Academic Reportage – Page 306 – MIL Submissions Engine

March 9, 2026

The federal government’s Musqueam agreements raise questions about who truly owns land

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Daniel Sims, Associate Professor of First Nations Studies; Adjunct Professor of Education, University of Northern British Columbia

Canada’s federal government recently signed three agreements with the Musqueam First Nation that, among other things, recognize the Musqueam People’s Aboriginal title to their traditional territory — which includes most of Vancouver.

For that reason, it’s surprising that rather than making headlines immediately, most media outlets didn’t report on the agreements until a week after Ottawa’s announcement. The situation was reminiscent of how the Cowichan case in the summer of 2025 didn’t make news until the City of Richmond started informing residents in October that it might affect their fee simple title, a term referring to ownership of full, permanent property rights.

Given how many residents not only in Richmond and Vancouver, but also the rest of British Columbia, have responded with concern about what this ruling means — including some who blame reconciliation efforts — the delay in informing the public is less than ideal and only causes further anxiety.

It hasn’t helped that when asked in the B.C. legislature, provincial government officials simply responded they weren’t involved in reaching the three agreements.

Cowichan

The Cowichan case is potentially precedent-setting because it stated that Aboriginal title could co-exist with fee simple title, the form of title most Canadians associate with land ownership.

In doing so, it transformed the general understanding of treaty-making in Canada — that only the Crown could acquire Aboriginal title, and having acquired it, could then grant title to third parties.

This concept is enshrined in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which is referenced in the Canadian Constitution and often cited as the reason why treaties were — or are — signed with Indigenous nations.

In fact, this belief was so entrenched in Canadian legal thought that in 1923, the federal government and the province of Ontario rushed through what are known as the Williams Treaties — final historic land cessions involving seven Mississauga and Chippewa First Nations — when they realized Aboriginal title had not been dealt with throughout the province.

One of the major exceptions to this way of handling Aboriginal title is British Columbia. Aside from the Douglas Treaties — negotiated by the colony of Vancouver Island, and Treaty 8, negotiated by the federal government without the province — treaties were not historically signed in B.C..

That means most Aboriginal title in B.C. has not been dealt with. They’re
currently being negotiated because past leaders refused to do so.

Perspectives on treaties

There has been a wealth of research and discussion regarding treaties between the Crown and Indigenous nations, and at times they come to some radically different conclusions.

For example, some First Nations view them as sacred agreements while others regard them in less than ideal terms.

The Conversation Canada ran a powerful piece two years ago that reconsidered the Williams Treaties from Anishinaabe perspectives.

Seven years ago, historian Sheldon Krasowski, who was born in Treaty 6 territory in Saskatoon, published his book No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous challenging the Crown’s perspective that treaties extinguished Aboriginal title. It illuminates why not all First Nations in British Columbia are negotiating treaties.

These discrepancies do not mean, however, that First Nations aren’t interested in having their Aboriginal title recognized. Instead, some nations, like the Tšilhqot’in, decided to take the matter to court. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the Tšilhqot’in had Aboriginal title to a portion of their traditional territory.

This prompted other First Nations to make similar legal claims, including the Cowichan and Musqueam, which brings us back to the Cowichan case and the Musqueam agreements.

Put simply, provincial and federal governments appear to be taking a calculated approach when it comes to these claims, fighting those they think they might win in the courts and simply recognizing Aboriginal title if they think they’ll lose.

‘Canadian dream’

As someone who researches this topic, I am amazed by how seemingly OK people are with the Haida Aboriginal Title Agreement in 2024 given that it also stated Aboriginal title can co-exist with fee simple title.

This brings us back to fee simple title. It’s important to remember it’s a legal concept that developed over time. In this sense, saying it can co-exist with Aboriginal title is a new development. That being said, given the place home ownership and land ownership play in the Canadian dream, it’s understandable that people who own property are concerned.

No one wants to worry that their land is not really theirs. Many people think of land ownership as absolute, even though strictly speaking, fee simple title starts with a Crown grant and can be revoked and infringed upon for a number of reasons. It also does not automatically include mineral rights.

In other words, no one has complete control over their land, and Aboriginal title is simply another layer of legal obligation.

Only time will tell what the co-existence of Aboriginal title with fee simple title will mean. The Cowichan case is currently being appealed, and given that in December 2025 the Wolastoqey ruling in New Brunswick found they could not co-exist, it’s possible the Cowichan ruling will be overturned.

Daniel Sims is a member of the Tsay Keh Dene First Nations. Currently he holds an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) to research failed economic developments and concepts of wilderness in Tsek’ehne traditional territory (the Finlay-Parsnip watershed).

– ref. The federal government’s Musqueam agreements raise questions about who truly owns land – https://theconversation.com/the-federal-governments-musqueam-agreements-raise-questions-about-who-truly-owns-land-277219

March 9, 2026

Gulf attention is turning inward: why the Iran war could destabilise the Horn of Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Brendon J. Cannon, Associate Professor, Khalifa University

Gulf states have become increasingly prominent in the squabbles, civil wars and inter-country tensions in the Horn of Africa over the past decade. The countries in this region include Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Somalia and Djibouti.

As a result, the US-Israel war on Iran matters for the Horn, where Gulf money, Gulf diplomacy and Gulf defence equipment have become part of the operating environment of conflict and rivalry.

For over a decade, I have researched the interactions of sub-Saharan Africa with Arab Gulf states, as well as Turkey, Japan, China and others. In my view, Gulf states may scale back their engagement in the Horn as the security situation in the Middle Eastern region deteriorates.

This could potentially reshape conflicts, alignments and diplomacy across the Horn of Africa – if the war drags on.

Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar – important partners for Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia – will likely begin focusing inward on their own security. The strategic importance of Horn of Africa states for Saudi Arabia or the UAE will diminish.

In practical terms, this could mean a drop in high-level visits, a reduction in arms flows and a weakening of political loyalty as Horn actors adjust.

For the Horn, this could lead to two outcomes. One, an escalation in conflict, with states and armed groups seeking to settle scores while external patrons are distracted. Or second, a temporary cooling-off period as actors reassess the implications of reduced Gulf funding, arms and mediation.

Either way, the Horn is unlikely to grow calmer. Instead, longstanding grievances, between Ethiopia and Eritrea for instance, may become more pronounced.

Sudan’s war and Gulf backing

For Sudan, the implications of the ongoing conflict in the Gulf could be significant. The two warring parties – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan’s military – have relied heavily on external support.

