Violent conflicts are reshaping what Nigerian farmers grow: what this means for food security

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Senior Lecturer at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria and Senior Research Associate at North West University, North-West University

Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy. It provides livelihoods for over 70% of the rural population and contributes to national food security and economic development.

For most rural households, farming is not just a source of income and sustenance. It also provides cultural identity and social stability. Over the past two decades, however, rural Africa has witnessed increasing levels of violent conflicts that undermine agricultural productivity, investment and long-term development.

Farmers facing insecurity often abandon productive crops, reduce land use and invest less in their farms. There are serious consequences for food security.

Conflict destroys lives and property. It also changes the decisions farmers make about investing in their land.

We are agricultural and applied economists with expertise in rural development,sustainable food system and climate-smart agriculture. We’ve studied the impact of conflict on food systems in the global south.

One of our studies examined how violent conflict influenced agricultural investment decisions among rural households in Nigeria. We combined nationally representative household data with detailed conflict records, to track how exposure to violence affects farming.

The findings showed that violent conflict altered agricultural investment decisions. It made farmers less likely to cultivate major crops.

The cultivation of yam, sweet potato, groundnut, cowpea, maize and cassava declined as conflict incidents increased. Sweet potato was the most affected, perhaps because it needs a lot of labour and a longer time to grow.

When conflict disrupts farming through abandoned fields, lost livestock, or altered investment decisions, it undermines food availability and long-term agricultural development.

Understanding these impacts is useful when designing ways to help farmers and sustain food systems in conflict-affected areas.

The reality

Our study used panel data from Nigeria’s Living Standards Measurement Study covering the periods 2012/2013, 2015/2016 and 2018/2019.

The national study provides detailed household-level information. This covers demographic characteristics, agricultural production, crop choice, land allocation, input use, production costs and market participation.

We combined the household coordinates with geocoded conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure exposure to violent conflict. The ACLED database provides detailed information on battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, protests and riots.

Our study focused on three indicators of violent conflict exposure:

  • total number of conflict incidents

  • number of violent incidents affecting civilians (including Boko Haram-related violence)

  • number of battles, including protests, riots and farmer–herder clashes.

To capture local exposure to violence, we measured conflict incidents within a radius of 10km of each surveyed household in a given year.

By linking spatial conflict data with household-level agricultural information across multiple survey waves, the study analysed how exposure to violent conflict influenced farmers’ production decisions, land allocation and agricultural outcomes over time.

The findings

The results indicate that insecurity discourages farmers from engaging in production activities that involve greater risk or long-term investment. Conflict exposure also affects land allocation decisions.

The analysis showed a reduction in the total cultivated land area and a decline in the share of land allocated to key staple crops.

This pattern suggests that farmers respond to insecurity by scaling down farming activities, avoiding distant plots, and concentrating on smaller or safer areas of land. Reducing the land cultivated may result in less food produced.

We found that conflict led to less spending on agricultural production. Farmers invested less in inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and hired labour.

The effects varied across management types. Plots managed by men showed relatively stable investment levels. Production costs increased on plots managed by men and women. This could be due to reliance on external labour during periods of insecurity.

The findings demonstrate that violent conflict affects crop choices, reduces land use and discourages agricultural investment.

Disruptions also increase the cost of agricultural production and marketing, making farming less profitable. Government efforts to support agriculture, such as input subsidies and rural development programmes, don’t work so well in conflict zones.

The adverse effects are more severe for households in highly conflict-prone areas. Disputes have long-term economic impacts.

Recommendation and policy implications

The findings highlight the need for conflict-sensitive agricultural policies and targeted rural development interventions.

First, strong rural security and community conflict resolution mechanisms are essential. Government and local authorities should monitor security in major agricultural zones and help communities to build peace.

Policies should encourage farmers to plant climate-smart and low-risk crops that need fewer inputs and have shorter production cycles. This would make agricultural systems more resilient to conflict.

Extension services should advise farmers on which crops to plant, improved seed varieties, and farming strategies suitable for insecure environments.

Policymakers should invest in rural infrastructure and early-warning systems, including market access, transport networks and conflict monitoring systems.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Violent conflicts are reshaping what Nigerian farmers grow: what this means for food security – https://theconversation.com/violent-conflicts-are-reshaping-what-nigerian-farmers-grow-what-this-means-for-food-security-278719

Strike on Afghan hospital shows the laws of war may document atrocities — but don’t prevent them

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Shabnam Salehi, PhD Candidate, Law, Carleton University; L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Pakistani jets recently bombed the Omid Addiction Treatment Hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan, a facility with 2,000 beds dedicated to helping patients recover from drug addiction.

Authorities in Afghanistan, along with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and various news agencies, reported that more than 400 people were killed and 265 were injured.

Pakistan has denied targeting the hospital, saying it aimed only at military installations and terrorist support infrastructure.

As a former commissioner at the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and a legal scholar focused on accountability for civilian harm, I view this incident as a serious violation of international humanitarian law, with profound implications for one of the most vulnerable groups: those struggling with addiction.

The chain of human casualities

The incident at Omid Hospital is a critical moment in the ongoing conflict, which dates back to late February, when Pakistani forces conducted airstrikes in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika.

According to UNAMA, the strikes in Nangarhar resulted in at least 13 civilian deaths and seven injuries, including women and children from the same family. In Paktika, a strike impacted a madrassa and damaged a mosque, a centre for religious education, in the Barmal district.

Pakistan then officially initiated Operation Ghazab lil-Haq on Feb. 26, leading to an escalation of violence targeting non-military sites. The first phase of the attacks lasted six days, during which UNAMA reported 42 civilian fatalities and 104 injuries.

By March 6, these figures had risen to 56 dead and 129 injured, with 55 per cent of the casualties being women and children. Approximately a week later, just three days before the Omid strike, the toll reached 75 dead and 193 injured. The UN humanitarian office warned of significant displacement and disruptions to aid efforts across the affected provinces.

Then, on March 16, the attack on Omid Hospital occurred. The severity of this incident highlighted the alarming reality of systematic violations of humanitarian law within the ongoing conflict.

Why does a drug treatment hospital matter?

Afghanistan is grappling with one of the most severe addiction crises in the world, exhibiting some of the highest drug use rates globally.

A 2025 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) described the situation as “a pressing but less understood dimension” of the drug economy.

Treatment facilities are critically limited, and international donors have largely withdrawn since the Taliban assumed power in 2021.

Attacking a facility like Omid Hospital not only endangers its patients but also undermines one of the few remaining care structures for a population that has suffered through more than five decades of conflict and war.




Read more:
The U.S. occupation of Afghanistan was colonialism that prevented Afghan self-determination


What the international law says

The rules safeguarding hospitals during wartime are longstanding. According to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, medical facilities “shall be respected and protected in all circumstances” and cannot be targeted. A hospital can lose this protection only if it is being used for hostile activities. Even in such cases, the attacking force is required to issue a warning and provide time before proceeding.

There is no evidence Pakistan issued a warning to the Omid facility, nor has the country made such a claim. Pakistan asserts that the building contained ammunition, citing secondary explosions as a primary cause of the incident.

But even if that’s true, international law stipulates that any anticipated civilian harm must not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” The destruction of suspected weapons cannot justify the deaths and injuries of hundreds of civilians.

