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May 4, 2026

Face à Pékin, Taïwan peut-il encore compter sur la protection de Washington ?

Source: The Conversation – in French – By Barthélémy Courmont, Directeur du master Histoire — Relations internationales, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

Le respect tout relatif que porte Donald Trump aux alliances de long terme souscrites par les États-Unis alimente l’inquiétude à Taïwan : si la République populaire de Chine, toujours plus puissante sur le plan militaire, décide d’envahir l’île, cette dernière pourra-t-elle compter sur le soutien de Washington ? Et même sans invasion directe, ne risque-t-elle pas d’être sacrifiée si le président des États-Unis décide de passer avec Pékin l’un de ces grands « deals » qu’il apprécie tant ?

Il n’est nul besoin de rappeler qu’une confrontation entre la Chine et Taïwan aurait, avant même l’implication d’autres acteurs, des incidences profondes sur la sécurité et l’économie internationales. Aussi est-il indispensable de porter un regard lucide et attentif sur les tensions actuelles dans le détroit de Taïwan. Ces tensions ne sauraient cependant être comprises sans tenir compte du positionnement de Washington, dans une relation triangulaire que le politologue américain Richard Bush a qualifiée de « nœud ».

Il convient aujourd’hui de s’interroger sur ce nœud. D’une part, en raison de l’évolution du rapport de force interdétroit, qui place désormais Pékin dans une position très avantageuse. D’autre part, en raison des errements stratégiques de Washington et d’une politique étrangère américaine qui montre d’inquiétants signes de déclin.

L’étau chinois se resserre

Depuis 2016, on relève de plus en plus de provocations militaires chinoises impliquant les capacités navales et aériennes, avec de multiples incursions dans l’espace aérien et les eaux territoriales de Taïwan. S’y ajoute un discours menaçant : plusieurs responsables militaires chinois ont notamment insisté sur les préparatifs d’une invasion. Xi Jinping, plus mesuré, a rappelé que l’unification doit se faire par la voie pacifique… sans cependant exclure la possibilité d’avoir recours à la force, et donc à l’invasion. Si les tensions interdétroit ne sont pas nouvelles et doivent être analysées avec précaution, elles sont très clairement montées d’un cran depuis quelques années.

Le premier facteur de tension est politique. Après l’élection en janvier 2024 de (William) Lai Ching-te, connu pour sa défense sourcilleuse de la souveraineté de l’île, Pékin a poursuivi ses pressions et continué d’attaquer Taïwan par tous les moyens juridiques en sa possession, notamment auprès des organisations internationales, dont Taïwan est interdite d’accès en vertu du principe d’« une seule Chine », ou en torpillant les efforts diplomatiques de Taipei auprès de ses rares partenaires. Le président taïwanais a ainsi récemment dû renoncer à un déplacement en Eswatini (anciennement le Swaziland, en Afrique australe) en raison de l’annulation temporaire des autorisations de vol par plusieurs pays situés sur l’itinéraire.

Le second facteur est militaire. Autrefois incapable de planifier une invasion de Taïwan, la Chine est désormais en position de force. Si Taipei dispose de soutiens officiels, la République populaire sait qu’elle possède un avantage stratégique lui offrant la possibilité de donner de la substance à son discours agressif. Lors du vingtième congrès national du Parti communiste chinois en octobre 2022, Xi Jinping a même annoncé un renforcement de l’appareil militaire pour doter son pays d’une « armée de classe mondiale » à l’horizon 2027. Plus récemment, à l’occasion de l’Assemblée nationale du peuple, l’habituelle formule de « réunification pacifique » fut remplacée par celle de « réunification ferme » dans le rapport sur le budget du premier ministre Li Qiang.

Une escalade militaire dans le détroit de Taïwan pourrait conduire à un conflit dévastateur pour la région et aurait des conséquences très lourdes sur l’économie mondiale. En effet, ce détroit constitue une voie de communication majeure pour le commerce international. L’arrêt des exportations et des importations depuis Taïwan perturberait les chaînes d’approvisionnement logistique et l’activité de nombreux centres économiques de la région, d’Europe et du reste du monde. Cette dépendance à Taïwan s’est renforcée au cours des dernières années, à la faveur du développement des exportations de produits de haute technologie, notamment les semiconducteurs.

Derrière la rhétorique agressive de Pékin et les risques d’escalade militaire, la relation interdétroit continue cependant d’offrir certaines garanties de maintien du statu quo.

La Chine a conscience du fait qu’une invasion de Taïwan l’exposerait à de très lourdes conséquences, militaires d’abord (capacités de riposte de Taïwan contre des villes chinoises, possibilité d’un engagement américain mais aussi japonais), diplomatiques ensuite (risque d’isolement et de sanctions), économiques enfin, quand on mesure l’importance des liens économiques et commerciaux entre les deux rives du détroit. En se lançant dans une hasardeuse invasion de Taïwan, Pékin prendrait donc un risque énorme, au point que la question de « l’après » se pose dans les cercles décisionnaires chinois.

Washington, un partenaire fiable ?

La relation interdétroit est triangulaire : elle implique le soutien des États-Unis à Taïwan, notamment en vertu du Taïwan Relations Act adopté par le Congrès américain en 1979 et des « Six assurances » données en 1982 à Taïwan par Ronald Reagan. Celles-ci engagent Washington à ne pas définir de date pour la cessation de la livraison d’armements à Taïwan ; à ne pas consulter Pékin sur les ventes d’armes à Taïwan ; à ne pas jouer de rôle de médiateur entre Taipei et Pékin ; à ne pas réviser les termes du Taïwan Relations Act ; à ne pas changer sa position sur la question de la souveraineté de Taïwan ; et à ne pas exercer de pressions sur Taipei pour ouvrir des négociations avec Pékin.

Ce lien a été particulièrement au centre des attentions en 1996 quand, en marge de la première élection présidentielle à Taïwan, Washington avait dépêché plusieurs navires de guerre dans le détroit pour répondre aux provocations chinoises. Une décennie plus tard, le soutien américain à Taïwan a été disputé à l’occasion de l’adoption par la République populaire de Chine (RPC) d’une loi anti-sécession indiquant que toute proclamation d’indépendance de Taïwan conduirait à l’utilisation de la force. Washington avait indiqué que son soutien ne serait pas forcément effectif dès lors que la « provocation » viendrait de Taipei.

Depuis, la relation sino-américaine s’est complexifiée, et Washington voit dans Taipei une épine dans le pied de Pékin. Mais Taïwan craint de voir la Chine profiter d’une vacance de leadership de Washington pour lancer l’assaut. La crédibilité des États-Unis est ainsi réexaminée à Taïwan. Le retrait américain d’Afghanistan en août 2021, la volte-face sur l’Ukraine et, plus généralement, le déclin relatif mais réel de l’influence des États-Unis dans le monde et leur refus de s’engager aux côtés des partenaires traditionnels sont perçus à Taipei comme des signes indiquant qu’il est nécessaire de réexaminer la relation avec Washington. Les Taïwanais craignent ainsi d’être « lâchés » par le partenaire américain et de devenir l’objet d’un « grand marchandage » entre Washington et Pékin.