Both may find themselves suddenly without the largesse and military equipment from Gulf backers, depending on how the Iran war unfolds. This drawback of support could hit the RSF particularly hard as its biggest external backer, the UAE, focuses on its own security. Sudan’s military, however, may continue to benefit from Turkish and Egyptian support.

Much recent commentary has focused on evolving “alliances” and “blocs” that pit the UAE/Israel/Somaliland/Ethiopia against Turkey/Saudi Arabia/Egypt/Somalia within Sudan’s civil war.

This framing, however, often misses two basic facts. First, these are not alliances but rather opportunistic alignments that bring together diverse actors and interests from outside the Horn. These alignments have always been opportunistic on the part of external state actors, such as Turkey, the UAE and Qatar.

They hold only as long as external patrons can plausibly deliver resources, arms and diplomatic attention without unacceptable reputational damage to themselves.

Second, state leaders in the Horn of Africa have largely steered these relationships themselves. They have used external patrons to advance domestic and regional interests.

Gulf states’ opportunistic interventions were possible largely because they were at peace with one another and with Iran. That is no longer the case.

Sudan’s civil war may last even longer now that Gulf states are focused elsewhere. Neither side in the civil war will have the ability to land a knock-out punch.

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland’s recognition

The Iran war could affect Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland in a number of ways.

Firstly, the diplomatic flurry of visits by Gulf leaders to Ethiopia and Somalia may slow. From 2023 to early 2026, Gulf leaders sought to shape political outcomes and advance investment and logistics interests. If this tempo slows, Horn actors will face less patronage and mediation, which may lead either to a pause in tensions or to quick escalation.

Secondly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland – which Qatar and Saudi Arabia (as well as Egypt and Turkey) have taken a stand against – is now likely to be far from their agendas. Somalia’s long-standing ambition of reabsorbing Somaliland may also find waning external support.

Thirdly, Ethiopia’s interest in gaining access to the Red Sea has been one of the central issues in recent diplomatic manoeuvring in the Horn. With Saudi Arabia, in particular, focused on Iran, Addis Ababa may feel emboldened to formalise access through Somaliland (with which it had signed an agreement in 2024).

Turkey and Egypt may remain engaged

Two non-Gulf states, however, are likely to remain active in the Horn: Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey can still afford foreign policy opportunism in the region, as long as it does not become directly involved in the Iran war. For Ankara, the Gulf states’ distraction may create an opportunity to expand its influence. This could be through trying to help Somalia reassert control over Somaliland and other autonomous regions. It could also encourage Ethiopia to reduce tensions with Eritrea, or help balance relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. These would all enhance Turkey’s reputation outside its region and reinforce the image it has of itself as a rising, global power.

Egypt’s involvement is driven by existential concerns over the Nile. This is particularly about a dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This is a massive project on the Blue Nile that Egypt fears could reduce the flow of water on which its agriculture, economy and population depend.

For both Turkey and Egypt, curtailing Israel’s growing influence across the wider Middle East and the Horn of Africa remains a strategic priority. A stronger Israel would dilute Turkey’s desired role as a broker and patron in the Horn, and complicate Egypt’s efforts to constrain Ethiopia.

An emboldened Israel, however, could also reshape Egypt’s engagement with Ethiopia. Egypt and Turkey might offer Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed diplomatic incentives – including limited or symbolic access to the Red Sea in Somaliland’s port of Berbera, for instance. This would be in return for Addis Ababa’s agreement to reaffirm Somalia’s territorial integrity (and never recognise Somaliland). But this seems unlikely as neither Egypt nor Turkey possesses the power to put Somalia back together again.

The Horn’s own agenda

The real powers in the Horn of Africa remain the region’s own states and rival centres of authority. Horn states have the agency and interests to shape outcomes. They have long drawn external patrons into the region, playing them off against one another to extract resources, recognition and diplomatic support.

What the Iran war changes is not who sets the Horn’s agenda, but the external conditions under which Horn actors pursue it.

Gulf states have been opportunistic precisely because they had the capacity to act in the Horn when the Gulf itself was stable. That capacity may now be constrained.

This is not a new finding. In work published over five years ago, my colleague Federico Donelli and I argued that enduring security burdens at home limited the reach of Gulf ambitions in the Horn.

The Horn’s underlying conflicts and rivalries will therefore continue to interact in unpredictable ways.

Brendon J. Cannon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Gulf attention is turning inward: why the Iran war could destabilise the Horn of Africa – https://theconversation.com/gulf-attention-is-turning-inward-why-the-iran-war-could-destabilise-the-horn-of-africa-277855

March 9, 2026

Mau Mau: how Kenya’s history of colonial violence speaks through living bodies and graves

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Rose Miyonga, Researcher, University of Warwick

The Mau Mau Memorial Monument in Nairobi, Kenya. Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

Between 1952 and 1963, Kenya experienced one of the most violent chapters in its modern history. The Mau Mau uprising, rooted in land dispossession and political repression under British colonial rule, escalated into a brutal counterinsurgency war.

An estimated 50,000 Kenyans died during the violent conflict between Mau Mau guerrillas and British forces, and from disease and starvation. Torture, sexual violence and forced detention were widespread. Over a million people were displaced into villages and detention camps in the 1950s.

Many victims of the uprising were buried in unmarked mass graves. Others survived, but were permanently scarred.

As Britain prepared to leave in the early 1960s ahead of Kenya’s independence in 1963, officials took painstaking efforts to hide the evidence of their brutality. They destroyed some archival material that described their violent conduct and secretly took other documents back to the UK.

Further, after independence, Kenya’s own government pushed Mau Mau survivors to “forgive and forget” the past.

This created a profound historical gap. So if archives were destroyed and public history suppressed, where else might the past be found?

As an oral historian, I set out to answer this question. I embarked on an oral history project, speaking to 60 Mau Mau survivors, visiting memory sites such as mass graves, and collecting material from archives in the UK and Kenya.

I set out my findings in a recent paper.

My research shows that many Mau Mau survivors are living with permanent wounds and disabilities, which serve as constant reminders of the past. During interviews, people were keen to show me their scars and wounds, using them to illustrate their painful histories. These included bullet wounds (and sometimes bullets still lodged in the body), scars from torture and amputations.

My study showed that the body can become evidence in contexts where written documentation is absent or contested. Physical scars authenticate memory. These injuries also ensure that the past is never fully forgotten. Chronic pain and disability materially shape everyday life, tying the present to wartime violence.

My research also included understanding the Mau Mau war through human remains. I visited memory sites where communities mourn and remember, such as mass graves. I also researched the contents of boxes at the National Museum of Kenya on Mau Mau victims.

By sharing their experiences, survivors reclaim agency over their histories. Rather than being passive victims of silence, they become active custodians of memory.

