U.S. actions in Iran are politically motivated, not the result of intelligence failures

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By James Horncastle, Assistant Professor and Edward and Emily McWhinney Professor in International Relations, Simon Fraser University

Intelligence agencies are often blamed when the use of military force has an unexpected or negative outcome. Pundits often argue leaders end up in difficult situations because they are not fully informed, or intelligence agencies got it wrong.

Of course, analysis is sometimes wrong. Intelligence failures do happen and can lead to bad decisions and disastrous outcomes. When intelligence agencies fail, as they did before 9/11, the price is steep. But, more often than not, intelligence analysis is very good.

Perceived failures are far more likely when political leaders manipulate, ignore or even revise intelligence findings for their own purposes.

The Donald Trump administration appears to be playing politics with intelligence regarding the ongoing United States-Israel war in Iran. Tulsi Gabbard, the current director of national intelligence, told U.S. congress last week that the judgment of whether Iran posed an imminent threat belonged to the president.

This statement exposes how intelligence was politicized and various agencies ignored in the lead-up to the conflict.

Intelligence agencies

Modern intelligence agencies resulted from difficult experiences; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, was only established in 1947, six years after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. had sufficient information to foresee the attack, but the institutions of the time and the interpretations of political leaders failed to put a complete picture together.

Dramatized spycraft makes for great entertainment. But the more important work of intelligence agencies is painstakingly collecting and assessing bits and pieces of information of various kinds.

Experiences like Pearl Harbor resulted in practices that guard against individual interpretation, force analysts to consider alternatives and subject assumptions to the critical eye of experts. It’s a massive undertaking: between 100,000 and 120,000 people now work in the U.S. intelligence community.

The importance of autonomy

Intelligence agencies, by the nature of what they examine, often have incomplete data. They must work carefully to avoid bias.

These biases range from internal biases, such as the concept of mirror imaging, to external ones, such as political interference. Recent history is replete with examples of political interference in intelligence assessment to their own country’s detriment.

Most European analysts did not believe Russia would invade Ukraine in the lead-up to the full-scale Russian assault in 2022. The reason for their incredulity was that given Russia’s stated strategic goals, a direct invasion would compromise the country.

Vladimir Putin, however, had isolated himself from objective analysis and continues to do so. Instead, the structure of the Russian state encouraged people who agreed with him rather than those who provided analysis based on expertise.

The result is a war entering its fifth year, with a heavy toll on the Russian people and Putin’s dream of a stronger Russia floundering.

But the U.S. doesn’t need to look abroad for similar examples. The greatest American strategic folly of the 21st century, the invasion of Iraq, was abetted by the George W. Bush administration’s misrepresentation of CIA assessments that did not further the goal of invading Iraq.

In the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, Bush and his inner circle reportedly “cherry-picked” intelligence assessments to justify their case for war, leading them to fall victim to a form of bias known as groupthink.

The Iraq invasion has had long-lasting consequences — it still compromises America’s geostrategic position in the Middle East and globally. The invasion, in fact, helped bolster the regional strength of the current U.S. adversary, Iran.

A grey-haired man stands a podium with the U.S. presidential insignia. Behind him a sign reads Mission Accomplished.
In this May 2003 photo, U.S. President George W. Bush declares the end of major combat in Iraq as he speaks aboard the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off the California coast. The war dragged on for many years after that.
(AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite)

Failure to learn from the past

It seems the Trump administration has learned no lessons from the Iraq debacle.

In her congressional testimony, Gabbard avoided the topic of whether intelligence agencies agreed that Iran posed an imminent threat to the U.S. Given that Gabbard was under oath, her evasion suggests the White House interpreted information differently or dismissed intelligence reports.

Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, recently resigned in protest over the decision to attack Iran.

Kent, regardless of his own problematic past, noted in his resignation letter that Trump chose to ignore intelligence briefings that Iran did not pose an imminent threat and instead relied on an inner circle of supporters to justify his decision to wage war.

Fallout

The problems emerging from Trump’s attack on Iran are both grave and predictable. Not only has the U.S. failed to bring about regime change — ostensibly one of the reasons to attack — but the government now in charge in Iran is even more radical than the one it’s replaced.




Read more:
U.S.-Israeli strikes against Iran may succeed on a military basis, but at what cost?


Furthermore, the world is now facing an energy crisis, which, according to the head of the International Energy Agency, is worse than the oil spikes of the 1970s. This directly stems from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

While Trump is trying to frame his decision to attack Iran as a victory, it is likely to be anything but — not only America’s strategic position in the Middle East, but for the intelligence community and global security.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. U.S. actions in Iran are politically motivated, not the result of intelligence failures – https://theconversation.com/u-s-actions-in-iran-are-politically-motivated-not-the-result-of-intelligence-failures-278971

If using ChatGPT is cheating, what about ghostwriting? The old debate behind a new panic

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Emily Hodgson Anderson, Professor of English and Dean of Undergraduate Education, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

Ghostwriting sits at the nexus of collaboration and deception. EThamPhoto/The Image Bank via Getty Images

In February 2023, a little more than a year after the launch of ChatGPT, Vanderbilt University sent an email to its student body in the wake of a fatal campus shooting at Michigan State.

“The recent Michigan shootings are a tragic reminder of the importance of taking care of each other,” the email read in part. In tiny type at the bottom of the message, a disclaimer appeared: “paraphrased from OpenAI’s ChatGPT.”

Students immediately objected.

“There is a sick and twisted irony to making a computer write your message about community and togetherness because you can’t be bothered to reflect on it yourself,” one senior wrote.

A Vanderbilt apology email quickly followed. The university launched a professionalism and ethics investigation. One associate dean couched the misstep as a result of learning pains tied to the adoption of new technology.

Chatbots have spawned a host of ethical questions about writing assistance for teachers, students and authors.

But similar debates about ghostwriting have been taking place for over a century, revealing a persistent discomfort with the idea that the words we read might not belong to the person whose name is attached to them.

Outsourcing authorship

Ghostwriting, a paid arrangement in which one person writes under another’s name, has existed for over a century.

The term seems to have first appeared in the English language in a 1908 newspaper article, which I encountered while researching my forthcoming book, “Ghostwriting: A Secret History, from God to A.I.” The story appeared in the Daily Star, in Lincoln, Nebraska, and describes an anonymous writer who earned US$5,000 to help a high-society woman write a book.

Today, ghostwriting usually involves collaborations between professional writers and celebrities or professionals who otherwise wouldn’t have the time, skill or connections to write a book.

On publication of the manuscript, the ghostwriter is typically named, albeit obliquely – perhaps identified as a friend or consultant in the acknowledgments section. In some instances, the ghostwriter’s name appears alongside the credited author’s on the cover. Either way, the client assumes ownership of the ghostwriter’s work.

An ethical gray area

And yet when I type “the practice of one person writing in another person’s name” into Google, the search engine doesn’t spit out “ghostwriting.”

My first hit is “pseudonym” or “alias.” “Plagiarism,” “libel” and “slander” aren’t far behind. A 1953 article titled “Ghost Writing and History” that appeared in The American Scholar also points out that in the mid-20th century, “forgery” – falsely imitating another’s work with the intent to deceive – and “ghostwriting” could be used interchangeably by scholars.

In other words, even when consensual and compensated, ghostwriting has some relatives that are ethically suspect. And maybe that’s why many clients obscure the fact that they’ve used a ghostwriter, and why responses to ghostwritten works often reflect uneasiness with the practice.

“You should be ashamed,” read one social media post, written in response to Millie Bobby Brown’s 2023 debut novel, which she co-wrote with a ghostwriter. “[The ghostwriter’s] name should be on the cover. She was the one who actually wrote the book.”

The discomfort goes both ways: “I feel so guilty and ashamed whenever I use a ghostwriter now because I feel people will think I’m lying,” an anonymous poster on Reddit admitted.

Both the criticism and self-flagellation imply that the act of claiming another person’s words can render these words deceitful, even if the words have been paid for and the content is true.

Ghostwriting agencies rush to defuse these worries. Ghostwriting has been around forever, the Association of Ghostwriters reassures its clients. Ghostwriting is consensual and collaborative – not lazy, deceptive or a form of “selling out,” an author who’d recently used ghostwriting services explained.

And yet, in the last chapter of her ghostwritten book, Whoopi Goldberg acknowledges some misgivings about using a ghostwriter.

“I meant to try (to write the book myself),” Goldberg writes. “And when it turned out I couldn’t quite pull it off … I looked for help.”

Goldberg frames the assistance of ghostwriting as something she deserved after overcoming obstacles as a Black woman. But Goldberg also has financial resources available that others looking for writing assistance usually don’t. High-end ghostwriters collect in the mid-six figures for their services; Prince Harry’s ghostwriter, J.R. Moehringer, supposedly scored a $1 million advance.