A conflict the world isn’t watching

Despite a death toll surpassing many incidents that have captured headlines in other conflicts, this conflict is receiving scant attention from the West.

This is likely because the Taliban, which provides the casualty figures, is not viewed as a reliable source. Similar death toll claims by the Gaza Health Ministry faced scrutiny for years before the Israeli military finally validated them. UNAMA is now providing independent verification in Afghanistan.

The Omid strike is reminiscent of the 2015 United States airstrike on the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)/Doctors Without Borders trauma centre in Kunduz, in northern Afghanistan, that resulted in the deaths of 42 people.

The U.S. military acknowledged its failure to verify the target, and no one faced prosecution. Following Kunduz, MSF president Joanne Liu stated: “Today we say enough. Even war has rules.”

A decade later, these rules are once again being challenged amid the devastation of another Afghan hospital and other civilian targets. Scholars, along with various international organizations, are raising alarms that international humanitarian law is increasingly being ignored due to the normalization of attacks on health-care facilities.




Read more:
Russian airstrike against a Ukrainian children’s hospital reveals Russia’s eroding military might


Will anyone enforce the rules?

The strike on the Omid hospital raises concerns not only about the ambiguity in applying international law, but about the enforcement of international humanitarian law and the mechanisms for its implementation.

Strikes on hospitals in Kunduz, Aleppo in Syria and Mariupol in Ukraine led to reports and condemnations, yet none resulted in prosecutions or future enforcement of humanitarian laws.

If the Omid strike follows the same trajectory, it will confirm my greatest concern in my research: that the laws of war, at best, are capable of documenting atrocities but not preventing them. The actions taken by the international community now will determine whether these rules are enforced.

The Conversation

Shabnam Salehi is affiliated with Women’s Rights First org. as co-founder and president, which works on women’s rights issues in Afghanistan.

ref. Strike on Afghan hospital shows the laws of war may document atrocities — but don’t prevent them – https://theconversation.com/strike-on-afghan-hospital-shows-the-laws-of-war-may-document-atrocities-but-dont-prevent-them-278715

More evidence doesn’t mean more justice: The limits of visual technologies in human rights cases

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Kamari Maxine Clarke, Full Professor, University of Toronto

Editor’s note: This story is part of a series of articles from Canada’s top social sciences and humanities academics in a partnership between the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and The Conversation Canada.

Body cameras, satellites and digital verification tools are generating more evidence of violence than ever before. But the institutions responsible for delivering justice still decide what counts as evidence — and what does not.

Some of the most consequential reporting on state-sanctioned violence concerns disputes over evidence: who controls the video, the metadata and the channels where events are logged in real time.

In Minnesota in January 2026, that meant court fights and public pressure over preserving — and potentially sharing — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) body camera footage after the killings of Alex Pretti and Renée Good, alongside wider disputes over federal transparency during immigration enforcement operations.

National outlets have tracked how community members are using encrypted messaging such as Signal to spot and report ICE activity, prompting an FBI investigation that civil liberties experts say tests the boundary between protected observation and alleged “interference.”

Meanwhile, in Canada, the RCMP is rolling out body cameras nationwide, raising questions about how the data collected by state security services might provide a future archive for complaint processes, prosecutions and civil litigation.

What we are witnessing is a “juriscopic regime” — a dense entanglement of scopic technologies (body cameras, satellites, open‑source verification), scientific protocols and legal evidentiary horizons that together govern what can be seen, verified and acted upon as “truth” — defining who counts as an expert and what forms of knowledge are ignored as anecdotal, non-scientific or non-legal.

How communities document violence

Citizens are taking these documentation tools into their own hands.

Families who have experienced violence and the forced disappearance or murder of loved ones are increasingly building grassroots “evidence infrastructures” with these technologies.

In Mexico, for example, colectivos — groups of families searching for their loved ones — have added geolocation mapping, drone surveys and other geospatial tools to identify possible clandestine grave sites and to document searches in real time, both to generate leads and to pressure reluctant institutions into action.

Some groups are experimenting with AI-mediated storytelling, creating “living” videos and other digital interventions to keep cases visible while simultaneously navigating new risks like digital extortion and retaliation that follow from making personal information public.

In Nigeria, families use social media and emerging missing persons portals to widen the radius of who might recognize a face, a name or a location, effectively crowd-sourcing identification and tips when official registries are fragmented or difficult to access.

Across these and many other contexts globally, communities are organizing mutual aid, warning others about threats, preserving data before it disappears and transforming private grief into collective, actionable knowledge.

But visibility is unevenly distributed.

This “evidence revolution” is often treated as if better visibility produces better justice but in practice, courts and legal institutions decide what becomes legible as truth. It is this gatekeeping that distorts what harms are recognized and acted upon, and that narrows the scope of what justice looks like.

The legal limits of digital evidence

Human rights and international justice professionals are increasingly relying on digital and visual evidence — satellite imagery, crowd-sourced video, geolocation and AI-assisted analysis — to document harm and hold perpetrators to account.

Turning to these technologies may even deepen the distance between those victimized and the evidence meant to help them.

Family members of the missing frequently have extensive knowledge, but their expertise may not be taken seriously.

Law reshapes what “evidence” means, and even the best technology must pass through evidentiary rules and institutional priorities, which narrow what can be acted on — often in opaque ways.

Our recently released research findings show that these systems make certain forms of harm more legible than others. While this is helpful for certain evidentiary processes, disappearances, abductions and many forms of state violence can be virtually impossible to “see” from above.

In Nigeria, for example, those optical biases can also reproduce older hierarchies: communities that align with modern land tenure and fixed settlement patterns may be more legible than nomadic or displaced populations, shaping which harms travel as authoritative evidence.

What we see is that optical and digital technologies don’t simply reveal truth; they are translated and authorized through legal institutions and expert hierarchies, sometimes sidelining grassroots knowledge.

At the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, where mass atrocity and disappearance cases could potentially be heard, the evidentiary rules and institutional priorities of the court — the ways in which it determines admissibility, relevance and probative value — act as obstacles to admitting evidence. In the case of technologically derived evidence, the court relies on a few technical experts to render it legible to judges.

As a result, socially constructed technical judgments govern the production of knowledge. Forensic science makes explicit what the ICC’s evidence law often implies: that evidence is not a thing but an inference.

Expanding evidentiary frameworks for justice

When a mother in Mexico or a sister in Nigeria searches for a disappeared or killed loved one, she enters an evidence regime long before any court does. Her “evidence” archive begins as a series of data — messages, sightings, scraps, rumours, maps. Forensic science teaches us what must happen with this data in order for it to become viable evidence: Is there a chain of custody? Contamination control? Validated methods? Honest statements of uncertainty?

But the family’s need to know the truth of what happened exposes the limits of both forensic science and international courts.

A trace of evidence can be existentially decisive yet institutionally inadmissible; scientifically interpretable yet socially insufficient; legally persuasive yet too late to end the disappearance as a lived everyday condition.

In that gap, the struggle is not only over facts, but over whose knowledge becomes official, and whether truth is treated as a right owed to families rather than a byproduct of prosecution.

We need a more expansive regime of what counts as evidence in courts, moving toward an approach that regards documentation as political, treats law as a constraining optic as much as a solution, insists that accountability projects be regrounded in local knowledge and grassroots priorities and acknowledges that various forms of harm do not neatly convert into evidentiary categories.