My findings suggest that archives are not limited to documents stored in state repositories. In post-conflict contexts where records are incomplete or destroyed, memory often persists through bodies and landscapes.

Custodians of memory

Through my study, I was able to observe how people use their bodies to tell their histories. I noticed this most powerfully in the 2002 BBC documentary Kenya: White Terror.

In one section, Mau Mau survivor Mwangi Kinyari goes with presenter John McGhie to a detention camp, and takes him to the cell where he was tortured and held for eight days during a three-year imprisonment.

Ignoring McGhie’s urges to be careful, Kinyari removes his jacket and insists on acting out a scene of torture, manoeuvring himself into a handstand position with his feet up on the wall and his hands on the dirt floor to demonstrate how he was hung upside down during torturous interrogations in that cell.

He then removes his belt and lifts his shirt to show the scars from the operation he had for the internal bleeding that resulted from beatings.

The descriptions of brutality he endured at the hands of white guards were powerful enough. Kinyari gives testimony of having his testicles beaten until he urinated blood, and his eyes seared with hot coals.

His words and descriptions communicate the facts of what happened, but there is something more that his body conveys through acting out the scene of his torture, using his body to write into the missing record of his experiences, and recentring himself in the frame of historical memory.

Aged 80, Kinyari seized an opportunity to speak back to the historical forces that had forgotten him. He used his entire body as a vehicle to do this.

Mass grave sites also deserve greater recognition as spaces of history and remembrance. These mass graves are a visceral reminder of Mau Mau history, countering attempts to silence and sanitise the past. They offer insights into the brutality and devastation of the war.

Even though they are not marked or honoured in an official capacity, community members have found ways to tend to them as sites of mourning and remembrance.

Violence has profoundly shaped the past and present of Mau Mau survivors. This is evident both in survivors’ bodies and in the remains of those who were killed. These are archives in their own right.

Unhealed wounds aren’t only symbolic. They continue to shape survivors’ economic opportunities, health and wellbeing decades later. Embodied memory also strengthens contemporary justice claims. Survivors seeking compensation rely not only on testimony but on visible physical evidence of abuse.

What should be done

Bodies have powerful stories to tell. Unhealed wounds have resonance in the present, materially affecting survivors’ lives, illustrating the legacies of war. They are also record-keepers, offering evidence for people who still hope to have their stories heard and maybe even get compensation for their suffering.

Tending to these wounds would be literally and figuratively healing for the Kenyan nation. Ignoring these embodied archives risks reproducing historical erasure.

First, there needs to be urgency in recording survivors’ testimonies through oral histories and community memory work. The Mau Mau generation is ageing, and embodied memory will not last indefinitely.

Second, mass grave sites and human remains deserve formal recognition as spaces of national history and mourning.

Third, continued engagement with reparations processes is essential as it allows survivors of Mau Mau traumas to seek justice and closure.

Acknowledging embodied suffering is central to meaningful justice. Addressing these wounds – both literal and historical – could contribute to broader national reflection in a country still shaped by colonial violence and inequality.

Rose Miyonga receives funding from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council via the Midlands4Cities consortium.

– ref. Mau Mau: how Kenya’s history of colonial violence speaks through living bodies and graves – https://theconversation.com/mau-mau-how-kenyas-history-of-colonial-violence-speaks-through-living-bodies-and-graves-277118

March 9, 2026

Treaty 4 raises hard questions like how did ‘Crown land’ come to be?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ken Wilson, Assistant Professor, Department of English and Creative Writing, University of Regina

In my recently published book, Walking the Bypass: Notes on Place from the Side of the Road, I describe standing beside the Regina Bypass, a new (and politically controversial) highway around Saskatchewan’s capital, asking myself how settlers came to own the land that stretched to the horizon in all directions.

Canadian courts have generally treated the numbered treaties as land cessions, though they also recognize them as solemn agreements requiring honourable interpretation.

I recalled what the late Stó:lō Elder Lee Maracle wrote in My Conversations With Canadians: settlers like me rarely get curious about “how the shift from Indigenous authority over the land to Canadian authority over the land occurred.”

I decided to get curious, and what I learned surprised me.

The official story: Surrender

Regina is in Treaty 4 territory. In September 1874, treaty commissioners representing the Crown negotiated that treaty with Cree, Saulteaux and Nakoda chiefs at Fort Qu’Appelle, now a town east of Regina, but then a Hudson’s Bay Co. trading post.

What Treaty 4 means depends on whose story you believe. The federal government tells one story; First Nations treaty Elders and legal scholars tell another. Those stories offer radically different versions of that treaty.

According to the federal government, First Nations surrendered their title to the land through the historical numbered treaties, including Treaty 4. That interpretation depends on the words of the treaty document: First Nations “do hereby cede, release, surrender and yield up” their land.

There’s a problem, however. As historian Sheldon Krasowski points out in No Surrender: The Land Remains Indigenous, there’s no evidence those words were mentioned by the treaty commissioners during the negotiations, or that their translator, Charles Pratt, a Cree-Nakoda catechist who often translated for Anglican missionaries, would have been able to convey the treaty’s legalese into the chiefs’ languages.

When pioneering Cree lawyer Harold Cardinal and historian Walter Hildebrandt explained the meaning of what’s come to be known as the “surrender clause” to First Nations Treaty Elders, those Elders were incredulous that anyone would think the chiefs would have agreed to give up their rights to the land. Elder Kay Thompson (Treaty 4) told Cardinal and Hildebrandt:

“We never gave it up; we never surrendered anything.”

If that interpretation is wrong, then Canada’s legal claim to much of the land west of Ontario rests on uncertain ground.

A different account of Treaty 4

If the so-called “surrender clause” wasn’t interpreted, and if contemporary Treaty Elders say no surrender of land took place, then the federal government’s story about the treaties doesn’t make much sense. And, if there was no surrender of land, then what gave the federal government the right to survey, sell or give away to settlers everything outside of reserves?

How did the notion of “Crown land” come about? How did the shift in authority that Edler Maracle describes happen?

First Nations legal scholars and Elders offer a completely different account of Treaty 4 and the other historical treaties: they were about sharing the land and establishing an ongoing relationship with settlers.

The most important speech of the Treaty 4 negotiations, the one that brought the talks to a conclusion, was made by Chief Loud Voice on the last day of the discussions. He said:

“Let us join together and make the treaty; when both join together it is very good.”

Those words suggest a desire to create a relationship with the newcomers to the Plains, not a surrender of land. Contemporary Indigenous legal scholars agree with this interpretation.