Cue chatbots. Generative AI promises to be the ghostwriter for the masses, so much so that ghostwriter Josh Lisec explained to me how, in the future, ghostwriting will need to be marketed as a boutique service for elites if it is to survive.

Naming names

Whether you’re paying for a ghostwriter or using a free chatbot, “assistance” or “collaboration” on intellectual and artistic work is not automatically unethical.

Editors have long made a career out of helping authors shape their writing. Visual artists have long employed studio assistants. Television shows only get written collaboratively in writers’ rooms.

And yet, accepting assistance on intellectual or artistic work can raise legitimate questions, particularly with regards to how that assistance is acknowledged and how much assistance can be accepted while still calling a project “ours.”

In the late 19th century, for example, one sculptor went to court to rebut a claim that his assistant – whom the press referred to as a “ghost” – had completed sculptures for which the sculptor took credit. The judge announced that an artist could accept, with integrity, a certain amount of mechanical assistance. But he added that there was a threshold when artistic assistance became “dishonest.” The judge made the accused sculptor craft a bust in real time to prove his skill.

Black and white photo of bearded man wearing suit watching two men work on white sculptures.
French sculptor Auguste Rodin observes his assistants as they make plaster casts of his works.
Corbis/Getty Images

Similarly, most educators find it more ethical when their students turn to ChatGPT for editing assistance but much less so when they use it to generate a document from scratch.

Many universities now allow AI as a tool but require users to verify its accuracy and disclose its use – rules that echo long-standing ghostwriting contracts.

Yet even verified, A.I.-generated text, if claimed solely as an individual’s work, can pose policy violations at my institution, the University of Southern California: “You should never attempt to present … content created by others, including generative AI, as your own.”

The same policies that govern appropriate A.I. use also come up in ghostwriting contracts. The ghostwriter signs a “warranty of originality” that promises the author that the ghostwriter has – via platforms such as iThenticate – fact-checked and plagiarism-checked their work.

When inaccuracies do crop up, ghostwriters often take the fall.

Former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem blamed her ghostwriter for indicating in her memoir that she had met North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Physician David Agus, who teaches at the University of Southern California Keck School of Medicine, held his ghostwriter responsible for the many instances of plagiarism that were identified in his popular science books.

Ghostwriters willingly provide assistance and accept responsibility for the originality of what they write. Scholars have permission to use generative AI, provided they properly cite its use.

And yet when Vanderbilt administrators advertised that their email had been written with the assistance of ChatGPT, students and faculty pushed back.

University policies and book contracts may offer veils of legitimacy and shields from legal liability. But in the end, readers still seem to want the words they’re reading to come from the mind of the person whose name is on the byline.

The Conversation

Emily Hodgson Anderson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. If using ChatGPT is cheating, what about ghostwriting? The old debate behind a new panic – https://theconversation.com/if-using-chatgpt-is-cheating-what-about-ghostwriting-the-old-debate-behind-a-new-panic-278754

French local elections: political scientist on what’s next for the hard right and radical left

Source: The Conversation – France – By Frédéric Sawicki, professeur de science politique, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

In the wake of the final round of France’s local elections, we asked political pundit Frédéric Sawicki what the mayoral vote tells us about the political future of the two main contenders – Rassemblement National (RN) and La France Insoumise (LFI)?


The Conversation: What was the outcome of France’s 2026 mayoral elections?

Frédéric Sawicki: Let’s start by recalling that, in 9 out of 10 municipalities, the elections were conclusive right from the first round. The second round mainly concerned urban France. In one in two cities, at least three lists were running against each other, confirming the tripolarisation of the political arena. Overall, political stability dominates because, unlike in 2008 or 2014, these mayoral elections were not an opportunity to sanction a majority or a government, due to a massive lack of lists of candidates representing the “presidential majority.”

Consequently, the few shifts from one camp to another are often explained by local concerns. If the Parti Socialiste (PS), France’s centre-left establishment, wins Saint-Étienne, it may well have something to do with the sex tape scandal surrounding the outgoing mayor. And vice versa in Brest in Brittany where the PS lost, which the ailing reputation of the outgoing mayor who had been in office since 2001, no doubt had a hand in. There are multiple cases of this.

We also note a certain number of “sociological constants.” France’s largest cities always vote massively to the left. In cities with tourist economies, a strong presence of independent professions, small employers, retailers, military-related populations (in Toulon, for example), or well-off retirees (Nice, Menton or Cagnes-sur-Mer), the vote is strongly right or far-right leaning.

On the whole, we noticed as many swings from the right to the left and vice versa, as movements within each camp: socialist or communist cities became LFI territory (Saint-Denis, Vénissieux), “green party” cities shifted towards the centre left (Strasbourg or Poitiers). On the other end of the spectrum, some right-wing or centre right cities shifted to the far right or to its allies, for example, as was the case in Nice with Eric Ciotti.

The slides from left to right were few and far between and were balanced with slides in the opposite direction. Over the municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the left and the ecologists lost Bordeaux, Clermont-Ferrand, Brest, Avignon, Besançon, Poitiers, Cherbourg, but won Saint-Étienne, Nîmes, Amiens, Roubaix, Aubervilliers and Pau.

RN’s wins in smaller towns were quite a result…

F.S.: One of the new phenomena to come out of the vote is the solid bolstering of far right party Rassemblement National’s “mayoral anchorage”. In 2020, the RN claimed only 17 cities, including seven with more than 20,000 inhabitants. This time, it won 60. Toulon or Nîmes were, without doubt, huge losses for RN, but they managed to win over many medium-sized cities, such as Carpentras, La Seyne-sur-Mer, La Flèche, Vierzon, Montargis, Liévin… RN strongholds are primarily located in the former mining Pas-de-Calais area, the Côte d’Azur, and also in Occitania (Agde, Castres, Carcassonne, Montauban).

The RN has particularly anchored its presence in the cities it conquered in 2014 and 2020; strengthening its credibility is essential for the RN ahead of the 2027 presidential elections.

Did LFI – the radical left party come out of these local elections any stronger?

F.S: LFI’s breakthrough became apparent as it won over several cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants – Saint-Denis, Roubaix, Saint-Paul and Le Tampon (France’s overseas territory – Island of La Réunion), Vénissieux, Vaux-en-Velin, La Courneuve, Creil, which is far from insignificant considering they started from scratch. However, this breakthrough must be put into context.

France’s radical left suffered losses in situations where they had taken the lead from the left (in Toulouse or Limoges). The party led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon failed to reclaim towns from the right, with the exception of Roubaix.

LFI specifically poised itself as an essential partner, with the threat of bringing down the centre-left PS if no alliance was formed. However, when the socialists and allies refused the merger, they were rarely defeated. LFI therefore failed to demonstrate its ability to hit hard – the example of Paris was emblematic, but Rennes and Montpellier are other fine examples.

Finally, in the context of alliances with the environmentalists, in particular, we note LFI losses in cities such as Strasbourg, Poitiers, Besançon. When the alliances made it possible to win (Grenoble, Lyon, Tours), LFI will not be represented at executive level because the mergers were only a “technicality.” The LFI representatives therefore remain confined to the role of opponent, which doesn’t give the party the ability to govern and appearing as a party “purely of the opposition” poses a real problem for obtaining supreme (presidential) power in 2027.

We noticed that the centre and the right strengthened their alliance during the mayoral runoffs…

F.S.: There were a lot of lists where the centre right, Horizons, MoDem and Renaissance, joint forces with conservative candidates, Union des démocrates et indépendants (UDI) or Les Républicains (LR), from the first round. In the second round, many alliances were formed. This municipal election is therefore part of the continuity of the parliamentary alliance between the central block and the right since 2022 and especially since 2024, and foreshadows what could happen in the presidential election. After the second round, we heard calls for LR, Horizons and the Macronists to have a common arrangement and one candidate. With his win in Le Havre, Édouard Philippe delivered a speech aimed at federating these forces – even though the battle remains very open.

There has been a lot of talk about “infighting within the left-wing,” with a clear divide between part of the socialists and LFI. What are the stakes for 2027?

F.S.: The fracture between those who refuse any alliance with LFI and the others has been reinforced with this vote. But what we notice is that the autonomous centre hardly exists any more, the central block is now clearly uniting with the right. So what is the alliance strategy of those who, like Raphaël Glucksmann or François Hollande, advocate a rapprochement with the centralists? If the Socialist Party comes out stronger after this election, it’s because it joined forces from the first round, with the ecologists, the communists, Place publique and former LFI supporters. The only path that seems to be emerging for the left is to work on this foundation by making it stronger – without LFI – while showing LFI voters that they are not “inaudible” and that their aspirations are heard.

