Academic Analysis – Page 777 – MIL Submissions Engine

January 7, 2026

Canada has too few professional archeologists, and that has economic consequences

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Lindsay Amundsen-Meyer, Assistant Professor in Archaeology, University of Calgary

Canadian cultural resource management archeologists — professional consultants involved in environmental assessment and compliance processes — are increasingly finding themselves in the public eye when their work intersects with the development or disaster response related infrastructure projects.

Public or media discussions often arise when delays in construction result from archeological assessments or Indigenous opposition. Yet, many more developments proceed without issue.

Today, these concerns are part of a variety of challenges including labour shortages, meaningful Indigenous engagement and recent legislative changes that guide how development occurs.

These challenges must be addressed to ensure timely assessment and approval of development projects through legally binding processes, without comprising the assessment and preservation of archeological sites — the overwhelming majority of which are Indigenous ancestral sites.

Demand for archeological professionals in Canada is quickly outpacing the number of students graduating with archeology or anthropology degrees. A similar deficit of archeologists has been demonstrated in the United States.

Post-secondary institutions can play a key role in addressing this deficit by altering and improving degree programs to ensure students are equipped with the knowledge needed to succeed in cultural resource management.

The politics of archeology

Cultural resource management (CRM) involves identifying, preserving and maintaining valuable cultural heritage like ancestral artifacts and built heritage. In Canada, this kind of archeological work is required ahead of most infrastructure development through provincial and federal legislation.

Recent political developments in Canada, including federal bill C-5 and similar legislation in Ontario and British Columbia, have the potential to impact the scope of environmental assessment work, including associated archeology work.

In order to speed economic development, these laws allow governments to exempt some infrastructure projects from archeological assessment prior to construction and bypass requirements for Indigenous consultation. This moves decision-making on archeological preservation away from Indigenous communities and trained professionals and into the political sphere.

Such exemptions risk violating the treaty rights of First Nations and causing irreparable harm to Indigenous ancestral sites without consideration or assessment, deepening conflicts between development proponents and Indigenous communities. These conflicts may themselves delay construction of infrastructure.

Where are all the archaeologists?

Our recent study indicates there are between 419 and 713 archeologists employed in cultural resource management in Canada. These are almost certainly underestimates. However, our study further suggests that labour market demand is outpacing supply.

Fifty-five responding employers across the country reported unfilled positions, including for jobs at all levels of experience. Overall, the CRM labour market has not kept pace with rapid industry growth.

Post-secondary institutions have an important role to play in meeting CRM labour market demand by creating robust degree programs which demonstrate that there are viable career pathways in archaeology outside of academia. But universities are simultaneously experiencing a significant decline in funding, and program opportunities are disappearing.

In part due to these challenges, students graduating from archeology and anthropology programs do not complete their degrees with the skills and knowledge needed to succeed in CRM. As a result, the burden of on-the-job training becomes high for employers.

There are some exceptions, such as CRM-specific undergraduate and graduate courses and programs at the Universities of Lethbridge and Calgary. However, the general lack of CRM-oriented programs at post-secondary institutions is particularly problematic given that the majority of graduates who stay in archeology will enter the CRM industry, and the overwhelming majority of archeology in Canada today is undertaken within a CRM context.

A path forward

Post-secondary curricula must extend beyond traditional academic programming to better prepare students for the workforce. To be clear, we are not arguing for creation of a CRM trade school for archeologists. Rather, we believe that small changes to curricula and programs can enhance student experience and career successes without compromising academic objectives and rigour.

Post-secondary institutions need to create degree programs that are aligned with the skills and knowledge used in industry and introduce CRM to students early in their undergraduate programs. Doing so will create more robust degree programs that attract students to a relevant education where they see a viable career path in archeology, meeting a market need.

This market need must be met to ensure timely assessment and regulatory approval of development projects, as the CRM workforce is needed to complete “nation-building” infrastructure projects. Archeology risks being seen as a barrier to development and may lose political and public backing if CRM processes are seen to slow or stall economic development.

If the CRM sector does not have the capacity to complete infrastructure assessments, current trends suggest that development will push ahead without archeological assessment or engagement. Archeological sites will almost certainly be destroyed in the process.

Critics will argue that it’s essential to cut red tape and speed up regulatory approval of economically important projects, making CRM a lesser part of the approvals process. We counter that CRM assessment is essential to development approvals, which are increasingly reliant on meaningful Indigenous engagement and Indigenous consent to proceed.

Wanton destruction of Indigenous archeological sites will only lead to further conflict and loss of heritage. Canada must protect that heritage and has a lot to gain from doing so. By protecting heritage, archeologists can help ensure better outcomes for all.

Lindsay Amundsen-Meyer receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Heritage Preservation Partnership Program (Arts, Culture and Status of Women).

Kenneth Roy Holyoke receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

Matthew Munro works for Stantec Consulting Ltd.

– ref. Canada has too few professional archeologists, and that has economic consequences – https://theconversation.com/canada-has-too-few-professional-archeologists-and-that-has-economic-consequences-272422

January 7, 2026

Congress takes up health care again − and impatient voters shouldn’t hold their breath for a cure

Source: The Conversation – USA – By SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Politics, University of Virginia

Congress has long been unable to come to an agreement on how to help constituents pay for health care. iStock/Getty Images Plus

As the bell struck midnight on Jan. 1, 2026, time ran out on Obamacare subsidies for over 24 million Americans. These subsidies, propped up through various legislative packages over the years, lowered the health insurance costs for Americans on the Obamacare exchange.

Following the expiration of these subsidies, health insurance premiums are skyrocketing for around 90% of Americans who use health insurance from the exchange. For many Americans, the new year means a choice between paying exorbitant costs or taking the risk of no health insurance at all.

But unlike other policy challenges that Congress may face in 2026, the expiration of health insurance subsidies was not unexpected.

The extension of health care subsidies was the pivotal disagreement that ultimately led to the longest government shutdown in U.S. history in the fall of 2025. Democratic members, in support of extending the subsidies, faced off against the majority party in Congress: Republicans who wanted a short-term legislative fix that did not fund subsidies.

Republicans ultimately won the shutdown battle. And while Democrats attempted a last-gasp vote in December to reform and extend health care subsidies, the health care debate was yet again punted into the next year.

Congress has reconvened, and Democratic members – joined by four Republican members – used the best possible procedural tool at the minority party’s disposal, the discharge petition, to force congressional leaders to allow votes on an extension of Obamacare subsidies during its first week back in session. But overcoming congressional leadership is an immense challenge: Even if the House is successful, Senate Republican leadership has made clear that there is no future for the legislation in that chamber.

The challenge of passing meaningful solutions to rising health care costs is not unique to this year or to this Congress. It has been a decades-long argument among lawmakers that shows no sign of being resolved.

Why is it so hard for Congress to lower the cost of health care for the people who sent them to Washington?

Like many policy problems, partisanship is partly to blame. But the sprawling complexities of the American health care system pose a particular challenge to members of Congress. As my own research finds, the outsized power and resources of congressional leaders means that for Congress’ most intricate issues, rank-and-file members do not have the time, resources or, frankly, the interest to dedicate to meaningful problem-solving.