In Two Families: Treaties and Government, writer and lawyer Harold Johnson argues that the treaties represent sacred ceremonies in which First Nations adopted settlers as their kin. That’s why the Elder he consulted suggested he use the Cree word kiciwâminawak — “our cousins” — to refer to settlers.

For Johnson, the key element of the negotiations was the Sacred Pipe Ceremony, which solemnized that adoption, not the treaty document. “The paper at treaty was ancillary to ceremony,” he explains. “My ancestors recognized your paper as your ceremony and participated so as not to offend.”

Ceremony, not paper, constituted the agreement.

What if the story isn’t true?

Interpreting Treaty 4, like the other historical treaties, as a sharing agreement rather than a surrender of land raises profound questions. How did so much land in Saskatchewan, as in other parts of Canada, come to belong to settlers?

This disagreement is not simply about history; it is about what counts as law.

In Saskatchewan, as elsewhere, reserves are a tiny part of the total area. The rest belongs to the Crown or has been sold or given to settlers.

How can that situation be considered sharing? How did the Crown come to possess the land? On what basis was the land sold or given away? Is our title to the land the product of a story that simply isn’t true? Did that shift from Indigenous to Canadian authority happen through a misunderstanding, at best, or trickery, at worst?

These two interpretations aren’t just trivia. The unsettling questions they raise block genuine reconciliation today because the official interpretation relies on a version of the treaty that partners reject. Thinking about those questions, and discussing them with Indigenous Peoples, won’t be easy for settlers, but it needs to happen.

As Dallas Hunt and Gina Starblanket, Cree authors and advocates for Indigenous thoughts, point out:

“Treaty is work; it takes labour to be in relationship with other people.”

Are we settlers ready for that work? The first step might be reconsidering which story about the treaties we believe.

Ken Wilson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Treaty 4 raises hard questions like how did ‘Crown land’ come to be? – https://theconversation.com/treaty-4-raises-hard-questions-like-how-did-crown-land-come-to-be-270036

March 9, 2026

How the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran helps Russia in its war against Ukraine

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

The American and Israeli attacks on Iran and the confusion within the United States over the war’s objectives are making headlines.

The attacks, and Iran’s countertactics of targeting American military bases and allies in the region, is having geopolitical ramifications beyond Iran’s borders. The surge in oil prices is just one way the war is affecting people around the world.

The war is also having a significant impact on other conflicts globally — especially the Russia-Ukraine war. The assault on Iran is helping advance Russian interests as it prepares for a spring offensive against Ukraine.

Impact of the war on Russia

The current phase of the Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fifth year, with the cost of the conflict in terms of resources and human casualties mounting on both sides.

One U.S. think tank estimates Russia’s total number of casualties at over 1.2 million, forcing Russia to rely on North Korean soldiers and illicit recruiting practices, primarily in Africa and Asia, to make up for a shortfall.

Russian casualty levels have impacted how it approaches the conflict, but equally important from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s perspective is maintaining support among both the broader populace and the Russian oligarchs. Preventing the Russian economy from collapsing has been critical to Putin’s endeavours.

The linchpin of the Russian economy is oil revenues, which are a critical component of the country’s federal budget. Efforts by Ukrainian allies to limit Russia’s ability to profit from oil revenues has resulted in oil reaching the lowest percentage of Russia’s budget in 2025 in over five years.

But the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, however, is likely to reverse this trend and indirectly further Russia’s war efforts.

The oil factor

Rising oil prices are the most immediate impact of the American-Israeli attack on Iran. In response to the attacks, Iran has shut down the Strait of Hormuz — a critical juncture in global energy responsible for one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

Iran has also targeted hydrocarbon production in surrounding states to further increase the strain upon the U.S., Israel and their allies.

Rising oil prices benefit Russia. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is having a disproportionate impact on Asia because the majority of the oil that goes through the strait is bound for Asian markets. That means Asian countries will have to look elsewhere to replace it.

The likely replacement source for Middle Eastern oil is Russia. Despite efforts by Ukraine’s allies to impose a price cap on Russian oil, Russia’s shadow fleet has succeeded in evading western sanctions.

China and other Asian countries will seize upon relatively cheaper Russian oil to insulate their economies against the energy shocks created by the war on Iran.

The oil profits generated by Russia as a result will help it continue its war in Ukraine. Given the declining state of the Russian economy, this turn of events couldn’t have happened at a better time for Putin.

Ukraine’s need for global support

The Ukraine-Russia conflict has become a war of attrition. The resources needed for victory go beyond the immediate resources that either Russia or Ukraine possess. Ukraine in particular needs its allies to focus on developments in the conflict.

The war on Iran, however, is diverting global attention from Russia-Ukraine. This works to Russia’s advantage.

America’s bombing campaign against Iran is also rapidly exhausting its stockpile of munitions. U.S. President Donald Trump has blamed former president Joe Biden for the shortage.

While the U.S. has cut supplies to Ukraine under Trump, Ukraine still relies on its European allies purchasing munitions from the U.S. due to Europe’s atrophied arms industry. As the war drags on, Ukrainian needs are likely to take a backseat to American needs.

Glimmer of hope?

Trump commented last year that Ukraine had no cards left to play in the war against Russia. Iran’s attacks, however, have exposed a critical weakness in American capabilities: drone warfare.

While the U.S. and its Gulf allies have shot down most Iranian drones thus far, they’ve done so at a disproportionate cost and are rapidly exhausting their air defence capabilities.

Ukraine has mastered drone warfare and countermeasures and is now arguably the most innovative state in these areas. A war game in 2025 between Ukraine and NATO in Estonia demonstrated Ukrainian superiority in this area of warfare.

Trump, in fact, has asked Ukraine for assistance in this area. It’s an opportunity Ukraine should seize upon to counter the many existential risks it faces due to the war in Iran.

James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran helps Russia in its war against Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/how-the-u-s-israel-attack-on-iran-helps-russia-in-its-war-against-ukraine-277724

March 9, 2026

Big beautiful refund? 5 tax code changes that may put more money in your pocket

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Jim Franklin, Professor of Accounting, Western Governors University School of Business

The days are getting longer and W-2s are blooming, which can only mean one thing – the U.S. tax season is here.

Many Americans may receive a bigger tax refund than in previous years as a result of changes under what has been dubbed “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” a package of tax breaks and spending cuts that President Donald Trump signed into law on July 4, 2025.

The act renewed tax cuts originally put in place in 2017 that had been set to expire at the end of 2025. Had that happened, one estimate shows the average individual filer would have seen a US$2,955 increase to their tax bill starting in 2026.

That hike would have come from factors including higher individual tax rates, while the standard deduction and child tax credit would have been slashed in half.