We also need to widen the scope of who counts as an expert, include families’ vernacular forensic practice and the embodied work of searching, mapping and enduring.

Unless we change what justice looks like, we will continue to miss a lot.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. More evidence doesn’t mean more justice: The limits of visual technologies in human rights cases – https://theconversation.com/more-evidence-doesnt-mean-more-justice-the-limits-of-visual-technologies-in-human-rights-cases-274929

Economic policy in South Africa neglects informal traders: 5 focus areas to support the sector 

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Campbell Francis, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The informal economy is responsible for a large share of economic output across the continent. Yet economic policy is almost always designed for the formal economy and overlooks the informal economy.

We are labour-market economists interested in the informal economy and informal work. We have spent the last two years investigating the concept of an economic policy for informal workers. We spent several months interviewing informal traders, traders’ associations and key stakeholders. Our aim was to better understand their challenges, and to inform the development of an economic policy for informal trading.

Drawing on our research partnership with Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising, we argue that rethinking economic policy from the perspective of the informal economy is essential.

We begin from the premise that economic policy must actively support the everyday economy. Recognising informal traders as economic agents, and investing in systems that support them, allows local economies to become more resilient, inclusive and sustainable. Traders need a supportive ecosystem so they can move beyond survival, and contribute to local growth and development.

Our findings highlight five areas that should support a policy ecosystem: macroeconomic stability; efficient administration; regulation of competition; participation in policy and governance; and inclusive infrastructure.

On the ground

Our research focused on informal traders in Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub. The sector provides vital income for marginalised communities and brings essential goods and services closer to where people live. Yet traders remain on the periphery of policy attention. Urban management often treats them as a problem to control rather than as economic actors to engage.




Read more:
Johannesburg has failed its informal traders: policies are in place, but action is needed


Most informal traders are own-account workers, operating on survivalist incomes that often fall below the poverty line. They face unpredictable markets, limited access to infrastructure, and constant regulatory uncertainty. This makes it difficult to grow their businesses or improve earnings.

These difficulties reflect the fact that informal traders operate in environments that have multiple layers. These include:

  • local factors: municipal regulations, permits, policing, infrastructure, competition, community networks

  • broader national forces: macroeconomic trends, regulatory frameworks, structural inequalities, formal-sector dominance.




Read more:
Johannesburg’s produce market has supplied the informal sector for decades: a refresh is due


Understanding these interlocking layers is essential when creating policies that support sustainable livelihoods and growth.

Five policy pillars

(1) Macroeconomic stability

This needs to be the first pillar of the economic policy. The informal sector is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions for a number of reasons.

Firstly, informal traders earn low and unstable incomes. This means that rising living costs quickly erode their ability to sustain livelihoods. This is particularly true when it comes to food, transport and energy prices.

Secondly, the sector is vulnerable to poor growth and unemployment. The informal economy functions as a safety net during economic downturns by absorbing workers displaced from the formal sector. This was well illustrated during the COVID pandemic. But there’s a downside. A flood of new entrants into a constrained sector leads to overcrowding. In turn this:

  • leads to intensified competition for limited trading spaces

  • disrupts existing organisational systems

  • weakens trader networks

  • reduces earnings.

Macroeconomic instability, therefore, expands informality. It also threatens informal livelihoods.

Revisiting macroeconomic policy should also include a tax policy that doesn’t prejudice informal workers.

(2) Efficient administration

Administrative inefficiencies and exclusionary practices create barriers for informal traders. For example, delays in issuing permits and other documentation leave traders vulnerable to harassment, bribery and eviction.

Inconsistent enforcement of bylaws creates an uneven playing field. Compliant traders are disadvantaged while irregular practices persist.

These burdens are not solely the result of local government shortcomings. They also reflect national-level failures such as delays in processing asylum-seeker applications. This disadvantages traders who rely on formal documentation to operate legally.

Together, these administrative challenges have a number of knock-on effects. They:

  • intensify competition over limited spaces

  • erode trust in authorities

  • constrain the stability and growth of the informal sector.

(3) Regulation of competition

The South African informal sector faces competition on multiple fronts.

Traders compete among themselves for a limited number of customers and trading spaces. They also face intense competition from the formal sector. Examples include supermarkets, retail chains and shopping malls. Informal traders are pushed into less profitable or precarious locations.

It’s often assumed that there’s perfect competition in the sector – that market players can trade freely.

But they do face structural disadvantages such as regulatory barriers, formal-sector dominance and uneven access to prime trading spaces.

Formal-sector expansion is framed as economic “development”. But it frequently displaces long-standing informal systems.

Intense and unfair competition in the informal sector has another consequence: it forces traders to compete primarily on price rather than quality or service. This is because they can’t match the economies of scale, marketing power, or infrastructure advantages of formal retailers and better-resourced informal traders.

(4) Participation in policy and governance

An economic policy for informal traders needs to emerge from their involvement in policy and governance discussions.

Informal traders are often excluded from the planning and decision-making processes around things that affect them. This includes bylaw enforcement, market design and permit systems.

The result is policies that fail to reflect the realities of informal trade. In turn this:

  • creates unnecessary obstacles

  • increases uncertainty

  • limits traders’ ability to plan, invest and grow.

(5) Inclusive infrastructure

Many traders operate in spaces without electricity, water, sanitation or safe storage facilities. Poor infrastructure limits the types of goods traders can sell and increases operational. It also exposes both traders and customers to health and safety risks.

Too often, cities treat infrastructure provision for informal traders as optional. Or it’s not designed with the needs of informal traders in mind.

This neglect produces unsafe and precarious work environments, undermining both livelihoods and local economic activity.

Infrastructure that is designed to meet traders’ needs will translate investment into higher productivity, improved earnings, safer working conditions and more vibrant local markets. This will benefit both traders and the communities they serve.

The Conversation

David Francis received funding from Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising (WIEGO) to support the research that informed this article.

Siphelele Ngidi received funding from Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising (WIEGO) to support the research that informed this article.

ref. Economic policy in South Africa neglects informal traders: 5 focus areas to support the sector  – https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-in-south-africa-neglects-informal-traders-5-focus-areas-to-support-the-sector-278323

China is helping build Africa’s cities, but its approach sidelines local urban planners and residents

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ding Fei, Assistant Professor, Cornell University

As African cities experience some of the fastest urban growth rates in the world, China has become a major bilateral financier for urban infrastructure.

From Nairobi’s elevated expressways to Lagos’s airport upgrades and Addis Ababa’s new riverside developments, Chinese-backed projects are transforming skylines and daily life across the continent.

I study China’s economic engagements in Africa, focusing on how development is enacted, negotiated, and contested across sites of production, governance, and everyday life.

My recent analysis of 267 Chinese‑financed projects in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), Lusaka (Zambia) and Nairobi (Kenya) shows that while China delivers an impressive volume of infrastructure, it risks reinforcing Africa’s national government dominance in decision-making on urban infrastructure development.

The completion rate, and the speed at which most projects are finished, is impressive. But that’s only part of the equation. Cities – their governments and residents – are excluded from the project planning and negotiation process.

Across my project dataset, none of the infrastructure deals were financed directly through municipal governments. Instead, the agreements were mostly negotiated and funded through national ministries or state agencies. This happens partly because many cities are legally restricted from taking on external debt, and partly because lenders prefer working with sovereign governments.