The failure of two health care proposals in December 2025, one from Democrats and one from Republicans, meant certain Obamacare enrollees face huge premium increases.

Government ‘dips its toe’

Americans face some of the highest health care costs in the world. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have long campaigned on addressing exorbitant costs and equitable access.

Progressive politicians proposed the idea of national health insurance as early as the 1900s, but efforts were limited to women and children, and any policy successes were moderate and temporary.

Following the Great Depression and the advent of Social Security in the 1940s, Congress had warmed to the idea of the federal government providing social services. But attempts at widespread health care coverage failed to gain traction.

During the 1950s, as Americans began to expect more services from their tax dollars, formal coalitions formed in support of, and in opposition to, government-supported health care. Workers and unions, bolstered by Congress and the Supreme Court, used the power of collective bargaining to push for employee benefits such as health insurance. Doctors and medical providers, enjoying their current – and profitable – position, coordinated campaigns against national health insurance proposals.

The tension held until 1956, when the government dipped its toe into federally funded health care, enacting the first “Medicare” government-funded program for dependents of the armed forces.

In the private sector, employee demands and employer tax incentives led to a convoluted web of employer-based insurance programs. But for many Americans, particularly the retired and elderly and those with low-paying jobs, there remained few, if any, insurance options available.

Enter: Medicare and Medicaid

In the 1960s, under Democratic President Lyndon Johnson’s vision for a “Great Society,” and with a bipartisan vote in Congress, the federal government took the greatest step forward in providing federal health assistance for Americans: Medicare and Medicaid. The programs helped with the cost of health care via federal health insurance for those who were elderly and low-income, and they ushered in a new era of federal health policy.

This was a watershed moment for policymakers. With health care coverage now under the umbrella of the federal government, domestic policymaking responsibility expanded to match. For lawmakers, this meant not only new debates but also new federal agencies, new congressional committees, new lobbying firms and new interest group coalitions.

An older woman pats the cheek of a much taller middle-aged man. — An elderly woman shows her gratitude to President Lyndon B. Johnson for his signing of the Medicare health care bill in April 1965.
Corbis via Getty Images

In the decades that followed, Congress’ responsibility for health care policy continued to expand: Coverage amounts and eligibility requirements were tweaked, programs were expanded to include prescription drugs and vaccines, health savings accounts were introduced, and more.

Yet still, the web of private and federal health insurance programs left millions of Americans uninsured. It wasn’t until 2010, under President Barack Obama, that the Democratic-controlled House and Senate passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known as “Obamacare,” to close that gap. But as evident from the 2025 government shutdown, this solution was far from perfect – and quite expensive.

Why, despite centuries of attention, does health care coverage remain one of – if not the most – perplexing and challenging domestic issues that Congress faces?

Consensus becomes more difficult

Part of this is a uniquely American problem: Like many services, the American health care system is based on economic incentives, and the foundational ideal of American liberalism means the government is inclined to let capitalism thrive.

As a former congressional staffer and now a scholar of Congress, I know that nowhere is the tension of societal support and personal freedom more apparent than the debate over health care access.

But the issue is also immensely complex, and today’s Congress does not have the resources to meet the challenge, particularly in the face of a sprawling executive branch.

Over time, as policies were adopted by the federal government, the scope of potential solutions expanded. To put it another way, as more cooks enter the policymaking kitchen, consensus became more difficult. The history of American health care is populated by private industries, powerful interest groups, federal officials and concerned citizens.

And the web of federal funding and private insurance companies across 50 states has resulted in a policy landscape that is easier to tweak, rather than whole-scale reform.

This is further stymied by the limited resources and expertise of the modern Congress. My research has shown that rank-and-file members are increasingly reliant on party leaders to take the lead on policymaking and problem-solving. Negotiating across coalitions and parties is unpleasant, and communicating policy changes on such a complex issue is difficult.

The result? Tepid policy tweaks made for partisan messaging.

And as ideological divisions on government support and personal autonomy become crystallized by the two parties in Congress, partisan policy solutions diverge even further. Collaboration becomes harder every year.

The continuing resolution passed late in 2025 funded the government only until Jan. 30, 2026, which means Congress is facing a Groundhog Day rather than a clean slate for the new year. With millions of Americans facing exploding health care costs, the question becomes who will Congress follow: party leadership or concerned constituents?

SoRelle Wyckoff Gaynor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Congress takes up health care again − and impatient voters shouldn’t hold their breath for a cure – https://theconversation.com/congress-takes-up-health-care-again-and-impatient-voters-shouldnt-hold-their-breath-for-a-cure-271998

January 7, 2026

Stephen Miller: portrait of Donald Trump’s ideologue-in-chief

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During a recent interview with CNN host Jake Tapper, the White House deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller, laid out what appears to be the core of the new ideology driving US foreign policy: the notion that might is right. Or, as he put it: “We’re a superpower. And under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”

Miller was referring to the Trump administration’s ambitions to take control of Greenland, if necessary by force. “We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,” he told Tapper. “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.”

The 40-year-old Californian is one of Trump’s most trustworthy advisers and also one of the longest serving, having joined Trump’s first campaign in January 2016. While the president’s first administration had a revolving door of different appointees, many of whom who barely lasted a year, Miller is one of a handful of advisers to serve in both Trump’s first and second terms.

The two reportedly have a close working relationship, meeting daily along with Trump’s chief of staff, Susie Wiles, to go through Trump’s diary and review the executive orders to be signed. Having started out as a speechwriter, Miller’s position has evolved to focus more on interpreting the president’s ideas and executing them as policy initiatives. He is also understood to be a key liaison point between the White House and Capitol Hill, where he briefs lawmakers on Trump’s plans.

Origins of an extremist

Miller’s extreme ideas did not come out of nowhere. In contrast to the vice-president, J.D. Vance and secretary of state, Marco Rubio, whose ideologies have evolved significantly to be in line with Trump’s agenda, Miller has had a long history of supporting radical America First style policies.

While in high school in Santa Monica, Miller is said to have complained about students having to pick up rubbish, saying janitorial staff should do it instead. As a 16-year-old he contributed an article to a local website, criticising his fellow Hispanic students for a lack of language skills.

While at Duke University, where he studied political science, he contributed a number of articles to the college website, attacking multiculturalism and championing right-wing issues. He was also part of a group at Duke, Students For Academic Freedom, that criticised what they saw as political bias among faculty staff. These ideas would resurface in his attack on universities as a Trump administration official.

Moving to Washington, Miller first worked as an aide to then Republican representative Michele Bachmann before taking a job with Republican senator Jeff Sessions as press secretary. One of his main focuses was in developing critiques of immigration, collaborating with groups such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform and the Centre for Immigration Studies.

This is where he developed the ideas that have formed the backbone of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies, including the now notorious family separation policy, by which children were often taken from their parents – who were subject to prosecution for attempting to cross the US southern border illegally. The policy was judged to be so harsh that the UN openly condemned it as cruel and unnecessary.

Immigration has been one of the main focuses of Miller’s work in Trump’s second term. He is understood to behind the decision to deploy immigration and customs enforcement agents en masse on the streets of US cities with power to detain and deport suspected illegal immigrants. Other radical policies bearing Miller’s hallmark are the plan to end the American policy of birthright citizenship, in contravention of the 14th amendment to the US constitution.