Some observers feared a “fusion” between the right and the far right. While this didn’t happen at party level, we have, on the other hand, witnessed moderate right-wing and far right-wing voters becoming closer…

F.S.: Local initiatives to bring the RN closer to conservative candidates were immediately condemned by LR. The fact that Bruno Retailleau did not call for Christian Estrosi to vote against Éric Ciotti in Nice caused outrage. On the other hand, voters’ choices at the ballot showed substantial porosity between the right and the far right. The presence of LFI candidates acting as a foil, RN voters voted LR to block the left, and LR voters voted RN for the same reason. It’s clear in Brest, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, Besançon, and Marseille that conservative LR Martine Vassal’s electorate (LR) was halved between the first and second rounds, in favour of Franck Allisio (RN).

Finally, who came out as the winner? Does this mean RN might be heading for success in 2027?

F.S.: The RN enjoyed a positive dynamic, strengthening its local presence is an important step in the right direction ahead of the senatorial elections, but also presidential and next legislative elections. That said, the FN remains on the outside looking in with regards to France’s largest cities, which is a major weakness for setting its sights on the Élysée palace. How could a party claim power at the national level while being absent in the cities where most of France’s intellectual and economic activity is concentrated? The RN represents around 30% of voters: it can win in 2027 against an isolated Jean-Luc Mélenchon, or if the left (excluding LFI) and the right remain divided. The potential success of the RN in 2027 is therefore not inevitable provided that the left or the right come together. This is what François Mitterrand managed to do in 1981 and 1988. That’s what Jacques Chirac did in 1995, like Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. It is now up to the political forces to play… their cards right.


Interview by David Bornstein, Political Editor at The Conversation France.


A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!


The Conversation

Frédéric Sawicki ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. French local elections: political scientist on what’s next for the hard right and radical left – https://theconversation.com/french-local-elections-political-scientist-on-whats-next-for-the-hard-right-and-radical-left-279129

Les voitures électriques pourraient rattraper l’essence en Afrique, si les obstacles au financement disparaissent

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Christian Moretti, Senior Researcher, Paul Scherrer Institute PSI, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

Le coût des véhicules électriques a longtemps semblé constituer un obstacle à leur adoption en Afrique. La plupart des chercheurs ne s’attendaient pas à ce que l’énergie des batteries devienne suffisamment abordable pour remplacer l’essence ou le diesel sur le continent avant 2040.

Mais la baisse du coût des batteries, l’essor de la production mondiale de véhicules électriques et l’abondance des ressources solaires sont en train de changer cette vision.

Notre nouvelle étude montre que les véhicules électriques, en particulier lorsqu’ils sont associés à une recharge solaire hors réseau, pourraient être moins chers que les voitures à essence ou diesel dans de nombreux pays africains dans un avenir pas si lointain. Cependant, plusieurs facteurs continuent de freiner leur adoption. Nous estimons que l’accès au financement est l’obstacle principal.

Nous sommes des chercheurs travaillant sur la politique énergétique, l’analyse du cycle de vie et les technologies à faible émission de carbone à l’ETH Zurich et à l’Institut Paul Scherrer (PSI). En collaboration avec des universités africaines partenaires, nous avons passé les deux dernières années à examiner si les pays africains peuvent passer directement à la mobilité électrique, en contournant les technologies plus anciennes.

Cette étude est née du besoin de données contextuelles pour évaluer si les véhicules électriques peuvent jouer un rôle significatif dans l’avenir des transports de la région. Cela pourrait améliorer la qualité de l’air local et transformer la trajectoire des émissions de l’un des secteurs des transports qui connaît la croissance la plus rapide au monde.

Le principal défi n’est pas de savoir si la mobilité électrique est techniquement viable dans le contexte africain – elle l’est –, mais plutôt de déterminer comment mettre en place un financement à grande échelle.

Les taux d’intérêt élevés, les primes de risque et l’accès limité au crédit à long terme rendent encore les véhicules électriques inabordables pour la plupart des Africains. Mais dans des pays à faible risque tels que le Botswana, Maurice et l’Afrique du Sud, les conditions de financement actuelles sont déjà proches de l’équilibre entre les coûts des voitures électriques et ceux des voitures à carburant fossile.

Nos recherches montrent que si un véhicule électrique est acheté comptant, hors taxes, il serait déjà compétitif en termes de coûts dans certains scénarios.

Il est nécessaire de mener des recherches ciblées sur des solutions de financement évolutives afin de débloquer une croissance accélérée des véhicules électriques en Afrique. Nous présentons quatre points potentiellement pertinents pour les chercheurs, les décideurs politiques africains et les institutions financières internationales.

Réduction des risques financiers parallèlement aux subventions publiques indirectes

Le marché africain des véhicules électriques connaît une croissance rapide, atteignant 17,4 milliards de dollars en 2025 et devant atteindre 28 milliards de dollars d’ici 2030, bien qu’il représente actuellement moins de 1 % du parc automobile total.

Notre étude examine la compétitivité du coût total de possession des véhicules électriques dans 52 pays africains, sur six segments de véhicules particuliers : les deux-roues de petite et moyenne taille ; les quatre-roues de petite, moyenne et grande taille ; et le segment des minibus. Nous avons également examiné trois horizons temporels : 2025, 2030 et 2040.

Nous avons constaté que, pour plus de la moitié des pays examinés, les coûts de financement devraient baisser de 7 à 15 points de pourcentage pour que les véhicules électriques atteignent la parité des coûts avec les véhicules conventionnels d’ici 2030. Cette baisse peut réduire les dépenses de financement sur la durée de vie de plusieurs milliers de dollars, ce qui suffit souvent à faire passer un véhicule de la catégorie « inabordable » à celle de « tout à fait accessible ».

Le risque technologique n’est plus le problème : les véhicules électriques ont désormais atteint leur maturité commerciale et sont largement utilisés à travers le monde, et de plus en plus en Afrique.

Le problème réside davantage dans les risques spécifiques à chaque pays. Ceux-ci reflètent plusieurs risques d’investissement, perçus ou réels, tels que l’instabilité macroéconomique ou institutionnelle, la volatilité monétaire ou la méconnaissance des modèles économiques des véhicules électriques chez les prêteurs, ce qui se traduit par des prix d’achat élevés.

Les subventions indirectes, telles que les exonérations fiscales ou les exemptions de droits d’importation pour les véhicules électriques, sont utiles et populaires dans de nombreux pays africains.

Mais pour accélérer et pérenniser l’adoption des véhicules électriques, les pays pourraient également avoir besoin d’outils permettant de transférer le risque financier des prêteurs privés vers les acteurs publics. Cela pourrait réduire le coût global du véhicule.

Parmi ces outils pourraient figurer des garanties de crédit, des prêts concessionnels et des structures de financement mixte. Concrètement, cela signifie que les gouvernements ou d’autres institutions financières publiques absorberaient une partie du risque associé aux prêts pour véhicules électriques. Les prêteurs se sentiraient ainsi plus à l’aise pour financer ces véhicules.

En absorbant une partie du risque, ces instruments pourraient faire baisser les taux d’intérêt à des niveaux rendant les véhicules électriques plus abordables, ce qui accélérerait leur adoption et réduirait la période pendant laquelle des subventions publiques sont nécessaires.

Les véhicules électriques en tant qu’actifs financiers

Les véhicules électriques se prêtent bien à la réduction des risques. Les voitures et les systèmes de recharge sont des actifs standardisés générant des flux de trésorerie prévisibles. Les prêts peuvent être regroupés et titrisés, ce qui signifie que les prêts individuels pour l’achat de véhicules sont mis en commun et convertis en produits financiers négociables. Un processus similaire s’applique aux prêts hypothécaires, mais pas à la plupart des projets d’infrastructure. En ce sens, le financement des véhicules électriques pourrait être plus simple et plus évolutif que le financement traditionnel du développement.

Le regroupement de milliers de petits prêts pour véhicules électriques en produits susceptibles de servir d’investissements pourrait attirer les fonds de pension, les assureurs et les investisseurs d’impact – des pools de capitaux bien plus importants que l’aide au développement traditionnelle.

Les banques multilatérales de développement jouent ici un rôle essentiel, non pas en tant que prêteurs principaux, mais en tant que créateurs de marché. En aidant à structurer les produits financiers, en établissant des normes et en offrant des garanties partielles, elles peuvent attirer des capitaux privés à grande échelle.

Le financement public pour renforcer la dynamique du secteur privé

Les entreprises privées démontrent déjà que la mobilité électrique peut fonctionner sur les marchés africains à faible risque.

Au Kenya et au Rwanda, les entreprises proposant des modèles de remplacement de batterie, de location et de paiement à l’utilisation pour les deux- et trois-roues électriques connaissent une expansion rapide. Ces modèles commerciaux réduisent les coûts initiaux pour les consommateurs et génèrent des données d’exploitation qui renforcent la confiance des investisseurs.