La politique étrangère déployée par l’administration Trump renforce les inquiétudes de Taipei. Le conflit en cours au Moyen-Orient fait craindre aux Taïwanais une nouvelle crise de crédibilité de Washington, qui non seulement parvient difficilement à définir une politique étrangère cohérente, mais qui se heurte en plus à d’immenses problèmes de moyens logistiques, notamment en matière de munitions.

C’est dans ce contexte que la réactivation du partenariat stratégique avec Washington est privilégiée à Taipei. Taïwan achète des armements aux États-Unis, sans avoir toutefois la garantie que ceux-ci seront livrés dans les délais et que l’armée américaine volerait à son secours dans le cas d’une agression chinoise.

Lors d’une rencontre avec des parlementaires américains à Taipei, le 7 avril 2026, le président taïwanais a rappelé que le budget de la défense nationale dépassera cette année 3 % du PIB du pays et atteindra 5 % d’ici à 2030. Il a également indiqué que le gouvernement a proposé un budget spécial de défense de 40 milliards de dollars (34 milliards d’euros) sur huit ans afin de renforcer les capacités de combat asymétrique et de coopérer avec des pays industrialisés militaires de pointe comme les États-Unis.

Lors de leur rencontre à Washington, le 19 mars 2026, Donald Trump et la première ministre japonaise Takaichi Sanae se sont engagés en faveur de la paix et de la stabilité dans le détroit de Taïwan. Ils ont également soutenu le règlement pacifique des différends par le dialogue, et se sont opposés à toute tentative de modification unilatérale du statu quo, y compris par la force ou la coercition, ce que Taïwan a salué.

Mais, dans le même temps, le locataire de la Maison-Blanche privilégie une approche unilatérale et sans aucune concertation avec ses alliés traditionnels sur le dossier de l’Iran, où il a choisi la voie de la force plutôt que celle de la diplomatie. De quoi interroger les Taïwanais sur la crédibilité du discours officiel américain, et rappeler que les inquiétudes des partenaires de Washington en Asie orientale sont très proches de celles des alliés européens.

De quoi, aussi, alimenter les craintes d’un passage à l’acte de la RPC, qui non seulement se sent en position de force, mais surtout qui peut estimer pouvoir attaquer l’île sans se soucier d’une riposte américaine. De quoi, enfin, faire réfléchir à une reconfiguration sécuritaire régionale, et donc imposer un dialogue décomplexé entre Taipei et Washington, au-delà des déclarations convenues et n’abordant pas les sujets qui fâchent.

Ce dialogue est plus que jamais indispensable, tout autant qu’il est désormais obligatoire pour Taipei de chercher d’autres partenaires, pour le cas où Washington ferait défaut. Mais du Japon à l’Australie, en passant par les Philippines et même l’Union européenne, les potentiels candidats seraient-ils plus fiables que Washington ?

Ce texte a bénéficié du soutien de la Taïwan Fellowship 2026 du Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), République de Chine (Taïwan).

– ref. Face à Pékin, Taïwan peut-il encore compter sur la protection de Washington ? – https://theconversation.com/face-a-pekin-ta-wan-peut-il-encore-compter-sur-la-protection-de-washington-281916

May 4, 2026

Wars destroy lives and the climate. Why aren’t we counting military emissions?

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Tamara Krawchenko, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria

When delegates gathered for COP30 in Belém, Brazil in November 2025, they scrutinized various sectors of the global economy for their contributions to rising greenhouse gases. Agriculture, aviation, steel, cement — all were on the table. One topic not discussed was war.

This isn’t a minor oversight. Militaries are significant contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has generated an estimated 311 million tonnes of what’s known as CO₂ equivalent, comparable to the combined annual emissions of Belgium, New Zealand, Austria and Portugal. CO₂ equivalent is the metric used to compare the warming impact of various greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide.

Recently published research calculated that the first 15 months of Israel’s war in Gaza generated more than 33 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent, comparable to the combined 2023 annual emissions of Costa Rica and Slovenia.

In February 2026, Israel and the United States launched a war against Iran, joining a long list of other conflicts where emissions go uncounted in global inventories.

These are massive emissions, and they are generated with no formal mechanism to record, report or attribute them, and no accountability for the climate costs that affect people in conflict zones and far beyond.

A recent article by Neta Crawford, a researcher with the Cost of War project at Brown University, highlights how armed forces, militarization and war fuel climate change. She argues that military emissions and conflict-related emissions remain undercounted, even though they undermine efforts to mitigate climate change.

The military emissions gap

Estimates suggest militaries and their supply chains account for approximately 5.5 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, which is enough to make them the world’s fourth largest emitter if counted as a country. And that figure only covers peacetime.

This is what researchers call the military emissions gap: the difference in emissions between what governments report and what their armed forces actually emit.

The problem starts with the rules. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries have been exempt from fully reporting military emissions since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in the 1990s. The United States successfully lobbied for the exclusion on national security grounds.

The 2015 Paris Agreement introduced voluntary reporting. However, as a 2025 briefing from the Conflict and Environment Observatory and Griffith University made clear, the result is a system that is “patchy, incomplete or missing altogether.”

The top three military spenders — the U.S., China and Russia — either submit no data or incomplete, non-disaggregated figures. This is a structural blind spot that excludes one of the most carbon-intensive sectors from meaningful accountability.

What wars cost the climate

Crawford’s study on Gaza provides a comprehensive account of the war’s full carbon cycle. It found that direct combat emissions — jets, rockets, artillery, military vehicles — account for just 1.3 million of the 33.2 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent.

The vast majority, more than 31 million tonnes, are projected to come from the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure: nearly 450,000 apartments, over 3,000 kilometres of roads, schools, hospitals and water systems. Rebuilding what war destroys is, climatically speaking, the biggest act of war of all.

A report on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by the Initiative on GHG Accounting of War found that direct combat emissions constitute 37 per cent out of total emissions between February 2022 and 2026. The war has ignited thousands of fires in forests and wetlands, accounting for 23 per cent of its total carbon footprint.

Russia’s attacks on electrical infrastructure have further released sulphur hexafluoride, a greenhouse gas 24,000 times more potent than CO₂, from high-voltage switching gear. And the rerouting of civilian aircraft around Ukrainian and Russian airspace has added an estimated 20 million extra tonnes of CO₂ equivalent compared to pre-invasion flight paths.

In Iran, it is estimated that the U.S.-Israel war has unleashed over five million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent — largely from infrastructure destruction and energy-related impacts.

None of this appears in any country’s reports on emissions to the UNFCCC.