But then many of the policy ideas he espouses have brought Miller into conflict with American constitutional law. He has publicly declared that in some circumstances it should be permissible to suspend a person’s habeas corpus right to a trial before they can be imprisoned and he has questioned the power of the judiciary to hold the administration to account over executive decisions on matters such as deportations and due process.

Personality politics

If relatively unknown during Trump’s first term, Miller’s profile has grown considerably in the first 12 months of the second Trump administration. A YouGov poll conducted in September 2025 found that 50% of respondents had heard of him and he had a popularity rating of 18%.

But if he is disliked and feared by many on Capitol Hill, as well as among the wider public, Miller has an ideological ally and staunch supporter in his wife Katie, who achieved instant fame on January 3 after tweeting a map of Greenland with the US flag superimposed on it, accompanied by the word “SOON”.

Within hours the US president had voiced his intention to intervene in Greenland for reasons of national security and to secure access to its huge reserves of mineral resources.

Like her husband, Katie worked in the first Trump administration, at the department of homeland security. She once told a reporter that even the administration’s separation policy was not a problem for her, claiming: “DHS sent me to the border to see the separations for myself, to try to make me more compassionate, but it didn’t work.”

She now runs The Katie Miller podcast, which she established as a “place for conservative women to gather online”. Among other things, it provides a regular and uncritical platform for administration officials.

But the Millers’ growing public profile could prove to be a double-edged sword for the Trump administration. Despite saying out loud what many on the far-right of the Republican party want to hear, their apparent extremism is increasingly a focus for Trump’s critics. California’s democrat governor Gavin Newsom – generally thought to be preparing for a presidential run in 2024, has taken to referring to Miller as Voldemort, the personification of evil in the Harry Potter novels.

All of which is unlikely to resonate well with the independent voters that the Republicans desperately need to win over if they are not to lose vital ground in November’s midterm elections.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Stephen Miller: portrait of Donald Trump’s ideologue-in-chief – https://theconversation.com/stephen-miller-portrait-of-donald-trumps-ideologue-in-chief-272869

January 7, 2026

US boards a ship sailing under a Russian flag: what we know and don’t know about the legal position

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Serdy, Professor of the Public International Law of the Sea, University of Southampton

Relations between the US and Russia have hit a fresh bump after the US coastguard boarded a vessel sailing in the Icelandic waters, claiming it was in breach of sanctions on Venezuela. The incident immediately sparked claim and counter-claim from the US and Russia.

The US claimed it was acting correctly to execute a warrant issued by a US federal court. Russian officials, meanwhile, were reported by the country’s Tass news agency as saying this was in clear breach of the law of the sea, saying “no state has the right to use force against ships properly registered in the jurisdictions of other states”. The statement asserted that the Bella 1 – which was recently renamed as the Marinera – had received a temporary permit to sail under the Russian flag on December 24.

Unlike the dramatic abduction of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, from his Caracas palace on January 3, which the United States (US) does not even appear to be trying to defend in international law terms, the interdiction of the Marinera/Bella 1 appears to raise a new point of the law of the sea which may offer at least some prospect for Washington to show itself to be on the right side of the law.

Before the change of flag, the US seemed to be selecting with some care the ships carrying Venezuelan oil that it was targeting. These were either stateless or suspected of flying a false flag, which provides no protection under Article 92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which is also the customary international law rule for non-parties such as the US.

Stateless ships are vulnerable

Being stateless, or acting in a way that gives warships on the high seas a valid basis for treating it as though it were stateless, is a position that any ship would be recommended to avoid if at all possible. A ship that is stateless has by definition no flag state to assert the protective exclusive jurisdiction over it on the high seas.

Unclos also provides that a ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, and swaps them depending on the circumstances, “may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State”. This means it can be regarded legally as stateless.

Thus, until the change of flag reported on December 31, not just the US but any State was entitled to treat the Marinera/Bella 1 as stateless. This made it vulnerable to interception on the high seas and the exercise of domestic law enforcement jurisdiction over it by the State of the interdicting warship or coastguard vessel.

So the legal position remains unclear. It may be a question of whether the US was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 when it changed its flag. If so the US may be entitled to disregard the reregistration.

Unclos allows for what it refers to as “hot pursuit”. It says that: “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third [another] State.” Since no other circumstance in which the right ceases is mentioned, including the ship ceasing to be stateless, this leaves it open to the US to argue that it was already pursuing the Marinera/Bella 1 and was thus not required to call off its pursuit.

But this argument has limited usefulness as there’s doubt as to whether this was actually a hot pursuit at all. The term is used for pursuits that begin in one of the maritime zones of the State conducting it – not on the high seas.

Claim and counter-claim

So far the Russian Ministry of Transport has claimed that the US action is contrary to the Article 92 rule. Russia insists that the change of registry occurred as long ago as December 24. To counter this, the US could say that it wasn’t until the Russian flag was painted on the ship’s hull, which was reported on December 31, that the Article 92 rule could be invoked against the US.

Article 92 also lays down that: “A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.” This is often misunderstood and assumed to mean that a change of flag in mid-voyage – such as appears to have occurred in this case – is not permitted at all. But a closer reading reveals that this is not the case. What it prevents is a change of flag without a corresponding change of registration.

But that is not the position here. Assuming there was a real registration to Russia, that is what counts. Painting on a flag because you don’t have a physical one is simply evidence of that.

Reflagging while under pursuit is a new point in the international law of the sea to the extent that no previous incident of it is known. In the absence of a clear answer on this, the way this incident plays out is itself going to set the precedent for the future on this issue. We’ll need to hear the competing legal narratives of the US and Russia to see which of them is the more convincing.

Andrew Serdy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. US boards a ship sailing under a Russian flag: what we know and don’t know about the legal position – https://theconversation.com/us-boards-a-ship-sailing-under-a-russian-flag-what-we-know-and-dont-know-about-the-legal-position-272957

January 7, 2026

Canada risks missing out on Africa’s trade boom under Mark Carney

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Isaac Odoom, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Carleton University

At the G20 summit in South Africa in November, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced several new initiatives, including talks toward a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) with South Africa.

But when asked about prioritizing Africa’s economic opportunities for Canada, Carney said Africa is not among his government’s early priorities because other regions offered “the most immediate return.” That remark was at odds with what many Canadians and African partners have been urging Canadian officials to do: treat Africa as a core partner in Canada’s economic diversification plan, diplomatic and geopolitical future.

Shortly after Carney’s remarks, in December, the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade released a landmark report entitled Canada–Africa: Seizing a Strategic Opportunity. It urged the federal government to engage Africa now with resources, ambition and a concrete action plan or risk being left behind.

Together, these two developments reveal a central tension shaping Canada’s Africa policy at the moment — and precisely when Africa’s global standing is rising.

Why this matters now

Africa’s demographic and economic trajectory is unmistakable. The continent’s working-age population is expanding faster than any other region, 12 of the world’s 20 fastest-growing economies are in Africa and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to create one of the world’s largest integrated markets, is already in motion.

This demographic dividend and market potential matter not only to African states, but to countries like Canada seeking new trade diversification partners and growth opportunities.