L’opportunité consiste désormais à obtenir des financements publics pour tirer parti de ces premiers succès. Les entreprises privées peuvent regrouper les prêts automobiles et les actifs de recharge dans des portefeuilles régionaux, répartissant ainsi le risque entre les pays et les segments de clientèle.

Une fois ces portefeuilles établis, les acteurs publics, tels que les banques de développement ou les fonds pour le climat, pourraient les développer à plus grande échelle, en particulier sur les marchés à haut risque. Ils pourraient par exemple contribuer à la mise en place de plateformes panafricaines de financement des véhicules électriques qui canalisent intelligemment les capitaux entre les environnements à haut et à faible risque.

Politiques en matière de véhicules éléctriques et conditions de financement spécifiques à chaque pays

Les efforts visant à réduire les risques financiers liés aux véhicules électriques en Afrique doivent s’accompagner d’une politique plus large en la matière. Des cadres politiques nationaux clairs et prévisibles peuvent réduire l’incertitude liée aux investissements et diminuer directement les coûts de financement.

La Politique nationale de mobilité électrique du Kenya en est un excellent exemple. Outre les incitations visant à accroître l’adoption des véhicules électriques, cette politique renforce les cadres réglementaires et soutient le développement des infrastructures de recharge. Elle encourage également la fabrication et l’assemblage locaux de véhicules électriques, ce qui pourrait contribuer à créer des opportunités de croissance économique verte.

Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que tous les pays doivent adopter dès demain des obligations strictes en matière de véhicules électriques. Au sein du continent, il existe de fortes disparités entre les pays, tant en termes de besoins de financement que d’environnements politiques pour la mobilité électrique. Certains pays peuvent nécessiter davantage d’intervention publique que d’autres.

Des mesures politiques efficaces pourraient inclure :

  • des exonérations temporaires des droits d’importation

  • des incitations à l’achat ciblées pour les acheteurs à faibles revenus

  • des réformes de la taxe sur les carburants

  • des stratégies claires pour éliminer progressivement les véhicules d’occasion très polluants.

Les politiques devraient être limitées dans le temps et régulièrement réévaluées, afin d’éviter des charges budgétaires à long terme alors que les prix des véhicules électriques baissent naturellement.

Cibler les incitations sur les véhicules plus petits et grand public peut également améliorer l’équité. Cela garantirait que le soutien public profite qu’aux nouveaux acheteurs plutôt qu’aux ménages les plus aisés.

Les faits sont clairs : l’Afrique n’a pas besoin d’une percée technologique pour électrifier le transport de passagers. Ce dont elle a besoin, c’est de capitaux moins chers et d’un environnement politique favorable pour accélérer l’adoption des véhicules électriques.

The Conversation

Christian Moretti bénéficie d’un soutienfinancier de l’ETH Mobility Initiative.

Bessie Noll remercie bénéficie d’un soutien financier de l’Initiative Mobilité de l’ETH.

ref. Les voitures électriques pourraient rattraper l’essence en Afrique, si les obstacles au financement disparaissent – https://theconversation.com/les-voitures-electriques-pourraient-rattraper-lessence-en-afrique-si-les-obstacles-au-financement-disparaissent-278674

Eco-anxiety: how do young people relate to the climate crisis?

Source: The Conversation – France – By Daniella Watson, Research fellow, Imperial College London

“Eco-anxiety” and “climate-anxiety” are the most widely known terms describing what people feel in response to being aware of the climate crisis.

We conducted a review of published academic papers including original research articles and review papers, and found surprising results on how young people aged 10-29 years actually experience being aware of global warming and climate change and its effects.

While you might have experienced climate anxiety or know about it, you might not know what it is.

Researchers do not have agreed definitions. In the papers we examined as part of our study, eco-anxiety was defined 41 times and climate-anxiety defined 24 times.

The main inconsistency between definitions of eco-anxiety stems from the extent to which it is related to anxiety. Some definitions position eco-anxiety as an extension of generalised anxiety or as having characteristics of anxiety disorders. Whereas some do not actually mention anxiety at all in the definition and may instead use concepts like “concern or worry,” which muddies the conceptual waters.

Natural disasters versus human-made disasters

Another discrepancy is whether the definitions relate to just climate-related changes, or wider environmental changes, and whether or not the feelings relate to human-caused changes only.

Some definitions consider these terms to describe experiences coming from awareness of climate and ecological change, whereas others consider “eco” and climate-anxiety to be experienced in response to more direct climate events.

In reality, all of this is likely to be going on, and our previous research has shown that eco-anxiety levels are significantly higher in US youth aged 16-24 years who self-report exposure to climate change hazards.

Although eco-anxiety and climate-anxiety are the most commonly used terms, our review found a total of 173 experiences describing how young people think, feel and behave in response to being aware of the climate crisis. They include: Solastalgia, symptoms of depression, sleep disruptions, financial strain and hope, along with other experiences not documented in the academic literature.

A breakdown of key climate change awareness concepts

As there were so many experiences described, we organised them into six interrelated categories and sub-categories (see the chart below).

Map of the key concepts and developed 6 categories and subcategories of young people’s experiences of climate change awareness.
Courtesy of Daniella Watson, CC BY

It is important to address and be inclusive of the full spectrum of young people’s experiences beyond climate-anxiety, including the impacts on physical health such as sleep, physical activity and eating behaviours, social and cultural practices, and spiritual and community wellbeing.

Climate awareness: exploring the cultural and colonial factors

Researchers like us are working with lived experience experts around the world to co‑design research and support tools that genuinely reflect the diverse ways people understand and are affected by climate change. Because awareness of the climate crisis is shaped by history, identity, place, and power, it is essential that research is developed with people whose lives are directly touched by these dynamics.

One example of how lived experience expertise has expanded the field comes from a contributor who challenged and deepened existing definitions of eco‑anxiety. They explained:

“I think we perceived [climate-anxiety] as more of an embodied and intergenerational, deep wound that comes out of colonisation, colonial legacies and something that was a lot more personal.”

Our research uncovered no existing definitions of climate change or eco-anxiety that acknowledge the impact of colonial history on individuals’ experiences of environmental distress. By collaborating with experts in lived experience, we have deepened and sharpened our understanding in this area.

Another example of our work with lived experience experts to codesign a research evaluation of The Resilience Project’s youth‑led intervention prompted us to adopt a broader definition of resilience: not simply “bouncing back”, but balancing strength, softness and self‑care so young people can sustain climate‑care activities in ways that are genuinely protective and long‑term.

The way forward

Taken together, our findings show that young people’s experiences of being aware of the climate crisis are far more complex, varied, and culturally situated than the terms eco‑anxiety or climate‑anxiety can capture.

While these labels have become dominant in public and academic conversations, the evidence reveals a much broader landscape of emotional, social, cultural, and structural impacts: from intergenerational grief and disrupted sleep to financial strain, solastalgia, and profound reflections on justice and inequality.

The lack of consistent definitions not only limits scientific clarity but also risks narrowing how we understand and support young people living through a rapidly changing world.

If researchers, practitioners, and policymakers want to design meaningful interventions and supportive environments, they must move beyond narrow psychological framings and engage with the full spectrum of people’s lived realities.

This means codesigning research, measures, and policies with those most affected; recognising the structural and historical forces that shape climate anxiety; and ensuring that the language we use reflects the world as people actually experience it. We recognise that news outlets and social media play an important role in shaping public understanding, which is why we chose to write this article and others like it, and to share our messages with the BBC Climate Question and other media platforms.


Created in 2007 to help accelerate and share scientific knowledge on key societal issues, the Axa Research Fund – now part of the Axa Foundation for Human Progress – has supported over 700 projects around the world with researchers from 38 countries on key environmental, health & socioeconomic risks. To learn more, visit the website of the AXA Research Fund or follow @ AXAResearchFund on LinkedIn.

The Conversation

Emma Lawrance received funding from AXA Research Fund. Emma was Director of the Climate Cares Centre at Imperial College London when this research was undertaken, and is now the Senior Research Fellow in climate change and mental health at the University of Oxford.

Daniella Watson ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

ref. Eco-anxiety: how do young people relate to the climate crisis? – https://theconversation.com/eco-anxiety-how-do-young-people-relate-to-the-climate-crisis-277520

How far can Iran’s ballistic missiles reach? A defense expert explains how the missiles work, and what Iran can and can’t hit

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Iain Boyd, Director of the Center for National Security Initiatives and Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder

Iran launched two missiles, possibly modified versions of this Khorramshahr ballistic missile, at the island of Diego Garcia. Iranian Defense Ministry via AP

Iran fired two ballistic missiles on March 20, 2026, at the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which hosts a strategically important joint U.S.-U.K. military base, according to U.S., U.K. and Israeli officials. One missile broke apart during flight, and the other appears to have been destroyed by U.S. missile defenses.