What needs to change

In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered an advisory opinion establishing that states have binding obligations to assess, report and mitigate harms to the climate system. In a separate declaration, ICJ judge Sarah Cleveland stated that those obligations extend to harms resulting from armed conflicts and other military activities.

The UN General Assembly has called for Russia to compensate Ukraine for all damages resulting from its invasion. When wars of aggression are launched, the emissions generated in fighting them, surviving them and rebuilding belong on the aggressor’s carbon ledger. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it generated a climate debt on behalf of the entire planet. The same can be said of other aggressors.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the UN body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change. The IPCC is currently in its seventh assessment cycle, with reports expected in late 2029.

This assessment cycle must include a dedicated report for conflict emissions covering infrastructure destruction, fighting and post-conflict reconstruction. The UNFCCC must make reporting military emissions mandatory and develop a framework for attributing conflict emissions under its Enhanced Transparency Framework.

Civil society and academia have already done the hard work of showing it can be done. Organizations like the Conflict and Environment Observatory have built methodologies from scratch, using open-source data. The science exists. What’s lacking is the political will to enshrine it in global climate governance.

The richest countries spend roughly 30 times more on their armed forces than they contribute in climate finance to developing countries. Global military spending has reached a record $2.7 trillion. This is more than the total $2.2 trillion invested globally in clean energy in 2025.

As conflicts proliferate, the world is committing to an ever-larger unaccounted carbon liability. The climate finance gap is also likely to get worse as countries cut international development aid to direct funds to higher military spending.

Every degree of warming we are trying to avoid is undermined by wars. Accounting for conflict emissions is a vital way to make climate science whole.

This article was co-authored by researchers who are part of the Accelerating Community Energy Transformation initiative: Curran Crawford, Basma Majerbi, Madeleine McPherson (University of Victoria) and Samaneh Shahgaldi (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières).

Tamara Krawchenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Wars destroy lives and the climate. Why aren’t we counting military emissions? – https://theconversation.com/wars-destroy-lives-and-the-climate-why-arent-we-counting-military-emissions-281129

May 4, 2026

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the load mothers carry — a burden that’s still being ignored today

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jane E. Sanders, Associate Professor, King’s School of Social Work, Western University

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated and brought into focus the ongoing disproportionate burden on mothers when it comes to household logistics, child care and financial inequity. It also revealed just how deeply embedded and structurally reinforced that burden is.

When labour that had previously been a shared social responsibility shifted into individual households, the load fell mainly to women. But perhaps even more important is that the true impact of this burden was invisible — even to women themselves.

Data over three years, from 2020 to 2023 — the height of the pandemic — laid bare the reality of a poorly scaffolded social structure. What had been seen as informal or “natural” for women to take on was, in fact, an uneven distribution of labour and responsibility.

That reality has clear economic effects. Canadian women earn approximately 69 per cent of the average salary of men. Mothers’ salaries also decrease by 49 per cent in the year after a child is born and 34 per cent 10 years later, while fathers’ salaries are largely unaffected.

This disparity — often referred to as the motherhood gap or child penalty — increases over time, crosses generations and is rooted in how societies value and distribute care work.

Studying families during COVID-19

Even before the pandemic, women were often responsible for the majority of housework and child care.

This was the status quo when COVID-19 arrived, as social isolation regulations increased family mental-health concerns while simultaneously decreasing social support.

Between January 2021 and August 2023, qualitative data was collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups that included 113 people — social work students and professionals from King’s University College at Western University’s School of Social Work and the local school board — to examine the impact of COVID-19 on families who participated in the first three years of our Support and Aid to Families Electronically (SAFE) program.

Participants were asked how families were impacted during COVID-19 and the associated restrictions. We did not expect the disproportionate cost of these increased household responsibilities to be invisible.

Our social systems position women, particularly mothers, as the primary load-bearing point, shouldering a concentrated burden within families. When the already inadequate scaffolding of social structures is removed, as it was during COVID-19, the pressure is too concentrated. Policies, social expectations and workplace culture reinforce these imbalances.

Inequality hiding in plain sight

There were stories of mothers juggling working from home with children’s daily needs, balancing in-person work without child care and facing unemployment and financial peril. After each story, and among other questions, we asked if they thought any of this was related to their gender.

Overwhelmingly, the women said, “No.”

The unequal burden of the COVID-19 pandemic on women was evident in the new roles they were required to undertake, the stress associated with these roles and the psychological and emotional impact of these increased expectations.

However, the concentrated weight of this load was not recognized by those bearing it.

The participants in our study did not identify the stories they shared — of job loss, of being an in-home caregiver (daycare provider, food preparer, entertainer, social support) or of providing mental-health case management and support when everything, including in-school learning, closed — as being connected to the fact that they are women.

The responses revealed how deeply gendered expectations are internalized, framed as circumstance or coincidence rather than inequality.

For example, some of the women said they took on more of the household burden simply because they happened to be the ones who were home during the day, while others said they took on more because they were the one working outside of the home during the day. One participant said:

“Whoever was at home dealing with [our] three children, [they’re] not really doing any of the household stuff. And that just happened to be my husband who was always home. [I would] come home [after having] worked, I now deal with kids and dinner, and then I’m also doing all of the household things. This was burdensome, but I don’t really think it was because I [am a woman].”

Even when the cost of this burden was clear, the fact that it was gendered remained hidden. Another said:

“I don’t think I closed down the business because of being a woman. It was just a lot to handle. It was just draining on a day-to-day.”

It was understood that if women are unable to bear the load, foundational social structures could fracture, as one mother observed:

“My mental health had the greatest impact on the mental health and emotional regulation of the entire household.”

The cost of ignoring the burden

There are profound positives to motherhood, and conceding the need for equity and balance does not contradict them. Rather, acknowledging the disproportionate responsibilities related to household well-being, child care, education and financial equity validates women’s struggle to keep up. It also challenges internalized dominant messages for all of us.

The mental health and educational impact of COVID-19 on children, youth and families will be longstanding. The impact on parents, particularly mothers, will be ongoing.

Only once we truly acknowledge this disproportionate burden can we discuss how these expectations fail everyone, particularly during times of structural instability.

Until caregiving and emotional labour are recognized as shared social responsibilities, rather than private obligations borne disproportionately by women, crises like COVID-19 will continue to deepen existing inequalities.

Jane E. Sanders received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant number 430-2021-00162.

– ref. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the load mothers carry — a burden that’s still being ignored today – https://theconversation.com/the-covid-19-pandemic-exposed-the-load-mothers-carry-a-burden-thats-still-being-ignored-today-275922

May 4, 2026

L’industrie automobile n’échappe pas à un « effet Doppler stratégique »

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Eric Viardot, professeur de stratégie d’entreprise, SKEMA Business School

L’« effet Doppler » explique pourquoi le son d’une Formule 1 paraît plus aigu lorsqu’elle s’approche et plus grave lorsqu’elle s’éloigne. MotorsportPhotographyF1/Shutterstock

Lorsque des entreprises évoluent selon des trajectoires et à des vitesses très différentes, leurs signaux concurrentiels peuvent être mal compris ou sous‑évalués. On peut y voir une analogie avec l’« effet Doppler » en physique, qui explique que le son d’une ambulance est plus grave ou plus aigu si on ne va pas à la même vitesse qu’elle. Une entreprise pense affronter un constructeur automobile classique ; elle se retrouve face à une entreprise technologique intégrée. On croit concurrencer un acteur à bas coût ; on découvre une organisation industrielle cohérente et rapide.