Against this backdrop, the Senate’s report provides 21 recommendations — including the need for a detailed Africa Strategy action plan with timelines and resources, regular high-level dialogue with the African Union, support for AfCFTA implementation, strengthened trade commissioner services and enhanced diaspora engagement. It urges the government to match its promises with real resources and commitment.

Canada’s Africa Strategy

The government’s March 2025 Canada’s Africa Strategy was widely welcomed as a positive step toward a more coherent foreign policy on Africa. It articulates goals for shared prosperity, security and mutual co-operation, acknowledging Africa’s growing place in the world.

My own earlier analysis on Canadian engagement in Africa highlighted that Canada’s new strategy offered a foundation to rethink how it builds partnerships across the continent — not simply viewing Africa as a development recipient, but as a region of strategic partnership and economic opportunity.

I also noted how Canada could learn from China’s long-term engagement model, particularly its emphasis on sustained relationships, infrastructure and market access, while offering a distinct, values-based alternative.

Delivery is the real test

Canada’s Africa Strategy articulates a necessary vision, but follow-through remains limited. That gap is visible in Canada’s broader policy signals.

Even after the launch of the strategy, Africa remains marginal in Canada’s trade and economic planning. The 2025 federal budget identified priority trade markets in Europe and Asia, but not Africa, despite stated support for the AfCFTA. Such inconsistencies suggest lingering hesitation in committing political capital to Africa.

Diplomatic choices reinforce this impression. Limiting Carney’s G20 trip to South Africa alone missed an opportunity to signal a continentwide vision.

A short stop in another regional hub would have underscored Canada’s recognition of Africa’s diversity and strategic importance. Instead, the narrow itinerary conveyed a constrained reading of Africa’s geopolitical and economic landscape. African governments notice these signals, especially at a time when they are actively diversifying external partnerships.

None of this means Canada lacks opportunities. The nuclear co-operation agreement with South Africa signed at the G20 has real potential. A future FIPA could offer greater certainty for Canadian investors in South Africa. And although tentative, the reference to AfCFTA engagement at the G20 is significant.

But for these opportunities to lead to real outcomes, Canada needs a more deliberate and sustained approach backed by resources and political commitment.

Africa’s expanding consumer market

Why does this matter for Canadians? Africa has a young and fast-growing population, a burgeoning middle class and an expanding consumer market. Canadian firms, from clean technology and education to agribusiness and services, can benefit if supported at the right time with the right tools.

Diplomatic influence from a continent of 54 countries also flows from consistency and commitment; not intermittent engagement.

For the first time, the G20 in South Africa was a reminder that Africa is no longer peripheral to global politics. African markets are diverse, fast-changing and increasingly central to the global economy. This requires Canada to look past short-term returns, acknowledging Africa’s critical role in its economic future and investing resources to that end.

Other countries like China, Turkey, Brazil and Gulf states have already recognized this reality. Every year Canada delays, it risks losing ground that will be hard to reclaim.

Time to act

Despite the strategy’s imperfections, Canada now has a plan for engaging with Africa. But a plan is only as good as its implementation.

The Senate report is timely and calls for committing real resources, expanding diplomatic and trade support structures and elevating Africa in Canada’s foreign policy narrative well beyond occasional summits. It means sustained leadership attention from the prime minister and senior ministers.

If Canada seizes this moment with purpose, resources and political will, it can build genuine partnerships that benefit both Canadians and African partners. The Senate’s report aligns with the view that Africa is not a charity case; it is a strategic frontier for trade, innovation and geopolitical influence. Delivery must be the priority going forward, or Canada will be left behind.

Isaac Odoom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Canada risks missing out on Africa’s trade boom under Mark Carney – https://theconversation.com/canada-risks-missing-out-on-africas-trade-boom-under-mark-carney-272166

January 7, 2026

Why Canada needs better data on strikes, unions and other labour issues

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Larry Savage, Professor, Labour Studies, Brock University

In the summer of 2025, the federal government quietly pulled national strike and lockout data from public view. The move followed a complaint from the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), the second-largest trade union federation in Québec.

The CSN learned that an employer organization was waging an anti-union campaign using flawed data published by Statistics Canada. The data artificially inflated the number of strikes in the province, leading the Montreal Economic Institute to falsely assert that since 2023, 91 per cent of Canadian work stoppages had affected Québec.

On Dec. 16, the corrected data was restored without comment.

Months of missing data made it difficult for employers, unions and researchers to make sense of trends and emerging patterns in Canadian labour relations. Worse yet, the flawed data helped influence a debate and shape public opinion about labour law reform in Québec.

This episode highlights a persistent problem: Canada does a poor job of gathering vital labour relations information. In a period of rising inequality and renewed union-management conflict, stakeholders need better and more accurate data.

What disappeared and why it matters

For decades, Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) and Statistics Canada have published national data on strikes and lockouts. These figures allow journalists, members of the public and other stakeholders to track where conflicts are occurring, how large they are, how long they last and the number of workers involved over time.

Labour relations data is a basic need for the purpose of work-related policy analysis. Without timely and reliable figures, it becomes increasingly difficult to analyze current workplace conflicts, compare them across sectors or provinces or place them in historical context.

Long-term, consistent data sets are especially important because they allow researchers to identify trends: whether work stoppages are becoming more frequent, which industries are most affected and how policy changes may be influencing workplace conflict. When that continuity is broken, so is the ability to understand how the labour relations landscape is changing over time.

While ESDC’s public tables were unavailable, Statistics Canada’s historical tables, on which researchers often rely, were also negatively affected. The government offered no public explanation on its website for why the data were taken down, though ESDC now indicates that revisions were made to recent data covering Québec.

Canada lags behind other countries

Other countries show that better labour relations data collection is possible. In the United States, for example, the National Labor Relations Board consistently releases statistics on union certification applications and unfair labour practice cases, giving the public regular insights into trends in unionization and workplace conflict.

Some Canadian provincial labour boards publish annual reports, but nothing at the federal level matches the depth and timeliness of U.S. labour relations reporting. This leaves Canada with a patchwork of partial figures instead of a coherent national picture of how unions, employers and workers are interacting.

Despite the return of ESDC’s work stoppages data, Canada still lacks crucial information on the broader system of labour relations. There is currently no timely national source for data on new union certifications, membership levels in individual unions, unfair labour practices, strike votes, health and safety work refusals, or duty of fair representation complaints.

Researchers looking for this information must often wait for uneven provincial annual reports or file individual requests with provincial labour boards and Statistics Canada, which can be slow and costly.

In some cases, the data is not collected at all. The result is a system in which some of the most important features of labour relations are effectively hidden from public view by administrative fragmentation.

Models Canada could follow

Canada already has models that show how a national labour relations data system could work. The Ontario Ministry of Labour’s collective bargaining database, for instance, tracks public and private sector negotiations, wage settlements, mediation and arbitration outcomes, and even the contents of recent collective agreements.

The Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of Canada shows that provincial data can be combined to create a clear national picture. Working with provincial workers’ compensation boards, it produces national statistics on injuries, fatalities and other workplace safety issues.

The ESDC could use this model to build a national labour relations database that would include information on union certification applications and outcomes, membership trends by sector and region, unfair labour practice complaints and work refusals.