Iran has denied responsibility for the launches.

Diego Garcia is about 2,500 miles (4,000 kilometers) from Iran, which is about twice as far as the top range Iran has declared that its ballistic missiles have. Parts of Western Europe, Asia and Africa lie within a 2,500-mile (4,000-km) radius of Iran, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these areas.

However, there’s no evidence that Iran has developed a new type of missile or that it can otherwise hit targets at the longer range. Iran most likely modified an existing type of missile, but increasing a missile’s range poses significant challenges.

Ballistic missile basics

A ballistic missile is launched on a rocket and, after separating from it, subsequently flies mostly under the influence of gravity to its destination. The name refers to the characteristic arc of projectiles whose trajectories are largely shaped by gravity. The range of these missiles is determined by the size of the rocket.

Short-range ballistic missiles can fly about 300 to 600 miles (500 to 1,000 km) and can be launched from mobile trucks. They are used for destroying key defensive infrastructure such as radars.

Medium-range ballistic missiles have ranges of about 600 to 1,800 miles (1,000 to 3,000 km). They are used to attack more strategic targets such as command and control centers where military leaders coordinate operations. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles operate over about 1,800 to 3,400 miles (3,000 to 5,500 km), putting much larger geographical regions at risk.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, have a range of about 3,100 to 6,200 miles (5,000 to 10,000 km), making it possible to strike targets over an enormous area. These very long-range weapons require multiple rocket stages. They fly very high, exiting the atmosphere and entering into space, before arcing back toward Earth.

At the height of the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States had thousands of ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads aimed at each other. Each weapon could obliterate an entire city, and nuclear-armed ICBMs have been the basis of mutually assured destruction in which both sides were deterred from ever using the missiles.

Iran’s inventory

Iran has an extensive ballistic missile program. The country has been developing a number of short-range ballistic missiles for many years. The suite of weapons includes the Fateh, Shahab-2 and Zolfaghar systems.

The ranges of these missiles – up to 500 miles (800 km) – are insufficient for Iran to use them against Israel directly because the closest distance between the two countries is about 550 miles (900 km). However, Iranian-backed militias have deployed these weapons in neighboring countries, such as Lebanon and Syria, and have launched them from there in attacks against Israel.

Iran has also developed intermediate-range ballistic missiles such as the Shahab-3, Sejjil and Khorramshahr weapons. These missiles have ranges of up to 1,250 miles (2,000 km), which means they can reach Israel directly from Iran.

Harder to go farther

Scaling up from short range to medium range to intermediate requires larger and larger rockets, which presents a number of increasingly difficult technical challenges. Larger rockets create more dynamic vibrations that the missile structure and all its components must survive. This requires an advanced manufacturing and testing infrastructure.

The size of the rocket also determines how much payload the missile can deliver. This challenge is very well-illustrated by the enormous Saturn V rocket that took astronauts to the Moon. Of the total launch mass, less than 2% was delivered to the lunar surface, with propellant taking up almost all the remaining mass.

ICBMs also have a small payload mass, and this in part explains why militaries more often load them with nuclear warheads than conventional chemical explosives. Pound for pound, nuclear warheads produce much larger effects. It is usually not worth the very high cost of sending an ICBM many thousands of miles just to blow up a single building.

Finally, maintaining control of the missile and hitting a target with sufficient accuracy becomes increasingly more difficult as range is extended. Missile navigation systems based on gyroscopes have slight errors that increase with time, and GPS-guided missiles can be jammed.

Limits on Iran’s reach

Having successfully launched satellites into space using two-stage rockets, however, perhaps it is not too surprising that Iran has been able to build on those successes to achieve longer ranges for its missiles. The simplest modification to extend a missile’s range is to reduce its payload.

Iran has reportedly demonstrated this with the Khorramshahr, using a smaller warhead that gives it a range of 1,800 miles (3,000 km). Some observers suggest that the missiles Iran fired at Diego Garcia most likely were further-modified Khorramshahrs.

a missile rises from a navy warship at sea
One of the Iranian missiles fired at Diego Garcia was possibly shot down by a missile fired from a U.S. Navy ship like this Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer.
U.S. Navy Photo by Fire Controlman 2nd Class Kristopher G. Horton

In the Iranian attack on Diego Garcia, however, one of the missiles failed in flight and the other appeared to have been destroyed by U.S. defenses. The missile failure may indicate that Iran is attempting to operate these systems at distances they are not reliably capable of.

The apparent ability of the U.S. to defend against the second missile suggests that the Iranian intermediate range ballistic missiles do not pose a significant military threat. This conclusion is further supported by the earlier high-volume attack by Iran in December 2025 when it launched hundreds of missiles and drones in a concerted raid against Israel. Almost all were shot down by a combination of Israeli and U.S. defenses.

Surprising but not so threatening

Ultimately, while Iran’s long-range attack on Diego Garcia caught the world off guard, it was likely intended more for its psychological and political effects than for posing a real military threat.

It is worth noting that an additional challenge with fielding intermediate-range ballistic missiles is the cost, which scales with the size of the rocket required. A two-stage rocket that can fly 2,500 miles (4,000 km) is probably one of the most expensive weapons that Iran possesses: It is therefore unlikely to have many of them. When launched in small salvos, these missiles are highly susceptible to the sophisticated air defense systems of the U.S. and its allies.

Still, the attack has certainly gotten the attention of the world and may increase pressure for diplomatic approaches to end the conflict with Iran quickly.

The Conversation

Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense and Lockheed Martin Corporation.

ref. How far can Iran’s ballistic missiles reach? A defense expert explains how the missiles work, and what Iran can and can’t hit – https://theconversation.com/how-far-can-irans-ballistic-missiles-reach-a-defense-expert-explains-how-the-missiles-work-and-what-iran-can-and-cant-hit-279072

When everyday tasks become harder: Early clues to Alzheimer’s disease

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Maryam Ghahremani, Research Data Scientist at Hotchkiss Brain Institute, University of Calgary

While almost everyone misplaces keys or forgets a name from time to time, chronic struggles that linger or worsen over months and years may reveal early disruptions in the brain’s ability to co-ordinate complex tasks. (Freepik)

For many older adults, life is full of routines. Making breakfast, paying bills, shopping, driving, managing appointments and keeping track of medications are tasks done almost automatically. For most, these routines run smoothly, but for some, small disruptions begin to creep in.

These small struggles matter. Perhaps it starts with uncharacteristically forgetting to add an item to the grocery list or misplacing a pair of glasses. Maybe a chequebook gets mismanaged, or a favourite recipe becomes harder to follow.

These moments can be brushed off as part of aging or blamed on a busy mind. Yet, when these new difficulties persist over time, they may be more than just minor frustrations; they might be early signs of something far deeper.

Understanding functional changes

Daily functioning is a key measure of independence, reflecting not only memory, but the co-ordination, planning and attention required to navigate everyday life. Changes here are often subtle, and they can go unnoticed by family members or health-care providers.

A man and a woman with grey hair preparing food
Functional changes can emerge years before dementia is diagnosed, providing an early signal that the brain may be at risk.
(Freepik)

Clinicians have long recognized that loss of functional independence, like difficulty performing everyday activities, is a hallmark of dementia. It is, in fact, part of the formal diagnostic criteria for dementia.

What is less widely appreciated is that these functional changes can emerge years before dementia is diagnosed, providing an early signal that the brain may be at risk. Even when memory seems intact, persistent new struggles in daily tasks may indicate that cognitive decline is starting quietly.

Persistent versus temporary struggles

Recent studies tracking older adults without dementia have found that those who experience persistent difficulties in activities of daily living (like preparing meals, shopping or driving) face a higher risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease in the years ahead. In addition, these persistent impairments are linked to biological markers of the disease, detectable in spinal fluid long before memory loss becomes obvious. By contrast, temporary or occasional difficulties do not carry the same risk.

One of the key insights in this new research is the difference between temporary lapses and persistent functional changes. While almost everyone misplaces keys or forgets a name from time to time, chronic struggles that linger or worsen over months and years may reveal early disruptions in the brain’s ability to co-ordinate complex tasks.


This article is part of our series The Grey Revolution. The Conversation Canada/La Conversation invites readers to examine the far-reaching impacts of the aging baby boomer generation on Canadian society — from housing and employment to culture, food, travel and health care. The series explores the transformations already underway, as well as those still to come.


These disruptions can be one of the earliest indicators that cognitive decline is on the horizon, even before conventional cognitive tests can detect it.

Families, especially those who live with or spend time daily with an older adult, are often the first to notice subtle but steady changes in function, like moments when their loved one struggles to follow a familiar schedule, double-checks every step in a process that used to be second nature or avoids tasks that were once routine. Recognizing these patterns early can help families seek timely evaluation, support and planning.