Instead, many filers can expect the new law to reduce their taxes for 2025 and beyond, with numerous provisions in place for the next three years.

Trump’s tax and spending package has introduced a variety of provisions aimed at benefiting a broad cross-section of individual taxpayers. The changes under the act are retroactive, meaning that even though the law was signed in July, taxpayers can treat the provisions as if they went into effect at the start of 2025.

Here are some of the new things 2025 filers should know about:

1. Increased deduction of state and local taxes

People subject to steep local and/or state taxes can now deduct a significantly larger portion of those assessments.

Allowable property, sales or income taxes paid to state and local governments in 2025 are deductible up to $40,000, or $20,000 for married filing separately. That’s up from the previous maximum of $10,000 and $5,000, respectively.

Higher income taxpayers – those with modified adjusted gross income exceeding $500,000, or $250,000 for those married filing separately – won’t be able to take full advantage of the $40,000 deduction. OB3 calls for gradual reductions in the deduction amount as income level rises.

In 2030, the state and local deduction reverts to the previous $10,000 limit, or $5,000 married filing separately.

2. Tip income deduction

Workers in approved occupations, such as hospitality, cosmetology or personal training, who receive qualified tips will be able to deduct up to $25,000 in tip income from their taxes for the first time.

This new deduction is phased out for single filers with a modified adjusted gross income over $150,000 and married couples filing jointly over $300,000.

This tax break is available through 2028.

3. Overtime pay deduction

Have earnings from working overtime? From 2025 through 2028, filers can take a deduction for pay exceeding their regular rate.

For example, if an employee typically earns $20 per hour and earns $30 per hour when working overtime, they qualify for a deduction of the extra $10. The maximum annual deduction is $12,500, rising to $25,000 for joint filers.

As with many of these deductions, there is a phaseout for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income over $150,000, or $300,000 for joint filers.

4. ‘Made in America’ car deduction

Purchased a new vehicle for personal use or thinking about buying one soon? From 2025 through 2028, buying a vehicle made in the United States means the filer can deduct vehicle loan interest.

Vehicles that qualify include cars, minivans, vans, SUVs, pickup trucks and motorcycles that underwent final assembly in the U.S.

The maximum annual deduction is $10,000. The deduction starts to phase out for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income over $100,000; $200,000 for joint filers.

5. New deduction for seniors

For tax years 2025 through 2028, individuals older than 65 are eligible for a deduction up to $6,000 or $12,000 total for a married couple when both spouses qualify. The deduction begins to phase out when modified adjusted gross income exceeds $75,000 or $150,000 for joint filers.

It’s important to note that this deduction is in addition to the existing senior deduction that was passed under a prior law.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute professional tax advice. Please seek a qualified tax professional for advice based on your individual tax circumstances.

Jim Franklin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Big beautiful refund? 5 tax code changes that may put more money in your pocket – https://theconversation.com/big-beautiful-refund-5-tax-code-changes-that-may-put-more-money-in-your-pocket-275528

March 9, 2026

I’ve studied MAGA rhetoric for a decade, and this is what I see in Hegseth’s boasts, action-movie one-liners and gloating over dominance

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Casey Ryan Kelly, Professor of Communication Studies, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth responds to questions about the Iran war in a March 2, 2026, press conference. Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

When Secretary of Defense James Mattis addressed the intensification of U.S. combat operations against the Islamic State group in 2017, he assured the American public of his commitment to “get the strategy right” while maintaining “the rules of engagement” to “protect the innocent.”

Mattis’ professional tone was a stark contrast to Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks following the first days of the joint U.S.-Israeli combat operations in Iran.

On March 2, 2026, after bragging about the awe-inspiring lethality of U.S. “B-2s, fighters, drones, missiles,” Hegseth casually brushed aside concerns about long-term geopolitical strategy, declaring “no stupid rules of engagement, no nation-building quagmire, no democracy building exercise, no politically correct wars. We fight to win.”

Admonishing the press for anything less than total assent, he commanded, “to the media outlets and political left screaming ‘endless wars:’ Stop. This is not Iraq.”

Two days later, Hegseth gloated about “dominance” and “control,” while asserting that the preoccupation of the “fake news media” with casualties was motivated by liberal media bias and hatred of President Trump.

“Tragic things happen; the press only wants to make the president look bad,” he said. He dismissed concerns about the rules of engagement, declaring that “this was never meant to be a fair fight. We are punching them while they are down, as it should be.”

Pete Hegseth’s Pentagon press conference, at which he asserted the Iran war would have no ‘No stupid rules of engagement, no nation building quagmire, no democracy-building exercise.’

I’m a communication scholar who has studied MAGA rhetoric for a decade. I have observed how Hegseth and other officials in the second Trump administration refuse to abide by what recurring rhetorical situations – urgent public matters that compel speech to audiences capable of being influenced – typically demand of public officials.

The theme of this administration is that no one is going to tell it what to say or how to say it. It will be encumbered neither by norms nor the exigencies that compel speech in a democratic society.

The big man

When the U.S. goes to war, the public expects the president and the defense secretary to convince them of the appropriateness of the action. They do this by detailing the justification for military action, but also by addressing the public in a manner that conveys the seriousness and competence required for such a grave task as waging war.

But during the first week of the Iran war, Hegseth’s press briefings deviated from the measured tone expected from high-ranking military officials.

Hegseth flippantly employed villainous colloquialism – “they are toast and they know it,” “we play for keeps,” and “President Trump got the last laugh” – delivered with a combative tone that communicated masculine self-assurance.

Many observers were taken aback by his haughty tone, hypermasculine preoccupation with domination, giddiness about violence and casual attitude toward death.

During Trump’s first term, this penchant for rule-breaking was by and large isolated to the president, whose transgressions were part of his populist appeal.

Although Trump’s first cabinet members agreed on most political objectives, they attempted to rein in what they saw as the president’s more dangerous whims.

But with loyalty as the new bona fide qualification for administration officials, Trump’s second cabinet is populated with a large contingent of right and far-right media personalities like Hegseth, including Kash Patel, Sean Duffy and Mehmet Oz.

The anti-institutional ethos of far-right media explains why these officials refuse to conform to “elite” expectations and instead speak in a manner that is bombastic, outrageous and perverse.

Among them, there is little reverence for what they may perceive of as emasculating rules of tradition and politeness in a media marketplace where “owning,” “dominating,” and “triggering” your enemy is precious currency. Far-right media personalities are adept at commanding attention with showmanship and swagger.

Trump appears to have chosen Hegseth for precisely this reason: He performs the role of the big man to perfection.