Such a resource would help policymakers see what’s happening in Canada’s workplaces, allow unions and employers to compare bargaining results, and help journalists and the public evaluate how well labour laws work. It would also strengthen academic research and support better labour relations policy.

Expanding public access to labour relations data would also send a clear signal that the federal government understands the value of evidence-based policy decisions. In a period when official statistics on wages, jobs and prices are under political pressure in other countries, Canada has an opportunity and a responsibility to strengthen its own commitment to open, reliable labour relations data.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why Canada needs better data on strikes, unions and other labour issues – https://theconversation.com/why-canada-needs-better-data-on-strikes-unions-and-other-labour-issues-272776

January 7, 2026

Claves para entender por qué EE. UU. tendría muy complicado hacerse con el control de Groenlandia

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By Ana Belén López Tárraga, Investigadora en el Grupo de investigación Territorio, Innovación y Desarrollo (TEIDE), Universidad de Salamanca

En los últimos días, el caso venezolano ha vuelto a colocar en el centro del debate internacional una cuestión fundamental: ¿hasta dónde están dispuestas a llegar las grandes potencias cuando consideran que sus intereses estratégicos están en juego?

Las discusiones sobre soberanía, control de recursos y legitimidad de la intervención han reabierto interrogantes que parecían superados tras el final de la Guerra Fría. En este clima de tensión y de normas cada vez más disputadas, ideas que antes se consideraban inverosímiles comienzan a circular con mayor naturalidad en el discurso político.

Recientemente, y después de atacar algunos enclaves en Venezuela y de detener a Nicolás Maduro, el presidente de Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, ha dejado muy claros sus intereses: “Necesitamos a Groenlandia por motivos de seguridad nacional”. Las alarmas ha saltado.

Es en este contexto donde reaparece una pregunta que, hace solo unos años, habría parecido absurda: ¿podría Estados Unidos intentar hacerse con Groenlandia? La cuestión no surge de la nada. Forma parte de un escenario internacional en el que la competencia por recursos estratégicos y el control de espacios clave vuelven a ocupar un lugar central.

La posibilidad de que Estados Unidos adquiera Groenlandia es muy limitada, ya que existen obstáculos legales claros. Desde 2009, cuenta con un amplio autogobierno dentro del reino de Dinamarca. Cualquier cambio de soberanía requiere el consentimiento de su población, un principio protegido por el derecho internacional.

También existen límites políticos relevantes. Una presión unilateral no solo dañaría la relación con Dinamarca, sino que además afectaría al conjunto de sus aliados. No debemos olvidar que Dinamarca es miembro de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN). Un conflicto interno debilitaría a la alianza en un momento de alta competencia global.

La respuesta europea

Ante este escenario, la Unión Europea ha reaccionado de forma coordinada. Recientemente, varios Estados miembros han firmado un comunicado conjunto de apoyo a Groenlandia y al Reino de Dinamarca en el que subrayan el respeto a la soberanía, al principio de autodeterminación y al orden internacional basado en normas. El texto busca enviar una señal política clara frente a cualquier cuestionamiento externo del estatus de la isla y reafirma el compromiso europeo con la estabilidad del Ártico como espacio de cooperación.

Esta posición común convive, sin embargo, con una realidad estructural difícil de ignorar. La seguridad europea depende en gran medida de Estados Unidos, tanto en capacidades militares como en disuasión estratégica. Muchos Estados miembros carecen de medios suficientes para garantizar su defensa sin el respaldo estadounidense, lo que limita su margen de autonomía política.

Esta dependencia ayuda a explicar el tono prudente de la respuesta europea. La Unión busca respaldar a Groenlandia y a Dinamarca sin abrir una brecha con su principal garante de seguridad. El equilibrio entre principios y realismo estratégico se convierte así en uno de los grandes desafíos actuales.

Un interés que viene de lejos

Durante su primer mandato, Donald Trump ya expresó de forma pública su interés por la isla. Aquellas declaraciones sorprendieron a aliados y analistas, y reabrieron un debate en el que confluyen geografía, recursos y poder.

Hoy ese debate regresa con más fuerza. El Ártico se transforma con rapidez debido al calentamiento global y Groenlandia ocupa una posición central en ese proceso.

El interés por Groenlandia se explica, en primer lugar, por sus recursos naturales. En sus fondos marinos existen importantes reservas de gas y petróleo sin explotar que atraen atención política desde hace años.

La isla también alberga minerales estratégicos, entre los que destacan el cobre, el níquel, el zinc y el uranio. Todos ellos resultan esenciales para la industria energética y tecnológica.

Pero el mayor atractivo son las tierras raras. Groenlandia concentra alrededor de 1,5 millones de toneladas. Según el Servicio Geológico de Estados Unidos, dichas reservas incluyen lantánidos, escandio e itrio.

La disponibilidad de estos elementos –clave para baterías, energías renovables y sistemas electrónicos– condiciona las cadenas de suministro globales. Por ello, la isla gana peso en la competencia internacional.

Estratégicamente situada

La posición geográfica de Groenlandia refuerza su importancia estratégica, ya que la isla se sitúa junto a las rutas marítimas árticas del noroeste y del centro. El deshielo permite su uso durante más meses al año.

Si estas rutas se consolidan, el comercio marítimo será más rápido. Las distancias entre Asia, Europa y Norteamérica se reducirán, lo que alteraría los flujos comerciales tradicionales.

Groenlandia podría actuar entonces como punto de apoyo logístico. Su territorio facilitaría tareas de aprovisionamiento y mantenimiento, función que incrementaría su valor económico y estratégico.

Y desde una perspectiva militar, la isla ocupa una posición central: se encuentra entre Norteamérica, Rusia y Europa. Además, controla el acceso entre el océano Ártico y el Atlántico Norte. Este control tiene implicaciones para la seguridad marítima y aérea e influye en la vigilancia del espacio polar. Por ello, Groenlandia sigue siendo relevante para la defensa occidental.

Pieza clave en la seguridad estadounidense

Como decía más arriba, en 2019, Donald Trump ya planteó públicamente la posibilidad de comprar Groenlandia, una propuesta que se dirigió al Reino de Dinamarca. Aunque tanto Dinamarca como las autoridades groenlandesas rechazaron la idea, el episodio reveló un interés persistente. Estados Unidos nunca ha sido ajeno a la isla.

La presencia estadounidense se remonta a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Durante la Guerra Fría, Groenlandia desempeñó un papel central en la defensa del hemisferio norte, una lógica estratégica que sigue vigente.

La base aérea de Thule, que continúa operativa, forma parte del sistema de alerta temprana y defensa antimisiles. Su función está directamente ligada a la seguridad estadounidense. La continuidad de esta base muestra que el interés no es coyuntural: responde a una visión estratégica de largo plazo. Groenlandia sigue siendo una pieza clave.

Más allá de Trump

Pero el debate sobre Groenlandia va más allá de Donald Trump. Refleja un cambio profundo en la política internacional donde la geografía vuelve a ocupar un lugar central.

El deshielo del Ártico abre nuevas rutas y oportunidades y, al mismo tiempo, intensifica la rivalidad entre potencias ganando valor político los recursos estratégicos.