Looking beyond cognitive screening tests

These findings also underscore the value of integrating functional assessments into routine health care. Traditionally, cognitive screening has focused on memory, attention or language tests. More recently, including assessments of changes in behaviour or neuropsychiatric symptoms have been included in dementia guidelines, even at screening of cognitively unimpaired older persons.

Measuring the ability to manage daily life may provide a window into brain health that is both a practical and potentially more culturally adaptable approach to early detection than cognitive screening. Standard cognitive screening tests can be affected by language, education or cultural background. For example, someone may score lower simply because the test uses unfamiliar words, assumes certain schooling or reflects cultural norms that differ from their own.

In contrast, observing changes in everyday function over time focuses on real-life abilities and can reveal early signs of brain changes, offering a practical and widely applicable way to detect risk.

A woman with grey hair doing a puzzle while a younger woman observes.
By shifting the focus from episodic forgetfulness to ongoing functional changes, families and health-care providers can act sooner.
(Freepik)

Shifting the focus in aging and brain health

The story of everyday struggles as early warning signs challenges common perceptions of aging. What looks like normal forgetfulness may, in some cases, be a signal to pay closer attention. These subtle changes are not personal failures — they are clues, pointing to the need for care, support and awareness.

It’s also important to keep this in balance: not every struggle points to dementia, and many older adults maintain their independence without experiencing any decline in daily functioning. But for those whose difficulties persist and accumulate, the pattern is meaningful.

Based on the latest research, it is this persistence, rather than occasional slips, that is most strongly linked to future cognitive decline and brain changes associated with Alzheimer’s disease.

By shifting the focus from episodic forgetfulness to ongoing functional changes, families and health-care providers can act sooner. Support strategies, such as simplifying routines, using reminders or providing assistance with complex tasks, can help maintain independence while also serving as a form of early intervention. Early recognition also allows for better planning, access to resources and timely medical evaluation.

A woman with her grey hair pulled back smiling
By joining studies on everyday function, you can help advance research that could make a real difference.
(Pexels)

A window into brain health

Ultimately, the story of functional change in aging is one of vigilance and insight. Paying attention to what may seem like small, everyday difficulties can offer a glimpse into the brain’s health years before memory loss becomes obvious. It’s a reminder that the subtle ways life becomes harder can carry vital information, and that early attention to persistent changes may make a meaningful difference in the course of aging and cognitive health.

If you’re interested in contributing to research on everyday function and brain health, Canadian studies like CAN-PROTECT and BAMBI are exploring how subtle changes in daily life may signal early risk for Alzheimer’s.

Both studies are led by Dr. Zahinoor Ismail, a clinician scientist at the University of Calgary and one of the authors of this story. BAMBI is based in Calgary, while CAN-PROTECT is an online study open to participants across Canada. By joining such studies, you can help advance research that could make a real difference.

The Conversation

Zahinoor Ismail receives funding from Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Gordie Howe CARES, and the NIHR UK Exeter Biomedical Research Centre. He has also served as a consultant to Eisai, Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Otsuka/Lundbeck, and Roche.

Maryam Ghahremani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. When everyday tasks become harder: Early clues to Alzheimer’s disease – https://theconversation.com/when-everyday-tasks-become-harder-early-clues-to-alzheimers-disease-277443

Artemis II: el reto espacial más arriesgado y fascinante de nuestra generación

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Valen Gómez Jáuregui, PTU y Coordinador del Grupo I+D InGraStrUC (Ingeniería Gráfica y Estructuras Espaciales), Universidad de Cantabria

Vista del sistema de lanzamiento espacial (SLS por sus siglas en inglés), vehículo que lanzará a la nave Orión y a los cuatro astronautas de la misión Artemis II fuera de la Tierra. NASA/Frank Michaux

Por fin, después de sucesivos aplazamientos, ya hay fecha marcada en el calendario: el 1 de abril, a las 18:24 de la hora local en Florida (00:24 AM del 2 de abril en horario peninsular español) está programada la primera oportunidad para que despegue de la Tierra la misión espacial que abrirá una nueva era de exploraciones y descubrimientos. Si las circunstancias climáticas no son favorables, la ventana de lanzamientos prevé otros intentos el 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 y 30 de abril.

Tras más de cinco décadas de ausencia humana en el espacio exterior desde el fin de la era Apolo, la misión Artemis II se alza como el salto más arriesgado y fascinante de nuestra generación. La diosa de la mitología griega, Artemisa, sucede a su hermano gemelo, Apolo.

Esquema de la misión Artemis II.
Esquema de la misión Artemis II.
NASA

El reto es monumental: la tripulación deberá validar el funcionamiento crítico de los sistemas de soporte vital de la nave Orión, en la que viajan los astronautas, mientras se enfrentan a la intensa radiación de los cinturones de Van Allen y a un viaje de 10 días sin la posibilidad de realizar un aborto rápido.

Nunca el ser humano llegó tan lejos

Los astronautas de la NASA (de izquierda a derecha) Christina Koch, Victor Glover y Reid Wiseman, y el astronauta de la CSA (Agencia Espacial Canadiense) Jeremy Hansen.
NASA

Lo más asombroso es que, al realizar un sobrevuelo por la cara oculta de la Luna, estos cuatro astronautas (incluyendo a la primera mujer y al primer afroamericano en una misión lunar) se alejarán más de 400 000 kilómetros de la Tierra, alcanzando el punto más distante en el cosmos al que jamás haya llegado nuestra especie. Para hacernos una idea, en ese espacio de 400 000 km cabrían, uno al lado del otro, todos los planetas del sistema solar (Mercurio, Venus, Tierra, Marte, Júpiter, Saturno, Urano y Neptuno) y aún sobraría espacio.

Para el gran reto de proteger a los astronautas de la radiación solar extrema y cósmica durante Artemis II, la NASA emplea una estrategia de “defensa por capas”. Bajo el nombre de “Experimento Matroshka”, combina tecnología de detección avanzada para monitorear los niveles de radiación y unas soluciones físicas ingeniosas que mitigan la exposición basándose en múltiples capas de protección.

Diferencias entre la misión Apolo 17 y Artemis II

Cuando en 1972 los últimos tres astronautas en misión a la Luna se montaron en el Apolo 17, los medios tecnológicos eran muy diferentes:

  • Apenas había espacio en el módulo de tripulación. Esta vez viajarán cuatro astronautas con más espacio habitable.

  • La generación de energía era mediante pilas de combustible, frente a los paneles solares actuales.

  • El único ordenador de a bordo contaba solo con unos pocos kilobytes de memoria total, muchísimo menos de lo que hoy en día tienen incluso relojes inteligentes o dispositivos electrónicos comunes. Mientras, el Orión dispone de múltiples computadoras redundantes, con millones de veces más memoria y procesamiento.

  • Las telecomunicaciones, muy básicas, se concentraban en una sola señal de radio en la banda S de aproximadamente 2 GHz. Hoy son superadas por una infraestructura con mayor ancho de banda y fiabilidad, con comunicaciones digitales más robustas que soportan voz, telemetría y transmisión de datos científicos más complejos.

Con todo y con ello, la expedición de la misión Apolo 17 consiguió llegar a la Luna, donde estuvo 75 horas trabajando intensamente. Los astronautas recolectaron muestras de rocas y polvo lunar que se trajeron a la Tierra (cerca de 100 kg), condujeron un vehículo lunar para explorar más terreno, colocaron sensores y sondas para para medir gravedad, calor, actividad sísmica y partículas y hacer experimentos científicos, etc.

Finalmente, una diferencia clave entre ambas misiones es que, si bien Apolo 17 fue la culminación de una carrera espacial esencialmente estadounidense, nacida de la rivalidad geopolítica de la Guerra Fría, Artemis II representa una nueva forma de explorar el espacio. Se trata de un esfuerzo internacional y colaborativo en el que varias agencias y países trabajan juntos para regresar a la Luna: Europa (ESA), Japón (JAXA), Canadá (CSA), Emiratos Árabes (UAESA), Australia (ASA), etc.

El gran ensayo general

Por su parte, la nueva misión ni siquiera tiene previsto alunizar, como se consiguió hace ya más de 50 años, pero será esencial para que, en 2028, Artemis IV lo logre con más garantías de éxito. Artemis II y Artemis III (misión también tripulada que se desarrollará en la órbita baja terrestre el año que viene para probar los trajes espaciales y diversas tecnologías críticas) serán el gran ensayo general antes del estreno más esperado de la exploración lunar.

Como en un teatro, cada sistema de la nave, desde la propulsión y la navegación hasta las comunicaciones, el soporte vital y la reentrada a gran velocidad, será testado bajo los focos de la realidad, con astronautas como protagonistas y la Tierra como público expectante.