“They are toast and they know it,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said of Iran on March 4, 2026.

‘Kill talk’

Hegseth’s language choices and petulant tone do not demonstrate an ignorance of what rhetorical situations demand of him; instead, they reflect a refusal to be emasculated by such cumbersome norms.

When making statements about the first week of the war, Hegseth grinned as he delivered action-movie one-liners, like “turns out the regime who chanted ‘Death to America’ and ‘Death to Israel’ was gifted death from America and death from Israel.”

Hegseth engaged in what is known as “kill talk,” a verbal strategy, typically directed at new military recruits, that denies the enemy’s humanity and disguises the terrible costs of violence. His repetition of words like “death,” “killing,” “destruction,” “control,” “warriors” and “dominance” framed violence in heroic terms that are detached from the realities of war.

In my view, Hegseth addressed the public as a squad leader addresses military recruits. Hegseth apparently delighted in dispensing death and elevating and glorifying war. He said virtually nothing of long-term strategy beyond “winning.”

In the MAGA media world, winning is really all that matters. If winning is the only goal, then war is, by profound inference, a game, a test of masculine fortitude.

This point was made clear when the White House posted a video that interspersed footage of airstrikes on Iran with “killstreak animation” from the popular video game Call of Duty: Modern Warfare. In the game, when a player kills multiple opponents without also dying, they are rewarded with the ability to conduct a missile strike to exterminate an opposing team. Again, this message gamifies violence and obscures the destructive toll of war.

Informed by the contemptuous hypermasculinity of far-right media culture, all this taboo behavior and glorified portrayals of death convey one fundamental message: When the public most needs explanation and justification for the actions of their government, the powerful owe the public neither explanation – nor comfort.

Casey Ryan Kelly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. I’ve studied MAGA rhetoric for a decade, and this is what I see in Hegseth’s boasts, action-movie one-liners and gloating over dominance – https://theconversation.com/ive-studied-maga-rhetoric-for-a-decade-and-this-is-what-i-see-in-hegseths-boasts-action-movie-one-liners-and-gloating-over-dominance-277731

March 9, 2026

Abandoned Pennsylvania mines and waste-heat recycling could make the state’s massive new data centers far more sustainable

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Wangda Zuo, Professor of Architectural Engineering, Penn State

An aerial view shows cooling vent fans on the roof next to generators on the lower level of a data center in Ashburn, Va. Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images

The electricity needed to power new Pennsylvania data centers already in advanced stages of planning could power 11 million homes – nearly twice the total number of households in the state.

Companies that want to build data centers to expand their cloud and artificial intelligence computing are drawn to Pennsylvania due to its proximity to major East Coast cities, relatively affordable land and electricity, and legacy industrial infrastructure. For instance, there is a plan to turn an abandoned steel mill in Pittsburgh into a high-density data center that can leverage the existing infrastructure for electricity and water supply.

If all data centers in advanced planning are built, it could total about 13 gigawatts of electrical capacity.

As more data centers are proposed across the state, residents and policymakers are asking important questions: How much energy and water will these data centers use? And what can be done to manage their environmental footprint?

As a professor of architectural engineering at Penn State, my research focuses on optimal design and control of data center cooling systems. I know that a key part of the answer to minimizing the negative effects of data centers lies in cooling.

Data centers generate a lot of heat

Every bit of electricity that a data center consumes is converted into heat that must be removed and released into the environment. Cooling systems, including chillers and cooling towers, are mission-critical infrastructure.

Without effective cooling, temperatures in computing devices would quickly rise to damaging levels, forcing systems to shut down. In November 2025, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange experienced a major outage when a data center’s cooling system failed. It halted trading for hours.

Data centers currently account for about 4.4% of total U.S. electricity consumption and are projected to rise to 6.7% to 12.0% in 2028, according to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

They also consumed nearly 211 billion gallons of water in 2023, most of it indirect and tied to electricity generation. Within individual facilities, cooling alone accounts for about 40% of total electricity use

How efficiently Pennsylvanians cool data centers has major implications for energy consumption, water demand and community impacts.

People hold signs that say 'No! D Da Dah Dat Data Center' — People opposed to a data center proposal at the former Pennhurst state hospital grounds talk during a break in an East Vincent Township supervisors meeting in December 2025 in Spring City, Pa.
AP Photo/Marc Levy, file

The challenges of cooling

AI workloads demand a lot of computing power and therefore generate more heat that must be removed.

Traditional air-cooled systems rely on powerful fans and mechanical chillers, both of which consume significant amounts of electricity.

During Pennsylvania’s hot and humid summers, cooling energy needs for data centers can rise sharply. This increased demand on electricity requires costly infrastructure upgrades, and the cost is often shared by all users including residents, which raises concerns of fairness.

Water is another concern. Many large facilities use evaporative cooling towers that consume millions of gallons of water per day. In regions facing periodic droughts or stressed water supplies, this can frustrate local communities.

Noise is a third, often overlooked issue. Most complaints from people who live near data centers are not about servers but about cooling systems. Large cooling tower fans, rooftop air-handling units and dry coolers generate continuous low-frequency noise. Chillers and compressors add vibration and tonal hum. In quiet rural or suburban settings – especially at night – this steady sound can travel surprisingly far.

Pennsylvania’s climate presents both challenges and opportunities when it comes to cooling data centers. Cold winters can support energy-efficient cooling for part of the year. However, hot and humid summers limit the effectiveness of those free cooling strategies.

At the same time, many proposed sites sit near legacy industrial infrastructure, including abandoned coal mines, that could enable innovative approaches.

A stretch of grassland alongside and empty road — This stretch of land near Carlisle, Pa., may become a $15 billion data center complex.
AP Photo/Marc Levy

Turning heat into opportunity

Improving cooling efficiency is a straightforward way to minimize the negative impact of data centers.

In a U.S. Department of Energy project my team worked on, we demonstrated a 74% cooling energy reduction in a Massachusetts data center. This was achieved by using a digital twin of the data center. A digital twin is a virtual representation of a real system. Using this digital twin, we were able to identify and fix different faults in the cooling system. We also used the digital twin to optimize the control set points based on the data center workload and weather conditions to meet the cooling needs with much less energy.

In addition, more saving can be achieved by integrating the digital twins with AI, which can perform the optimal cooling control with minimal human interventions. This concept – I call it “AI for sustainable AI” – aims to reduce the environmental footprint of the very systems powering the AI revolution. We are currently working with the Alerify data center in Harrisburg to reduce its cooling energy consumption using this technology.

