clerics in Iran and the wider Shiite world.

There are several dozen grand ayatollahs and sources of emulation in the world. Most of them reside and run seminaries in the holy cities of Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq. Shiites can choose which one they want to follow as a senior figure of the faith, making the institution decentralized.

The electoral facade

The members of the Assembly of Experts serve eight-year terms and are authorized to elect, supervise and, if necessary, dismiss the supreme leader. Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution grants the assembly the authority to remove the supreme leader if he is deemed incapable or unqualified politically and religiously. However, it is unlikely to do so given that its members are first vetted by the Guardian Council before being elected by a popular vote of Iranian men and women ages 18 and older.

It should be noted that the members of the Guardian Council are appointed by the supreme leader and the chief justice, or head of the judiciary, who is also appointed by the supreme leader.

Therefore, through the council, the supreme leader approves the candidates. They are potentially elected to a body that oversees him, making the process far from free and fair.

In the last election for the Assembly of Experts in March 2024, which had a historically low voter turnout of about 40%, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates.

This was particularly the case with moderates and reformists, who tended to oppose the supreme leader on various issues. For this reason, the assembly has not been known to seriously supervise or challenge the supreme leader, and its proceedings have remained strictly confidential or closed to the public.

The 1989 succession

As Khomeini approached the end of his life in 1989, the constitution was amended so that a lower-ranking cleric like Khamenei could assume the position.

A bearded man wearing a black turban and a long robe speaks on microphones while holding white flowers in one hand. On the wall next to him are photographs of two men, also wearing black turbans.
The leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, speaks at Friday prayers in Tehran on Oct. 30, 1998. Beside him is a picture of his predecessor, Khomeini.
AP Photo/Mohammad Sayyad

As a seminary student of Khomeini who was more interested in politics than religion, Khamenei ranked below an ayatollah. Within the Shiite clerical hierarchy, and like other Islamic scholars who studied under an ayatollah, he earned the title Hojjat al-Eslam, or “proof of Islam.” He possessed the foundational knowledge of Islam without the advanced and independent reasoning – ijtihad – required for an ayatollah.

After being appointed to succeed Khomeini, Khamenei’s rank was elevated overnight to a grand ayatollah. The reason for the appointment was that Khamenei was a longtime loyalist and regime insider, even though he lacked the charismatic and religious authority of Khomeini.

Until 1989, Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri – a prominent theologian and revolutionary leader – was expected to take over as the supreme leader. That year, however, he was ultimately passed over by Khomeini and detained by the Revolutionary Guard.

Montazeri succumbed to this fate because he had questioned Khamenei’s qualifications as supreme leader and condemned the regime for its repression, especially the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988 by a committee of four prosecutors. After continuing to criticize Khamenei in 1997, Montazeri was placed under house arrest under the pretext of protecting him from hard-liners. In 2003 he was released by the reformist president Mohammad Khatami, who had received pressure from parliamentarians to do so.

The situation with succession today

For years, rumors circulated that Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the recently slain supreme leader, could be named the next one. However, such a scenario seemed unlikely during the lifetime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who openly opposed it.

He did so to avoid antagonizing parts of the political and religious establishment that categorically reject hereditary or dynastic succession. After all, the concept is considered antithetical or anathema to the Iranian Revolution, which deposed the monarchy led by the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in 1979.

From a political perspective, Mojtaba has never held public office. By contrast, his father served as Iran’s third president between 1981 and 1989.

Several men surround a bearded, spectacled man wearing a black headdress.
Mojtaba Khamenei, center, attends the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, rally in Tehran on May 31, 2019.
AP Photo/Vahid Salemi, File

Religiously speaking, Mojtaba – like his father before he became the supreme leader – is only a midranking cleric, though he teaches theology at the renowned Qom Seminary. As with his father, and for political purposes, the Assembly of Experts would have to elevate Mojtaba’s status to a grand ayatollah, even without the requisite religious credentials.

It is worth mentioning that Mojtaba is being considered for supreme leader alongside some seniors clerics whose credentials come closer to that of a grand ayatollah. Alireza Arafi, whose name has also come up as a potential successor, attained the rank of an ayatollah, or mujtahid, after publishing over 20 books and articles on Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy.

That said, in 2022 his religious qualifications were called into question. That year he joined the Assembly of Experts without taking the required written exam administered by the Guardian Council, even though he had been a member of it since 2019. Instead, he was appointed to the assembly by Khamenei through a legal loophole and without being elected. This incident indicated that Arafi was favored by Khamenei and may have an advantage as a candidate for supreme leader.

Another candidate, Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, is an Islamic philosopher and theoretician. In this capacity, he serves as the head of the Qom Academy of Islamic Sciences and has been a member of the Assembly of Experts since 2016.

Yet another contender is Ayatollah Hashem Hosseini Bushehri. He was educated in the Qom Seminary and became the Friday prayer leader of the city. Alongside Arafi, Bushehri serves as a deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts.
As the current conflict continues, and even with the Interim Leadership Council in place, the Assembly of Experts is under immense pressure to rapidly rule on succession to preserve the system.