Les tensions actuelles sur le marché du véhicule électrique, illustrées par la fermeture de l’usine de Poissy de Stellantis, les résultats fragilisés de Renault avec 10,9 milliards d’euros de perte, Ford avec 11 milliards de dollars (plus de 9,38 milliards d’euros, ndlr) sur le seul quatrième trimestre 2025, ou Volkswagen avec un bénéfice en chute de 44,3 %, à 6,9 milliards d’euros, dépassent le simple ralentissement de la demande.

Dans un contexte d’investissements massifs, de marges sous pression et de concurrence chinoise accrue, la transition vers l’électrique coûte plus cher et rapporte moins vite que prévu.

Cette situation révèle un mécanisme récurrent : les entreprises établies sous-estiment souvent les nouveaux concurrents qui transforment leur industrie.

Effet Doppler

Christian Doppler, mathématicien et physicien autrichien (1803-1853).
Wikimedia

Toutes les entreprises ne sont pas condamnées face au changement. Comme je l’ai montré dans mes travaux sur la longévité des entreprises dans le monde, certaines traversent les siècles : plus de 1 700 ont plus de 150 ans et environ 250 existent depuis plus de quatre siècles. Leur endurance ne tient pas à la chance, mais à leur capacité à anticiper, à comprendre leurs clients et à percevoir correctement l’évolution de leurs concurrents. La plupart disparaissent faute d’avoir su s’adapter au marché ou d’avoir mal interprété l’arrivée de nouveaux rivaux.

En physique, l’effet Doppler désigne la modification de la fréquence d’une onde lorsque la source et l’observateur sont en mouvement relatif. Il explique pourquoi le son d’une ambulance est plus aigu lorsqu’elle s’approche et plus grave lorsqu’elle s’éloigne ; les ondes sont comprimées devant la source et étirées derrière elle. Ce phénomène est utilisé en météorologie, où l’analyse des fréquences émises et reçues permet de mesurer des vitesses (ou des flux) invisibles à l’œil nu et d’analyser les mouvements internes des systèmes atmosphériques.

En stratégie, un phénomène métaphoriquement comparable apparaît. La vision qu’une entreprise a d’une autre est d’autant plus déformée qu’elles ne se développent pas ni ne se transforment à la même vitesse. Plus les écarts de trajectoire et de vitesse d’évolution sont importants, plus la compréhension de la concurrence devient difficile. Ce décalage peut conduire à des décisions tardives ou inadaptées.

Un écart difficile à combler

C’est ce qui s’est produit avec Tesla. Beaucoup de constructeurs traditionnels ont vu en premier lieu une voiture électrique performante avec un beau design. Ils ont pensé que le défi consistait à proposer un modèle équivalent avec la même autonomie, la même accélération et le même style.

Tesla n’était pas un constructeur automobile, mais une entreprise technologique produisant des voitures. Son avantage repose sur le logiciel, les mises à jour à distance et l’intégration des batteries. Là où un constructeur classique lance une nouvelle version tous les cinq à sept ans, Tesla peut améliorer à distance un véhicule déjà vendu ; la voiture évolue. Cette logique transforme la relation client, mais aussi le modèle économique avec davantage de services, de données, d’interactions continues.

Cette différence de rythme crée un écart difficile à combler pour des organisations historiquement structurées autour de cycles industriels longs, de fournisseurs multiples et de hiérarchies complexes.

Là où un constructeur classique renouvelle un modèle tous les cinq à sept ans – comme Renault avec la Clio ou Peugeot avec la 208 – Tesla améliore en continu un véhicule déjà vendu. Le client ne change pas de voiture ; c’est la voiture qui se transforme. Le signal était visible, mais perçu avec retard, à travers un prisme industriel ancien.

Ce décalage n’a été pleinement reconnu que tardivement. Jim Farley, directeur général de Ford, après le démontage d’une Tesla Model 3 par ses équipes, déclarait : « Nous avons été très étonnés. Quand nous avons démonté la Model 3, ce que nous avons découvert était stupéfiant. » Herbert Diess, alors président-directeur général de Volkswagen, qualifiait la Tesla Model Y de « voiture de référence » pour son groupe.

BYD et l’« effet Doppler stratégique » chinois

Toujours dans l’industrie automobile, l’« effet Doppler stratégique » est également observable dans le cas plus récent de BYD et ceux d’autres constructeurs chinois, tels que Geely, SAIC Motor, NIO ou XPeng. Longtemps perçus comme de simples acteurs à bas coûts, ils ont été évalués surtout sous l’angle du prix. En 2024, Carlos Tavares, PDG de Stellantis, déclarait :

« Pas question de laisser le marché des voitures électriques à 20 000 euros ou moins aux mains des Chinois. »

Cette focalisation tarifaire a masqué l’essentiel. La concurrence chinoise repose sur des cycles de développement plus courts, une intégration verticale poussée et une maîtrise industrielle de la batterie. BYD conçoit et fabrique batteries, moteurs et composants critiques, réduisant coûts, délais et dépendances. Le géant chinois des batteries pour véhicules électriques, CATL, et BYD concentrent à eux seuls plus de la moitié de la production mondiale de batteries pour véhicules électriques. La batterie représentant environ de 30 % à 40 % du coût d’un véhicule électrique, cette maîtrise constitue un avantage économique et stratégique décisif.

L’échec du projet européen de Northvolt illustre la difficulté à rattraper tardivement cette distance. L’investissement était massif mais insuffisant pour combler l’écart accumulé en compétences industrielles et en chaînes d’approvisionnement. Là encore, la menace était visible, mais mal évaluée à distance.

Cette métaphore de l’« effet Doppler stratégique » complète les analyses des chercheurs Clayton Christensen, Rajesh Chandy et Gerard Tellis sur les biais internes qui freinent l’adoption des innovations de rupture. Contrairement à la physique, où le signal est effectivement modifié par le mouvement, l’analogie met ici en lumière un biais de connaissance et d’interprétation organisationnelle, lié à des cadres d’analyse inadaptés à des concurrents évoluant à un autre rythme.