A pesar del revuelo mediático de estos días, Groenlandia no es Venezuela. Una anexión de Groenlandia por parte de Estados Unidos es poco probable, pero la actual situación muestra cómo cambian los límites del debate internacional. Así, el Ártico se consolida como uno de los escenarios clave del siglo XXI.

Ana Belén López Tárraga no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

– ref. Claves para entender por qué EE. UU. tendría muy complicado hacerse con el control de Groenlandia – https://theconversation.com/claves-para-entender-por-que-ee-uu-tendria-muy-complicado-hacerse-con-el-control-de-groenlandia-272920

January 7, 2026

Inseguridad alimentaria en Venezuela: qué está pasando y por qué importa

Source: The Conversation – (in Spanish) – By José Miguel Soriano del Castillo, Catedrático de Nutrición y Bromatología del Departamento de Medicina Preventiva y Salud Pública, Universitat de València

Barriada humilde en Caracas. Tomasz Podolski/Shutterstock

Al margen de la reciente captura de Nicolás Maduro por fuerzas estadounidenses, no debemos olvidar la situación de inseguridad alimentaria que arrastra Venezuela desde hace tiempo. Este concepto no se circunscribe solo a la “falta de comida”: también supone hablar de acceso, calidad, estabilidad y dignidad. Un país puede disponer de alimentos en mercados o bodegas y, aun así, millones de personas tienen dificultades para comprarlos de forma regular, o terminan consumiendo dietas poco nutritivas.

En Venezuela, esta circunstancia se ha mantenido como un problema estructural en la última década, pero con cambios de intensidad según la economía, la inflación y el financiamiento humanitario.

Una situación seria

Diversas fuentes coinciden en que la situación sigue siendo crítica. El Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) indica que aproximadamente el 15 % de la población (alrededor de 4 millones de inividuos) necesita asistencia alimentaria urgente, y que alrededor del 40 % experimenta inseguridad alimentaria moderada o severa. Esto no significa que todas esas personas estén en la misma condición: “moderada” suele implicar reducción en calidad y cantidad de alimentos (saltarse comidas, dietas monótonas), mientras que “severa” puede significar quedarse sin comida o pasar días con muy poca ingesta.

Los organismos humanitarios ubican a Venezuela entre los países de la región con altas necesidades humanitarias sostenidas. El informe publicado el 29 de diciembre de 2025 por el Sistema Mundial de Información y Alerta Temprana de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO-GIEWS) señala que 7,9 millones de personas dentro del país necesitan asistencia, con necesidades críticas concentradas en seguridad alimentaria, entre otras áreas.

Lo que dicen los hogares: miedo a que la comida no alcance

El trabajo de campo en hogares ayuda a entender el componente cotidiano del problema. Según la última Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) del 2024, realizada por la Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, el 78,1 % de las personas entrevistadas estaba preocupada por la posibilidad de que los alimentos se acabaran, y el 41,1 % afirmó haberse quedado sin comida en su hogar en algún momento.

Estos indicadores importan porque muestran el “estrés” alimentario: cuando una familia no sabe si podrá comer mañana, tiende a reducir porciones, priorizar calorías baratas, endeudarse, vender bienes o sacrificar gastos en salud y educación.

Principales causas: inflación, ingresos y fragilidad del abastecimiento

Uno de los motores más repetidos en análisis recientes es el deterioro del poder adquisitivo. En una actualización de noviembre de 2025, la Red de Sistemas de Alerta Temprana contra la Hambruna advierte que las condiciones macroeconómicas han empeorado la inseguridad alimentaria, destacando que la inflación aumentó más del 100 % durante 2024–2025. Este incremento de precios estaba vinculado, entre otros factores, a tensiones en el tipo de cambio.

A día de hoy, el Fondo Monetario Internacional proyecta un aumento de la inflación del 269,9 % actual hasta el 682 % en 2026 en Venezuela. Por su parte, el salario mínimo nominal se mantiene congelado en 130 bolívares mensuales (equivalentes a 43 centavos de dólar) desde 2022.

Cuando los precios crecen más rápido que los ingresos, incluso quienes “tienen empleo” pueden terminar ajustando su alimentación a lo mínimo: menos proteína, menos frutas y verduras, más carbohidratos baratos y porciones menos abundantes. El bolívar venezolano cerró 2025 con una devaluación del 82,7 % frente al dólar, lo que erosiona aún más el poder de compra de los hogares.

A esto se suma la dependencia de importaciones y la vulnerabilidad de la producción local. FAO-GIEWS señala presiones sobre la producción de maíz y anticipa requerimientos de importación de cereales por encima del promedio en el ciclo 2025/26. Las importaciones de alimentos alcanzaron en 2024 un total de 3 022 millones de dólares (un 9 % más que en 2023) y representan aproximadamente el 60 % del suministro total de alimentos del país. Entre enero y julio de 2025, las compras externas del grupo agropecuario, alimentos y bebidas fueron de 5 837,1 millones de dolares, lo que supone un aumento de 11,3 % respecto al mismo periodo de 2024.

Consecuencias visibles: salud, nutrición infantil y decisiones difíciles

La inseguridad alimentaria deja huellas en el cuerpo y en la vida social, especialmente entre los más pequeños: las dietas pobres en micronutrientes y proteínas afectan al crecimiento, el aprendizaje y el sistema inmunitario infantil. Según Cáritas Venezuela, entre 8 y 10 de cada 100 niños evaluados sufren desnutrición aguda severa con riesgo de muerte, mientras la desnutrición crónica ha crecido de 18 % en 2016 a cerca del 30 % actualmente. Adicionalmente, más del 40 % de las embarazadas presentan déficit nutricional agudo y un 24 % de las mujeres en edad reproductiva padecen anemia.

En zonas vulnerables, muchas familias ajustan su dieta para “llenar” con lo que rinde más, pero eso no equivale a alimentarse bien. Las estrategias de supervivencia incluyen liquidación de ahorros (76 % de hogares), endeudamiento para comer (54 %) y venta de bienes personales.

Brechas territoriales y desigualdad

De cualquier modo, la crisis alimentaria no afecta por igual a todos los territorios. Las ediciones más recientes de la ENCOVI muestran que, aunque la pobreza extrema se ha reducido en promedio nacional, más del 70 % de los hogares siguen en situación de pobreza de ingresos y los mayores niveles de vulnerabilidad se concentran en zonas rurales, periféricas y fronterizas. En estos espacios –con fuerte presencia indígena o agrícola– la inseguridad alimentaria moderada y severa se mantiene por encima del promedio nacional, y los hogares reportan con más frecuencia saltarse comidas, reducir porciones y sustituir alimentos frescos por opciones más baratas y menos nutritivas.

Esta expansión territorial de la pobreza se vincula con el colapso de servicios básicos: más de 54 000 fallos eléctricos fueron registrados en enero de 2025. Además, según una encuesta reciente, un 86 % de los venezolanos indicó la presencia de agua fétida y sucia y un 87 % de la población requiere gas por bombona con distribución ineficiente.