Pennsylvania also has potential for geothermal cooling from its abandoned mines across the state. An example is Iron Mountain’s underground data center in western Pennsylvania, about an hour north of Pittsburgh. The data center is located 220 feet below ground in a former limestone mine. The stable and naturally cool subterranean environment – around 52 degrees Fahrenheit (11 degrees Celsius) – and underground lake reduce reliance on conventional mechanical cooling.

Beyond efficiency, reusing waste heat can transform how we think about data centers. In Idaho, a startup is using server waste heat to support hydroponic greenhouses for year-round food production. In Paris, excess data center heat has warmed swimming pools used during the 2024 Olympics, and one of Meta’s data centers in Denmark supplies heat to a district heating network serving roughly 11,000 local homes. In Colorado, the National Laboratory of the Rockies recovers heat from its high-performance computing systems to warm building spaces and melt snow.

There are also opportunities in food processing and aquaculture. In Norway, waste heat from a data center is used to warm water for land-based fish farming. Studies suggest that the waste heat from data centers could also support food-drying processes for coffee beans, fruits and vegetables.

To be economically viable, these solutions often require a constant heating demand located adjacent to the data center, which may not be readily available in some cases.

Data centers will likely play a growing role in Pennsylvania’s economy. The question is not whether they will use energy and generate heat – they inevitably will. The question is whether we design them to simply release that heat into the air and water, or design cooling systems to harness it for more sustainable uses.

Read more of our stories about Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, or sign up for our Philadelphia newsletter on Substack.

Wangda Zuo receives funding from National Science Foundation, U.S. Department of Energy, and Penn State.
He is a Fellow American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers.
Besides his academic position at Penn State University, he is CTO and Co-founder of Glacian Technologies Inc, which is a Pen State spin-off company. He also holds a joint appointment at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Laboratory of the Rockies.

– ref. Abandoned Pennsylvania mines and waste-heat recycling could make the state’s massive new data centers far more sustainable – https://theconversation.com/abandoned-pennsylvania-mines-and-waste-heat-recycling-could-make-the-states-massive-new-data-centers-far-more-sustainable-273180

March 9, 2026

Why do mountaintops stay snowy, even though they’re closer to the Sun?

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Allie Mazurek, Engagement Climatologist and Researcher, Colorado Climate Center, Colorado State University

Curious Kids is a series for children of all ages. If you have a question you’d like an expert to answer, send it to CuriousKidsUS@theconversation.com.

Why do we see snow on mountaintops that are closer to the Sun but not near the ground? – Ms. Drew’s third grade class, Beechview Elementary School, Farmington Hills, Michigan

There’s not much better than a bluebird day in the mountains – a crisp, sunny day accompanied by a fresh blanket of snow. But why doesn’t the Sun quickly melt all that high altitude snow away?

It all boils down to our atmosphere, which is what I research as a scientist in Colorado. Let’s dive in!

Our atmosphere: Earth’s armor

Earth’s atmosphere begins right at its surface and extends to outer space, and it is filled with a mixture of many different gases. Gases in the atmosphere include the oxygen we breathe and the water vapor that makes it rain and snow. They are essential to supporting life on Earth in several ways.

One of the most important jobs those gases have is to protect us from harmful things in space, including our closest star: the Sun.

The Sun’s radiation provides heat to our planet, but too much of it can be a problem. If you’ve ever gotten a sunburn, then you’re already familiar with this idea.

Illustration shows how the greenhouse effect warms the Earth by trapping some gases close to the surface. — Gases in the atmosphere warm the Earth by trapping heat close to the planet’s surface. Too much of those greenhouse gases can cause global temperatures to rise beyond normal and stay high.
Climate Central, CC BY

Some of our atmospheric gases limit the amount of radiation from the Sun that can reach the Earth’s surface by absorbing some of it, which prevents temperatures from being way too warm in the daytime. At night, certain atmospheric gases also trap some of the heat that the Earth’s surface releases as it cools down, protecting us from unsurvivable cold.

The way the atmosphere regulates Earth’s temperatures is known as the greenhouse effect. You’ll often hear this term used alongside climate change or global warming. That is because global warming is caused by enhancing the greenhouse effect: As people burn fossil fuels in cars and factories, the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increases. These extra gases allow the Earth’s atmosphere to trap more heat, causing an increase in temperatures.

The atmosphere likes to stay grounded

If you were to compare the Earth’s atmosphere along a Caribbean beach to that surrounding the top of Mount Everest, it would look quite different.

That is because as you go higher up in the atmosphere, it gets “thinner,” meaning that there are less gases present at higher elevations and altitudes.

There are more atmospheric gas molecules present at lower altitudes, closer to sea level. But as you go higher in the mountains, atmospheric pressure and the density of air molecules decrease. It’s why climbers on Mount Everest need oxygen tanks.

Why? Blame it on gravity.

In the same way that gravity keeps people and objects from flying away to outer space, Earth’s gravitational force pulls on the gases in our atmosphere, trying to keep them as close to Earth as possible.

As a result, there are fewer gas molecules in the atmosphere as you go higher up in altitude, making the air thinner, or less dense. Humans can sometimes experience altitude sickness at high elevations because there is less oxygen present in the air as a result of this phenomenon.

Closer to the Sun, but still cold and snowy?

Our high-elevation mountains protrude into higher altitudes of the atmosphere, where the air has fewer gas molecules. While this thinner air allows more of the Sun’s radiation to pass through compared with the atmosphere at sea level, thinner air tends to be colder for two reasons:

First, collisions between gas molecules generate heat, and if you have fewer molecules available to run into each other, that heat generation is lower.

Second, a thinner atmosphere is less effective at maintaining heat because there are fewer molecules available to trap and hold on to heat.

Colder temperatures can create more opportunities for precipitation to fall in the form of snow rather than rain, which is why some mountains can be so snowy.

And if the ground is habitually covered in snow, as is the case in many mountain ranges, it can be even easier to maintain cooler temperatures. That’s because snow-covered surfaces are very reflective, making them highly effective at causing the Sun’s incoming rays to bounce back toward space instead of getting absorbed by the ground.

So if you visit the mountains to have fun in the snow, be sure to pack your jacket, but don’t forget that sunscreen too.

Allie Mazurek does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why do mountaintops stay snowy, even though they’re closer to the Sun? – https://theconversation.com/why-do-mountaintops-stay-snowy-even-though-theyre-closer-to-the-sun-277560

March 9, 2026

Mobile clinics offer a practical way to improve health care access in maternity care deserts

Source: The Conversation – USA (3) – By Adetola F. Louis-Jacques, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of Florida

Only three of the 14 counties in north-central Florida provide full access to obstetric care. Six have low access to care – meaning there are fewer than two hospitals offering obstetric care or birth centers per 10,000 births and fewer than 60 obstetric providers. The remaining five counties are maternity care deserts. Approximately 3,400 women of childbearing age live in those deserts.