This national-level dominance has far-reaching consequences for how African cities develop. When cities are not involved in financing negotiations, they lose the opportunity to align major infrastructure projects with long-term urban development plans.

China’s expanding footprint

African cities face massive infrastructure shortfalls. The African Union estimates that urban areas require about US$142 billion every year to build and maintain essential systems. In this context of urgent need, China has become one of the most important bilateral financiers helping to fill the gap.

The six cities examined in my study are the biggest urban centres in their respective countries. Together they house only about 13% of national populations. Yet they receive nearly 30% of all Chinese infrastructure financing flows into those countries.

Between 2000 and 2021, Chinese lenders committed about US$37 billion to urban infrastructure in these six cities. Transport projects account for the largest share, over US$17 billion. This is followed by social projects such as housing, schools and hospitals, which drew more than US$8 billion. Digital networks, electricity systems, water infrastructure and government buildings made up the remainder.

These investment patterns mirror the continent’s biggest infrastructure gaps, especially in transport and education, as identified in a 2022 UN-Habitat report.

Most of this financing is in the form of loans rather than grants. Loans represent nearly 68% of all projects and almost 89% of the total money committed to the six cities. The terms vary widely. Some loans are offered at very low interest rates. Others are closer to commercial rates, sometimes approaching 7%, with repayment periods stretching up to two decades.

Digital infrastructure projects often come with more favourable terms, though they are often tied to Chinese technology suppliers. Two large Chinese development banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, provide nearly 94% of project lending.

One notable feature of Chinese finance is the speed at which many projects are completed. Of the projects with available information, about 74% were completed. Many were completed within two to three years.

This is a relatively high rate compared with typical attrition levels in infrastructure projects across the continent.

The overall completion rate shows a capacity to deliver infrastructure projects at speed.

Still, speed and scale tell only part of the story. Equally significant is who negotiates the terms of lending.

Bypassing city authorities

Local governments are often mandated to implement projects and operate new infrastructure. Yet they lack the power or resources to do so.

In 2020, subnational governments across Africa received only 24% of total public spending, well below the global average of 39.5%. Weak property tax systems, heavy reliance on transfers from central government, and restrictions on borrowing leave most cities with limited fiscal autonomy.

Chinese financing, while substantial, has not altered this structural imbalance.

It’s not that cities don’t get funding at all. As urban hubs in their respective countries, the six cities under study often attract high-profile, foreign-funded projects. The projects elevate a city’s skyline. But they often don’t address neighbourhood-level gaps in water supply, transit access, or environmental services.

My other research indicates that large, showcase projects funded by China often take precedence over localised, community-level improvements. Thus infrastructure is unevenly provided in urban areas.

Cities need fiscal power

If African cities are to manage the rapid urbanisation and meet the needs of the roughly 1.5 billion people expected to live in urban areas by mid-century, they need more than new bridges and roads.

They need the fiscal power and planning capacity to plan, finance and govern infrastructure on their own terms.

Based on my research findings, these steps would be useful:

  • rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed

  • strengthen municipal revenue and financial capacity

  • improve planning coordination across governments.

Firstly, it is crucial to rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed in policy and the media. For years, the conversation has revolved around the idea that African cities simply lack enough roads, pipes, grids and public facilities.

While the shortfalls are real, this framing can reinforce the belief that only large, externally financed megaprojects can solve urban problems. It also risks sidelining the diverse and often creative ways communities already provide services when formal systems fall short.

Instead of viewing cities solely through the lens of what they lack, policymakers should also recognise the hybrid networks that public, private or community actors establish to keep daily services running. Examples of these include housing collectives in Harare and smart water meters in Nairobi.

Strengthening these systems requires a broader, more inclusive vision of what urban infrastructure can be.

Secondly, municipal revenue and financial capacity needs to be strengthened.

For cities to gain real decision-making power, they need stronger and more reliable sources of revenue. That means improving property tax systems, developing transparent land-based financing tools, and ensuring residents have equitable access to productive sector employment.

Some cities, such as Lagos, have already built robust tax bases and even issued municipal bonds to finance major projects.

But reforms cannot just happen at the city level. National governments must give municipalities clearer legal authority to raise revenues and borrow responsibly.

And when countries do rely on external finance, they need strong safeguards in terms of transparent bidding processes, rigorous project evaluations, and clear rules for how risks and costs are shared. Without oversight, long-term contracts can saddle cities with high user fees or hidden financial liabilities that become burdens on future budgets and residents.

Thirdly, planning coordination across governments and sectors must be improved.

Urban infrastructure does not function in silos. Transport depends on land use, water systems depend on energy, and digital networks depend on both. Yet planning is often fragmented across ministries, sectors and international partners.

A more coordinated approach is essential. National and local governments should work together through joint planning committees, shared databases and consultation processes that ensure new projects fit into long-term city strategies. Giving city governments and community groups a seat at the table, especially in the early stages of feasibility studies and project design, will help prevent mismatches between high-profile investments and everyday needs.

Reliable information is central to this effort. Many African countries still lack systems to track external financial flows, project progress, evaluation and management. Building comprehensive data systems is a cornerstone of transparent and responsible governance.

China’s involvement across multiple sectors offers an opportunity to pursue more integrated planning. The recent summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have pledged efforts to institutionalise subnational cooperation. But these will only be effective if African governments actively and strategically shape the agenda.

The challenge for African cities is not simply attracting more finance but gaining the authority and capacity to guide urban development. China will likely remain an important financier. But no external partner can substitute for strong city institutions, transparent financial systems, and coordinated planning.

The Conversation

Ding Fei does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. China is helping build Africa’s cities, but its approach sidelines local urban planners and residents – https://theconversation.com/china-is-helping-build-africas-cities-but-its-approach-sidelines-local-urban-planners-and-residents-278209

Violent conflicts are reshaping what farmers grow: what this means for food security

Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Senior Lecturer at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria and Senior Research Associate at North West University, North-West University

Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy. It provides livelihoods for over 70% of the rural population and contributes to national food security and economic development.

For most rural households, farming is not just a source of income and sustenance. It also provides cultural identity and social stability. Over the past two decades, however, rural Africa has witnessed increasing levels of violent conflicts that undermine agricultural productivity, investment and long-term development.

Farmers facing insecurity often abandon productive crops, reduce land use and invest less in their farms. There are serious consequences for food security.

Conflict destroys lives and property. It also changes the decisions farmers make about investing in their land.

We are agricultural and applied economists with expertise in rural development,sustainable food system and climate-smart agriculture. We’ve studied the impact of conflict on food systems in the global south.

One of our studies examined how violent conflict influenced agricultural investment decisions among rural households in Nigeria. We combined nationally representative household data with detailed conflict records, to track how exposure to violence affects farming.

The findings showed that violent conflict altered agricultural investment decisions. It made farmers less likely to cultivate major crops.

The cultivation of yam, sweet potato, groundnut, cowpea, maize and cassava declined as conflict incidents increased. Sweet potato was the most affected, perhaps because it needs a lot of labour and a longer time to grow.

When conflict disrupts farming through abandoned fields, lost livestock, or altered investment decisions, it undermines food availability and long-term agricultural development.

Understanding these impacts is useful when designing ways to help farmers and sustain food systems in conflict-affected areas.