Todo se pondrá en escena con precisión, como quien ajusta la música, el vestuario y la coreografía, para que Artemis IV pueda, finalmente, brillar en su histórico estreno sobre la Luna.

Cuando esto ocurra en 2028, dos de los cuatro astronautas del Orión descenderán al suelo lunar para recopilar muestras, hacer experimentos científicos, estudiar el terreno y tomar datos del entorno de nuestro satélite antes de volver a la órbita lunar y regresar a la Tierra. En total, 30 días, una misión tres veces más larga que la que nos espera en los próximos días.

En vivo y en directo

Es innegable que vivimos un momento extraordinario: nunca antes había sido tan fácil sentirnos parte de una misión lunar. Gracias a las nuevas tecnologías, podemos seguir Artemis II casi como si estuviéramos allí, en directo y desde casa, comiendo palomitas, a través de plataformas como NASA+, el canal de YouTube de la NASA y Artemis, y las redes sociales oficiales de las agencias participantes, donde se comparten imágenes, vídeos, explicaciones y momentos clave en tiempo real.

La exploración del espacio ya no es solo cosa de astronautas y centros de control: hoy es una experiencia para todos nosotros, compartida, abierta y global. ¿Se lo va a perder?

The Conversation

Valen Gómez Jáuregui recibe fondos de la Universidad de Cantabria, el Gobierno de Cantabria y Kyberon Neo S.L.

José Andrés Díaz Severiano recibe fondos de Universidad de Cantabria, el Gobierno de Cantabria y Kyberon Neo S.L.

Noemí Barral Ramón recibe fondos de la Universidad de Cantabria, el Gobierno de Cantabria y Kyberon Neo S.L

Miguel Iglesias no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Artemis II: el reto espacial más arriesgado y fascinante de nuestra generación – https://theconversation.com/artemis-ii-el-reto-espacial-mas-arriesgado-y-fascinante-de-nuestra-generacion-274546

Si vous donnez une tâche ingrate à vos salariés, vous allez le regretter

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Rahman Khan, Associate professor, PSB Paris School of Business

Entre 30 et 50 % des salariés doivent effectuer des tâches sans lien avec leur poste ou leur expertise professionnelle. Résultat, ils deviennent silencieux, gardant pour eux leurs questions ou leurs suggestions, bien qu’elles pourraient s’avérer utiles pour l’entreprise. Alors, comment sortir de cette dynamique perverse ? Car, le silence des salariés n’est qu’un symptôme d’une entreprise malade.


L’image d’Épinal du stagiaire « responsable machine à café » ou « photocopieuse » traduit une réalité. Dans certaines entreprises, des employés en contrat limité ou non limité, souvent surdiplômés, doivent se cantonner à réaliser des missions ingrates. « Tu veux bien passer les slides PowerPoint pour ma présentation ? »

Dans une recherche récente, nous avons étudié la façon dont les tâches assignées déterminent le comportement des employés, en particulier lorsque ces tâches sont perçues comme illégitimes – considérées comme déraisonnables, inutiles ou ne correspondant pas au rôle des employés. Une étude complémentaire rappelle que de telles tâches ne sont pas une simple source de désagrément. Elles influencent la manière dont les employés perçoivent l’équité et leur place au sein de l’organisation, au-delà d’être des facteurs de stress.

Le silence est une réponse courante à l’illégitimité perçue. L’effet secondaire : les employés peuvent cacher des informations qui pourraient aider leurs équipes, comme leurs préoccupations, leurs idées ou leurs suggestions. Alors, comment fonctionne ce mécanisme pervers pour l’entreprise et pour les salariés ?

Tâches injustes sans mauvaises intentions

Les employés qualifient certaines tâches d’injustes lorsqu’ils constatent un décalage avec leur rôle, leur statut professionnel ou l’objectif de leur poste. Cette évaluation reflète la perception des employés et non les intentions de leur responsable.

Une tâche peut être donnée sans mauvaise intention, mais tout de même être perçue comme injuste quand elle entre en conflit avec les attentes liées à un poste ou qu’elle témoigne d’un mépris pour l’expertise professionnelle. Des études sur les tâches illégitimes établissent une distinction entre les tâches qui ne relèvent simplement pas d’un rôle précis et celles qui sont considérées comme inutiles.

Les deux cas remettent en question la manière dont les employés définissent leur contribution au travail. Lorsque les tâches vont à l’encontre des normes du métier, les employés se sentent méprisés dans leur identité professionnelle.

De 30 % à 50 % des salariés concernés

Les enquêtes indiquent que les tâches illégitimes sont monnaie courante dans le milieu professionnel. Entre 30 % et 50 % des employés sont confrontés, au moins occasionnellement, à des tâches déraisonnables ou inutiles, avec des variations importantes selon les professions et les secteurs.

Le phénomène est particulièrement fréquent dans les environnements à forte surcharge de travail et où les rôles sont flous. Des rôles mal définis augmentent le risque que les employés se voient confier des tâches ne relevant pas de leurs responsabilités officielles. Les environnements à forte charge de travail intensifient ce phénomène, car les managers s’appuient sur une délégation ad hoc pour répondre au besoin immédiat de l’entreprise.

L’injustice organisationnelle va de pair avec un silence accru, les employés choisissant de ne pas partager leurs idées même lorsque celles-ci pourraient être très importantes pour l’organisation. Le silence est notamment utilisé délibérément pour exprimer son désaccord avec l’attribution injuste des tâches.

Moins de sincérité dans l’entreprise

Le silence des employés traduit une tendance à ne pas communiquer à ses supérieurs ou à ses collègues, intentionnellement, des informations ou des suggestions liées au travail, même lorsque les exprimer pourrait être utile. C’est une décision délibérée. Le cas d’un silence délibéré peut traduire un motif de représailles ou de vengeance à la suite d’une injustice perçue.




À lire aussi :
Le silence, un outil de performance managériale sous-estimé


Il existe une différence entre silence et désengagement. Des employés désengagés fournissent globalement moins d’efforts, tandis que les employés silencieux restent impliqués dans leur travail, mais communiquent moins. Concrètement, ils ne souhaitent pas exprimer sincèrement leur opinion sur les conditions de travail à ceux qui sont en mesure d’y répondre.

Un traitement inéquitable et une injustice organisationnelle sont susceptibles d’entraîner un silence défensif, où les employés évitent de partager des informations afin de se protéger d’éventuelles conséquences négatives.

En revanche, le silence délibéré est dirigé vers l’organisation en réponse à une répartition des tâches jugée injuste. Les employés sont plus enclins à garder le silence lorsqu’ils s’attendent à :

La morale influence les réactions des salariés

La moralité des employés – leur sens du bien et du mal – détermine leur comportement éthique au travail. Par exemple, les employés ayant une forte identité morale sont moins susceptibles de tricher au sein de leur entreprise.

Cette conduite morale, traduction d’une conception de soi en entreprise, guide le comportement des salariés. Les employés qui valorisent des traits moraux importants pour leur image d’eux-mêmes, comme le fait d’être juste et bienveillant, sont plus à même d’éviter les comportements négatifs au travail, tels qu’un silence motivé par la vengeance, contraire à leurs valeurs morales.

Cette éthique individuelle a ses limites. En réalité, elle ne permet pas de déceler pleinement les systèmes injustes ni les environnements de travail toxiques. Lorsque la répartition des tâches et les processus de prise de décision restent constamment inéquitables, le silence persiste, même lorsque les employés ont une image morale élevée d’eux-mêmes.

Ce que les entreprises peuvent apprendre

La délégation des tâches reflète la manière dont les employés sont considérés au sein d’une organisation. La répartition des tâches est un signe de respect et de statut, mais aussi d’inclusion.

La perception d’une répartition des tâches équitable favorise la confiance et la coopération, tandis qu’une répartition inéquitable est source de tension et de ressentiment. Il n’est pas surprenant que les employés confrontés à cette dernière se plaignent davantage d’épuisement émotionnel et d’une baisse de leur bien-être.

La légitimité de la répartition prime sur les objectifs d’efficacité au sens strict. Des processus équitables renforcent les normes d’échange social et l’engagement en soulignant que chaque contribution est reconnue à sa juste valeur. Parallèlement, l’attribution des tâches sur la base de la justice est corrélée à un engagement plus fort et à une diminution des réactions de retrait.

Le silence des employés n’est qu’un symptôme. Les organisations devraient donc être attentives au silence de leurs employés et à leurs pratiques d’attribution afin de détecter les problèmes de légitimité avant que des conflits ouverts ou des départs ne surviennent.