La malédiction des leaders établis

Dans le cas du véhicule électrique, les constructeurs historiques ont bien investi dans la technologie, mais souvent en interprétant la transition comme un simple remplacement du moteur thermique par la batterie, alors qu’il s’agissait d’un changement de système. L’échec des batteries Blue Solutions du groupe de Vincent Bolloré, fondées sur une technologie propriétaire peu compatible avec les standards industriels émergents, et les limites des premières générations de la Renault Zoé, conçues comme une évolution du produit plutôt que comme une reconfiguration d’ensemble, illustrent cette lecture partielle. Dans les deux cas, l’enjeu était avant tout systémique, et non uniquement technologique.

L’histoire industrielle montre que les leaders peuvent se réinventer, comme l’ont fait, par exemple, Michelin, Schneider Electric ou Safran pour ne prendre que des exemples d’entreprises françaises. Ces transformations reposent moins sur le volume des investissements que sur la capacité à voir les concurrents tels qu’ils sont réellement dans des industries en constante évolution.

À l’ère des transitions rapides, l’analogie de l’« effet Doppler stratégique » rappelle une vérité simple : mal comprendre la concurrence peut être aussi dangereux que la voir arriver trop tard.

Eric Viardot ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. L’industrie automobile n’échappe pas à un « effet Doppler stratégique » – https://theconversation.com/lindustrie-automobile-nechappe-pas-a-un-effet-doppler-strategique-276650

May 4, 2026

Canada’s United Nations abstention on slavery recognition wasn’t neutral — it was a choice

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Julie Ada Tchoukou, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

When Canada abstained from a recent vote at the United Nations on a resolution recognizing the transatlantic slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity, the decision may have appeared cautious, even procedural.

It was neither.

Abstention, in this situation, is not neutral position. It’s a firm stance — one that carries legal, political and historical consequences.

A vote about legal meaning, not just history

At first glance, the resolution might seem symbolic; a statement about a past atrocity with a moral status that’s already globally accepted. But in international law, recognition is never merely descriptive. It helps define legal norms and the scope of responsibility.

The category of “crimes against humanity” has evolved significantly since its early articulation at the Nuremberg Trials in the 1940s. What began as a response to the atrocities of the Second World War has developed into an important pillar of international criminal and human rights law.

Identifying the transatlantic slave trade as the gravest crime against humanity isn’t simply restating history. It situates that history within the legal architecture that governs how we understand atrocity, responsibility and redress today.

The resolution passed with 123 votes in favour. The United States, Argentina and Israel voted against it, while 52 states abstained, including the United Kingdom, Canada and all European Union member states, including Spain.

By abstaining, Canada did not opt out of a symbolic gesture. It declined to participate in shaping the legal meaning of one of international law’s most significant categories.

The myth of absention as neutrality

In multilateral diplomacy, absention is usually framed as a middle ground; a way to avoid taking sides. But in practice, especially in process of creating legal norms, absention can function as a form of resistance.

Votes at the UN General Assembly are part of how international norms are consolidated, clarified and sometimes contested. When states abstain from resolutions that seek to expand or develop those norms, they signal hesitation about the direction of that particular legal development.

Canada’s absention therefore raises questions about alignment. It places the country neither among those states affirming a stronger legal characterization of the slave trade nor among those openly opposing it. Instead, Canada now occupies a position of ambiguity — one that may reflect concerns about legal implications, including potential claims for reparations.

But ambiguity isn’t without impact. In the politics of international law, declining to affirm a legal norm can slow its consolidation and weaken its force.

Why recognition still matters

If the transatlantic slave trade is widely acknowledged as a profound injustice, why does formal recognition matter? Because recognition is tied to how harm is measured, narrated and addressed.

Efforts to grapple with the legacies of slavery increasingly involve questions of quantification, of loss, of dispossession and of enduring inequality. Legal recognition, including reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, shapes these process by establishing what counts as a harm of the highest order and therefore what kinds of responses are justified.

This is particularly evident in ongoing debates about reparations, where claims are often grounded in the characterization of slavery and the slave trade as crimes against humanity. Without clear and consistent recognition, these claims face higher legal and political barriers.

In this sense, the resolution isn’t only about the past. It’s about the frameworks through which historical injustice is made visible in the present.

Waves are seen crashing at the base of the Cape Coast Castle. — The Cape Coast Castle in Ghana in October 2018. It was a slave facility used in the trans-Atlantic slave trade for more than 100 years.
(AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)

A choice with consequences

Canada has long positioned itself as a supporter of international human rights and the rule of law. Abstaining on the UN’s slavery resolution is at odds with that self-perception.

States may have reasons to be cautious in endorsing specific resolutions about legal responsibility. But those reasons should be clearly stated and open to scrutiny.

Absention avoids that scrutiny. It allows states to sidestep difficult questions about history, law and accountability while maintaining the appearance of neutrality.

But there is no neutral ground in the recognition of crimes against humanity. There are only choices about what to affirm, what to resist and what to leave unresolved.

Canada has made one such choice. It should be prepared to explain it.

Julie Ada Tchoukou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Canada’s United Nations abstention on slavery recognition wasn’t neutral — it was a choice – https://theconversation.com/canadas-united-nations-abstention-on-slavery-recognition-wasnt-neutral-it-was-a-choice-281062

May 4, 2026

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the load mothers carry — and that burden is still being ignored today

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jane E. Sanders, Associate Professor, King’s School of Social Work, Western University

This disparity — often referred to as the motherhood gap or child penalty — increases over time, crosses generations and is rooted in how societies value and distribute care work.

Studying families during COVID-19

Even before the pandemic, women were often responsible for the majority of housework and child care.

This was the status quo when COVID-19 arrived, as social isolation regulations increased family mental-health concerns while simultaneously decreasing social support.

Inequality hiding in plain sight

Overwhelmingly, the women said, “No.”

However, the concentrated weight of this load was not recognized by those bearing it.

The responses revealed how deeply gendered expectations are internalized, framed as circumstance or coincidence rather than inequality.

“Whoever was at home dealing with [our] three children, [they’re] not really doing any of the household stuff. And that just happened to be my husband who was always home. [I would] come home [after having] worked, I now deal with kids and dinner, and then I’m also doing all of the household things. This was burdensome, but I don’t really think it was because I [am a woman].”

Even when the cost of this burden was clear, the fact that it was gendered remained hidden. Another said:

“I don’t think I closed down the business because of being a woman. It was just a lot to handle. It was just draining on a day-to-day.”

It was understood that if women are unable to bear the load, foundational social structures could fracture, as one mother observed:

“My mental health had the greatest impact on the mental health and emotional regulation of the entire household.”

The cost of ignoring the burden

The mental health and educational impact of COVID-19 on children, youth and families will be longstanding. The impact on parents, particularly mothers, will be ongoing.

Only once we truly acknowledge this disproportionate burden can we discuss how these expectations fail everyone, particularly during times of structural instability.

Jane E. Sanders received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grant number 430-2021-00162.