The reality

Our study used panel data from Nigeria’s Living Standards Measurement Study covering the periods 2012/2013, 2015/2016 and 2018/2019.

The national study provides detailed household-level information. This covers demographic characteristics, agricultural production, crop choice, land allocation, input use, production costs and market participation.

We combined the household coordinates with geocoded conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure exposure to violent conflict. The ACLED database provides detailed information on battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, protests and riots.

Our study focused on three indicators of violent conflict exposure:

  • total number of conflict incidents

  • number of violent incidents affecting civilians (including Boko Haram-related violence)

  • number of battles, including protests, riots and farmer–herder clashes.

To capture local exposure to violence, we measured conflict incidents within a radius of 10km of each surveyed household in a given year.

By linking spatial conflict data with household-level agricultural information across multiple survey waves, the study analysed how exposure to violent conflict influenced farmers’ production decisions, land allocation and agricultural outcomes over time.

The findings

The results indicate that insecurity discourages farmers from engaging in production activities that involve greater risk or long-term investment. Conflict exposure also affects land allocation decisions.

The analysis showed a reduction in the total cultivated land area and a decline in the share of land allocated to key staple crops.

This pattern suggests that farmers respond to insecurity by scaling down farming activities, avoiding distant plots, and concentrating on smaller or safer areas of land. Reducing the land cultivated may result in less food produced.

We found that conflict led to less spending on agricultural production. Farmers invested less in inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and hired labour.

The effects varied across management types. Plots managed by men showed relatively stable investment levels. Production costs increased on plots managed by men and women. This could be due to reliance on external labour during periods of insecurity.

The findings demonstrate that violent conflict affects crop choices, reduces land use and discourages agricultural investment.

Disruptions also increase the cost of agricultural production and marketing, making farming less profitable. Government efforts to support agriculture, such as input subsidies and rural development programmes, don’t work so well in conflict zones.

The adverse effects are more severe for households in highly conflict-prone areas. Disputes have long-term economic impacts.

Recommendation and policy implications

The findings highlight the need for conflict-sensitive agricultural policies and targeted rural development interventions.

First, strong rural security and community conflict resolution mechanisms are essential. Government and local authorities should monitor security in major agricultural zones and help communities to build peace.

Policies should encourage farmers to plant climate-smart and low-risk crops that need fewer inputs and have shorter production cycles. This would make agricultural systems more resilient to conflict.

Extension services should advise farmers on which crops to plant, improved seed varieties, and farming strategies suitable for insecure environments.

Policymakers should invest in rural infrastructure and early-warning systems, including market access, transport networks and conflict monitoring systems.

The Conversation

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Violent conflicts are reshaping what farmers grow: what this means for food security – https://theconversation.com/violent-conflicts-are-reshaping-what-farmers-grow-what-this-means-for-food-security-278719

Birutė Galdikas: The last of ‘Leakey’s Angels’ in primatology’s most extraordinary chapter

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Mireya Mayor, Director of Exploration and Science Communication, Florida International University

Birute Galdikas carries an orangutan named Isabel in Borneo, Indonesia. The 2011 film ‘Born To Be Wild 3D’ followed her work. AP Photo/Irwin Fedriansyah

Primatologist Birutė Galdikas died on March 24, 2026, and an era of science that began in the forests of Tanzania, Rwanda and Borneo studying humanity’s closest living relatives more than half a century ago is coming quietly to a close. Her passing marks more than the loss of a scientist – it’s the end of one of the most extraordinary chapters in modern science.

For more than half a century, primatology had three central figures: Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Galdikas — often called Leakey’s Angels, after their mentor — who transformed how we understand primates and, in many ways, how we understand ourselves.

A young woman sits with orangutans playing around her in the jungle.
Birutė Galdikas, shown in 1965.
Universal Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

They were sent into the field by paleoanthropologist Louis Leakey, who believed that if we understood other primates, we might better understand human evolution and human nature. It was a radical idea at the time, not only scientifically but culturally. Leakey did not send large research teams or established professors. Instead, three young women went into forests, often alone, for years at a time.

What they discovered changed science and the public imagination.

Seeing chimpanzees and apes as individuals

Before the scientists’ work, primates were often described as creatures of instinct, their behavior explained largely through simple drives for food and reproduction. After their work, people began to talk about individuals with personalities, alliances, rivalries, friendships and grief.

Goodall, Fossey and Galdikas showed that chimpanzees make tools and wage political struggles, that gorillas live in complex family groups, and that orangutans raise their young with a patience and investment that rivals that of humans. The line between humans and other primates did not disappear, but it became harder to draw cleanly.

They also changed who could be a scientist.

Three women living for years in remote forests in the 1960s and ‘70s was not normal. By succeeding, they quietly expanded the boundaries of who could lead expeditions, run field sites, publish major research and become the public face of science. Many primatologists of my generation entered a field that these women forced open.

Birutė Galdikas talks about her career.

Each of these extraordinary women shaped my life in different ways. I never met Fossey, who died in Rwanda in 1985. But watching “Gorillas in the Mist,” a movie about her work, changed the course of my life and sent me toward primatology instead of law school. Years later, as a young primatologist studying lemurs, I met Goodall at a conference; she later wrote the foreword to my book and became a mentor and friend as I navigated my own path in conservation science. I met Galdikas, a scientist at Canada’s Simon Fraser University, professionally and immediately recognized a kindred spirit – another woman who had devoted her life to the study and protection of humans’ closest animal relatives.

With their deaths – Goodall died in 2025 – it falls to those of us who were inspired by them to continue and evolve their work at a time when it has never been more difficult or more important.

But the field today’s primatologists inherited is not the same one they began.

The next generation and primates’ struggle for survival

The first generation of field primatologists went into forests full of animals to discover how primates lived. They were explorers as much as scientists, and their work had the feel of discovery in the classic sense – new behaviors, new social structures, new understandings of intelligence and culture in animals.

Their research helped reshape anthropology, psychology and evolutionary biology. They helped answer one of the oldest questions humans ask about themselves: What makes us different from other species?

Birutė Galdikas talks about the documentary ‘Born to be Wild 3D’ and her work rescuing and returning orangutans to the wild.

By the time my generation began working in the field, many of those questions had already been answered. We knew primates used tools, formed political alliances, reconciled after fights and mourned their dead. We knew they had personalities and social strategies.

The question was no longer whether primates were like us, but whether they would survive us.

This is the quiet shift that defines modern primatology. My generation now goes into forests that are smaller, more fragmented and quieter, and the work is increasingly focused on making sure those animals are still there at all.

I have spent much of my career studying lemurs in Madagascar, where this shift is impossible to ignore. Lemurs are among the most endangered group of mammals on Earth, with more than 90% of species threatened with extinction. In many parts of Madagascar, forests now exist only as isolated fragments surrounded by agriculture and human settlement. Some lemur populations survive in forest patches so small that a single fire or logging operation could eliminate them entirely.

Conservation begins with caring

These primates that captured the world’s attention are also the species most like us. They have long childhoods, complex societies, intelligence, and emotional lives that feel familiar to us. Their similarity is what made people care. And that caring, in many cases, is what has kept them from disappearing entirely.

The great achievement of Leakey’s Angels was not only what they discovered, but that they made the world care about primates.