The Conversation

Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

ref. Si vous donnez une tâche ingrate à vos salariés, vous allez le regretter – https://theconversation.com/si-vous-donnez-une-tache-ingrate-a-vos-salaries-vous-allez-le-regretter-274756

Las dos almas de Irán: entre el islam y la memoria sasaní

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Carlos Martínez Carrasco, Profesor de Biblioteconomía y Documentación. Investigador en el Centro de Estudios Bizantinos, Neogriegos y Chipriotas, Universidad de Córdoba

‘Bizhan recibe una invitación a través de la nodriza de Manizha’, en el folio 300v del _Shahnama_ (Libro de los Reyes) de Shah Tahmasp. Metropolitan Museum of Art

El estallido de la guerra entre Irán y EE. UU. e Israel ha dado pie a todo tipo de comentarios en redes sociales y tertulias. Fruto de las prisas por la coyuntura y el desconocimiento sobre esta parte del mundo, se ha incluido a Irán en la nómina de los países árabes, mientras voces airadas reclaman que se le llame Persia, porque ese era el nombre del país antes de su islamización.

Decía Pierre Vilar que la Historia “debe enseñarnos, en primer lugar, a leer un periódico”. En este caso, merece la pena aprovechar el trágico contexto internacional para cuestionar las mitificaciones sobre este país islámico cuya existencia se remonta muchos siglos atrás.

Portada de _Samarcanda_ de Amin Maalouf.
Portada de Samarcanda de Amin Maalouf.
Alianza Editorial

En Samarcanda (1988), el escritor libanés Amin Maalouf se vale del manuscrito perdido de las Rubāˁiyyāt (‘Cuartetas’) de ˁUmar Jayyām (m. 1123) para hilar dos períodos de la historia de Irán. La primera parte narra la vida de este intelectual persomusulmán al servicio del visir Niẓām al-Muluk y los sultanes Alp Arslan y Malik Shāh. La segunda se centra en los intentos democratizadores del país asiático entre 1909 y 1911 a la sombra del Reino Unido y Rusia, las potencias que se habían dividido el país y no querían perder su influencia en él.

Mito y memoria de la Persia preislámica

Como otros antes que él, a finales del siglo XI Niẓām al-Muluk miró hacia el período sasaní (224-651) buscando crear una identidad propia en la que se mezclasen elementos islámicos y preislámicos. A ese movimiento de “iranización” del islam le debemos casi todo lo que sabemos sobre el imperio de los iranios. Llamado el Ērānshahr, hace referencia al territorio que ocupaban los actuales Irak e Irán antes de que los árabes musulmanes lo conquistaran entre los años 634 y 651.

No conservamos ningún texto literario original de época sasaní. Pero cuando los habitantes de Persia rechazaron lo árabe porque, comparado con la propia tradición, era visto como atrasado y sin valor alguno, los califas ˁabbasíes, la segunda dinastía del islam (750-1258), no dudaron en iranizarse. Así, decidieron imitar las formas cortesanas de los shāhānshāh, los “reyes de reyes”, quienes ocupaban el centro de la organización política gracias a una especie de gracia divina que se transmitía de padres a hijos y que solo poseían los gobernantes del imperio.

Comenzó entonces un proceso de traducción de textos de la antigua tradición al árabe que llevaron a cabo los persas islamizados, y que vertieron escritos creados en una lengua indoeuropea, el farsi, a una semítica: el árabe.

El valor que sigue teniendo para los iraníes el pasado preislámico lo indica que su poema nacional sea el Shānāmè (“Libro de los reyes”), compuesto en torno a 1010 en persa por Ferdosi. En sus versos repasa la historia del Ērānshahr, en los que se mezclan mito y realidad.

Los mitos originarios

Tras la llamada Guerra de los Doce Días (del 12 al 24 de junio de 2025), los ayatolás recurrieron a los bajorrelieves de Naqsh-e Rustam o al mítico Arash el Arquero como parte de su propaganda contra israelíes y estadounidenses.

Ambos elementos tienen una fuerte carga simbólica. En Naqsh-e Rustam está representado el momento en el que el emperador romano Valeriano reconoce la victoria del soberano sasaní Sapor I en el año 260.

Estatua a Arash el Arquero en Irán.
Estatua a Arash el Arquero, Saryazd, provincia de Yazd, Irán.
ninara/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Por su parte, el personaje de Arash el Arquero pertenece a la mitología persa. Cuenta la leyenda que Arash, el mejor arquero del ejército iraní, fue elegido para responder al reto planteado por el victorioso rey de Turan (eternos enemigos de Irán): lanzar una flecha para marcar la frontera allí donde se clavara. Desde la montaña sagrada Irivokht, Arash tensó el arco como jamás lo hiciera y el proyectil voló durante semanas, impulsado por el viento, incrustándose en el tronco del nogal más grande del mundo, a orillas del río Amu Darya. Cuando fueron a buscar a Arash, este había desaparecido; no quedaba ni rastro. El arquero se había sacrificado por su pueblo y su cuerpo era el territorio que les ofrecía a sus compatriotas.

Estos símbolos, como toda arma, tienen un doble filo, en este caso en forma de propaganda interna. Son iconos que, por un lado, rechaza el régimen teocrático, ya que representan unos valores propios de un tiempo que la tradición islámica considera “de la ignorancia”. Por otra parte, se trata de historias y personajes que forman parte de la cultura popular. Los ayatolás, cuestionados internamente, se valen de ellos para acercarse a una población que cada vez está más lejos del régimen.

Los manifestantes que se echaron a las calles entre diciembre de 2025 y enero de 2026 coreando vivas al sah son la prueba de su calado popular. En el imaginario colectivo se establece una línea de continuidad entre los tiempos míticos de Arash el Arquero y la monarquía, pasando por la época sasaní y el apogeo persomusulmán de la shuˁūbiyya (movimiento cultural de reivindicación de lo iranio frente a lo árabe). Reclamando la vuelta del rey y el fin de la república islámica se pretende regresar a una Arcadia feliz.

La nostalgia sigue en el mismo bando

Ahora, igual que en los siglos IX-XI, la nostalgia de una pretendida edad de oro pertenece a una clase que ocupa una posición subalterna. El período preislámico se convierte en un tiempo al que se quiere volver porque se asocia con el esplendor cultural, económico y político, cuando la influencia de lo iranio iba del Índico al Atlántico.

Entonces, el zoroastrismo era la religión oficial sasaní. A sus seguidores, junto a cristianos y judíos, se les permitió conservar sus creencias a cambio del pago de la yizia, la capitación. De hecho, el judaísmo, el cristianismo y el islam heredaron su carácter dualista (los principios del Bien y el Mal).

Relieve en Naqsh-e Rostam ubicado en Persépolis, Irán. Esta talla muestra una famosa escena en la cual el emperador romano, Valeriano se arrodilla ante Sapor I y solicita piedad.
Relieve en Naqsh-e Rostam ubicado en Persépolis, Irán. Esta talla muestra una famosa escena en la cual el emperador romano Valeriano se arrodilla ante Sapor I y solicita piedad.
Diego Delso, delso.photo, CC BY-SA

Los descendientes de la aristocracia sasaní vieron ese pago especial como una humillación. Por ello, las élites optaron por convertirse al islam para preservar su estatus. En su mayoría se inclinaron por el chiismo, la rama que defiende el legado de ˁAlī y sus hijos, al-Ḥasan y al-Ḥusayn, el yerno y los nietos del profeta Mahoma.

Sin embargo, de alguna forma los conquistadores árabes acabaron siendo conquistados por los derrotados iranios: el modo de vida persa resultaba mucho más atractivo por el boato de la corte sasaní. No fueron pocos los rigoristas que criticaron lo que consideraron un excesivo gusto por esta dolce vita.

Los sabios de la ley islámica también pasaron por alto que la construcción del califa como autoridad política y religiosa había sido un calco de la posición del shāhānshāh, el “rey de reyes”. Esto hizo que el islam se convirtiera en una copia del zoroastrismo con carácter de religión estatal de un imperio. Se establecería un sistema confesional, persiguiendo las ideas consideradas contrarias a la línea oficial. La noción de pureza e impureza en el islam surge de la influencia de los conversos zoroastras, aquellos sacerdotes que conservaron su peso en la sociedad aun cuando hubieran abandonado su antigua fe dos siglos después de la conquista.

El pasado preislámico se integra en la identidad de los iraníes actuales como una de sus dos almas. Dos almas que, a veces, se hallan en contraposición, pero que no se entienden aisladas. El islam no es un bloque homogéneo y en cada territorio adopta unas formas propias. Fiestas como el Noruz perviven porque fueron asumidas por el islam, en este caso iranio, que les da carta de naturaleza.

En resumen, la llama del Ērānshahr no se ha apagado.


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The Conversation

Carlos Martínez Carrasco no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

ref. Las dos almas de Irán: entre el islam y la memoria sasaní – https://theconversation.com/las-dos-almas-de-iran-entre-el-islam-y-la-memoria-sasani-278273