– ref. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the load mothers carry — and that burden is still being ignored today – https://theconversation.com/the-covid-19-pandemic-exposed-the-load-mothers-carry-and-that-burden-is-still-being-ignored-today-275922

May 4, 2026

Mythos AI is a cybersecurity threat, but it doesn’t rewrite the rules of the game

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mohammad Ahmad, Assistant Professor of Management Information Systems, West Virginia University

The hacking prowess of Anthropic’s Mythos AI has gotten a lot of attention, including from the NSA. Samuel Boivin/NurPhoto via Getty Images

The cybersecurity community went on alert when Anthropic announced on April 7, 2026, that its latest and most capable general-purpose large language model, Claude Mythos Preview, had demonstrated remarkable – and unintended – capabilities. The artifical intelligence system was able to find and exploit software vulnerabilities – the most serious type of software bugs – at a rate not seen before.

The news ignited concern among the public, world governments and the information technology sector about the capabilities of today’s AI to undermine cybersecurity, with some people framing the model as a global cybersecurity threat.

Claiming that it would be too risky to release the model, and that the company had the moral responsibility to disclose these vulnerabilities, Anthropic said it would not immediately offer the model to the public. Instead, it granted exclusive access to tech giants to test the model’s capabilities, a process Anthropic dubbed Project Glasswing.

As a cybersecurity researcher, I think Mythos’ capabilities are impressive, but the AI system does not represent a radical departure. Mythos is less a new threat than a mirror reflecting how people behave and how fragile modern systems already are.

What Mythos did

During a controlled evaluation, engineers with minimal security experience prompted Mythos to scan thousands of software codebases for vulnerabilities. The model showed striking capabilities in conducting multistep, autonomous attacks that take experts weeks or even months to put together. Mythos was not only able to discover 271 vulnerabilities in Mozilla’s Firefox, it also developed exploits to take advantage of 181 of those.

Overall, Anthropic’s red team, which takes on the role of an attacker to test defenses, and the United Kingdom’s AI Security Institute reported that Mythos found thousands of zero-day, or previously unreported, vulnerabilities in major operating systems, web browsers and other applications – software flaws that have not yet been patched and can be turned into exploits immediately. National Security Agency officials testing Mythos have been impressed by the tool’s speed and efficiency in finding software vulnerabilities, according to a news report.

Anthropic’s announcement of Mythos and the cybersecurity threat it poses garnered widespread media attention.

Among the most widely reported were Mythos’ ability to identify a dormant 27-year-old security flaw in OpenBSD, a security-focused operating system, and a 16-year-old bug in FFmpeg, a video/audio processing tool. Some of these flaws allow unauthenticated users to gain control of the machines hosting these applications.

Even more striking, the relatively inexperienced engineers running Mythos’ evaluations were able to use Mythos to complete attacks overnight, from finding vulnerabilities to exploiting them – something that can take human experts weeks to do. The model’s ability to chain multiple steps is what surprised Anthropic and organizations that tried it. In an evaluation by the AI Security Institute, Mythos was able to take over a simulated corporate network in three out of 10 tries, the first AI model to succeed at the task.

These results are real. They also paint an incomplete picture in ways that matter.

Where is the breakthrough?

At first glance, Mythos’ breakthrough sounds novel and could signal a new class of cyber threats. However, a closer look suggests something different. The vulnerabilities Mythos found are not new in nature. They generally don’t belong to unknown security flaws, and in many cases they are variations of well-known and well-understood classes of software vulnerabilities.

In cybersecurity, finding new instances of known types of flaws is not unusual. The most successful attacks rely on known, well-defined vulnerabilities that stay overlooked or unpatched. What concerned the researchers was not Mythos changing the nature of finding and exploiting vulnerabilities, but rather the intense scale and speed with which it was able to find and exploit those vulnerabilities.

This is not a breakthrough per se but rather a result of decades of research in both cybersecurity and AI. In that sense, Mythos is the natural – and expected – result of powerful automation and AI integration because it follows the same fundamental procedures used in standard offensive cybersecurity practices. These include scanning for vulnerabilities, identifying patterns and testing exploitability. Mythos and similar emerging models make it possible to chain these steps together at a speed that is hard to fathom.

So why were these vulnerabilities missed in the first place?

It is crucial to understand that not all vulnerabilities are cost effective to fix, and not all vulnerabilities are a priority. Mythos did not discover a new kind of weakness – it exposed the limits of how cybersecurity practitioners search for them.

New tech, age-old dynamic

Mythos highlights an important fact about the reality of cybersecurity threats. System defenders are always at a disadvantage because they need to always succeed. Attackers, however, need to succeed only once to break the security of a system. This cat-and-mouse game will always be the same, and Mythos does not change that – it simply reinforces it.

Mythos follows a familiar dynamic: A tool created to protect can also be used to attack and harm.

“The same improvements that make the model substantially more effective at patching vulnerabilities also make it substantially more effective at exploiting them,” Anthropic officials wrote in a blog post about Mythos.

What once may have required highly specialized skills can now be achieved with significantly less effort, which raises the most important question: Who will benefit first by using tools like Mythos – defenders or attackers?

Mohammad Ahmad does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Mythos AI is a cybersecurity threat, but it doesn’t rewrite the rules of the game – https://theconversation.com/mythos-ai-is-a-cybersecurity-threat-but-it-doesnt-rewrite-the-rules-of-the-game-281268

May 4, 2026

A democracy or a republic? History shows that some Americans are asking the wrong question

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Barbara Clark Smith, Curator, Division of Political History, Smithsonian Institution

A Harper’s Weekly image of the first reading of the Declaration of Independence outside Independence Hall in Philadelphia on July 8, 1776. MPI/Getty Images

As the nation observes its 250th birthday, historians can help settle one present-day dispute: Is the United States a democracy or a republic?

For years, advocates have argued the point.

Yet the question itself is misleading. It assumes that the categories constructed by political theorists neatly describe actual practice.

As a historian of early America, I know this nation has always been unwieldy, its institutions hammered out from conflicting ideals and the pragmatic lessons of lived experience. Just as Britain today is both a monarchy and a democracy, so the U.S. has always been a hybrid.

Ideals of both republicanism and democracy have shaped the nation. To understand how requires a history lesson.

No purity

A yellowed page from a 1787 newspaper, covered in small print. — James Madison’s essay, known as Federalist X, was published under the pseudonym ‘Publius’ in the New York Daily Advertiser on Nov. 22, 1787.
Library of Congress

Let’s start with a famous definition. Here is the often-quoted “Father of the Constitution,” James Madison, urging Americans to ratify the new frame of government proposed by the Constitutional Convention in 1787.

In Federalist essay No. 10, Madison distinguished two sorts of governments for his readers.

One was a “pure democracy,” which he described as “a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.” A New England town meeting might qualify for this definition, where voters assembled to choose town officers and approve local bylaws.

The other type of government was a “republic,” defined as “a government in which the scheme of representation takes place”
– meaning where the people’s chosen representatives made governing decisions for them.

That seems cut and dried. Surely no one thought the entire population of 13 states could work like a town meeting.