Before the three scientists’ work, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans were largely abstract animals to most people – zoo exhibits, textbook illustrations, evolutionary symbols. After their work, these creatures became individuals with names, families, histories and personalities. Each of the women’s work was celebrated in films and books, including the Morgan Freeman-narrated documentary “Born to Be Wild 3D” that followed Galdikas’ orangutan rescues.

Conservation begins with caring, and caring begins with stories. They gave the world those stories.

But caring is no longer enough. We are now in an era where the most important breakthroughs in primatology may not be new discoveries about behavior, but new ways to protect habitats, connect fragmented forests, preserve genetic diversity and help humans and primates survive on the same increasingly crowded landscapes.

The work has shifted from observation to intervention, from discovery to responsibility.

Every generation of scientists inherits a different world. The generation of Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Birutė Galdikas inherited a world full of primates we did not yet understand. My generation has inherited a world where we understand primates very well, but are in danger of losing them anyway.

The forests are quieter now than when these three young women went into them more than half a century ago. The responsibility, however, has only grown louder.

The central question of primatology is no longer what makes us human. It is whether a species intelligent enough to understand extinction will choose to prevent it in our closest living relatives.

The Conversation

Mireya Mayor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. Birutė Galdikas: The last of ‘Leakey’s Angels’ in primatology’s most extraordinary chapter – https://theconversation.com/birute-galdikas-the-last-of-leakeys-angels-in-primatologys-most-extraordinary-chapter-279398

NASA wants to build a base on the Moon by the 2030s – how and why it plans to build up to a long-term lunar presence

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Michelle L.D. Hanlon, Professor of Air and Space Law, University of Mississippi

NASA’s Space Launch System rocket that will take an astronaut crew around the Moon rolls out to the launchpad. Joel Kowsky/NASA via Getty Images

The next U.S. trip to the Moon isn’t about planting a flag. It’s about learning how to live and work there.

NASA has just reset its Artemis program, marking a clear strategic shift: Space exploration is moving away from a race to achieve milestones and toward a system built on repeated operations, a sustained presence and lunar infrastructure that could become part of the technology networks we rely on here on Earth.

That shift is reflected in newly announced plans to invest billions of dollars in building a long-term lunar base, with habitats, power systems and surface infrastructure designed to support ongoing human activity. The message? Humans have already normalized travel to space. The next step is normalizing living beyond Earth.

Artemis is NASA’s plan to return people to the Moon with the goal of staying. Unlike the short Apollo missions of the 1960s and 1970s, it consists of increasingly complex missions: flying around the Moon, landing on its surface and eventually establishing a base near the lunar south pole. The program aims to create a reliable way for humans to live and work there, develop technologies useful on Earth and prepare for the journey to Mars.

Rather than moving straight from the upcoming Artemis II crewed lunar flyby to a surface landing, the new road map adds an intermediate mission in 2027. Astronauts will test docking, life-support systems and communications with commercial lunar landers from SpaceX and Blue Origin, but in low Earth orbit, the region roughly 100 to 1,200 miles (160 to 2,000 kilometers above Earth’s surface, where rescue remains possible.

NASA head Jared Isaacman discussed changes to the Artemis program on Feb. 27, 2026.

The first landing near the lunar south pole is now targeted for 2028. This timeline may sound delayed, but in reality, it has been deliberately reset to prioritize building reliable systems that can operate long into the future over speed.

As a professor of air and space law, I’ve been watching these developments closely. The United States is still in a race – particularly with China – but it is choosing to compete on its own terms. Rather than chasing the fastest possible landing, NASA is focused on building a system that can support repeated missions and a lasting human presence.

From sprint to system

The original Artemis plan aimed to leap quickly from test flights to a crewed landing while simultaneously developing new rockets, spacecraft and landing systems. That approach carried risk. Artemis I, an uncrewed mission, flew successfully in 2022. After a few delays, Artemis II is now nearing launch, with windows planned for early April 2026. But the further jump to a safe and reliable landing remains significant.

NASA’s new road map slows the transition deliberately. Instead of stand-alone milestones, NASA is now building a sequence of repeatable steps to gain hands-on experience.

This change includes a substantial new investment, with a multiphase plan for a lunar base with habitats, power systems and the surface infrastructure needed for a long-term human presence on the Moon. Consistent launch cadence and repeatable operations are how teams develop the expertise needed for safe, reliable spaceflight and eventually for traveling to Mars.

A rocket on a launchpad overlooking water.
The Artemis II Space Launch System rocket is poised to launch a crew of four to space.
NASA/John Kraus

This shift is reflected in the decision to pause the planned lunar Gateway station, a small space station intended to orbit the Moon, and prioritize infrastructure on the lunar surface itself, where astronauts will live, work and build over time.

The new changes also emphasize a shifting role for commercial companies.
SpaceX’s and Blue Origin’s lunar landers are integrated into the mission architecture.

The 2027 test mission, for example, will practice docking between crewed spacecraft and new commercial lunar landers in low Earth orbit. NASA is coordinating a network of public and private partners rather than running a single government-run Apollo-like program.

This method spreads risk across partners, lowers costs and speeds development, though success now depends on multiple players working reliably together.

Law follows activity

NASA’s road map is not just about lowering technical risk. It is also about shaping the future environment of lunar activity.

International space law, including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, sets out broad principles to guide space activities, like avoiding harmful interference with others’ activities. But those rules only gain real meaning through repeated, coordinated activity, especially on the lunar surface, where desirable landing sites are limited.

Countries and companies that maintain a sustained presence on the Moon will shape the practical expectations everyone will share while living and working on the Moon. One-off demonstrations, like lunar landings, don’t shape lunar activity like continued operations would.

A diagram showing the three phases on NASA's lunar base plan, with phase 1 securing access, phase 2 establishing a base and phase 3 a semipermanent crew presence
NASA’s Artemis program seeks to establish a long-term human presence on the lunar surface.
NASA TV

Why this matters – even if you never go to space

It would be easy to see these changes as purely technical, but they are not. The structure of a space program shapes what technologies are developed, how industries grow and which countries influence how space is used. Technologies developed for sustained lunar activity, including life-support systems, energy storage and advanced communications, have found applications on Earth, from medicine to disaster response.

There are economic effects as well. The Artemis program supports jobs across the United States and among its international partners. It helps build industries that extend far beyond NASA itself.

And there is a strategic dimension. As more countries and companies operate in space, the question is no longer just who arrives first, but who helps define how activity is carried out. Over time, that presence will likely become part of the infrastructure that supports daily life on Earth.

Communications, navigation, supply chains and scientific data already depend on space-based systems. As activity expands to the Moon, facilities there, from energy systems to communications relay systems that transmit data and signals back to Earth, will become integrated into those networks. What is built on the Moon will not sit apart from life on Earth, but increasingly function as an extension of it.

The Moon is becoming a place where infrastructure, industry and rules and expectations for how humans operate there are already beginning to take shape. NASA’s updated plan signals that the United States intends to be present there consistently.

The updates to the Artemis program are a statement about how the United States intends to engage in the next phase of space exploration. Rather than pursuing a single dramatic landing, the U.S. is committing to the steady, repeatable work of building a lasting foothold on the Moon, and redefining humanity’s relationship with space itself.