Actualmente, a la situación inestable de Venezuela hay que sumar la situación de inseguridad alimentaria que mezcla emergencia (hogares que pasan hambre) con cronicidad (hogares que sobreviven con dietas pobres y vulnerables a cualquier shock). Los datos actuales muestran necesidades amplias y persistentes, y también advierten de que sin estabilidad macroeconómica y sin financiamiento humanitario suficiente, la situación puede empeorar rápidamente. Y esto, ante los próximos retos que vive el país, se debería de tener en cuenta para proteger y salvaguardar a su población.

José Miguel Soriano del Castillo no recibe salario, ni ejerce labores de consultoría, ni posee acciones, ni recibe financiación de ninguna compañía u organización que pueda obtener beneficio de este artículo, y ha declarado carecer de vínculos relevantes más allá del cargo académico citado.

– ref. Inseguridad alimentaria en Venezuela: qué está pasando y por qué importa – https://theconversation.com/inseguridad-alimentaria-en-venezuela-que-esta-pasando-y-por-que-importa-272915

January 7, 2026

Notre-Dame de Paris et l’avènement du patrimoine spectacle-et-science

Source: The Conversation – France (in French) – By Patrice Gourbin, Historien de l’architecture [maître de conférences à l’Ecole nationale supérieure d’architecture de Normandie], Ecole Nationale supérieure d’architecture et de paysage de Bordeaux (ENSAP Bordeaux)

La reconstruction de Notre Dame de Paris, en avril 2024. CC BY

En 2019, la reconstruction de la charpente de Notre-Dame de Paris « à l’identique » des matériaux d’origine et de leur mise œuvre a été présentée comme une nécessité technique, historique et parfois même mystique. Or ce type d’attitude, relativement récente, mérite d’être interrogée en tant que fait culturel qui interroge le rapport de nos sociétés à leur histoire.

Fort de la mission qui lui avait été confiée par l’État dans les années 1830, le service des Monuments historiques fut pendant près de cent cinquante ans l’unique garant du patrimoine national.

Confronté aux dévastations de la Grande Guerre, il mit en place une doctrine de reconstruction des édifices ou parties d’édifices détruits qui fut reprise après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et se maintint inchangée jusqu’au milieu des années 1990. Il ne s’agissait pas de refaire les monuments « à l’identique » de ce qu’ils étaient avant la catastrophe, mais de leur redonner leur apparence originelle tout en les améliorant d’un triple point de vue, technique, archéologique et artistique.

Les charpentes furent par exemple reconstruites en béton armé pour des raisons d’économie, de facilité d’entretien et de résistance au feu. Le matériau pouvait aussi être utilisé pour renforcer des structures instables ou remplacer à moindre coût les maçonneries traditionnelles. À Rouen, la grande voûte en bois de la salle des procureurs du palais de justice, incendiée en mars 1944, fut reconstituée dans son apparence grâce à un voile mince de béton armé supportant à la fois un lambris de bois intérieur et la couverture extérieure en ardoises épaisses. La modification concernait l’ensemble de la structure de l’édifice : du fait de la poussée de la nouvelle voûte, trois fois plus lourde que l’ancienne, il fallut renforcer les fondations en sous-œuvre et forer l’épaisseur des murs pour y installer des tirants métalliques reliant la voûte, le plancher intermédiaire en béton et les fondations.

Retrouver un état de « référence »

Sur le plan archéologique, il était courant de supprimer des éléments considérés comme non pertinents, en particulier ceux du XIXᵉ siècle, une période dévalorisée de l’histoire de l’art. Le but était de retrouver un état de référence, souvent le plus ancien connu. Par exemple pour la reconstruction de l’église de Carignan (Ardennes) détruite en 1940, l’architecte en chef Yves-Marie Froidevaux choisit de revenir à l’état de 1681 en remplaçant la tour-porche du XIX^e en pierre par un clocher en charpente de style classique.

Politiques de création

Enfin, la dernière amélioration concernait le domaine de la création. Si les éléments décoratifs répétitifs (corniches, garde-corps, décor géométrique ou végétal, modénature étaient refaits tels qu’ils étaient avant la catastrophe, ce n’était généralement pas le cas des éléments artistiques uniques, tels que tympans sculptés, chapiteaux, vitraux, mobilier. Leur remplacement était alors une occasion de faire appel à des créateurs contemporains.

Lors de la première reconstruction, des commandes furent passées auprès des artistes au cas par cas pour remplacer les éléments mobiliers détruits. Lors de la seconde, le service des Monuments historiques vit dans les destructions une opportunité de développer une politique de création dans les monuments anciens, en particulier dans le domaine du vitrail. L’intervention n’était pas uniquement réparatrice : les objets et vitraux du XIX^e siècle, considérés comme inappropriés, étaient souvent supprimés, qu’ils soient endommagés ou non, au profit de créations neuves. La commande reposait sur une conception corporatiste : l’objectif était de créer une classe d’artisans spécialisés dans l’intervention en milieu patrimonial. Ce n’est qu’en 1955 que les commandes commencèrent à s’ouvrir à des artistes qui n’étaient pas aussi des maîtres-verriers, comme Jacques Villon (à Metz) ou Marc Chagall (à Reims).

Les dernières interventions sur les monuments endommagés par la seconde guerre mondiale datent du milieu des années 1980. À Rouen, la flèche de la tour Saint-Romain de la cathédrale fut reconstruite en 1984 avec une charpente en béton armé.

Incontestée, la reconstruction-amélioration s’appliquait à toutes sortes d’interventions, post-catastrophe ou non : la reconstitution des combles du Parlement de Bretagne à Rennes après l’incendie de 1994, la remise en état d’usage du château de Falaise (Calvados) à partir de 1997 ou de celui de Suscinio (Morbihan).

Nouvelles pratiques de reconstruction

Mais le milieu des années 1990 fut aussi celui de l’émergence de nouvelles pratiques de (re)construction, en dehors du champ d’action du service des Monuments historiques. Les interventions s’inspiraient des méthodes de l’archéologie expérimentale qui cherchait, par la reproduction du geste créateur, à mieux comprendre les artefacts originaux. À Saint-Sylvain-d’Anjou, une association initiée par le maire de la commune restitua un château à motte en bois de l’an mil à quelques du site originel afin de l’ouvrir à la visite. À Rochefort la reconstruction de la frégate l’Hermione débuta en 1992 avec un double objectif. Il s’agissait non seulement de refaire un objet à valeur mémorielle et patrimoniale, mais aussi de mettre en scène sa fabrication dans le cadre d’un chantier immersif ouvert au public.

La construction du château (imaginaire) de Guédelon qui débuta en 1997 reposait sur la même stratégie, mais avec une exigence supplémentaire dans le domaine de l’archéologie de la matière et du geste. Il s’agissait de retrouver les savoir-faire et les matériaux correspondant à la période de référence qui avait été choisie. Les interférences avec le présent étaient évacuées pour la science mais aussi pour le spectacle, avec par exemple des ouvriers vêtus de costumes médiévaux.

Le patrimoine-spectacle existait déjà : le premier son et lumière avait eu lieu à Chambord en 1950 avec un succès planétaire et de multiples avatars au fil du temps comme celui du Puy-du-Fou. Guédelon y ajoutait une dimension scientifique et son succès témoignait de la profondeur des attentes du public, qui n’était pas seulement consommateur de divertissement.