But Madison here was saying only that the possibility of a “pure” democracy was impractical. He was by no means banishing all democratic ideas and institutions.

As the French theorist Montesquieu had noted, republics were of varying sorts. Some republics were aristocratic, controlled by a relative few who were set above the rest. Other republics were democratic, engaging many more in the ongoing affairs of government.

What was at stake in the U.S. in 1787 wasn’t a “pure” democracy nor a “pure” republic. The issue was how aristocratic – and how democratic – the American scheme of representation would be.

Who would be represented – the many or the few?

‘Actual’ representation

America had never been the home of an aristocracy in the British sense. Besides, the Revolution had discredited the very idea of hereditary power. There would be no House of Lords, filled with titled men born into political power and a special set of legal privileges denied to ordinary people. The people alone would be sovereign, and all authority to govern derived, directly or indirectly, from them.

Even so, the problem of aristocracy remained. After all, it had been the lower house of Parliament – the House of Commons, not of Lords – that had sparked the imperial debate when it tried to tax and legislate for the Colonists.

Not nobility, members of the Commons still formed a remote and ambitious elite. None was elected by American voters or even necessarily informed about the Colonists’ lives. Apologists for Parliament claimed that the Commons “virtually” represented the Colonies anyway.

But the Colonists watched the Commons ignore American grievances while favoring private interests – East India Company shareholders, for example – that served wealthy British gentlemen such as themselves.

Many concluded that the members of the House of Commons did not “actually” represent either the poor of Britain or the growing population of the continental Colonies.

In contrast, “patriot” Americans pointed to the legislative assemblies established in each colony soon after its founding.

Needing to attract British settlers, and following the British model, each colony established an elected house of the legislature to provide a check to governors and upper houses that were appointed by the king or a wealthy Colonial proprietor.

Law and custom required that delegates to these assemblies live among their constituents. Although they were men of some fortune and standing in their districts, assemblymen might plausibly “actually represent” their lesser neighbors.

In the lead-up to the Revolution, patriots used new measures to ensure their representatives’ fidelity: They called for vigilant popular oversight of government decision, publicized those decisions in the press, wrote constituent instructions for legislators and winnowed out noncompliant officeholders at election time.

Individual and collective liberties

With independence, Americans created a patchwork of new, representative state governments. South Carolina empowered its wealthy planter elite by setting a high property-holding requirement for voters and a higher one for officeholders. Pennsylvania and Vermont adopted unprecedentedly democratic systems that allowed a large proportion of the white male population to participate in government.

By 1787, some Americans thought there was too much popular democracy – too much power given to nonelite members of society, especially within state governments.

The Constitution adopted restraints on democracy – a Senate appointed by state legislatures, an electoral college that put the choice of president at a remove from the people, a supremacy clause that allowed national laws to supersede, or contravene, state laws.

At the same time, a commitment to democracy was also evident in the U.S. frame of government.

A man with rosy skin and curled white hair looks off to the distance against a dark curtain. — Founder James Madison, frustrated when pushed to define the U.S. government, said the ordinary ‘political vocabulary’ fell short.
Painting by Gilbert Stuart, National Gallery

The Constitution set no property requirements for federal officeholders. It left suffrage requirements up to individual states, some of which already extended the vote to all male taxpayers.

Equally important, the ratification process produced a consensus that a bill of rights was necessary to protect ordinary people’s rights and liberties from government overreach.

These first 10 amendments would defend individual rights but also collective rights of the people, such as their right to assemble, to petition the government or even to change it.

The Bill of Rights also protected a free press. It ensured that ordinary free men would still serve in armed militias when their state needed protection. And they would still sit on grand and petit juries to enforce the law or prevent its overreach.

These were the sorts of institutions that the lawyer John Adams called “democratical.”

More and better democracy

Within a few decades, the common phrase for the American system became “democracy.”

Madison had been inconsistent in how he used the term. In the 1790s and 1800s he called himself a “Democratic Republican,” in opposition to the allegedly aristocratic party, the Federalists.
Decades later, Madison was frustrated when pushed to define the U.S. government more precisely. Ordinary “political vocabulary” fell short, he wrote. The American system was “so unexampled in its origin, so complex in its structure, and so peculiar in some of its features” that it was best understood as something new.

How aristocratic? How democratic? The question of 1787 has returned repeatedly to face Americans.

Elites with aristocratic aspirations have repeatedly tried to build permanent governing hierarchies. American history is partly the story of these contests – Free-Soilers against a slaveholding elite, reformers against wealthy “barons” of the Gilded Age, critics of inequality against billionaires who shape government policies today. In such cases, Americans have often turned to more and better democracy, their necessary resource for pressing their political leaders to actually represent the people.

Following Madison’s advice, Americans today can refuse to be misled into describing the U.S. in a single, inadequate term.

They might prize both of these historic commitments: to a republic that insists on the people’s right to be represented rather than ruled, and to a democracy that ensures that ordinary people might collectively make it so.

Barbara Clark Smith does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. A democracy or a republic? History shows that some Americans are asking the wrong question – https://theconversation.com/a-democracy-or-a-republic-history-shows-that-some-americans-are-asking-the-wrong-question-274798

May 4, 2026

Is it wrong to pay incarcerated people in jail? This Pennsylvania county says no

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Nancy La Vigne, Dean of the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University – Newark

Unlike prison, jail confinement is primarily about custody and court processing, not punishment for convicted criminals. The Washington Post/The Washington Post Collection via Getty

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is experimenting with a policy that has drawn national attention and local skepticism: providing cash compensation to people confined in the Allegheny County Jail in the city of Pittsburgh. The funds include monthly disbursements to all those incarcerated and additional pay tied to work assignments and participation in educational programming.

At first glance, the policy may sound counterintuitive. Why pay people who are in jail, especially when many law‑abiding residents are struggling to afford housing, food and transportation? That reaction is understandable. But it often reflects a misunderstanding about who is held in the Allegheny County Jail, the amount of the disbursements and what the county is trying to accomplish.

An outdoor shot of a building with bars on the windows. — Allegheny County Jail is experimenting with a new policy that compensates incarcerated people.
AP Photo/Gene J. Puskar

Over the course of two decades, I have partnered with Allegheny County on policy relevant to justice research and served on the advisory board of the Allegheny County Jail Collaborative, a nationally recognized initiative launched in 2000 to better coordinate jail, health and community-based services. Long before many places began using data to rethink criminal justice, Allegheny County was already analyzing data from multiple sources to develop and test new approaches. With that history in mind, this policy may come as less of a surprise – though it still deserves scrutiny.

Most people in jail haven’t been convicted

Understanding the county’s rationale for compensating people in jail begins with understanding the jail population itself. Jail confinement is primarily about custody and court processing, not punishment after being convicted of wrongdoing.