Mojtaba Khamenei’s election, as I see it, would continue the trend of prioritizing political preferences over religious principles that started in 1989.

This piece includes material from an earlier one published on May 23, 2024.

The Conversation

Eric Lob is affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

– ref. How does Iran go about selecting a new supreme leader? And who is in the running? – https://theconversation.com/how-does-iran-go-about-selecting-a-new-supreme-leader-and-who-is-in-the-running-277249

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International Women’s Day: Why is Mark Carney rejecting gender equity efforts?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jeanette Ashe, Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Women’s Leadership, King’s College London

The past year marked the 30th anniversary of the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the world’s most comprehensive plan to achieve the equal rights of women and girls.

Adopted in 1995, it called on governments to fight for gender equality, to protect women’s rights and to rebalance power structures so that everyone has an equitable chance in the world.

Thirty years later, Canada is still falling short. One of Beijing’s core commitments was for governments to create permanent, well-resourced institutions dedicated to advancing gender equality. Yet across Canada, some provinces still lack full, stand-alone ministries of Women and Gender Equality (WAGE), and the federal ministry of WAGE has been deprioritized.

A fragile federal commitment

Prime Minister Mark Carney initially dropped the Women and Gender Equality (WAGE) portfolio from his first cabinet, reinstating it only after pushback from women’s and social justice organizations.

More recently, reports of deep budget cuts to WAGE have renewed concern that gender equality remains politically expendable. Without sustained funding, programs vital to women’s safety and economic security could be decimated at a time when a number of urgent issues demand gender expertise.

As a recent UN Women media advisory reports, “the spread of digital misogyny poses a direct and urgent threat to progress on gender equality.” While much of this activity results in various forms of cyberbullying and harassment, the impact of these networks goes far beyond the digital world and shows up in real life spaces like our public schools.



Read more:
‘Quiet, piggy’ and other slurs: Powerful men fuel online abuse against women in politics and media

Wavering commitment

Yet, Canadian governments have done little to respond, as exemplified by AI Minister Evan Solomon’s decision against banning Elon Musk’s X or his AI chatbot Grok despite the growing problems of “nudification” and personalized pornography .

This wavering commitment echoes global patterns of institutional gender rollback, with the UN warning of a “post-feminist retrenchment.”

These trends are part of an international shift against equity and inclusion exemplified by recent court cases and policy changes in the United States — a shift glaringly evident as the Donald Trump administration blames gangs of “wine moms” for ICE protests and violence, including the killing of 37-year-old Renee Good in Minneapolis. Good’s death was described by Vice President JD Vance as a “tragedy of her own making.”

While this anti-equity rhetoric is circulating in Canada, a recent report reveals that “most Canadians view EDI measures in the workplace positively, with strong support among equity deserving groups, younger workers and those with positive job experiences.”



Read more:
Blaming ‘wine moms’ for ICE protest violence is another baseless, misogynist myth

A provincial patchwork

Six provinces currently maintain full, stand-alone ministries dedicated to women and gender equality:

By contrast, four provinces still lack a dedicated ministry:

Opaque and easily cut

When gender equality has a ministry of its own, citizens can see its budget, monitor its priorities and hold governments accountable. Where it does not, gender programs are buried inside larger departments; invisible in financial statements and easily cut.

Even federally, where WAGE exists, proposed cuts and decreased funding show how vulnerable these portfolios remain.

Carney’s mandate letter to cabinet clearly indicated a shift from his predecessor’s feminist brand. There is no reference at all to feminism or gender equality. In fact, Carney’s cuts to WAGE seem to reflect a larger rejection of feminist policies, including foreign policy.

But while governments stall, the public is ahead. Recent Abacus Data polling found that 86 per cent of Canadians support equal numbers of women and men in politics and 58 per cent support requiring political parties to nominate a minimum number of women candidates — up four points from last year.

This data shows Canadians are ready for legislated gender quotas and for the institutions needed to help deliver them. Fully funded ministries for Women and Gender Equality are one such institution.

Why now matters

The Beijing anniversary arrived amid a global gender backlash, from the rollback of reproductive rights in the U.S. to rising online abuse of women in politics. At precisely this moment, governments should be strengthening equality initiatives rather than weakening them.



Read more:
Growing threats faced by women candidates undermine our democracy

If gender equality is a priority, it’s simply not enough to celebrate the growing number of women in our legislatures. Real progress demands institutional power and stable funding of gender equality mandates. As UN Women recently reported, “achieving gender parity could cumulatively add US$342 trillion to the global economy by 2050.”

Repositioning Canada in the global hierarchy does not mean leaving 50 per cent of the population behind. Now, more than ever before, it’s critical to double down on the commitment to equity. In troubled times, leaders need to embrace equity wholesale, and taking leadership on equity must be a cornerstone of Carney’s supposed “values-based” pragmatism.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. International Women’s Day: Why is Mark Carney rejecting gender equity efforts? – https://theconversation.com/international-womens-day-why-is-mark-carney-rejecting-gender-equity-efforts-273677