The Conversation

Michelle L.D. Hanlon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

ref. NASA wants to build a base on the Moon by the 2030s – how and why it plans to build up to a long-term lunar presence – https://theconversation.com/nasa-wants-to-build-a-base-on-the-moon-by-the-2030s-how-and-why-it-plans-to-build-up-to-a-long-term-lunar-presence-279166

Panicking scientists, canceled experiments – federal funding cuts turned my work as a research dean into crisis management

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Nara Parameswaran, Senior Associate Dean for Research, College of Human Medicine, Michigan State University

Cuts to federally funded research slow the progress of scientific innovations and new treatments. Michigan State University College of Human Medicine

Fielding frantic faculty emails and panicked texts was not how I had hoped my 2025 would begin. Little did I imagine that my role as a research dean at a medical school would be taken over by navigating chaotic grant terminations and delays of federal research funding, all justified in the name of scientific progress.

Under normal conditions, a major part of my job is reducing barriers for faculty, staff and students engaged in innovative research. For example, I make sure my faculty have enough human help to complete necessary administrative tasks so they can focus on their science while writing their grants. My overall goal is to remove roadblocks and foster an environment in which new discoveries are made that can improve people’s lives.

But none of us in research leadership positions around the country had ever faced anything like the Trump administration’s attacks on universities and science.

One of my first clues that we were no longer operating in business-as-usual mode was when the White House terminated U.S. Agency for International Development grants. Michigan State University was one of the institutions affected by this major blow to agricultural, food and other global research, but the medical school where I work wasn’t directly hit. Our turn came when DOGE – the Department of Government Efficiency, a Trump administration effort at eliminating bureaucratic wasteturned its attention to the U.S. National Institutes of Health.

As the White House took aim at higher education and the scientific research enterprise with its budgetary scalpels, my world was thrown into chaos.

man standing at a podium, speaking
Nara Parameswaran’s job as a medical school research dean transformed into dealing with much more chaos and uncertainty.
Michigan State University College of Human Medicine

The human costs of grant uncertainty

While interruptions to grant funding slow scientific progress, there is an immediate real-world human cost to the upheaval.

Consider the case of one of my junior faculty members. 2025 was a critical year for them: If they didn’t receive funding, they would lose their employment – it’s common in academia for scientists to need to raise money to support their own research and part of their salary. Their NIH program officer – the person who recommends whether a grant would be funded – had previously told them their proposal would likely be successful. But by February 2025, that NIH officer was DOGE’d – that is, fired – and so the fate of the grant remained in limbo.

The review of a second grant proposal that this MSU researcher had submitted to NIH was delayed by several months after NIH suspended the panels that assess the scientific merit of grant submissions.

By the time the faculty member received initial feedback on that grant and resubmitted it for reevaluation, the government had shut down and delayed the review again. By this point, nearly a year had passed and no grant had been awarded – or rejected, for that matter.

Without funding, this faculty member cannot conduct experiments, pay or train students and other lab members, or purchase essential supplies to do experiments. As a result, both scientific progress and their career advancement remain in jeopardy; they hang on by a thread while waiting for yet another grant to come through.

Sadly, this was not an unusual case. A number of faculty – at my school and across the country – had received funding, only to have the government cancel their grants mid-project for unknown or unclear reasons. Haphazard grant terminations or prolonged uncertainty create chaos not only for faculty, but also for students, research staff and all the families who depend on these positions for income.

Identifying new resources to help faculty continue their work became one of my top priorities. But finding spare money is not a trivial task. It meant working with the college and university leaders to identify resources, prioritizing some spending while holding back on other budget items, as well as raising money from the community for what we called “research rescue.”

A small group of medical school research deans from various universities started meeting on Sundays – the only day that worked for everyone. We share information, provide advice and support and try to think strategically about how to help faculty. We talk about any successes and commiserate about the depth of the chaos at our institutions. None of us were trained to deal with this kind of situation, and the support of this group has been critical for me personally.

In addition, the research deans from various colleges here at MSU discuss these issues regularly with each other and other university officials to strategize how to navigate these difficult times, sharing information among people with different roles.

young man in white lab coat works with materials under a lab hood
Early-career researchers are among those hardest hit by uncertainty and chaos – with some choosing to leave science altogether.
Michigan State University College of Human Medicine

A generation of scientists at risk

One of the most profound consequences of all this instability has been its impact on the next generation of scientists, especially Ph.D. students and postdoctoral scholars. Not only are these early-career researchers training to be the scientists of the future, but they are also essential contributors to performing grant-funded experiments, publishing in scientific journals and ensuring research program continuity.

By June 2025, several dozen Ph.D. students across my campus were affected by grant terminations or delays. With more than 100 faculty from my college concerned about funding, many postdoctoral scholars working under them faced uncertain futures. This wasn’t unique to our college or university – this was, and is, a national problem.

Anticipating deep cuts to funding for student stipends and training, institutions were forced to reduce or even cancel graduate student admissions for the year.

Additional widespread disruption stemmed from revoking F-1 visas, which had allowed international students to study in the U.S., and terminating related recordkeeping, placing international students in academic and personal limbo.

Recruitment and training were further complicated by a September 2025 proclamation calling for restrictions on H-1B visas. This further constrained universities’ ability to recruit postdoctoral scholars and faculty who aren’t American citizens.

Unsurprisingly, these conditions have profoundly shaped how students and trainees assess their future careers. In a 2025 survey of 824 trainees, 77% said that recent executive orders or federal policy changes influenced their career plans significantly or somewhat. The long-term implications of these barriers could be grim, especially because more than half of the country’s postdoc scholars in science, technology, engineering and math, and around a third of the country’s graduate students, are visa holders.

Recent data on who received grant funding revealed troubling trends, particularly for early-career investigators. As a research dean, my major worry is about the livelihoods of these scientists, especially because most of them have young families to provide for.

woman in white lab coat has a pipette in one hand and holds up a test tube
Every dollar that NIH spent on research in 2024 generated more than twice as much value to the economy by creating jobs, supporting small businesses and developing new technologies.
Michigan State University College of Human Medicine

A new reality for scientists

Countless breakthroughs that have altered the course of human and animal health have been made possible by sustained federal research investment through agencies such as NIH. These discoveries are made by real people working in research labs or in the communities we serve, and this work requires real money.

Declines in support for these researchers, coupled with reduced graduate enrollment and ongoing visa challenges, risk erasing an entire generation of scientists, with consequences that will reverberate for many years.

All these unresolved challenges – grant terminations, potential reductions in funding for research infrastructure, federal workforce cuts, visa instability, lawsuits and threats to the next generation of the scientific workforce – have converged into a single reality: Uncertainty has become the norm. Each day brings new questions about who will be affected and how to respond in ways that protect faculty, staff and students so they can continue their important work.

The Conversation

Nara Parameswaran has received funding from National Institutes of Health, American Heart Association, Korean Ginseng Society and the California Prune industry.

ref. Panicking scientists, canceled experiments – federal funding cuts turned my work as a research dean into crisis management – https://theconversation.com/panicking-scientists-canceled-experiments-federal-funding-cuts-turned-my-work-as-a-research-dean-into-crisis-management-277162

Sex test used in IOC’s new transgender ban more likely to exclude from Olympics intersex women who were assigned female at birth

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Ari Berkowitz, Presidential Professor and Graduate Liaison for biology programs; Director, Cellular & Behavioral Neurobiology Graduate Program, University of Oklahoma

Sex testing in elite sports has had a long, inconsistent history. anton5146/iStock via Getty Images Plus

The International Olympic Committee announced a new policy on March 26, 2026, for women’s competitions: Every athlete must be tested for a gene called SRY, usually found on the Y chromosome. Males typically have a Y chromosome and females typically don’t, so the IOC says this requirement will exclude “biological males.” This announcement comes as planning for the 2028 Summer Olympics, hosted in Los Angeles, is underway.