In 2024, a report found that hospitals across Florida were discontinuing obstetric care due to lack of funding. Eighteen of the state’s 21 rural hospitals no longer provide obstetric care.

To address this gap in care, in February 2025 the University of Florida established the OB/GYN Mobile Outreach Clinic. The mobile clinic provides comprehensive maternal health services, including prenatal and postpartum care, breastfeeding support, family planning, annual gynecological exams and preventive health screenings. The only services not offered on-site are deliveries.

We are the director and assistant director of the clinic and a at the University of Florida. Outside of our work with the mobile clinic, we also research interventions to improve maternal health in low-resource settings.

We launched the clinic in February 2025. By the end of 2025, we had provided care to 194 women in 616 visits.

Based on our experience, we believe that mobile clinics focused on maternal health could be an effective way to reach more rural and low-income communities.

Maternity deserts across the US

Two and a half million American women of childbearing age – nearly 4% – live in a maternity care desert: a county without a single hospital, birthing center or obstetric health care professional.

Over the past decade, the closure of hundreds of obstetric units has exacerbated this problem, particularly in rural regions. Women in maternity care deserts travel an average of 35 miles to reach a birthing hospital, compared to an average of 9 miles for women in full-access counties.

The maternal mortality rate in the U.S., which peaked during COVID, remains higher than that of most other high-income nations. Access to timely prenatal and postpartum care is crucial to preventing pregnancy-related deaths. Studies have shown that traveling longer distances for obstetric care is associated with worse infant and maternal health outcomes.

Our mobile model

Mobile health clinics are vehicles, such as buses or vans, equipped with medical tools and supplies to deliver health care services.

The University of Florida OB/GYN Mobile Outreach Clinic is a retrofitted bus with two exam rooms, an ultrasound machine and supplies for serum and urine testing for prenatal labs. A small dispensary allows providers to give prenatal vitamins and medications for common conditions, such as vaginitis or urinary tract infections. This reduces the need for patients to make additional pharmacy or lab visits or pay for medication.

Care provided at the mobile clinic is free to the patient. If patients are eligible for Medicaid or other health insurance, our team assists them in applying for benefits. In 2023, about 1 in 7 women of childbearing age in Florida were uninsured.

Operating on a different model

The Mobile Outreach Clinic operates twice weekly in consistent, rotating locations, including northeast Gainesville in Alachua County, Lake City in Columbia County, Bronson in Levy County and Trenton in Gilchrist County. Of these locations, only Levy County is a maternity care desert, but all of these locations were selected to care for patients of low socioeconomic status and limited access to care.

We set up the clinic at sites that are already trusted or frequently visited by our target population. This includes family resource centers, churches and public libraries. Patients and families know they can expect us on a consistent day of the week. A core principle of our program is that we show up, no matter what. This ethos has helped us establish and maintain trust with our patients.

Appointments are walk-in or scheduled, with wait times significantly shorter than traditional clinics. Patients are scheduled within a week, generally through referrals from trusted partner agencies or from other patients.

Unlike traditional clinics, which schedule for 15- to 20-minute appointments, the mobile clinic allots 30-60 minutes for patient visits. This allows time to address social needs, transportation barriers, food insecurity or housing needs. The clinical care team is led by nurse midwives and includes a physician assistant, certified nurse-midwives, nurses, a nurse practitioner and lactation consultant, medical assistants and promotoras, community health workers who act as peer educators and patient liaisons in Hispanic communities. Maternal-fetal medicine physicians review ultrasound images remotely.

Operating outside a traditional clinical setting sometimes requires our staff to be flexible and creative to meet the needs of our patients. For instance, the week before Thanksgiving, our clinic was at capacity while parked in a church lot in Trenton. One of our patients needed a nonstress test, and with space limited, the nurse and health educator interpreter worked together to complete the test in a quiet area within the church. The patient received timely care despite the full schedule and space constraints.

Taking health care to the streets

Currently, there are approximately 3,600 mobile health clinics in the United States, with 1,319 tracked through the Mobile Health Map.

These clinics can provide a wide range of services, from disaster relief and mental health care to mammography and dental care, to primary and preventive care. They particularly target low-income and uninsured populations. A study of 811 mobile clinics found that among patients treated between 2007 and 2017, 36% were from rural areas, 38% were homeless, 55% were low income and 56% were uninsured.

Mobile health clinics have been shown to improve health by delivering regular care directly to populations that would not have access otherwise.

In a survey of mobile clinic users, patients reported receiving holistic care, feeling safer than they’d felt in other health care settings and interacting with staff who were mindful of health care costs.

Regardless of insurance status, patients said they were able to maintain continuity of care, meaning the mobile clinic managed their care consistently and was able to share their records with new providers to ensure they received appropriate care.

Expanding mobile health to pregnant patients

Unfortunately, only 128 of the 1,319 mobile clinics tracked in the mobile health map provide maternal and infant health services, and the services they offer pregnant, postpartum and newborn patients are generally quite limited. As maternity care deserts expand, mobile health clinics could offer a practical solution for meeting prenatal and postpartum care needs.

We believe our model could be replicated elsewhere, and other similar clinics are already up and running, such as the University of Arizona Mobile Health Program.

The primary challenge for mobile clinics is funding, as they are typically free to patients and supported through grants. With projected recent changes to Medicaid and ACA marketplace coverage, even more patients may face limited access to prenatal and postpartum health care.

Studies on mobile health clinics have identified several additional challenges associated with this model of care. Mobile clinics are not equipped to manage emergent complications, complex medical procedures or labor and delivery.

They also face staffing limitations, particularly in finding health care professionals who understand and enjoy the unique opportunities and challenges inherent in providing care on a mobile clinic, in addition to their scheduled clinic or hospital shifts.

But our hope is that as our clinic and others like it demonstrate an improvement in health care in maternal care deserts, increased awareness and support may help expand this model to more communities.

Read more stories from The Conversation about Florida.

Adetola F. Louis-Jacques receives funding from NIH, Direct Relief/CVS Foundation, Children’s Trust of Alachua County

The OBGYN Mobile Outreach Clinic receives funding from Direct Relief/CVS Foundation.

Arielle Ayotte does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mobile clinics offer a practical way to improve health care access in maternity care deserts – https://theconversation.com/mobile-clinics-offer-a-practical-way-to-improve-health-care-access-in-maternity-care-deserts-274476