According to county data, only about 8% of people housed in the jail have been convicted and sentenced to jail time. These individuals are serving a maximum incarceration term of less than two years for misdemeanor or lower-level felony convictions. Roughly half of those incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail, or 46%, are awaiting trial and have not been convicted of a crime. Another 36% are detained based on an alleged probation violation. The remaining 10% are either on a legal hold placed by an outside agency – such as federal authorities or a correctional facility in another state – are awaiting transfer to a different facility or are ordered to be incarcerated for allegedly violating family court orders.

While jails provide food, clothing and basic hygiene items, those provisions often fall short of what people actually need. Commissary purchases make up the gap, yet many people in jail have little to no money. When even basic necessities, such as ramen noodles, toothpaste and tampons, become scarce, bartering can take place. Commissary items become currency. Debt, theft, intimidation and power imbalances emerge, leading to conflicts that can cause serious or fatal injury. Staff must manage these threats, sometimes at risk to their personal safety.

Incarcerated person mopping a jail floor. — The compensation is for labor, education and vocational training.
Boston Globe/Boston Globe Collection via Getty Images

The county’s compensation policy addresses this reality in concrete ways. Since 2022, the Allegheny County Jail Oversight Board has approved monthly payments of about US$100 to every person housed in the jail through the Incarcerated Individuals Welfare Fund. The fund is financed by proceeds from jail commissary, phone and tablet contracts. These funds can be used for commissary items, phone access, fees, or to accrue savings for post-release needs.

$5 a day – and the research behind it

In addition, in March 2026 the county began compensating people confined in jail approximately $5 per day for voluntary work assignments, as well as for participation in some types of vocational and educational programming. Some of this compensated work is labor that keeps the jail running – including cooking, cleaning and maintenance – and benefits the institution directly. Some of it includes education and vocational training. Paying for it signals some level of fairness and respect. It is also pragmatic: When people perceive systems as legitimate, they are more likely to follow rules and less likely to engage in misconduct.

Offering compensation for education may also boost enrollment, much like how earned credits toward early release encourage participation in federal programs through the First Step Act. This may better prepare them for reentry into society while also reducing idle time, which is linked to misconduct.

Man in orange jumpsuit sits inside a cell behind bars. — The financial incentives may not meaningfully change behavior for everyone.
fpphotobank/iStock via Getty Images Plus

Another reason for compensation comes at the point of release. People often leave jail with no cash and limited access to transportation. Providing even limited financial resources can help people make better choices during a well-documented critical transition period that can make or break successful reentry intro society.

Still experimenting

None of this means the policy will work as intended. Increased access to resources could shift, rather than eliminate, forms of conflict among those incarcerated. And the financial incentives may not meaningfully change behavior for everyone.

This makes rigorous, transparent evaluation essential. Research should measure both intended and unintended effects of this policy, including on institutional safety, program participation, reentry outcomes and overall cost effectiveness.

Paying people in jail is not about rewarding crime. In Allegheny County, it is a pragmatic experiment grounded in local data, institutional realities and a clear-eyed commitment to public safety. Whether it ultimately improves safety inside the jail or stability after release remains to be seen. But asking the question and measuring the answer is exactly what evidence-based justice policy should look like.

Nancy La Vigne does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Is it wrong to pay incarcerated people in jail? This Pennsylvania county says no – https://theconversation.com/is-it-wrong-to-pay-incarcerated-people-in-jail-this-pennsylvania-county-says-no-280777

May 4, 2026

How balcony solar can help renters and homeowners save money

Source: The Conversation – USA (2) – By Moncef Krarti, Professor of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder

Small-scale solar panels mounted on balconies can help more households use renewable energy. Jens Büttner/picture alliance via Getty Images

Somewhere between 5% and 7% of U.S. households have rooftop solar panels. Many more Americans want them, but high costs, building locations and landlord restrictions are key obstacles.

As someone who has designed and evaluated a wide range of building energy efficiency technologies, including integrated photovoltaic systems, I know that other options are available elsewhere in the world – and are becoming available in the U.S. Plug-in solar systems, also referred to as balcony solar systems, are alternatives to rooftop panels that still generate electricity from sunlight, but without complex and expensive installations.

Plug-in solar systems are designed to be used without requiring specialized technicians, construction permits or permission from electricity utility companies. A typical system consists of small photovoltaic panels that can be placed on a balcony, in a backyard or on a deck or roof area. They are connected to the home’s electrical system by simply plugging them into a regular power outlet.

European popularity

In Europe, systems like this have been legal for more than a decade. They are wildly popular, especially for renters who do not have permission to install permanent solar panels on their buildings.

In Germany, the introduction of balcony solar raised the share of households with solar panels to about 10%.

Germans can buy plug-in solar kits in local retail stores and set them up quickly at home, with no help or oversight from technicians or utility companies. Estimates find that with current electricity prices in Germany, the systems generate enough power to pay for themselves in less than three years.

Legal changes afoot in the US

In the U.S., the main barrier to widespread availability and adoption of plug-in solar systems is that current laws and regulations do not distinguish them from larger rooftop panel systems.

In most cases, solar panels on buildings that are connected to the power grid must be installed by professionals, because they typically require additional equipment that prevents too much of the home-generated power from entering the grid. This process also requires a permit from a state or local government.

For balcony solar systems, the grid-protection equipment is built in to what consumers buy at the store. But in most states, the laws don’t recognize a difference and still require permits and professional installation for any solar panels at all.

However, in 2025, Utah passed a law that removes those requirements for plug-in solar panel systems that generate less than 1,200 watts of power. Maine has enacted a similar law, and one in Colorado awaits the governor’s signature. Both are slated to take effect at different points in 2026. The Vermont Senate passed one too, and the state’s General Assembly is considering it now. And lawmakers in 25 other states are considering similar legislation.

In addition, in early 2026, UL Solutions, an independent safety certification company, announced a new standard for plug-in solar systems in the U.S., which can help consumers feel confident they are buying something that is safe for them to use in their homes.

Costs and benefits

The potential benefits of balcony solar systems vary primarily with the local cost of electricity. Buying these systems can cost between US$1,200 and $2,000, but they can generate enough power to save several hundred dollars in electric bills each year.

They can’t power a whole home, but they can power relatively low loads, like refrigerators, LED lights, laptop computers, phone chargers, televisions and fans, even when a grid power outage occurs.

Depending on their configurations, balcony solar systems can offer additional benefits. Mounting them to movable bases that track the Sun’s path through the sky can boost power generation. Mounting the panels on overhangs can create shade, reducing the need for air conditioning, especially in hot climates.

Adding battery storage to balcony solar systems can also help households store extra energy from the daytime and use it at night, further lowering their utility bills, though buying batteries would raise the costs.

I expect U.S. demand for balcony solar systems to be significant, especially in places with lots of sunlight and high electricity prices. Householders will still need to select their equipment and its location carefully to maximize their power generation and cost savings.

Moncef Krarti does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. How balcony solar can help renters and homeowners save money – https://theconversation.com/how-balcony-solar-can-help-renters-and-homeowners-save-money-281620