But the IOC statement hides the complexity of biological sex and continues the organization’s century of what the record shows is inconsistent and biologically unsound sports policies.

I’m a biology professor and author of an upcoming book, “The Binary Delusion: How Biology Defies the Myth of Two Sexes.” While the impetus for the new policy seems to be exclusion of transgender women from women’s athletics, it will more likely exclude and draw unwelcome publicity to many more women who are not transgender.

Few elite athletes are transgender

Transgender people have faced mounting legal and political attacks in recent years.

President Donald Trump issued an executive order on Jan. 20, 2025, asserting that biological sex is simple and binary – that everyone is unambiguously female or male – and another executive order precluding “males” from women’s competitions.

At least 29 U.S. states have excluded transgender girls and women from girl’s and women’s athletic competitions. These laws are built on the idea that men on average are superior to women in many sports, so women need to be protected from unfair competition.

Person holding a sign reading 'SPORTS FOR ALL' in front of U.S. Supreme Court; other people bearing trans flags
Numerous state bills have aimed to ban transgender athletes from participating in sports.
Oliver Contreras/AFP via Getty Images

But elite transgender athletes are rare. In a 2024 hearing before the U.S. Senate, the president of the NCAA testified that of the 510,000 athletes in U.S. colleges at that time, he was aware of fewer than 10 transgender athletes – less than 0.002%.

Only one known transgender woman has ever participated in an Olympic women’s competition since the committee allowed women to compete in the Games beginning in 1900: Laurel Hubbard, a weightlifter who competed for New Zealand in 2021 but did not medal.

The rarity of transgender athletes in elite competition suggests their exclusion is a solution in search of a problem.

Biological sex is complicated

The genetic test the IOC is requiring is more likely to identify intersex women.

Intersex people have a combination of typically female and typically male biological sex traits. These include sex chromosomes, internal and external reproductive anatomy, sex hormones and hormone receptors.

There are many variations of intersex traits, but three may be the most relevant for women’s athletic competitions: androgen insensitivity, 5-alpha-reductase deficiency and genetic mosaicism.

People with androgen insensitivity don’t respond as much to androgens like testosterone. Some believe that having high levels of testosterone can give athletes a competitive advantage. Athletes with this condition gain little or no advantage like muscle growth from androgens. This also means their visible sex characteristics, including their genitals, appear mostly or entirely female. The new IOC policy has an exception for “complete” androgen insensitivity but doesn’t say how athletes would demonstrate this.

The policy also doesn’t mention partial androgen insensitivity, where androgen receptors respond to testosterone but probably not enough to gain a significant advantage in performance. Nevertheless, athletes with partial androgen insensitivity will presumably fail the test and be excluded from participating under the new policy.

People with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency make and respond to testosterone but make little or none of a more potent androgen called dihydrotestosterone, or DHT. If they have no DHT, their genitals appear more female and they gain less athletic advantage from androgens. People with this condition who have a Y chromosome will fail the new sex test and be excluded.

People with mosaicism are born with some cells that have a Y chromosome and some that do not. Women can develop mosaicism during pregnancy, when fetal cells with Y chromosomes cross the placenta into her body. The woman will have some cells with a Y chromosome, perhaps for the rest of her life. Such cells could cause a previously pregnant athlete to fail the new test.

History of sex testing in women’s athletics

The IOC and associated sports federations have a long history of sex testing, especially for track events. Sex testing has switched from genitals to genes to testosterone levels, and now back to genes. While the stated goal for these policies was to uncover males pretending to be female, they have never found any. Instead, they identified and excluded intersex women.

For much of the 20th century, sports administrators examined genitals if a competitor was suspected of being male. In the mid-1960s, they began examining the genitals of all women participating in International Amateur Athletics Federation competitions in what were called “nude parades.”

The nude parades embarrassed athletes and sports federations and were replaced by newly available chromosome or gene tests in the late 1960s. These tests were often done without informed consent – athletes were instead told they were being tested for performance-enhancing drugs. The test results were then often revealed publicly without the athlete’s consent.

For example, in 1967, the Polish sprinter Ewa Klobukowska, who had won three gold medals and set three world records, was designated “male” by a chromosome test, though she had typically female genitals. She was excluded from competition and forced to return her medals. But the following year, she gave birth – she apparently had genetic mosaicism.

Black-and-white photo of athletes running on a track
Ewa Klobukowska (No. 3 bib) had her medals stripped after being incorrectly designated ‘male’ through genetic testing.
S&G/PA Images via Getty Images

In 1985, a Spanish hurdler, Maria José Martínez-Patiño, found out through a public announcement that she was designated “male” by a genetic test and excluded from competition. “I felt ashamed and embarrassed,” she has said in a personal account. “I lost friends, my fiancé, hope and energy. But I knew that I was a woman and that my genetic difference gave me no unfair physical advantage. I could hardly pretend to be a man; I have breasts and a vagina.” She has complete androgen insensitivity.

Genetic testing largely gave way to testing testosterone levels in recent decades, which also excluded many intersex athletes. The 2026 IOC announcement states that there is no overlap in the testosterone levels of female and male elite athletes, but published research examining hundreds of elite athletes contradicts this statement.

In 2021, the IOC announced a new policy stating that “Every person has the right to practise sport without discrimination and in a way that respects their health, safety and dignity.” But the committee left it to each sport’s federation to regulate their own competitions, leading to a confusing mix of criteria that may have paved the way for the organization’s simplified 2026 policy.

SRY gene test is misleading

The IOC’s 2026 policy hints at the complexity of biological sex, stating that sex includes “sex chromosomes, gonads and hormones.” But it’s odd that genitals didn’t make their list, considering that genitals – external sex organs like the vagina and penis – are how most ordinary people define female and male, how physicians assign sex at birth, and how the IOC itself defined sex for decades.

Sex testing through genital inspection, though embarrassing and traumatizing for many athletes, may have been a better indicator of athletic advantage from androgens like testosterone than the SRY gene. During prenatal development, androgens cause initially undefined body structures to become a penis and scrotum; in their absence, or with androgen insensitivity, these structures become a clitoris and labia instead. Thus, typically female genitals indicate low androgen levels or low sensitivity to androgens, which suggests an athlete’s physical performance was not enhanced by these hormones.

Unless the IOC takes scrupulous care to screen for these exceptions, its new genetic test will likely exclude athletes who have not gained an advantage from androgens. Their new policy, however, states that “the need for consistency and fairness across sports” will not allow for “case-by-case consideration.”

As a result, it’s likely that another generation of intersex women will be excluded from the Olympics.

The Conversation

Ari Berkowitz receives funding from the National Science Foundation.

ref. Sex test used in IOC’s new transgender ban more likely to exclude from Olympics intersex women who were assigned female at birth – https://theconversation.com/sex-test-used-in-iocs-new-transgender-ban-more-likely-to-exclude-from-olympics-intersex-women-who-were-assigned-female-at-birth-279489