Les actuels chantiers de la charpente de la cathédrale de Paris et de la flèche de l’abbatiale de Saint-Denis sont dans la continuité de ce renversement des pratiques engagé dans les années 1990. La triple amélioration qui caractérisait les reconstructions suivant les deux guerre mondiales s’est évaporée. Dévalorisées, les techniques modernes sont considérées comme inappropriées au moment même où leur utilisation plus que centenaire aurait pu en démontrer la pertinence économique et structurelle.

Quant à l’amélioration créative, elle paraît désormais anachronique comme le montre le procès intenté à l’encontre de l’insertion de vitraux contemporains à Notre-Dame de Paris voulue par le président de la République. Appliquant les leçons de Rochefort et Guédelon, les deux chantiers parisiens convoquent science et spectacle. Il s’agit tout autant de retrouver l’apparence ancienne que de s’assurer du geste et de la matière ancienne, sous le regard du public qui est invité à suivre l’avancement des travaux, sur site (à Saint-Denis) ou en différé (à Paris) par médias interposés. Enfin l’équilibre économique est assuré de la même manière, par les dons et les recettes du chantier-spectacle.

La reconstruction de tout ou partie du patrimoine disparu a-t-elle trouvé un nouveau départ ? Le patrimoine-spectacle, qui est aussi patrimoine-science a trouvé son public, mais il ne s’applique qu’à des édifices iconiques de l’histoire nationale. Peut-être marque-t-il la fin de cette expansion patrimoniale dénoncée par les experts dans les années 1990, de l’historienne Françoise Choay, qui y voyait le signe d’un « narcissisme collectif », au directeur de l’architecture et du patrimoine François Barré qui s’inquiétait de l’abus patrimonial. Quoiqu’il en soit, le patrimoine-spectacle-et-science peut dès maintenant être érigé en emblème du champ culturel patrimonial des années 2020.

Cet article est publié dans le cadre de la série « Regards croisés : culture, recherche et société », publiée avec le soutien de la Délégation générale à la transmission, aux territoires et à la démocratie culturelle du ministère de la culture.

Patrice Gourbin ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Notre-Dame de Paris et l’avènement du patrimoine spectacle-et-science – https://theconversation.com/notre-dame-de-paris-et-lavenement-du-patrimoine-spectacle-et-science-263672

January 7, 2026

US action against Greenland would undermine Nato, but now is not the time to panic

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Donald Trump sees Greenland as national security priority for the US. muratart / Shutterstock

Shortly after the US military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on January 3, US president Donald Trump restated his claim to Greenland. The White House sees Greenland, which is part of the kingdom of Denmark, as crucial for national security and is reportedly considering a range of options to acquire the island. This includes “utilising the US military”.

Trump’s proclamations have led to a sense among Europeans that US aspirations for dominance over the western hemisphere extend beyond Latin America. And the fact that Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, told congressional leaders in Washington that the administration wants to buy Greenland, not invade it, is unlikely to make them feel much better.

Their worries that Trump is serious about annexing Greenland are not unfounded: the US president has repeatedly expressed his desire to make Greenland part of the US, starting back in his first term. But some of the presumed implications, like the dissolution of Nato as foreseen by Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, are at least for now overblown.

Assuming there is an American move against Greenland, this would not be the first time two Nato allies have been at loggerheads. France pulled out of Nato’s military structures in the late-1960s over concerns about losing its foreign policy autonomy and possibly being drawn into the Vietnam war.

Greece withdrew from military participation in the alliance in 1974 after neighbour and fellow Nato member Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern, predominantly Turkish-Cypriot, part of the island. Tensions between the two Nato members continue to this day but have not brought the alliance down.

Nato also rode out the Suez crisis in 1956. This crisis saw Britain and France, together with Israel, invade Egypt to regain control of the Suez canal before withdrawing after intense US pressure.

The alliance also survived the “cod wars” between the UK and Iceland in the 1970s. And Nato did not disintegrate during the rift that emerged between its members in the run-up to – and in the aftermath of – the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

What sets all of these previous examples apart from an American move against Greenland is that this would be the first time the US engages in an aggressive act against a Nato ally. This would hardly be something that Denmark and its European allies could accept, especially if it involves the use of force.

But not accepting US aggression can come in many different forms. On the spectrum of possible responses, the least likely is an activation of the EU’s mutual defence clause, which would be followed by military hostilities between European states and the US. The EU does not have the military capabilities, nor is it likely to have the political will, to go to war with the US.

A mass European exodus from Nato is also far from a foregone conclusion. Nato’s founding treaty does provide an option for members to leave in its article 13, which foresees a “notice of denunciation” and a 12-month period until an exit takes full effect. But given the security threats that Europe currently faces from Russia, even a temporarily dysfunctional Nato would be better than no Nato at all.

In the event that the US moves to take control of Greenland, political paralysis within Nato would almost be certain. This would probably involve escalating rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic and a Danish withdrawal from military participation in Nato.

European diplomatic protests against American action over Greenland might lead Trump to declare that the US is withdrawing from Nato. But that, too, is not straightforward. Such a move would require approval in the US Senate and consultation with members of both houses of Congress.

There would probably be significant pushback both from US lawmakers and from the Pentagon. This is because a US withdrawal from Nato would entail a possibly rushed and almost certainly chaotic transfer of responsibilities in the Nato command structure and would raise major questions about US military bases in Europe.

None of this would be in the interests of American security and would certainly undermine US abilities to project force outside the western hemisphere.

Europe’s next steps

So, for Europe, the first order of the day is not to panic and rush into any ill-advised actions. While it is important to match Trump’s aggressive rhetoric, it is also key not to be drawn into needless escalation. In the long-term, an even deeper transatlantic fracture is ill-suited to the European interest in a revitalised Nato.

Security in the Arctic is a joint priority for the alliance, not just for the US. Greenland is a critical node in north Atlantic security, but so are Iceland and Norway as well as US bases in Europe. Emphasising these shared interests may not cut much ice with Trump but it is likely to strengthen congressional resolve to push back against the president’s threats to the transatlantic alliance.

At the same time, Europe should not rush into any hasty deals with Trump over Greenland. While US security concerns, and possibly even economic interests, could be accommodated in existing arrangements, anything beyond that – such as selling Greenland to the US in exchange for renewed US commitments to Nato and Europe – would be foolish.

Not only can Trump not be trusted to keep any promises he might make in order to get a deal done but he could also not credibly commit his successors. Hence, any arrangement that the Europeans may now undertake to manage American hostility may be counterproductive if it cannot be undone should the mood in Washington change to become less anti-European.

And there is still a faint hope in Europe that things might get better either after the US mid-term elections in 2026 or the presidential elections in 2028. As always, there is also the possibility that Trump’s strategic focus might zoom in on some other issue – such as a protracted failure of US policy in Venezuela – and so take his eyes off Greenland.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.

Mark Webber is Senior Non-resident fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome and a trustee of NATO Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy to carry out research on NATO.

– ref. US action against Greenland would undermine Nato, but now is not the time to panic – https://theconversation.com/us-action-against-greenland-would-undermine-nato-but-now-is-not-the-time-to-panic-272911